Kimberly Ramos Authenticating Authenticity: Authenticity as Commitment, Temporally Extended Agency, and Practical Identity Kimberly Ramos The everyday concept of authenticity presupposes the existence of an underlying, unchanging self to which to be authentic. However, with the rise of bundle theories in philosophy of mind and neuroscience, it is unlikely that we have an essence of self to which to be authentic. In this case, should we abandon the concept of authenticity entirely or formulate a new account of it? I argue that authenticity is still important to one’s everyday life, particularly when making difficult decisions about one’s identity in terms of morals, goals, and values. Rather than being true to an objective essence of self, I argue that we can be true to the self as a construct (a self-concept). We create this self-concept with consistency and steadfastness in our commitments, as well as our ability to be an agent that fulfills those commitments. Thus, authenticity and self- hood are more about undertaking important projects and a creative process of becoming rather than unearthing and expressing an essence of self. Just be yourself. Embrace your most authentic life. Or, if you like, “To thine own self be true.” We often encounter such pithy aphorisms. Some of us might find such advice to be helpful because it pushes us to pursue a career or life path that brings out the best version of ourselves. On the other hand, such advice could also induce anger because of its irrationality and emptiness. The self, as others of us might point out, is just a construct, so what is there to be “true” to? Or perhaps the whole concept of authenticity is simply confusing. We might agree that it is good to be authentic to one’s self but find it confusing as to what sort of identity this means for our own lives. We might, like philosopher Elisabeth Camp, pose this question: “What is my true self, such that I should pursue and cultivate it?” The everyday, common view of authenticity assumes that (1) we possess a “true” self, and (2) we ought to embrace this “true” self. But as more is learned about the mind and brain, it seems increasingly unlikely that a true, underlying self exists. Dr. Christian Jarrett, a writer for the British Psychological Society, mentions a study conducted by Strohminger et al. Strohminger and her colleagues observed that belief in an underlying “true” self is common across cultures, and inherent in this belief is the concept of authenticity. However, they are skeptical that this true self actually exists because such a self would be “radically subjective” (1). We see this sort of radical subjectivity in a study conducted by Quoidbach et al. The study found that people tend to underestimate the amount of change they will undergo in the future. They believe that their personality, core values, and preferences will be preserved over time, even though these attributes have already changed from the past to the present (2). The belief in the consistency of the self and its preferences is radically subjective in that it is based on feeling alone—it is not based on objective fact or essence. If at least some personality traits and values can and do change over the course of one’s life, then the common view of authenticity does not seem plausible. There is no true and essential self to which to be authentic because the self is not immune to change. An action which is authentic to me today might not be authentic to me in ten years. If this is the case, then how am I to decide what is most authentic: my past values, my current values, or my future values? In rejecting true and essential self, philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists including Douglas Hoftstader, Thomas Metzinger, and Daniel Dennett have turned to bundle theories. David Hume, one of the first bundle theorists, expresses the general sentiment of bundle theories in viewing the self as a series of “bundled” perceptions that change from moment to moment (3). As such, bundle theorists declare there is no rational reason to believe in an enduring self over time. Under their view, a new self exists each moment. If no enduring and underlying self exists, then pursuing the everyday view of authenticity seems somewhat futile. Authenticity would only be possible to a given self at the singular moment it exists, which does not seem satisfying given that, from a practical standpoint, we view the self as a consistent entity, at least on a day-to-day basis. This paper is dedicated to redefining the way we commonly think about authenticity and the self. Is there even a “true” self to be authentic to? And why should we desire authenticity at all? Three Cases: Authenticity as a Common Concern Before discussing more of the practical reasons for desiring authenticity at length, I will begin with a few “real world” examples to illustrate authenticity as a common concern within one’s daily life. (a) Neryssa and Her Corporate Job : Neryssa dislikes her current job as a human resources manager at a large corporation that manufactures soda. Though she enjoys working with people, the corporation’s product and mission don’t align with her personal values. She desires a job that feels more representative of the person she takes herself to be, but she isn’t sure if her job should even matter in terms of her sense of identity and values. (b) Rowan and Their College Major : Rowan needs to decide between a major in English or in History. On the one hand, they love literary analysis, especially as it applies to the fantasy genre. On the other hand, they also enjoy detangling and reconstructing historical narratives. When they think about the job prospects of each, they find each option to be about equal. Rowan wants to pick the major that “fits” them best, but at this juncture, both choices seem equally well-fitting. Which should they choose? (c) Julia and Her State Senate Campaign : Julia is running for election to the state senate. Her platform emphasizes environmental consciousness, especially in contrast with her opposition, who takes donations from large corporations that con- tribute to the climate crisis. Julia’s team suggests that she run a slander ad that, while not conveying outright lies, strongly insinuates that the opposition is cheating on his partner. While the ad would help Julia win the election and implement environmentally sustainable legislature, Julia isn’t sure that she can condone the ad. She takes herself to be someone who “plays by the rules” and holds herself to high moral standards. What should she do? In each of these three examples, authenticity plays a role in the decision making process of the individual involved (4). In (a), Neryssa desires a job that feels more authentic to her person. A job which represents her values is important to Neryssa, and thus, authenticity is relevant to her creating a life she enjoys. In (b), Rowan wants to know which of two options is more authentic of them to choose. Like Neryssa, they want to make a choice that will lead to a fulfilled and enjoyable life. In (c), Julia must choose between becoming a state senator and her morals. An understanding of authenticity might help her decide between these two options. I would wager that we, like Neryssa, Rowan, and Julia, have come up against similarly difficult decisions that challenge who we take ourselves to be and leave us wondering what decision is most authentic. I would also wager that the simple advice “Just be yourself!”would not help much in the situations described above. The purpose of this paper, then, is to provide a novel account of authenticity that (1) takes into account the lack of an underlying “true” self in light of bundle theories, and (2) helps us confront difficult decisions in which one’s identity is in question. Ultimately, I will propose a commitment-based account of authenticity, in which the personated, socially-constructed self and the commitments it makes are the basis for determining authentic action. A “True” Self? A Foray Into Bundle Theories and a Postmodern Ac- count of Authenticity Discussions about the self often turn to psychology and the brain. Following John Locke and his discussion of substance in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , the view of the self shifted from one of body or spirit to one of psychological substance, particularly consciousness (5). But, as philosopher David Hume later pointed out, the brain and its associated consciousness do not have a substance of self. In more modern terminology, this means that there is no lobe or neural center that constitutes an essence of self, which is an inherent entity upon which one’s identity is founded. Rather, the self is the “bundle” of thoughts and impressions present at any moment (6). These bundles pass away and give rise to new thoughts and impressions. Thus an entirely new self arises that bears no necessary or logical connection to the previous self. To support his argument, Hume asks us to turn inwards and observe the contents of consciousness: For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I al- ways stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist (7). If we look inwards, we can find only perception. We can also find memories, but these are the revival of past perceptions (8). We do not find any singular thing that we could call an essence of self. Hume does not completely negate the existence of the self. There is certainly something that perceives. But, Hume argues that given the evidence, we cannot extrapolate beyond this fairly minimal conception of the self—what Elisabeth Camp more recently calls a “bare skeletal ego.” Again, the self just is perception. Science writer and neuroscientist David Eagleman offers an updated view of how bundle theories apply to the biology of the brain and thus supports bundle theories originating from Hume: So who you are at any given moment depends on the detailed rhythms of your neuronal firing. During the day, the conscious you emerges from that integrated neural complexity. At night, when the interaction of your neurons changes just a bit, you disappear...the meaning of something to you is all about your webs of associations, based on the whole history of your life experiences (9). Like Locke, Eagleman locates the self in consciousness, which he describes as “detailed rhythms of neuronal firing.” And when this neuronal firing shuts down perception during sleep you “disappear,” reflecting Hume’s claim that when we are “insensible” of perceptions we do not really exist (10). The self is perception and neuronal firing, and this neuronal firing impacts the way we experience and interpret the world. Hume’s description of the self is the foundation for most modern bundle theories. Thomas Metzinger, a German philosopher, similarly undermines belief in an essence or substance of self: “There is no such thing as a substantial self (as a distinct ontological entity, which could in principle exist by itself), but only a dynamic, ongoing process creating very specific representational and functional properties” (11). Like Hume, modern bundle theorists doubt an underlying self that exists over time and endows one with a sense of “I,” which is closely tied to one’s perceived personal identity and autonomy. While bundle theorists claim we do not have any rational reason to believe in a sense of “I,” they do admit its practical necessity, as well as the human inability to abandon it. Douglas Hofstadter expresses the utility of the sense of “I” in I Am a Strange Loop : “Ceasing to believe altogether in the ‘I’ is in fact impossible, because it is indispensable for survival. Like it or not, we humans are stuck for good with this myth” (294). It is natural and practical for an individual to construct a sense of “I” to navigate the world, make future plans, and distinguish herself from others. As Hofstadter states, a sense of “I” is thus necessary to survive in and engage with the world. If there is an objectively existing self, it is momentary and fleeting. And, in being solely composed of processes and perceptions, it is not an entity we can be perfectly authentic to over time. Nor is there an essence of self that we can stake personal identity upon. Instead, our sense of “I” comes from the temporally and subjectively existing selves we construct as useful “myths” (12). Let us call this subjectively existing entity the “self-concept” for the sake of clarity. The common view of authenticity, however, assumes that there is “true” underlying self to which to be authentic to. Under this view, authenticity is the expression of one’s “real” self. But, as bundle theorists have stated, there is not an underlying, temporally-extended self to em- brace! How can we be authentic to something that isn’t objectively real, if at all? Beyond proclaiming that personal identity is a construct, bundle theorists do not offer us any answers about authenticity. Still, I think bundle theorists would likely embrace what Varga and Guigon call a “postmodern” view of authenticity. This account of authenticity abandons an essential self and embraces a more minimal construction of self and authenticity: Postmodern thought raises questions about the existence of an underlying subject with essential properties accessible through introspection. The whole idea of the authentic as that which is “original”, “essential”, “proper”, and so forth now seems doubtful. If we are self-constituting beings who make ourselves up from one moment to the next, it appears that the term “authenticity” can refer only to whatever feels right at some particular moment (13). The bundle theorist, in viewing the objectively existing self as a continual and ever-changing process, would endorse the idea of a “self-constituting being” that makes itself up from “one moment to the next” (14). Thus postmodern authenticity is merely whatever feels right at some particular moment. And if we reject an essential, underlying self—which, given the psychological evidence from Strohminger, Quoidbach, and bundle theorists, I think we should—it seems we are left to embrace the postmodern account of authenticity. However, I do not find the postmodern conception of authenticity satisfying because we do not view ourselves as beings that make themselves up from one moment to the next. Rather, we wake up each day believing that we are more or less the same person we were the day before, with the same projects and goals, social relationships, and values. In our three “real world” examples, the postmodern view of authenticity gives Neryssa, Rowan, and Julia no direction as to what sorts of values or projects they ought to pursue to feel personally fulfilled. It may be true that they are just bare Humean selves from a purely objective standpoint, but they don’t view themselves as such. Consider if, in virtue of the postmodern account of authenticity, we were to tell them, “Well, just do what feels right in the moment.” They would probably respond along the lines of, “The problem is I don’t know what feels right in the moment, and the choice I make will impact my future. I don’t want to make the wrong choice!” They view themselves as people who are concerned about their futures, their well-being, and their personal projects. Neryssa, Rowan, and Julia all regard themselves as selves that exist over time with relatively consistent attributes. I think it is likely that most humans view themselves as selves that exist throughout time with somewhat consistent attributes, too. For instance, if I go to sleep liking the song “Piano Man” by Billy Joel and having a desire to learn the song on the guitar, I expect to wake up the next morning with the same sort of preferences and goals. And in taking myself to be a person with specific aspirations, I necessarily find myself interested in my future and what it holds for me. On the pain of speaking for a reader, I find it probable that they conceive of themselves in this manner, too. Elisabeth Camp offers further practical reasons for embracing a sense of “I” concerned with authenticity beyond the bare Humean ego. She argues that the sense of “I” allows an individual to make sense of and evaluate her life given her values and goals, to select relevant characteristics of selfhood and thus form a meaningful identity through which to understand herself, and to create and carry out future plans based on the self-concept she wants to create or maintain (15). Camp’s three listed benefits of a sense of “I” point to authenticity: we want to know who we are, if we have lived up to what we want to be, and how to best preserve a sense of self. In the service of self-understanding and pursuing a fulfilling life, we ought to care about a sense of “I” along with authenticity and its application to our lives. For an account of authenticity to be useful, then, it should take into consideration our perceived existence as temporally-existing selves with an eye to the future and the values and projects we hope to fulfill. In other words, a more satisfying and practical account of authenticity should work alongside our intuition of hav- ing a “true self,” even if the true self turns out to be more of a construct than an objectively existing entity. This new account of authenticity seems to be related to being loyal to a constructed self-concept. To restate, this account should (1) take into account the lack of an underlying “true” self in light of bundle theories, and (2) provide us with some direction in confronting difficult decisions in which one’s identity is in question or at stake. The Self-Concept and Concerns of Self-Deception In this section, I will define the self-concept and discuss some difficulties self-deception poses to the self-concept, though ultimately I think we can table such difficulties. Before we address the wider question of how one might be authentic to the somewhat subjective self-concept, we need to first define the self-concept. Here I will draw from Elisabeth Camp’s character model of self. This model describes the objective self as possessing “a distinctive way in which a particular ‘I’ inhabits, interprets, and engages with the world—a particular nexus of dispositions, memories, interests, and commitments” (16). These dispositions, memories, and interests, fit in with our earlier discussion of a psychological, Humean ego if we view them at a singular point in time. The self, as Camp defines it, is not so much a unified identity that endows one with a sense of “I.” Rather, it is a particular way of experiencing and interpreting the world. Here, it is worthwhile to note that these interests and dispositions constitute a “something” that makes up the bare, Humean ego. I do not wish to misrepresent Hume or bundle theorists in saying that there is no self whatsoever. Instead, we should recognize that the bare Humean ego is an existing self, an underlying “something” that makes up an individual. The problem regarding authenticity we find with the Humean ego is its impermanence and lack of a unified, temporally existing identity. The underlying Hueman ego is not an essence or substance of self that can endow us with a sense of “I” and a lasting identity. The bare Humean ego allows us to say “I exist,” or “Something that is me is here having experiences,” or perhaps even, “At this current moment, I would like to have a glass of lemonade,” but it would not allow us to say anything about the kind of person we are, especially if the statement has to do with a characteristic or commitment that is meant to describe us over time—perhaps something to the effect of, “I am the type of person to pursue graduate study.” So the Humean ego endows one with momentary consciousness but not a sense of self or identity. Camp believes that an individual comes to an understanding of herself when she posits a “self-interpretation,” and thus forms the meaningful identity the bare Humean ego lacks. Camp compares a self-interpretation to a theory, as both create a coherent pattern or explanation “by electing and structuring a coherent unity out of [a] teeming multiplicity [of evidence].” Camp remarks that we can evaluate the effectiveness of a self-interpretation in the same way we would evaluate a theory. The more disparate elements it unites, the stronger the theory and related self-interpretation. Just as many theories can be equally probable or valid, so too can multiple self-interpretations. Likewise, when interpreting a body of data, there are clearly some interpretations that are better than others. While many interpretations may be on a par in strength, we can still distinguish between “bad” theories, which are not much grounded in the evidence nor realistic, and “good” theories, which take into account the available body of evidence for realistic interpretations. Let us say that the self-concept is the self-interpretation an individual embraces as the “best” explanatory theory for themselves given the current evidence. The self-concept is one’s understanding of their experience of the world. It is also the constructed identity that unifies one’s dispositions, memories, and interests. Thus, it is the self-concept that endows one with a sense of self and identity. I want to emphasize that even though one’s self-concept is subjective, there are limitations to its construction. The self-concept relies on objective evidence: the particular dispositions, interests, and memories held by an individual. This evidence is publicly accessible, too. Irish philosopher Philip Pettit remarks that an individual is a “figure in the public world, characterized by public properties” (17). The dispositions and interests held by an individual influence her behavior, actions, and statements. As such, the evidence becomes accessible to the public and available for use in forming a self-interpretation. Though the interpretation itself is subjective in how one decides to connect evidence and organize it into a meaningful pattern, an individual’s dispositions and interests remain objective because they exist without any given meaning. For example, say that Cassandra has an interest in almost every genre of music: country, hip hop, indie, classical—she likes it all. Before interpretation, this is simply an objective fact. Cassandra’s friend, Russel, believes that Cassandra likes many different genres of music because she is an open-minded person. Cassandra, on the other hand, believes that she likes so many genres because she had friends with varied music tastes growing up. Cassandra and Russel take an objective fact and then attribute meaning to it through interpretation. I would compare this sort of interpretation to the construction of historical narratives. Historians share the same set of facts about a historical event, but how they choose to connect them and endow them with meaning will vary. Given the objective nature of these public properties, we can blame an individual for a particularly self-deluding interpretation. For instance, a man who believes he is Napoleon might point to some evidence as reasons for him forming such a self-concept—perhaps he has a talent for tactical strategy and horseback riding— while ignoring glaringly contradictory evidence such as the fact that he is not French and he was not born in 1769. But this is a quite obvious case of self-delu-sion. What about more ambiguous, “real life” cases? I do not want to venture too far into this topic, but I would like to put forth a general means of avoiding, or at least living, with self-delusion. Firstly, we ought to approach self-concepts with the understanding that we are constructing theories, and like theories, self-interpretations are provisional. They can and should be replaced when new evidence comes to light, and if we are individuals that are dedicated to self-understanding and epistemic respectability, we ought to undergo regular introspection to uncover new evidence or re-contextualize old evidence. I think it is likely that we do so already. As fairly self-centered creatures, we like to talk about our lives with our acquaintances. Much of the time, this naturally incorporates interpretation of the self. Perhaps you spend some time talking with a friend over lunch about why you like horror movies. That evening, you discuss with your partner why they feel unfulfilled by their current job. Before bed, you silently think about whether you are the sort of person who would be happy adopting a child. With our recognition of self-concepts as provisional comes a sense of what Laurie Paul calls “epistemic humility.” We can be wrong about the sort of person we think we are, and so we must approach the self-concept knowing that we will likely get quite a few things wrong. Perhaps you thought you were the sort of person who values their career over family, but once you were faced with the actual choice to stay home and raise children or accept a promotion, you found that your priorities lay with family. What is most authentic for us to do is not always represented by the current self-concept, and this only comes to light when we encounter a choice that tests our self-concept. These choices are an integral part of self-discovery. Once again invoking epistemic humility, it seems that we are never fully done defining the self-concept. There will always be additional evidence generated or uncovered through events that test or reveal one’s character. Thus, we should accept that the self-concept is a provisional entity which we must continually discover and refine. Authenticity as Commitment, Temporally Extended Agency, and Practical Identity An Existing Definition of Authenticity Charles and Guigon pose this question in their entry on authenticity in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “What is it to be oneself, at one with one- self, or truly representing one’s self?” They contrast this more complicated view of authenticity of self with the authenticity of objects, in which the latter is defined as the state of being “faithful to an original” or a “reliable, accurate representation” (18). While I agree that the authenticity of a self is more complicated than that of objects, I see no need to generate an alternative definition of authenticity if we can produce a “standard” to which an individual might be faithful. The existing thing being judged for authenticity in terms of faithfulness to an original or reliability in representation is a particular self-concept. Our account of authenticity will need to explain how we can temporally extend the self-concept and thus create a standard to be faithful to over time. The next natural question has to do with what it means to say that a person is a “reliable, accurate representation” of themselves (19). To form a “reliable, accurate, representation” of oneself, there are two primary “keys”: commitment and tempo- rally-extended agency, both of which I will discuss in the remainder of this section. The Personated Self, Commitment, and Agency The first key to a new account of authenticity lies in commitment. Here I will make use of Philip Pettit’s discussion of commitment and selfhood. Though Pettit primarily focuses on selfhood and identity in his article “My Three Selves,” I believe we can extend his conclusions to our current discussion of authenticity. According to Pettit, a person is defined as an “agent with the capacity to personate,” where personation is the act of presenting a persona and “inviting[ing] others to adopt [this] picture of who you are” (20). For instance, say that my friend asks me to keep a promise and I agree to do so. In doing so, I am making a claim about myself and a commitment to that claim: I will keep my friend’s promise. If I want my personated self to be relied upon, I ought to do as I said I would and keep the promise. If I do not, my earlier claim is compromised in its assertion as the truth. An individual must “live up to their words in practice: they act as the attitudes communicated would warrant" (21). In effect, the individual treats their personated self as real and, in living up to their personated self, invites others to do the same. In doing as I said I would, I fulfill the persona I set forth, thus endowing it with a sense of provisional reality. Here we come up against an objection. In making commitments or endorsing a particular self-interpretation, it would seem that an agent must be almost narcissitically focused on the creation of the self-concept at any given moment. Pettit’s own view is in tension with this sort of narcissism: “To return to a point made earlier, however, this self is not a construct that I intend to create as such...That claim ties personhood, implausibly, to a highly intellectualized form of reflection and a pattern of self-scripting that sounds downright narcissistic, as critics have suggested” (22). Relying on a “highly intellectualized form of reflection” poses a problem because it would require us to undergo a good deal of reflective agony about the person we take ourselves to be every time we make a commitment. Furthermore, it is entirely possible for an individual to possess a rich identity without undertaking highly intellectualized reflection. I think that we can still be quite conscious and aware of the commitments we endorse without being overly focused, or even highly aware of, the personated self we are creating in most cases. The following example will help us overcome this objection. Say that you ask me to drive you to the mechanic to pick up your car. I will likely say yes barring a major inconvenience. When I agree to drive you to the mechanic, I do not fully conceptualize the person that I believe myself to be. Rather, I feel as a matter of good will that I should help you out. If you were to ask me why I drove you, I could come up with the answer upon momentary reflection: I agreed because I take my- self to be the sort of person to help out a friend in a bind. But I don’t take the commitment itself to be constitutive of my self-concept unless prompted by some out- side inquiry or internal reflection. Furthermore, in such moments of self-reflection I do not focus on a singular commitment but a larger collection of commitments that I attempt to arrange into a meaningful pattern, thus forming a self-concept. Pettit echoes this sort of intermittent reflection, writing, “...it is important that it may take effort to achieve a full knowledge of who and how in this sense I am... Thus, it may take time and trouble for me to develop such a sense of where I am committed” (23). In other words, the personated self is something we make somewhat unconsciously through conscious commitments, and it is only later, through adequate reflection, that we develop a “sense of where we are committed,” and thus a self-concept to which to be faithful to (24). Now we can return to the initial example of my promissory commitment to my friend. In keeping my promise to my friend, I find that I have been faithful to my commitment in this particular instance. If I expand this promissory commitment to be constitutive of my self-concept and thus the sort of person that I take myself to be, I will as a matter of principle continue to fulfill my promises. If I successfully keep such commitments, my actions, behaviors, and claims will accurately and reliably represent my self-concept. My friend will accept that I am the sort of person to keep a promise, given that I continue to keep promises when called upon to do so. So authenticity relies on the fulfillment of the commitments one sets forth as constituting their self-concept (or at least, a sincere attempt to fulfill such commitments). With commitment comes the second key: temporally extended agency. As Pettit suggests in his definition of a person, persons are a particular sort of agent—an individual or entity that undertakes or performs an action (25). When we make commitments, we become agents concerned with values, goals, and policies that are enacted over time. American philosopher Michael Bratman uses the goal of writ- ing a paper as an example of temporally extended agency: I see my activity of, say, writing a paper, as something I do over an extend- ed period of time. I see myself as beginning the project, developing it over time, and (finally!) completing it. I see the agent of these various activities as one and the same agent-namely, me. In the middle of the project I see myself as the agent who began the project and (I hope) the agent who will complete it. Upon completion I take pride in the fact that I began, worked on, and completed this essay. Of course, there is a sense in which when I act at a particular time; but in acting I do not see myself, the agent of the act, as simply a time-slice agent. I see my action at that time as the action of the same agent as he who has acted in the past and (it is to be hoped) will act in the future (26). Similarly, an individual can make a commitment to be a particular sort of person that acts in a particular sort of way, and then carry this commitment over time. The individual does not view their self-concept and associated commitments as a “time-slice agent,” even if the Humean self changes from moment to moment (27). Rather, commitments connect both the personated self and the self-concept through time. Harry Frankfurt, another American philosopher, similarly argues that the individual makes plans and acts in virtue of the commitments which she cares about, and thus becomes “inherently prospective; that is, [she] necessarily considers [herself] as having a future” (28). So too do such plans entail a “notion of guidance” along with a “certain consistency or steadfastness of behavior; and this presupposes some degree of persistence” (29). To re-emphasize my point, though we may objectively be bare Humean selves, on the basis of forming commitments and endorsing them over time, we create a provisional sort of self that is temporally extended in terms of agency and identity. Even if the objective self shifts from moment to moment, the commitments we endorse remain somewhat consistent and thus so does the self-concept. Furthermore, for our self-constituting commitments to have a real impact on who we take ourselves to be and how other people perceive us, they must be somewhat consistent. Like a theory, a self-concept should accurately “predict” future behavior and actions—if a self-concept were not consistent, it would not have much credibility or trustworthiness for those around us. Nor would it be a source of guidance and meaning for the individual. To sum, a personated self arises out of one’s commitments (and more generally, one’s intent to act/actions). A personated self is temporally extended into a more unified identity when one is faithful to their commitments, though a reflective understanding of this identity is not yet present. To construct the self-concept and achieve a level of self-understanding, the collection of commitments are arranged into a meaningful pattern as if to say, “I am this sort of person because I have made several commitments of this kind in the past, and I would like to continue doing so.” The self-concept, though subjective, gives us a standard to which to be authentic and guides our future actions in the service of preserving authenticity. We decide who we are and who we want to be, and then we do our best to fulfill the self-concept we conceive. At the core of authenticity, we find a steadfastness and consistency towards one’s commitments. I also believe that the required degree of faithfulness to a commitment is normative. I cannot give a full account here, but if we accept Quoidbach’s conclusion that core values, personality traits, and preferences change over time, then we should also allow commitments and authenticity to shift over time. An individual should be required to uphold her commitments for as long as they accurately rep- resent the person she takes herself to be at present. In this manner, our novel ac- count of authenticity occupies a median position between that of bundle theorists and a true and essential self. The self-concept is stable from moment to moment unlike the self put forth by bundle theories. However, the self-concept is revised as one undergoes self-discovery and changes as a person, so it does not rely on consistent and core personality traits like the essential self. What is authentic to me today might not be authentic to me in ten years, though our account of authenticity allows for gradual changes over the course of one’s life. We are held to our commitments, but only to a point. Authenticity is, then, a moving target. How Commitments Originate Commitments and the behaviors and actions they endorse may seem arbitrarily chosen, especially if one does not have a given reason to endorse a particular self-concept over others. Here I will discuss how commitments originate and what reasons they are based on. First, I wish to introduce the concepts of fixed traits and free traits. According to personality psychologist Brian Little, a fixed trait is an inborn or “culturally endowed” personality trait such as introversion or conscientiousness (30). A fixed trait is “fixed” in virtue of its givenness. I cannot wake up and decide, as a matter of will, to no longer be an introvert. Free traits, on the other hand, are “tendencies expressed by individual choice,” such as cultivating an interest in soccer (31). However, Little also believes that fixed traits and free traits can coexist, particularly in how an individual chooses to modify fixed traits to fulfill a goal. In the spirit of our earlier discussion of temporally extended agency, Little states that we must “extend personality temporally ,” because over time, particular personality traits are emphasized or downplayed based on one’s core projects (32). A core project is defined as “meaningful goals, both small and large, that can range from ‘put out the cat, quickly,’ to ‘transform Western thought, slowly’” (33). Importantly, a longstanding core project related to one’s life work and identity resembles Pettit’s definition of commitments. Little uses himself as an example: as an introvert, he dislikes public speaking. However, he also values being a professor and sharing knowledge, and thus pushes himself out of his comfort zone during lectures and speeches (34). His commitment to teaching and imparting knowledge allows him to take a fixed trait and disposition, introversion, and treat it as a free trait for a limited amount of time to work towards his core project. Though it may not be authentic of Little to become a professional public speaker, it is still authentic of him to undergo public speaking engagements due to his commitments. Little’s self-concept might be the following: “I take myself to be an introvert, but if I have a cause I really care about, I’m willing to talk in front of a crowd and thus act as if I were an extrovert.” Little’s acting like an extrovert does not make him one, but rather invites others to view him as someone who can successfully engage a crowd with a speech regardless of introversion or extroversion. Therefore, commitments are based upon inborn and culturally endowed behavior, dispositions, and interests, although we might have some control over if and how we enact such traits. In his paper “The Importance of What We Care About,” Harry Frankfurt offers support for the necessity of given traits. He writes, “While what is antecedently important to the person may be alterable, it must not be subject to his own immediate voluntary control. If it is to provide him with a genuine basis for evaluations of importance, the fact that he cares about it cannot be dependent simply upon his own decision or choice” (35). We must start with some given and objective behaviors, dispositions, and interests, lest our entire constitution be entirely arbitrary. Though we cannot choose our given traits, I believe we still have a degree of freedom in which traits cultivate and express. We can, as Millgram argues, “take an interest in something, in the hope of finding it interesting” because we are curious and will ourselves to look into a new interest (36). The same sort of curiosity and flexibility applies to behaviors and dispositions. We cannot fundamentally change these characteristics, but perhaps we can be curious enough to see how flexible they are in our expression of them. Like Little, we can undertake a project that pushes us outside of our comfort zone. This allows us to observe how freely we can manipulate a fixed trait. There is a balance between commitments we undertake knowing that we will have to alter fixed traits and commitments which we accept because we acknowledge we have particular fixed traits. Thus, another consideration of authenticity is understanding how far and for how long we can push ourselves past fixed traits until we experience what Little calls “burnout” (37). We might also find that there are behaviors and interests that we simply cannot enact or adopt, try as we might. A few years ago, I tried to cultivate an interest in ornithology. Though I was curious, I could not adopt or sustain the interest, and eventually abandoned my attempts at doing so because it did not bring me any pleasure and I had no other strong reasons to keep trying. On the other hand, there are behaviors and interests that we simply cannot abandon or downplay. While I cannot bring myself to be interested in ornithology, I find it difficult to remain uninterested in The Bachelor when it airs. Perhaps my lack of interest in ornithology and my inability to abandon interest in The Bachelor are the result of my not trying hard enough. To this sort of objection, I reply that I have no reason to try harder, nor a further interest in doing so. I might try harder to develop an interest in ornithology if I had a commitment or core project that related to it, such as spending more time with a friend who likes bird watching. I might also try harder to abandon my interest in The Bachelor if I read a scientific article about the detriment of reality TV to the human brain, which would be in tension with my greater commitment to intellectual health. As it stands, I don’t have any further interest or relevant commitments that would have me try harder to mold these traits. Thus, part of living authentically might be realizing which of our traits are involuntary and which of our traits are voluntary—in other words, which traits are decidedly fixed and which traits are some- what mutable. Living authentically is a balance of acceptance and choice in terms of forming and fulfilling commitments, as well as discovering what commitments we can and cannot enact. Our account of authenticity has arguably come to resemble Harry Frankfurt’s account of freedom of will. Frankfurt argues that freedom of will relies on the hi- erarchical ordering and endorsement of desires and volitions (38). Likewise, I believe authenticity relates to ordering one’s commitments by their strength, especially when we are faced with two competing commitments. Authenticity comes from the commitments we endorse, and one commitment, such as the inborn tendency to be introverted, can be overridden by a stronger commitment and accompanying desire such as the commitment to be a professor that engages in public speaking with the desire of imparting knowledge. Therefore, another aspect of authenticity is reflecting upon what one cares about, and then determining, either by an act of will or an acceptance of one’s nature, which of these values “overrides” the others. Our new account of authenticity also bears relation to Christine’s Korsgaard’s description of practical identity. In deciding which commitments to make, we create policies or “laws” which dictate future actions: “When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself” (39). Korsgaard further supports my assertion that commitments are expressions of the self-concept. Making commitments builds what Korsgaard calls one’s “practical identity,” which is “a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.”40 Where the personated self focuses on the making of commitments to present a self to others, the practical identity emphasizes making commitments to define and justify the actions of a self. Indeed, Korsgaard’s description of integrity might as well be discussing authenticity: Etymologically, integrity is oneness, integration is what makes something one. To be a thing, one thing, a unity, an entity; to be anything at all: in the metaphysical sense, that is what it means to have integrity. But we use the term for someone who lives up to his own standards. And that is be- cause we think that living up to them is what makes him one, and so what makes him a person at all (41). Along with authenticity and practical identity comes a sense of “integration” or “oneness” of self. The commitments, values, interests, and actions of an individual come together under the self-concept to form a rational pattern. Korsgaard additionally indicates another consideration in our search for authenticity: we should attempt to form commitments that exist in harmony with each other rather than in tension. In doing so, we form a self-concept better equipped for consistency and steadfastness. Practical and Existential Reasons for Committing Once you have made a commitment, why should you keep it? Let’s return to our earlier example: I tell my friend that I’m the sort of person to keep a promise, and he asks me to promise that I will attend his jazz concert tomorrow evening. What are the consequences of my failure to show up and fulfill my promise? Pettit offers three excuses that I might use in such a situation, which we will apply to our discussion of authenticity. The first is an excuse of circumstance (42). Say that I call my friend after the concert and profusely apologize for missing the event. However, I have a relevant excuse for the context. At the last minute, a family member of mine was admitted to the hospital and my presence was needed. With this excuse (as long as it is true), my friend excuses me from living up to my earlier promissory commitment. In fact, I could use an excuse of circumstance as many times as necessary, though it is unlikely that I would be able to genuinely use such excuses unless I were an incredibly unlucky person. We can regard ourselves as acting authentically in this situation because, although we had two competing commitments, we fulfilled the commitment we felt was stronger. If my friend understands my self-concept and rationally approaches the situation, he will likely understand why I valued my commitment to aiding my family in an emergency over attending his jazz concert. In this context I suffer little to no consequences for failing to uphold my promissory commitment. The other two excuses are less so the product of uncontrollable circumstances but of mental states or events. They result in interpersonal consequences. The first is an appeal to being misled by one’s mind. Say that I tell my friend that I truly thought I could make a promise to go to his concert, but when the occasion arose, I found that I simply could not keep it. Perhaps I remembered that I don’t like crowds, and therefore could not attend the concert. My initial willingness was an instance of self-delusion, or at the very least, a lack of self-knowledge (43). If I use this excuse, my friend would begin to see me as easily misled and too quick to form self-judgments. What kind of person, he might ask, forgets that they dislike crowds? Certainly not a person who is properly introspective. My friend would regard me as untrustworthy when it comes to my statements about commitments, and thus would disbelieve elements of my self-concept. If my self-concept does not match up with my personated self and its actions, then I have failed to act authentically. I will suggest that authenticity is an attractive quality in a friend and necessary for a steady relationship. If I continue to be inauthentic, then I might destroy our relationship. The second excuse is a matter of changing one’s mind (44). Say that I was not misled when I made the prior commitment, but I decide I no longer want to keep my promise. Besides being outrightly rude in changing my mind about this commitment, I also appear “wishy-washy,” or indecisive, to my friend. I make commitments without thinking about what they entail. My friend would regard me as unreliable and “flaky.” I would fail to be faithful to my commitments, and it might cost me my reputation. My friend would be less likely to rely on me and to let me rely on him in return (45). Again, authenticity is necessary for maintaining stable interpersonal relationships (46). Beyond potentially losing a meaningful interpersonal relationship, breaking commitments bears pressing existential implications. Varga and Guigon, in quoting Sartre, express a worry about the “cost” of breaking self-constituting commitments: If an agent acts against her commitments, she risks the “radical transformation of her being-in-the-world.” If I say that I am the type of person to keep a promise and then fail to do so, I will have to take this new behavioral evidence into account. If I fail to keep a promise multiple times, then my action is not simply out of character—it is my character. If I avoid deceiving myself, I will have to admit that I am not the type of person to keep a promise, and thus must change my self-concept. My personated self, the outward persona which I present to others through my attitudes and actions, would come apart from my practical identity and self-concept. I would lose who I take myself to be. Korsgaard adds to this worry: “Consider the astonishing but familiar ‘I couldn’t live with myself if I did that.’ Clearly there are two selves here, me and the one I must live with and so must not fail” (47). Here, she elaborates upon the discomfort of losing who one takes themselves to be. As we have previously seen in the case of the personated self vs the self-concept, there is a tension between who we take ourselves to be and who we really are by virtue of our behavior and actions. I would have to live with the knowledge that I want to be someone who keeps their promises, but, based on my actions, I can no longer claim this commitment as part of my self-concept. Again, if I do not delude myself, I have to recognize that I am not a reliable person nor a good friend when it comes to promises. As Korsgaard points out, I would have trouble “living” with myself; my self-esteem would suffer. Indeed, this sort of asymmetry in my personated self versus my self-concept has some serious consequences if I let it infect too much of my being: It is the conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us that give rise to unconditional obligations. For to violate them is to lose your integrity and so your identity, and no longer to be who you are. That is, it is no longer to be able to think of yourself under the description under which you value yourself and find your life worth living and your actions worth undertaking. That is to be for all practical purposes dead or worse than dead (48). This is quite the cost. If I value being the sort of person who keeps their promises, then I would find it difficult to exist with the knowledge that I am someone who does not do so. While I think Korsgaard’s statement here is overly dire in terms of breaking only a few loose commitments, she illustrates the real and pressing threat that losing one’s authenticity poses. If I fail to live up to several of my commitments, especially those which I designate as highly integral to my self-concept, I risk creating a life in which I find no value, meaning, or self-esteem. My personated self would be so far removed from my desired self-concept that I would feel the disconnect Korsgaard mentions between “me and the one I must live with” (49). Such an existential state is likely the source of statements such as, “I am a stranger to myself,” and “I do not recognize myself any longer.” Finally, having long-term commitments is part of an enjoyable life and the avoidance of boredom. Little and Frankfurt concur on this end. Little is quoted as saying, “Human flourishing is achieved through the sustainable pursuit of one’s core projects,” which can be reframed as lasting commitments to one’s goals (50). Frankfurt, too, identifies final ends as the driving purpose of one’s life: “If we had no final ends, it is more than desire that would be empty and vain. It is life itself. For living without goals or purposes is living with nothing to do” (51). We need commitments as final ends in order to build fulfilling and interesting lives. Further- more, commitments stave off the encroachment of boredom. Boredom, Frankfurt claims, threatens one’s “psychic survival” (52). Besides losing a sense of personhood, a lack of commitments and the development of boredom would endanger one’s mental existence and inner life. We can see, from discussing the existential implications of breaking commitments, even more reasons to pursue authenticity. Applying Our New Account of Authenticity Now that we have a new account of authenticity, let’s return to the three cases we posed earlier. How does our new account of authenticity offer guidance to Neryssa, Rowan, and Julia? For (a), we would first ask Neryssa how much her job contributes to her sense of identity, and thus, her self-concept. If she does not stake much of her identity upon her job, then for the sake of authenticity, she does not need to search for a new job. If she does take her work to be a large part of her identity, then she will need to search for a new job because the current job is in tension with her self-concept and the person she takes herself to be. We would also ask Neryssa how much the company’s product and mission misalign with her personal values. If she works for a corporation that espouses anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric while simultaneously taking herself to be someone who supports LGBTQ+ rights, she might, as Korsgaard warns, find it difficult to “live with herself.” Let’s say that Neryssa does stake a fair amount of her identity on her job. In addition, let’s say that the company’s values are greatly misaligned with Neryssa’s values. We would say that it is more authentic of Neryssa to leave her current job and search for a job that is representative of her values and the person she takes herself to be. We might even counsel her and suggest that, in staying in a job that is in tension with her self-concept, she risks burnout, the loss of her sense of identity, and general dissatisfaction. Furthermore, she might find it difficult to even commit to a job that she cannot fully endorse. In terms of authenticity alone, we would say that it is best for Neryssa to search for a new job. In (b), it would be helpful if we suggest that Rowan reframe the question. Instead of worrying about which major is the most authentic choice, we would remind Rowan that authenticity is not an expression of an essence of self. Rather, authenticity is a commitment to the self-concept, or, the self they take themselves to be. Therefore, they should ask themselves which major they would find themselves most capable of committing to. Can they envision a long-term commitment to either history or literature? In reframing the question in this way, we take away the agony related to the question, “What kind of person am I?” and turn our attention to a new question: “What kind of person would I like to be?” This question is prospective and forward-looking, and it emphasizes that there is no truly “right” choice (although some choices might be more “right” than others). We make a choice “right” by committing to it, given that we have the capability and interest necessary to commit to it in the first place. In Rowan’s case, they have the added benefit of being able to change their major. Say that Rowan declares an English major, but after a semester of classes, realizes that they would much prefer life as a history major. They can now change their commitment and self-concept. Thus, Rowan’s case endows us with a bit of advice for ourselves. When we can, we might try out a choice or experience before making a commitment to it and staking our identity upon it. For example, say that you are interested in becoming a parent. Before committing to parenthood (which, unlike a college major decision, cannot be reversed once chosen), you might spend some time taking care of young children and talking to their parents about the pros and cons of raising a child. While spending time with young children and talking to parents cannot fully replicate the actual experience of becoming a par- ent, you would at least have a clearer idea of what parenthood entails. In (c), we would remind Julia that her decision for or against the attack ad will become evidence that constitutes her self-concept. This is because decisions of this nature are “expressive of yourself” (Korsgaard 83). She needs to evaluate which she values more: the ultimate goal of her campaign, which is to promote environ- mentally sustainable legislature; or her personal morals and commitment to “playing by the rules.” If she runs the attack ad, she commits to being the sort of person who values the greater cause over her personal morals. If she decides against the attack ad, she commits to being the sort of person who values her personal morals over the greater cause, even if the greater cause is quite worthy. What we are asking of Julia is similar to what we asked of Rowan: “What sort of person would you like to be?” As we did with Neryssa, we would tell Julia to make the commitment that results in a self-concept she can “live with.” Though running the attack ad might help Julia win the election, the victory will mean little if she has sacrificed the self-concept that she wants to embody. Or perhaps Julia determines that she values the ultimate goal of her campaign more than her personal morals. In doing so, she commits to a new self-concept, one that values the greater good over her personal qualms. What matters in Julia’s case is that she decides in relation to a self-concept she can endorse and commit to, and thus continue past the decision with minimal tension between the person she takes herself to be and the person she acts as. Her self-concept, whatever it ends up being, will also influence how she reacts to and values future decisions, so it is imperative that she be able to commit to this new self-concept over time. I hope these three examples properly illustrate how one would use this new account of authenticity in real-world situations. I believe authenticity is of greatest importance when we are faced with difficult, self-constituting decisions. On a day- to-day basis, we might find it unnecessary to ask whether an egg salad sandwich or a hamburger is a more authentic lunch choice. However, it is necessary to spend time reflecting upon the self-concept and authenticity when the choice we face has clearly life-altering consequences or stands to change the way that we conceive of ourselves. And though authenticity may be an important factor in how one makes decisions and conceives of themselves, it is not necessary that authenticity and steadfast commitments constitute a morally admirable or respectable life. A person could commit to being flaky, to being a nuisance to their friends, or to being a criminal mastermind all while still being authentic. On a final note, it may seem as if one cannot help but be authentic if, at the end of day, authenticity amounts to a sincere commitment to one’s self-constituting choices. It seems like Neryssa could just as easily authentically embrace the practicality of keeping her current job as she could embrace the authenticity of seeking more fulfilling work, as long as she fully commits to her choice. However, I do not think this new account of authenticity is too weak regarding the tension between the personated self and the self-concept. Again, I will use the quote from Korsgaard: “Consider the astonishing but familiar ‘I couldn’t live with myself if I did that.’ Clearly there are two selves here, me and the one I must live with and so must not fail” (53). Sometimes the person we take ourselves to be is markedly different from the behavior we exhibit and values we espouse. In these situations, we have two options. One option is to accept a new self-concept in light of new behavioral evidence. Alternatively, we can change ourselves or our lives, thus pursuing greater harmony between the person we act as and the person we take ourselves to be. The discomfort of not being able to live with oneself is what holds us to a stricter attribution of authenticity. Conclusion From the initial doubt that bundle theories cast upon the necessity and nature of authenticity, we find ourselves with a novel account of authenticity centered upon steadfastness to the commitments which we take as integral to our self-concept. It is this self-concept that endows us with a sense of “I” and identity. When the actions and behavior of the personated self successfully act as a “reliable, accurate representation” of the person we take ourselves to be, we are authentic to that sense of identity. When faced with difficult decisions which have the potential to shape who we take ourselves to be, it may help to ask ourselves not what is most authentic of some underlying essence of self, but what we would find most natural to commit to. With this sort of direction, we will hopefully continue to construct self-concepts which we can “live with” and bring fulfillment and satisfaction to our lives. Endnotes 1 Christian Jarrett, “There Is No Such Thing as the True Self, but It’s Still a Useful Psychological Concept,” 2017. https://digest.bps.org.uk/2017/08/22/there-is-no-such- thing-as-the-true-self-but-its-still-a-useful-psychological-concept/ 2 Jordi Quoidbach, et al., “The End of History Illusion,” Science , vol. 339, (2013), 98. 3 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , (Oxford: 1896), 134). 4 There are other considerations at play in each scenario. For instance, in (c), there are also considerations of ethics. In (a) and (b), there are considerations of practicality and utility in regards to selecting a job and a college major. Still, authenticity plays a role in what the agent chooses and how they decide to value considerations of ethics, practicality, and utility, so each scenario will involve authenticity in some way, although authenticity might not be the only deciding factor. 5 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book II: Ideas , 118. 6 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , 134. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, 11. 9 David Eagleman, The Brain: The Story of You , (New York: Vintage Books, 2015), 34-35. 10 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , 134. 11 Thomas Metzinger, “Self Models,” Scholarpedia , 2007. 12 Douglas Hofstadter, I Am a Strange Loop , (Basic Books: 2007), 294. 13 Somogy Varga and Charles Guignon, “Authenticity,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 2020. 14 Ibid. 15 E Camp, “Wordsworth’s Prelude, Poetic Autobiography, and Narrative Constructions of the Self,” Retrieved 2021, from https://nonsite.org/wordsworths-prelude-poetic- autobiography-and-narrative-constructions-of-the-self/. 16 Ibid. 17 Philip Pettit, “My Three Selves,” Philosophy , vol. 95, no. 3, 2020, 6. 18 Varga and Guignon, “Authenticity.” 19 Ibid. 20 Philip Pettit, “Philip Pettit: My Three Selves. Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture 2019,” YouTube , uploaded by RoyIntPhilosophy, 2019, www.youtube.com/ watch?v=DUzuNVuEIYA. 21 Pettit, “My Three Selves,” 7-8. 22 Ibid, 18. 23 Ibid, 19. 24 Three more brief notes. (1) It is possible that the first time I make a commitment to be a certain sort of person that the commitment does require substantive reflection and narcissistic intellectualization. But hereafter, the fulfilling of the commitment is somewhat automatic as a matter of policy. If I find no difficulties in fulfilling my commitment (say, a competing commitment), it should be easy for me to do so with little reflection. (2) Some decisions concerning commitments do require substantive reflection and narcissistic intellectualization, along with an awareness of both. However, these sorts of commitments are likely “tests of character” or life-changing decisions, so they warrant such agonizing and reflection. I have in mind the decision to marry someone, to have a child, to go to war, to change careers, etc. (3) Here we can easily see how “taking stock” of one’s life might prompt a series of new commitments and the abandonment of old ones. We look back on the commitments we have made and decide, through the gradual making and fulfilling of new commitments, to form a new self-concept. In instances of conscious change, we would be aware of the new commitments we make—we would be more “mindful” of the personated self being created than we naturally find ourselves to be. 25 Pettit, “My Three Selves,” 7. 26 Michael Bratman, “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency,” The Philosophical Review , vol. 109, no. 1, 2000, 43. 27 Ibid. 28 Harry Frankfurt, “The Importance of What We Care About,” Synthese , vol. 53, no. 2, (1982), 260. 29 Ibid, 161. 30 Susan Cain, Quiet , (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 209. 31 Craig Lambert, “Introversion Unbound,” Harvard Magazine , July 2003, www.harvardmagazine.com/2003/07/introversion-unbound.html. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Cain, Quiet , 209-210. 35 Frankfurt,“Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy, Inc. , vol. 68, no. 1, (1971), 18. 36 Elijah Millgram, “On Being Bored Out of Your Mind,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , vol. 104, (2004), 179. 37 Lambert, “Introversion Unbound.” 38 Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” 15. 39 Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 83. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid, 84. 42 Pettit, “My Three Selves,” 17. 43 Ibid, 9. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid, 19-20. 46 By authenticity in relationships, I do not mean "showing your true self." Many of our relationships might only exist because we present ourselves in a curated fashion. So authenticity in relationships might simply be keeping one’s commitments. However, as in our discussion of free trait theory, there is a limit to which we can keep up an image that is in tension with our given traits. Authenticity in a relationship is, once again, a balance between the person we are for others (free or mutable traits) and the person we cannot help but be (fixed traits). 47 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity , 84. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Lambert, "Introversion Unbound." 51 Harry Frankfurt, "On the Usefulness of Final Ends." Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 41, (1992), 6-7. 52 Ibid, 12. 53 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity , 84. Works Cited Bratman, Michael E. “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency.” The Philosophical Review , vol. 109, no. 1, 2000, pp. 35–61. JSTOR , www. jstor.org/stable/2693554? seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. 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How Political Instability Unravels Religious Commitment Even in the Face of Uncertainty Abanti Ahmed Author Hans Xu Koda Li Xuanyu (Willard) Zhu Editors Abstract This paper explores the dynamic relationship between political instability and religiosity in Egypt and Tunisia, with a focus on the period from 2012 to 2018. The central research question examines how individuals navigate uncertainty and address political challenges, influencing the role of religion in their lives. The argument posits that tangible solutions to political challenges diminish religious commitment, while a lack of such solutions fosters an increased reliance on religion. Drawing on a detailed analysis of events, protests, and economic conditions, the paper reveals that the perception of uncertainty can be controlled and the pursuit of tangible solutions demotes religion to a secondary role in individuals' lives. When addressing citizens' concerns during economic challenges, political repression, and societal grievances, policymakers should consider creating platforms for discussion, promoting religious tolerance, and offering practical avenues for positive change, which can be achieved through religious accommodation laws, interfaith dialogue initiatives, and religious endowments. These initiatives ease society’s broader challenge in engaging in open dialogue about the complex human response to political instability that encourages a reevaluation of how uncertainty is navigated. Introduction The periods after pivotal moments in American history, such as the September 11 attacks and the Great Depression, were marked by sharp, brief increases in church attendance as communities sought solace during troubling times. Religious communities are often the first place that people who feel like they have lost control seek refuge. Is this short-lived surge because they have found alternative solutions or because religion slowly loses its allure in the face of prolonged turmoil? Perhaps online communities provide a platform that empowers apostates to be open and therefore increases their visibility. Alternatively, escalating religious persecution and intolerance might contribute to a decline in religiosity, as individuals distance themselves from beliefs facing opposition. Yet, the root causes behind these shifts remain unclear. In this paper, I will explore the conditions under which political instability decreases religiosity. In the currents of geopolitical turmoil, economic upheaval, and rocky political transitions, one might expect religiosity to be a steadfast anchor, providing relief in uncertain times. Yet, as the Arab Spring swept across the landscapes of Egypt and Tunisia, leaving behind a trail of political transformations, the unexpected occurred: religiosity rather than standing resilient, underwent stark fluctuations. The Arab Spring marked a significant period of upheaval and change across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, characterized by widespread protests, demands for political reform, and calls for greater social justice. While Tunisia is often recognized as the birthplace of the Arab Spring, the movement’s mass protests and uprisings transcended national boundaries, influencing countries like Syria, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, and Bahrain, each with its unique socio-political context and grievances. In Egypt, if the period from 2012-2018 was marked by political turmoil, while the period from 2018-2021 focused on economic reforms and stability, then why did religiosity decrease during turmoil but increase during more stable times? In Tunisia, the opposite occurred; religiosity increased during periods of relatively more political instability from ongoing democratic transitions between 2018-2021 than between 2012-2018. In these two cases, fluctuations in religiosity trends were very similar over the same periods of time despite having divergent political outcomes. This is not to postulate that the essence of religion is solely a response to political instability or repression, nor does it assert that religion solely arises from a particular type of uncertainty. Rather, it underscores that within the realm of political instability, a condition that inherently diminishes religious commitment is a type of uncertainty that invites competitive resolutions that take precedence over religious avenues. Despite fluctuations in non-religiosity within a specific sub-group of the Egyptian population over the past decade, it has not exceeded 25%. Consequently, religion consistently maintains a primary role in the lives of the majority within this subset, highlighting its enduring significance and resilience amidst societal changes. My central thesis posits that when individuals are confronted with tangible solutions to alleviate the challenges that they attribute to their political instability, this set of solutions will take precedence over religious commitment. Religious commitment increases when individuals do not have access to these solutions and feel disillusioned by the future. Their perception of the future is important here, and I will discuss in these cases how these perceptions emerge and are sustained during political instability. Consequently, religion assumes a secondary role in individuals’ lives as it is outcompeted by alternative solutions that best alleviate their uncertainties. One secondary argument entails that overall trends of secularization, driven by societal shifts toward modernization, play a central role in diminishing religiosity. As societies modernize and prioritize democratic values, religious influence tends to decline. This argument suggests that broader secularization, marked by the declining significance of religion in public and private spheres, has an impact on individual piety. An alternative argument delves into the role of political Islam during periods of political instability. It suggests that individuals may attribute their political and economic grievances to religious frameworks, especially when political actors weaponize religion for political gains. This attribution may lead to a decline in religious commitment as people scrutinize religion's involvement in political decisions and its consequential impact on their daily lives. This paper will be structured as follows: First, I will discern the type of political instability I will examine. I will explore the types of uncertainties that come with political instability, and how uncertainty is tied to religious commitment. Then, I will showcase what happens to the role of religion when individuals perceive particular types of uncertainty to be present. Finally, I will introduce my cases of Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab Spring and explore how my proposed conditions of political instability are present in both despite their divergent transitions and outcomes. Theory Political instability exhibits diverse characteristics in terms of duration and intensity, ranging from brief upheavals to prolonged disruptions. My focus extends beyond a general assessment of political instability, emphasizing instances of uncertainty directly impacting citizens' daily lives and their perception of the world around them. This perception has cascading effects on how the role of religion is viewed, so I seek to analyze the relationship between individuals' perception of uncertainty with their resulting course of action and religious commitment. Religion, despite being an ancient phenomenon, can also be a psychological response to uncertainty and turbulent times. Religiosity is measured by attitudes toward religious practices, frequency of worship, and overall belief in God. When religion is tied to self-identity, changes within the political sphere are least impactful on individuals’ religiosity. In Lebanon, for example, individuals tend to identify with their religious and ethnic identities before an overarching national identity. In countries where people prioritize nationalism, ethnic divisions, and plurality of religion, the secondary nature of religion in everyday life makes it more susceptible to change in response to changes in the political sphere such as regime change, citizen repression, economic hardship, and military and police brutality. For instance, in Turkey, there are reports of decreased religiosity among youth and even self-reported accounts of hijabi women who wear the hijab in the public eye, but have said to have already “left Islam.” The Republic of Turkey—whose founding father, Ataturk, had revolutionized Turkey as a “modern” state, adopted a Latin alphabet in place of Ottoman Turkish, and removed religion in state affairs—has consequently experienced decades of secularization. Now, with President Erodgan, Turkish society reaches a crossroads with religion and secularization; as Erdogan increases the role of Islam in politics, such as reducing interest rates because “Islam demands it” while inflation increases. As a result, Turkish citizens attribute their economic challenges to religion. While religion may not be the direct cause of these difficulties, the deliberate political weaponization of Islam can contribute to this perception among the population. I postulate that there are two types of uncertainty: controlled uncertainty and random uncertainty. Under controlled uncertainty, individuals have an optimistic outlook that they have the power and agency to pursue tangible courses of action to relieve their uncertainties. In contrast, under random uncertainty, individuals have the pessimistic outlook that their uncertainties are beyond their control. This perception is coupled with a sense of disillusionment regarding the future. In Israel, for example, women responded to random uncertainty by participating in palm recitation to better cope with the uncertain conditions of the Second Intifada and the threat of terror. They inhibited both an absence of control over their uncertain circumstances and disillusionment with the future, which increased their reliance on rituals as a coping mechanism. Trauma is particularly powerful in identity formation, as it brings out what attributes and experiences individuals have in common. While existing research suggests that instability can heighten individuals' religious commitment by reminding them of their shared religious beliefs, this study aims to delve deeper by considering not just the presence of instability, but also its nature and activity. The activity of instability (e.g. living in a constant state of poverty vs. experiencing escalating instability) determines the type of uncertainty individuals perceive of their circumstances. When faced with controlled uncertainty, where the level of instability remains relatively stable, individuals may rely more on their religious beliefs as a source of solace and guidance. However, in situations of escalating instability, where uncertainty intensifies over time, individuals may be more inclined to explore alternative solutions beyond religion to address immediate challenges brought about by political instability. "The consequential secondary role of religion is supported by the notion of secular competition—when economic opportunities or social norms conflict with religious obligations—that individuals face when considering alternative solutions. For instance, during the Great Depression, as conditions worsened, many Americans cataloged the failures of capitalism and voluntarism, emphasizing citizens’ basic responsibilities to one another. Even conservative religious leaders began to join social workers and hungry Americans in calling for more vigorous federal intervention as they faced the suffering before them and their own inability to alleviate it. Their efforts took off in the summer of 1932, when tens of thousands of out-of-work World War I veterans and their families marched to Washington, DC to demand early payment of promised service bonuses. Yet as the federal government extended its place in Americans’ daily lives, leaders of some religious institutions feared for their own status. This historical example illustrates how under conditions of political instability, individuals may perceive a sense of control over their uncertain situation and may prioritize tangible courses of action over religious commitment due to the perceived favorability of the outcomes they desire." To determine, then, the conditions under which political instability decreases religiosity, I argue that when individuals face controlled uncertainty, their reliance on religion becomes secondary as alternative solutions with the potential for immediate favorable outcomes take precedence, but random uncertainty results in the increase in religiosity that many might predict. The cases of Tunisia and Egypt offer valuable insights into the dynamics between political instability, tangible actions, and the evolving role of religion under political instability. Case of Tunisia: Controlled Uncertainty In the case of Tunisia, the Arab Spring catalyzed in December 17, 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old street vendor in the impoverished city of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, self-immolated. This came after market inspectors confiscated some of Bouazizi’s wares, claiming that he lacked the necessary permit. Bouazizi’s suicide was the result of desperation rather than symbolizing a political cause, though it was publicly interpreted as an act of protest. Several reward systems were activated after Bouazizi's suicide. Bouazizi was considered as a "hero for Tunisians and the Arab world as a whole" by Tunisian film directors, assumed a martyr by the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) of Tunisia, and named TIME magazine’s person of the year in 2011. The publicized suicide of Bouazizi made many people in similar situations believe that suicide was an appropriate action for them as well. Bouazizi was a university graduate distraught with the inability to financially support his mother and siblings, reflecting the vast majority of Tunisians experiencing soaring rates of unemployment. In 2009, the overall unemployment rate in Tunisia was 13.3%, but 30% among Tunisia's youth, who made up almost a third of the total population. The Tunisian government decreased expenditures from 45% to 29% from the 1970s to the 1990s, lowering the quality of public goods and services. Hence, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, president of Tunisia from 1987 to 2011, along with his family and other elites, created and strengthened the inner circle of cronyism—political elites appropriating economic resources and creating privileges by preventing outsiders. Controlling half the country’s wealth, the enterprises they owned produced 3% of total output and employed only 1% of the labor force. In addition, Ben Ali never allowed genuine political opposition to emerge and elections were manipulated: In 1989, he supposedly garnered 99.3% of the vote; in 1994, 99.9% and five years later, 99.4%. Political opponents — in particular Islamists— were persecuted, tortured or forced into exile. Tunisia's press was censored. According to the theory of suicide proposed by French sociologist Emile Durkheim, Bouazizi's self-immolation would be best categorized as anomic suicide. This type of suicide occurs when individuals experience a chronic state of societal disorganization, where traditional sources of regulation, such as religion and government, fail to provide moral constraints in the face of an unregulated capitalist economy. Anomic suicide is often associated with a sense of disillusionment about the future, leading individuals to see self-infliction as a way out. It's important to note that self-immolation directly contravenes Islamic law, as the Quran prohibits harm to oneself. Therefore, Bouazizi’s act can be viewed as a poignant illustration of the prioritization of social circumstances over religious beliefs. Despite the religious prohibition, Bouazizi saw self-immolation as a desperate means to escape his dire socio-economic situation. This conflict between religious doctrine and the perceived urgency of his socio-economic plight highlights how individuals may prioritize immediate material concerns over religious commitments. After years of severe economic hardship, during which most Tunisians were struggling to survive while President Ben Ali’s family, friends, and allies were getting richer, Bouazizi’s self-immolation marked the tipping point. Tunisians began to protest. Tensions heightened on December 22nd when another young man from Sidi Bouzid climbed up an electricity pylon and electrocuted himself on the cables, saying he was fed up with being unemployed. The new wave of strikes first erupted on December 17th in Sidi Bouzid, and came after the labor unions announced that they would organize peaceful marches to urge the government to improve its performance in development and employment. A few days later, a teenager was killed when police in Sidi Bouzid opened fire on protesters. An interior ministry spokesperson said police had been forced to "shoot in self-defense" from protesters who were setting police cars and buildings ablaze. The Tunisian government had been trying to manage the crisis politically before using force and the Tunisian development minister traveled to Sidi Bouzid to announce a new $10m employment program. The Tunisian government’s concessions—often met with skepticism on its sincerity and implementation—were a response to the resilience and violence of the crisis, showing Tunisians that the government was reacting to their demands rather than solely resorting to violence. This instilled hope in Tunisians regarding the positive trajectory of their protests. Despite protests, the rich were getting richer, the poor were not only getting poorer, but also had no job prospects, no ability to express themselves, and no way of criticizing government policy. The protests that erupted in Sidi Bouzid were spontaneous, yet they were marked by a level of organization and sophistication that appeared grounded in the sheer determination of those who participated in them. Tunisians faced a more costly and risky path due to being the first country to protest, unlike Egyptians who benefited from the momentum generated in Tunisia. The cost of cronyism and corruption to Tunisia is much higher because it also hinders job creation and investment and contributes to social exclusion. The presence of cronyism exacerbates the costs of protest by increasing repression, legal and financial consequences, social stigmatization, and psychological toll for protesters. The fear of retaliation from security forces was high, and protesting carried significant risks, including arrest, torture, and disappearance. For Tunisians, the standard method of expressing dissent has been informally within the party framework, but the masses participate in riots and demonstrations. The first president of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987), carefully appointed members of the political elite and removed them from office in such a way as to prevent anyone from building up a political base to keep factions to a minimum. The Tunisian economy was heavily centralized around the ruling elite and suffered from widespread corruption and cronyism. Economic grievances were a major driver of the Tunisian uprising, and many protesters were motivated by frustrations with unemployment, poverty, and lack of economic opportunities. The economic challenges faced by Tunisians may have increased the perceived costs of protesting, as individuals risked losing their livelihoods or facing economic hardships as a result of participating in protests. In Tunisia, the uprising was driven by a broad-based coalition of activists, students, workers, and ordinary citizens who came together to demand change. Solidarity among protesters helped to mitigate some of the risks associated with protesting by providing emotional support, practical assistance, and collective action. From this, it is clear that Tunisians perceived their uncertainties as resolvable through risky actions, therefore partaking in actions that would immediately relieve their grievances rather than remaining disillusioned with their future, which ultimately decreased their religiosity during this period. On January 13, 2011, Ben Ali appeared on national television and made broad concessions to the opposition, promising not to seek reelection as president when his term would end in 2014. He expressed regret over the deaths of protesters and vowed to order police to stop using live fire except in self-defense. Addressing some of the protesters’ grievances, he said he would reduce food prices and loosen restrictions on Internet use. Ben Ali’s concessions did not satisfy the protesters, who continued to clash with security forces, resulting in several deaths. The next day, a state of emergency was declared, and Tunisian state media reported that the government had been dissolved, Ben Ali fled Tunisia, and that legislative elections would be held in the next six months. Ben Ali’s reign from 1987-2011 had ended and Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi, appointed by Ben Ali in 1999, assumed power. The aftermath of Ben Ali's departure marked a significant moment for Tunisia, as protests persisted despite the regime change. Protesters had gathered in the area to demand that the interim government step down and the current parliament be disbanded. Demonstrators were also asking for suspension of the current constitution and the election of an assembly that can write a new one, as well as organize the transition to democracy. There were daily protests that members of Ben Ali's Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) party were in the new government and thousands of largely peaceful anti-RCD protests emerged.36 After persistent clashes between protesters and armed forces, Ghannouchi announced his resignation particularly following the death of three people in the country's capital, Tunis: “I am resigning today because I am not willing to be a person that takes decisions that could cause casualties," he told reporters Sunday. He also questioned "why a lot of people considered their main target to keep attacking the government, although a lot of its members agreed to join in this critical time." Ghannouchi’s resignation can be seen as a tangible outcome of the protesters' efforts. It signifies that their voices were heard and that their actions had a direct impact on the political landscape. Ghannouchi's acknowledgment of the need to avoid decisions that could cause casualties reflects a recognition of the legitimacy of the protesters' grievances and a commitment to avoiding further violence. Bouazizi's actions were instrumental in differentiating between controlled uncertainty and random uncertainty, providing Tunisians with a tangible catalyst that transformed disillusionment into proactive engagement with the future. Role of Religion Becomes Secondary As people sought to find concrete control over uncertain circumstances amid political instability, their dedication to religious beliefs weakened. Involvement in organized protests, the confrontation of severe repression, and the navigation of severe economic hardships became the focal points of their attention, demoting religious commitment to a secondary position. In 2012, the Pew Research Center surveyed Tunisians and found that though democratic principles were high priorities, as were the economy and security. 92% said that improving the economy ranked as the most important priority while 79% said that it was very important to maintain law and order. Also, people found democratic freedoms more important than religious divisions. This shows that Tunisians found these economic and democratic principles to take precedence over other grievances they faced. In this time period, a perceived resolution for these priority issues was through civil resistance, demonstrations, general strikes, and self-immolations, that were leading to visible outcomes and relieving uncertainty in a way that religion was not. Outside the party system, Tunisians became politically active, especially Tunisian women, who protested the draft constitution, the economy, and the ruling coalition. Within this political context of newly found political liberalizations, similar to Egypt, various religious groups started coming out of the underground in order to take advantage of the political openings. As these political openings were prioritized, trust in religious leaders went down from 38% to 35% between 2012 and 2018 and those who say they are not religious increased from 18% in 2012 to 30% in 2018. Tunisian Muslims that attend mosques at least some of the time decreased from 52% in 2012 to 30% in 2018. Tunisia’s troubled economy was the biggest challenge in 2017. The national unity government took some measures to stimulate growth, but it struggled to implement key reforms. High unemployment, a rising inflation rate, and tax increases plagued Tunisians. In January 2018, protests erupted in more than a dozen cities over price hikes. This further emphasizes the continued prioritization of addressing economic challenges by the Tunisian people. Secularization In Tunisia, the decades of Ben Ali’s secular regime had excluded religion from the public sphere. Its cascading effects have led Tunisia to have notably lower religiosity than other Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries with the proportion of people who said they were not religious increasing from 15% in 2013 to over 30% in 2018. The ousting of Ben Ali created political opportunities for Islamists, yet the secularizing impact of his two-decade-long regime remains a compelling explanation for the decline in religiosity between 2012-2018. Following the dissolution and drafting of a new constitution in October 2011, Tunisia no longer enforced secularism through repression. Surveillance, restriction, and harassment of Islamist activists that were previously practiced by the government ceased during the year. The new draft gave rise to Islamists to fight for power. In the months that followed the 2010-2011 revolution, several hundred imams were replaced, often by violent Islamists who accused the imams of having collaborated with the former Ben Ali regime. By October 2011, the Ministry of Religious Affairs announced that it had lost control of about 400 mosques. 6 The “uncontrolled” classification means that a mosque’s imams were operating without the official authorization of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In Tunisia’s new political landscape, the content of prayer services was also no longer controlled by government authorities, a step many Tunisians approved of and viewed as part of the new liberties acquired through the revolution. In 2014, secular parties edged out Islamists at the polls. In the October parliamentary elections, Nidaa Tounes, a secularist political party, won 85 seats compared to 69 for Ennahda, an Islamist political party. Veteran politician Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi, the head of Nidaa Tounes and a former prime minister, was elected president in December. But turnout was lowest among the young, who ignited the Arab uprisings; among cities, the turnout was lowest in Sidi Bouzid, the birthplace of the uprisings that spread across the Middle East and North Africa. In 2016, Nidaa Tounes, the ruling secular party in Parliament, splintered. Ennahda founder Rachid Ghannouchi declared the Islamist party was abandoning political Islam. Amidst competition between Islamist and secular parties, when asked whether Turkey or Saudi Arabia is a better model for the role of religion in Tunisia’s government, 78% of Tunisians prefer the more secular Turkey, seeing it as a model for religion and politics. While the trends toward secularization during this period seemingly impact individual piety levels, the dominant controlled uncertainty factor holds greater significance, given that secularization has not been exclusive to this period and has prevailed since the era of Ben Ali. Despite the freedom of Islamist parties to enter political life, the government’s loss of control over regulating mosques, and new liberties granted toward religious freedom, levels of non-religiosity still prevailed. Political Islam In contrast to secularization efforts during Tunisia’s political transition, the country simultaneously experienced concerted efforts from Islamists to increase the role of religion in politics. During this period, the presence of political Islam coupled with economic and political insecurities might have led individuals to deviate from religious commitments as they witnessed greedy power grabs from both Islamists and secular parties who employed religion as a political instrument. From January to October 2011, an interim government moved toward reform, recognizing new political parties and disbanding Ben Ali’s party. On October 23, Ennahda, a moderate Islamist party, won the national elections and formed a coalition government with two secular parties. Ennahda first emerged as an Islamist movement in response to repression at the hands of a secularist, authoritarian regime that denied citizens religious freedom and the rights of free expression and association. In 2014, the new constitution incorporated mentions of Islam as the religion and culture of the Tunisian people while also establishing a state role for protecting freedom of religious worship and expression. Ennahda, formerly an Islamist movement, transitioned into a party of "Muslim democrats," distancing itself from the label of "Islamism" due to negative associations with radical extremism. This shift reflects a strategic response to counter the misinterpretation and abuse of Islam by radical groups like ISIS, positioning Ennahda as a moderate political force advocating for democratic principles. Ennahda’s re-labelling as “Muslim democrats” reflects frustration with outsiders not understanding its supposedly true democratic nature which may have resulted in individuals associating their challenges with these religious changes in governance and frustration with religion being politicized. Today, Tunisians are less concerned about the role of religion than about building a governance system that is democratic and inclusive and that meets their aspirations for a better life. However, the interplay between political Islam and religiosity is tied to perceptions of uncertainty. The prevalent economic hardships—regardless of the presence of political Islam—left Tunisians uncertain about the future. In 2011, 78% of Tunisians expressed optimism that the economy would improve to some extent within the following 2-3 years. However, by 2018, this hope had significantly dwindled, with only 33% of Tunisians maintaining confidence in a better economic outlook over the same timeframe. Case of Egypt Egypt stands as a prominent example of a country profoundly affected by the events in Tunisia. The success of the Tunisian Revolution in ousting President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali provided a template for dissent, inspiring Egyptians to rise up against the longstanding rule of President Hosni Mubarak. The images and narratives of Tunisian protesters challenging authoritarianism and demanding change resonated with Egyptians, fueling their own aspirations for political reform and social justice. In Egypt, decades of corruption, police brutality, media censorship, unemployment, and inflation led labor and youth activists, feminists, and individual members of the Muslim Brotherhood to protest. From the occupation of downtown Cairo’s Tahrir Square, to labor strikes, acts of civil disobedience, clashes with armed forces, and others, violence between protestors and the police resulted in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries. The wave of organized protests gained momentum following the oustings of Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi in 2011 and 2013, respectively. These pivotal events demonstrated to Egyptians that mass mobilization could be an effective means of addressing the longstanding issues they had endured. Despite Mubarak's lengthy rule from 1981 until his departure in 2011, previous protests had proven ineffective in leading to his resignation. However, the timely catalyst provided by Tunisia's Revolution ignited a sense of urgency among Egyptians, inspiring them to seize upon the pan-Arabist phenomenon sweeping the region. This newfound determination empowered Egyptians to confront their decades-long grievances head-on. Egyptians, seeking an immediate end to enduring abuse and corruption, embraced large, organized protests despite harsh governmental crackdown and threats of death. Their perception of the uncertainty faced during this period appeared to be remedied by protests and political changes, thereby diminishing the role of religion to a secondary position. The Egyptian case took advantage of the momentum that the Tunisian revolution brought, making it unique to examine the intricate relationship between their resistance and the decline in religious commitment, challenging the notion that religious avenues are the primary recourse during times of political instability. Controlled Uncertainty Egypt has been an authoritarian government since 1952 with periodic revolts and unrest. The causes of the 2011 protests against Mubarak also existed in 1952, when the Free Officers, who led the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, ousted King Farouk. Issues such as inherited power, corruption, under-development, unemployment, and unfair distribution of wealth have persisted as constants in Egyptian life since 1952. Successive Egyptian regimes have systematically used repression to ensure order. The authoritarian barter “bread and security for freedom” has been widely disseminated along with the notion that the country was not yet ready for democracy. Egypt has long grappled with a systemic pattern of human rights abuses and repression embedded in its governance, prompting citizens to attribute their crises directly to the government. While these challenges have persisted since 1952, worsening economic conditions, government corruption, and Mubarak’s rule, coupled with the influence of the Arab Spring ignited by the events in Tunisia, led Egyptians to unite in similar protests in 2011. The momentum from Tunisia became a catalyst, empowering Egyptians to engage in hands-on initiatives challenging Mubarak’s authoritarian government. President Hosni Mubarak's regime was also repressive, but opposition groups had more space for political activism compared to Tunisia, which lacked a traditional history of political dissent. Mubarak’s regime escalated violence against protesters significantly as protests enlarged with the anticipation of Mubarak’s resignation. Pro-Mubarak demonstrators targeted journalists, and, in what became known as the “Battle of the Camel," plainclothes policemen rode into Tahrir Square on camels and horses to attack unarmed protesters. The issuing of laws restricting public assembly allowed security officials to ban protests up to their discretion and were consequently allowed to use indiscriminate force on defying protestors. Egyptians mobilized protests in diverse ways and when they were repressed through laws restricting public assembly or with increasingly violent police responses, organized protests grew larger and more inflamed. Messages were picked out in stones and plastic tea cups, graffiti, newspapers and leaflets, and al-Jazeera's TV cameras which broadcast hours of live footage from the square everyday. When one channel of communication was blocked, people tried another. Mubarak had grown fearful of the protestors’ relentlessness—first pledging to form a new government, then promising not to seek another term in the next elections, and later becoming increasingly defiant about not stepping down—all the while asking protesters to return to normal. Eventually, Mubarak was forced to step down and the Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed leadership of the country on February 11, 2011. Protests still endured; during March and April 2011, SCAF granted a number of concessions to protesters’ demands in an effort to clear the streets of continued demonstrations. Human Rights Abuses Mubarak’s regime initially responded to the protests with brute force and tear gas, beating and arresting protesters. The regime responded to later increases in protest mobilization by shutting down internet service and mobile phone text messages, replacing regular police forces with the military, and imposing a curfew. This exemplifies a cycle of human rights abuses that not only heightened violent responses but also fueled additional protests, as Egyptians became increasingly outraged. Egyptians faced constant repression and abuse for decades under Mubarak’s rule, and used religious commitment as a coping mechanism before Tunisia catalyzed the Arab Spring, bringing newfound hope that Egyptians could better their circumstances. Since 2013, the military and security-led regime has reinstated its control over society and citizens with an iron fist, curtailing freedom of information and banning freedom of expression. Peaceful political participation and civil society activism, which were the pillars of the January uprising, have been de facto outlawed by the adoption of an arsenal of undemocratically spirited and restrictive laws. Protesting was costly and these laws banning public assembly made it much more risky for Egyptians to participate in protests, but the momentum of the revolution had assured individuals that there would be large turnouts, therefore bolstering their confidence in protesting as a means to confront the military and security-led regime. Egyptians, fueled by the momentum of their revolution and triggered by the ousting of Mubarak and Morsi, found empowerment in protesting. The logical nature of their efforts heightened hope for the future, as each overthrow or victory seemed to validate their path to stability. The move against Morsi deepened the political schism. Millions of Egyptians had taken to the streets against Morsi, but large numbers also protested the ousting of Morsi. A crackdown by security forces killed hundreds and Egypt declared a state of emergency. The emergency measures allowed security forces to detain people indefinitely for virtually any reason. They also granted broad powers to restrict public gatherings and media freedom. Gallup classifies respondents as thriving, struggling, or suffering, according to how they rate their current and future lives on a ladder scale numbered from 0 to 10 based on the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale. Egyptians gave their lives some of the worst ratings they ever have in the weeks leading up to former President Mohamed Morsi's removal from office. The 34% of Egyptians who rated their lives poorly enough to be considered suffering in June was up from 23% in January. Fewer than one in 10 rated their lives positively enough to be considered thriving. Role of Religion Becomes Secondary Fridays frequently became “days of rage” in Egypt and elsewhere because of the convenience of organizing would-be protesters during Friday prayers. Likewise, mosques themselves are often said to have served as organizational hubs for protest. Mosques functioned as a locus of anti-government agitation and logistical centers of preparation for demonstrations. While it may seem that protest activities at mosques contributed to an apparent increase in mosque attendance, thus suggesting elevated overall religious commitment, these places of worship primarily assumed roles as organizational centers during the peak of the protests, prioritizing logistics over prayer and religious services. Although, of course, mosques and Friday services were still attended for customary reasons, the dual functionality of the mosque introduced secular competition as highlighted earlier in the Theory section. Individuals are confronted with the dilemma of choosing between prayer and protest. Protest is a costly behavior that becomes progressively less risky as the number of participants increases. Hence, overall Mosque participation during the height of mass protests between the overthrow of Mubarak in 2011 to the beginning of El-Sisi’s presidency in 2014, declined. Prior to the Arab Spring, strength in religious beliefs were at high levels: the belief that things would be better if there were more people with strong religious beliefs decreased from 89.8% in 2005 to 83.4% in 2013. Additionally, the percentage of individuals with the belief that religious faith is an important quality in children decreased from 47.1% in 2005 to 27.7% in 2013. Muslims who say they attend the mosque at least some of the time decreased from around 85% in 2012-2014 to 75% in 2018-2019. Secularization In Egypt, as the regime experienced waves of regime changes and upheavals, the period between 2012-2016 witnessed efforts toward constitutional reform emphasizing the protection of civil liberties, the separation of powers, and the establishment of a democratic system of government. While Islam remained the state religion, the constitution also guaranteed freedom of religion and prohibited discrimination based on religion. The constitutional assembly was almost entirely composed of Islamists (Muslim Brothers, Salafis, and independent Islamists). Dozens of articles addressed individual rights and liberties of Egyptian citizens, which was more than the number of articles mentioning Islam. By enshrining these goals in the constitution, the government was held accountable, making failure to fulfill its constitutional obligations not just an act of inefficiency but anti-constitutional. Examples include Article 61, which demands to eradicate illiteracy within ten years; Article 66, which requires the state to provide opportunities for sports and physical exercise; and Article 184, which instructs the state to assimilate living standards across the country. While Islamist groups participated in the drafting of the constitution, the outcome reflected a broader commitment to democratic principles and social reforms driven by the demands of the people. In 2013, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi ousted Morsi and campaigned for the presidency on an anti-Islamist platform. He deemed the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, imposing restrictions on their operations and political activities. Liberals called the Brotherhood’s vision for Egypt “totally contradictory with the Egyptian national character,” which they argued respected pluralism of religion and the separation of religion and politics. The banning of the Muslim Brotherhood has likely contributed to the loss of faith in Islamist parties. El-Sisi also claimed that ‘the religious discourse in the Islamic World has lost the values of humanity in Islam’ and rejected the idea of an Islamic state. When he won the presidency in 2014, many moderate Muslims supported El-Sisi because he had taken a clear stand against Islamist radicalism and expressed a genuine desire to support a peaceful understanding of Islam. And in 2018, when El-Sisi ran again, he was re-elected with 97 percent of the vote, although the turnout was low and he faced virtually no competition. The crackdown against human rights defenders and independent rights organizations have made effective monitoring of the elections extremely difficult, especially with the number of organizations that were granted permission to monitor the elections being 44 percent fewer than in the last presidential election in 2014. This has resulted in elections facing criticism for not meeting the standards of a free and fair democratic process. This can also suggest that through negative partisanship, or the phenomenon of individuals forming their political opinions based on their opposition to certain individuals or parties, people viewed El-Sisi as either the best among limited options or endorsed his secularization efforts. Political Islam When governments weaponize a religion that the majority of their populations affiliate with, it is reasonable to link political Islam and individual piety to assert that piety levels and overall religiosity may decrease. This is a competitive argument because perceptions of Islam are directly shaped by how their governments implement Islamic laws, often at the expense of neglecting the needs of the people. Individuals are increasingly witnessing religion being wielded as a political tool. On one hand, they are promised welfare services in the name of Islam, while on the other hand, their repression is justified through the manipulation of Islamic texts. While El-Sisi initially presented himself as anti-Islamist, appearing on stage with the Coptic Pope, the Sheikh of Al-Azhar (the country's most esteemed institution of Islamic learning), and Galal al-Murra, a prominent Salafist, following the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, he privately holds conservative Islamic views. In A 2006 paper that Sisi wrote for the U.S. Army War College, he argued that democracy in the Middle East could only be of an Islamic nature, and that Islam provides the intellectual framework for his political beliefs. In addition, in 2011, when crowds protested against the military for imposing “virginity tests” on female protesters, Sisi declared that it was his responsibility to “decide if [protesters] were honorable.” However, the fluctuating influences of political Islam in Egypt between 2012-2018 indicate that it is not a strong enough condition on its own for political instability to decrease religiosity. Even the most liberal Egyptian party in 2012, the Free Egyptians Party, publicly defended a constitutional clause making the principles of Sharia the source of legislation. Even when the dominant strategy of the incumbent government was to combat political Islam—as has been the case since July 2013—the formal discourse of President El-Sisi included frequent mentions of the Qur'an and Hadith.33 The Muslim Brotherhood witnessed a consistent rise in support from July 2011 to February 2012 at 63%, followed by a sharp decline in April 2012 to 42%. Prior to the Brotherhood’s rise to power, many believed that its political inclusion would lead to its democratization and moderation. Throughout the eighteen days of demonstrations in January and February 2011 that toppled Mubarak, Brotherhood leaders were aware that the protests were not dominated by Islamist ideas but rather oriented toward the broad goals of freedom and social justice. As a result, Brotherhood leaders were deliberate in their strategies to appeal to voters by not expressing their Islamist views too overtly. This deception was caught on by Egyptians. Nevertheless, between 2011 and 2013, the old state chose to cooperate with Islamists, including the Brotherhood, to neutralize the revolutionary mood in the country. After coming to power, the Brotherhood quickly lost support among the main recipients of its social welfare network: the poor. The Brotherhood’s relationship with the poor was entirely clientelist and was concerned exclusively with creating an electoral base as opposed to developing a more substantive ideological or political relationship. It preferred to reproduce poverty as long as it translated into welfare recipients and, by extension, loyal voters. However, the strength of the argument that the presence of political Islam decreases religiosity diminishes when considering the current scenario, where political Islam exerts even more influence, and yet, religiosity has increased. This discrepancy suggests that the dynamics between political Islam and religiosity are subject to evolving perceptions of uncertainty. During the height of the revolution, Egyptians may have perceived their uncertainties about the future differently, driven by a sense of optimism and the belief in activism. In contrast, the present disillusionment with uncertainties about the future may be contributing to an enhanced role of religion in their lives. The increased religiosity could be a response to the perceived inadequacy of political solutions to address current challenges, prompting individuals to turn to religion as a source of guidance in times of persistent uncertainty. Conclusion I have posited that the conditions of political instability that decrease religiosity are controlled uncertainty and the secondary role of religion. When individuals are presented with concrete solutions to address challenges they attribute to their political circumstances, these solutions will assume greater significance than religious commitment. And when individuals lack access to these tangible solutions and experience disillusionment about the future, religious commitment tends to increase. The pivotal factor in this dynamic is individuals' perception of the future, and this analysis delved into how these perceptions manifested and endured during periods of political instability. Consequently, the outcome is a demotion of religion to a secondary role in individuals' lives, outcompeted by favorable solutions that emerge from the uncertainties they face. It's noteworthy that Egypt has faced challenges since the Mubarak regime, raising concerns about the possibility of a new Arab Spring. Despite the ongoing deterioration of human rights conditions, the intensity that characterized the Arab Spring has diminished. Reflecting on the revolution has yielded diverse opinions, with some viewing it as a success while others perceiving it as a failure. Although repression in Egypt may arguably be more severe today, the period between 2011 and 2016 marked a distinct phase. The ongoing debates surrounding the success or failure of the initial Arab Spring make it seem improbable for a similar movement to occur. Despite the immediate changes following the revolution, both Egypt and Tunisia continue to grapple with longstanding grievances. Tunisia, in particular, is confronted with economic challenges, with approximately 6,000 Tunisians joining ISIS, marking the highest per capita rate globally. Tunisians became disillusioned with post-revolution politics, especially well-educated youths, who experienced unemployment at extremely high rates. Despite the gradual political progress seen over the past seven years, economic rewards have yet to emerge, spurring some to radicalize. Some remaining questions that emerge are: Do individuals revert to heightened religious commitment after resolving political instability, or does the influence of tangible solutions have a lasting impact on their religious commitment? 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Author Name < Back Editorial Board Foreword Tianyu Zhou & Juno Tantipipatpong “And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of soul is justice and its defect injustice?" In this issue, we welcomed articles that centered around the theme of “political theory as a vehicle of social change.” We’ll first introduce the thematic logic and then proceed with a brief summary of articles. Can PPE theories serve as a vehicle for social change? Since the Axial Age (8th - 3rd century BCE), Vergeistigung , or spiritu- alization of the human mind, was complete among major world civilizations. Based on “rationality and rationally-clarified expe- riences,” humans began to question the current state of affairs, and political theories thus became a preoccupation for the pro- lific minds, not only as a description of how societies and polities are , but as a prescription of what they should become. The Socra- tic inquiries and Plato’s Republic were remarkable in defining, for the first time in the Western tradition, the role of a philosopher in society and polity–that is, to seek justice. Economics as a sci- entific matter emerged as a normative subject on how society may improve by scientific means. Important studies of how PPE theories may serve as a ve- hicle of social change first emerged in the 1920s. In his book, Crystallizing Public Opinion , Edward Bernays proposed a theory that took the “public opinion” of political economic matters as the problematik . The study demonstrated the effect of news and factual information on society are a function of the channels through which they were transmitted. As Bernays himself put, “[the] public relations counsel must lift startling facts from his whole subject and present them as news. He must isolate ideas and develop them into events so that they can be more readily understood and so that they may claim attention as news.” The tension caused by the question of how the logical and evidential basis of ideas may best correspond to their effects on society has haunted intellectuals ever since. The human rights theorists, Marxists, a number of political economists and the New Leftist intellectuals, and many scholars who began such inquiries in the aftermath of the Vietnam War have proposed various theories. In our current issue, authors have discussed topics of vital import in a wide range of fields, from the study of the ethics of ignorance to gender and sexual consent, from political ideology and public discourse to the politics of secularization and religi- osity, and from economic disruption to the meaning of work. We believe these issues are best examined through the lenses of philosophy, politics, and economics jointly. Through our pieces, we wish to illuminate both the diversity of thoughts and advise reflection on how readers might use this knowledge to improve the social conditions. References [1] Plat. Rep. 1.353e, “ἡ μἡν ἡρα δικαία ψυχἡ καἡ ἡ δίκαιος ἡνἡρ εἡ βιώσεται, κακἡς δἡ ἡ ἡδικος”. [2] Jaspers, K. (2017). Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte (K. Salamun, Ed.). Schwabe Verlag. https://doi. org/10.24894/978-3-7965-4059-2.Recommended translation is Jaspers, K. (2021). The Origin and Goal of History (C. Thornhill, Ed.; 1st ed.). Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/The-Origin-and-Goal-of-History/Jaspers/p/book/9780367679859 [3] “[die] Rationalität und [die] rational [geklärte] Erfahrung (der Logos gegen den Mythos)”. [4] Brown, E. (2017). Plato’s Ethics and Politics in The Republic. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-ethics-politics/#Rel. [5] Samuels, W. J., Biddle, Jeff., & Davis, J. Bryan. (Eds.). (2003). A Companion to the History of Economic Thought (1st ed.). Blackwell. https://www.wiley.com/en-us/A+Companion+to+the+History+of+Eco- nomic+Thought-p-9780631225737. [6] Bernays, E. L. (1923). Crystallizing Public Opinion . Liveright Publishing. [7] I.e., Vilfredo Pareto and Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere. Serious scholars of Marxian thought and its history are referred to Kołakowski, Leszek. (1981). Main Currents of Marxism: The Founders, The Golden Age, The Breakdown (P. S. Falla, Ed.; Revised). W.W. Norton & Co. https:// wwnorton.com/books/Main-Currents-of-Marxism/.On human rights, see Jean Quataert, & Lora Wildenthal (Eds.). (2021). Routledge History of Human Rights (1st ed.). Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-History-of-Human-Rights/Quataert-Wildenthal/p/ book/9781032089669.8 [8] On politics, see T. Ball & R. Bellamy (Eds.), The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521563543 On economic thought, see The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015. (2019). In K. Becker & I. D. Thomson (Eds.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy , 1945-2015 (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. https:// doi.org/10.1017/9781316779651.

Editorial board Foreword Volume I Issue I Introducing the inaugural issue of JPPE The ambition to start an international, interdisciplinary, academic journal of philosophy, politics, and economics was one that emerged as much as a consequence of a desire to take a new approach to undergraduate scholarship as it was motivated by an affinity for an old idea: ‘philosophy, politics, and economics’ (PPE). PPE is famously a product of the University of Oxford, which, in the 1920s, began to amalgamate the three disciplines into a single degree that could provide a strong, yet broad foundation for future policymakers. And in this regard, the program succeeded. Many major British politicians and public figures—from the Labour Party’s Ed Miliband to Former Prime Minister David Cameron to Christopher Hitchens—studied PPE at Oxford. It is important when considering the emergence of PPE, however, to recall the relative radicalism of the concept at the historical time period in which it emerged. Just as the Russian Revolution came to a close and the First World War left Europe devastated, the United Kingdom began to experience high unemployment. It was in this context of political strife, growing inequality, and seemingly insurmountable threats to global peace and human livelihoods that PPE emerged as a concept that could help spur the thoughtful ethical, political, and economic decisions that might affect positive change. And yet, despite the success of Oxford’s PPE program and the stunning propensity of the program’s top graduates to take seat in British Parliament today, it has not crossed the Atlantic to achieve the same popularity. Much of this is a consequence of a particularly English affinity for generalists; however, whatever the reason, this Journal holds that the failure for PPE to take off in the United States has been a shame. Though PPE has been criticized at times as an academic experience that produces broad knowledge as opposed to deep knowledge, the interdisciplinary program is, at its core, the single most effective tool to analyze modern circumstance as a social scientist. Brown University, to its credit, has seen nascent developments in PPE programming. Every year, students look to pursue Independent Concentrations that mimic Oxford’s program, and the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society, which, like this Journal, is sponsored by the Political Theory Project, highlights this growing trend. We created the Brown University Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics to encourage the growth in PPE-related academic work on Brown’s campus and, most importantly, to provide young people with a space to debate and put forth academic arguments that can kindle the discussions that ultimately transform communities and entire democracies. In achieving in this end, our Journal dedicates itself to five guiding principles. First, we value interdisciplinary understanding. By shifting toward a more broad approach to social sciences, the debates, which are too often compartmentalized, are made more accessible and inclusive. In each issue of JPPE, we aim to highlight the best economic arguments alongside the best philosophical and political arguments. This could for instance illustrate, at once, the ways in which a discussion of the minimum wage can be understood as a question of economic efficiency and as a question of political feasibility, as well as a moral proposition that asks important questions about the permissibility of income inequality. What results from this is not a dearth of deep knowledge, but rather a broad understanding in which the sum is greater than each of its individual parts. The bold idea of this Journal stems from a belief that the lenses of philosophy, politics, and economics are not only useful to considering contemporary circumstance. They are all essential. Second, we value diversity. In order to create a space that effectively reflects the character of contemporary debate among young people, as well as the issues most motivating the next generation of leaders and thinkers, it is essential that diversity of views and backgrounds are highlighted. As a non-partisan publication, we strive to highlight a range of political arguments so long as they are rigorous, thoughtful, and conceived in good faith. And though our Journal selects submissions name-blind, we are committed to promoting an inclusive environment for all our employees, welcoming staff members regardless of ethnic origins, gender, religious beliefs, disability, sexual orientation, or age. This doesn’t just make us a more responsible organization, it makes us a better journal. Third, we value academic rigor. As an academic publication, we are committed to publishing the highest levels of student scholarship, and we require that submissions be well written, well argued, well researched, and innovative. In creating this Journal, however, our publication’s founders recognized the limits of undergraduate experience and knowledge as a means to assess the quality of scholarship. For this reason, our Journal is peer-reviewed, receiving guidance and feedback on what essays to publish from a team of over 25 eminent scholars. Fourth, we value free thinking and original arguments. Though many essays we receive are pieces that have been written for a classroom environment and thus may be confined to answer a particular array of questions in a smaller paradigm than academics might, we have been consistently impressed by the unique ideas students have put forth. It is the aim of our Journal to highlight these pieces of original analysis, which are too often tucked away into the cupboards of forgotten undergraduate work. Fifth, we value and desire to play an integral part in stimulating global leadership among young people. Though we are an academic publication, we aspire to influence discussions among undergraduates that can help spur re-evaluation, action, and change. In placing an emphasis on global leadership, we recognize that the real value of our Journal comes less through the answers our authors provide than through the discussions they encourage and the audacity of the ideas they propagate. The inaugural issue of our Journal you are now reading perfectly reflects our five guiding principles. In “A More Perfect Union”, for instance, the author encourages readers to more closely analyze the relationship between liberalism and national unity, pondering how a liberal democracy should best understand its relationship to patriotism. And in the “Latent Effects of Cannabis Legalization”, we publish original research on the criminalization of marijuana and its disproportionate effects on black communities. This edition also features pieces from two significant American leaders: Providence Mayor Jorge Elorza and Louisville Mayor Greg Fischer. Both mayors are important figures on the frontlines of local policy that seeks to make economic growth in the 21st century more inclusive and competitive, reducing the barriers to entry and ordinances that too often discourage participation in the American economy and in our democracy. We asked both mayors to highlight their achievements on this front not only as a means to highlight examples of effective local policy implementation, but also in order to more profoundly integrate the literature of future leaders with the work already being done by current leaders. We believe that all of these elements have helped us put forth a powerful combination of essays, and we hope JPPE will be a place where young people can go to consider new ideas and offer innovative solutions to addressing today’s ethical, economic, and political challenges. Our team is united by a shared love of argument, problem solving, and a deeply felt desire to help contribute to conversations that can so greatly impact livelihoods. And in a time where the world is rapidly changing, as forces like technological disruption, globalization, climate change, and political polarization threaten to vastly alter our human experience this century, young leaders will undoubtedly be called upon to develop new ideas to solve the challenges we face. JPPE aims to both facilitate and be a part of this great conversation.

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Editorial board Foreword Volume II Issue I Introducing the third issue of JPPE In recent years, the world’s attention has increasingly turned to environmental issues. Once a subject that interested only a few committed activists and academics, climate change and other related issues have now gained the interest and concern of a large number of people all around the world. In recent years, we have witnessed the signing of a landmark protocol – the Paris Agreement – that seeks to tackle some of the causes of climate change. Moreover, world leaders of the caliber of Pope Francis, French President Emmanuel Macron and former US Vice President Al Gore have attempted to draw attention to the harm humans cause to the environment. Yet, concurrently we have seen the rise of those who deny the existence or minimize the importance of a concerning rise in world temperature, most notably President Donald Trump. Aside from the political debate on climate change, academics have started engaging with the issue more and more often. Universities all over the world now have departments that focus on environmental studies. Pioneering scholars like Wallace Broecker, Phil Jones, Michael Mann, Susan Solomon and Veerabhadran Ramanathan have devoted their entire career to the study of various aspects of this important issue. Notably, the work of Yale economist William Nordhaus was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2018 for “integrating climate change into long-run macroeconomic analysis.” This edition of the Brown Journal of Philosophy, Politics and Economics is, in part, devoted to climate change both as a political and academic issue. To explore this guiding theme, we feature a submission by United States Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, from Brown’s home state of Rhode Island, who has led the charge to raise awareness about climate change in the American political arena. In addition, one of our submissions examines and compares how the environment fits into the political imagination in Germany and the United States. It is our hope that these two pieces will help our readers better understand this crucial global issue. Yet, this edition of this Journal also features pieces on a number of other topics. Amongst others, our submissions explore subjects that range from realism in Chinese cinema to the value of shareholder activism, from gerrymandering in the United States to the ethics of using drones. Indeed, it is our sincere hope that by reading this semester’s edition our readers will be exposed to a number of distinct yet interrelated topics and that the value and insights of these papers will be enhanced when looking at them together rather than individually.

*Feature* JPPE INTERVIEW, WALTER SCHEIDEL: Coronavirus and Why Inequality is Only Ever Reduced by Disaster Walter Scheidel (pictured) is a historian at Stanford University as well as the author of eighteen books, including “The Great Leveler”, which presents a history of economic inequality from “the stone age to the twenty-first century”. In the book, which won a number of awards, Scheidel argues that inequality has historically only ever been reduced by “four horsemen”: plague, civil war, mass military mobilization, and government collapse. You can buy “The Great Leveler” here . May 2020 JPPE: The Great Leveler presents this very ambitious thesis that inequality only ever gets reduced by mass military mobilization, plague, civil war, or government collapse. Your previous work dealt with demography, political economy, ancient history, and the classics. Why was a book studying the history of inequality something that you wanted to work on? Scheidel : Well, I should say I’m not much of a classicist. I’ve always considered myself a historian, and even though I specialize in ancient and premodern history, I’ve always been interested in world history and comparative history, more generally. And I guess the short answer is that I wrote this book because nobody had ever tried to write it before, and it would not have been possible even ten or fifteen years earlier because there simply weren’t enough case studies of the pre-modern period to piece together a broad survey of the evolution of income and wealth inequality across hundreds and even thousands of years. And then my more immediate inspiration was Thomas Piketty’s book “Capital in the Twenty-First Century”. I had been familiar with his work already even before this book came out, and when the book actually did come out and was a huge success, I figured that if I didn't sit down now and write the book, then someone else is going to do it. And so, I got going, and I had the thesis already in the back of my mind—Piketty had the same thesis that I did but just for the twentieth century. And what I was trying to do was see if it applied to world history, more generally, and somewhat to my surprise, it turned out this was the case. And because I didn’t run into any obvious counterexamples, I was able to write up a whole book in the course of about two years. JPPE: Do you believe that high levels of inequality might be partially responsible for producing the shocks that ultimately reduce it? Scheidel : What I focused on was the impact of violent shocks on existing levels of inequality. And I think, in that respect, we are on pretty solid ground in that there are long term patterns regardless of what stage of development you are. Whether you are dealing with an agrarian society or an industrial society, the underlying principle and the underlying dynamics assert themselves again and again—it’s this idea that certain types of violent shocks would drive down inequality. Now, it is tempting to think that there could be some sort of homeostatic system where, if inequality goes up and exceeds a certain level, it triggers violent events that then reduce inequality. And then inequality rises again, and you have a never-ending series of cycles. That’s intellectually quite appealing. I don’t think that theory is fully borne out by the evidence that I have been able to put together. I think the evidence is much stronger in terms of a consistent effect of violent shocks on inequality, but not in quite the same way the other way around. JPPE: Are there certain instances in which inequality is responsible for causing the leveling force that ultimately brought it down? One example that seems to speak to this is the case of Germany prior to the Second World War. The high inequality that took place during that time and the decline in German purchasing power seems to have contributed to the socio-political conditions that would ultimately lead to the Second World War and the leveling that took place then. Scheidel : I’m not familiar with that particular case study. I think that it is perfectly plausible and possible to tease out this conclusion by statistical analysis. Yet, if you look at world history more generally, you become very wary of cherry-picking. It’s easy to identify individual cases where you can observe such a connection. There are very powerful counterexamples that should give us pause, however. So, for instance, if you just looked at France in the late eighteenth century, you could say, ‘of course the French Revolution was driven in part by extremely high levels of inequality’, and that makes perfect sense. Yet then you have to bear in mind that France was surrounded by other countries—Britain, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Germany—that were just as unequal as France and had no revolutions. You also have to bear in mind that the revolution in Russia occurred in a country that was not only not very industrialized, contrary to what Marx expected; it was also not very unequal by the standards of the time. The most unequal countries were the only industrialized ones—Britain, for example. The same is true of China when Mao took over. So, once you put all of these individual cases in context, it’s very difficult to say that a particular level of inequality triggers some kind of societal breakdown, ferments revolution, or leads to other kinds of leveling. JPPE: In your book, you argued that leveling would not have happened without the presence of a violent shock. You conclude, however, by discussing the possibility that we have moved to a point in history where the “four horsemen” are no longer necessary to reduce inequality. What do you think now? Scheidel : I think the evidence supports the belief that violent shocks are necessary to bring about leveling. They may not be sufficient, and they also act as catalysts. So, if you go back a hundred years or over one hundred years, there were already trends on the way in favor of increasing education, unionization of the workforce, the spread of democracy, and certain kinds of progressive taxation. All these things already existed but they got an enormous boost by World War One, the Great Depression, the New Deal, and World War Two. And the counterfactual is to think about if they would have gotten an equally big boost had these shocks not occurred, and I’m very pessimistic about that. It’s not a black and white picture; it’s not to say nothing ever changes in the absence of such shocks. It’s just to say the changes would be far less dramatic, and I think that this is quite easy to substantiate empirically. Now, as for your other question, when I concluded the book, I had to look forward to the future and I came to the conclusion that the traditional four horsemen were dormant right now. We no longer fight mass military mobilization wars; there are no credible revolutionary movements (at least in high-income countries); states are much more stable in most of the world than they used to be; and pandemics, such as the one that we are encountering right now, are nothing like the pandemics of the past that leveled by reducing the workforce and driving up wages. We’ll see the exact opposite in this case with respect to wages. What I neglected to include is that climate change might become a fifth leveling force. I’m sympathetic to that view. It needn’t be a fifth leveling force, but it could revive some of the others. It could lead to conflict, to state breakdown, to more pandemics, and to all kinds of things along those lines. So that’s something I should have perhaps considered more systematically. Otherwise I never really said that you can’t do anything at all in the absence of such violent shocks. I just wanted to remind people how difficult it is, and I think that’s important to bear in mind when we develop policy programs. We can’t just say ‘let’s go back to the way things were in the fifties’, for a number of reasons. We have to be aware when we develop policy initiatives what the structural impediments are and what very special conditions had to be in place in the past to bring about significant leveling. That’s not a call to defeatism. But I think it’s the historian’s job to put those things in perspective, and in this case, I think our job is to remind people over and over again that it’s really hard work to reduce inequality. JPPE: Are there instances of policy successfully reducing inequality that we can try and mimic in the future? Scheidel : That’s a very good question. I think there are two cases to consider. One is historically Scandinavian countries—not just Denmark, but also Sweden and Norway—, which used to be highly unequal two hundred years ago with extreme inequality in land ownership and so on. And that already started to get a little better in the course of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Those countries were not very heavily touched by the world wars. They were in some sense, however, and we see major contractions of inequality during those periods, but that’s clearly only part of the story. So, there is something going on in those countries, in particular, that put them on a trajectory towards lower inequality, and that was amplified and accelerated by the shocks in the first half of the twentieth century. Now, to what extent you can extrapolate from this is a very difficult question because those countries were—especially then— relatively small, not very populous, and they were extremely homogenous in a great many ways—linguistically, ethnically, socially, culturally, and so on. They were the exact opposite in many ways from the United States, which has historically always been very diverse, and there are studies that show that high levels of diversity can obstruct ambitious redistributive programs because there is simply less widespread popular support for those kinds of policies. So, we are talking about apples and oranges. It’s not quite clear to what extent you can transfer some examples and apply them to different kinds of societies. And I think this is where the case of Latin America comes in. Latin America is very interesting. It’s a major outlier because it never experienced a major reduction in inequality; inequality has always been very high because of its colonial past—slavery, plantation economies, for example. It also never experienced any major leveling shocks. It wasn’t really touched by the World Wars. There were hardly any revolutions outside of Cuba. And so, you had status quo for a really long time and not very many changes. And in terms of diversity, some of those societies are more similar to the United States. What you saw there in the first decade of this century was a quite significant trend towards lower inequality in most Latin American countries—such as Brazil—by peaceful means, and that’s very encouraging. It really depended on the concatenation of circumstances that may be hard to replicate—gains from increased investment in education, political changes, a commodities boom in China that shored up certain sectors of the economy. All kinds of things were coming together in just the right way to reduce historically high levels of inequality. As I was writing this book, I was wondering whether this peaceful trend might be sustainable, and there were already clouds on the horizon. There was a major economic downturn a number of years ago. And the trends seemed to have stopped in many countries. With what’s happening right now and will be happening as a result of the current pandemic, we can be pretty sure that this trend is not going to continue or be sustainable in the long term. We will have to wait for a revival of this trend. JPPE: It strikes me that when you ask scholars what the causes of inequality have been, people who study finance will blame financialization or the democratization of credit. Others will blame trade or technology. And others will blame policy. What do you believe the causes of inequality have been? Scheidel: It’s really like the story of the elephant and the blindfolded men who touch different parts of the elephant, and they try to describe the animal and come up with very different descriptions. In the existing scholarship on the reasons for the increase in inequality from the 1980s onwards, different studies identify different components— as you say, automation, globalization, deregulation, financialization, all kinds of “ations”, the weakening of unions, and the fact that enormous numbers of workers came online with the opening up of China. All of these effects really refashioned the post-war order in ways that revived economic growth, which had been flagging in the 70s, but also led to a higher concentration of income and wealth. And all these many factors have been interacting ever since, and this makes it so much more difficult to address the problem because there are so many different factors that are operational and active now and have been for a generation. So, if you just address globalization, or robots, or tax reform, you would only really touch one part of the elephant, so to speak. And it would be very difficult to implement comprehensive reforms without at the same time transforming the entire economic system that we live in and depend on. It may be possible in theory, but it doesn’t strike me as a very plausible policy goal in the short run. JPPE: You also argue that major economic transitions (e.g. the Industrial Revolution), often increase in inequality in the “short-run”. Do you think that we’re in the middle of something like this as we embrace digital technology? Scheidel: Yes, I’ve seen this argument a number of times and it makes perfect sense to me. I mean, at the beginning of agriculture, if you have a plow and someone else doesn’t have a plow, then you are better off than the other person. Now if you work in Silicon Valley, then you are well off, and if you don’t, then you are in trouble. So, these transitions—regardless of what they were like and what the specifics were like— certainly have disequalizing potential in the sense that they might make society overall richer, but they reward certain groups disproportionately. And frankly, the current pandemic is an excellent example. There are people who can work from home; their jobs are more secure; they have higher incomes on average. And there are people who do more traditional kinds of work, for lack of a better word, and they are much more heavily exposed to the economic downturn. You have students who can participate in online instruction because they have broadband access and laptops and those who can’t. All these inequalities already existed, but they are now actually amplified and made more painful by the existing crisis. And I think ultimately this is a symptom of the effects of a broader transition towards a more digital economy. JPPE: When we consider past plagues, do you think that there is anything fundamentally different about the Coronavirus Pandemic? Scheidel: Well, the most obvious difference is that even in a worst-case scenario, the coronavirus is going to kill a far smaller share of the population than pandemics of the past and even than the Spanish Flu did a hundred years ago. And mortality is, of course, concentrated among people in advanced ages and spares most of the active workforce and people who are about to enter the workforce. So, there won’t be any kind of demographic shock or Malthusian reset. Real wages are not going to go up because there won’t be a shortage of wages. In fact, mass unemployment is going to depress wages, if anything. So, we can mercifully forget about this. Nobody wants that kind of pandemic to ever happen again. And frankly, even if it did happen again in some future year, AI and automation would actually absorb some of those effects. We wouldn’t necessarily have to pay people more; we might just automate more, which aging societies are already doing if you look at Japan. So that’s a fundamental difference. In the short run, I think this pandemic is going to increase inequality for all the reasons we touched on and because unemployment is unevenly distributed. This is maybe not that different from earlier pandemics because, in the immediate aftermath of a pandemic, things tend to be quite chaotic. So, the real question is if the current pandemic has the potential to lead to some kind of equalizing change down the line—not tomorrow, but maybe a couple of years from now. That’s a very good question, and I think it depends ultimately on how severe this crisis is going to be because historically, the worse the crisis was, the harder the shocks and the greater the potential for equalizing change was. So if quantitative easing works and scientists come up with a decent vaccine within a year or so, there is a pretty good chance we will return to some modified version of the status quo, at least with the respect to inequality—i.e. that the existing inequalities will survive and maybe even be reinforced, which is what happened in 2008 after the Great Recession. The alternative is that things really get out of control, that creating new money turns out to be insufficient, that there will be a global depression that lasts for a long time, and that the virus turns out to be intractable—it mutates, and all kinds of horrible things happen. And, as a result of this, we may end up with levels of dislocation, misery, and despair that would drive our policymaking in a certain direction, which would be more like what we had in the 1930s, when conditions were so terrible and the social safety net so rudimentary or nonexistent that all kinds of measures had to be taken that would have been considered too radical just a few years before. So, it is quite possible that we find ourselves on the cusp of this sort of change. The ideas are already out there. There was no Bernie Sanders twenty years ago, and much of this will depend on how this is actually going to play out—just how big and disruptive this shock is going to be. JPPE: Are there specific policies you would like to see implemented? In your NYT op-ed, you called for a new era of progressive policy. Very practically, what are some of your positions? Scheidel : Well, I think outcomes are going to vary quite a lot by country. In the US, we live in a kind of low hanging fruit society, in the sense that inequality is higher than it needs to be and is higher than in other western capitalist countries for a number of reasons specific to the US—the political system, the fiscal structure, the weakness of unions, and so on. So, there are certain things the US could do that would have an effect longer-term on inequality. This includes campaign finance reform; there’s a clear connection between plutocratic influence and certain inequality outcomes. This includes providing better access to health care, improving access to education, protecting and reenabling collective bargaining and unionization. Whether it is tweaking the tax code to make it a bit more progressive and a bit more like what we see in Western Europe. None of these approaches would be radical. It’s not a new deal kind of scenario. It’s not a Green New Deal kind of scenario but it would certainly contribute to a reduction in inequality. It wouldn’t take us back to where we were after World War II, but that’s not to be expected anyways. It would certainly improve the situation. JPPE: Are there areas of the study of inequality that you believe are under covered by researchers and that you would like to see people work on? Scheidel: Well, that’s actually a very good question. Going back to what we talked about initially, it is still an open question to whether inequality can destabilize society in a systematic way. There have been studies on developing countries (low-income countries)—especially in post-colonial settings in Africa, Asia, and Latin America—that show high levels of inequality are associated with an increased risk of civil war, for instance, or some kind of societal breakdown. It seems that crossing a certain GDP threshold protects more affluent societies from these kinds of dislocations, but that doesn’t mean that inequality can’t lead to less extreme forms of social unrest and problems. And that’s something that has not been as well researched as maybe it should be. And if it could be shown that there is such an effect, that should galvanize policymakers and make them think twice about propping up the existing structures that enable the very high degree of inequality that we see right now.

The Imagined Isle Irish Catholic Identity in the Restoration Era Nathan Mainster Brown University Author Matthew Dowling Armaan Grewal Kara Huang Shreya Raghunandan Rudra Srivastava Editors Fall 2018 This essay explores to what extent an Irish Catholic nation formed in the Restoration Era. The Bleeding Iphigenia, written by Nicholas French, Bishop of Ferns, in the early 1670s and published in 1674, informs the reader of the principal metaphor which governs the tract: “The author hath drawne another Iphigenia of the body of a noble, ancient Catholic Nation clad all in red Robes.” He then claims to speak on behalf of said nation, writing that he, “presents to the view of our gracious King Charles the second a Catholic People, his faithful subjects wounded by thieves, and left half dead.” His request is also spelled out: “I beseech you, gentle Reader, pray to God for my afflicted Country, and for the Catholic Religion therein persecuted.”[1] The confidence with which French asserts the existence of a Catholic nation is striking; most scholars, including Joseph Leerssen, Tom Garvin, and Jim Smyth, maintain that neither an Irish Catholic nation nor a concept of nationalism appeared until the eighteenth century. The inherent social and political complexities of the Restoration era (1660-88), originating from a gaping ideological and power vacuum following the frenetic confusion of the Interregnum, coupled with the self-interested imperative of rebuilding of pre-Cromwellian life, effectively forestalled religious or national coalescence. Experiences of the war and of the post-war settlement did not fall neatly along confessional lines; in many cases, Protestants and Catholics of certain classes or political persuasions had more in common with each other than with their co-religionists. However, in the discursive realm, the confusion of the Restoration era provided fertile ground for the unification of the Irish Catholic interest. By the time of the Glorious Revolution, Protestant lawyer Richard Cox claimed that, “the Old English...are now so infatuated and degenerated, that they do not only take part with the Irish, but call themselves Natives.”[2] Protestants and Catholics clashed bitterly over a multitude of issues, and the politics of memory ensured that battles fought during the 1640s were replayed in an intellectual context. In an attempt to justify their positions during the Interregnum, Irish Protestants aggravated the memory of the 1641 rebellion, focusing on the epoch wherein Catholic loyalty to the crown may have been called into question. New pamphlets emphasizing the barbarity of the Irish Catholics during said revolt proliferated, and old ones, such as Sir John Temple’s famous 1646 account, enjoyed consistent reprintings. The Irish parliament indirectly participated in these politics of paranoia by forming a “committee for the preservation of the rights of Protestants” in Ireland, in response to falsified reports of another rebellion.[3] Combined with the bitter realities of mass dispossession, political disenfranchisement, and marginalization, one would think that the volatile Restoration period would foster an atmosphere conducive for Catholic nationhood. However, such a notion was not fully-fledged during the Restoration. Instead, the time period laid the ideological framework for such a concept by embedding the notion of Ireland as a Catholic nation in propagandistic discourse, thus recognizing Catholic unity as a desirable goal. Though Irish Catholic nationhood did not develop in a visible sense, it became a standard theme of contemporary political dialogue, in which several complex versions of unity were promulgated to support the view of individual authors. The idea of nationhood emerged from the fray, guaranteeing that following the Restoration period “Ireland” became a decidedly Catholic entity. The Divisions in Catholic Irish Society The disappointing reality of Catholic Ireland in the Restoration period was one marred by entrenched intra-communal conflict. The ancient divisions between the Old English and Gaelic ethnicities, the two major Catholic groups, were far from obscured. Though intermarriage and centuries of interaction had helped to diffuse certain quotidian cultural distinctions, sentiments of prejudice, distrust, and alienation overwhelmingly predominated.[4] State-sponsored discrimination, even by the likes of Catholic heroes such as the Earl of Tyrconnell, and mutual animosity, served to definitively prevent Catholics from cooperating across ethnic lines.[5] Irish Catholics were no more unified by the experience of the land settlement. On 23 October 1641, sources suggest that Irish Catholics possessed 69 percent of Ireland’s profitable land; during the Interregnum, this figure was reduced to 10 percent. However, when the Stuarts were restored to the throne, Catholic land ownership increased significantly to 30 percent due to the briefly-operational court of claims, which rather clumsily attempted to restore unjustly dispossessed Catholics, royal sympathy, and access to patronage.[6] This rather arbitrarily orchestrated and haphazard process ensured that Catholic experiences with the settlement were myriad. Spokesmen for dispossessed Catholics such as Sir Nicholas Plunkett and Richard Talbot, and later the Earl of Tyrconnell, spent much of the 1660s at Whitehall lobbying for the restoration of their co-religionists. They asserted that the 1648 peace entitled Irish Catholics to full restoration of property of which they had been stripped by Parliamentarians, and as such undermined the legitimacy of the Cromwellian claims.[7] Perhaps the greatest single effort occurred in 1670, when 52 dispossessed Irish Catholics and their supporters sent Talbot to present a petition to the King and parliament for full Catholic restoration. Delivered in the name of the King’s, “Most distressed subjects of your kingdom of Ireland who were outed of their estates by the late usurped government and are not yet restored,” the petition claimed that under the terms of the 1648 peace treaty, most, if not all, Catholics were entitled to repossession, and requested an “Act of Indemnity” and fair revision of the settlement act. The argument was underscored by a narrative of unwavering Catholic loyalty from the Interregnum to the present in the face of Cromwellian temptation. This argument fell on deaf ears: the Crown rejected the proposal, citing the material and political benefits already wrought by the land settlement.[8] The land settlement meant that 20 percent of dispossessed lands did return to Catholic hands. Patronage or sound political connections proved to be of paramount importance in procuring articles of restoration, and men such as Viscount Muskerry, the Marquis of Antrim, the Talbots of Malahide, and the Earl of Carlingford found their estates restored or expanded thanks to covert political machinations.[9] Consequently, a powerful minority of “new interest” Catholics emerged and effectively stonewalled any legislation altering the settlement throughout the Restoration period. Indeed, they wholeheartedly endorsed bills to confirm their titles at the expense of their unrestored co-religionists. In 1678 and 1680, Lord Lieutenant Ormond unsuccessfully attempted to call a parliament to pass legislation which would fully complete the land settlement. Under the proposed acts, the dealings of the court of claims were to be formalized and a commission was to be entrusted to investigate uncertain titles. In other words, further possibility of restoration would be curtailed. Predictably, responses to the bill polarized around the experience of the settlement; restored Catholics such as Colonel John Fitzpatrick and Nicholas Taaffe, Earl of Carlingford actually traveled to London to support the legislation and to counter the claims of unrestored Catholics or their advocates who simultaneously pleaded their case at Whitehall. The legislation was eventually killed in its crib due to the unstable political climate resulting from the so-called popish plot, but the similarly difficult experience of James II in attempting to overturn the land settlement provides equally illuminating insight. Upon his accession, distraught Catholics rejoiced over the prospect of a co-religionist as their sovereign and hopes for a reversed land settlement ignited anew. Yet once again the vocal minority of restored Catholics consistently and forcefully lobbied against any alterations. In 1689, the Earl of Tyrconnell, new Lord Deputy of Ireland, fulfilled his dream of the past two decades and called a parliament to overturn, or at least drastically transform, the land settlement. His efforts were met with immediate opposition. A petition presented to James composed by “new interest” Catholics and Old Protestants warned of the inevitable downturn the Irish economy would face should land be confiscated from the settlement’s beneficiaries. It rejected the disaffected Catholics’ contentions that the court of claims did not operate for sufficient time to evaluate the Irish situation effectively, and affirmed the conservative Declaration for Ireland of November 1660 as the basis for the settlement. The petition ended with a cautionary warning of desertion from the Jacobite camp if the land settlement was overturned: “Suffer me to make one step more, and query: Whether the Catholic Purchasers now to be turned out of possession, will join heartily with those that enter upon them?” This faction aligned themselves with Old Protestant representatives in the House of Lords to block the legislation. In the end, those in favor of repeal represented the larger interest, and James, forced to choose between war funding and bankruptcy, conceded to their demands and began to repeal the settlement. Even religion itself proved to be a divisive force. Questions of the monarch’s role in ecclesiastical structures and Irish Catholics’ often contradictory obligations to Rome and London precipitated not only acrimonious debate, but also persecution and bitterly vindictive conflict. These debates found their visible manifestation in the proposed 1661 remonstrance. This petition, attempted to reconcile the dissonance in Catholic theo-political theory created by their dual loyalty by affirming the supremacy of secular loyalty to the crown. The petition was also a political document responding to contemporary Stuart policy, whose ultimate object was to assert the right of Catholics to participate in a political society which increasingly appeared to cater solely to Protestant interests.[10] The remonstrance emphasized the Catholic duty of, “being entrusted by the indispensable Commission of the King of Kings with the Cure of Souls...and teaching the People that perfect Obedience...they are bound to pay to your Majesties Commands,” yet they still found themselves, “loaden with Calumnies, and persecuted with severity.” They lamented that they could not “with freedom appear to justify [our] Innocence, all the Fictions and Allegations against them are received as undoubted Verities;” and thus seek to “humbly beg your Majesties pardon, to vindicate both by the ensuing Protestation” their loyalty. The petition claims that, “These being the Tenets of our Religion, in point of Loyalty and Submission to your Majesty’s Commands, and our dependence of the See of Rome no way intrenching upon that perfect Obedience...we are bound to pay to your Majesty,” and elaborates on these “tenets”: "We do acknowledge and confess your Majesty to be our true and lawful King, supreme Lord, and rightful Sovereign of this Realm of Ireland, and of all other your Majesties Dominions. And therefore we acknowledge and confess our selves to be obliged...to obey your Majesty in all Civil and Temporal Affairs ... as the Laws and Rules of Government in this Kingdom do require at our hands. And that notwithstanding any power or pretension of the Pope... or by any Authority, Spiritual or Temporal, proceeding or derived from him, or his See, against your Majesty, or Royal Authority, we will still acknowledge and perform, to the uttermost of our abilities, our faithful Loyalty, and true Allegiance to your Majesty."[11] The remonstrance prioritized temporal loyalty over spiritual, denied the pope any tangible jurisdiction over monarchs, and implied that the pope’s role in secular affairs was an advisory one devoid of real political power if the monarch opposed his judgment. It was signed by 98 Catholic peers and sent to Ormond in 1661. The document immediately provoked rancorous debate. Most Catholic clergymen, who necessarily relied on Rome for patronage without a legal, state-sponsored episcopate of the Gallican variety, followed the lead of their backers and refused to sign the document for its judgments regarding papal power.[12] Bishops Anthony MacGeoghegan of Meath and Nicholas French of Ferns pamphleteered vociferous opposition to what they considered religious treason. Peter Walsh, one of the few clergymen who backed the remonstrance, who was also a supporter and confidant of Ormond’s, defended the document in various written works throughout the Restoration period. Formal protests were submitted, and a synod of Catholic clergymen in 1666 meant to resolve the issue only further retrenched animosity.[13] The movement collapsed and no remonstrance was ever submitted to the Crown.[14] Yet the ideological divisions within the Catholic community by no means ended with the defeat of the remonstrance. Not only did the questions it raised dominate clerical discourse for the remainder of the Restoration period, but the internal debate it generated also had concrete implications for the shape and character of the Restoration church. The appointments of the fervently anti-remonstrant Peter Talbot to the Archbishopric of Dublin and Oliver Plunkett to that of Armagh in 1669 fundamentally transformed the politics of Catholic ecclesiastical structures. Encouraged by the death or marginalization of many of the remonstrant clergy, Talbot embarked on a campaign of vindictive persecution against the remainder. They were relieved of official positions and denied material support. He was reported to have proudly proclaimed that the remonstrant clergy “would all hang” and ruthlessly purged them of all offices within the church.[15] Furthermore, the pamphlet debate continued in full fury well into the 1670s and did little to mend fissures in Catholic ecclesiastical ideology. Given these firmly-rooted ethnic, economic, and spiritual divisions, any claims that a common Irish Catholic nation made itself visible in the Restoration would be extremely difficult to substantiate. Yet, do these fissures necessarily mean that no Irish Catholic nation developed at all? Contemporary pamphleteers did not think so. Nicholas French’s The Bleeding Iphigenia was by no means the only tract which referred to the Irish Catholics as a “nation.” In fact, every side of Irish Catholic discourse in the Restoration era over the aforementioned issues of the land settlement and the Remonstrance often addressed “All Irish Catholics,” either described a coherent Irish Catholic nation or called for one, compartmentalized all Catholic experiences into one which fit their theses, and denounced efforts to divide the Irish Catholic polity in a tract which was contributing to just such a phenomenon. Though each version of history, each founding memory, and each sense of what “Irish Catholic” meant was distinct, all tracts contended that their prescribed formula could create this new idea or explain its existence. How is this difference between discourse and practice possible? Perhaps the issue arises from how the modern reader perceives nationhood. Instead of conceptualizing it concretely, as manifested in a coherent body of united individuals with a common ethnicity, culture, or interests, it may be more accurate to conceive of it as Ernest Renan did: as a people unified through common experiences and shared memories.[16] If we conceptualize it as such, it becomes evident that the idea of Irish Catholic nationhood appeared constantly in written work of the time, not as one singular, exclusively-defined identity, but as a fractured concept which agreed on little more than the fact that such an idea existed or should exist. As we have seen, Irish Catholic experiences varied widely in the Restoration era. Yet, discourse often attempted to ignore entrenched complexities in order to impose upon reality a set of homogenous experiences which all Catholics ostensibly suffered together. The reconstruction of history – over the recent war as well as more distant moments – provided the memorial basis for Catholic unity in the discursive realm. In using historical memory as a propaganda tool, each author to be examined asserted that their treatises could bring or explain Catholic unity under their terms, which often sought to justify or persuade the legitimacy of a short-term ambition. * * * The rhetoric of unity regarding the land settlement will be examined first. As Danielle McCormack has noted, the success of Catholic lobbying for restoration in this period was principally predicated upon proving the legitimacy of the 1648 peace, whose indemnity clause would directly contradict the Restoration policy of inordinately limiting the potential of Catholic innocence.[17] To support their positions, Catholic advocates of restoration simplified the 1640s into an era of nationalized, confessional conflict of English Protestant versus Irish Catholic. Yet, though the search for material interests undeniably acted as the principal imperative for this type of language, the effects of its presence took on quite a different form. Pamphleteers employed discourse as a bandage to patch up undeniably present acrimony by framing the past as an era of unity, and thus implied either that unity still existed or could be attained, and affirmed the image of Ireland as a state closely associated with Catholicism. The anonymously written pamphlet Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland from 1668 articulates the obdurate, oppositional position taken by Catholics such as Nicholas French and Oliver Plunkett, espousing a view of history wherein Irish Catholics since 1641 had displayed indefatigable, flawless loyalty, yet nevertheless had been betrayed in the land settlement by Ormond, the king’s ministers, and self-interested, land-grabbing Protestants.[18] This ideological history is intended to lump all Catholic experiences into a single, inflexible memory so as to purge the discourse of the complexities of the social reality and Catholic culpability for wartime atrocities and subsequently affirm the validity of Catholic claims to land. The opening line of the tract states that the author’s intention is to recount, “the sad and deplorable state of the Irish Nation, and the apparent injustice, and inequality used in the present Settlement of that Kingdom.”[19] He substantiates this claim of extant Irish nationhood by claiming the existence of a force which binds them all together: “It cannot be denyed, but that the Roman Catholicks of Ireland have infinitely suffered, during the late Usurped Government.”[20] A few sentences later, he entirely omits the qualifier of Catholicism, believing it instead to be implicit in the statement wherein he simply describes the sufferers as “the Irish alone,” thus conveniently ignoring the significant portion of Irish Catholics (and Protestants) whose experiences differed from those of his vision of a unified Catholic community collectively double-crossed by the settlement, and retrenches the link between Irishness and Catholicism.[21] Having thus postulated the existence of an Irish Catholic nation indivisibly united by the universal experience of dispossession, and casually conflated Irishness with Catholicism in a manner which inextricably and exclusively binds the two identities, the author then recounts a historically revisionist understanding of the past to defy Protestant land claims. As the antithesis to his purportedly unified Catholic body, he conceives of the enemy as one equally monolithic Protestant beast, fueled by greed, vengeance, and unfaltering support of Cromwell, blurring all nuance present in the equally complex reality of Irish Protestantism. He claims that the land settlement was legislated and supervised entirely by Protestants, and transmuted into law by, “a Parliament, which met on the 8th. day of May 1661. The Lower House of this Parliament was all composed of Cromwellists, and but very few of the Irish Peers were admitted to sit in the House of Lords, under the pretence of former Indictments. This Parliament made the first Act of Settlement...This Act decides all the doubtful expressions of the Declaration in favour of the Cromwellists, and to the disadvantage of the Natives, it allows only a Twelve-months time for the tryal of Innocents; But those Irish Gentlemen who served His Majesty abroad, together with the generality of the Nation pretending to Articles, (half a score persons only excepted, who were particularly provided for) are forever debarred by this Act, to recover their Estates without previous Reprisals, which is a thing not to be had in nature.”[22] Several important rhetorical devices are present in this passage. First, the word “Catholic” is never uttered. It is implicit in the word “Irish,” which is placed in direct opposition with a “Cromwellist” interest. The pamphlet, whose object is a searing takedown of former Protestant royalists such as the Earl of Clarendon or the Duke of Ormonde, erases their monarchist credentials by portraying them as greedy post-Cromwellists attempting to deprive loyal Irish Catholics of their land much like the Lord Protector did. Thus “Cromwellist,” in this context, does not necessarily refer to political leanings; rather, it likely denotes any Protestant beneficiaries of the land settlement regardless of their political affiliation during the war. This statement confessionalizes not only nationality, but also political loyalties during the war in an attempt to invalidate Protestant claims under accusations of treason. The essentialist implication that Protestants by nature are inherently inclined towards parliamentarianism is a cogent reduction of the historical narrative meant to promote the author’s vision of the Irish Catholic: resolutely royalist yet deferentially shocked at the loss of their lands to the “enemy.” The author underpins his position with a host of ethical and legal arguments. Morally, he claims that the: “parties pretending are the Irish Proprietors, and the London Adventurers: The first enjoyed it for so many ages...and they lost it at length upon the account of Loyalty, fighting for the Kings Interest against the Murderers of his Royal Father: the last...have no other Title but what they derive from the Ordinance of an usurped Government, for having disbursed vast sums of Money to countenance Rebellion, to pull down Monarchy, and put up a pretended Commonwealth. And yet the Land is adjudged for them, and confirmed to them and their Heirs forever...”[23] Furthermore, Cromwellian settlers, he asserts, are not technically entitled to their land until the 1641 Catholic, “rebels be declared by the two Houses of Parliament to be wholly conquered; until a Commission….[examines] who are the Rebels, and who are Innocents.”[24] Oftentimes, the distinction between logos and ethos are blurred. The author laments that the “Duke of York should now enjoy all that Land, by no other Title but that of the Regicides. The Land was given them by a Tyrant, for murthering the King, let the World judge of the goodness of their Title.”[25] This rather incisive averment insinuates that James’s land claim is illegal precisely because of its immorality; it was acquired through the crime of regicide. Implicit in this statement, of course, lies the contention that all Protestant claims to land are void by virtue of their ostensible parliamentarian and thus regicidal tendencies. Yet, according to the author, Protestants alone controlled the outcome of the settlement and ensured that Catholic capacity for reinstatement was minimal. First, the Catholic gentlemen in exile with the King were never reinstated. Next, the Protestants made it so difficult to “qualifie an Innocent, that it should be Morally impossible to find any such” in Ireland.[26] In a final, devastating act, Parliament in 1664, “decreed, that no benefit of Innocency, or Articles, shall be allowed... to any of the Irish Natives.” [27] The King is absolved of all culpability in this grand Protestant conspiracy, and blame instead is placed on the greedy minister Clarendon and the Earl of Orrery, who, “assured to the King, that there was a sufficient stock of Reprisals to, “satisfy all interests” and thus maintain the loyalist credentials of the Catholics.[28] The Protestants, furthermore, are motivated by lustful material concerns, not love for the king. This passage is worth quoting at length: ...the first Minister of State...telling, as for a final reason, that the Protestant English Interest cannot be maintained in Ireland, without extirpating the Natives…. True Religion was ever yet planted by preaching and good example, not by violence and oppression: An unjust intrusion into the Neighbours Estate, is not the right way to convert the ancient Proprietors...And as to the present Settlement of Ireland, it is apparent to the World, that the Confiscation of Estates, and not the Conversion of Souls, is the only thing aimed at. If by the English Interest we understand the present Possession of the London Adventurers, and of Cromwell's Soldiers, there is no doubt it is inconsistent with the restoration of the Irish, neither can the New English Title to Land be well maintained, without destroying the old Title of the Natives; even as the Interest of the late Commonwealth was incompatible.[29] In this version of history, divisions within the Irish Protestant community are effectively erased. They are replaced instead by an immutable bloc of irreligious, selfish, politically radical colonialists labeled the “English interest” who use the cover of missionary work to ultimately destroy the Catholic Irish--or the natives, as the author would say--for the worldly sake of appropriating their property. The Catholic experience is presented with an equal lack of nuance. Ignoring the existence of legally restored Catholics, the author maintains that Ormond “is gone with all his Greatness, and the miseries of the poor Irish do still continue” and laments the state of “that Nation, who are deprived of the Benefit of Law, Justice, and public Faith,” of course referring to the Catholic nation.[30] Furthermore, this narrative of history does not stop with the Restoration. The author sees the struggle between Irish Catholic royalism and English and Scottish Protestant radicalism as ongoing, and uses the memory of the attempted Presbyterian coup by Colonel Thomas Blood and the English Civil War, as sufficient justification for promoting Catholic interest in Ireland: For that the true Interest of England (as relating to Ireland) consists in raising· the Irish as a Bulwark, or balance, against our English and Scotch Presbyterians….when the Presbyterian practises and Covenant began to disturb these Kingdoms, the Papists and Prelatiques in Ireland (as well as in England) joined their hearts and hands against Presbytery for the King. [31] Thus, in arguing for the overturn of the land settlement, the author of A Narrative constructs his vision of an Irish Catholic nation: a unified, loyal polity, whose history consists of having fought heroically during the war yet being tragically betrayed by the king’s selfish ministers and their Protestant and imaginably Cromwellian or neo-Cromwellian supporters. Though egregiously misrepresenting the actual experience of the war, the nature of the land settlement, and the complex character of confessional identity in Ireland, it serves as adequate foundational history for his equally distorted vision of a unified Catholic nation. His conflation of “Irish” and “Catholic” further embeds the image of the entity of “Ireland” as fundamentally Catholic, and ignores the serious ethnic, social, and theological distinctions of the population. This position, however, was met with backlash from other members of the Old English community. Archbishop of Dublin and celebrated anti-remonstrant Peter Talbot’s 1674 Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects is an essential piece to examine, not only because its message differs vastly from that of A Narrative, but also because its purpose is slightly different and adds a complex element to the debate.[32] This text was not written with the purpose of obtaining anything material, and grounds its arguments in theological rather than political justification. Just like the author of A Narrative, Talbot uses the concept of Catholic unity, justified by the common experience of 1641, to accomplish a distinct goal: to end what he sees as immoral and heretical practices. Talbot follows the lead of the author of A Narrative and addresses the pamphlet to all of the “Roman-Catholics of Ireland,” thus implying that he believes Catholic unity exists, and sets out to prove it on his terms.[33] His main area of concern is the ostensible Irish Catholic obsession with property, decidedly sinful in his eyes. He affirms, “that the Happiness of Man in this present state consists more in possessing the riches of a good Conscience than the conveniences of this world.”[11] Yet he recognizes that, “Tis the depraved condition of human nature which makes us affectionately covet...such paltry trash.”[34] The “paltry trash” referred to is property confiscated by the land settlement, and his treatment of the incident manages to be wholly out of touch with both the new interest Catholics and the dispossessed faction. Again, what is an Inheritance? A parcel of land whereof our Ancestors were Masters as long as they liu'd; which term of Life (the only interest any of them could pretend to) is valued but at seven years purchase: Is it reasonable then think you, to fix your hearts so…passionately upon that earth, as if your Souls were to turn into it as well as your Bodies? Poor Souls! After a mans death hee has no expectation of any good for his Temporal Estate, being quite out of all circumstances of enjoying the least convenience from it.[35] Talbot here makes the oft-vaunted religious claim that acquisitive interests are inherently sinful. Such a belief carries additional weight in the phrenetic context of the Restoration era and the politics surrounding the land settlement. His call for salvation to, “be your comfort, not that empty one of possessing estates already disposed” was an unequivocally bold statement, because the tract aims to unite Irish Catholics on its terms.[36] As we have seen, the land settlement polarized Irish Catholics along lines of the repossessed and the dispossessed. Talbot’s argument essentially claims both sides to be reprehensible. Talbot spends several lengthy paragraphs asserting that, “Disobedience to our King necessarily implies disobeying God,” and denounces rebellion, “against His Majesty’s Government, Person, or Subjects,” as religiously and politically unforgivable.[37] He then supplements his contention with a more political rationalization for the deleterious essence of material concerns: they lead to rebellion. He asks, “how can it be imagined that [God] will allow of so great a crime as rebellion upon any score….much less upon that meer Temporal motive of saying or regaining an Estate?”[38] Challenging the land settlement, if not explicitly an act of revolt, can easily lead to one. Thus, “Let not the vain hopes of better Times, or the desire of passing a short Moment something more commodiously plunge you into the intolerable miseries of Hellfire for all Eternity... You have lost your real Estates, let not Imaginary ones fool you...”[39] His principle over which Catholics could find unity is one of collective responsibility: either to stop pressing for restoration, or to ensure that their Catholic brethren lay down their claims. And the shared experience which provides the imperative for such collective responsibility? The war. Talbot’s idealized understanding of 1641 stands in direct opposition to the view espoused by the author of A Narrative, who argues that, “ The Irish insurrection...hath not been accompanied with that Insolence and Malice in the beginning...which...some Pamphlets have charged the Irish with.”[40] His view is more in agreement with the Protestant narrative which emphasizes Catholic atrocities and greed instead of monarchical loyalty. He writes: You have had experience of...Preachers who pretend great zeal to God and the King’s service, and yet, at the same time Rebellion, and Murders were proou'd against them. These are the men you must not give ear to, nor converse with, lest you be infected with their Doctrine and perverted by their Example….And yet if either these, or I, or an Angel from Heaven should go about to persuade you that it is lawful to molest your Protestant neighbors, or defraud them of their goods, or enter upon their possessions by any means or method which the Law of the Land doth not allow, give them no credit...[41] This theologically-underpinned incarnation of Catholic unity is derived from a necessity of repentance. Like that of the author of A Narrative, Talbot’s vision of a united Catholic Ireland is prescriptive rather than descriptive; a means to an end rather than a factually accurate statement. Old English discourse over the land settlement, then, engendered several iterations of an Irish Catholic identity, none of which were reconcilable with each other nor with reality. Yet there are striking methodological parallels: both tracts assume the existence of a united Catholic Ireland as a critical element of their rhetorical strategy. Such a rhetorical strategy was a conscious choice and the considerations that went into it should not be taken lightly. One may assume that claims of unity would be the most effective way to convince others of their point; unity was evidently an ideal that appealed to much of the literate Old English community. A Gaelic perspective on the land settlement and memory of the Cromwellian wars is essential to any comprehensive assessment of the extent to which Catholic Irish identity formed in this period. The relative paucity of surviving Gaelic sources for everyday native Irishmen renders any evaluation of their contribution to Catholic discursive identity problematic. Yet one does remain which can offer insight into the way the Gaels constructed their version of Ireland: Gaelic poetry. Historical memory in Gaelic poetry was a familiar concept by the time of the Restoration. For centuries, Irish poets evoked the names of legendary heroes, battles, and kings to draw a firm line connecting their patrons to extant days of Irish glory.[42] During the Restoration period, however, a salient change took place. Gaelic poets began to treat the Irish heroic past as more self-consciously legendary, and presented it in stark contrast with recent memories of English conquest. Every element of English culture, society, and politics was acrimoniously criticized with relentless vigor and poetic wit. As such, Dáibhí Ó Bruadair, the most renowned poet of the era, claims in his poem “Thou Sage of Inanity” that the English historical pedigree pales in comparison to that of the Irish.[43] He derides a defender of Ormond who claims, “That his father or himself or any offspring of that race E'er performed such deeds as those,” performed by the Irish, as having, “been hoaxed by thy conceit.”[44] Shameful, cowardly Englishness is placed in direct dialogue with powerful, resplendent Irishness. This theme is expanded into the cultural realm and the traditionally English conception of civil and moral superiority is shrewdly reversed. The Restoration-era poems of Ó Bruadair depict a cultured, refined Gaelic Ireland ruined by boorish English brutes representing Cromwellian plantation and the Restoration settlement. Ó Bruadair laments this tragic state, writing in his 1674 poem “Woe Unto Him Who Hath Failed”: Every prayerful, faultless, noble, charming chieftain of the flock, Scattered through the land of Fionntan, growing with no lowly growth, Who hath been compelled to part with state and wealth and native nook...”[45] These “Noble-born, cultured, and high-minded chieftains” have been replaced by “ignorant dullards” and “ostentatious upstart[s] swollen high with pompous pride” whose pastimes include “plundering maids, single, defenceless, in delicate health.”[46] The title of the poem from which the last excerpt is taken, “Proud as a Chief is the Bailiff,” embodies the contempt with which the Gaelic poets treated the English upstarts who believed that they represented the rightful, moral and political governing class of Ireland. As Joseph Leerssen has noted, the English language was often used as a signifier in Gaelic-language texts for Saxon incivility. Restoration-era poems often contained Gaelicized loanwords from English--such as “clóca” or cloak, “cóta” or coat, sbuir or spurs, buat or boot, sdocaidhe, or stockings, locaidhe, or curls, ráipéar, or rapier, and sgarfa, or scarf, which were deliberately employed to disrupt the rhythm and rhyme scheme of the poem; these intentionally painful interruptions easily communicated to the reader or listener the invasionary nature of the English settlers.[47] Ó Bruadair explicitly treats with the contamination of the Irish language in his 1675 “I Shall Put a Cluáin On Thee,” where he writes, “Now the Béarla Teibidhe is the language which Ó Lonargáin used to talk...on account of the excessively silly bombast of the poets in Freamhain.'' Béarla Teidbidhe, the dialect of Irish which more liberally utilized loanwords from other languages, functions as a literary device signifying the degradation and decline of the Irish language by “silly bombast.”[48] From a confessional perspective, theologian Francis O’Molloy printed a comprehensive overview of the Irish language in 1677, which contained a lengthy tract lamenting the seemingly concurrent decline of the Gaelic nobility and language, writing: Pity the people for want of literacy after the destruction of their letters...Ireland has fallen under the shower against the host of its ancestors. The music of tunes has not remained, nor proper instruction, nor learning. The Irish do not even understand the Irish language, they speak it carelessly, they do not read it with any propriety; they abandon it, and leave honour behind….If you ask them to read verses in their own sweet mother tongue...they cannot. This is what happened to the Irish from Ireland.[49] The use of language as a symbol for not only cultural, but also national distinctions, is essential to note here for two reasons. First, it places the bardic poet, master of the Irish language, at the center of Gaelic national identity. Gaelic poetry in this time was something of a moribund cultural relic, existing in a world that had long considered it a vestigial curiosity. Indeed, Ó Bruadair died hopelessly impoverished, and much of his later poetry focuses on this destitution.[50] Ascribing language a primary role in the formation of Irish identity assigns the poet a relevance which he had most certainly lost. Second, by linking language and idealized history, Gaelic poets implicitly grounded Irish national identity in both ancient and recent historical memory: the glorious past, the apex of Irish linguistic hegemony and its cultural byproducts; and the depressing present, wherein language is under threat of extinction thanks to an influx of English colonialists bent on aggressive acculturation of the Gaels. Such perceptions of English savagery are reflected in Gaelic poetic treatments of social class. Gradually, the English of all classes replaced the lower classes of all ethnicities as the paradigm of boorishness and stupidity. Prior to the Restoration period, foreigners were categorized with poorer Gaels in criticisms of the uncultured and barbaric enemies of refined Gaelic Ireland. It was a classist—as opposed to a nationalist—distinction. Yet, Restoration poetry increasingly defined the brutes as distinctly English “boors” whose humble patrimony did not warrant their wealth and status, and whose rough, bumbling language and contemptible manners stood in stark opposition to those of the refined, well-spoken Gaels.[52] This conflation of ancient and recent memory also featured heavily in political rhetoric surrounding Gaelic perspectives of James II and their high expectations for his rule. Leerssen affirms that Gaelic poets rejoiced upon James II’s accession, due to his heritage and Catholic faith; thus, poems from the period were tinged with an arrogant optimism. Diarmaid Mac Carthaigh, for example, writes, “Behold there the Gaedhil in arms...they have powder and guns, hold the cities and fortresses; the Presbyterians, lo, have been overthrown, and the Fanatics have left an infernal smell after them,” thus drawing on a recent memory of conquest. Several lines later, he remarks, “Prophets and saints in great numbers have prophesied that Erinn would sure get help at the promised time; by Thy wonderful power, O Christ, and thy nurse’s prayer, everything they predicted shall certainly come to pass.”[53] James II’s accession was lauded in both recent and ancient terms; it was an event foretold by ancient Irish history to relieve the Gaels of their more recent suffering.[54] By contextualizing the often disconnected quilt of Gaelic history within a framework grounded in fresh experiences of collective trauma sustained by a vaguely-defined group of people in “Erinn” devoid of very present internal distinctions, these Gaelic poets implicitly “nationalized” a confederated Ireland in opposition to “Fanatics”; Protestants. This concept of unity is underpinned by the trajectory of the word “Éire,” which underwent linguistic signification during the Restoration period from a term denoting specific dynastic regions to one which conveyed the entire island.[55] Furthermore, the Irish side of the dichotomy between English and Irish is not necessarily exclusive to the Gaels. In fact, it lended Gaelic history a quasi-democratic character; in defining Irishness as a set of cultural and linguistic practices in opposition to Englishness, anybody who agreed with this contemporary critical assessment of Englishness and indulged in or sympathised with Gaelic customs could subscribe to the ancient legacy of old Gaeldom. Whether this happened or not is not relevant; what matters is that this poetry laid the basis for Irish Catholic national identity. Like Old English discourse, its artificial construction of a Catholic Irish memory had serious implications for Irish nationalism; Joseph Leerssen notes that the rise of Irish nationalism in the eighteenth century was characterized by a fascination with and appropriation of Gaelic culture which crossed confessional boundaries, emphasizing the importance of a language, culture, and history in direct opposition with that of the English.[56] Yet there is one important caveat: Gaelic discourse surrounding the land settlement did not explicitly address unity transcending ethnic boundaries as much as it laid out the historical and cultural groundwork for an ostensible common experience. Gaelic writers erased dynastic distinctions, spoke of common experience, and denigrated English language, manners, and history while touting their Gaelic counterparts, thus permitting unity. It was not clear from this literature who could participate in this unity and how qualified it would be. This will be discussed in the next section, focusing on Gaelic religious discussions. * * * As has been shown, the Irish Catholic clergy—and much of the laity—were irreconcilably factionalized throughout the Restoration period, with the initial split precipitated by the proposed 1661 remonstrance which would have subordinated the pope’s jurisdiction to the king’s. Internal acts of vindictiveness by squabbling Catholics in positions of authority, combined with Ormond’s deliberate rehashing of the issue in order to weaken Catholic political activity, served to isolate his Catholic allies from enemies based on who subscribed to the remonstrance, and allowed him to persecute the identified foes, ensuring that Catholics could not even appeal to their common religious beliefs for unity well after the remonstrance failed.[57] But, as with the land settlement, polemicists attempted to surmount these obstacles through discourse by either denying the reality of conflict, or attempting to impose unity artificially through their tract. And once again, as with the land settlement, the context of the topic to be dealt with dictated the experiences used to found this unity. The land settlement was a direct result of recent conflict; thus, memories of the 1640’s were evoked and framed so as to suit the agenda proffered. The remonstrance debate took place within the context of centuries of constantly evolving Catholic theology. Accordingly, the time frame for memories evoked was significantly enlarged. Father Peter Walsh’s mammoth-sized 1673 tract History and Vindication of the Loyal Formulary, or Irish Remonstrance is the first text to be examined.[58] Walsh, a Franciscan monk, was one of the earliest defenders of the remonstrance when the conflicts first began in the 1660s; he notably convinced Ormond to let the clergy summon a synod to ratify it. Walsh’s advocacy of unity is more subtle than that of some other tracts analyzed in this essay. Its implicit, rather than explicit, nature likely derives from the nature of the work. It is intended to defend a coherent set of principles and the man who constructed it from accusations of treachery rather than accomplishing anything concrete through mass support. Remonstrant Catholicism was a significant theo-political departure from orthodox Irish Catholicism, and should be treated as a micro-identity within a larger Catholic body with its own ideological history to ground it. In this case, instead of attempting to forge an Irish Catholic identity out of the shards left behind by its bitter internal conflicts, this tract attempts to construct a wholly new paradigm parallel to the defunct alternatives. As such, unity is implicit insofar as the memories evoked attempt to justify subscription to a piece of reformatory legislation so large it can more or less be considered a separate sect of Catholicism. In short, this tract is purely ideological; unity was the express goal. It does frame the remonstrance as an end to dissolve the penal laws, but that is not the priority. The end of the penal laws is another justification for the benefits of the remonstrance. So how was a “Remonstrantist” identity fashioned? Walsh envisioned the remonstrance model as an acceptable, patriotic manifestation of Catholicism in an increasingly hostile Stuart state which would affirm monarchical loyalty while simultaneously foregoing certain unsavory papal principles in the process. Due to the increased crackdown on Catholicism in the early 1670s, “the old and fatal Controversy” was rehashed in public debate and called into question the loyalty of all Catholics.[59] Walsh explained his remonstrance as, “ a conscientious, Christian...and satisfactory profession of the duty which by all Laws... they...owe His Majesty against all pretences of the Pope to the contrary.”[60] Walsh does not blissfully ignore the existence of deep divisions which may prevent adherence to his vision; instead, he embraces them, writing that soon after the drafting of the Remonstrance it was, “impugned by sundry Ecclesiastics of the Roman Communion and chiefly by many of those Irish who had received most benefit by it.”[61] The reason behind this open admission of failure is twofold. One, it is easier to deny Catholic divisions when there is no public referendum on the issue by which one can concretely gauge the extent of conflict. The synod provided such a referendum and thus its failure was historically impossible to deny. The second reason is that this embarrassment substantiates one of his key arguments: the steady degradation and increasing corruption of Rome over the last several hundred years. Crafting the narrative of his history as a constant, descending slope from Pope Gregory VII to the present, Walsh paints a picture of a corrupt, tyrannical institution which generates political instability by presenting itself as a parallel power structure to secular hierarchies. He claims that over the past six hundred years, Rome has been operating under a set of principles which, “many Thousands of the most Learned, Zealous; Illegible word Godly Illegible word, Priests, and Doctors, as well as [the laity], who never approved... but always reproved, condemned, abhorred, detested; and protested against them both, as not only heretical, but tyrannical.[62] Chief amongst these he names the unchecked, absolute power of the papacy. He enumerates specific examples of malevolent papal authority intended to evoke contemporary politics in such a way as to galvanize support for his ecclesiastical program against Rome which may eliminate differences between Irish subjects. He writes: That by divine right...the Bishop of Rome is Universal Monarch and Governor of the World, even with.... spiritual and temporal authority over all Churches, Nations, Empires, Kingdoms, States, Principalities; and over all persons, Emperors, Kings, Princes... and People...and in all things and causes whatsoever, as well Temporal and Civil, as Ecclesiastical or Spiritual….That He is empowered with lawful Authority, not only to Excommunicate, but to deprive, depose, and dethrone (both sententially and effectually) all Princes, Kings, and Emperors; to translate their Royal Rights, and dispose of their Kingdoms to others, when and how He shall think fit…. That whoever kills any Prince deposed or excommunicated by Him, or by others deriving power from Him, kills not a lawful Prince, but an usurping Tyrant; a Tyrant at least by Title, if not by Administration too: and therefore cannot be said to murther the Anointed of God, or even to kill his own Prince.[63] Tyranny, usurpation, and regicide were all terms typically lobbed at the Cromwellian regime in Catholic discourse. By framing these crimes as inherent to the Catholic Church, and not to the inevitable outcome of radical Protestantism, Walsh accomplishes several discursive feats. One, he sets familiar terms of objective abjectness within a new context and places the blame on a supposedly friendly institution, therefore forcing Catholics to make a choice between loyalty to their beliefs and loyalty to Rome. Two, he implies that his prescription is the only feasible path for Catholics who wish to remain loyal, and thus forces a second introspective confrontation regarding royal or papal allegiance. Three, he maintains that said tendencies are inherent not in the religion but in the institution, implying that following his example will not change liturgy or customs but will simply purge ecclesiastical structures of institutionalized corruption. Four, he constructs a narrative that renders a, “System of Doctrines and Practises... contrary to those...manifestly recommended in the...Gospel of Christ... in the belief and life of the Christian Church universally for the first Ten Ages thereof,” entirely culpable for the, “misfortunes and miseries whatsoever of the Roman-Catholics in England, Ireland, Scotland.”[64] Thus, in Walsh’s world of untenable Church institutions which act as the source of all present Catholic suffering, the only viable way forward lies in subscribing to remonstrance principles. These “misfortunes and miseries” are embodied in the penal laws. Following his affirmation of Rome as the cause of all Catholic tribulation, he expands upon the statutes as a shared traumatic experience to encourage unity over the remonstrance. He affirms that: All Roman-Catholics... without any distinction of Sex, or Age...from the most illustrious Peer, to the most obscure Plebeian...lie under all the rigorous Sanctions, and all the severe Penalties of so many incapacitating... Laws...And your Predecessors, before you, have well nigh a whole Century of years been continually under the smart or apprehension of the severity of them.[65] Such an evaluation of the present state was not entirely true. Irish Catholics often circumvented the penal laws which were rarely enforced during the Restoration period. Yet it is important to remember that this tract was published in 1674, and likely written two years before, at which time the indulgence controversy in England had ushered in a period of harsher persecution and a crackdown on Irish Catholics.[66] Using the aberrational reality of the contemporary political climate, Walsh seizes the opportunity to affirm that such experiences were the normative standard. Yet instead of using shared experiences of oppression to galvanize resistance to the crown, he contextualizes them within his own narrative of uniquely Catholic culpability. Thus, he contends that only Catholics can change their own situation, making subscription to the remonstrance an absolute necessity for any Catholic who wished to ameliorate their present struggles. Within this discourse, that would be all of them. One final point that is necessary to fully illustrate Walsh’s utilisation of memory to craft a remonstrant identity is his claim that the blame for the seemingly never ending cycle of Irish rebellion can be entirely attributed to the pope’s corrosive influence. This counters the oft-articulated English and Protestant claim that the Irish, or Catholicism, for that matter, are inherently rebellious, and supplements his assertion that loyalty to the crown was not only of paramount importance for Irish Catholics, but is also possible under the proper ecclesiastical leadership. Here, Walsh describes a Catholic Ireland forced into repeated rebellion against the Crown by malevolent Roman overlords. And Pope Pius V, His Declaratory Sentence...against Queen Elizabeth. And the Bull or Breve of Gregory XIII...granting to all the Irish that would join and fight in the Rebellion of the FitzGeralds of Desmond against Queen Elizabeth, even the same plenary pardon and remission of all their sins, which is granted to those engaged in a Holy War against the Turk...And that other of Clement VIII...of the like tenor and direction to the Irish Nation in general, animating them to join unanimously in Tyrone's Rebellion against the self-same heretical Queen... And lastly...that Bull or Breve of Plenary Indulgence...given yet more lately to all the Roman-Catholics of Ireland, who had join'd in the Rebellion there begun in the year 1641...witness in the second place all the no less unchristian, than unhappy effects of these very Bulls, Breves, Judgments and Indulgences.[67] Significantly, Walsh fails to add that many Catholics in all conflicts listed refused to rebel, and thus makes this history, just like his other narratives, available to all Catholics. It also skirts around the complicated question of Catholic culpability and the extent to which they acted illegally in the 1640s by affirming that Rome was the reason for any malicious action. Thus, Walsh’s defense of the remonstrance should really be considered a formulation of a specific brand of Catholic identity, just like those of the other authors. He draws on a range of memories, constructing various histories intending to support his argument, and connects these histories to contemporary politics in such a way as to provide a direct catalyst for unification. Catholic nationhood is rarely mentioned explicitly; it functions in this tract not as a means to an end but instead as the ultimate objective. The end goal is a new brand of Catholicism, loyal to the king over Rome, freed from the shackles of forced insurrection, and instead fully integrated, and presumably welcomed, into the Stuart political nation. Yet not everyone approved of such a radical restructuring of Catholic theo-political doctrine. Peter Talbot, Archbishop of Dublin and self-appointed nightmare of remonstrants, produced a pamphlet the following year in 1674 titled The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh: His New Remonstrant Religion. It thoroughly excoriates Walsh and his perceived treason, spends an undue amount of time examining laws regarding public whipping and the extent to which they apply to Walsh.[68] Even when he is not indulging his fantasies of subjecting Walsh to corporal punishment, the rage in Talbot’s writing is still palpable. He accuses him, perhaps correctly, of intending to found a “new religion” and becoming, perhaps incorrectly, the “Pope of this new Remonstrant Church.”[69] He labels him a traitor, and maintains that by accusing, “all Bishops, and by consequence the Representative Roman Catholic Church, or...its supreme Pastor together with all the other Bishops of the said Communion, of holding and swearing the lawfulness of Treason,” he has become the “greatest Rebel...of the Irish nation.”[70] It is significant, of course, that the Irish nation means Catholicism, and we shall see that in this tract, as in his The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects, Talbot constantly portrays Ireland as a categorically Catholic nation. This conflation of Ireland with Catholicism is intended to explain the reason why Walsh’s church failed in Ireland. Just as Walsh attempted to create a distinct, remonstrant Irish Catholic identity, so too does Talbot attempt to claim the existence of an opposing number which interprets history and shared Catholic experiences differently. The bulk of Talbot’s evidence for Walsh’s treachery lies in his accusations that Walsh’s remonstrance articulates nothing more than Anglican Protestantism. He argues that the remonstrance affirms that the, “King is the only supreme Governor of England, and of all other his Dominions, as well in all Spiritual or Ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal,” religious authority is duly denied to the pope, and thus the King is given, “all the spiritual power and authority in his own Dominions.”[71] He draws an immediate parallel with Protestantism, noting how, If you will read the Statutes 1. Eliz. 1. & 8. Eliz 1. You will find that the Kings of England’s supremacy, is so spiritual and sublime, that there needs no changing the signification of the word spiritual into temporal, and that a King of England (if he should think fit) may, according to the principles of the Protestant religion, established by the lawes of the land, giue power by letters patents, to any of his lay subjects to consecrate Bishops and Priests… [72] Thus, in practice, Walsh is, “the greatest Traitor and Rebel that breathes,” to the Catholic faith, stemming from his attempt to create a separate Protestant Church to make himself its pope rather than out of a genuine reforming impulse.[73] However, Talbot does not limit the scope of his argument to legal queries over the separation of temporal and ecclesiastical power. He uses the notion of collective memory and a constructed Catholic identity to prove that Walsh is truly operating contrary to the interests of all Irish Catholics. His selection is a curious one: the martyrdom of Thomas Becket, the Archbishop of Canterbury who was murdered on King Henry II’s (unintentional) orders in 1170. The reasons for this choice are twofold. First, Talbot needs to formulate a narrative honoring Rome for the same period of time that Walsh did to provide a viable opposition model. Thus, he claims, “it’s much better….to justify…. doctrine of...the whole Roman Catholic Church, ever since S. Thomas his Martyrdom, then the fancies of a dull ignorant Friar.”[74] Walsh, however, objects against it the Martyrdom and Miracles of S. Thomas of Canterbury; it being evident out of all Histories, both sacred and profane; that S. Thomas suffered, was canonised and declared a Martyr, for defending the immunities of the Church, and particularly that of Churchmen from the coercive supreme power of secular Courts.[75] Becket’s murder is the founding moment for Irish Catholics because of its contemporary relevance; he died defending the ecclesiastical court’s integrity and independence from a crown increasingly attempting to encroach on spiritual authority. Yet there is something else implicit in such a choice, something far more salient. By claiming that Walsh, who has become a Protestant, has succeeded in bastardizing the memory of saint Thomas Becket, Talbot further retrenches the Irish Catholic and English Protestant worldview. Though Henry II was a Catholic, he was the English king who conquered Ireland, and as we have seen, Talbot’s criteria for Protestantism is predicated on how one perceives the divisions (or lack thereof) between temporal and spiritual power as vested in the monarch. Thus, Talbot ahistorically assigns to Henry the faith of Protestantism to define the Irish Catholics in opposition to the English monarch who, like those of the Restoration, desired for himself ecclesiastical supremacy. Having described a common experience to unite all Catholics, Talbot thus claims that a pan-Catholic identity already exists, with a rich history of papal loyalty and devoted to the separation of secular and ecclesiastical authority dating back to the martyrdom of Becket. He again claims that as Walsh believes, “that the oath of supremacy may be taken with a good conscience by Roman Catholics,” the entire, “Roman Catholic Church belives, and tells vs the contrary,” thus Walsh has, “no reason to be angry with Catholics, if they do not rely upon [his] word in any point that concerns their conscience or religion.”[76] By describing Walsh as a Protestant, Talbot attempts to unite all Catholics against him and avoid afracturing Catholic unity; Walsh is no Catholic. Yet unlike Walsh, Talbot is not attempting to create unity. He is attempting, like the author of A Narrative or himself in The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects, to justify its existence. As such, he isolates Peter Walsh as a lone figure in a defunct movement attempting to combat centuries of Catholicism. By what authority, he asks, may Catholics subscribe to the Remonstrance? None but your own authority; nothing but your saying, that the Roman Catholic Church hath err'd rashly and obstinately for these 600. last years, because it admitted not a Spiritual Supremacy in temporal Soueueraigns. Really Mr. Walsh, I do not believe your sole authority is a sufficient argument to prove the Church hath erred. To proue so rash an assertion you would fain make us mistrust the testimonies of holy and learned Authors of the Church History, as Baronius, Bellarmin, and others…[77] Talbot invokes the concept of nationhood to counteract Walsh’s ability to create a separatist Church. He even explicitly refers to it; he asks whether Walsh would “disgrace [his] own nation” by “promoting protestancy... and dividing...Catholics by his Remonstrance.”[78] Thus his crime extends beyond religious heresy into the secular sort; it also consists of attempting to divide his version of the Catholic nation. This division is a conditional one, however, in the subjunctive tense. It does not exist, of course; it is only the foolish attempt of a deranged traitor. Yet it is not enough to deny Walsh the privilege of support. To claim a united nation in opposition to Walsh, Talbot needs to deny his blatant persecutions of remonstrants. As we have seen, Talbot, in his position as Archbishop of Dublin, gleefully tormented the few remonstrant clergy remaining in his diocese. Yet he instead baldly lies about it: “I neuer persecuted, him nor any of his...Friars Remonstrants, in whose behalf he petitioned.”[79] Talbot, then, uses memory to controvert and invalidate Walsh’s construction of identity and instead articulates an iteration of Catholic identity that he claims as not only a viable alternative, but perhaps more importantly, already the reality. *** How did the Gaels perceive the remonstrance? Clues can be discerned from poetry. As we examined in the last section, the land settlement produced a wealth of tracts chronicling a collective set of experiences for all of Ireland; yet the question of who is included is left rather ambiguous. That question will be answered in this section. In his 1670 poem “O God of the Universe,” Ó Bruadair laments, Dark is the light of the sun and the heavenly elements, And rent is the covering surface of earth's grassy countenance, I deem it no wonder that they should then wholly extinguished be, Seeing that clerics transgressing their oaths into treason fall.[80] The decidedly critical outlook of the remonstrants – or rather, “The corrupt and un-Irish conceits of this renegade forger-clique” – finds a scapegoat in Peter Walsh.[81] In his 1670 tract “‘Tis Sad for Erin’s Fenialí Bands,” Ó Bruadair condemns Walsh as “guilty of the wounds inflicted on the land of Fál, Whicli lies to-day beneath his hand all powerless to act or stir.”[82] Yet such criticisms raise important questions. If the remonstrant clergy and Walsh are traitors, who are they betraying? The Catholic religion, or Ireland itself? Either way, the implications are massive. If Walsh is betraying Catholicism, then Ó Bruadair is claiming the existence of another vision of Irish Catholicism more in line with Talbot’s thinking. If the answer is Ireland, then by consequence all Catholics must be counted as Irish. In examining Ó Bruadair’s treatment of Catholicism as it relates to his already-discussed perception of a Gaelic Ireland, a mostly coherent, yet at times contradictory, vision of who Ó Bruadair considers Irish emerges. His 1680 work “Those Who Once Knewest The Law” sheds some light on these queries. The poem is written in response to the news that one Master Verling, a lower Gaelic nobleman, converted to Protestantism for admittance to Trinity College, Dublin.[83] The poet writes: Those who once knewest the law of the flock that cleaved closest to Christ, And who therefore have let themselves be by the cruellest slavery oppressed, Reflect in thy mind on thyself and observe how accursed the deed To yield to the heart's base desires and sell heaven for a short spell of life.[84] Verling’s treachery is not to Gaeldom but to Catholicism as a whole, and the oppressed peoples mentioned are all Catholics, not just ones of a certain ethnic persuasion. These few short lines reveal a startling conclusion: what Joseph Leerssen mistakenly considers an exclusive, Gaelic identity developing in the Restoration period should really be understood as an Irish Catholic identity.[85] Yet still, this issue is complicated by the fact that the culture and history of Ireland Ó Bruadair espouses is very much a Gaelic one. It is thus necessary to examine his perception of Old English eligibility for this collective memory. Paradoxically, in his rather exclusionary language which separate Gauls from Gaels, he lumps Catholics of all persuasions into a de-ethnicized confessional identity. As reverend Mac Erlean notes, Gauls is a complicated term. It may designate Gauls, Vikings, Normans, or English. Until the seventeenth century, Gauls were characterized and distinguished by different physically descriptive terms such as “fair,” or “bright.” Yet, as the social upheaval of the seventeenth century introduced various new settlers into Ireland, words such as “old” or “new” began to be used, and physical descriptions such as “fair” or “black” became transmuted so as to solely convey moral judgements.[86] Thus “Gall” by Ó Bruadair’s time was a decidedly ambiguous term. As such, we find various pieces praising them, even though they are not Gaels: Many daring soldiers, many swords and volumes, Many masts and currachs, Did that fleet's crew bring across the sea from Britain, Everlasting radiance. The diploma of these Galls is Christ's religion And their prince's patent, The prescription of five hundred years' possession. 'Tis no living falsehood.[87] Thus, the Anglo-Irish conquerors of the twelfth century are distinguished from the Cromwellians of the 1640’s because of their religion. Though their religion does not make them “Gaels,” it does establish a bond with them, symbolized in this particular poem by the marriage between the “Choicest wheat of Erin's Gaels and Galls.”[88] Catholic Gauls are included in the land of Erin, and as we have seen in the previous section, are also included in the land’s Gaelic past which was founded for this united island. The most important Gaelic-language work in forging a discursive Catholic union between Gaels and Gauls is Ó Bruadair’s poem “Love of Sages,” written in praise of John Keating, the Old English Chief Justice of Ireland who acquitted the Gaelic noblemen accused of complicity in the supposed 1682 “Popish Plot.”[89] In the poem, Ó Bruadair identifies two types of Galls. One includes the, Royal champions for the king’s cause murdered Made these sons of malediction proud; Soon the frauds of sullen, hateful scoundrels Flourished fierce without a spark of shame.[90] This classification refers to the Protestant English officials who poisoned the king’s ear with fantasies of Catholic rebellion. The other group – or as Ó Bruadair writes, it, “Galls like these” – including Keating, “shield of our protection/Against the wicked tramp’s perfidious snares.”[91] This second category comprises the Catholic Galls of Ireland, or the Anglo-Normans, to whom the Gaels “owe allegiance.”[92] To further complicate this conception, Ó Bruadair makes several bold statements in his praise of Keating which seem to contradict the notion that these Gauls are even foreigners. First, he lauds the “the chivalrous blood of that generous true Irish Gall,” a seemingly blatant linguistic paradox.[93] Several lines later, he similarly praises him for bringing “comfort to your oppressed Countrymen.”[94] Thus, the distinction between Gael and Gall persists, yet the Galls seem to count as Irish. How so? Catholicism, of course, unites them. The Irish nation conceived by Ó Bruadair and the other Gaelic poets reviewed in the Restoration period is one not of Gaels, as Joseph Leerssen maintains, but of Catholics. As we have seen, Gaelic language, culture, and history were touted with characteristic fervor in these thirty volatile years. Yet these were defined not in opposition to the Old English, but to the English Protestant invaders. The memories that were drawn upon were indeed Gaelic, yet they were memories to which all Catholics could subscribe; thus his praising of Keating for appreciating the Gaels for who they were.[95] In uniting them in the present as one Catholic force, Ó Bruadair further implies that they also should subscribe to this history, as all of Ireland increasingly became united as one single geographic, religious entity. Thus, just as the Old English pamphleteers attempted to resolve economic and ecclesiastical animosities by professing some sort of unified Irish Catholic identity (implicitly surmounting ethnic differences), the Gaelic poets, in their quest to comprehend the transformed society around them, smoothed over ethnic differences and the complexities of recent experience to articulate a coherent version of Ireland. This Ireland which was Gaelic in culture, language, and history, was now also available to Catholic Gauls as a result of supposedly shared recent experiences. Like those of the Old English writers, such affirmations had little grounding in reality. Yet their existence is vital to understanding how Irish nationalism, in the eighteenth century, took place within a context of “cultural-political osmosis” wherein even the English-speaking, Protestant population adhered to this vision of Ireland in direct opposition to England. In conclusion, an Irish Catholic nation did form in the Restoration period, insofar as it appeared in discourse as an appealing alternative to confusing and oftentimes depressing social realities. It transcended ethnic, economic, and theological bounds, yet never appeared in the same form more than once. Irish Catholic identity can only really be described as a rhetorical chameleon, used constantly – in many more works than just the above discussed – yet changing to adapt to the circumstances of the propaganda. Gaelic poetry and the remonstrance discourse, more or less devoid of ulterior motives other than asserting the continued role of the poet in society and formulating a remonstrant versus anti-remonstrant identity, respectively, came the closest to articulating a clear, ideologically-founded Catholic nation. Yet all of the tracts examined, and several more which I have not had the space to assess here, have one common theme: the discourse is massively disconnected from reality. Any development of Irish Catholic identity in this period was purely rhetorical and was not reflected by any actual events. This is not to say these tracts have no importance in posterity. They certainly do. Nationhood as defined by the parameters set out in this particular essay, is inherently both rhetorical and practical; it must originate in articulations of experience and a call for unity before this actually happens. Rhetorical unity is necessarily anticipatory of actual nationhood; Restoration articulations of nationhood may be considered, with the benefit of historical hindsight, to have anticipated what Tom Garvin deems, “Irish separatist nationalism as a popular political creed,” that originated in the eighteenth century.[96] The seventeenth century provided the rhetorical framework and memorial precedent; the eighteenth century, with its mass persecutions of all Catholics and economic and political imperialization of Ireland, provided the immediate impetus to subscribe to the memory.[97] We should be careful not to rely too heavily on hindsight, however, and should focus equally on the immediate impact of the discourse within the context of the Restoration era. The literature of the 1660s, 70s, and 80s had the immediate effect of enforcing the image of Ireland as a Catholic nation, and in describing Ireland in opposition to English Protestantism, it became an inherently, if unwittingly, subversive entity. This discourse also offers one more important revelation, alluded to earlier in this essay: given that Irish unity was employed in such a myriad of tracts from this period, one may assume it was an effective rhetorical tool and appealed to broad swaths of the Catholic population. Thus, though they could not agree on how they should unite, it appears that many Irish Catholics did agree that indeed they should. Given the Protestant ascendancy, increasing imperialization, and marginalization of Catholics in political life, the fact that this was the case is not surprising. Yet it is also not surprising that unity did not happen: the brunt of this oppression was not felt by the entire population. The Stuarts did not perfect the art of confessional, economic, and political persecution in Catholic Ireland. The Hanovers, however, did. Endnotes [1] Nicholas French, The bleeding Iphigenia or An excellent preface of a work unfinished, published by the authors frind, [sic] with the reasons of publishing it.] 1675. 2, 3, 6 [2] Tim Harris, “Restoration Ireland: Themes and Problems” in Restoration Ireland: Always Settling, Never Settled, edited by Coleman A. Dennehy (Hampshire, England, 2008). 13 [3] Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). 35-8 [4] Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). 11-14 [5] Tim Harris, “Restoration Ireland: Themes and Problems” in Restoration Ireland: Always Settling, Never Settled, edited by Coleman A. Dennehy (Hampshire, England, 2008). 13 [6] Tim Harris, “Restoration Ireland: Themes and Problems” in Restoration Ireland: Always Settling, Never Settled, edited by Coleman A. Dennehy (Hampshire, England, 2008). 10 [7] Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). 87 [8] Ann Creighton, “Grace and Favour: The Cabal Ministry and Irish Catholic Politics, 1667-1673” in Restoration Ireland: Always Settling, Never Settled, edited by Coleman A. Dennehy (Hampshire, England, 2008). 152 [9] Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Making Ireland Modern (Gill and MacMillan: Dublin, 2006). 235 [10] Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Making Ireland Modern (Gill and MacMillan: Dublin, 2006). 237-8; Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). 98 [11] Peter Walsh, P. W's Reply to the Person of Quality's Answer: Dedicated to His Grace, the Duke of Ormond. Paris: [s.n.], 1682. 88-80 [12] Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Making Ireland Modern (Gill and MacMillan: Dublin, 2006). 238-9 [13] Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Making Ireland Modern (Gill and MacMillan: Dublin, 2006). 239 [14] Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). 96-98; Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Making Ireland Modern (Gill and MacMillan: Dublin, 2006). 239 [15] Ann Creighton, “Grace and Favour: The Cabal Ministry and Irish Catholic Politics, 1667-1673” in Restoration Ireland: Always Settling, Never Settled, edited by Coleman A. Dennehy (Hampshire, England, 2008). 144-6 [16] Ernest Renan, What is a Nation? (Lecture at Sorbonne, 11 March 1882 in Discours et Conferences, Paris, Caiman-Levy, 1887). 277-310 [17] Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). 87 [18] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland: Whereby the Just English Adventurer Is Much Prejudiced, the Antient Proprietor Destroyed, and Publick Faith Violated : to the Great Discredit of the English Church, and Government, (if Not Re-Called and Made Void) As Being Against the Principles of Christianity, and True Protestancy. Lovain: [s.n.], 1668 [19] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 1 [20] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 1 [21] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 1-2 [22] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 7, [23] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 12 [24] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 11-12 [25] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 17 [26] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 5-6 [27] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 8-9 [28] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 10 [29] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 16 [30] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 25 [31] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 25 [32] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. Represented by Peter Talbot In a Letter to the Roman-Catholiks of Ireland, Particulary Those of the City and Diocese of Dublin. [Douai: s.n., 1674.] [33] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 1 [34] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 1 [35] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 1-2 [36] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 7-8 [37] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 10 [38] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 2, 13 [39] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 13 [40] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 9 [41] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 18 [42] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subiects. 15 [43] Joseph T. Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). 198 [44] Joseph T. Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). 220; Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part I, CONTAINING POEMS DOWN TO THE YEAR 1666, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 206 [45] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part I, CONTAINING POEMS DOWN TO THE YEAR 1666, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 207 [46] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. 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The Pay Gap Among Academic Faculty for Higher Education in the U.S Yucheng Wang Author Aditi Bhattacharjya Jason Fu Meruka Vyas Editors Abstract This paper investigates whether academic rank, academic field, and gender account for the pay disparity in higher education in the United States. Analyzing 2,235 faculty in the University of Iowa, I find that pay gaps are primarily driven by academic rank, especially among professors and non-tenured faculty. Male assistant professors earn 23.8% more than females, while non-tenured males earn 31.6% less than females. Within identical academic ranks, there are gender pay gaps between assistant professors and non-tenured faculty. By analyzing 301 assistant professors, this paper identifies the academic field as another factor in pay discrepancies across academia, particularly among business, medical, social science, and STEM disciplines. However, gender doesn’t contribute to the pay disparity problem when faculties are under the same academic rank and field of study. Given this paper does not utilize datasets for any private institutions or colleges in other states, the paper’s findings can only be generalized to public universities in the U.S. I. Introduction In August 2023, five of Vassar’s female professors sued the college for wage discrimination against female faculties. According to the Washington Post, full-time male professors at Vassar earn an average annual salary of about $154,200, while their full-time female professors only earn $139,300. In this lawsuit, advocates for Vassar professors argued that the gender pay gap arose due to substantial differences in starting salaries. In academia, there exists a merit rating system biased against females, alongside a discriminatory promotion process that systematically prevents or delays the advancement of female professors compared to males. This gender bias and stark compensation difference between male and female faculty members does not only happen at Vassar College. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) finds that full-time women professors make up 82% of what their male colleagues earn across academia. Recent lawsuits in Vassar have alleged wage discrimination against female professors, raising questions about the presence of the gender pay gap in academia across the United States. The College and University Professional Association for Human Resources has discovered persistent pay disparities for females in staff and faculty positions at colleges and universities across the United States. Academic researchers and policymakers hypothesize that the gender gap in earnings persists because it is hidden intentionally (Trotter et al., 2017). Given that limited research focuses on the gender pay gap for higher education in the United States, this paper aims to provide evidence of how male and female academic faculties differ in their earnings at colleges or universities in the United States. Moreover, this paper also investigates non-gendered factors contributing to the pay gap in academia across the United States like academic rank and field. Using the University of Iowa as its primary data source, this paper examines whether academic rank, academic field, and gender account for the pay disparity for higher education in the United States. Motivated by Koedel and Pham’s research in 2023, I categorize determinants of salary disparity into two areas: conditional gaps and unconditional gaps. Since compensation differences can be explained partially by the level of faculty’s skills and contributions, the conditional gaps include academic rank and academic field. The remaining unexplained portion of the pay gap falls under the unconditional gap like gender. Faculties with higher seniority typically take more responsibility in teaching and administrative tasks, have more years of experience, and potentially make more substantial contributions to research. Therefore, academic rank has the most significant impact on pay disparity in academia. Besides academic rank, the academic field is the second most influential factor. As some academic fields like medicine or business are historically more prestigious or better funded for research, it leads to a greater pay discrepancy when faculty members have identical academic ranks. As a result, I hypothesize that gender is the least influential factor in the pay gap problem. II. Background President Obama proposed the White House Equal Pay Pledge in 2016 to narrow the gender wage gap across the United States. Following Obama’s campaign, academic institutions formed new committees and commissions on college campuses to address the gender pay inequality problems. For instance, Louisiana State University established the Council on Gender Equity to emphasize gender pay equality. However, research still shows a persistent gender pay gap among university faculty across the United States. AAUP finds that a full-time female professor earned roughly $82 for every $100 a full-time male professor earned in 2023. This compensation difference between male and female full-time professors raises questions about the existence of a gender pay gap for higher education in the United States. Does pay depend on the skills and contributions of males and females equally, or does bias result in differential salary solely based on the individual's gender? From the late 1980s to the mid 2010s, previous research indicates that the gender pay gap, a form of unconditional gap, accounts for 20% of wage difference at research universities (Koedel & Pham, 2023). Besides the unconditional gap, the conditional gap contains the unexplained portion of the pay gap in academia. The conditional gap is typically associated with the academic field, years in the position, and peer performance evaluations. In contrast to the unconditional gap, the conditional gap only accounts for 4% to 6% of wage difference, or 20% to 30% of the unconditional gap (Li & Koedel, 2017). Given that the unconditional gender pay gap is almost three to five times bigger than the conditional gap, this sizable difference underscores the substantial influence of gender on salaries within academia. Furthermore, this finding also suggests that the pay gap in academia is more closely tied to gender-based disparities than to intellectual or performance measurements. III. Data My main estimates are based on an analysis of data from the Iowa Legislature for the University of Iowa in 2022. This annual census survey collects data on full-time and part-time teaching and administrative staff at degree-granting public universities and their affiliated colleges in Iowa State from July 1 to June 30 of the following year. The survey covers 14,295 employees in the University of Iowa, including administrative and support staff, librarians, all full-time tenure track faculties, part-time affiliated staff, adjunct staff, clinical staff in teaching hospitals, visiting scholars, and research staff who have academic ranks and salaries similar to teaching staff, for all those whose term of appointment is not less than 12 months. The main objective of this paper is to examine how male and female academic faculties differ in their earnings at universities or colleges in the United States. Thus, this dataset excludes clinical staff, visiting scholars, research staff, teaching assistants, administrative and support staff, and librarians. Since the Iowa Legislature mandates that state employees participate in the annual census survey, confidential pay information is obtained directly from the Department of Administrative Services without additional verification or editing. As the publicly available salary data is directly obtained from this State Employee Salary Book, the accuracy of data and publicly accessible features make the University of Iowa an ideal choice for this paper. Data about demographics, qualification data, and salaries were collected for all tenured, tenure-track, and non-tenured track faculty. Demographic data include each faculty member’s gender and county information. Qualification data include each faculty member’s academic rank and academic field. The salary data is directly obtained from the Iowa State Employee Salary Book payroll records. A limitation of the Iowa Legislature database is the generalizability problem. The database only includes state-funded public universities like the University of Iowa, Iowa State University, and the University of Northern Iowa. Other private universities or liberal arts colleges are not included in the Iowa Legislature database due to confidentiality concerns regarding wage information. This restriction poses a significant challenge in drawing broader conclusions about pay disparities across all public or private institutions in the United States. IV. Methods Given that the range of faculty’s wages varies from $1,000 to $1,685,834, this paper uses a log specification for salary to normalize the scales of the variables to make it less prone to outliers. To examine whether the faculty’s academic rank correlates with the pay gap, I analyzed 2,235 faculty members among tenured, tenure track, and non-tenured track at the University of Iowa for 2022. Tenured faculty typically secure lifetime professor employment after a six-year probationary period. Tenure track faculty hold positions as Associate Professor or Assistant Professor and are currently in the promotion and evaluation process towards attaining the status of tenured full professor. All faculties besides tenured or tenure track are classified as nontenured track faculties. The tenured faculties include 496 employees as full-time professors. The tenured track includes 415 employees as full-time associate professors or assistant professors. The non-tenured track includes 1,324 employees as part-time Adjunct staff, Professors of Instruction, Professors of Practice, and Lecturers. The general regression model is represented as follows: log Salary= β1AssociateProfessor + β2NonTenured + β3Professor + β4Male + β5AssociateProfessor Male + β6NonTenured Male + β7Professor Male + α + ε where Male is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the assistant professor is a male and 0 if not. AssociateProfessor, Professor, and NonTenured are indicator variables that equal 1 if the faculty member is associate professor, professor, or non-tenured track accordingly, and 0 if not. To test for differential returns for ranking by sex, I include three interaction variables: AssociateProfessor Male, Professor Male, and NonTenured * Male. These interaction variables are equal to 1 if the faculty member is a male assistant professor, male professor, or male in a non-tenured track accordingly, and 0 otherwise. To testify whether the faculty’s academic field correlates with the pay gap, I controlled the academic rank effect and analyzed 301 assistant professors at the University of Iowa for 2022. Faculties are sampled from six academic disciplines: art, business, humanities, medicine, social science, and STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics). Once a discipline was selected for sampling, all assistant professors listed on the department website were included in the dataset. The Arts discipline includes 22 assistant professors from the Arts Division in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences. The Humanity discipline includes 21 assistant professors from the Humanities Division at the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences. The STEM discipline includes 61 assistant professors from the College of Engineering and Natural and Mathematical Sciences Division in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences. The Social Sciences discipline includes 41 assistant professors from the Social Sciences Division in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and College of Education. The Business discipline includes 23 assistant professors belonging to the College of Business. The Medical discipline includes 133 assistant professors from the College of Medicine, Dentistry, and Nursing. The general regression model is represented as follows: log Salary= β1Business + β2Humanity + β3Medical + β4SocialScience + β5STEM + β6Male + β7Business Male + β8Humanity Male + β9Medical Male + β10SocialScience Male + β11STEM Male + α + ε where Male is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the assistant professor in the arts field is male and 0 otherwise. Business, Humanity, Medical, SocialScience, and STEM are indicator variables that equal 1 if the faculty member is business, humanity, medical, social science, or STEM accordingly, and 0 if not. To test for differential returns for the academic field by sex, I include five interaction variables: Business Male, Humanity Male, Medical Male, SocialScience Male, and STEM * Male. These interaction variables are equal to 1 if the assistant professor is a male in business, humanity, medical, social science, or STEM, and 0 otherwise. V. Results V.a.1 Academic Rank on Salary AAUP finds that the average annual salary in 2021 for assistant professors, associate professors, and professors was about $83,300, $96,000, and $140,500 respectively. Professors typically have more years of experience and research grants, so they tend to have higher salaries than associate professors or assistant professors. From this result, I hypothesize that academic rank correlates with pay disparity in academia. To test my hypothesis, the regression in Table 1 compared each faculty member’s salary based on their academic rank, with the expectation that professors have the highest wages compared to associate professors, assistant professors, and non-tenured track faculties. The non-tenured track faculty in my dataset consists of adjunct staff, lecturers, Professors of Instruction, and Professors of Practice. In the University of Iowa, the Professor of Instruction and Professor of Practice are instructional faculty solely responsible for teaching and not involved in administrative duties. Since the hiring criteria for instructional faculty is less rigorous in terms of research and scholarship requirements as compared to those for tenured or tenure track faculty, instructional faculty tend to receive lower compensation. In this regression, the adjusted R2 is 54.8%, which is consistent with my hypothesis that academic rank accounts for salary disparity. The β1, β2, and β3 coefficients indicate relative salary differences for female associate professors, non-tenured track faculties, and professors compared to female assistant professors. Because of higher ranks, the predicted signs for β1 and β3 coefficients are positive, suggesting that female associate professors or professors receive higher salaries compared to female assistant professors. However, the β1 coefficient is negative and not statistically significant at 0.01 level, suggesting pay is not increasing for associate professors. The β3 coefficient is positive and suggests that female Professors earn relatively 26.3% higher than female assistant professors. Since non-tenured track faculties are part-time basis or instructional faculty, they receive lower compensation than their tenured or tenure track colleagues. Thus, the predicted sign for β2 is negative. The β2 coefficient is negative and suggests female non-tenured track faculty earn relatively 173.7% less than female assistant professors. Given both Professor and NonTenure variables are economically significant and statistically significant at 0.01 level, I conclude that academic rank accounts for wage discrepancies only in the professor and non-tenured track faculty levels. V.a.2 Gender Effect on Salary Within Same Academic Rank AAUP found that full-time women professors earned 82 cents for every dollar their male counterparts earned in 2023. This compensation disparity motivated me to investigate whether gender influences salary within identical academic rank conditions. In Figure 1, male faculty members earn much more than their female counterparts under professors, associate professors, and assistant professors levels. However, female non-tenured faculty members receive higher salaries than their male colleagues. Therefore, within the same academic rank, I hypothesize that gender accounts for pay discrepancy. To test my hypothesis, the regression in Table 1 compares each faculty member’s salary based on their gender when they have identical academic ranks. The β4, β5, β6, and β7 coefficients indicate relative salary differences for male assistant professors, associate professors, non-tenured track faculties, and professors compared to their female counterparts under the same academic rank condition. I expect males to earn less at the non-tenured level while earning more at the professor, associate professor, or assistant professor level. The predicted sign for β6 is negative while β4, β5, and β7 are positive. However, both β5 and β7 coefficients are not statistically significant at 0.01 level, suggesting that the pay gap for the associate professor and professor level cannot be explained by gender reasons. In contrast, the β4 coefficient is positive and suggests that male Assistant Professor earns relatively 23.8% higher than female assistant professors. The β6 coefficient is negative and suggests that male non-tenured track faculties earn relatively 31.6% less than female non-tenured track faculties. Since both Male and NonTenure * Male variables are economically significant and statistically significant at 0.01 level. I conclude that gender bias accounts for wage disparity only in assistant professor and non-tenured levels when both female and male faculty have identical academic ranks. V.b.1 Academic Field on Salary Within the Same Academic Rank Under the same academic rank, is gender the sole factor contributing to the wage disparity at the University of Iowa? Previous research suggests that academic rank and academic field account for 4% to 6% of wage difference in academia (Li & Koedel, 2017). To examine whether the academic field impacts wage differences, I analyzed 301 assistant professors across six academic departments at the University of Iowa in 2022. The regression in Table 2 compared each assistant professor’s salary based on their academic field. I anticipate that medical, business, and STEM assistant professors will have the highest wages relative to other disciplines. Professions like doctors, investment bankers, and software engineers are known for their lucrative salaries. As a result, students are more likely to declare majors in medical, business, or STEM subjects. To meet the growing demand for these majors while providing a more robust academic curriculum, universities, and liberal arts colleges offer competitive salaries to attract top-tier talent for teaching positions. Therefore, I hypothesize that the academic field accounts for wage discrepancy at the assistant professor level. In this regression, the adjusted R2 is 32.9%, which is consistent with my hypothesis that the academic field accounts for salary disparity. The β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 coefficients indicate relative salary differences for female assistant professors in business, humanity, medicine, social science, and STEM compared to the female assistant professors in the arts field. Since the business, medical, and STEM fields provide lucrative salaries, the predicted signs and values for β1, β3, and β5 are positive and mathematically larger. It suggests that female assistant professors in business, medicine, or STEM receive higher salaries than those in the art department. Since the β2 coefficient is slightly positive and not statistically significant at 0.01 level, it suggests the salary difference for female assistant professors between humanities and art disciplines is negligible. In contrast, the β1, β3, β4, and β5 coefficients are positive, which suggests that female assistant professors in the business, medical, social science, and STEM fields earn a relatively higher proportion of salaries than those in the art department. Given that the β1, β3, β4, and β5 coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, I conclude that the academic field accounts for wage disparity for assistant professors in business, medical, social science, and STEM disciplines. V.b.2 Gender Effect on Salary Within Same Academic Rank and Field In Figure 2, I observed the average annual salary between male and female assistant professors separately within the Arts, Business, Humanity, Medical, Social Science, and STEM fields at the University of Iowa in 2022. Within the same academic field, the greatest gender gap is $110,510 in the Medical department while the smallest is only $558 in the Humanities department. Given that the gender pay gap exists among all six departments, I hypothesize that gender accounts for pay disparity when female and male assistant professors are within the same academic field. To test my hypothesis, the regression in Table 2 compared each assistant professor’s salary based on their gender when they are in the same academic discipline. The β6, β7, β8, β9, β10, and β11 coefficients indicate relative salary differences for male assistant professors in Arts, Business, Humanity, Medical, Social Science, and STEM compared to their female assistant professors under the same academic field condition. Since the β6, β7, β8, β10, and β11 coefficients are economically insignificant at the 0.1 level and statistically insignificant at the 0.01 level, I find that there is not any gender pay gap under the assistant professor level within the Arts, Business, Humanity, Social Science, and STEM departments. However, the β9 coefficient suggests the relative salary difference for male assistant professors is 32.4% higher than for female assistant professors within the medical field. As the β9 coefficient is economically significant at 0.1 level while statistically insignificant at 0.01 level, I identify that there is no gender pay gap under the assistant professor level within the medical field. In sum, gender does not account for wage disparity at the assistant professor level within the same department condition. V.b.3 Gender Effects for Assistant Professor in Medical Field Previous research suggests that women may encounter greater pay inequality in which they are underrepresented within a field (Casad et al., 2022). In Figure 3, I find 23 more male assistant professors in the Medical department, while the faculty number difference is less than 10 for each Arts, Business, Humanities, and STEM department. The economically significant relationship is present only in the Medical department due to the underrepresentation of female assistant professors. In the University of Iowa case, there are 58.6% male and 41.4% female assistant professors within the medical field, which implies that females are underrepresented in the medical department. As the β9 coefficient is economically significant at 0.1 level while statistically insignificant at 0.01 level, it partially confirms my hypothesis that the mismatch between male and female faculty numbers leads to the gender pay difference. Historical reasons point to why the medical department has more male faculty members than female. Typically, students need to take three or four years of education in medical schools along with three to nine years of medical training before they enter hospitals or academia. The Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) finds that the average age for assistant professors in United States Medical Schools is 45.5 and 43.2 years old in 2023, which suggests the current assistant professors received their M.D. or D.O. degree from medical schools between 1997 and 2004. According to the AAMC records, from 1997 to 1998, 58.3% of medical school graduates were males while only 41.7% were females. From 2003 to 2004, 54.1% of medical school graduates were males and 45.9%were female. Even though the medical department still has high male representation, the rise of advocacy for women in STEM and the increased proportion of female medical school graduates from AAMC records imply that the gender pay gap in the medical field is likely to narrow in the future. VI. Conclusion I use the University of Iowa in 2022 as my dataset to investigate factors accounting for wage disparity in higher education in the United States. The findings show that academic rank explains wage differences in professors or non-tenured track faculty levels. Within the same academic rank, the gender pay gap only exists for assistant professors or non-tenured track level. Besides academic rank, the academic field also accounts for the wage discrepancy when I limit my dataset to only focus on the assistant professor level. The pay gap arose among business, medical, social science, and STEM disciplines. However, when two faculty members have identical academic ranks, there is no gender pay gap within the same department. To improve and expand on this research, diversifying the dataset must be a key focus by adding more public and private universities or colleges. A large dataset would provide a comprehensive perspective on whether the gender pay gap in academia is a nationwide inequality problem or a local inequality problem inside Iowa. If the study reveals stark differences between male and female faculty, it would be advisable to inform policymakers of the severity of the issue and propose equity focused policies such as implementing pay transparency laws to reduce pay inequality and associated gender gaps. Bibliography Gabriel, D. (2023). Female professors sue Vassar College, alleging wage discrimination. https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2023/08/30/vassar-college-wage-discrimination-lawsuit/ American Association of University Professors. (2023) “Annual Faculty Compensation Survey.” American Association of University Professors, June 2023, https://www.aaup.org/news/aaup reports-third-consecutive-year-faculty-wages-falling-short-inflation Koedel, C., & Pham, T. (2023). The Narrowing Gender Wage Gap Among Faculty at Public Universities in the U.S. SAGE Open , 13 (3), 21582440231192936. https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440231192936 Li, D., & Koedel, C. (2017). Representation and Salary Gaps by Race-Ethnicity and Gender at Selective Public Universities. Educational Researcher , 46 (7), 343–354. https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X17726535 College and University Professional Association for Human Resources. (2024) “Representation and Pay Equity in Higher Education Faculty: a Review and Call to Action.” College and University Professional Association for Human Resources, April 2024, https://www.cupahr.org/surveys/research-briefs/representation-and-pay-equity-in-higher-ed faculty-trends-april-2024/ The Iowa Legislature. (2022) https://www.legis.iowa.gov/publications/fiscal/salarybook Casad, B. J., Garasky, C. E., Jancetic, T. R., Brown, A. K., Franks, J. E., & Bach, C. R. (2022). U.S. Women Faculty in the Social Sciences Also Face Gender Inequalities. Frontiers in Psychology , 13 , 792756. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.792756 Trotter, R. G., Zacur, S. R., & Stickney, L. T. (2017). The new age of pay transparency. Business Horizons , 60 (4), 529–539. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2017.03.011 Wiedman, C. (2020). Rewarding Collaborative Research: Role Congruity Bias and the Gender Pay Gap in Academe. Journal of Business Ethics , 167 (4), 793–807. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551- 019-04165-0 Association of American Medical Colleges. (2023) “U.S. Medical School Faculty Trends: Average Age.” Association of American Medical Colleges, Dec 2023, https://www.aamc.org/data reports/faculty-institutions/data/us-medical-school-faculty-trends-average-age Association of American Medical Colleges. (2019) “Percentage of U.S. medical school graduates by sex, academic years 1980-1981 through 2018-2019.” Association of American Medical Colleges, August 2019, https://www.aamc.org/data-reports/faculty-institutions/data/us-medical-school faculty-trends-average-age Appendix Figure 1. Average Salary for Female and Male Faculties in Each Academic Rank Figure 2. Average Salary for Female and Male Assistant Professors in Each Academic Department Figure 3. Number of Female and Male Assistant Professors in Each Academic Department

Two Forms of Environmental-Political Imagination: Germany, the United States, and the Clean Energy Transition All Power to the Imagination Radical Student Groups and Coalition Building in France During May 1968 and the United States during the Vietnam War Calder McHugh Bowdoin College Author Alexis Biegen Sophia Carter Editors Fall 2019 Download full text PDF (26 pages) Abstract Student-led social movements in May of 1968 in France and through the late 1960s and early 1970s in the United States captured the attention of each nation at the time and have had a profound impact on how Americans and French understand their respective states today. Both movements held the lofty goal of completely reshaping their respective societal structures but the vast differences of the cultures in which they were carried out resulted in distinct end results. In France, student protests sparked mass mobilization of the nation and, at their height, were seen by most of the country in a positive light. The broader movement that involved worker participation as well also won material gains for workers in the nation. Across the Atlantic, on the other hand, student protests were met with mostly ill will from the American working class. This work will particularly focus on the ways in which a history of strikes and a popular Communist Party in France both allowed for mass mobilization and stopped the students from pursuing more radical change. It will also work to challenge dominant narratives in political science around coalition building. I. In mid-May, 1968, as 10 million people marched in demonstration through the streets of every major French city, student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit sat down for a wide-ranging interview with philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. Bendit cogently articulated his goals for the student movement as well as its potential challenges. “The aim is now the overthrow of the regime,” he said. “But it is not up to us whether or not this is achieved. If the Communist Party, the [general confederation of labor union] CGT and the other union headquarters shared it… the regime would fall within a fortnight.” Six years later and across the Atlantic Ocean, the Weather Underground, a militant leftist organization in its fifth year of operation which was composed of young radicals, published a book entitled Prairie Fire: The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism. The Weather Underground wrote, “Our intention is to disrupt the empire… to incapacitate it, to put pressure on the cracks, to make it hard to carry out its bloody functioning against the people of the world, to join the world struggle, to attack from the inside.” II. Radical social movements aimed at the overthrow of capitalism and capitalist-based governments existed throughout the Western world through the late 1960s and early 1970s. In Italy, West Germany, France, and the United States, these movements were particularly wide ranging and distinctly impacted each society, causing momentous political and cultural upheaval. This work will focus on the latter two nations. The mass mobilization that shook France was confined largely to one month: May, 1968. In the middle of March, France’s leading newspaper Le Monde called France’s citizens too “bored” to protest in the same manner that was occurring in West Germany and the United States. A mere six weeks later, after the occupation of the University of Nanterre on March 22nd sparked conversation about collective action around the country, French students occupied the University of Paris at the Sorbonne, in the Latin Quarter of Paris, sparking nightly clashes with the police. Streets were barricaded, all transportation was shut down, and worker mobilization reached a height of 10 million on strike. Notably, students’ grievances were separate from those of the workers. The students rallied around a popular slogan of the time, “all power to the imagination,” which captured their collective interest in enacting changes to the educational system that would allow for a more free and accepting university structure. Comprised of Trotskyites, Maoists, anarchists, and others on the Left, many also believed in the violent overthrow of the 5th Republic of France and the complete reshaping of society. As Suzanne Borde, who in May, 1968 had recently left her childhood home for Paris, said, “Everything changed [in May, 68], my way of thinking, everything… My favorite expression at the time was “La Vie, Vite” (Life, Quickly)! I wanted to change the usual way of life.” The workers, who made up the lion’s share of the protestors but had fewer public clashes with the police, were concerned less with political ideology or societal restructuring than with material gains that would make their lives better, such as wage increases. Their protests ran in conjunction with the students’, but their union was a tenuous one: the French Communist Party (PCF) and its associated labor union Confédération Général du Travail (CGT) controlled much of the political action amongst the workers and was deeply suspicious of the goals of the student movement from its nascent stages. Ultimately, two central events led to the movement’s demise. Maybe ironically, the first was originally interpreted as a success: the protests led to governmental upheaval and President Charles de Gaulle’s temporary departure from the country. After weeks of uncertainty, representatives of de Gaulle’s government negotiated what came to be termed the Grenelle Agreements with the leadership of the CGT. Resulting in more bargaining power for unions as well as a 35 percent minimum wage increase and a 10 percent increase in average real wages, these concessions pacified many workers, leading them back to the factory floor. Second, upon returning to the country on May 30, Charles de Gaulle organized a significant counter-protest on the Champs-Elysees, dissolved the legislature and called for new legislative elections that took place in late June. De Gaulle’s party, the Union of Democrats for the Republic (UDR) won a massive victory and went back to being firmly in control of the nation, while the PCF lost more than half of their seats. Social protest in the United States was not so neatly circumscribed into a few months. Anti-Vietnam War protests took many shapes over numerous years. For the purposes of this work, analysis will be confined to the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) organization, its offshoot groups, and their respective impacts on the broader movement. Launched with the Port Huron Statement in 1962 before the official beginning of the American War in Vietnam in 1965, the organization purposefully did not couch its goals in traditionally communist or Marxist rhetoric, because unlike in France, there was no appetite for it in the United States. Rather, they argued quite persuasively, “We are people of this generation, bred in at least moderate comfort, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.” While fewer than 100 people signed the Port Huron Statement, by 1965, the SDS organized the “March on Washington to End the War in Vietnam,” which 15,000 to 25,000 people from around the country attended. This march both attracted a degree of attention and trained future organizers of better-coordinated marches on Washington, including the November, 1969 Moratorium March on Washington, which had over 250,000 attendees. While SDS remained a strong political force through the late 1960s, by its 1969 convention in Chicago the group had moved significantly to the left ideologically and had developed political differences amongst itself that detached it from the unified spirit of the Port Huron Statement. As SDS gathered in Chicago, by the end of the weekend of June 18-22, three separate factions had emerged. One, calling itself the Progressive Labor Party (PL), argued for Maoist and worker-oriented solutions to what they perceived as the ills of America. Another, the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM), became the foundation of what was eventually called the Weather Underground—they advocated for a radicalization of SDS to fight American imperialism alongside the Black Panthers and revolutionary groups around the world. Finally, the Revolutionary Youth Movement II (RYM II) agreed with RYM on most substantive issues, but believed in a more traditional Marxist approach to solve them. According to sociologist Penny Lewis, none of these groups, including the PL whose entire revolutionary strategy was based on cross-class alliance with workers, enjoyed any significant support from the working class. She writes, “The obvious reason for this was the near-unanimous embrace of Cold War anticommunism in the ranks of labor and the collapse of Communist Party influence within the class.” Left without the possibility of even a tenuous connection between young radicals and the broad working class, the Weather Underground began to participate in militant action to attempt to bring the Vietnam war home. In March of 1970, Weather Underground member Bernardine Dohrn anonymously recorded a transmission and sent it to a California radio station on behalf of the group. She warned, “The lines are drawn… Revolution is touching all of our lives. Freaks are revolutionaries and revolutionaries are freaks… within the next 14 days we will bomb a major U.S. institution.” While her timeline was a bit optimistic, the group bombed the Capitol in March of 1971 and the Pentagon in May of 1972, all the while intending not to injure anyone (these two actions had no deaths associated). Their most famous (and infamous) deed was an accident—also in March of 1970, two members (Diana Oughton and Terry Robbins) accidentally detonated a bomb in a Greenwich Village townhouse while assembling homemade explosives, killing themselves and a third “Weatherman” who was walking into the house (Ted Gold). The Weather Underground did continue action after the conclusion of American involvement in Vietnam in 1975, but paired down much of its more violent activities. The group, whose members found their way to the FBI’s Most Wanted List, eventually disbanded; many now work as professors, educating and informing new generations of American thought. III. The outgrowth of the fragile connection between student protest and worker protest in France, as well as the lack of any significant worker mobilization in the United States, has a lot to do with the way each nation developed in the wake of World War II. During the altercations in May, 1968 in France, President Charles de Gaulle and the PCF represented two opposing poles of influence. This, in many ways, defined the conflict: de Gaulle’s fairly centrist (by modern standards) regime was forced to contend with a popular Communist Party facing a radical push from student activists combined with a wellspring of support from French workers. Interestingly, both De Gaulle and the Communists found much of their legitimacy from their actions a quarter-century prior, during World War II. De Gaulle and his supporters, along with the PCF, were the two most significant resistance forces to the collaborationist Vichy government. As such, in the first legislative election after the War in 1945, the PCF won a plurality of the vote, with 26.1 percent, and controlled the most seats in the legislature. De Gaulle did not participate in these elections. By 1967, while the PCF’s support had diminished, it remained a powerful force: they held 21.37 percent of the vote, a slight drop, but were able to build a governing coalition with fellow Leftist parties Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left (FGDS) and the Unified Socialist Party (PSU). Together, the three received 53.43 percent of the vote. The revolution in 1968, then, did not come out of nowhere. Not only could the PCF count on at least 20 percent of France’s support throughout the 1950s and 60s, it also organized strikes. Significant agrarian protests led by the PCF occurred in 1959 and 1960, and in 1963 strikes reached a zenith of the era before 1968, as the number of days that workers were on strike was the highest in 10 years. As Kenneth Libbey, who is both a scholar of and an advocate for the PCF, argues, “the belief in the ability of a mass movement to sweep aside obstacles to its success is a dominant theme of the party. Its acceptance makes the arguments about the transition to socialism at least plausible.” By May of 1968, significant differences existed between the often anarchist, Maoist, or Trotskyite student groups and the Stalinist PCF and CGT. However, these disagreements on ideology were not significant enough to halt the cross-coalitional movement—at least at first. In the case of Leftist groups in the United States, whether they marched under the Maoist banner of coalition-building with the working class (in the case of the PL movement) or had more anarchist tendencies as well as interest in engaging with black revolutionary groups such as the Black Panthers (in the case of the Weather Underground), they had very little historical precedent or organizational support upon which to draw. Even at its relative peak in 1944, the Communist Party in the United States (CPUSA) only had a confirmed membership of 80,000. In the context of the Cold War, it became impossible to be an avowed Communist in public life. In a period often called the “Second Red Scare” or “McCarthyism,” the United States Congress convened the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in order to attempt to find and punish Communists whom they believed to be working for the Soviet Union. In 1954, the United States government formally outlawed the CPUSA. While in the French case the Communist Party was associated with brave resistance to World War II, politicians in the United States were able to successfully present the CPUSA as a subversive group intent on aiding the Russians in the Cold War. As an ideology, McCarthyism faded through the 1950s and was eventually seen for what it was: a witch-hunt. However, in the Cold War context, a genuine Communist Party in the United States would have been something of an anachronism at best. Thus, radicals in the United States had to both divorce themselves from any extremely weak institutions that did exist and strive to create their own culture and identity. The divergent histories of France and the United States shaped not only the popularity of social movements in the late 1960s, but also the strategies and tactics employed by student radicals in both nations. IV. A shared characteristic of the radical students in France and the United States was their distaste for slow-moving, marginal improvements. In fact, French radical students had been preaching this ideology since the early 1960s. Trotskyite dissidents, many of whom were engaged in the leadership of the 1968 movement, submitted a manifesto to the socialist publication Socialisme ou Barbarie in 1961 outlining many of the same principles as the Weather Underground did eight years later. They argued, “One hundred and fifty years of ‘progress’ and ‘democracy’ have proved that no matter what reforms are applied to the capitalist system they will not change the real situation of the worker.” As is typical of the French case, revolutionary politics are more wrapped up in the labor movement than in the United States. The manifesto continues, “The workers will not be free of oppression and exploitation until their struggles have resulted in setting up a really socialistic society, in which workers’ councils will have all the power, and both production and economic planning will be under worker management.” Fredy Perlman, a student who aided in the shutdown of the Censier Annex of the Sorbonne, believed in a direct connection between the actions at the Universities and the larger strikes. He saw the main contribution of the students at the Censier to be the formation of worker-student action committees, in which the two groups coordinated actions together. Perlman, who published a booklet entitled Worker-student Action Committees, France, 1968 in 1970, wrote, “The formation of the worker-student committees coincides with the outbreak of a wildcat strike: ‘In the style of the student demonstrators, the workers of Sud-Aviation have occupied the factory at Nantes.” For Alain Krivine, the founder of one of the most influential activist groups for youth during 1968, Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire, increased rights for workers were essential to the success of the movement. However, he did not believe that leaders of the unions or the Communist Party best represented the workers’ interests. He says, “For me [leftwing political leaders Pierre] Mendès-France and [François] Mitterand were shit… Mendès-France and Mitterand could be an alternative, but for us it was a bad one.” Student demonstrator Isabelle Saint-Saëns largely agrees. “When we marched with the workers we felt united with them, but it remained theoretical as well,” she said. Nevertheless, the students did see the workers as the key to their success, because they were willing to mobilize and they held such tremendous political power because of their sheer numbers. As opposed to the situation in France, protest in the United States was based largely around denouncing the imperialism inherent within the conflict in Vietnam. In the shadow of the SDS convention in June of 1969, student radicals who formed the leadership of the splinter group of the Weather Underground sprang into action. Leadership of the organization included many young radicals who had been involved in the demonstrations against the Vietnam War at Columbia University the year before, including Bill Ayers, Bernardine Dohrn, and Mark Rudd, who famously wrote in a letter to Columbia President Grayson Kirk: “You call for order and respect for authority; we call for justice, freedom, and socialism. There is only one thing left to say. It may sound nihilistic to you, since it is the opening shot in a war of liberation. I’ll use the words of LeRoi Jones, whom I’m sure you don’t like a whole lot: ‘Up against the wall, motherfucker, this is a stick-up.’” The Weather Underground’s first major action,termed the “Days of Rage,” was scheduled to take place from October 8-11, 1969 in the streets of Chicago. The action’s specific purpose was to protest the trial of the “Chicago Eight,” a group on trial for antiwar activism during the 1968 Democratic National Convention. While they hoped for the participation of around 50,000 militants they got only a few hundred. The action, which included the looting and burning of downtown Chicago appeared not to have a particularly cogent mission, was panned by the mainstream media, but also by many fellow Leftist organizations, who argued that the organizers were alienating the broader public from their cause. The Weather Underground itself, though, argued that the “Days of Rage” were part of a larger effort to “bring the war home.” At this point in the antiwar fight, the Weather Underground had decided that they could not count on the participation of workers because of their lack of any significant socialist or communist sympathies. As such, they planned demonstrations and militant actions to raise the consciousness of the greater populace to the horrors of the war abroad. Friends and siblings who were drafted, sent to Vietnam, and often killed in action particularly galvanized American youth. Partially to announce the formation of the Weather Underground, the group released a manifesto entitled “You Don’t Need A Weatherman To Know Which Way The Wind Blows.” A subsection of this argument, “Anti-Imperialist Revolution and the United Front,” states, “Defeating imperialism within the US couldn’t possibly have the content, which it could in a semi-feudal country, of replacing imperialism with capitalism or new democracy; when imperialism is defeated in the US, it will be replaced by socialism- nothing else. One revolution, one replacement process, one seizure of state power- the anti-imperialist revolution and the socialist revolution, one and the same stage.” Student radicals in the United States saw the need to engender violent revolution in order to move to a state willing to accept socialism as a rational political ideology. The stated aims of the two movements, then, were quite similar. Each believed that their government was not truly democratic, and that there was a distinct need to expel the ruling elite from power. The two groups framed the issue using a shared language of the Left that dealt primarily with expressing solidarity with the oppressed. Divergence in the movements appeared in each group’s understanding of their own role in society. In France, while students were suspicious and sometimes downright dismissive of the PCF and the CGT, they believed they needed the participation of the workers (many of whom were members of those organizations) to succeed. The split at the SDS convention in June of 1969, on the other hand, further alienated the Weather Underground even from fellow Leftist organizations. While the Weather Underground hoped to gain more support for its cause amongst the general populace, the group also understood the nature of the political system in the United States and made the conscious decision to exist outside of it. In “You Don’t Need a Weatherman…” they wrote, “How will we accomplish the building of [a Marxist-Leninist Party]- It is clear that we couldn’t somehow form such a party at this time, because the conditions for it do not exist in this country outside the Black Nation.” Much of the reason for both the divergent outcomes as well as the divergent tactics and framing of the student movements in France and the United States have to do with the political opportunity structures that existed in each nation during the late 1960s. These are broadly rooted in the historical differences in the treatment of Communism as an ideology in both nations. V. Many scholars have argued that the character of the revolution of May 1968 was defined by the youth and, to a lesser degree, intellectuals in the nation. Maybe more important for mass mobilization in France, though, was the history of strikes in the nation. According to French historian Stéphane Sirot, while in other nations strikes are often the result of failed negotiations, in France they frequently occur either during or before negotiations with labor bosses. Strikes are such successful tactics of negotiation because they work on two levels. First, they have an offense element through mass demonstrations that attract the attention of the media. Second, they work defensively in that by refusing to work, they put pressure on bosses to find a quick solution. In their paper, “The Shape of Strikes in France, 1830-1960,” published in 1971, scholars Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly argue that French strikes, while fairly prevalent throughout this period, changed fairly significantly in character in this time period. This, according to Shorter and Tilly, has largely to do with the significant expansion of industrial unionism at the end of the 1930s around the European continent. They use measurements of size, duration, and frequency to calculate the shape that these strikes took. Below is an example of their model: Table 1.1 This table shows two distinct strike scenarios. What Shorter and Tilly refer to as “Industry X” represents a scenario in which strikes are long but small and occur fairly infrequently. “Industry Y” has strikes that occur more frequently and with a larger size, but do not last for as long. By the 1960s in France, the model for strikes looked quite a bit more like “Industry Y” than “Industry X.” Below is, once again, Shorter and Tilly’s graphic explanation of this phenomenon, based on the historical cataloguing of strikes: Table 1.2 This is significant in that massive, short demonstrations, while not necessarily more successful than those that are smaller and play out over a longer period of time, are wont to receive more attention from the public and the media due to their dramatic nature. The sheer mass of strikes through the 1960s made it easier for workers to mobilize around issues that ran adjacent to the concerns of the students, such as rights to self-management in any workplace, but were certainly not the same. Conversely, in the United States before 1968 there were few examples of large scale strikes. Other than the steel workers’ strike in 1959, which included around half a million participants, frequent general strikes had not existed in the nation since the 19th Century. Additionally, while union activity was certainly stronger in the 1960s in the United States than it is today, the protests of the 1960s were more focused on the antiwar effort than the rights of workers. VI. Likely due at least partially to their comfort with general strikes and mass mobilization, the French populace largely supported the students and their efforts to protest, expressing ire for the police force when they clashed. On May 10, 1968, in what has since been termed the “night of the barricades” (because of barriers that students constructed to slow down police), French police and students clashed violently in the streets of Paris. 80 percent of Parisians, though, supported the students and believed fault in escalating the violence lay with the police. Nevertheless, cultural differences between the youth and both the ruling class and worker allies persisted in France as well, which manifested themselves in the priorities of the students. Before the revolution of 1968, the French schooling system was extremely restrictive. Students could not voice their own ideas in the classroom and the gender and sexual politics of the university were also extremely conservative—men and women were often divided. Thus, in considering how all of French society should change, the University system was at the front of many students’ minds. As Perlman argued about the revolutionary movement, “What begins [when the Universities are occupied] is a process of collective learning; the "university," perhaps for the first time, becomes a place for learning. People do not only learn the information, the ideas, the projects of others; they also learn from the example of others that they have specific information to contribute, that they are able to express ideas, that they can initiate projects. There are no longer specialists or experts; the division between thinkers and doers, between students and workers, breaks down. At this point all are students.” As might be expected, while many supported the broad protests of the students and their right to do so, concepts like the total change in University structure, for which Perlman argued, were less popular or important to much of French society. Thus, the French students created their own political ideology and culture that was often separate from that of the more institutionalized labor movements. However, while their culture and their priorities often separated them from the workers, the French students also believed the workers to be necessary to their success. When the Grenelle Accords were signed and a majority of the workers agreed to go back to work, students quickly demobilized. As scholar Mitchell Abidor argues in the introduction to his oral history May made me, “For the workers, it was not the qualitative demands of the students that mattered, but their own quantitative, bread-and-butter issues.” Ultimately, French students were incapable of understanding or accepting this. Abidor continues, “The ouvriérisme—the workerism—so strong on the French left led the students to think the workers were the motor of any revolution, which left the vehicle immobile because the engine was dead.” So, after the workers returned to work, the students also quite quickly demobilized. The alliance between the students and the workers in France was further complicated by the students’ tenuous relationship to the PCF and CGT, organizations which were active participants in the society that students were striving to upend. The PCF and CGT, naturally concerned with their parties’ success, framed their arguments and made agreements based on the existing political opportunity structure in France. Many student radicals, on the other hand, saw it as their charge to revise those very structures. The PCF was thus forced to walk a fine line between maintaining its own institutional legitimacy and representing the more revolutionary elements of its own party. According to Libbey, French Professor Georges Lavau thus argues, “[the PCF] has assumed the role of tribune: articulating the grievances of discontented groups as well as defending the gains of the workers against attempts by the bourgeoisie to undermine them. The PCF has thus become a legitimate channel for protest, protecting the system from more destructive outbursts. This protection failed in 1968, of course, but Lavau contends that the party’s role of tribune nonetheless coloured its response to the crisis.” Lavau and Libbey’s contention that the PCF lost the role of tribune in May of 1968 is worth noting because although the CFDT and the CGT were the ones to negotiate with de Gaulle’s government, they had lost control of the situation. They were able, ultimately, to demobilize the workers, but they lost significant support, which showed in the elections of June, 1968 where they lost half of their seats. The Grenelle Accords in many ways crystallized the differences between the gauchiste students and the institutionalized, Stalinist political parties. These differences, which existed throughout the movement, were momentarily put aside as everyone took to the streets. After most workers returned to the factory floor, though, student radicals, as well as radical elements within the Communist Party, discussed their disappointment with the limited scope of the Grenelle Accords. Prisca Bachelet, who was helped to organize the nascent stages of the movement during demonstrations at the University of Nanterre on March 22, 1968, said of the leaders of the CGT, “they were afraid, afraid of responsibility.” Éric Hazan, who was a cardiac surgeon and a radical Party member during 1968, argued the Communists’ actions at the end of May and their negotiations with the government amounted to “Treason. Normal. A normal treason.” Student Jean-Pierre Vernant argued, “The May crisis is not explained and is not analyzed [by the Party]. It is erased.” The students and their allies had good reason for frustration. They believed the Party theoretically meant to represent them betrayed many of the principles for which they were fighting. Members of the Communist Party also quite obviously held distaste for many of the student radicals. In a very obvious reference to the student movement, Communist Party leader Roland Leroy said at the National Assembly on May 21, 1968, “The Communists are not anarchists whose program tends to destroying everything without building anything.” For their part, the students’ significant miscalculation, was that they believed Party leaders like Leroy did not speak for the interests of the workers. Hélène Chatroussat, a Trotskyite, argued at the time, “I said to myself, [the workers] are many, they’re with us… so why don’t they tell the Stalinists [the PCF] to get lost so we could come in and they could join us?” To the contrary, many of the workers who went on strike in the factories were uninterested in broader political change or politics in general. They simple hoped for a positive change to their material conditions. As Colette Danappe, a worker in a factory outside Paris, told Mitchell Abidor, “The students were more interested in fighting, they were interested in politics, and that wasn’t for us.” Danappe continued about the Grenelle Accords, “We got almost everything we wanted and almost everyone voted to return… Maybe we were a little happier, because we had more money. We were able to travel afterwards.” At first glance, it would appear that the situation in the United States and the goals of antiwar demonstrators would have made it easier to mobilize a broader cross-section of the population. By mid-May of 1971, 61% of Americans responded “Yes, a mistake” to the Gallup poll question, “In view of developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam?” However, a larger segment of the older population in the United States was against the war than the younger generation. These older Americans did not support the war, but largely did not support protest movements either. The lasting images of social movements in the United States in the 1960s all include what came to be referred to as “the counterculture.” The counterculture is depicted, stereotypically, as young men and women with flowers in their hair, listening to Creedence Clearwater Revival, and holding radical aspirations for the dawn of a new age in America. This group was generally maligned by significant portions of older generations of Americans in particular, who believed the youth movement to be related more to drug use than to any serious concern. While the counterculture’s goals of promoting peace and community were in many ways quite sincere, with the fear of the draft adding to their outrage, an older generation of Americans refused to take their style of protest seriously. Table 1.3 This table explains mobilization. The situation in France in May of 1968 can be found in the bottom-right box: the broad-based grievances of students were largely supported and they found political allies in the labor and Communist parties. In the United States, mass mobilization did not occur on the same scale, because although the popularity of the grievance was high (as support for the American War in Vietnam was low), no significant political allies (who could have been found in the older generation of anti-war Americans) existed. This situation can be found in the top-right box. This disdain for the youth movement was made obvious in the way that Walter Cronkite and Dan Rather covered clashes at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Members of the counterculture movement, calling themselves “Yippies” (included in this group were many members of the SDS), descended onto Chicago to protest the Vietnam War and the lack of democracy inside the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination selection. Cronkite had already argued on air that the Vietnam War had become unwinnable, but when he and Rather covered the 1968 DNC together, their attention was focused on normative politics as a whole—and they quite obviously had very little respect for the protestors. Each argued that it was the Yippies who provoked a bloody confrontation with the police, with Rather stating that, “Mayor Richard Daly vowed to keep it peaceful, even if it took force to keep the peace. He was backed by 12,000 police, 5,000 national guardsmen, and 7,500 regular army troops. But the Yippies succeeded—they got their confrontation.” Through the 1960s, many protest and counter-culture groups (including the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Americans for Democratic Action, and Vietnam Veterans Against the War, to name a few) created and sustained significant cultural differences from much of American society. Members of the Weather Underground, despite some of their uniquely militant positions, dressed and spoke in a language that was common to the broader counterculture movement. They did so largely because they felt themselves unable to work within the boundaries of a political system that, even on the left, did not come close to representing their political ideology. In forming their own cultural identity, Leftist groups in the United States did manage to catch the attention of the masses, even if that attention was largely negative. In this way, their issues and demands were placed at the center of the conversation, causing a fraught societal debate. VII. The legacies of the social movements of the late 1960s in the United States and France are hotly debated. Historian Tony Judt, holding an unmistakable disdain for the student movement in France, wrote, “It is symptomatic of the fundamentally apolitical mood of May 1968 that the best-selling books on the subject a generation later are not serious works of historical analysis, much less the earnest doctrinal tracts of the time, but collections of contemporary graffiti and slogans. Culled from the walls, noticeboards and streets of the city, these witty one-liners encourage young people to make love, have fun, mock those in authority, generally do what feels good—and change the world almost as a by-product… This was to be a victimless revolution, which in the end meant it was no sort of revolution at all.” On the other hand, scholar Simon Tormey wrote about the events of May of 1968, “1968 represented a freeing up of politics from the congealed, stodgy and unimaginative understandings that had so dogged the emergence of an oppositional politics after the second world war. It unleashed a wave of joyous experimentation, evanescent and spontaneous efforts to challenge the dull routine of the repetitious lives that had been constructed in and through advanced capitalism.” As we can see, this duality of point-of-view about revolutionary movements existed both in France and the United States. While the Weather Underground, without any significant political allies and carrying a negative media portrayal from the press, has mostly been portrayed negatively in the years since, some scholars believe that they altered a broader American consciousness. As Arthur Eckstein writes, “Thousands of New Leftists agreed with the Weathermen’s analysis of what had gone awry in America… the last 50 years have seen remarkable progress in black rights, women’s rights, gay rights, Hispanic and Asian rights… Weatherman’s violence... did not impede that progress.” Although Eckstein certainly does not offer a ringing endorsement of their militant tendencies, he does argue here that the group spawned social progress in a way that they did not expect they would. Interestingly enough, these more positive interpretations from historians and political scientists contradict the feelings of the student radicals themselves. Neither group had an exact moment of demobilization, but it became increasingly clear to young leaders throughout the early 1970s that they had not fomented the change for which they had hoped. In France especially, a growing frustration existed towards the Communist Party and its Labor wing, which points quite obviously to the dangers of coalition building. Students’ purported political allies came to be thought of as traitors by many of the student radicals. These frustrations and divisions that were born in 1968 proceeded, if not directly led, to the French Communist Party’s long slide into irrelevance during the 1970s and 80s, as Abidor argues. He writes, “Once it lost the PCF as the mediating force to represent its grievances, the French working class fulfilled Herbert Marcuse’s 1972 warning that “The immediate expression of the opinion and will of the workers, farmers, neighbors—in brief, the people—is not, per se, progressive and a force of social change: it may be the opposite.” The PCF understood this latent conservatism in the working class of 1968. Not so the New Left student movement.” The coalition was successful very briefly in May and resulted in positive material gains for workers—through pay raises, France became a little bit more equal. The most significant legacies of movements in France and the United States, though, were separate from any coalition. The French and the American students, each galvanized to be part of the revolutionary vanguard and inspired to change their societies, felt a deep sense of disappointment after the events of the late 1960s. Broken alliances and dashed goals led to the perception that they had let themselves and their ideals down. Measured this way, revolution failed, and Judt is right to argue that in this context, “it was no sort of revolution at all.” A middle ground perspective is well-explained by May ’68 protestor Suzanne Borde, who noted, “It made it possible to change the way children were educated, leading many teachers to reflect and to teach differently. Experimental schools opened... But it had no consequences on political life and failed to changed anything real.” Holding a completely different interpretation of the outcome, Maguy Alvarez, an English teacher in France, told New York Times journalist Alissa Rubin, “Everything was enlarged by 1968; it determined all my life.” Rubin titled the article “May 1968: A Month of Revolution Pushed France Into the Modern World.” So, maybe “these witty one-liners [that encouraged] young people to make love, have fun, mock those in authority, generally do what feels good,” did change France as a byproduct. The kicker of Alvarez’s quote is that she told it to Rubin not as she was deeply examining the political consequences of the era, but as she was walking through an exhibition of posters and artworks from the period. During his interview with Borde, Abidor noted towards the end of the discussion, “May ’68 didn’t result in anything concrete, then.” Borde responded, “Sure it did. It completely changed the way I live.” VIII. Much of the existing literature in the field of social movement theory is concerned with the ways in which social groups successfully frame their movements to a broader public in order to increase popular support, political allies, and best take advantage of existing political opportunity structures. This work, although not formatted with a traditional structure of similar systems design, is concerned with the comparison of a social movement that attempts to tap into public support (French student movement) with another that appears to at times actively avoid building coalitions (the Weather Underground). More than anything else, the historical differences in France and the United States led to vastly different political opportunity structures for each social movement in the late 1960s. Yet neither group compromised their idealistic political ideology, and for this reason both groups failed to achieve their ultimate goals. Nevertheless, both did change cultural aspects of the societies in which they operated. The conclusion of these movements’ cultural success, despite their political failure, challenges existing social movement literature that argues that successful social movements should attempt always to build broad support. French student radicals found cultural success not because of their coalition with the working class but often despite it. In the United States, much of the lasting memory of the SDS occurred after it split into the Weather Underground. Certainly, a degree of this remembrance is negative—French student radicals with their “power to the imagination” are remembered in a much rosier light than the Weather Underground, which is often considered a terrorist organization in the United States. However, the Weather Underground and its writings continue to inspire generations of young activists, who do not necessarily ascribe to their militant tactics but are inspired by its political ideology. Coalition building can without a doubt aid in the success of a social movement. However, it can also at times minimize its impact. As we examine these two distinct approaches to creating change, our analysis shows that coalition building might support the historical imagination, but it can hinder change. IX. Since the financial crisis of 2008, questions of the value of coalition building have continued to roil activists, in particular in the United States, which precipitated the 2008 global financial crisis and now exists in a period of unstable economic and political development that scholars have called a “crisis of neoliberalism.” Current social protest movements have faced some of the same issues confronting protestors in the 1960s and early 1970s—the Occupy Wall Street movement presents a worthy case study. In many respects, the Occupy movement is the closest analog in recent history to the May 1968 movement in France. Sparked by young people, the protests were concerned with income inequality and were able to create an entirely new language to talk about money in this country through popular slogans—“we are the 99%.” Branding itself a revolutionary movement, Occupy eschewed traditional leadership structures and declared an “occupation of New York City” on September 29, 2011 which resulted in a series of clashes with the police and ended in the protestors being forced out of their home base of Zuccotti Park on November 15 of the same year. Protests continued for months afterwards around the world, but did not maintain the same sort of zeal as they did in September, October, and November of 2011. While the Occupy movement quickly burned and petered out in a similar way to May 68, its results are of a somewhat different character than those in France and are thus worth examining here. Most significantly, the United States government was never forced to come to the bargaining table with Occupy, and their leaderless movement has been criticized for never laying out concrete demands. Additionally, though, the amorphous nature of the group allowed it to buck trends of significant splintering along ideological lines—post-Occupy activism has simply dispersed to campaigns like #AbolishICE and protesting the Keystone XL Pipeline. Its greatest success has likely been the proliferation of discussion of income inequality in the United States, which has led to campaigns for an increased minimum wage. However, in a similar way to the student protestors in France, questions remain as to whether “we are the 99%” has been honored or coopted. Hillary Clinton launched her 2016 presidential campaign in Iowa with the statement “the deck is still stacked in favor of those at the top.” Ted Cruz highlighted in the lead-up to 2016 “the top 1% earn a higher share of our income nationally than any year since 1928” and Jeb Bush said “the income gap is real.” The rhetoric is well and good, but each of these politicians has, according to Occupy, aided in the widening of this gap. There are positive messaging lessons to be learned from the Occupy movement for other protest groups, but in many respects Occupy lost control of the narrative—the shrinking 1% now speaks for the 99%. Bibliography: Abidor, Mitchell. May made me: an oral history of the 1968 uprising in France. Chico: AK Press, 2018. Abidor, Mitchell. “1968: When the Communist Party Stopped a French Revolution.” New York Review of Books. April 19, 2018. https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/04/19/ . 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Advisory Board The Advisory Board is a group of eminent scholars who participate in the peer review editorial process and provide guidance. Robert Blair Professor of Political Science Brown University PhD. Political Science, 2015 Yale University Justin Broackes Professor of Philosophy Brown University PhD. Philosophy, 1986 Oxford University David Christensen Professor of Philosophy Brown University PhD. Philosophy, 1987 University of California, Los Angeles Mark Cladis Professor of Religious Studies Brown University PhD. Religion, 1988 Princeton University Linda Cook Professor of Political Science Brown University PhD. Political Science, 1985 Columbia University Daniel J. D'Amico Professor of Economics Brown University PhD. Economics, 2008 George Mason University Brandon Davis Professor of Law and Society Kansas University PhD. Political Science, 2017 University of Alabama Shawn Fraistat Professor of Political Science Brown University PhD. Political Science, 2014 Yale University Kevin Duong Professor of Political Science Bard College PhD. Political Science, 2017 Cornell University Gianna Englert Professor of Political Science Southern Methodist University PhD. Government, 2016 Georgetown University Bradford Gibbs Professor of Economics Brown University Managing Director, 2008-2013 Morgan Stanley (London, Johannesburg) Stephen Kinzer Senior Fellow in International and Public Affairs Brown University Sharon Krause Professor of Political Science Brown University PhD. Political Theory, 1998 Harvard University Michael Kuelwein Professor of Economics Pomona College PhD. Economics, 1988 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Charles Larmore Professor of Philosophy Brown University PhD. Philosophy, 1978 Yale University Glenn Loury Professor of Economics Brown University PhD. Economics, 1976 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Rose McDermott Professor of Political Science Brown University PhD. Political Science, 1991 Stanford University Kenneth Miller Professor of Biology Brown University PhD. Biology, 1974 University of Colorado Benjamin Powell Professor of Economics Texas Tech University PhD. Economics, 2003 George Mason University Grigorios Siourounis Professor of Economics Brown University PhD. Economics, 2004 London Business School David Skarbeck Professor of Political Science Brown University PhD. Economics, 2010 George Mason University Emily Skarbeck Professor of Political Theory Brown University PhD. Economics, 2009 George Mason University Nina Tannenwald Professor of Political Science Brown University PhD. International Relations, Political Theory, 1996 Cornell University John Tomasi Professor of Political Science Brown University PhD. Philosophy, 1993 Oxford University Michael Vorenberg Professor of History Brown University PhD. American History, 1995 Harvard University

Eleanor Ruscitti God Save the Fish: The Abyss of Electoral Politics in Trade Talks—a Brexit Case Study Eleanor Ruscitti “The EU is continuing to make demands that are incompatible with our independence... we cannot accept a deal that doesn’t leave us in control of our own laws or waters” ~ Boris Johnson on December 20, 2020 (1-2). Abstract During the “exit negotiations” between the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU), the relatively economically insignificant fishing industry received a disproportionate share of not just UK media attention, but global press as well; not to mention an array of political machinations, which almost halted a free trade agreement between two of the world’s largest trading partners. This evaluation seeks to understand why such disproportional influence existed. Why were both the EU and the UK coming to blows over something as seemingly innocuous as fishing, and willing to risk the most significant trade agreement in recent European history? Existing subject matter literature cites history and symbolism as the main factors that brought fishing into the limelight, almost killing a multi-billion-dollar trade deal between these two primary trade partners. While this paper concurs with existing analysis, it finds further illumination in the murky waters of electoral politics. It argues that the Conservative Party brought fishing to the trade talk surface to demonstrate that they were protecting a disenfranchised industry while aiming to convey the benefits of Brexit to maintain votes and prevent Scottish secession. More broadly, this paper sheds light on the potential ramifications that domestic politicians have on free trade agreements, especially in this new global populist era where the leverage of the disenfranchised is key; an affirmation of the American colloquial- ism that “all politics is local” (3). I: Introduction A Fishy Paradox From many perspectives, most of the Brexit drama did not make sense. From an economic point of view, it made more sense for the United Kingdom (UK) to remain in the European Union (EU) to keep access to the European Single Market (Single Market) and their largest and longest trading partners, especially in an era of increasing globalization. However, even though the vast majority of expert opinions concluded that leaving the EU would be economically disastrous for the UK, in the summer of 2016, its citizens voted to leave. Brexit was not just about economics, though. It was a reaction of nostalgia and entrenchment vis-à-vis a world that was rapidly becoming more interconnected with the EU leading the way. As the offshoring of lower productivity sectors of the economy and the development of more technologically advanced goods and services providers sailed ahead, once-thriving industries were no longer key to the economy. These changes left many in the UK workforce feeling stranded in an unnavigable wake of market disruption, while Brussels charted a course toward ever-increasing globalization. The disenfranchised felt as though they were under the thumb of Brussels, having to abide by laws that they believed were unfavorable to the UK. A rather sentimental notion of sovereignty and the call for “taking back control” resonated within certain portions of the British populace. Their goal was to withdraw from their largest economic market to regain full regulatory control yet maintain access to the Single Market via a free trade deal that represented over 40 percent of its exports (4). When the time came to negotiate this free trade deal, economic reasoning took a back seat, again. As the final days of the deal approached, most of the negotiations had been settled. However, over a dinner of pumpkin soup, scallops, and steamed turbot with mashed potatoes (a not-so-subtle nod to the feud) UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and EU President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen almost derailed the entire deal for the seemingly economically insignificant fishing industry (5). Johnson left the dinner asserting that “very large gaps remain between the two sides (regarding a fishing deal) and it is still unclear whether these can be bridged.” Von der Leyen said that “we understand each other’s positions. But [we] remain far apart” (6). With only 15 days left to seal the deal, and no consensus on fishing in sight, many were left confused and frustrated. The fishing industry employs roughly 12,000 workers out of a UK workforce of over 33 million (excluding the processing industry, which employs a larger portion); represents 0.1 percent of British domestic output; 0.2 percent of EU GDP; and accounts for just 0.8 percent of total EU-UK trade (7, 8, 9, 10). It produces a little more than £1 billion of the total £300 billion worth of UK exports. It seemed that the UK was effectively putting at risk over 99 percent of its trade with the EU to defend an industry that accounted for a mere fraction of the world’s sixth-largest economy. Even Harrods in London contributes more to the British economy (11). Many questioned why the British government was prepared to risk the most important trade negotiations in recent British history over an industry that barely even touches the economic needle, let alone moves it. Literature Review Academics and journalists alike, such as Professor Anand Menon (12), Jeremy Phillipson (13), Sophia Kopela (14), and Stijn Billiet (15) tried to address the paradox, but the vast majority failed to account for the genesis of the paradox by failing to consider the role of elections and electoral politics. Professor Menon argued that the British government’s focus on the repatriation of fishing rights was instrumentally relevant because it was symbolic and represented a commitment to the “left behind.” Menon asserted that the media’s amplification of the issue brought it to relevance, and in a sense, forced Johnson to act (16, 17). Other scholars, such as Craig McAngus, Christopher Huggins, and John Connolly concluded that since fishing was one of the most Europeanized policies for the UK, it would receive the most attention throughout the trade talks (18, 19). On par with the rest of Brexit, the answer lies in convoluted domestic politics rather than economic reasoning. As mentioned in previous analyses, the fishing industry was perceived as a symbol for the wider movement fueling Brexit: “taking back control” and revitalizing a domestic industry that was lost under the heel of the EU boot. Politicians focused on it in order to create an image that the government was helping the citizens, and particularly, the disenfranchised (20). The cause for this might not be just because of the media’s influence, as per Menon’s analysis, but rather because of a synergistically strong confluence of the Scottish fishing lobby, an upcoming Scottish general election, and the Conservative party’s political agenda. II: Why Do Politicians Protect and Amplify Certain Industries in Free- Trade Agreements? Theoretical Frameworks: Lobbying Influence and the Self-Serving Politician There are a multitude of theories regarding the significance of certain industries in trade talks, often finding answers in lobby groups and politicians’ electoral objectives. Typically, democratically elected/appointed officials ultimately determine trade agreements. As theorized by Robert Putnam in 1988, the politics of trade agreements are often a two-level game in which public sector officials/politicians are simultaneously in negotiations at both the international and the domestic levels (21). Putnam assessed that domestic groups pressure the officials to adopt favorable policies and, in turn, these officials seek to amplify their power by developing relationships with these groups who offer support via votes or campaign contributions (22). Politicians then go to the international level and seek to maximize their ability to satisfy domestic pressures while balancing the needs of their international partners (23). Following Putnam’s two-level game theory, Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman introduced special-interest politics into the analysis, analyzing profit-maximizing lobbying groups. They found that, “lobbies seek to curry favor with politicians who covet their financial support... seeking to maximize the aggregate welfare of the lobby groups’ members” (24). As the politician’s objective is to maximize their own political welfare––which often relies on having a large number of contributions––they champion the policy of those who donate the most. In other words, those who donate the most have purchased the most access to influence during trade talks. Sometimes, though, the most influence comes from industries that do not have deep pockets. In 1982, Arye Hillman assessed why politicians put their support behind declining industries that have little special-interest money and/or little economic or voting influence (25). Hillman found that politicians protect and promote declining industries for self-interest motives to maximize political support, rather than for altruistic ideals, as the industry will still typically decline even with protection (26). However, a strong influence of a declining industry may not solely manifest from a politician’s political agenda. In “Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers”, Richard Baldwin and Frederic Robert-Nicoud use Grossman and Helpman’s 1994 pressure group approach to conclude that while government policy is influenced by pressure groups that employ expensive lobby- ing tactics, losers (such as declining industries) lobby more diligently through less expensive means (27). They concluded that it is not just the government that picks the losers, but rather it is also the losers that pick the government (28). The Fishing Industry as a “Loser” Lobbyist It is helpful to use Grossman and Helpman’s campaign finance lobbying, Hillman’s self-serving/re-election interests, and Baldwin’s and Robert-Nicoud loser lobbying framework to contextualize the fishing paradox. To begin, one must view the fishing industry as a lobbyist and Johnson as a political welfare maximizer. However, the fishing industry is not the lobbyist illustrated by Grossman and Helpman. After analyzing over 7,000 donations to both Conservative Party and Unionist Party between 2016-2020, the Scottish Fishing Federation and the National Federation of Fishermen did not appear to make meaningful contributions to the party. Several material contributions came from the fishing towns, yet such donations did not correlate with the amount of influence achieved. From 2016-2020, of the £169,449,385 donated to both parties, only £275,950 came from relevant coastal towns––roughly 0.163 percent (29). It is a bit of a conundrum, as according to Grossman and Helpman, the more robust sectors that donate the most would receive the highest levels of government support. When applying Baldwin and Robert-Nicod’s theory, though, it becomes clear that the fishers were not campaign contribution lobbyists, rather they were “loser” lobbyists who were loud and deliberate. They saw the Brexit movement as their policy opportunity and harnessed their symbolic nature to make themselves quite relevant in final trade talks. Concurrently, Johnson acted as a political welfare maximizer. When applying Hillman’s theory, the declining fishing community became relevant to the Conservatives, who hoped to maximize political support for electoral gains, re-election, and legacy. The newly formed Johnson administration needed to amplify an easy-to-understand industry that resonated with Brexit supporters and exemplified regained sovereignty. But it is often overlooked that the Conservatives also needed an industry that could help maintain the Tory Scottish Parliament seats and form a bulwark against the growing post-Brexit Scottish independence movement. The industry that conveniently and succinctly represented these values was the Scottish fishing industry. To see how this fits together, the story of Brexit and the fishing industry should be traced. First, we will examine the path to Brexit and the ways in which fishing––particularly the Scottish fisher––was influential from the beginning. Then we will scrutinize the trade talks and the political machinations of each actor. We will see that the political endgames of politicians are apparent in trade talks and domestic electoral gains often materially influence their tack as they adjust for the ever-changing political winds. III: A Deep-Seated History Part 1: How Did the UK Get to Brexit? An Overview of UK/EU Relationship: A Troubled Beginning As Professors Vivien Schmidt and Jolyon Howorth note, “Brexit was, in many ways, an accident waiting to happen” (30). The UK and the EU always had an am- bivalent relationship––a noncommittal half-in, half-out—in which the UK has been referred to as the “awkward partner” that never really embraced the deeper political, cultural, and ideological ambitions of her partners across the Channel. In the aftermath of WWII, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created in 1951 to ensure stability across the continent by linking economies. While the UK embraced the idea of a united Europe, she saw herself as a separate entity––not just physically, but culturally as well. She was an island empire on which the sun had never set. But as the empire declined in stature and size during the post-war recovery period, she realized that in order to achieve her global ambitions in the new post-imperial world, she may find herself in a useful position to be the bridge between the US and the new ECSC: the European Economic Community (EEC). After two prior attempts, the UK finally joined in 1973 under Tory Prime Minister Edward Heath (31). However, Euroscepticism reigned from the get-go. Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell argued that a federal Europe would mean the “end of Britain as an independent European state” and promised to hold a referendum if elected (32). Two years later, in 1975, Labour formed a government under Harold Wilson and held the UK’s first EU referendum (33). Although closely divided, the UK would vote “Yes” to a united Europe, with the then-Europhile Conservative leader Margret Thatcher leading the way for the Conservatives, while Labour remained extremely divided over the subject (34). Thatcher’s Europhilism, however, was short-lived. A staunch supporter of the Single Market, Thatcher ultimately changed course due to the contentious Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and its budget contributions (35). She felt that the UK contributed more than its fair share of funding. Rhetoric of losing power and control to Brussels became common in her speeches and while her Eurosceptic agenda and rhetoric would ultimately become her downfall, it planted the seed for a growing anti-Europe movement that divided both parties internally (36). This seed later found its political moment amongst the disenfranchised in 2016 after a Conservative political opportunist called another EU referendum in hopes of bridging a divided Tory Party and securing a re-election win. Divisions within the Tories regarding Europe had been brewing since the Thatcher years, and were proving to be problematic for David Cameron’s upcoming general election as the rise of a relatively new right-wing populist party, the UK Independence Party (UKIP), began siphoning off the Conservative Eurosceptic votes. Hoping to mitigate Tory Europhile defections, Cameron promised an EU membership referendum if re-elected, believing that the party would vote to remain (37). The result was a complete miscalculation as he underestimated just how powerful Euroscepticism had become. The country split into two camps: Leave vs. Remain. The Remain campaign took a negative approach, focusing their argument on the economic consequences of a vote to leave (38). As mentioned, however, Brexit was not about economics and, as such, it did not resonate at the doorstep. The Leave campaigns led by Boris Johnson and former UKIP leader Nigel Farage took a more emotional, visceral approach that resonated well with the disenfranchised who felt that the globally interconnected EU was the source of all their problems. They had seen their employment opportunities evaporate as the industrial sector left the country and viewed the EU as their scapegoat. The campaigns of Vote Leave and Leave.EU tapped into this discontent, arguing to “take back control” of a trade by creating their own trade deals, revitalizing declining industries, and bringing jobs back to Britain (39). The Take Back Control mantra percolated throughout the country and was succinctly exemplified with the vignette of the fishing industry. The fishing industry perfectly embodied the Conservative Leave movement––it was an industry key to the British identity, but was disenfranchised and felt powerless and expendable, and held deep-seated resentment towards Europe. This resentment was a manifestation of an EU policy known as the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) that seeks to conserve fishing stocks and ensure fair competition in European waters by setting catching quotas for European fishing vessels based on 1983 catch activity (40, 41). The EU can determine quotas in each boundary as the policy requires that each member state pool its sovereignty and open its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to all member states, creating a ‘European Water’ and overriding the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (42). To understand why the British held deep resentment towards this policy, one must understand the fishing wars. Part 2: Fishing Wars To Control or Not to Control, That is the Question As an island nation, Britain has had an obsession with claiming ownership and sovereignty of its waters, at times to the point of belligerency. Fishing has always been key to British identity, especially Scottish identity, which makes it a rather sensitive topic. The tension between the Island and the Continent regarding the open seas dates back to the Anglo-Dutch wars and grew throughout the Anglo-French rivalry and crescendoed with the infamous 1950s-70s Cod Wars where the UK and Iceland faced off over British access to the rich cod waters off the coast of Iceland (43, 44). These violent showdowns repeated throughout multiple decades, with Iceland almost leaving NATO and falling into the Soviet orbit (45). The clash ended with the UK’s long-distance fishing fleets losing access to Iceland’s lucrative fishing grounds followed by a sharp decline in fishing industry revenues. Around the same time, the UK joined the EU and was required to join the contentious CFP. The UK’s fishing industry was wary about entering the CFP and pooling access to its waters, relinquishing control over its EEZ. Academics, politicians, and journalists alike wondered why the Heath government did not try to negotiate an opt-out of the CFP––an action for which the UK is famous––or even negotiate a better deal for the UK (46). The answer circles back to Iceland. When the UK lost its long-distance access to Iceland, there was little inshore activity to replace it as the nation had become so dependent on the white fish from the more northern seas (47). British fishers were not fishing near the British coast. As such, most of the quota rights for inshore fishing went to the French, Dutch, and Danish fishers during the accession negotiations (48). The Resentful Fishers This did not sit well with the fishers, particularly the Scottish fishers, who watched their industry decline just as the EU gained access to UK waters. When asked about Britain’s entrance into the CFP, Scottish fisher Baden Gibson insisted that: “The EU and its fisheries policy have destroyed businesses beyond fishing... If you fish outside of your quota the penalties can be fierce— my worry would be that I would lose my boat and then I would lose everything. I realize that there must be quotas, but it should be fishing organizations who set those quotas” (49). Fishers felt a loss of control and that the government sold them out for access to the Single Market. This was further exacerbated when it came down to ownership of the quotas. Over the years, more and more foreign entities started to own Brit- ish fishing fleets, with 50 percent of all English quotas “owned” by British-flagged ships that were actually Spanish, Dutch, or Icelandic; that is about £160 million worth of England’s fishing quota (50, 51). The feeling of loss of control was palpable. It must be noted that it was not necessarily Brussels causing the decline. Rather, it was overfishing and advances in technology that prevented fishers from achieving previous catching thresholds as well as the aftermath of the Cod Wars that prevented them from fishing in certain areas. Another factor was the rise of multimillion-dollar fishing companies in the UK (52). Nonetheless, British fishers did not see it this way. From their perspective, the correlation was objectively clear: the UK fishing industry thrived before EU membership, but as part of the EU, it died at the hands of the quotas. Reforming the Common Fisheries Policy Calls were made by the fishing industry to reform the CFP, and in 2014, the European Commission tried to do so, putting forth reforms that would increase the labor market mobility of fishers (53). These schemes were criticized as they did not consider the local and cultural factors enough and did not give countries sufficient control over the quota issue. The reforms adjusted the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and allowed member states to manage 89 percent of it, while the European Commission would manage 11 percent (54). However, that still did not fix the unpopular element of being too distant and top-down with rules dictated by Brussels, far away from the UK and even further from understanding the local fishers’ needs (55). The fishers wanted a greater say in fishery management; they wanted to decentralize the decision-making structures as they felt like bystanders in decisions that impacted them greatly. Part 1: The Referendum Brexit as a Policy Window for Fishers The EU referendum was the fishing industry’s “policy window” under Leave’s rally cry of “Take Back Control.” It was finally time to expel the European vessels from British waters and manage their fish stocks independently. Rather than lobbying via campaign contributions, as Grossman and Helpman’s theory predicts, the fishing industry-aligned more with Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud’s theory of lobbying diligently through less expensive means. In this case, the less expensive means came in the form of a new 21st-century campaign tool: social media. UKIP’s Nigel Farage teamed up with the campaign group Fishing for Leave (FFL) to storm social media and conduct demonstrations, calling for the UK to leave the EU and leave the CFP. To make a public display of discontent and grievances a few days before the referendum, Farage led a 35-boat flotilla of fishers up the Thames, asserting that “today’s flotilla is not a celebration or a party but a full-throttled protest. We want our waters back” (56). He also said that “one thing I can promise you, is that you are about to hear a lot about the fishing industry” (57). They were vociferous lobbyists who would become a key electoral constituency for the Conservatives. The hope, and promise, was that leaving the EU would allow the UK to reclaim fishing dominance and sovereignty over their territorial waters, which would, in turn, see fishing communities thrive again with replenished stock and the return of jobs. On June 26, 2016, the referendum was held, and the UK voted to leave 51 percent to 48 percent. The fishing industry, as predicted, was a firm supporter, especially the Scottish fishers (58). A pre-referendum survey indicated that 92 percent of Scottish fishers intended to vote to leave (59). Fishing communities such as Banff and Buchan voted for Brexit, with around 54 percent voting to leave, but were outnumbered by the rest of Scotland who largely voted to remain (60). They were a small, disenfranchised group within a larger community that found a policy window and representation within the Brexiteers. They would become incredibly important to the Conservatives who needed to keep a seat at the team in Scotland. Part 2: The Trade Talks The Conservative’s Seat at the Scottish Table: The Rise of the Politically Important Scottish Fishers The Scottish fishers were Brexiteers, but that did not necessarily mean they were pro-Tory. After Heath’s historic 1973 betrayal of fishing, Scotland’s northeast fishing community channeled its anger by voting with the pro-independence, social democratic Scottish National Party (SNP) for the following decades. The Tories were treacherous in the eyes of the fishers, best underscored by the 1973 quote from a UK civil servant: “In light of Britain’s wider European interests they, the Scottish fishermen, are expendable” (61). While the Scottish Tories initially lost the community’s trust, gaining it back was easier than one may think as the Scottish fisheries did not ideologically align with the rest of Scotland and the SNP. Leading up to the referendum, Scottish scholar Dr. Craig McAngus conducted a survey of Scottish fishers’ demographic characteristics as well as their political, social, and constitutional attitudes. McAngus found that they were: (1) a unionized industrial working class made up of mostly middle-aged men with standard grade qualifications who value self-sufficiency and sense of freedom to succeed in their profession and take on a libertarian ideology that is skeptical of state intervention; (2) very Eurosceptic, portraying themselves as “victims of an overly bureaucratic and unsympathetic governance regime,” and would lean towards the Conservative Party rather than the Labour Party whose values of collectivism and socialist principles conflicted with their notion of an unsympathetic governance regime; (3) differing from the rest of the Scottish population in that they tended to trust the UK Government more than the Scottish Government, which seems contradictory at first given Heath’s 1973 betrayal for access to the Single Market, however, their support relates to the Scottish independence movement. As the Scottish Government is currently led by the SNP, and as the fishers tend to be more British-unionist, conflicts often arise between the secession-seeking Scottish government and the union-seeking fishing industry. How the British Government Attempted to Divert Fisher’s Support Away from SNP to Scottish Tory via Brexit Scottish independence from the UK has been a divisive topic ever since Scot- land joined the UK in 1707. In a 2014 independence referendum, Scotland voted to remain in the UK, 55 percent to 45 percent, but the debate never settled. Scot- land’s First Minister Nicola Sturgeon continued to push for another referendum, rather than receiving additional devolved powers from Westminster (which had been done in the past as a way for Westminster to circumvent Scottish independence). After the Brexit referendum, her calls for independence grew louder than ever as the majority of Scotland voted to remain in the EU––62 percent to 32 percent. Sturgeon argued that it was undemocratic for Scotland to be “dragged out of the EU against its will,” demanding another independence referendum–– indyref2––and then hoping to re-join the EU.62 But, to hold another referendum on Scottish independence, the UK’s Prime Minister must grant formal permission and the newly minted PM Boris Johnson did not support such. Johnson and other supporters of a unified UK argued that the 2014 referendum was a once-in-a-generation opportunity––a phrase Sturgeon campaigned on back in 2014––and asserted that under this reasoning, another referendum should not be held for another 40+ years. On the horizon, however, was the upcoming May 2021 Scottish Parliament election, thus Johnson and his Scottish Tory counterparts were finding themselves in a political pickle. Opinion polls saw a sizable shift from a slight majority of pro-independence voters in 2019 to a solid majority in 2020. Analysts attributed this shift to Brexit, and also to Sturgeon’s handling of the Coronavirus, which many believed had been better than Johnson’s. With polls indicating that the SNP was on course to win an overall majority in the May 2021 Scottish Parliament election, polling expert Sir John Curtice said that the country “seem[ed] headed for a significant clash between the UK and Scottish governments over whether another independence referendum should be held” (63). Conservatives started to worry that if they lost their Scottish Tory seats to the SNP, the Scottish Parliament would be comprised mostly, if not all, of the SNP. Scottish Tories would lose their voice in the Scottish Government, and Westminster would have to grant an independence referendum if asked, or risk being further branded as undemocratic. There was, however, a Brexit-supporting Scottish constituency that could potentially save the Scottish Tories: the Scottish fishers. As mentioned previously, fisheries have been caught between supporting the SNP and the Tories for decades. The fisheries voted SNP in the years after Heath’s “betrayal,” as the then-SNP Leader Alex Salmond sought to bring Scotland out of the CFP (64). During the 2014 independence referendum, Salmond made fishing a material role in the SNP’s campaign, asserting that if independence was gained, fishing would be the #1 national priority and would have direct representation in the EU (65). The issue, however, was that the fishers wanted out of the CFP, not more EU representation, which is what Salmond was campaigning for. As a result, SNP lost a large majority of the fisheries in the 2015 Scottish Parliament election. The hemorrhaging of fishing votes continued when the Brexiteers campaigned to “Take Back Control” during the 2016 EU/UK referendum. The 2017 Scottish Parliament elections saw a loss of fishing votes from SNP to Scottish Conservatives. The Tories increased their hold from one seat in 2015 to 13 in 2017, gaining the northeast fishing community seats as per figure 11 (66, 67). Figure 11 (68) Yellow indicates SNP seats, orange indicates Liberal Democrats, red indicates Labour, and blue indicates Scottish Tory. Brexit was the perfect opportunity for the Conservative Party to regain both the fishers’ trust and seats in the Scottish Parliament. Once they regained that support, they could potentially prevent independence by keeping the vote. The game was not over, though. The SNP made it its goal to regain coastal communities by illustrating that the Tories could not be trusted in looking out for Scotland’s best interests.69 Conservatives then countered by making fishing a key part of the “exit-negotiations.” A Hiccup: When May did not prioritize the Fisheries After the referendum, Cameron stepped down and Theresa May assumed Tory leadership in 2016. May called a snap election in 2017 in hopes of increasing her party’s slim majority in the lower house and having a stronger mandate to negotiate a Brexit deal with the EU. However, due to a resurgent Labour Party, May did not gain a majority and had to form a confidence-and-supply agreement with ten MPs of Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (70). That being said, May did gain some Scottish coastal seats due to the 2017 surge in Scottish Tory support. Suddenly, Scottish fishers––as well as the DUP––became one of the preeminent interest groups for May’s coalition, as they were some of the few who kept her party from anemic minority status. Appeasing them and creating and maintaining trust would be necessary to get her Brexit deal approved and to keep Scottish Parliament seats. May proceeded with her Brexit plans and announced a Fisheries Bill to take back control of British waters and remove fishing quotas after the country with- drew from the EU (71). This pleased the fishers, but as 2017 progressed, the EU countries whose fishing industries were heavily dependent on access to UK waters became worried that access to the waters would be completely severed and that the EU would set an undesirable precedent for its member nations. Denmark claimed it had historical rights to fish in British waters dating back to the 1400s, while other EU countries claimed that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea stated that countries must respect each other’s “traditional fishing rights”, and the ability to access British waters fell under traditional rights (72). In March of 2018, then-Brexit Secretary David Davis and the EU’s Brexit Negotiator Michel Barnier announced that the UK and the EU had agreed on a Brexit transition deal. However, to achieve the deal, the UK partially conceded its fishing contentions: fisheries would be required to follow the CFP rules until the end of the December 2020 Brexit transition period (73). The UK fishing industry was infuriated. Bertie Armstrong, CEO of the Scottish Fishermen’s Federation, said, “This falls far short of an acceptable deal. We will leave the EU and leave the CFP, but hand back sovereignty over our seas a few seconds later... Our fishing communities’ fortunes will still be subject to the whim and largesse of the EU for another two years” (74). Again, Nigel Farage protested on a fishing boat floating along the Thames outside of Parliament while chucking dead haddock into the river. SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon took to Twitter hoping to sway the fishers back over to the SNP stating: “This is shaping up to be a massive sellout of the Scottish fishing industry by the Tories” (75). The thirteen Scottish Conservative MPs announced that the deal was like “drink[ing] a pint of cold sick” and assured that they would be prepared to vote against their own party if they did not see a return to full control of British waters as “the EU does not care about Scottish fishermen and neither do the SNP government who wants us to re-join the Common Fisheries Policy and the EU” (76). A sense of betrayal was palpable, and May’s fellow Conservative politicians started to understand that prioritizing fishermen would need to be on their political agenda. May would go on to put forth two other Brexit deals but was met with sound political rejection. In June 2019, she stepped down and Boris Johnson assumed leadership in July. The Hiccup Continues: Johnson Learning to Prioritize Fish With May’s Brexit failure in the rearview mirror, Johnson was keen on steering the UK out of the EU. However, after May’s perceived slight, he found little support amongst the Scottish Conservatives and fishers. In August, Scottish Tory leader Ruth Davidson resigned. She worried that a Johnson government would boost support for independence, given that his hard-liner Brexit stance stood in complete opposition to the majority opinion of Scotland and the SNP (77). Johnson, however, had a different agenda; one that was keen on maintaining the union and appeasing the fishing industry was one way of doing so. In July 2019, Johnson made his first visit to Scotland and pledged that fishing access would not be sacrificed in the new Brexit deal.78 The Scottish fishers welcomed his rhetoric, with Bertie Armstrong stating, “We have been looking for a straight and direct answer and that’s exactly what we have got... Scottish fishing’s sea of opportunity lies on the other side of Brexit” (79). Additionally, Johnson assured fishers that he would “strengthen the union” and pledged £300 million for boost- ing growth in the devolved nations (Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) as a way to try to counteract critics who said his no-deal strategy would break up the UK (80). Among those critics was Nicola Sturgeon, who branded Johnson as the “last prime minister of the UK” (81). After a series of controversial events in the Fall of 2019––proroguing Parliament and then withdrawing the whip from 21 MPs (effectively expelling them from the party)––Johnson was left with no majority in Parliament and found it impossible to get Brexit legislation through. He enacted the Benn Act to extend the divorce date from October 19th, 2019 to January 31st, 2020, and then called a snap election for December 12th, 2019. While Johnson took a strong stance against Scottish independence, his attention to fishing seemed to wane during the snap election. Johnson did keep Scotland in his sights, but most of his attention was to mainland England, hoping to gain back the English voters who defected to Labour in 2017 (82). He visited Scotland once during the campaign, where he delivered the Scottish Conservative manifesto and claimed that Scotland was “paralyzed” by the SNP. Johnson asserted that “a vote for the Scottish Conservatives is a vote to stop a second independence referendum and to get Brexit done... Only a vote for the Conservatives will stop the SNP’s plans to break up the UK” (83 , 84). However, given that May lost many British votes to Labour in 2017, he also needed to prioritize issues that were of interest to larger voting blocs, such as the NHS, the police, and the British education system. To do so, as is now second nature to many politicians, Johnson harnessed Twitter to connect with constituents. On Twitter, Johnson spoke less about fishing and more about those three campaign stances. In total, Johnson tweeted 62 times regarding his campaign agenda on those issues, while only tweeting about fishing five times and Scotland nine times. Figure 13 (85) Illustrates the number of times Johnson Tweeted about a specific subject: 5 times about fishing; 9 times about Scotland; and 62 times about the NHS, policing, and schooling. With much focus on Johnson’s campaign, fishers in coastal Scottish towns were growing worried that fishing was not his top priority. These fishers became more apprehensive and began questioning Johnson’s true intentions: “There’s a calculation that the fishing industry is making that there’s a heavy risk they will get sold out on the way out of the EU, just like they did on the way in” and that maybe “the SNP might get a better deal for Scottish fishing from the EU” (86) especially since Johnson “changes his mind like the weather” (87). A growing number of fishers were unsure whether Johnson would protect the fishing industry or divert his focus towards other aspects in the UK during the trade talks. Election day came, and while Johnson won the largest Parliamentary majority since Thatcher in 1987, he lost several crucial seats in Scotland, which resulted in a small swing back to the SNP, who won 48 out of 59 seats (88). Although a tabloid journalist, Torcuil Crichton provided some thoughtful insight by noting that Scottish Tory 2017 gains were halved in 2019, and any further “betrayal” of the fish- ing industry “will fuel the independence argument and undermine the principles Brexit was fought on” (89). Suddenly, the importance of Scottish independence began to sink in. Johnson needed to show Scotland the benefits of staying in the UK and that Brexit was good for Scottish communities. The fishing industry was the perfect political tool for this end. Johnson could argue that he was going to secure them a good deal, stand up for the disenfranchised against an “overbearing” Brussels, and bring back the domestic industry. He could argue that the UK’s government was paying attention to Scottish needs and, as such, Scotland should stay in the UK rather than back the independence-preoccupied SNP. It is for this reason that fishing was greatly amplified during the trade talks. The Tories needed to secure the Scottish fishing industry a good deal––the rare Scottish industry that embodied the Brexit movement, had yet to back SNP fully, and were against independence––or else potentially be forced to consider calling an independence referendum. Fishing was the fulcrum for Johnson’s political leverage. The Talks and the Deal With the general election behind him and the risk of Scottish independence at the forefront of his mind, Johnson entered the trade talks as a strong counter to Macron and other EU officials who wanted the status quo ante . The issue has now come full circle, back to the famed scallop and turbot dinner on December 9th, 2020, when Johnson and von der Leyen sat down to hash out the final open issue. Britain demanded 80 percent of the EU’s catch to be returned to the UK, but reduced this to 60 percent as a compromise; the EU countered with 20 percent (90). The UK demanded that this transition would take no longer than three years, while the EU asked for a 14-year transition period, which they then reduced to seven. The EU asked for its fishing vessels to be able to fish in the six-to-twelve-mile zone from the British coastline, but the UK insisted that EU vessels be banned from this zone. Von der Leyen left the dinner saying the two sides remained “far apart” (91). The whole trade deal was on the line, with only a few days to go. Finally, on Christmas Eve, after four-and-a-half years of bitter negotiations and only a week to spare before the UK would crash out of the EU, they came to a deal. The 1,200-page document was passed by MPs on December 30th, 521 to 73, and it goes as follows: The transition will be phased over five and a half years, during which EU vessels will still be able to fish in the UK waters. During the adjustment period, EU quotas will decrease by 15 percent in the first year, and then two and a half percent for the following four years. That means by year five, the UK will regain 25 percent of the current EU catch in British waters; Fish will continue to be traded between the two parties with no tariffs imposed; After the five-year adjustment period is over, the UK and EU will enter annual negotiations to determine the quota of fish that EU vessels are allowed to catch in UK waters (92). Johnson announced the deal while wearing a fish patterned tie and praised it as a great deal in which fishers would see their hauls increase from half of the fish quota in British waters under CFP, to about two-thirds by the end of the adjustment period (93). However, neither the fisheries, the French, nor the other EU nations, saw it this way. A deal had been made, but the saga was far from over. V: Conclusions Summary of Findings While fisheries were the “losers” that lobbied hard to grab the government’s attention initially during the Brexit campaign (much like Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud’s theory), it appears that the Conservatives needed the fishers during the exit negotiations and thus took a hard position on access to UK waters, not for social merit, but rather for their electoral and political gains (much like Hillmen’s theory). Matt Bevington, an analyst with the UK in a Changing Europe, pointed out that Johnson saw fishing as one of the few areas where the government would be able to score a “win” to tout as evidence of Brexit’s success (94). Barrie Deas, CEO of the National Federation of Fishermen’s Organization, said that the fishing industry was a “litmus test’’ for Brexit since we will not know most of the effects of the Brexit deal for many years, but the effects for fishing will be realized immediately (95). The Guardian journalist Daniel Boffey noted that fisheries were important to Johnson as he needed to show some benefit of Brexit to Scottish communities as Sturgeon was ramping up her demands for another independence referendum (96). In a similar vein, Denis Staunton of the Irish Times emphasized that North East Scotland is now essential to Johnson’s electoral constituency and will play an important role in the Scottish independence debate over the next few years (97). However, if he remains unable to please the Scottish fishers, the SNP may snatch up those who feel expendable to the Tories. This will again potentially embolden the independence movement since no politician wants to be known as the last Prime Minister. Lessons Learnt While the deal itself was a “Christmas miracle” to the Tories, in many respects, its aftermath has not been so merry. Johnson was unable to provide the fishing industry the deal that they wanted, and more importantly, that they were expect- ing. While the Scottish Tories matched their 2016 performance in the May 2021 Scottish elections, the fishing debacle still plagues the Johnson government with many lessons to be taught to future politicians (98). Hoping to illustrate the UK government’s commitment to the disenfranchised and their commitment to taking back control from the EU, many promises were made. These promises, however, were not plausible, let alone achievable––especially in regards to the fishing industry. Now, the Scottish independence movement has re-emerged, with the SNP harnessing the fishing failure as another reason for why they should leave the UK. Electoral politics influenced the amplification of the industry during the talks. In so doing, it amplified a delicate social, economic, and political bond that is about to snap. However, the main lessons scholars may glean from this case study is the extreme influence of domestic electoral politics in trade agreements: 1. An industry being economically insignificant does not mean that it will be insignificant in the international arena. Not everything in trade talks distills down to economics. More likely than not, declining domestic industries will be protected in trade talks for political purposes. 2. That is not to say, however, that economics is not influential. Johnson was a champion of the industry throughout the trade talks, but ultimately, he had to secure a deal that would allow European vessels access to UK waters for a limited time in order to salvage a trade relationship. In other words, economic interests were prioritized over politics towards the end of the talks. As Barrie Deas said, “It’s what we always feared... When you get to the endgame in the negotiations it becomes a binary choice and economics prevails over politics. I think that’s what’s happened and it’s really not good news.” Ultimately, for better or for worse, Johnson needed a deal (99). 3. Politicians often pick easily understood industries to get their message across. While much of the fishing industry is quite complex, once dissected, its disenfranchised status is not. Johnson harnessed the underserved with a message centered around one question: “what does Brussels know about potholes in London?” His intent with the fishing industry was to illustrate an example of him protecting locals to show (1) that Brexit can be a success and (2) that he was fighting for the British (and Scottish) industry. Fishing was an industry that many people could understand as it portrayed Brussels as treating them unfairly with “draconian quotas.” It would have been difficult if, for example, Johnson had tried to highlight intellectual property rights; few people would latch on to that due to its highly technical nature. Here, success revolves around clear messaging, which is something the Remain camp struggled to achieve. In the eyes of the Brexiteers, these were local fishers––the heart and soul of the UK, even if they were no longer as economically significant––being taken advantage of by Brussels. Fishers also happened to be politically right-leaning and resided in the “hostile” territory of Scotland. As the world enters a more global epoch, there has been a greater emphasis on interdependence and trans- nationalism, which often glazes over domestic factors. But, as former Speaker of the House of Representatives Tip O’Neill (D-MA) famously quipped: “all politics is local,” or, rather, “all local politics are global,” especially in free-trade agreements. Constituents care more about what is happening on the home front, rather than what is going on in Brussels. They care about how Brussels affects them at home more than being in an economically efficient partnership with the EU. 4. Thus, as Putnam theorized in 1988, international negotiations are a two-level game in which domestic groups pressure the government to adopt favorable policies, as the politicians seek to amplify their power by consulting coalitions of these groups. The politicians then go to the international level and seek to maximize their ability to satisfy domestic pressures while balancing the needs of their international partners. However, the need to get reelected and to preserve legacy presides over the strategy they bring to the negotiation table and the industries they choose to protect. Electoral politics is at the heart of all politics, especially in free trade arrangements. Future Research It has been eight months since this paper was originally completed, and fishing still remains top of the fold. The UK and France are in continuous disputes, threatening sanctions and denying each other licenses to harvest in each other’s seas. To understand this continued conflict, scholars and politicians must look at the EU’s perspective as well as the British perspective. While this paper sought to understand why British politicians amplified the fishing industry during the talks, the UK was not its only amplifier. Just as with the UK, fishing is an economically insignificant industry for the EU overall, yet it continues to be amplified by EU member states. From the EU’s perspective, British waters have fish that are the staple of the European diet: herring, mackerel, sole, and shellfish (100). Herring and mackerel are Denmark’s most popular seafood, and it would be impossible to catch their quota if they could no longer fish in UK waters. This would devastate Denmarks’ industry, culture, and customs. For France, on the other hand, it is more about political weight, similar to what we saw in Scotland with Prime Minister Johnson. As journalist John Lichfield pointed out, “The north of France, around Boulogne, is hugely important for the presidential election in 2022... The regional president... might well be one of Macron’s main rivals at that time, so [Macron] needs to be seen to be supporting what is already a struggling area economically” (101). Additionally, the EU was determined to not set an undesirable precedent. They could not let Britain dictate access to such waters, which could potentially portray the EU as weak to other countries trying the same. This was one of the reasons the EU insisted that the previous level of access to UK waters be maintained, and why Phil Hogan, the EU’s Trade Commissioner, assured Johnson that if he wanted to gain access to EU financial markets, the UK would have to allow EU vessels in British fishing waters (102) Both sides took hardline positions for their constituents, thinking that they were doing their best while also serving their political agendas. Now, though, both British and EU constituents and their businesses are the ones suffering from the fallout of the deal. As stated by Olivier Lepretre, the head of the Hauts-de-France regional fishers association, they want to move on with their lives: “Fishers really don’t care about the politics” anymore, “they just want to work, to go to sea” (103). But, Brexit always was, and still is, a political initiative at its core, and as such, the politics remain. The continued fishing feud illuminates much larger and more profound structural relationship issues that will play out over the next few decades as the two former partners navigate these uncharted waters and tack against the political winds. Endnotes 1 Robert Fisk, “Boris’s Last Push for Brexit Sees Him Kissing Fish and Posing for Selfies as New Poll Gives Leave the Narrowest of Leads,” The Sun (The Sun, June 22, 2016), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1326026/boriss-last-push-for-brexit-sees-him-kissing-fish-and-posing-for-selfies-in-a-gruelling-final-day-of-campaigning/ . 2 Raf Casert, “EU-UK Trade Talks Floundering over Fish as Cutoff Day Nears,” Associated Press , December 20, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/brexit-europe-global- trade-boris-johnson-europe-94ead6da2c46c87efc51328893cd3590 . 3 Thomas Phillip “Tip” O’Neill. 4 Avery Koop, “Visualizing the UK and EU Trade Relationship,” Visual Capitalist, February 9, 2021, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-uk-and-eu-trade- relationship/ . 5 Adam Coghlan, “Breaking Bread Over Brexit With Fish in Brussels, a Short Story,” Eater London , December 10, 2020, https://london.eater.com/2020/12/10/22167244/no-deal-brexit-fishing-boris-johnson-ursula-von-der-leven-dinner . 6 Daniel Boffey, “The Brexit Brussels Dinner: Fish and Frank Talk but No One Left Satisfied,” The Guardian, December 10, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/ dec/10/the-brexit-brussels-dinner-fish-and-frank-talk-but-no-one-left-satisfied . 7 Elena Ares et al., “UK Fisheries Statistics,” House of Commons Library, November 23, 2020, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn02788/ . 8 Reuters Staff, “PM Sold out Fish in Brexit Trade Deal, Fishermen Say,” Reuters, December 26, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-fish/pm-sold-out-fish- in-brexit-trade-deal-fishermen-say-idUSKBN2900KG . 9 Kat Haladus, “Fisheries: An Industry That’s Worth 0.1% of the UK’s GDP Is Holding up the Talks,” UK Customs Solutions, December 23, 2020, https://ukcustomssolutions . co.uk/2020/12/23/fisheries-an-industry-thats-worth-0-1-of-the-uks-gdp-is-holding-up-the- talks/. 10 Matt Bevington, Professor Anand Menon, and Professor Jonathan Portes, “Fishing: Why Is It Such a Tricky Issue in UK-EU Negotiations?” UK in a Changing Europe, November 10, 2020, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/fishing-why-is-it-such-a-tricky-issue-in-uk-eu-negotiations/ . 11 British Sea Fishing, “Brexit and Britain’s Fisheries,” British Sea Fishing, January 20, 2021, https://britishseafishing.co.uk/brexit-and-britains-fisheries/ . 12 Anand Menon and UK in a Changing Europe Team, “Fisheries and Brexit,” The UK in a Changing Europe , June 2020, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ Fisheries-and-Brexit.pdf . 13 Jeremy Phillipson and David Symes, “‘A Sea of Troubles’: Brexit and the Fisheries Question” 90 (2018): pp. 168-173, https://doi.org/10.31230/osf.io/fxnqj . 14 Sophia Kopela, “Historic Fishing Rights in the Law of the Sea and Brexit,” Leiden Journal of International Law 32, no. 4 (2019): pp. 695-713, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0922156519000438 . 15 Stijn Billiet, “Brexit and Fisheries: Fish and Chips Aplenty?” The Political Quarterly 90, no. 4 (2019): pp. 611-619, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923x.12748 . 16 Tom McTague, “Why Britain’s Brexit Mayhem Was Worth It,” The Atlantic (Atlantic Media Company, December 24, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/12/brexit-trade-deal-uk-eu/617509/ . 17 Anand Menon and UK in a Changing Europe Team, “Fisheries and Brexit”. 18 Craig McAngus and Christopher Huggins, et al., “The Politics and Governance of UK Fisheries after Brexit.” Political Insight 9, no. 3 (September 2018): 8-11, https://doi.org/10.1177/2041905818796570 . 19 John Connolly et al., “The Governance Capacities of Brexit from a Scottish Perspective: The Case of Fisheries Policy,” Public Policy and Administration , January 2020, https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076720936328 . 20 Matt Bevington, Professor Anand Menon, and Professor Jonathan Portes, “Fishing: Why Is It Such a Tricky Issue in UK-EU Negotiations?” 21 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706785 . 22 Corneliu Bjola and Ilan Manor, “In the Long Run,” In the Long Run, July 19, 2018, http://www.inthelongrun.org/criaviews/article/revisiting-putnams-two-level-game-theory- in-the-digital-age-domestic-digita/ . 23 Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Patrick A. Mello, “Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.496 . 24 Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, “Trade Wars and Trade Talks,” Journal of Political Economy 103, no. 4 (1995): pp. 678, https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3450062/Helpman_TradeWars.pdf . 25 Arye L. Hillman, “Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives.” The American Economic Review 72, no. 5 (1982): 1180-187. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1812033 . 26 Hilman, 1186. 27 Richard E. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, “Entry and asymmetric lobbying: why governments pick losers.” PSPE working papers, March 2007. Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. 28 Ibid. 29 Data collected by Eleanor Ruscitti via the UK Electoral Commission donation reports from 2016-2020, http://search.electoralcommission.org.ukcurrentPage=1&rows=10&sort=AcceptedDate&order=desc&tab=1&open=filter&et=pp&isIrishSourceYes=true&isIrishSourceNo=true&prePoll= false&postPoll=true®ister=gb®ister=ni&optCols =IsAggregation . 30 Vivien Schmidt and Jolyon Howorth, “Brexit: What Happened? What Is Going to Happen?” Politique Étrangère, no. 4 (2016): pp. 123-138, https://doi.org/10.3917/pe.164.0123 . 31 Ibid, 4. 32 Kevin H. O’Rourke, “A Short History of Brexit: from Brentry to Backstop,” in A Short History of Brexit: from Brentry to Backstop (London: Pelican, 2019), p. 74. 33 James Walsh, “Britain’s 1975 Europe Referendum: What Was It like Last Time?” The Guardian, February 25, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/25/britains-1975-europe-referendum-what-was-it-like-last-time . 34 Ibid. 35 Pan Pylas, “Britain’s EU Journey: When Thatcher Turned All Euroskeptic,” Associated Press, (January23,2020), https://apnews.com/article/64855d1ff67454443db5132bdfb22ea6 . 36 Ibid. 37 Vivien Schmidt and Jolyon Howorth, 7. 38 Ibid, 4. 39 Jorge Martins Rosa and Cristian Jiménez Ruiz, “Reason vs. Emotion in the Brexit Campaign: How Key Political Actors and Their Followers Used Twitter,” First Monday 25, no. 3 (March 2, 2020), https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v25i3.9601 . 40 European Commission, “The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP),” European Commission, 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp_en . 41 Andy Forse, Ben Drakeford, and Jonathan Potts, “Fish Fights: Britain Has a Long History of Trading Away Access to Coastal Waters,” The Conversation, March 25, 2019, https://theconversation.com/fish-fights-britain-has-a-long-history-of-trading-away-access- to-coastal-waters-112988 . 42 Convention on the Law of the Sea , New York, 10 December 1982, United Nations Treaty Series, pg. 40. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e. pdf 43 Thomas Wemyss Fulton, “The Fisheries,” in The Sovereignty of the Sea: an Historical Account of the Claims of England to the Dominion of the British Seas, and of the Evolution of the Territorial Waters; with Special Reference to the Rights of Fishing and the Naval Salute (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1911), pp. 25-57. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/54977/54977- h/54977-h.htm . 44 Keith Johnson, “So Long, and Say Thanks for All the Fish,” Foreign Policy, February 28, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/28/fishing-uk-european-union-brexit-trade- talks-cfp/ . 45 Ibid. 46 Dan Roberts, “‘We Have Been Hijacked’: Fishermen Feel Used over Brexit,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, March 23, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/23/we-have-been-hijacked-fishermen-feel-used-over-brexit . 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Serena Kutchinsky, “Is Nigel Farage the Fisherman’s Friend?” Newsweek, June 27, 2016, https://www.newsweek.com/eu-referendum-brexit-fishing-policy-nigel-farage- scotland-snp-473435 . 50 John Litchfield, “Ukip Is Wrong: British Fishing Answers to Westminster Not Brussels,” The Guardian, April 6, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/06/ ukip-british-fishing-westminster-brussels-brexit . 51 Oliver Barnes and Chris Morris, “Brexit Trade Deal: Who Really Owns UK Fishing Quotas?” BBC News, January 1, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/52420116 . 52 Keith Johnson, “So Long, and Say Thanks for All the Fish.” 53 European Commission, “The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP): the essentials of the new CFP,” 2015. 54 Ibid. 55 Craig McAngus, “A Survey of Scottish Fishermen Ahead of Brexit: Political, Social and Constitutional Attitudes,” Maritime Studies 17, no. 1 (2018): pp. 41-54, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40152-018-0090-z . 56 Daniel Boffey, “UK Fishermen May Not Win Waters Back after Brexit, EU Memo Reveals,” The Guardian, February 15, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/feb/15/uk-fishermen-may-not-win-waters-back-after-brexit-eu-memo-reveals . 57 Severin Carrell, “Nigel Farage to Lead pro-Brexit Flotilla up Thames,” The Guardian, June 3, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/03/nigel-farage-pro-brexit- flotilla-thames-eu-referendum-leave-campaign . 58 Chris Morris and Oliver Barnes, “Brexit Trade Deal: What Does It Mean for Fishing?” BBC News, January 20, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/46401558 . 59 Craig McAngus, “A Survey of Scottish Fishermen Ahead of Brexit: Political, Social and Constitutional Attitudes.” 60 The Newsroom, “Scottish Constituency of Banff and Buchan ‘ ̃Voted for Brexit’,” The Scotsman, November 22, 2016, https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/scottish-constituency-banff-and-buchan-voted-brexit-1462018 . 61 Kevin McKenna, “Scotland’s Fishermen Feel a Sickening Sense of Betrayal Yet Again,” The Guardian, March 24, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/ mar/24/scotland-fishermen-betrayal-peterhead-brexit . 62 “Scottish Independence: Will There Be a Second Referendum?” BBC News (BBC, March 22, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-50813510 . 63 Ibid. 64 Scotland Correspondent, “SNP Tries to Dump EU Fisheries Policy” (The Times, March 31, 2010), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/snp-tries-to-dump-eu-fisheries- policy-7b8tnlq3gw5 . 65 Scottish Government, “Scotland’s Future and Scottish Fisheries,” Scottish Government, August 14, 2014, https://www.gov.scot/publications/scotlands-future-scottish-fisheries/pages/2/ . 66 “General Election 2017: Former SNP Leader Alex Salmond Loses Seat,” BBC, June 9, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-40212541 . 67 “General Election 2017: SNP Lose a Third of Seats amid Tory Surge,” BBC News, June 9, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-40192707 . 68 Ibid. 69 “Letters: Tories Could Not Be Trusted to Negotiate in Good Faith in Independence Talks,” HeraldScotland, November 11, 2020, https://www.heraldscotland.com/ news/18864349.letters-tories-not-trusted-negotiate-good-faith-independence-talks/ . 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 British Sea Fishing, “Brexit and Britain’s Fisheries.” 73 Ibid. 74 The Newsroom, “Fishing Industry’s Anger as UK and EU Strike Brexit Transition Deal,” The Scotsman, March 19, 2018, https://www.scotsman.com/country-and-farming/ fishing-industrys-anger-uk-and-eu-strike-brexit-transition-deal-318889 . 75 Ibid. 76 Jenni Davidson, “Brexit Deal for Fisheries like ‘A Pint of Cold Sick’, Conservative MP Douglas Ross Says,” Holyrood Website, October 4, 2019, https://www.holyrood.com/news/view,brexit-deal-for-fisheries-like-a-pint-of-cold-sick-conservative-mp-douglas-ross- says_13762.htm . 77 Libby Brooks, “Scottish Tories Still Anxious over Johnson’s Impact on the Union,” The Guardian, July 23, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jul/23/scottish-tories-still-anxious-over-johnson-impact-on-the-union-independence-ruth-davidson . 78 Tom Peterkin, “Boris Johnson Pledges That Access to Fishing Will Not Be Sacrificed in New Brexit Deal,” Press and Journal, July 30, 2019, https://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/fp/politics/scottish-politics/1807666/boris-johnson-pledges-that-access-to-fishing-will-not-be-sacrificed-in-new-brexit-deal/ . 79 Ibid. 80 Rowena Mason and Libby Brooks, “Boris Johnson Heads to Scotland to Deliver £300m Pledge,” The Guardian, July 28, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jul/28/boris-johnson-heads-to-scotland-to-deliver-300m-pledge . 81 Ibid. 82 Tim Ross, “Boris Johnson’s Tories Abandoned Scotland to Win Their Big Victory,” Bloomberg, December 23, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-23/how-johnson-s-tories-ditched-scotland-to-rule-a-divided-kingdom . 83 “General Election 2019: Boris Johnson Claims Scotland ‘Paralysed’ by SNP,” BBC News, November 26, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2019-50561993 . 84 Reuters Staff, “Boris Johnson to Tell Scotland: Vote Conservative to Stop Independence Bid,” Reuters, November 6, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-election- scotland/boris-johnson-to-tell-scotland-vote-conservative-to-stop-independence-bid-idUSKBN1XG333 . 85 Data collected by Eleanor Ruscitti via Boris Johnson’s Twitter account 86 Alistair Grant and Rohese Devereux Taylor, “Constituency Profile: Fishing for Votes in Scottish Coastal Communities,” HeraldScotland, December 1, 2019, https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/18072191.general-election-2019-fishing-votes-scottish-coastal- communities/ . 87 Ibid. 88 “Results of the 2019 General Election,” BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/election/2019/results . 89 Torcuil Crichton, “Why Scottish Fishing Rights Are a Brexit Deal Breaker in EU Trade Talks,” Daily Record, October 15, 2020, https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/.politics/scottish-fishing-rights-brexit-deal-22850163 . 90 British Sea Fishing, “Brexit and Britain’s Fisheries.” 91 Ibid. 92 Chris Morris and Oliver Barnes, “Brexit Trade Deal: What Does It Mean for Fishing?” 93 Harry Taylor, “Kipper Tie: Boris Johnson Sports Fish Symbol in Brexit Message,” The Guardian, December 24, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/dec/24/net-gains-boris-points-up-his-ties-to-the-fishing-industries . 94 Jeremy Kahn, “A Fine Kettle: How Fishing Became the Issue That Could Sink a Post- Brexit U.K.-EU Trade Deal,” Fortune, October 15, 2020, https://fortune.com/2020/10/15/fishing-rights-brexit-u-k-eu-trade-deal/ . 95 Barrie Deas, “Opinion Piece,” NFFO, October 9, 2020, https://nffo.org.uk/news/opinion-piece.html . 96 Daniel Boffey, “Catches, Quotas and Communities: the Key Fisheries Issues at Stake,” The Guardian, October 17, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/oct/17/catches-quotas-and-communities-the-key-fisheries-issues-at-stake . 97 Denis Staunton, “Johnson Covers Brexit Win on Fish to Show He’s ‘Taking Back Control’,” The Irish Times, December 4, 2020, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/johnson-covets-brexit-win-on-fish-to-show-he-s-taking-back-control-1.4426956 . 98 “Scottish Election 2021: Conservative Match Best Scottish Election Results,” BBC News (BBC, May 8, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-57042432 . 99 Dan Roberts, “‘We Have Been Hijacked’: Fishermen Feel Used over Brexit.” 100 Laura Hughes, “Brexit: Why Fishing Threatens to Derail EU-UK Trade Talks.” 101 Lucy Williamson, “Brexit: Why France Is Raising the Stakes Over Fishing” (BBC, October 13, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54526145 . 102 British Sea Fishing, “Brexit and Britain’s Fisheries.” 103 Jon Henley, “French Fishing Industry Divided over Sanctions on UK Trawlers,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, November 1, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/nov/01/french-fishing-industry-divided-over-sanctions-on-uk-trawlers . 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