Abstract

Migration policies in the European Union (EU) have long been securitized; however, the 2015 migration crisis represented a turning point for EU securitization of development aid to shape migration outcomes from various African countries. In 2015, the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (EUTF) was created at the Valletta Summit on Migration to address the drivers of irregular migration such as poverty, poor social and economic conditions, weak governance and conflict prevention, and inadequate resiliency to food and environmental pressures. The duration of this fund was from 2016-2021. Central to the strategy of the EUTF was addressing “root causes” however, the fund came with security dimensions. Under its objective of improved migration management, the EU directed capital to various security apparatuses in Africa to limit the movement of irregular migrants and prevent them from reaching Europe. This method diverted aid from addressing the existing problems faced by vulnerable populations in the region and contributed to practices and organizations that are responsible for implementing coercive measures to limit movement of migrants and committing human rights abuses. This paper examines the political and ideological motives and objectives behind the EU's securitization of development financing via the EUTF, how it has strategically used the “root causes'' narrative to secure these arrangements, and the ways in which this pattern of interaction is inherently neo-colonial. 

Introduction: The European Union Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa) was passed in November 2015 at the Valletta Summit on Migration where European and African heads of state met to address the challenges and opportunities presented through the 2015 migration crisis. African and European heads of state recognized that migration was a shared responsibility between the countries of origin, transit, and destination. They were joined by the African Union Commission, the Economic Community of West African States, states parties to the Khartoum and Rabat Process, the Secretary General of the United Nations, and representatives of the International Organization for Migration. 

The Valletta Summit identified the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement which became the guiding narrative to create and implement the EUTF. The Action Plan of the Summit stated, “the Trust Fund will help address the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement, and irregular migration by promoting economic and equal opportunities, strengthening the resilience of vulnerable people, security, and development.” Therefore, addressing these issues via development aid would limit irregular migration. The European Commission claimed that “demographic pressure, environmental stress, extreme poverty, internal tensions, institutional weaknesses, weak social and economic infrastructures, and insufficient resilience to food crises, as well as internal armed conflicts, terrorist threats, and a deteriorated security environment” needed to be addressed within the EUTF framework.

However, the root cause narrative itself was partially based on assumption rather than empirical evidence. Economic data analyzing the correlation between economic development aid and migration show that the two variables have an inverse relationship. Economic and human development increase peoples’ ambitions, competencies, and resources, encouraging them to emigrate. Migration has a downward trend only when a country reaches an upper-middle income level. This concept is also known as a migration hump. Although EU officials were aware of this phenomenon, they ignored the underlying issues of the root causes narrative and proceeded to create the fund. 

Between 2016 and 2022 the EUTF dispersed approximately EUR 5.0 billion across 26 African countries in the Sahel and Lake Chad, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. This funding was on top of pre-existing EUR 20 billion annual aid from the EU to these geographical regions. Despite packaging the EUTF as development aid and extracting the money almost exclusively from the European Development Fund (EDF), which specifically targets economic, social, and cultural development programs, the EUTF fell within the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, introducing a security dimension to development financing. The EU and African partner countries used a significant amount of aid from the EUTF to bolster migration management initiatives via the funding and strengthening of security apparatuses that are responsible for targeting migrants within Africa, before they could embark on their journeys to European states. Under the EUTF, improved migration management constitutes “contributing to the development of national and regional strategies on migration management, containing and preventing irregular migration, and fight against trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants and other related crimes, effective return and readmission, international protection and asylum, legal migration, and mobility.” It includes increasing logistical capabilities by providing capital to train border agents, and bolstering surveillance infrastructure to monitor citizens’ movement, and expanding logistical capacities. In some cases, it also relies on encouraging certain policies in recipient countries to align with the priorities of the donor countries. As shown in EUTF annual reports (Figures 1.1-1.6), there was an increasing diversion of capital towards funding migration management projects in Africa, which came at the expense of economic development projects. 

By using aid to fund security goals, the EU securitized and politicized development financing. Securitization in migration policy refers to the externalization and extra-territorialization of migration control through border controls and reclassification of various activities like drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and delinquency of migrants as national security concerns.   Still, some EUTF funding  went towards projects geared at economic development. As stated in the Action Plan and shown in subsequent annual reports, the EUTF implemented programs that promoted job creation, education, entrepreneurship, and building resiliency. However, they also used the money from the development package to strengthen migration management initiatives and shift responsibilities to third countries in Africa, ultimately creating “legal black holes” where European norms about human rights did not apply. Despite the clear evidence of the EU’s contribution to abuses towards African irregular migrants, the EU continues to implement repressive policies through various externalization mechanisms and faulty narratives that have been empirically proven to not work – such as the root causes narrative – in order to further its own interests in the African continent. 

Research Question

The practice of funneling capital toward security-related migration management projects raises the following question: Why has the EU opted to securitize its development aid through EUTF in the aftermath of the 2015 migration crisis? Furthermore, what are the implications of aid securitization in terms of development aid effectiveness, human rights practices, and the EU’s external legitimacy as a normative actor? To answer these overarching questions and understand the promotion and proliferation of migration policies through pacts like the EUTF requires an inward look into the European Union and its political and ideological interests in the migration policy domain. Therefore, I propose that the EUTF was a neo-colonial mechanism through which European member states could further their migration policy priorities into certain African states thereby reinforcing their colonial legacy hierarchies. 

Methodology

First, I will provide background information about the EUTF, highlighting its objectives and strategies for development aid implementation and effectiveness. Then, I will provide quantitative data regarding the dispersion of money from the EUTF to show the increasing investments toward migration management schemes. Understanding these specificities and inherent challenges of the EUTF will contextualize my hypotheses.

 Next, I will support my hypothesis through case studies of specific EUTF security operations in African countries, analysis of the EU’s previous migration policies, interviews with African and European Union stakeholders about EUTF’s development and impact, and various theories to help explain how the EU navigates its migration policies. Finally, I will assess the implications of aid securitization in both Europe and Africa. 

My research will rely on official documents from the EU about its migration agenda and policies. It will also use data from academic journals and previous literature that have examined the trajectory of the EU’s migration-development nexus, specifically through the EUTF.  

 Assessing the current nature of the EU’s migration policies will be useful in helping guide future policies. As migration becomes an increasingly salient issue, it is crucial to determine strategies or “best practices” that are humane and sustainable to address it. Adhering to human rights norms should be at the center of these policies. 

Background

The Action Plan of the Valletta Summit was based on five priority domains:

1. Reducing poverty, advancing socio-economic development, promoting peace and good governance.  

2. Facilitating educational and skills training exchanges between EU and EU member states as well as the creation of legal pathways of employment for migrants and returnees.  

3. Providing humanitarian assistance to countries needing food assistance, shelter, water, and sanitation. 

4. Fighting against irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and trafficking. 

5. Facilitating the return, readmission, and reintegration of migrants.

During Valletta, Martin Schulz, the former President of the European Parliament stated, “By boosting local economies through trade, for example through economic partnership agreements and through ‘aid for trade’ programs, by investing in development and by enhancing good governance people will be enabled to stay where they want to be ‘at home.’” He reiterates that the purpose of the EUTF is not “fight the migrants” but rather, “fight the root causes of migration: poverty and conflict.” This seemingly proactive approach underscores the belief that addressing the primary drivers of migration by promoting development measures will empower people to remain in their respective countries by choice rather than feeling compelled to migrate elsewhere. 

“Root Causes”: Overlooking Evidence 

 The problem with the EU’s understanding and use of the “root causes” narrative is that it ignores how wage differentials contribute to migratory patterns.  Wage differentials refers to the discrepancy in wages for similar jobs due to factors like industry or geography. While development aid can be effective, it is not enough to redistribute wealth and address the deep structural inequalities of the global economy that drive migration to more developed and wealthier countries.  Subsequent sections will elaborate further on the adoption of the root causes framing.

EUTF Annual Aid Reports (2016-2022)

As stated in the Valletta Summit political declaration, the EU was committed to “address the root causes of irregular migration” through the EUTF. However, aid allocation data (Figures 1-1.6) from EUTF annual reports, which highlight the distribution of aid in amount and percentage terms by geographical window and five of the EUTF’s objectives, show an increased prioritization of implementing migration management schemes at the expense of development projects between 2016 and 2022.

In 2016 (Figure 1), when EUTF was in the implementation phase, EU officials distributed significantly more funds for economic development projects across North Africa, the Sahel, and Horn of Africa than any other domains which aligned with the root causes narrative that was emphasized at Valletta.  In 2017 (Figure 1.1), the allocation for improved migration management significantly increased across the three regions. In North Africa, funding for economic development, strengthening resilience, and conflict prevention was eliminated while EUR 285 million was given to migration management. This pattern is strategic due to the geographic proximity of the region to southern European borders. In 2018 (Figure 1.2), North Africa remained the biggest recipient of migration management funds but did not receive funding for development projects. In 2019 (Figure 1.3), 31.56 percent of total funding was invested in migration management. In 2020 (Figure 1.4), 2021 (Figure 1.5), and 2022 (Figure 1.6), improved migration management projects continued to receive most funding at the expense of other objectives.   The funding patterns outlined in these reports show the EU’s increased focus towards its migration objectives. 

Figure 1: EUTF Projects Approved in 2016

Figure 1.1: EUTF Projects Approved in 2017

Figure 1.2: Projects Approved in 2018

Figure 1.3: Projects Approved in 2019

Figure 1.4: Projects approved in 2020

Figure 1.5: Projects approved in 2021

Figure 1.6: Projects approved in 2022

Taking the background information and data into account, I will prove my hypothesis, explaining why the EU increasingly invested in migration management projects in the following sections. 

Defining Neo-Colonialism

The concept of ‘neo-colonialism; was coined by Kwame Nkrumah’s Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, in which he argues that neo-colonialism is a contemporary form of colonialism that is perpetuated through less traditionally coerciece methods, such as development aid. This theory can be applied when assassing relations and interdependency between former colonial states with formerly colonized states. Interdependence is manufactured by former colonial powers that “[give] independence” to their subjects, only for them to follow up by allocating aid.” They speak about guaranteeing independence and liberation but never implement policies to preserve them in an effort to maintain their influence and objectives via unobstrusive and monetary means rather than directly coercive ones. As a result, these countries’ economic system, and thus their political policy, is “directed from outside” through foreign capital.”

EUTF as a Neo-Colonial Instrument

In the 19th and 20th centuries, European powers reshaped all aspects of African society, through colonialism, for their own strategic imperatives. These included, but were not limited to, extraction of material resources, manufactured dependency, and assertion of European institutions and policies at the expense of indigenous cultures and institutions. The complete overhaul of pre-colonial Africa interrupted economic and political development in the region and led to its continued structural subordination despite achieving independence from European colonial states in the 21st century. As a result, the repercussions of colonialism have contemporary implications in EU-Africa relations.

During the colonial era, colonial powers used military power and additional forms of coercive strategies to assert foreign influence; currently, former colonial powers capitalize on the weaknesses of African countries and use political and economic measures to gain influence. Colonialism never disappeared, but rather, evolved into neo-colonialism.  This concept is demonstrated in the framework of the EUTF which, despite being a development aid package and product of a seemingly coordinated multilateral process, imposed conditionalities and security measures on African states to achieve political goals in the field of migration. Under the EUTF, patterns of cooperation between European countries and their former colonies to limit migration are also prevalent, especially in the case of Libya and Niger. These initiatives safeguard colonial-era power structures and undermine the sovereignty of the respective African states.  

The EU took advantage of its status as a donor institution through three mechanisms that enforced hierarchies between African and European powers: 

1. The governance structure,designed to dismiss African stakeholder engagement

2.  EU’s imposition of positive and negative conditionalities to certain African states 

3. The strategic partnerships between European and African states to implement migration management programs

These steps demonstrate the EU’s broader goals to assert their influence in the region’s migration policies by implementing security schemes, jeopardizing the needs of African states and the preservation of human rights in the process. The use of EUTF to conduct such projects signals the “de facto policy purchase” on the African government’s stance on migration. Consequently, African states become an “instrument” for European neo-colonial policies, especially in the migration domain. 

Eurafrica to Modern EU-Africa Relations

 The legacy and discourse of colonialism and neo-colonialism are not equal among EU member states. Many European countries were colonial powers, with the exception of Ireland and Malta, along with several central European countries that were subjugated to the authority of larger imperial powers. However, specific past actions hold little significance when discussing the broader nexus between European integration, the European Union, and colonialism. 

In Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism, Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson argue that there was a vast overlap between the colonial and European projects. Several African countries, under colonialism, have historically played a key role in efforts towards European integration and unity from the 1920s to the 1950s under the geo-political concept of Eurafrica. According to this idea, European integration would only occur through “coordinated exploitation of Africa and Africa could be efficiently exploited only if European states cooperated and combined their economic and political capacities.” The pan-European movement in the interwar period was based on conditions for peace through a “united colonial effort” in Africa. 

Eurafrica turned into a political reality with the emergence of the European Economic Community (EEC) made up of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany, along with colonial possessions that were referred to as “overseas countries and territories” (OCTs). For the EEC, Africa served as a “necessity,” “a strategic interest,” “an economic imperative,” “a peace project,” “a white man’s burden,” and “Europe’s last chance.” Put differently, “Africa was indispensable for Europe’s geopolitical and economic survival.” Africa became the guiding force of European integration and Eurafrica became a system through which colonial powers could preserve their empires.

Eurafrica, in its original form, did not materialize because African countries took back control from European colonial powers, but its legacy is crucial to the development of the EEC and modern EU-Africa relations. Today, the EU describes its relationship with Africa in terms like “interdependence,” and “partnership of equals.”   Nonetheless, the EU’s colonial past still plays a significant role in its foreign policy with Africa as it promotes the adoption of European rules and practices in its “normative empires.”  The continuation of these empires has cemented core-periphery dynamics of interaction, which ultimately advances European interests, especially in the migration domain.  Specifically, the EU’s externalization of border and migration management efforts to transfer the European model of governance to third countries have transformed them into “southern buffer zones” to curtail unwanted migration and enhance Europe’s sense of security. Such measures demonstrate the separation of physical borders from functional regimes in Europe’s fluid borderlands, which are antecedent to imperial practices when control was extended beyond territorial boundaries. These practices are evident in the EU’s security operations through pacts like the EUTF, EU-Turkey Deal, and Operation SOPHIA. These externalization policies ensure the continuity of the vision derived from the Eurafrica project in the 21st century. 

Conditional aid

The EUTF was conditional as it leveraged development aid to finance security-related migration projects and imposed positive and negative conditionalities that were used as leverage for African cooperation. When the European Commission announced its Migration Partnership Framework in 2016, it stated that development and trade policies will use positive and negative conditionalities to encourage cooperation on EU’s migration management projects. The “more for more, less for less” framework embedded into development financing means that “African governments use migration cooperation as a bargaining chip for procuring finance through renting inherent powers of state sovereignty to control entry and exit.” This coercive and concessional method contradicts the nature of cooperation that was emphasized at the Valletta Summit in 2015 and undermines the autonomy of the African states as these conditionalities perpetuate neo-colonial practices.

EUTF Governance Structure and Oversight

The EUTF was a product of a multilateral decision-making process. However, its governance structure, which limits proper stakeholder engagement from African representatives, signals the EU’s push to prioritize its policies over development in Africa. The European Commission claims that it is taking a bottom-up approach where the EU delegations play a key role in identifying and formulating the EUTF through consultations and dialogues to build partnerships with local stakeholders (civil society organizations, national and local authorities, and representatives). Subsequently, proposals are created by the EUTF for African teams based on EU Commission Headquarters and EU delegations. Then, the proposal is submitted to the Operational Committee for approval. Once approved, the proposals are implemented via EU member states’ authorities, developmental and technical cooperation agencies, civil society organizations, international or UN organizations, and private sector entities.

The governance of the EUTF is dependent upon the Strategic Board and Operational Committees for each of the three regions where the EUTF distributed funds. The Strategic Board is responsible for “adopting the strategy of the EUTF, adjusting the geographical and thematic scope of the EUTF in reaction to evolving issues, and deciding upon amendments to the guiding document establishing the internal rules for the EUTF.” The board is chaired by the European Commission and composed of representatives and contributing donors. The Operational Committee is responsible for “reviewing and approving actions to be financed, supervising the implementation of the actions, and approving the annual report and accounts for transmission to the Strategic Board.” In the Board and the Committee, the African partner countries can only act as observers and do not hold decision-making powers. This management framework is ineffective as it is designed to limit the participation of African parties that have more comprehensive knowledge regarding the needs of the continent and areas where funds need to be directed. However, they are structurally silenced. 

The classification of the EUTF as development aid from the EU to Africa also provided a loophole under which parliamentary oversight was not required. The European Development Fund, which operates outside the EU budget, funded most of the aid, bypassing conventional parliamentary procedures, allowing for swift implementation of the fund. As a spokesperson for the European Commission’s DG DEVCO claimed that simplifying the procedures allows for more flexibility so projects can be implemented earlier. Proponents of the fund believe that the easy implementation process is what makes it advantageous. However, opponents of the fund like Elly Schelien, a member of the European Parliament’s Development Committee, claimed that the EU Parliament has not been given “the right democratic scrutiny” of the fund. The framing of the fund as an “emergency instrument” led to retracted bureaucratic measures to increase effectiveness as project cycles were much shorter than traditional development programming. 

The consolidation of power to the EU institutions and representatives meant that EUTF projects were “identified at the country level under the leadership of the EU Delegations, discussed and selected by an Operational Committee.” Engagement from African stakeholders and civil society was not required. An interview with a representative from the Operational Committee revealed that EUTF “projects were simply approved without discussion. Negotiations took place upstream between EUTF managers, European agencies, EU delegations, and partner countries.” This form of decision-making amplifies hierarchical structures between European and African representatives.

Strategic Partnerships

Certain EU member states partnered with African states to implement migration management programs in which they exercised authority over the movement of migrants within Africa, especially in the origin and transit countries. Not only do these policies directly conflict with the EU’s stated commitments regarding development aid and cooperation with partner countries, but the EU’s agenda is antecedent to European empires leveraging local African officials to undertake security operations in the continent.  Today, this exploitative relationship is parallel to the EU’s allocation of capital, military equipment, and capacity-building instruments to African representatives who adhere to the needs of EU leaders. This pattern is visible in various projects and funding executed under the EUTF. Though reluctant to enter into such agreements with Europe, African policymakers are forced into a “perpetual balancing act, juggling domestically-derived interests with the demands of external donor and opportunity structures.” This concession stems from inherent power asymmetry between relatively weak and powerful states, upholding colonial legacy hierarchies.

Case Studies on Libya and Ethiopia

In the following section, I use Libya and Ethiopia as case studies to provide evidence that EUTF’s prioritization of funding migration management projects, increasing policing and surveillance in these countries, and imposing positive and negative conditionalities are reflective of neo-colonial practices to assert dominance over the movement of African irregular migrants. I chose these countries to study because each one falls within one of the two geographical windows and serves either as a popular departure or transit country where the European Union is heavily involved in migration management projects. 

Libya

Libya is a major departure country for migrants from West African countries of origin such as Nigeria, Guinea, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Mali, and Senegal. Italy demonstrated strategic interest in Libya due to its geographical proximity and colonial legacy. Between 2017 and 2022, the Italian Ministry of Interior (MI) led implementations of various migration management projects that sought to curb the arrival of migrants into Italy. In 2017, MI led the first phase of its project called “Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya” with a budget of EUR 42.2 million and a EUR 2.23 million co-financing from Italy. The principal objective of this phase was migration management. Focus areas included strengthening border control, increasing surveillance activities, combatting human smuggling and trafficking, and conducting search and rescue operations. The second phase of this project was launched by MI in 2018 until 2024 for EUR 15 million. This phase was focused on capacity-building activities and institutional strengthening of authorities such as the Libyan Coast Guard and the General Administration of Coastal Security. It also advanced the land border capabilities of relevant authorities and enhanced search and rescue (SAR) capabilities by supplying SAR vessels and corresponding maintenance programs. The beneficiaries of this project included 5,000 relevant authorities from the Libyan Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Ministry of Communications. The indirect beneficiaries include “future migrants rescued at the sea due to the procession of life-saving equipment to Libyan Coast Guard and General Administration for Coastal Security for them to be able to save lives.”

 Italy’s actions under the EUTF compromise the proper use of development financing tools by diverting them for the use of security-related projects. Its engagement and strengthening of Libyan security apparatuses such as the Libyan Coast Guard also undermine the values of human rights that EU member states claim to promote in their foreign policies as the Libyan Coast Guard is notorious for violating non-refoulment principles and committing human rights violations such as extortion, arbitrary detention, and sexual violence against migrants and asylum seekers. Recognizing brutal actions by the border authorities and the deplorable living conditions in detention centers in Libya, the Assize Court in Milan condemned the torture and violence inflicted in these centers. In November 2017, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights released a statement criticizing the EU’s support for the Libyan Coast Guard as “inhumane” as it led to the detention of migrants in “horrific” conditions in Libya. Despite institutional disapproval of the EU’s and Italy’s involvement in Libya, funding for these security projects continued. 

Ethiopia 

While Ehtiopia was never formally colonized, it remained under Italian occupation from 1935-1941 and subsequently fell under (in)formal British control from 1941-1944.   The EUTF initiatives in Ethiopia do not show the same patterns of cooperation as seen in Libya and Niger, since Ethiopia served as a key interest to the EU due to its status as one of the main countries of origin, transit, and destination for migrants and refugees. EUTF report from 2016 highlighted that Ethiopia hosts over one million displaced people.  It is also the biggest recipient of EUTF funding in the Horn of Africa. Its geographical proximity to countries like Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan has vastly affected its migration demographics, making it a focus area for the EU’s development aid under the EUTF. While there pre-existing migration management schemes in Ethiopia, they were concerned with the returns and reintegration of irregular Ethiopian migrants and refugees rather than building up the capacity of various security actors as seen in other regions. This objective was linked with positive conditionalities as the Third Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration links progress in the returns and readmissions field with more financial support for refugees that reside within Ethiopia.  Additional projects in Ethiopia were geared towards economic development and focused on addressing the root causes as outlined in Valletta. Some of these initiatives included job creation, providing energy access, healthcare, and education to vulnerable populations which are in line with development cooperation. However, the European Union’s increasing focus on returns and readmission of Ethiopian migrants can decrease revenue derived from remittances which contribute three times more to the Ethiopian economy than development financing.  This approach ensures the fulfillment of the EU’s migration interests while undermining Ethiopia’s economic needs. 

Ethiopian officials also expressed disappointment with the EUTF measures because they were guided by the EU’s focus on repatriation, thereby eroding migration cooperation with Ethiopia. In regards to EU interests in Ethiopia, an EU official claimed: “We can pretend that we have joint interest in migration management with Africa, but we don't. The EU is interested in return and readmission. Africa is interested in root causes, free movement, legal routes, and remittances. We don't mention that our interests are not aligned.” This non-alignment in interests is irrelevant to the EU because it is the more dominant actor and has the power to assert its priorities by using money as leverage. However, this pattern of interaction comes at the cost of losing cooperation with Ethiopian stakeholders and diverging finances from refugee and migrant populations in Ethiopia who need humanitarian assistance. 

Perspectives from Africa 

African representatives and ambassadors displayed suspicion about the fund’s motives and called on the EU to fund projects that increase economic opportunities in their respective countries. As Nigerien mayor of Tchirozerine Issouf Ag Maha stated, “as local municipalities, we don’t have any power to express our needs. The EU and project implementers came here with their priorities. It’s a ‘take it or leave it’ approach, and in the end, we have to take it because our communities need support.” Maha’s statement highlights the role the EU plays in shaping the direction of development money and how its priorities overshadow decisions and input from local officials, who are significantly more knowledgeable about the needs of their communities. Despite diverging interests and priorities, African officials concede to their demands because their communities require financial resources to alleviate hardships. President Akufo-Addo from Ghana claimed that “instead of investing money in preventing African migrants from coming to Europe, the EU should be spending more to create jobs across the continent.” Similarly, Senegalese President Mackey Sall and former Chairperson of the African Union warned that the trust fund to tackle the causes of migration is not sufficient to meet the needs of the continent stating, stated that “if we want young Africans to stay in Africa, we need to provide Africa with more resources.” The allocation of aid to security-related projects comes at the expense of funding genuine development projects that align with the needs of African communities. It also takes advantage of the ‘cash-starved’ governments.” These statements underscore the necessity of the EUTF to direct capital towards structural and sustainable economic development as opposed to combatting, detaining, or returning migrants. However, the EU has not been responsive to these inputs from its African stakeholders despite stressing the importance of cooperation and partnership during the Valletta Summit.

Reinforcing Power Imbalances   

The imposition of European policies and priorities through the EUTF takes advantage of African nations' relatively weaker economic standing and agency, showing that the political and security needs of powerful states and institutions determine where and how development aid is designated. It also shows the continued influence and intervention of European interests into their ostensibly independent former colonial holdings, therefore reiterating Nkrumah’s theory that foreign capital, such as development aid, can be used for the exploitation of developing countries by their former colonial powers. This hypocrisy goes against the EU’s normative approaches to its foreign policy while also continuing to reinforce power imbalances and colonial-era hierarchies between Europe and Africa. 

Discussion

Critically examining the European Union Trust Fund in the broader context of EU-Africa relations demonstrates how EUTF represents a complex intersection of historical legacies, political interests and expediency, and political ideologies that determine attitudes towards migrants and refugees and thus, shape policy outcomes. These factors reinforce each other by showing the multifaceted nature of migration governance. 

The neo-colonialism lens in my hypothesis provides historical context to show how enduring colonial legacies continue to guide policies today. This lens also forms the basis for discourse about EU-Africa relations because of the visible power imbalances that are sustained through policies like the EUTF which are structurally designed to achieve European political interests at the expense of the needs of African states. As seen through the case studies on Libya, Niger, and Ethiopia, development aid is not always allocated for the benefit of the recipient. Rather, aid can be abused as a political tool to reach the objectives of the donor institutions. Despite the rhetoric of cooperation between stakeholders, preservation of human lives, equal partnership, and addressing root causes, as stated in Valletta, the strategic policy design of the EUTF highlights the persistence of neo-colonialism because it continues historical patterns of exploitation and hierarchies between Europe and Africa. 

Conclusion

The findings in this paper show that EUTF was not merely a development instrument but also a political one that came with negative consequences for African irregular migrants. The securitization of aid along with the EU’s other externalization policies have not effectively solved the problems that have caused the migration crisis. Instead, it has reinforced them. The model of the EU’s migration policies under the EUTF has also created issues beyond the realm of migration. As discussed, it continues to sustain power imbalances between Europe and Africa, shift aid priorities, and undermine development goals.Addressing the migration crisis will require a paradigm shift in the EU migration policy domain. The EU needs to deviate away from a security-based approach to a holistic and rights-based approach. This ideological reform requires the EU to look inward to address its own limitations and failures by recognizing its neo-colonial practices, acting out of mutual rather than political interests, and lastly, collectively humanizing migrants and refugees arriving to Europe for safety and opportunities. Through these measures, the EU and African stakeholders can address the true root causes of migration – which stem from structural global inequalities.

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