One Planet, One Oklahoma: Exploring a Framework for Assessing the Feasibility of Localized Energy Transitions in the United States Anna Hyslop Author Arjun Ray Arthur Shamgunov Benjamin Levy Editors Abstract Net-zero energy transitions, necessitated by the threat of climate change, need to occur on an international scale. However, powerful economic lobbies and political stagnation often mar the negotiation processes driving national and international action. In this context, local communities become increasingly important in achieving widespread emissions reduction objectives. This analysis centers on exploring a framework that evaluates the feasibility of net-zero energy transitions in U.S. localities. The framework highlights the technological and political feasibility of transitioning the electricity and transportation sectors of a given municipality. While such a framework does not capture the entirety of a community’s energy system, it nonetheless serves to address two sectors that dominate emissions production and energy usage. I apply this framework to the suburban community of Norman, Oklahoma, to both highlight the value of such analysis and to provide important information to local officials in my community. By collecting information from administrative and primary sources, this study documents forecasted decreases in the cost of renewable energy sources, residual emissions abatement technologies, and energy storage solutions for Norman. Further, an analysis of the local transportation sector reveals that the costs associated with public transit improvements—an important component of decarbonization in the transportation sector—generally ranged from 0.01-5.1% of the City’s 2023 budget (excluding national high-speed rail enhancements, which involve cost-sharing between local, state, and federal governments). I also examined the political feasibility of this transition, documenting the partisan preferences that may hinder clean energy implementation. My findings suggest that while technology costs may decrease, political opinion could hinder clean energy transitions in Oklahoma. The model of analysis employed throughout this study presents significant opportunities for further exploration of localized energy transitions in suburban areas and college towns, two types of municipalities often left out of transition scholarship. At the end of March in 2023, the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a Synthesis Report covering the burgeoning climate crisis. The report served as the sixth installment in a series designed to inform international climate negotiations with updated scientific findings. Within the first ten pages, the IPCC reaffirmed common scientific consensus, declaring that “human activities, principally through the emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming.” Increasing global temperatures pose threats to people throughout the United States. Coastal communities in states like Texas and Florida have experienced a greater volume of flooding in part due to sea level rise resulting from climate change. Out West, Zhuang et al. (2021) found that “anthropogenic warming…contributed at least twice as much natural variability to the rapid increase of fire weather risk” observed in the record-breaking fires of 2020 in California, Washington, and Oregon. These two studies, as a part of a growing academic literature, demonstrate the variability found in the impacts of climate change across geographies. The United States, for its part in contributing to the crisis, produced 6.0 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalents (Gt CO2eq) of greenhouse gas emissions in 2022, making up 11.2% of total global emissions. This makes the U.S. the second-largest global emitter behind China–which produced 15.7 Gt CO2eq in 2022–and puts it in the top ten global emitters per capita. With a population of approximately 4 million people, Oklahoma produces about 2% of the U.S.’s share of global emissions. Total emissions data for Norman, Oklahoma—home to the University of Oklahoma and the subject of this analysis—does not currently exist. If Norman, like many American cities, does not individually contribute much to the climate impact of the entire United States, then why does the possibility of a localized energy transition and a net-zero future for this municipality merit discussion? First and foremost, local communities play a critical role in achieving national carbon neutrality as they can overcome federal policy inertia. After the release of the first IPCC report in 1990, several transnational associations of municipalities–including Local Governments for Sustainability, Climate Alliance, and Energy Cities–were formed to help cities pursue climate targets in the face of “strong economic lobbies [that] were blocking national and international climate policies.” By belonging to these organizations, cities are granted legitimacy and support from other municipalities in pursuing localized climate policy action. Rutherford and Coutard (2014) further acknowledge the capability of cities to pursue climate work despite national gridlock, stating that “cities may have a window of opportunity for action on energy transitions by their distinctive…political and/or sociotechnical contexts compared with those at a national level.” The ability of cities to pursue sustainability work despite national constraints presents a compelling argument for exploring a local energy transition. Furthermore, greenhouse gas emissions—and the systems that lead to their release into the atmosphere—exist at local, regional, and national levels. Municipalities regularly make decisions regarding transportation, energy consumption, and land-use planning, three sectors that contribute heavily to total U.S. emissions. Collier and Löfstedt (1997) point out, however, that the financial and legal capacities of a city to enact local change vary greatly by location. Regardless of such limitations, changes at the community level contribute to broader national decarbonization objectives. The Biden Administration supported this argument in its long-term climate strategy, citing the importance of non-federal leadership—including municipalities—in reaching domestic carbon neutrality by 2050. Even smaller, suburban cities like Norman possess the power to radically reshape local transit and energy policy, addressing both its local carbon footprint and national carbon contributions. Third, Oklahoma—and Norman by extension—cannot escape the impacts of the climate crisis. The South Central Climate Adaptation Science Center predicts an average high temperature increase of more than 2 degrees Fahrenheit by midcentury without significant action to reduce emissions. The Fifth National Climate Assessment expands on these projected temperature increases, forecasting negative economic and public health consequences. The authors observed with high confidence that warmer temperatures and increasingly erratic weather patterns will “force widespread and costly changes” to the employment of Oklahomans. Additionally, climate change will result in increased water scarcity, animal extinction, and declining public health as extreme heat events become more common in the south-central United States. Tropical diseases and heat-related deaths are projected to increase in the warming region. Other public health impacts have already been observed in Tulsa, where the expansion of eastern red cedars—associated with longer pollen seasons—resulted in a 205% increase in allergic pollen intensity. Although the consequences of climate change borne by Oklahomans are largely not self-inflicted, we still bear responsibility for addressing our carbon footprint. Assessing Norman’s current capacity to transition to carbon-free consumption may encourage further action within Oklahoma’s cities, as only Oklahoma City currently pursues sustainable policy initiatives. Finally, analyzing the feasibility of an energy transition within Norman may spark further discussions about an energy transition in Oklahoma at large. Our local context incorporates both the resources of a nationally-recognized research institution and heavy dependence on the automobile. This combination of factors should make Norman—and other suburban college towns—a subject of interest. Drewello notes the importance of university partnerships in assessing “unique local situations” and generating innovative solutions. With access to the University of Oklahoma and its faculty, Norman offers a great opportunity for building a model to inspire a statewide or regional energy transition. Furthermore, our dependence on the automobile mirrors that of other suburban communities within the state; accordingly, any assessment of Norman’s potential for changes in the transportation sector can provide a framework for similar analyses within Oklahoma. In the Routledge Handbook of Energy Transitions , Miller et al. (2022) call for the systematic “mapping” of the policies, processes, and pathways needed to achieve regional carbon neutrality. The study offers a novel framework for analyzing the feasibility of net-zero localized energy transitions in the United States. Though Norman, Oklahoma, is used merely as an example of the application of this framework, the case study provides a model for similar analyses to be conducted in other localities. I focus on establishing this underlying framework for a local energy transition by assessing the current energy system and analyzing the technological and political feasibility of achieving a net-zero future in Norman. To conduct this assessment, I researched administrative, academic, news, and primary sources to gather cost estimates of different technologies. I also analyzed national and state-level assessments of public opinion on renewable energy development to understand the transition’s political feasibility. The remainder of this paper outlines the definitions and criteria used throughout the study, with an in-depth examination of Norman’s current energy system following soon after. Then, I offer an assessment of both the technological and political feasibility of pursuing an energy transition. My general conclusions from this research follow the feasibility assessments. I. Outlining the Energy Transition: Definitions and Criteria In this section, I provide an overview of several proposed definitions of energy transitions, as well as the objectives that such transitions seek to achieve. I then articulate this study’s interpretation of a net-zero energy transition and my justification for selecting such a definition. Finally, I conclude with an explanation of the criteria by which I will assess feasibility in later sections of this paper. Prior academic work provides many definitions that explain the fundamentals of energy transitions. Araújo (2022) postulates that basic energy transitions involve a “considerable shift in the nature or pattern of how energy is used within a system, including the type, quantity, or quality of how energy is sourced, delivered, or utilized.” Zinecker et al. (2018) offer a simpler yet similar definition to Araújo, defining energy transitions as “shifts… [in] the way people produce and consume electricity using different technologies and sources.” Drewello builds on the foundations provided by Araújo and Zinecker et al. to postulate that an energy transition “is nothing less than a revolutionary restructuring of the entire energy supply in the sectors of electricity, heat, and transportation.” Here, Drewello points out specific sectors involved in a transition. These three definitions articulate the basics of an energy transition, defined in this study as a fundamental, multi-sectoral shift in both the consumption and production of energy towards a net-zero future. A net-zero future achieves maximum emissions reductions while using carbon capture technologies to remove any residual emissions. Accordingly, net-zero transitions involve deploying renewable energy technologies–like solar, wind, and nuclear power facilities–at scale. I elected to study the feasibility of a net-zero energy transition with a framework inspired in part by the literature. In evaluating Norman’s current energy sector, I focus on two of the sectors highlighted by Drewello: electricity and transportation. These sectors compromise 53% of U.S. emissions, with transportation at 28% of the total. Although Norman may not observe the same trends in emissions as the greater United States, addressing emissions in these two sectors is of great national importance and should be relevant to an energy transition in Norman as well. The decision to focus on the electricity and transportation sectors represents the first layer of my analytical framework. The second layer consists of considering both the technological and political feasibility of making net-zero transitions in each sector. Sovacool and Geels (2016) provide justification for these considerations. They divide the elements of an energy transition into three “interrelated” categories: “the tangible elements of socio-technical systems…actors and social networks…[and] socio-technical regimes.” In practice, these three dimensions prove difficult to distinguish from each other, but still roughly suggest a division between the intangibles and the tangibles of energy transitions. This study understands political feasibility to be the intangibles of transitions—namely, public support for clean energy development–and technological feasibility to be the tangible elements of an energy transition, most notably the costs associated with shifting to renewable energy and developing emissions reduction techniques. II. Norman Now: Our Energy Today Of the 90 million megawatt-hours (MWh) of electricity generated in Oklahoma in 2023, 40 million MWh (or around 44%) of this generation came from renewable sources. Norman hosts two primary electric utilities: Oklahoma Gas and Electric (OG&E) and Oklahoma Electric Cooperative (OEC). OG&E provides generation, transmission, and distribution services across Oklahoma and parts of western Arkansas. While public data listing the number of OG&E customers in Norman is not currently available, it serves approximately 888,800 customers across its service territory. OG&E reports that 60% of the utility’s generation capacity comes from natural gas, 30% from coal, and 10% from renewable sources. This data also incorporates OG&E’s power purchases, which account for 58% of OG&E’s total generation portfolio. OG&E purchases this power from other producers in the Southwest Power Pool (SPP). As a member of SPP, OG&E’s energy could come from any generation site within the regional transmission organization (RTO) at any given time. SPP’s generation mix in 2022 consisted of 37.5% wind, 33.3% coal, 20.9% natural gas, and 8.3% of energy produced from other sources. This data mirrors SPP’s generation mixes from 2020 and 2021. In 2020, SPP produced 31.3% of its power from wind, 30.9% from coal, and 26.6% from natural gas. In 2021, 35.6% of SPP’s power came from coal, 34.6% from wind, and 20% from natural gas. Instead of generating its own power, OEC operates an electricity distribution business. OEC purchases its power from the Western Farmers Electric Cooperative (WFEC), a generation and transmission provider. WFEC possesses a diverse fuel mix, generating 30% of its power from renewable sources and 11% from coal and natural gas. Additionally, WFEC imports 42% of its electricity from SPP. Power purchased from the Grand River Dam Authority, Oneta Power Plant, and Southwestern Public Service provided the final 17% of WFEC’s generation mix in 2022. The complexity of power generation networks, exemplified by OG&E and OEC, makes it difficult to determine Norman’s exact energy landscape based on public data alone. Future applications of this framework may run into similar challenges due to public data limitations. OG&E’s and OEC’s connections to SPP mean that consumers in Norman could theoretically receive energy from anywhere in SPP at any given time. However, some consumers have a limited degree of choice in deciding where their electricity comes from. OG&E customers can opt-in to receiving power from the utility’s solar farms, while OEC allows its customers to purchase renewable energy certificates that support renewable generation. These programs are naturally limited in scope, and data regarding the number of customers choosing to participate in these initiatives is not currently available. While I cannot accurately provide a detailed picture of Norman’s electricity provision, I can use SPP generation data to construct general assumptions. As mentioned previously, the largest share of SPP’s electricity production came from wind power, indicating that Norman could theoretically receive a notable amount of our electricity from that source. This assertion can be extrapolated to other cities within SPP’s 14-state service territory, assuming that a city’s serving utility maintains membership in SPP and that SPP’s generation portfolio remains consistent across states. This second assumption, however, cannot be verified by publicly-available SPP data; as such, the statement remains largely speculative. Decarbonizing the electricity sector requires a combination of multiple technologies. Regardless of the combination, however, a net-zero transition necessitates either elimination or removal of the emissions from coal and natural gas power plants that supplied over 50% of SPP’s generation in 2022. Power plant emissions can be reduced through a replacement of generation fuels—in this case, via renewable energy—or a deployment of smokestack emissions-reduction technologies. Emissions that cannot be addressed through the replacement of generation fuels or other reduction technologies must be removed through carbon capture. The costs of these options are explored in depth in the “Technological Feasibility” section of this paper. An assessment of Norman’s current transportation sector consists of analyzing both private and public transportation. Oklahoman workers display a strong dependence on private forms of transit, with 77.8% driving alone to work in 2022. In comparison, 68.7% of U.S. residents display a similar commuting pattern. Furthermore, 9.4% of Oklahomans carpool and 0.3% use public transportation to get to work. Nationally, 3.1% of people use public transit and 8.6% carpool. Evidently, passenger vehicles predominate Oklahomans’ commutes. These vehicles are overwhelmingly gasoline-powered. Though data specific to cars owned by Normanites is not available, of the 4,287,900 total vehicles registered in Oklahoma, 83% are powered by gasoline. 0.5% of cars registered in the state are fully electric, while 0.8% are plug-in hybrid electric and 1.3% are hybrid electric. These trends reflect larger national patterns, as 85% of vehicles registered in the United States are gasoline-powered, while 1.2% are fully electric. Norman’s public transportation consists of five fixed bus routes, operated by EMBARK Norman, which serve local destinations six days a week. EMBARK Norman also partners with EMBARK OKC to provide weekday commuter service to Oklahoma City. Intracity service is free and the commuter route to Oklahoma City costs $3 per adult and $1.50 for qualifying riders. Buses are scheduled at least every hour on four out of the five routes. The Norman fixed-route fleet consists of 10 compressed natural gas (CNG) buses, 2 electric buses, and 1 diesel-powered vehicle. The paratransit fleet uses 9 CNG buses, 2 diesel buses, and 3 gasoline-powered shuttles. Additionally, the University of Oklahoma possesses four bus routes on its campus. Norman also has an Amtrak station, with service ending in Oklahoma City. In this study, I also include biking as a form of public transportation. In 2022, only 0.2% of Oklahomans biked to work. Given that much of Oklahoma lacks biking infrastructure, this finding is unsurprising. Current data on the number and type of bike lanes within Norman is not readily available. However, given Norman’s possession of bike-friendly infrastructure, we may safely assume that Norman’s commuter biking statistics are higher than the Oklahoma average. III. Technological Feasibility The exploration of Norman’s electricity and transportation sectors reveals the community’s overwhelming dependence on fossil fuels. In this section, I use estimated costs of different clean energy technologies as a metric for assessing the technological feasibility of a net-zero transition in Norman. My study of electricity-related feasibility primarily concerns the costs associated with increasing the share of low-carbon energy sources in power generation, incorporating power storage methods, and abating residual emissions. In the transportation sector, I consider different scenarios in which the City of Norman improves public transportation. I do not focus on action taken by individual Normanites (commonly termed “reductions in demand”), as such action falls outside the scope of the analysis I hope to provide. Evaluating the technological feasibility of a power-sector transition in Norman begins with an understanding of the costs associated with alternative energies. The levelized cost of energy (LCOE) “combines technology cost and performance parameters, capital expenditures, operations and maintenance costs, and capacity factors” into a statistic that helps researchers, government agencies, and private companies predict the costliness of different forms of energy per MWh generated. The LCOEs for various sources of energy in Cleveland County—where Norman is located—in 2023 dollars are reported in Table 1. Table 1: Data from NREL (2020); Lewis et al. (2022); IEA (2020). All costs—including cost projections—are in 2023 dollars, with inflation adjustment calculations made based on OECD (2024) data. County-level costs for key renewable energy technologies like solar and wind are expected to experience significant declines by 2050, while the costs of traditional fossil fuel generation facilities are expected to increase. Across the board, the median costs associated with renewable sources of energy in Cleveland County are expected to drop by 2050. Gas-induced power plants, on the other hand, are expected to experience cost increases, regardless of whether these plants incorporate carbon capture and storage (CCS) techniques into plant practices. Unlike gas-powered plants, however, coal is expected to experience cost declines, but will likely remain more expensive than solar, wind, nuclear, or even gas-powered generation. This insight is significant, as coal generation produces more emissions than natural gas and renewable resource generation. Since the county-level statistics parallel the patterns observed in state-level analysis (not pictured), I observe that the comparatively-high costs will likely discourage the use of coal within Oklahoma, reducing the state’s emissions. Decreases in renewable energy costs for Cleveland County, depicted in Table 1, indicate that our electricity sector may feasibly transition to renewable energy. However, the data provided for county-level costs by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) neglects to mention an increasingly-popular form of alternative energy: hydrogen power. The fuel is expected to play a critical role in decarbonizing personal transportation. Currently, steam methane reforming (SMR), a process dependent on fossil fuels, dominates hydrogen production in the United States. The implementation of CCS with SMR practices is expected to increase the LCOE of hydrogen production, but still maintains the “highest potential for low-cost clean hydrogen supply.” Transitioning to sources like wind and solar also requires measures to manage their intermittent nature. Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) are touted as the solution to the need for power storage. NREL reports that costs of utility-scale LIBs within Cleveland County will decrease approximately 53% by 2050, making the reality of incorporating this technology into a transitioned power grid increasingly plausible. This assertion is further supported by the declining prices of renewable power sources, allowing greater amounts of capital to be allocated to power storage instead of generation. Addressing residual emissions—those that cannot be easily reduced through the previously-discussed strategies—necessitates the usage of carbon capture technologies. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) involves removing carbon dioxide at its emission source. NREL already provides a Cleveland County LCOE for CCS in the context of natural gas generation, placing the 2020 LCOE at $60.06 and expecting a $68.3 LCOE by 2050. Global estimates from the International Energy Agency (IEA) further contextualize this data. Globally, the LCOE for CCS ranges from 17.87-143.02 USD per ton of carbon dioxide captured. Direct air capture (DAC), another emissions-reduction technology, captures carbon dioxide after its release into the atmosphere. The technology generally costs more than CCS, with global LCOE estimates ranging from 160.9-411.19 USD per ton captured. NREL’s forecasted costs to 2050 are helpful in evaluating the feasibility of a net-zero power sector transition. Such forecasting, however, remains difficult to find for transportation improvements. Instead, I rely on the costs associated with different public transit improvement scenarios that Norman explored in fiscal year 2023 (FY23). Table 2: Data from City of Norman (2021); City of Norman (2022); City of Norman (2024); Taylor Johnson at the City of Norman; Lazo (2023); Feigenbaum (2023). All costs are adjusted to 2023 dollars using data from OECD (2024). In 2021, the Norman City Council approved the Go Norman Transit Plan, a document detailing different transportation improvements anticipated for Norman’s bus system. Adding an additional bus route, Route 113, requires nearly $9 million in capital and operational investments. Increasing route frequency for two of the current bus routes entails expenditures of between $8.21-$8.91 million, depending on route length and the number of buses needed to achieve frequency improvements. Improving the frequency of Route 111 stops from a 30-minute to the ideal 15-minute frequency necessitates $11.55 million from the City. These frequency improvements are intended to make public transit options competitive with the convenience and consistency offered by single-passenger vehicular transport. Expanding route service often demands adding additional buses to the City’s fleet. To gather information on the historical costs of purchasing CNG and electric buses, I contacted Taylor Johnson, the Transit and Parking Program Manager for the City of Norman. Mr. Johnson offered information on the current fixed-route fleet and the previous costs of purchasing individual electric and CNG buses. One fixed-route CNG bus cost the City $639,741.79 in 2023 dollars, whereas an electric bus cost over $1 million in the same year. The cost estimates specific to certain route improvements cannot accurately predict the expected future costs of similar improvements. However, this information still provides an important overview of what such improvements may entail. Regardless of future inflation or specified costs associated with different projects, improvements to Norman’s bus system will cost millions of dollars to implement. As mentioned in the “Norman Now: Our Energy Today” section, Norman possesses one Amtrak station with service to Oklahoma City. Finding a cost estimate for adding additional rail lines or increasing train speed in Oklahoma is not currently feasible; therefore, I turned to two case studies of these improvements in other areas. Amtrak anticipates increasing the speed of the Washington-to-Boston route with new trains. This project, originally proposed in 2011, costs $3.11 billion in 2023 dollars. The proposed Dallas-to-Houston Amtrak project, involving the development of completely-new rail lines, costs a whopping $33.6 billion in 2023 dollars. Support for the development of additional Amtrak lines through Norman would need to occur at the state level; after all, as the two currently-proposed projects demonstrate, Amtrak projects are extremely expensive and involve multiple municipalities. While it is unlikely that Amtrak will expand coverage in Oklahoma in the near future–given the minimal demand for such infrastructure–this discussion still offers important context for comprehensive public transit considerations in the state. Bike infrastructure serves as the final area of analysis within the public transportation sector. For this exploration, I use data from an Association of Central Oklahoma Governments grant received by the City for air quality improvements. Adding two bike lanes cost the City $11,497.99 in total. Details on the length and cost of each individual bike lane were not provided by the City. Table 3: Data from City of Norman (2021); City of Norman (2022); City of Norman (2023); City of Norman (2024). *The “Actual Public Transit Expenditures” for FY24 have yet to be released; accordingly, I provided the City’s current estimate. During FY23, the City of Norman proposed and passed a $225,785,971 budget. As exemplified in Table 2, the costs of transportation improvements under Norman’s control ranged from 0.01% of the budget to 5.1% of the budget. Given the trends in public transit spending observed in Table 3, the budget typically allows enough flexibility for only one of the transit improvements detailed in Table 2 to occur. This finding suggests that substantial improvements to Norman’s public transit system will likely occur slowly, unless the City’s spending patterns change. The technology exists to support a net-zero energy transition. The challenge, then, comes with the cost of such technologies. As the NREL forecast predicts, renewable energy sources will likely continue to decline in cost, encouraging utilities to adopt these forms of energy for power generation. Additionally, both long-term energy storage solutions and residual emissions reduction technologies are anticipated to experience declining costs. Norman’s electricity sector, therefore, could realistically experience a clean energy transition in the coming decades, contingent on utility adoption of necessary technologies. The feasibility of adjustments to Norman’s transportation sector proves incredibly difficult to predict due to the challenge of obtaining cost forecasting data. Regardless of this limitation, the scenarios explored demonstrate realistic costs for the City, although the pace at which such projects are pursued may be slower than desired. IV. Political Feasibility In this study, political feasibility is more challenging to quantify and anticipate than technological feasibility. By its very nature, public opinion is dynamic, and the individuals surveyed often possess opinions that do not fit cleanly into prescribed party affiliations or expectations. Furthermore, creating an accurate measure of political support for an energy transition proves difficult, considering the complexity of interacting components in such a transition. Given these constraints, I focus this section on a broad investigation of the views on renewable energy development that are associated with national and statewide partisan identifications while acknowledging the complexity of these affiliations. I also highlight studies specific to Oklahoma that offer valuable insights into the nuances of support for a carbon-neutral energy transition. According to the Pew Research Center, 31% of Americans currently support the complete phasing out of fossil fuels across the United States, compared to the 68% that support the use of a fossil fuel and renewables mixture. This belief does not necessarily conflict with the net-zero transition proposal, as carbon capture techniques could theoretically support the strictly-limited use of fossil fuels. Regarding renewable energy development, 74% of Americans highlight this type of development as “the most important energy priority for the U.S.” when compared to “expanding [the] production of fossil fuels.” Evidently, national support for a net-zero future depends on the specific limitations of that energy transition. Attempting to break down support for the transition by political party causes further difficulties, as the opinions of both Democrats and Republicans do not always follow expectations. For example, 58% of Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents believe that fossil fuel expansion should operate as the U.S.’s top energy priority, but 70% of this group still support the development of more solar farms. 90% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning Independents give renewable energy priority over fossil fuels, but 51% “oppose phasing out fossil fuels completely” for right now. The responses to these questions do not clearly indicate partisan support for a net-zero future. For additional clarity, Kennedy et al. asked respondents about their opinions regarding the complete phase-out of fossil fuels. 87% of Republicans and Republican-leaning respondents reported a belief in the need to use a mix of fossil fuels and renewables in the near-term, while 51% of Democrats and Democrat-leaning respondents reported the same. Understanding national party positioning on the phase-out of fossil fuels, a component of net-zero energy transitions, contextualizes an analysis of Oklahoma’s current partisan makeup. As of January 15th, 2024, approximately 52% of Oklahoman voters are registered with the Republican party, while 28% are registered Democrats and 19% are registered Independents. However, these affiliations do not directly indicate voters’ position on energy transitions. Generally, 57% of American Republicans believe the U.S. should never stop using fossil fuels, a viewpoint likely shared by many Oklahoma Republicans given the historical importance of the fossil fuel sector within the state. Republican State Representatives and Senators also dominate our legislature. Only 20% of seats in the Oklahoma House and 16% of seats in the Senate belong to Democrats. The prevalence of the Republican party, when considered in the context of national survey data, indicates that political support for renewable energy development at the state level is likely low. The Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (IPPRA), based at the University of Oklahoma, surveyed 3,564 Oklahoma residents to gather “advice and guidance on how to develop socially sustainable solutions to water, carbon, and infrastructure problems in Oklahoma." This study revealed that 92% of the Democrats surveyed believe that greenhouse gas emissions are causing average global temperatures to rise, compared to the 38% of Oklahoma Republicans believing the same. Additionally, only 28% of Republicans surveyed believe that global warming has resulted in changes to Oklahoma’s weather patterns. In the context of Republican domination in the Oklahoma House and Senate, these findings further indicate that political support for measures addressing GHG emissions and climate change is likely minimal. Within Cleveland County, 47% of registered voters identify as Republicans, 30% identify as Democrats, and 22% identify as Independents (Cleveland County Election Board 2024). This data does not reveal Norman’s specific situation, as it includes registered voters throughout the entire county. Under such circumstances, I choose instead to refer to the state-level data described in the preceding paragraph. Using the data available to me, I provided an initial assessment of the political climate in Oklahoma. In doing so, I offer a broad overview of the expected political feasibility regarding a net-zero energy transition. My analysis of the state-level situation, contextualized in the presence of national polling data, indicates that support for the phase-out of fossil fuels in Oklahoma likely remains low. These findings cannot be directly applied to Norman’s specific local context. Further public opinion research should be conducted to determine the opinions of Normanites and their City Council members on the topic. Given the challenges in conducting this political analysis for Norman, similar obstacles may appear when applying this model to other municipalities. V. Conclusion Throughout this study, I offered and explored the applications of a particular model for analyzing the feasibility of localized energy transitions in the United States. Here, I will summarize the model and discuss the implications of both the framework and the case study I used to evaluate the framework. I derived the model of analysis employed throughout this study from observations of both U.S. emissions data and literature concerning energy transitions. I wanted to ensure that a localized energy transition focused on the sectors with the largest greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S.; thus, I chose to focus on the electricity and transportation sectors. This selection was reaffirmed within the literature, as explored in “Outlining the Energy Transition: Definitions and Criteria.” The next level of my analysis focused on evaluating the technological and political feasibility of transitioning each sector. I separated the discussion of technological feasibility by sector and highlighted the costs associated with clean energy developments accordingly. In the political feasibility section of my analysis, I largely focused on generalized public opinion data surrounding an energy transition due to the limited availability of data related to electricity and transportation decarbonization specifically. I articulated this framework of analysis through my case study of Norman, Oklahoma. The assessment of technological feasibility generally reflects declining costs in renewable technologies across Cleveland County, the United States, and the world. These declining costs appear to indicate that decarbonization in Norman is feasible. Given Oklahoma’s geographical conditions and expected cost declines, solar and wind energy could drive a transition away from fossil fuel dominance. Declining costs of utility-scale batteries will help mitigate the intermittent nature of these two sources. Additionally, nuclear energy possesses significant promise in helping Norman to achieve net-zero, especially given the apparent political support for nuclear energy within the state legislature. During the 59th regular session of the Oklahoma legislature, both the House and Senate passed Senate Bill 1535, which amended the Oklahoma Low Carbon Energy Initiative to include nuclear energy. The support for this legislation, however, does not mean that the legislature or the Public Utilities Commission will prioritize clean energy over fossil fuel interests in the future. Thus, predicting an energy transition in Norman remains exceedingly difficult. With regards to transportation, the City possesses the ability to fund both bike lane and bus route improvements, as costs for these advances ranged between 0.01-5.1% of the City’s 2023 budget. These costs are in line with the total amount of actual public transit expenditures made by the City in prior years. Improving and adding regional high-speed rail lines, however, proves increasingly expensive and is outside of the City’s regulatory purview. Accordingly, the City can realistically pursue localized public transit improvements over the next couple of years, ideally leading to decreased dependency on personal automobiles within Norman. The political preferences of Oklahomans possess a strong bearing on the overall feasibility of pursuing net-zero energy transitions. Republican domination in both the Oklahoma House and Senate indicates that statewide measures supporting energy transitions remain unlikely, especially given the general Republican stance on climate change and renewable energy versus fossil fuels. Data for Norman specifically cannot be found; accordingly, future research can focus on evaluating public opinion within the municipality. The difficulties present in ascertaining the feasibility of an energy transition in Norman reflect the limitations of the model I developed. First, this model does not cover all components of a municipality’s energy sector, leading to inconclusive predictions regarding the feasibility of total localized decarbonization. Second, the model relies on forecasting cost data, which is generated via a naturally uncertain practice. Third, the limited availability of publicly-accessible data—the backbone of this framework and my observations in Norman—weakens the conclusivity of assertions made using the application of the model to a given local context. This third component can be addressed in future uses of the model by obtaining access to private company and government data. Future applications of a similar framework possess ample opportunity for improving and innovating based on the foundation provided in this research. Regardless of its limitations, this model possesses significant implications for planning processes and improvements within my local community. Local strategic energy plans, which often possess decarbonization as a primary objective, rely on the type of in-depth analysis conducted throughout this report to accurately ascertain the current realities and future possibilities of local energy systems. Communities can use the model explored here as a guide in strategic energy plan development. Within Norman specifically, this paper provides critical analysis absent from the City’s long-term planning processes and suggests the need to develop some type of energy plan within the municipality. Climate change threatens all of humanity, regardless of one’s proximity to a coastline or dry zone. Addressing this crisis and preventing its exacerbation entails decarbonization across our energy systems. Throughout this study, I explored a framework to assess local energy transition feasibility and applied it to my local community. In doing so, I hope to encourage greater localized action in Norman and in the United States at large. 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Will Matheson Federal 5G Innovation Policy in the Context of Technological Competition between the United States and China Will Matheson Introduction Proponents of 5G pitch the technology as a societal panacea, leading to a ‘fourth Industrial Revolution’ complete with robotic surgeons and near-boundless economic growth (1). Such predictions are premature—the nascence of this technology makes impossible predictions of its economic, political, and societal implications (2). Nevertheless, just as each progression from 1G to 4G brought a greater impact than its predecessor, the transition to 5G holds substantial implications as the largest network overhaul in history, effectually causing tremendous innovation across facets of society. As such, beyond questions of bandwidth, spectrum allocation, and mobile capacity, questions of politics, cybersecurity, and national prestige have shaped the adoption of 5G. In particular, China and its “national champion” telecommunications company, Huawei, have become central to the political questions surrounding 5G. In 2020, Attorney General William Barr delivered a speech accusing China of having unfairly gained an advantage in 5G development through the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) market-distorting support of Huawei, seeming to imply the US is being cheated in this race and needs to begin playing by China’s rules (3). Similarly, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently warned business leaders in Silicon Valley to be aware of intense technological competition with China, suggesting the CCP and Chinese companies have engaged in widespread cheating to steal from US companies and gain a technological advantage over the US (4). This rhetoric draws attention to a more interesting trend: a shift in US government technology policy, particularly in the 5G space, and particularly driven by the Trump administration. As China gains global attention for its technological innovation in 5G, the US has reacted with increased intervention and control in the sector. Traditionally, US economic orthodoxy is associated with a free-market system, in which innovation derives from competition among private firms. Proponents of American capitalism, representing the economic doctrine of both major political parties, embrace this innovation model as a great strength of the system. As the US has shifted towards a more interventionist approach in spaces like 5G in reaction to China’s successes, supporters of this economic approach such as The Economist have, predictably, reacted with surprise and disapproval (5). Of course, this free-market depiction oversimplifies the US economy—the government has played significant and varying roles in technological innovation throughout history—but the shift in strategy matters. It also contradicts historical responses to similar cases of national competition. In the 1980s, fears of Japanese technological innovation outpacing that of the US’s were rampant, leading credible voices to call for direct government involvement in capital allocation analogous to Japan’s system (6). However, such a shift from a free market economy to the interventionist Japanese-style “industrial policy” did not happen. The US never picked specific companies or industries to drive economic growth, did not develop a vast bureaucracy to direct technology adoption and dispersion, and did not adopt widespread protectionist measures. Today, the US government’s shift in technology strategy is not yet on the scale of true industrial policy. However, comments from key Trump administration officials asserting a need to pick “the ‘horse’ we are going to ride in this [5G] race” and the administration’s embrace of tariffs suggest that the reaction to China’s innovation surge differs from the re- action to Japan’s 40 years ago, begging the question, why might the US shift now, but not then? This paper begins to investigate the factors motivating the shift in the US federal government’s 5G innovation strategy. To understand why the government’s reaction to China’s technological rise differs from its reaction to Japan’s, the paper investigates the influence the US-China relationship has on federal 5G strategy, with emphasis on the relative influence of concerns of national security and concerns of economic growth and development. The US’s relationship with China differs greatly from that of the US with Japan in the 1980s; increasingly, policy- makers view the relationship through the lens of great power competition. This essay considers how the differing security relationship with the People’s Republic of China may motivate this shift and investigates the specific ways it may manifest. Economically, the Trump administration’s policies represent a shift in economic orthodoxy in the US as industrial policy has become more mainstream. This strategy results from a reaction to global trade, particularly with China. While these motivations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, this paper’s test of the perceived strength of each motivation illustrates the relative influence of perceived security and economic challenges from China on the US’s domestic innovation strategy. It concludes that while both factors likely play a role in motivating US 5G innovation strategy, the security aspect of the relationship holds a stronger sway over the federal approach to innovation than does the economic aspect. Literature Review The scope of academic research specifically focusing on the US government’s recent shift toward greater intervention in 5G innovation is limited, likely due to the recency of this trend, its ongoing evolution, and the specificity of this change. However, numerous schools of thought have provided useful frameworks for understanding this evolution, and in some cases, academics have applied these frameworks to questions of US technology policy oriented toward China. The following sections delineate these bodies of literature as they apply to this evolution in US tech policy. The “New Cold War” and the Role of Historical Analogy Today, popular discourse increasingly frames the US-China relationship as devolving into a “new Cold War” (7). One key parallel emerging from this discourse is the systematic differences between American democracy and Chinese autocracy (8). At the same time, many challenge these claims, illustrating the multiplicity of views of China in popular discourse and the ongoing use of history as a mechanism to understand the Sino-American relationship (9). Certainly, the Trump administration has seemed to adopt a more confrontational stance toward China that belies a belief in great power competition, perhaps best embodied by its depiction of China as “revisionist” in the 2017 National Security Strategy (10). This discourse holds key implications for US policy. Given its empirical nature and the difficulties of understanding the present and future, history often serves as a heuristic for national leaders. Analogizing the Sino-American relationship to the Cold War will shape how leaders view the relationship and the policies they enact (11). However, a smaller body of literature instead finds that analogies serve more as post hoc justifications for policies (12). Of course, the framing of China as a wholly “revisionist” power that serves as an ideological and geopolitical foe oversimplifies the Sino-American relationship and China’s own behavior on the international stage at the expense of empirical accuracy (13). Nevertheless, the belief in such a “new Cold War” likely influences US policy toward China. Interestingly, some research suggests less conceptually complex leaders—defined as the level of sensitivity to information and its nuances within, measured by relative usage of high and low complexity words—use less sophisticated, more simplistic, and universalizing historical analogies in foreign policy decision-making (14). Political psychology naturally involves significant issues with validity, and this study’s sample size is limited. However, its implication suggests that Trump (a less complex leader by its measure of complexity) is particularly inclined to universalizing analogies such as framing the US-China relationship as a second Cold War. Such analogizing implies that the perception of great power competition with China may be motivating the shift in US technology policy. Indeed, the connection between memory of the Cold War to technological competition with China is beginning to emerge in popular discussion (15). At a baseline level, research detailing government technology strategy during the Cold War provides a rough idea of the lessons leaders analogizing the present may draw. The Cold War national security apparatus routinely dictated innovation strategy and goals across sectors in a departure from market-driven innovation, instead being motivated by a greater focus on pre-eminence in key areas such as radar, jet propulsion, and telecommunications. In particular, the government drove innovation primarily via federal projects (rather than the creation of state- owned enterprises) organized in the constellation of a few critical government lab- oratories, a slightly larger group of independent labs and sources of expertise, and a large array of businesses fulfilling contracts. The sheer scope and size of government funding for these projects was exorbitant and focused on specific technological achievements rather than foundational research (16). The most powerful techno- logical Cold War analogy is the Space Race. This episode condenses the notions of technological competition between great powers and is still reflected today by Americans’ general fascination with space and support for “space leadership” (17). Securitization Another way the US security relationship with China may influence support for 5G technology development is the securitization of various facets of the relation- ship as a result of a rising perception of great power competition. Securitization theory refers to a politicization process in which leaders of states assert policy areas as issues of national security, redefining the way actors treat the issue (18). An array of scholars argue the aforementioned “new Cold War” framing creates depictions of China as a threat that leads to the securitization of the US-China relationship (19). Importantly, securitization is a phenomenon that describes how countries, leaders, media, and other political actors understand things as threats. The securitization of something—such as aspects of the US-China relationship—does not imply that said object does not genuinely constitute a security threat. Rather, the theory is useful for understanding discursive constructions of threats, but the determination of whether that construction is justified is a separate question. Recently, scholars of securitization theory have applied it to the realms of technology and cybersecurity. Hansen and Nissenbaum propose a three-pronged framework for the securitization of cyberspace useful for evaluating possible security constructions of 5G. First, securitization in cyberspace includes depictions of entire infrastructures at risk of devastating, irreversible attack. Second, emphasis on everyday security practice in cyberspace creates powerful links between people’s everyday experience with their personal electronic devices and the threat of devastating attack. Third, emphasis on the technical complexity of the security threats (“technification”) powerfully motivates the securitization of a cyber issue and lends credibility to those securitizing it (20). Given how recently the Huawei issue has risen to public prominence, only a small body of literature specifically argues US discourse securitizes Huawei (and ZTE, another key Chinese telecommunications company) (21). Of course, a wider body of scholarship investigates the ways cybersecurity and critical infrastructure are constructed or securitized, implying the potential securitization of specific Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE (22). The securitization of technology has unique implications, such as substantial restrictions to trade (e.g. export controls, tariffs, localization requirements, restrictions on foreign direct investment). This immediate effect in turn leads to greater securitization of technology (creating a feedback loop), as well as tensions between nation-states (23). Industrial Policy Industrial policy connotes a specific economic intervention by the government. The economic strategy requires government intervention into the economy to tar- get the allocation of capital, alter production models, and provide protection for sectors deemed key drivers of economic growth and job production (that, absent said intervention, would perform significantly less well) (24). Japan’s rapid economic development in the mid- to late 20th century best exemplifies this strategy of a developmental state: a system closely coordinating government and business by limiting the entry of competitors, creating recessionary cartels, coordinating technology uptake and knowledge sharing in key industries, forcing and guiding mergers and industry exits, and providing subsidies through regulating pricing, government purchasing schemes, tax breaks, the use of tariffs, and low-interest rate loans (25). The process results in the “picking of winners and losers” where- by the government plays a key role in determining which companies become the conglomerate drivers of certain industries or sectors. While consensus generally assumed this process was almost entirely bureaucracy-driven (26), recent scholarship has suggested that elected leaders still played a key role in shaping Japanese industrial policy (27). China’s strategic plan, “Made in China 2025,” also reflects the core tenets of industrial policy. The strategy articulates China’s current industrial policy, serving as a ten-year guide to pivot the economy away from low-quality, labor-intensive goods to high-quality, technology-intensive goods and services. The plan provides the framework by which the Chinese government will coordinate massive subsidies, preferential market access, and technology uptake from other nations in or- der to promote specific companies in key industries as national champions (28). “Made in China 2025” identifies key industries including information technology, and Huawei is one of China’s most successful national champions. The multinational technology company Huawei provides a useful case study in Chinese industrial policy: the company benefits from large state subsidies, lucrative contracts with the military, and favorable tax breaks. As a result of its ability to consistently undercut all competitors on pricing, it has experienced massive global market growth (29). Much like how some American thinkers and leaders called for industrial policy in reaction to Japan’s industrial policy successes in the 1980s, today some call for the strategy in reaction to China’s policy (30). This sentiment may be grounded in states modeling their policy behavior off of the actions of one another, particularly in defense policy (31). Donald Trump, and key advisors in his administration such as Peter Navarro, have strong records of supporting industrial policy and have made attempts at enacting such an economic strategy both broadly and in relation to China over the previous three years (32). However, while the administration may have attempted to use strategies like a trade war as a protectionist reaction to China’s industrial policy, China’s recent behavior and industrial planning have continued to emphasize the industrial policy mentality of “Made in China 2025,” suggesting the influence of the administration’s policies on China’s behavior has been limited thus far (33). Nevertheless, this track record demonstrates that in the US, support for industrial policy empirically derives from interactivity with other nations’ economies and that it is reasonable to suggest that the orthodoxy of industrial policy may motivate the Trump administration’s economic strategies. Indeed, research is beginning to investigate how industrial policy motivated by economic competition with China specifically influences technology innovation strategies (34). Methodology Operationalization of the Dependent Variable Understanding the evolution of government policy toward greater intervention and control in technological innovation presents distinct challenges. Because this dependent variable is a recent trend that is continuing to develop, factors that indicate it are subtle. As a result, a composite of indicators best illustrates this change within the past few years. In particular, this shift has three components: protection of domestic technology firms from perceived risks, investment in technological innovation, and intervention specifically designed to support US-based semiconductor manufacturer Qualcomm as it competes with Huawei. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) provides evidence of the protection of domestic technology firms from perceived risk. CFI- US is an interagency governmental body that was created in the 1970s to evaluate potential national security implications of various forms of foreign direct investment. Its powers have generally expanded over time, now focussing on the broader implications of specific investments and on the implications of aggregate investments from certain countries and investors in specific industries. Given this role, its record of enforcement illustrates the protection of domestic firms from foreign—and in particular, Chinese—firms. CFIUS’s scope has expanded significantly over the past 15 years as it increasingly scrutinized Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 2007, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act officially codified CFIUS (which had previously enjoyed the mandate of only an executive order) in a clear push by Congress to give it more sway in screening FDI. In 2015, Ralls Corporation v. CFIUS expanded the presidential powers to use the committee to prevent FDI on claims of national security. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 further expanded CFIUS’s purview, instruct- ing it to both consider the risks of cumulative investments in particular sectors and the broader economic implications of any single investment in national security terms. It also instructs the committee to take into account the country from which FDI originates, signaling its increasing focus on China. In the same year, CFI- US intervened in the hostile takeover of Qualcomm by then Singaporean-based Broadcom, marking the first instance of the committee intervening before a deal was finalized. The cumulative effect has turned CFIUS into a gatekeeper to the US economy, enjoying broad, unappealable power to dictate FDI (35). The data demonstrate this expansion of CFIUS intervention over the previous decade. Crucially, the threat of a CFIUS investigation is the most important way CFIUS influences businesses due to the high costs these entities must shoulder under an investigation (36). Over roughly the past decade, CFIUS has dramatically increased the number of notices it has received as its scope has broadened and has correspondingly pursued a greater number of investigations over time (see “Increasing CFIUS Enforcement and Deterrence, 2009–2017,” above) (37). Correspondingly, this increase in investigations has deterred companies from following through on their transactions, as the number that have withdrawn their notices during investigation or review has increased, as demonstrated by the same chart. This expansion of notices has specifically focused on China. Between 2005–2015, CFIUS dramatically increased the number of transactions originating from China that it covered, and Chinese transactions became a larger part of its port- folio (see “Chinese transactions covered by CFIUS,” next page) (38). In addition, be- tween 2016–17, China far outpaced any other country for the number of CFIUS cases explicitly concerned with acquisitions of critical US technology, totaling over 1/5th of all such cases (a total of 38 cases) (39). Two cases under the Trump administration demonstrate how the 5G/semiconductor fight has particularly shaped this growth in CFIUS’s power. In 2017, President Trump directly blocked the takeover of Lattice Semiconductor by a Chinese-backed investor on the basis of national security (40). In 2018, CFIUS intervened to prevent the hostile takeover of Qualcomm on the national security grounds that the deal could potentially undermine America’s ability to compete with Huawei (41). The application of the national security framework, citing the threat from China, for a case concerning a takeover by a non-Chinese firm underscores how seriously the government has taken 5G. Tracking government investment in 5G is more difficult—for as many times as the White House has had Infrastructure Week, the government still has not put substantial funding toward 5G. Nevertheless, the government has made a number of steps that collectively signal an increasing level of involvement in the 5G space. The FCC’s controversial approval of the T-Mobile and Sprint merger (given the substantial concerns regarding oligopoly among cellular network providers) was explicitly founded upon the reasoning that it would promote “United States leadership in 5G” and conditioned the deal on the company’s provision of 5G to 90% of rural Americans (42). Moreover, the FCC recently announced a $9 billion fund for 5G in rural areas (43). The Department of Labor additionally created and put $6 million toward a public-private partnership to support education and training for jobs considered key to accelerating 5G deployment (44). Most relevant, however, is the Networking and Information Technology Re- search and Development Program (NITRD). NITRD unites various federal agencies, serving as the primary source of direct government research and development for advanced technologies relating to information technology. The “NITRD Bud- get Data, FY2011–2020” graph below captures how the government has ramped up its investment in this area over the past decade (45). This graph demonstrates three important trends. First, from 2011 to 2018, NITRD’s budget increased by 43%, from $3.7 to $5.3 billion, illustrating the substantial shift in the importance the government has placed on its research. While the total amount of funding may seem small by the standards of the government budget, the strong growth rate illustrates the shift to place greater emphasis on the government’s role in technology innovation. Second, the executive branch has begun substantially increasing its requested budget amount every year since 2016, suggesting a concurrent increase in government investment in IT. Third, the actual budget has outpaced the re- quested budget for each year recorded since 2015, suggesting Congress has also played a key role in driving this shift toward more government investment. Finally, the government’s involvement with Qualcomm and Huawei illustrates how it is willing to take low-frequency, high-visibility actions to protect 5G technology innovation. The Trump administration’s 2018 intervention to prevent the Broadcom takeover of Qualcomm signaled the degree to which it will intervene to protect this 5G chip-making company it sees as crucial to national competitiveness. This year, the administration has doubled down on this emphasis on Qualcomm, using the Department of Justice (DOJ) to back Qualcomm in an anti- trust lawsuit. Interestingly, this lawsuit was first brought against Qualcomm by the Federal Trade Commission under the Obama administration, with a district court ruling in favor of the FTC (46). Now, the DOJ (with support from the Departments of Defense and Energy) has supported Qualcomm’s appeal, explicitly making the argument that the courts should allow the company to maintain its business model on grounds that the company itself is integral to the security of the nation (47,48). Similarly, the Trump administration has taken aim at Huawei. In 2019, President Trump issued Executive Order 13873, which dramatically expanded government protections for telecommunications on the basis that such networks faced serious threat from foreign companies and governments and that such threats constituted a national security risk. Though not mentioning Huawei by name, the move was universally regarded as a reaction to the company’s perceived threat in the 5G space. Indeed, at the same time, the Department of Commerce added Huawei to the Entity List, effectively banning Huawei from doing business in the US. The coordination of these actions demonstrates the US government’s specific targeting of Huawei as the face of the Chinese technological competition with the US (49). While other Trump administration officials have spoken on this subject as well, these statements will not be as useful for signaling the existence of a shift in government policy toward more intervention in 5G innovation (50). First, this administration’s statements have conflicted in this area. In 2019, administration officials openly disagreed on the right level of intervention in 5G policy, with Trump finally deciding to oppose a direct federal acquisition of Nokia or Ericsson. However, a year later Attorney General Barr’s aforementioned speech revisited the issue and suggested that acquisition remained on the table (51). Clearly, the statements by the Trump administration send too many conflicting signals to reliably capture the trend of increasing government intervention. Additionally, intervention in the tech space matters for its actual effects on innovation processes, so tracking actions is better than tracking words. However, the concrete actions by CFIUS and the DOJ regarding Qualcomm unequivocally show how the government is increasingly fa- voring an interventionist approach specific to 5G. Taken together, the data from CFIUS, NITRD, and the government’s specific focus on Qualcomm illustrate a growing tendency in the federal government to intervene in technology areas such as 5G in order to promote innovation. Hypotheses The emphasis on great power competition has emerged in the government at the same time this shift in innovation policy strategy has occurred. Especially under the Trump administration, key government documents reflect this shift, arguing that China and Russia present the greatest threats to the United States. These documents forward a collection of related ideas: that great power competition will define the coming decades, that China is a revisionist power, that this competition is not simply a military one but an ideological one, etc. (52). Interestingly, while most of these documents, including the most authoritative such as the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), have emerged during the years of the Trump presidency, the 2016 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority embraced the notion of great power competition between the US and China, showing how this trend is not necessarily exclusive to the Trump administration (53). Clearly, an emerging trend is the perception of great power competition between the US and China, which seems at first glance to motivate or be invoked in the interventions the government is making into the 5G and technology innovation space. As detailed in the literature review, this trend can motivate political behavior, including through the influence of historical analogy and securitization. Given this trend and the literature on technology as a realm of great power competition, an overarching hypothesis for this shift in government innovation policy follows: The perception in the US of great power competition with China has led it to embrace greater intervention in technology innovation. This hypothesis has two implications alluded to by the literature review. First, this perception of great power competition may lead to Cold War analogizing that in turn motivates the shift in government innovation policy. The body of literature on historical memory as a heuristic for policymakers suggests the Cold War analogizing of the US-China relationship may have distinct political effects. Such effects and the general discourse around a “new Cold War” imply that perceptions of great power competition could motivate changes to technological innovation policy. Second, the perception of great power competition may motivate the securitization of the 5G space. Literature on securitization suggests that the US may construct technological innovation as a front in a great power competition, there- by necessitating intervention on national security grounds. Both of these scenarios are particular manifestations of the great power competition hypothesis. Testing each of these possibilities, then, illustrates the ways in which the hypothesis may be true. The results of those tests will specifically highlight the mechanisms by which great power competition leads to the shift in technology policy, and will more broadly illuminate the dimensions of this new era of perceived great power competition. Note that these manifestations are neither mutually exclusive nor dependent. To test the potential for Cold War analogizing, I will track analogizing of 5G to the Space Race with the USSR. This test will examine rhetoric framing 5G as a “race,” including a specific focus on analogies to US and Soviet achievements in the 1960s, over time. Given the rich literature on historical analogies’ influence on political behavior, a trend of such comparisons increasing over time will demonstrate how the administration is framing technology innovation with great power competition. NASA and the race to the moon represent perhaps the most critical Cold War episode concerning technology innovation in competition with another great power. As such, these comparisons are the most likely to take place, given the importance of simplistic analogies in particular, and are thus most illustrative of the use of analogizing in viewing 5G. Because the space race represented a pivot toward greater government intervention in technology innovation, its analogy serves as a likely motivator for a similar shift today. Of course, the government’s intervention in support of 5G is nowhere close to the scale of involvement it took in the space race, but the analogy-driven change in policy matters more than the parity in magnitude between government involvement in innovation in the 1960s and 2010s. This data is admittedly correlational, though the body of literature on the use of historical memory suggests that the perpetuation of specific analogies influences decision making. This suggestion means the greater the use of the analogy, the more likely it is influencing the shift in innovation strategy. To test for securitization, I will examine critical documents to understand if a securitizing discourse is being deployed. Securitization is a discursive process, meaning this review of such wording is the most direct way to detect whether or not the government is constructing technology innovation as a realm of security risk. One key implication of securitization is that the national security apparatus absorbs securitized issues, so to test this hypothesis, I will look at key national security documents such as the NSS, National Military Strategy, and Nuclear Posture Review in order to see if national security discourses are intentionally incorporating questions of technological innovation, especially with explicit reference to or focus on 5G. The literature on the Trump administration’s affinity for industrial policy suggests a different explanation for this shift in innovation strategy. Rather than a reaction to China based on notions of great power security competition, this shift may derive from a reaction based on notions of economic vulnerability to China. In other words, this industrial policy in the 5G area stems from an economic em- brace of industrial policy more broadly, rather than from the security concerns borne out of great power competition. This literature thus suggests the following hypothesis: The Trump Administration’s belief in industrial policy has led it to embrace greater intervention in technology innovation. The strongest evidence that supports the industrial policy hypothesis is the DOJ’s intervention specifically protecting Qualcomm. By advocating for the preservation of an anticompetitive business model, the government is effectively signaling a policy of “picking winners and losers” that characterizes industrial policy. However, to understand if this strategy is industrial policy rather than security strategy, there must be a trend of similar uses of this courts-based strategy that seems to be “picking winners” in sectors beyond 5G. To test this hypothesis, I will track the appellate briefs filed by the DOJ’s Antitrust Division to determine if it is advocating for anticompetitive equilibria that pick winners and losers in other industries as well. The implication of the hypothesis is that the administration is actively embracing the economic orthodoxy of industrial policy, meaning its interventions extend beyond 5G. Observing such a trend would thus imply the economic motivation for the 5G intervention, rather than the security motivation. Of course, this tracking method is imprecise—the individual facts and nuances of each case likely shape the content of the DOJ’s appellate briefs. However, survey- ing all briefs over the previous four years will demonstrate broader trends in the frequency with which the DOJ supports anticompetitive behavior. Results Cold War Analogizing The data on the use of the phrase “race to 5G” demonstrate a dramatic in- crease in the use of the analogy beginning in 2018. Using an analysis of documents employing the phrase between 2014–2019 (accessed through Factiva), the graph at right demonstrates the dramatic adoption of this term as mentions of 5G in- creased from 97 in 2017 to 715 in 2018, a 637% increase. Additionally, when only including documents that specifically make mention of the United States Federal Government or Federal Communications Commission, the data still demonstrate a similar jump from 17 in 2017 to 271 in 2018, a 1,494% increase. This increase serves as a rough indicator of the prevalence of technology race analogizing. Factiva aggregates publications using specific keywords, meaning this data reflect the prevalence of this analogy in the media. However, given the influence of analogies on decision-makers’ thinking, a greater prevalence implies a greater likelihood of such an analogy shaping public policy. Additionally, isolating the publications that specify the FCC or USFG demonstrates the connection between government action and this perceived technology race. A random sampling of these publications also suggests the vast majority employed the analogy, rather than argued against using it. Admittedly, establishing causality between government action and prevalence of the analogy is difficult—the media could be ascribing the analogy to the actions of the government without policymakers ever having employed the analogy. Fortunately, the record demonstrates that policy- makers have adopted this analogy in recent years. Key figures in the government, including President Trump, FCC Chairman Ajit Pai, Chief Technology Officer of the United States Michael Kratsios, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Com- merce, Science, and Transportation Roger Wicker, House Energy and Commerce Ranking Member Greg Walden, and Communications and Technology Subcommittee Ranking Member Bob Latta, have all employed the analogy (54). Moreover, Attorney General Barr has explicitly argued the US has not yet had its “Sputnik moment” in this race, further underscoring the connection to the space race (55). Taken together, the aggregate data from Factiva and the specific examples from key elected officials provide compelling evidence for “Race to 5G” analogizing. Securitization The set of documents articulating national security priorities and assessments provides the best source to scour for the securitization of 5G technology. Because these documents articulate matters pertaining to the security of the United States, their inclusion of 5G specifically and the domestic technology innovation base more broadly indicates the securitization of these spaces. The most recent Worldwide Threat Assessment from the Director of National Intelligence directly addresses 5G, arguing that the creation and adoption of 5G networks by other countries directly implicates data security within the United States due to the interconnectedness of communications and information technology infrastructure. Additionally, the Assessment connects this data infrastructure to threats posed by decryption capabilities growth, underscoring the technical threats to sensitive data in particular (56). Similarly, the 2016 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority specifically connects great power competition with China and Russia to threats to US information technology systems and argues crucial outputs enabled by 5G such as better AI will dramatically influence the balance of power.57 These depictions conform to Hansen and Nissenbaum’s framework by emphasizing a threat to the broad data infrastructure in the US posed by foreign development of 5G technologies and engaging in technification by emphasizing aspects like decryption capabilities growth and complex 5G outputs. The 2017 NSS is particularly important given its reframing of technology issues in a national security framework. The document identifies the need for the nation to excel in technology and innovation domestically to ensure the security of the nation, which in and of itself may not represent a dramatic shift from previous security orthodoxies that emphasized US domestic innovation as a component of national power. However, the NSS also asserts a new idea of a National Security In- novation Base (NSIB), formalizing the notion that technological innovation across the economy (not simply for defense purposes) is crucial to the balance of power the US must maintain to survive inter-state strategic competition. The document directly confronts China for intellectual property theft that it argues undermines the NSIB, discursively creating the notion of a Chinese threat to the securitized domestic innovation base (58). The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) builds on this idea of the NSIB, arguing that non-defense related innovation directly implicates the command of the commons: “The fact that many technological developments will come from the commercial sector means that state competitors and non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that risks eroding the conventional overmatch to which our Nation has grown accustomed” (59). Crucially, what follows from this assessment that commercial innovation is a security issue is the absorption of non-defense technology development into the military’s purview: “A long-term strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national power—diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military. More than any other nation, America can expand the competitive space” (60). This absorption classically models the discursive securitization of a policy area and the following policy change as the national security apparatus begins to dictate policy in said area. The DOD has specifically applied this notion of commercial innovation as central to the command of the commons. A spokesperson for the DOD framed 5G as a question of ability to function on the battlefield, claiming: “That’s where we are with 5G...we are going to run our entire warfighting ecosystem though communications.” She directly connected this vulnerability to grand ideas of the balance of power, arguing: “If we don’t embrace it and apply it towards our goals, we could be overcome quickly with technical overmatch” (61). Clearly, by connecting 5G in- novation to the nation’s warfighting ability and conventional military superiority, and by directly echoing the phrase “technical overmatch” used in the 2018 NDS when it discusses the national security importance of the NSIB, the spokesperson frames technology innovation as a question of debilitating collapse of the nation’s military, securitizing the issue. This analysis of key national defense documents and statements by members of the national security state provides compelling evidence for the securitization of 5G. Industrial Policy A review of the roughly 80 appellate briefs filed by the DOJ’s Antitrust Divi- sion reveals a dramatically limited scope of interventions supporting specific companies’ anticompetitive practices analogous to the DOJ’s intervention to protect Qualcomm in 2019 (62). During this period, only seven briefs opposed antitrust enforcement. Of these, two related to Qualcomm (briefs for Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm, Incorporated and Karen Stromberg, et al. v. Qualcomm Incorporated ), excluding them from consideration as they pertain specifically to 5G. A third, for State of New York and Other Plaintiff States v. Deutsche Telekom AG, et al. , supported the merger of T-Mobile and Sprint conditioned on the company’s rollout of 5G infrastructure across America, excluding it from consideration as well. Among the four remaining briefs, Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., et al. only weakly supports the notion that the government is supporting anticompetitive behavior in order to promote specific companies. In this case, the DOJ states that it takes no position on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, only stating that proof of reduced competition in a market is necessary in addition to proof of the existence of agreements considered anticompetitive (arguing that behavior must be effectually anticompetitive to be subject to antitrust laws, not simply anticompetitive based on a company’s decisions on paper). Two briefs better demonstrate opposition to antitrust enforcement—those for Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, et al. and Apple Inc. v. Robert Pepper, et al. The final brief, for Intel Corporation and Apple Inc. v. Fortress Investment Group LLC, et al. , also pushes back against the application of antitrust laws, though in favor of Fortress Investment Group; this behavior is puzzling for the “winners and losers” hypothesis because Apple and Intel would likely be considered American national champions of sorts, implying the government would intervene in their favor were it truly interested in promoting their market dominance. Put simply, too few briefs oppose antitrust enforcement to indicate a trend sup- porting the industrial policy hypothesis. Due to their limited number, it is not possible to discern a broader trend from the briefs that do oppose antitrust enforcement. The DOJ may take the position it does in these cases simply based on its reading of the law and understanding of the facts in each individual case. Because there is not a sufficiently discernible trend, it is not possible to confirm the hypothesis that the government is engaging in the picking of winners and losers. This finding complements previous findings that the effects of CFIUS investigations are non-discriminatory, implying their use is based on actual national security (their stated purpose), not protectionism of special interests (63). These findings thus imply the industrial policy hypothesis is less accurate than the great power competition one. However, watchdogs and journalists have noted that under the Trump Administration, the DOJ’s antitrust division has significantly reduced the application of cartel and merger enforcement (64), and the number of personnel working on antitrust cases has similarly declined (65). This trend may indicate an embrace of a permutation of industrial policy, whereby the Trump administration may not be “picking winners and losers” but, rather, allowing rapid consolidation such that the market picks national champions. This evidence thus lends some credence to the industrial policy hypothesis. However, given the observed behavior of the dependent variable includes active intervention to support Qualcomm, this de- cline in enforcement alone does not provide as good of an explanation for the motivation of the Trump administration’s 5G strategy as does the great power competition hypothesis. Conclusion The assessments from the previous section demonstrate stronger evidence for the great power competition hypothesis than for the industrial policy hypothesis. The assessment of aggregate data on publications by Factiva as well as statements by key administration officials demonstrates the substantial growth of rhetoric analogizing 5G to the Cold War space race. This trend demonstrates how US policymakers are employing historical thinking as they understand the US-China security relationship more broadly as well as competition in the 5G space specifically. The assessment of key national security documents and statements illustrates the securitization of 5G, also providing support for the great power competition hypothesis. In contrast, the assessment of the appellate briefs filed by the DOJ’s Antitrust Division reveals the government’s interventions in support of anticompetitive behavior are almost exclusively limited to the 5G space thus far, meaning evidence for the industrial policy hypothesis does not presently exist. The available evidence thus suggests the security relationship, manifested both in historical analogy and in securitization, more powerfully motivates the government’s shift toward greater intervention in 5G technology innovation than the economic relationship and derived inclinations toward industrial policy. As technological innovation appears to be growing into a key facet of the US-China relationship, the change in government policy represents a manifestation of how the Sino-American relationship is evolving. This change in the technology innovation space is particularly important for understanding the broader US-China relationship. Because technological developments like 5G and AI, which have emerged from interconnected economies and had impacts beyond borders, are being framed as areas of competition, the ways the US and China interact in this sphere will have implications for their broader relationship. Beyond speaking to the motivations behind the administration’s 5G strategy, the findings in this paper shed light on how the US more broadly perceives China’s economic and technological behaviors in a national security mindset. Finally, because this trend is relatively nascent, this paper is only a first step to- ward understanding changing government policy in technology spaces. Assessing motivations is difficult, and more research into the topic—particularly involving interviews with actual policymakers—will help better define this trend as it evolves over the coming years. More research is needed to understand the influence and limits of the emerging industrial policy mindset. In particular, the possibility dis- cussed in the previous section that the Trump administration may be “letting the market pick the winners and losers” in a permutation of traditional industrial policy merits attention. Additionally, given the implication that securitization of domestic technology innovation has led to a shift toward more government intervention in the 5G space, future research may seek to understand other manifestations of this securitization. Finally, scholars should explore the motivations behind securitization. While legitimate security threats may exist, proponents of industrial policy may see securitization as an effective means to achieve their ends; similarly, leaders of US technology companies may see securitization as a useful strategy to secure favorable government policies. These possibilities suggest a need for future research into the motivations for different actors deploying securitizing discourse of 5G. 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Atkinson, “The Case for a National Industrial Strategy to Counter China’s Technological Rise” (Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, April 13, 2020), https://itif.org/publications/2020/04/13/case-national-industrial-strategy-counter-chinas-technological-rise; Gabriel Wildau, “China’s Industrial Policies Work. So Copy Them,” The Japan Times, November 19, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/19/ commentary/world-commentary/chinas-industrial-policies-work-copy/. 31 Patrick Major and Rana Mitter, “East Is East and West Is West? Towards a Comparative Socio-Cultural History of the Cold War,” Cold War History 4, no. 1 (October 1, 2003): 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740 312331391714; Joâo Resende‐Santos, “Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870–1930,” Security Studies 5, no. 3 (March 1996): 193–260, https:// doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429280; Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage,” International Security 43, no. 3 (2018): 141–89. 32 Peter Navarro, Death By China: How America Lost Its Manufacturing Base (Official Version), 2016, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=mMlmjXtnIXI; “Strategy for American Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing” (National Science & Technology Council, October 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2018/10/Advanced-Manufacturing-Strategic-Plan-2018.pdf; Justin Wolfers, “Why Most Economists Are So Worried About Trump,” The New York Times, January 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/upshot/why-most-economists-are-so-worried-about-trump.html; Rana Foroohar, “Trump Aims for an Industrial Policy That Works for America,” Financial Times, May 7, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/9b6ed79a-318c-11e7-9555- 23ef563ecf9a; Ted Gayer, “Should Government Directly Support Certain Industries?,” Brookings (blog), March 4, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/should-government-directly-support-certain-industries/. 33 Orange Wang and Adam Behsudi, “Beijing’s New Industrial Policy Plan Doesn’t Address Trump Complaints,” South China Morning Post, November 20, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/ article/3038590/chinas-new-industrial-policy-dismissed-made-china-2025-rehash. 34 Kevin Honglin Zhang, “Industrial Policy and Technology Innovation under the US Trade War against China,” The Chinese Economy, February 27, 2020, 1–11, https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2020.1730553. 35 James K. Jackson, “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)” (Congressional Research Service, February 14, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf; Grindal, “Trade Regimes as a Tool for Cyber Policy;” Hunter Deeley, “The Expanding Reach of the Executive in Foreign Direct Investment: How Ralls v. CFIUS Will Alter the FDI Landscape in the United States,” American University Business Law Review 4, no. 1 (2015): 125–52; Kevin Granville, “Cfius, Powerful and Unseen, Is a Gatekeeper on Major Deals,” New York Times, March 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/what-is-cfius.html. 36 Paul Connell and Tian Huang, “An Empirical Analysis of CFIUS: Examining Foreign Investment Regulation in the United States,” Yale Journal of International Law 39, no. 1 (2014): 131–64. 37 Data sourced from Jackson, “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).” 38 Note – chart taken from Grindal, “Trade Regimes as a Tool for Cyber Policy.” 39 Jackson, “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).” 40 Ana Swanson, “Trump Blocks China-Backed Bid to Buy U.S. Chip Maker,” The New York Times, September 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/trump-lattice-semiconductor-china.html. 41 Aimen N. Mir, “Letter From Treasury Department to Broadcom and Qualcomm Regarding CFIUS,” March 5, 2018, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4407490-Letter-From-Treasury-Department-to- Broadcom-and.html; Chris Sanders, “U.S. Sees National Security Risk from Broadcom’s Qualcomm Deal,” Reuters, March 7, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-broadcom-idUSKCN1GI1S8. 42 “FCC Approves Merger of T-Mobile and Sprint” (Federal Communications Commission, November 5, 2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-360637A1.pdf. 43 “FCC Proposes the 5G Fund for Rural America” (Federal Communications Commission, April 23, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-363946A1.pdf. 44 “WIA Awarded $6 Million DOL Grant to Train 5G Workforce” (Wireless Infrastructure Association, February 19, 2020), https://wia.org/wia-awarded-6-million-dol-grant-to-train-5g-workforce/. 45 Data sourced from the NITRD’s Supplement to the President’s Budgets for Fiscal Years 2012-2020. 46 “United States District Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Public Redacted Version), Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated” (UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION, May 21, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ documents/cases/qualcomm_findings_of_fact_and_conclusions_of_law.pdf. 47 “BRIEF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT AND VACATUR” (US Department of Justice, August 30, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case- document/file/1199191/download; Kadhim Shubber, “US Regulators Face off in Court Tussle over Qualcomm,” Financial Times, February 9, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/adbca366-49d3-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441. 48 Note – the government’s support for the T-Mobile-Sprint merger, which (as mentioned earlier) is explicitly premised on 5G rollout to be enabled by consolidated market power, is another example of government intervention supporting anticompetitive behavior in the 5G space. For more, see Thomas M Johnson et al., “Statement of Interest of the United States of America” (United States Department of Justice, December 20, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1230491/download. 49 Donald Trump, “Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, Executive Order 13873” (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/ executive-order-securing-information-communications-technology-services-supply-chain/; “Department of Commerce Announces the Addition of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. to the Entity List” (US Department of Commerce, Office of Public Affairs, May 15, 2019), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/05/department-commerce-announces-addition-huawei-technologies-co-ltd; Tamer Soliman et al., “US Commerce Department Proposes Sweeping New Rules for National Security Review of US Information and Communications Technology or Services Transactions,” Mayer Brown, December 2, 2019, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/ perspectives-events/publications/2019/12/us-department-of-commerce-proposes-rule-for-securing-the-nations- information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain; Damian Paletta, Ellen Nakashima, and David Lynch, “Trump Administration Cracks Down on Giant Chinese Tech Firm, Escalating Clash with Beijing,” Washington Post, May 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump- signs-order-to-protect-us-networks-from-foreign-espionage-a-move-that-appears-to-target-china/2019/05/15/d982ec50-7727-11e9-bd25-c989555e7766_story.html; Annie Fixler and Mathew Ha, “Washington’s Huawei Ban Combats Chinese Espionage Threat,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, May 16, 2019, https://www.fdd. org/analysis/2019/05/16/washingtons-huawei-ban-combats-chinese-espionage-threat/. 50 For example, see Barr, “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers the Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference;” Michael Pompeo, U.S. States and the China Competition: Secretary Pompeo’s Remarks to the NGA, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1BbswU3i10; and Pompeo, Silicon Valley and National Security. 51 Margaret Harding Mcgill, “Trump Rejects Government Intervention in 5G Wireless Networks,” POLITICO, April 12, 2019, https://politi.co/2P4erlI; Barr, “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers the Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference;” Peter Newman, “How the US Buying Ericsson or Nokia Would Impact Networking,” Business Insider, February 10, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-could-buy-ericsson-nokia-to-compete-against-huawei-report-2020-2. 52 Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2017;” Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America” (United States Department of Defense, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf; Jim Mattis, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018), https://media. defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT. PDF; Daniel R. Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2019), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR--- SSCI.pdf; “Description of the National Military Strategy 2018” (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), https://www.jcs. mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf; John Richardson, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority: Version 2.0” (United States Navy, December 2018), https://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Richardson/Resource/Design_2.0.pdf. 53 John Richardson, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority: Version 1.0” (United States Navy, January 2016), https://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/cno_stg.pdf. 54 Todd Haselton, “President Trump Announces New 5G Initiatives: It’s a Race ‘America Must Win,’” CNBC, April 12, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/12/trump-on-5g-initiatives-a-race-america-must-win.html; Ajit Pai, “Remarks of FCC Chairman Ajit Pai at the White House” (Washington, D.C., April 12, 2019), https://docs. fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-356994A1.pdf; Michael Kratsios, “America Will Win the Global Race to 5G,” The White House, October 25, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/america-will-win-global-race-5g/; Roger Wicker, “Wicker Convenes Hearing on the Race to 5G” (Washington, D.C.: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, February 6, 2019), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2019/2/wicker-convenes- hearing-on-the-race-to-5g; Greg Walden and Bob Latta, “Walden and Latta Statement on Bipartisan Bills to Boost 5G” (Washington, D.C., January 8, 2020), https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/news/press- release/walden-and-latta-statement-on-bipartisan-bills-to-boost-5g/. To the extent that business leaders’ rhetoric on this issue matters as well, see Katie Lobosco, “AT&T Chief: China Isn’t Beating the United States on 5G — Yet,” CNN, March 20, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/20/business/att-randall-stephenson-5g/index.html. 55 Barr, “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers the Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference.” 56 Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.” 57 Richardson, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority: Version 1.0.” 58 Trump, Donald. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2017,” 20-22. 59 Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.” 60 Ibid. 61 C. Todd Lopez, “Pentagon Official: U.S., Partners Must Lead in 5G Technology Development,” US Department of Defense, March 26, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1796437/pentagon- official-us-partners-must-lead-in-5g-technology-development/. 62 To see these briefs, see “Appellate Briefs,” US Department of Justice, n.d., https://www.justice.gov/atr/ appellate-briefs. 63 Connell and Huang, “An Empirical Analysis of CFIUS: Examining Foreign Investment Regulation in the United States.” 64 “The State of Antitrust Enforcement and Competition Policy in the U.S.” (American Antitrust Institute, April 14, 2020), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/work-product/antitrust-enforcement-report/; “FCC Proposes the 5G Fund for Rural America;” Kadhim Shubber, “US Antitrust Enforcement Falls to Slowest Rate since 1970s,” Financial Times, November 28, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/27a0a34e-f2a0-11e8-9623-d7f9881e729f. 65 Kadhim Shubber, “Staffing at Antitrust Regulator Declines under Donald Trump,” Financial Times, February 7, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/cf1ed2a6-2619-11e9-b329-c7e6ceb5ffdf. 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Staff ~ Vol. VII | Issue I Editorial Board Aimee Zheng William Loughridge Manaal Saadaat Mason Zhang, Hansae Lee Benjamin Levy, Zachary Freer Maggie Jiang, Manaal Saadaat Editor-in-Chief Content Director Marketing Director Philosophy Section Director Politics Section Director Economics Section Director Content Team Philosophy Section Editors Hansae Lee Steve Nam Alexander Gerasimchuk Matthew Wong Theodore Young Gabriel Gonzalez Coco Zhu Nahye Lee Koda Li Fatima Avila Politics Section Editors Arjun Ray Faith Li Malcolm Furman Meruka Vyas Fatima Avila Emerson Rhodes Lachlan Edwards Aditi Bhattacharjya Sophie Rukin Economics Section Editors Meruka Vyas Aditi Bhattacharjya Max Robinson Vittorio Nazzi Arjun Ray Lachlan Edwards Matthew Wong Arthur Shamgunov Operations Team Marketing Associates Claire Kim-Narita Nadya Tan Designers Julian Croonenberghs Neil Xu Founders Julian D. Jacobs '19 Daniel Shemano '19

John Taylor and Ben Bernanke on the Great Recession Who Was Right About What Went Wrong? Mikael Hemlin University of Gothenburg University of Oxford London School of Economics Author Hans Lei Leonardo Moraveg Neil Sehgal Editors Fall 2019 Download full text PDF (8 pages) In the autumn of 2007, the United States’ housing market collapsed, pushing the world economy to the brink of disaster. In the US, unemployment rates soared, trillions of dollars of wealth disappeared, and millions of Americans lost their homes in what is generally considered the most severe recession since the Great Depression of the 1930’s. In the aftermath, economists have diligently discussed the properties of the crisis, asking if it could have been prevented and if policymakers could have responded more prudently. The American economist John Taylor has accused US policymakers of paving the way for the housing bubble by conducting an excessively loose monetary policy in the years leading up to the crash, and of prolonging the crisis by responding with measures based on premises that were essentially misguided. Conversely, Ben Bernanke, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve and one of the main targets of Taylor’s critique, offers an opposing view. According to Bernanke, the low federal funds rates during the years 2002–2006 were sound, and did not contribute to the inflation of the housing market to the extent that Taylor describes. Rather, Bernanke claims, it was mainly regulatory flaws that caused the financial collapse, and the actions taken by policymakers prevented the financial system from imploding completely. This essay makes the argument that although monetary policy played a part in the build-up to the crash, it was by no means a defining factor. What sets the Great Recession apart from other economic downturns is the regulatory setting in which the housing bubble developed and the crisis unfolded. As such, the governors of the Federal Reserve are not culpable for the crisis’ occurrence. They, along with the US Treasury, are nevertheless culpable for the misguided policies that were enacted to resolve the situation. Much like Taylor suggests, the measures that were undertaken by the authorities rested on the false presumption that it was lack of liquidity rather than the persistence of counterparty risk that protracted the crisis. The situation could have been dealt with much more efficiently were it not for these misconceptions. Neither Taylor’s nor Bernanke’s argument is convincing on all counts. Rather, it is a combination of the two that offers the most accurate account of what happened. One of the main points of disagreement between Taylor and Bernanke is the role of the Federal Reserve’s loose monetary policy during the years 2002–2006 in inflating the housing market. While Taylor is right in claiming that excessively low interest rates generally accommodate the creation of bubbles, he wrongly alleges that his rule for monetary policy, the Taylor Rule, is detailed enough to work as a reference point for how monetary policy should be conducted, regardless of context. Indeed, as Bernanke argues, the monetary situation in the US in the period 2002–2006 was complex in ways that are unaccounted for in the Taylor Rule. For example, the recovery after the dot-com bubble burst in 2001 was rapid, but did not push down unemployment to the extent that conventional wisdom would suggest. The Taylor Rule does not explicitly account for unemployment, but instead expects it to follow inflation and output as described by Okun’s law and the Phillips curve. Taking into consideration the low inflation rates of the years in question, Bernanke’s argument that raising the FFR at that time would have been deflationary is hardly unfounded. Indeed, while mainstream economic theory would have predicted unemployment to diminish as the economy recovered after 2001, it would also have predicted inflation to fall to very low levels had the Federal Reserve raised the FFR over the period that Taylor suggests. Additionally, as Bernanke points out, the sharp increases in housing prices started in 1998, well before the period of the allegedly too loose monetary policy. Taken together, the evidence above indicates that while the low interest rates before the crisis played a role in inflating the housing market, it was not a major factor. The economic indicators of the time were ambiguous, and the Federal Reserve chose a policy path associated with avoiding the deflationary trap that had suppressed the Japanese economy over the past decades. Nevertheless, the Fed could have better appreciated the instability of the housing market and started raising interest rates in time to prevent the crash from turning into a worldwide financial disaster. If the FFR had been raised a couple of years earlier, the concealed risk in the securities markets could have been exposed without risking a system collapse. In such a scenario, it is plausible that the average creditworthiness of borrowers would have been higher, as lenders would not have had enough time to work their way down to the absolute bottom of the income/asset brackets. In Hyman Minsky’s words, financial practice would not yet have degenerated from “speculative finance” to “Ponzi finance.” As such, the mortgage default rates and banks’ leverage ratios would have been lower, and the recession more manageable. While monetary policy leading up to the crisis did contribute to its onset, the circumstances that magnified the crisis to a global collapse emerged as a result of the government’s exceedingly poor regulatory oversight. Taylor finds that the countries where housing prices rose the steepest were also the ones that deviated the most from his monetary policy rule. He argues that this serves as evidence that the Federal Reserve’s lax monetary policy played a significant role in setting the stage for the crisis. While this statement likely has some truth to it, it suffers from several shortcomings. As mentioned earlier, Bernanke underscores that the housing boom started in 1998 when the FFR was well over 5 percent. Against this background, it is more likely that the regulatory situation both in the US and elsewhere is to blame for the housing boom and subsequent crisis. In 1999, around the same time that Bernanke alleges the boom started, the Clinton administration partially repealed the Banking Act of 1933 (or the Glass-Steagall Act). The act was adopted after the Great Depression to improve financial stability, and essentially separated investment banks and hedge funds from commercial banks. After the repeal, it became legal for financial institutions of all types to merge, thereby making them “too big to fail” and allowing them to engage in larger-scale speculation. This paved the way for a moral hazard and exposed depositors to speculative risk in the process. In addition, the partial repeal failed to give the Securities and Exchange Commission authority to regulate and scrutinise financial institutions, thus allowing for the creation of riskier and ever-more opaque derivatives. As such, the abolishment of parts of the Glass-Steagall Act drastically increased the scale of speculative operations and weakened regulatory oversight, thus shrouding the securities markets in ignorance. Taylor elegantly compares the ensuing situation to a game of hearts, but with many queens of spades instead of just one. Everybody knew that most financial institutions’ balance sheets were riddled with queens of spades, i.e. toxic assets. The problem was that when the crisis hit, nobody could distinguish the toxic assets from the non-toxic ones, and thus, all assets of a kind sharply diminished in value. The indistinguishability of safe mortgage-backed securities from risky ones was in part due to the complexity of the financial instruments in question, and in part due to the failure of the rating agencies to accurately evaluate the risk of the constituent mortgages (Crotty, 2009). This is an issue of poor oversight as well; the rating agencies evaluated the riskiness of loans under the pressure of competition, and therefore consistently gave customers (e.g. banks) the ratings they required to sell off the loans as quickly as possible. Since there were no regulatory mechanisms in place to prevent this from becoming standard practice, it became hugely profitable for banks to grant loans to more or less anyone. The expansive access to credit led the housing market to boom. It is also worth mentioning that the expected future values of the homes that the mortgages financed were included as collateral in the risk evaluations. As such, the stability of the financial system was built on the premise that the US housing market could continue to boom indefinitely. This indicates that it was poor oversight, not lax monetary policy, that paved the way for the housing bubble and the subsequent crisis once the bubble burst. In the wake of the crisis, when the flow of financial transactions had frozen and market interest rates had skyrocketed due to the increased uncertainty and risk, the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury set out to stimulate the economy to prevent it from collapsing altogether. Based on what measures the policymakers chose to enact, it seems they diagnosed the problem to be insufficient liquidity. Taylor correctly claims that they were mistaken—it was excessive counterparty risk, not liquidity, that petrified the financial markets. Among other things, policymakers tried to stimulate aggregate demand by giving out over 100 billion USD in cash to US households. The effects of these cash infusions quickly subsided and had little to no effect in terms of economic recovery. Next, they tried to reduce the financial friction in the system by adopting the so-called Troubled Asset Relief Programme of around 700 billion USD. As the name suggests, the programme sought to relieve troubled financial institutions of bad assets. However, the legislative text lacked a predictable framework as to what kinds of assets would be bought up, at what prices, and what the targeted institutions should do with the money. The consequences were that uncertainty and counterparty risk persisted, and that most of the money was used to buy US Treasury bonds and other safe assets that did not reduce the financial friction in the system (Taylor, 2009). Essentially, the mistake that the policymakers made was to conceive of the crisis as one of liquidity rather than counterparty risk. If counterparty risk in the system is high, then financial friction is high, and if financial friction is high, then neither monetary policy nor fiscal stimulus can restart the economy. This is because the increased risk offsets the effects of any lowering of the FFR or an increase in aggregate demand. Had the problem been diagnosed as excessive counterparty risk from the outset, then predictable and targeted quantitative easing could have been used immediately to remove the toxic assets from the system, thereby decreasing risk and uncertainty. Eventually, quantitative easing was used, but it could have been done much earlier (Taylor, 2009). Neither Taylor nor Bernanke provides a satisfactory account of what went wrong before and during the Great Recession. Taylor is mistaken in claiming that the Federal Reserve’s lax monetary policy in the years leading up to the housing bust is to blame for the crisis. While this might have played a minor role, the fact that the boom began under rather strict monetary conditions and that the Federal Reserve had a strong rationale for its chosen policy path suggests that Bernanke is right that it was inadequate regulation that paved the way for the crash. Nevertheless, Taylor’s critique of the interventions that Bernanke’s Federal Reserve undertook to resolve the crisis is justified. Had it not been for Bernanke’s and other policymakers’ misconception of the crisis as a liquidity shortage rather than an issue of counterparty risk, the recession would have been much less painful. Thus, on a concluding note, future policymakers should enhance the discretion of regulatory authorities to prevent a similar situation from emerging again, and improve the targeting of interventions in the event of a crisis to ensure that they are potent enough to produce the desired effect. Works Cited Bernanke, Ben S. “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, January 03, 2010. www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.htm. 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Kaufman, George G. “Too big to fail in banking: What does it mean?” LSE Financial Markets Group Special Paper Series, Special paper 22, June 2013. www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/assets/documents/papers/special-papers/SP222.pdf. Krugman, Paul. The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2008. Maues, Julia. “Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall),” Federal Reserve History. November 22, 2013, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/glass_steagall_act. Miller, Richard A. “Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis and the role of equity: The accounting behind hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance.” Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, vol. 41, no. 1, 2018, pp. 126–138. doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2017.1392870. Taylor, John B. “Economic policy and the financial crisis: An empirical analysis of what went wrong.” Critical Review, vol. 21, no. 2-3, January 2009, pp. 341–364. doi.org/10.1080/08913810902974865. 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The Influencer Issue: The Link between Commodification and Well-being on Social Media Enya Willems Author Xuanyu (Willard) Zhu Koda Li Hansae Lee Editors “Finally, there came a time when everything that men had considered as inalienable became an object of exchange, of traffic and could be alienated. This is the time when the very things which till then had been communicated, but never exchanged; given, but never sold; acquired, but never bought – virtue, love, conviction, knowledge, conscience, etc. – when everything, in short, passed into commerce.” - Karl Marx in The Poverty of Philosophy (1847, ch. 1) I. Introduction The phenomenon of the social media personality, commonly named influencer, has exploded over recent years. This individual has also been called the ‘micro-celebrity’ by academics, coined by Senft as “a new style of online performance that involves people ‘amping up’ their popularity over the Web using technologies like video, blogs, and social networking sites.” In more recent years, this list of characteristics has expanded to include: increasing political power; performed authenticity and connection to the audience; and self-branding. Marwick has expanded on Senft’s original definition by defining micro-celebrity fame as “a self-presentation technique,” or “a set of practices and a way of thinking about the self, influenced by the infiltration of celebrity and branding rhetoric into day-to-day life, rather than a personal quality.” This definition clearly differentiates the micro-celebrity from other forms of niche fame and stresses the importance of appearance and relatability. Due to its unique conceptualisation, the influencer is the celebrity of the new age; a time in which the use of online platforms can launch an individual into stardom, making this process easier than ever before. The created online personas are not only used for personal gain, but are often exploited by brands for marketing purposes. This technique has shown to be effective, with a study done by Nadanyiova et al. reporting that 56% of respondents said they would buy products that were recommended by influencers, going as far as 42% claiming they would change their entire lifestyle based on influencer endorsement. Accordingly, we can no longer see the influencer as an entertainer only; it has become an entity that blurs the lines between the public and private sphere, in every respect. By effectively selling their personhood to be used as a marketing strategy, the influencer turns into a mere commodity. Capitalism has made the body into a product that can be sold and bought, and social media has accelerated this process. This commodification of the self and the body is closely related to self-branding and the public image, which is the construction of a specific public persona with a fabricated set of values and interests, used to create economic value. The influencer industry is one part of the digital landscape that arguably represents the digital age very well: authenticity, agency and persona online have become concerns that have gotten widespread attention. This article takes on the task of constructing an interdisciplinary framework that combines Marxist normative critique and social analysis, combining relevant theories together to illuminate how the influencer as the commodified-being is the key to understanding negative effects on well-being. After identifying the link between the commodified social media influencer and the philosophical concept ‘well-being,’ this article mainly argues that as a consequence of the endless search for authenticity and relatability, the commodification of the influencer necessarily infringes upon the influencer’s privacy and intimacy; therefore the self of the influencer is commodified, which eventually has a negative impact on well-being. To create a new framework to analyse the issue, this article will take an interdisciplinary approach that combines empirical evidence with a normative approach; first introducing the Marxist analysis and expanding upon the phenomenon of the influencer, then combining the two to be able to explore the influencer-commodity and the questions that arise. II. The Marxist frame: commodification and digital capitalism A. Marx in the contemporary context The classical Marxist concepts of alienation and fetishism have been adjusted and expanded to fit the alternative forms of labour that have arisen over the last century. Due to the shift from the industrial to post-industrial society, Marxism can be contextually adapted as a flexible tool to utilise as opposed to a set of fixed assumptions. In the twenty-first century, the labour market has evolved and therefore diversified significantly. Undoubtedly, the last decades can mostly be defined by the digital age; automation, computers and the internet have led to the disappearance of several traditional jobs, while also creating other new ones. Taking the concepts of alienation and commodity fetishism directly from Marx’ original works allows us to justify our further analysis as it is grounded in theory. Therefore, this section will first briefly explain the core concepts and later adapt and develop it to fit the context of the influencer case. As Marx describes it in his 1867 work Capital Volume 1, the commodity is “first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind.” When a good or a service is turned into a commodity, exchange-value is created; and this is the process of commodification. For an object to be considered a commodity, a social use-value has to be created through the process of exchange. Thus commodity fetishism examines how social relations are shaped around this exchange and therefore also the value of the commodity; this idea is essential for the understanding of how the worker and value are connected. As a result, social relations start to shape around the exchange of the commodity; the individuals who exchange their products do not have any relation to each other aside from their mutual interest in the commodity, meaning their interaction is centred only around creating economic value. Thus, the workers’ personhood becomes attached to the commodity, since its value directly expresses their labour, but when it is exchanged for the commodity of money this labour is made invisible. What follows is the process of alienation : the worker becomes estranged from their own labour, as well as from the other workers and their own human essence. This form of alienation therefore has major consequences on our mental state as the human being’s consciousness becomes “the self- consciousness of the commodity, ” in a situation in which every commodity loses their physical character. B. Digital capitalism and emotional labour To further connect the universal critique of labour under capitalism to the particular influencer case, understanding the concept of emotional labour is crucial. In her 1983 work The Managed Heart, Hochschild explores some of the complexities of capitalist labour by introducing emotional labour, in both the private and public life, and how this affects the emotional well-being of workers. Firstly, emotional labour is defined as labour that requires the worker to prompt or repress certain feelings, to be able to give a service that calls for a great amount of care. This type of labour is therefore exceptionally personal, as it calls for the worker to make use of a significant part of their identity. Therefore, there are similarities with heavy physical labour as in both cases this leads to alienation. In this case, the worker is likely to get alienated from their emotions and selfhood, as their job requires them to exploit their own individual personality as a way to perform well. This is evident in the service industry, where a worker is expected to smile at the customers, and their body and behaviour become an extension of the commodity they are trying to sell. Traits that are inherently personal therefore become divorced from their personhood, and a smile would be likened to something outside of the body, like the make-up or outfits worn. According to Hochschild, the effects of alienating emotional labour can be seen both in private and public life. It already starts in the private sphere that human emotions are taught to be repressed or brought out in a certain way. This emotion management is done through feeling rules, which are the ways in which we guide our emotions by setting up specific obligations or requests for ourselves during emotional exchanges; meaning when, where, and how we are ‘allowed’ to feel a certain way. In the case of emotional labour, these personal feeling rules become commercialised; when we are forced to act a certain way in a professional setting, this display of perceived fake emotions eventually becomes conflated with our real emotions. This leads to emotive dissonance, a process in which there is a discrepancy between real identity and forced identity, therefore affecting our mental state. When the worker is unable to maintain the distinction between real and perceived forced feelings, the lines get blurred. Then, since these forced feelings are used during the alienating practice of labour, the worker is more likely to feel estranged from their own personal feelings as well. More specific to the twenty-first century and the information age, Fuchs proposes we live in an era of digital capitalism in which we need to acknowledge the range of ways in which modern capitalism manifests itself and how they cocreate. Commodity fetishism stays relevant in the digital age, as it is displayed in the consumption of ideologies, both political and corporate, through modern mass media. In advertising on digital platforms, the mystification of the commodity is used by alienating the product from its labour, and replacing the void that is left with product propaganda. On social media, the commodity form of the platform is veiled by the social aspect, meaning it works invertedly to regular commodity exchanges where the social interactions are buried due to the obsession with exchange-value that overshadows it. The pleasure that is obtained when receiving a ‘like’ or message from a friend overshadows the distress of being endlessly bombarded with advertisements. Through this process, the social character is used to mask the fact that the website is still a commodity, as it is actively being used to generate income, looking at for example the unequal ratio between advertisements and social content on these platforms. Users are being convinced that the main purpose of social media is communication and social interaction, therefore successfully hiding the fact that many platforms are set up in a way that favours constant product propaganda to increase economic gains for the company over friendly connections. Logically, this will lead to alienation, as the social interaction on the platform becomes shaped by the process of exchange-value being created constantly. Thus, the user's purpose of socialising is forcibly minimised, to make place for the profit maximising-interests of the companies, with constant advertising taking over the platform. This also takes on more sinister forms, with companies making use of consumer data, even going as far as creating a market for the exchange of it, to analyse behavioural patterns to then use this information for personalised targeted advertisement, to eventually impact the consumer’s choices. This is part of a process that Zuboff calls surveillance capitalism. III. The rise of the influencer and the mechanism of internet fame A. Explaining the Influencer As made clear by now, the influencer is the symbol of the twenty-first century, which must be examined carefully to understand its role in the digital age. Chasing this form of internet fame has become a full-time job for many aspiring celebrities and was made big by social media websites such as Twitter and YouTube around 10 to 15 years ago. This shift in celebrity culture has made it possible for ordinary people to build a following quickly; a trend that was started by reality television in the early 2000’s. While more traditional celebrities have also used their social media accounts to reach out and build a more intimate interpersonal relationship with their fans, the micro-celebrity is a more unique phenomenon. These social media stars can build a niche audience in a certain subculture or interest group, leading to them amassing millions of followers while still remaining anonymous to the general public. This broad interest in public figures and celebrities stems from the mediatization of culture , the process in which media has become more and more important to society and has affected daily life and therefore culture. Nearly every aspect of life has become permeated by mass media, with engaging in celebrity culture now being a major aspect in regular people’s lives; a process that is called celebritization or celebritification by scholars such as Driessens. However, a more in-depth overview of mediazation must also incorporate how the microcelebrity operates under a unique mechanism of celebrity status, most notably enjoying more mobility from the origin and increasingly persisting relevancy. Modern fame generated on the internet has the advantage that it attracts a loyal niche audience, therefore impacting the degree to which a media personality is seen as easily replaceable. A link can be observed between relevancy of the micro-celebrity and commercialisation. Success can be found when commercial content is combined with personal, non-sponsored content, to the point where the two have become integrated. The influencer has to make sponsored content, while also linking this to a personal story or opinion. Thus, for the influencer to attract and maintain an audience, it must attach itself to a carefully crafted identity and commercial purpose. B. Branding and authenticity: the practice of building an audience The term influencer displays how the sole purpose of the celebrity has become to use stardom to promote a certain lifestyle. Attached to this lifestyle are products, activities, and experiences that they promote; making them a valuable instrument for brands who are looking for marketing opportunities.The role of personas is therefore exceptionally important, to make themselves as marketable as possible. Self-branding is the concept of individuals crafting a public image as a way to gain commercial attention and cultural capital, as Khamis et al. describes it. This is now often associated with celebrities and social media, however this practice dates back to the early twentieth century, and since then it is common for individuals to be marketed just as commercial products: their “unique selling points” that make them attractive to a specific target audience are exaggerated and developed together with the demands of the customers. However, this also illustrates the major issues that are raised when individualising branding. Parallels can be observed between brand loyalty between commercial brands and their customers and between influencers and their audience. The influencer therefore capitalises on the perceived devotion from their fans, as much as mainstream brands do. For big multinationals such as Apple or Starbucks, certain promises can be made regarding the quality and overall experience staying the same, wherever and whenever the product is consumed. Their ability to stay consistent is a major aspect of what makes a brand trustworthy and therefore lucrative in the long term. However, this consistency is extremely difficult to maintain for individuals who do not have large teams of employees to ensure their objectivity. As established earlier, influencer marketing depends greatly on the exposure of the private life, and due to the inherent spontaneity of life the quality cannot be consistent in the same way. Therefore, the influencer who has a certain image to upkeep faces the difficult task of having to be extremely strict to not diverge from the path they are on, as advertisers might withdraw their sponsor deals if the influencer’s brand is abruptly changed. The appeal of the social media influencer, in contrast to the traditional celebrity, is the fact that audiences can effortlessly follow and connect with their favourite influencers. Their personas are close enough to believable ‘real’ personalities, so the audience feels an attachment, although they might still be aware that this is not a completely accurate portrayal. A celebrity with a successful brand, one that has built certain associations and images around their persona, will be able to attract market value that interests advertisers. Due to this economic dependence on its following, the influencer’s persona is essentially tied to their audience; they both mould their audience around their brand and their brand around their audience. Hence, if there is a strong audience that is willing to buy the products endorsed by their favourite online personality, this means there is a lucrative business model behind the influencer marketing. The concept of ‘self-presentation,’ as originally used by Goffman, can be applied to influencer branding. He argues that the individual presents itself with certain goals in mind and therefore takes on a “role;” hereby comparing social interactions to performance, including the individual’s consciousness of the audience and being perceived. This exploration of identity through social interactions is magnified on social media, since on these platforms one’s image is extremely controlled through deliberate posts and engagement with certain content. This image created can change drastically when presented for friends or for strangers; there is no personal connection between strangers, meaning their profiles naturally become the sole determinant of one’s image, making it more likely that the social media user is more conscious of their presentation. This leads to influencers mostly coming across as more refined than the average social media user, as their audience consists mostly out of strangers. This can be recognised in, for example, the prevalence of photo-editing or the use of ‘beauty filters’ under influencers, displaying the importance of keeping up an appearance. This can be connected to character masks in Marxist philosophy; the idea that individuals are dehumanised and forced into a certain (social) role, therefore being “forced to put on a mask,” which then leads to alienation from their personhood. The same is done by the influencer, as they are also forced to only portray themselves in a certain way, to fit the “perfect” image they are supposed to. C. Agency and “meta-capital” Marshall argues that due to the emergency of public personas, everyone, including both public figures and regular people, has become more comfortable with the mediatization of the self. This has led to the normalisation of the celebrity as a form of “meta-capital,” meaning that they are recognised as a part of the structure of the attention economy. Their ability to move between fields, both online and offline, and enact influence on all these different platforms has led to their value increasing significantly. This, once again, has made marketing through the endorsement of big public figures, most notably the influencer, extremely attractive. However, this has impacted agency in a way that the concept has become hyper-individualised; influencers are the personification of agency in the contemporary attention economy. The formation of the celebrity into the commercial meta-capital, has given them power to enact change. They can affect the sales of a product by a simple endorsement, or even have a political or cultural impact, hence it is argued that this gives them agency. According to Papacharissi and Easton the structures in which the actors act are reinforced through agency; by doing the actions they believe they are bound to, they form the exact structures they are bound by. Therefore, while the influencer on one hand has autonomy over their life, it is also completely shaped by their understanding of society and their appointed place in it. IV. Influencers and commodification A. The celebrity-commodity on social media Overall, it is not a new or ground-breaking idea that the celebrity is a commodified being. Scholars before the twenty-first century have already theorised about the celebrity image being used as a tool in the marketing of products. This also means that celebrities have always been extremely careful to maintain their persona due to commercial reasons, as to not tarnish any future endeavours and profits that could be made. Furthermore, there are many political motivations attached to the formation of the persona, due to the close connection between public identity and politics, a classic argument made in Daniel Boorstin’s 1962 work The Image. He uses the example of American politicians engaging in televised debates, who eventually end up showing their ability to perform well when displaying an image to the media, instead of having actual political knowledge. This is what Boorstin calls a “pseudo-event:” an inauthentic, planned and somewhat ambiguous event solely made to be broadcasted. This is then extended to the celebrity himself: “The celebrity is a person who is known for his well-knownness. (...) He is the human pseudo-event. ” Hereby, Boorstin effectively critiques how the use of public images in the media has made audiences more likely to be willingly deceived; the image has become more interesting than the ‘original.’ Using Boorstin’s use of ‘the original’ and ‘the image’ to analyse the influencer, it is evident that the image instead of the identity is sold to the audience. When these celebrity personas are being marketed as perfect images of people, they become sellable goods and undergo the process of commodification as described by Marx. Thus, naturally, the alienation both from the audience and themselves is an inescapable result. Following Marx’ explanation, commodity fetishism will be affecting the influencer twofold: they are both the commodity itself and the maker of the commodity, since they are responsible for creating their own image. The biggest difference between this more traditional celebrity and the modern social media influencer is not the amount of influence they have, but the fact that the influencer thrives on their proximity to normality, as stated earlier. They started off as ‘regular people’ and work carefully to maintain the image that they still are. This however also means that it is infinitely more difficult to preserve the boundaries between persona and identity. Hochschild’s theory of emotive dissonance becomes relevant, as the emotions needed to make the social media persona believable become conflated with the true identity of the influencer, both by the audience and the influencer themselves, who can also no longer effectively separate their social-media persona and private personality. Lehto and Kanai have observed this same tendency in how influencers deal with feeling rules on social media, as they are in a difficult situation in which everything they express has to be in line with the persona they want to maintain. Thus, the influencer parallels the worker in the service industry that Hochschild discusses. It can be noted that in the case of the influencer there are also particular social dynamics at play, due to the general anonymity of the audience in contrast to the extremely exposed identity of the influencer. This could even be identified as a case of information asymmetry, in which the audience is able to access more information than the influencer. So, since the influencer is not familiar with who they are talking to, in contrast with how social interactions would typically go, they are unable to correctly handle their emotion management. Therefore, we can point to the influencer’s relationship with their audience as a critical aspect of how commodification affects the individual, through an analysis of emotional labour. B. The person or the product as the commodity As mentioned by Fuchs, social media websites actively try to hide the process of commodification from us, making it harder for us to recognise what we are truly being sold. This opens up an interesting discussion about whether, effectively, the influencer is selling the product or the person, which is herself. Increasingly, brands are less interested in the former, and more in the latter. Considering the influencer-commodity and its relationship to branding, it can be observed that it is more important for the influencer’s persona to fit in with what they are advertising, then for the product to fit the influencer’s persona, as self-branding knows hardly any bounds. Looking at the earlier discussed argument by Rojek that influencers can build certain associations around their personas to receive brand sponsorship deals, this makes it apparent that there is an incentive for the influencer to change their persona when it is more profitable for them. Examples of this have already been found in mainstream celebrity culture, in which it is common among former child stars to suddenly “rebrand” their personalities, to further their careers. Thus, the ease with which influencers are expected to mould their personas around marketing opportunities, essentially treating them as products that are changed based on consumer’s wishes, would logically lead to an increase in the effect of emotive dissonance. Since these humans are treated as malleable commodities, their personas become more and more divorced from their own identity and personhood. C. Digital authenticity: redefining the public and private sphere The now established fabricated nature of the influencer can be connected to the search for authenticity and the resulting carefully crafted relatability as ethical concerns. It is questionable if authenticity can even exist on social media, as Kadirov et al. note that the term itself has become a buzzword in marketing used to increase sales. The major issue that arises is the fact that to even appear somewhat authentic, influencers will have to expose their private lives to the public, which has to be in line with their constructed identity. This makes them more vulnerable for commodification, as every aspect of their life turns into something to sell. In Hochschild’s theory of emotional labour, she concludes that the effects of having to engage in emotional labour will end up affecting the worker’s mental state. She discusses many consequences of this, but it is most evident in the occurrence of emotive dissonance. Using the previously discussed concept of self-branding, it is evident that the influencer is very conscious of the persona they have to maintain and which emotions they have to portray to make it seem convincing. Jansz and Timmers claim that, to relieve oneself of emotive dissonance, quite some cognitive reconstruction of the person’s identity is needed. This would mean fundamentally changing one’s professional identity to correspond to the feeling rules that have to be followed in the profession. However, the inherent characteristic of the influencer as an individual that demands to be ‘authentic,’ leads to an inability to clearly differentiate between public persona and identity. It is therefore exceptionally difficult for the influencer to construct a professional persona that acts in ways that is detached from their own feelings; this would mean that the authenticity they have been striving for has to be compromised. D. Privacy in the digital age To further analyse how the merge of the public and private have led to an increase in the commodified private life, it is firstly important to examine how to define these spheres. Discourse on the boundary between public and private has been initiated long before the internet was even invented. But the rise of social media has made it highly relevant once again. Shifts between what is designated as private and what as public is what Marshall calls the “privlic ” culture. He describes the emergence of “commodity activism,” which is when activism that started with private action is now mostly recognised by how it is used in the public sphere, mostly in branding by commercial corporations. One important way in which this has manifested itself is in the rise in the use of endorsement as a marketing technique. We can regard the influencer as the link between the public corporation and the private individual, becoming essentially a public individual. It can be observed that due to social media bringing private life into the public, this has led to further commodification of the influencer and alienation from themselves. One interesting example is the effect of the reveal of personal relationships to the public. Certain intimate relationships, such as love, can only survive in the private realm. But, for many lifestyle influencers staying authentic will have to include revealing large parts of their love life to their followers. Thus, there is a lack of privacy that should be a necessity. In this “privatised-public sphere” the influencer’s lack of privacy can be observed in many aspects of their personal life. For the average social media user, privacy on the internet becomes a commodity, as personal data is sold to provide relevant advertisements. Similarly for the influencer, they create value by exchanging their privacy for authenticity, which will lead to their brand endorsements being more successful. However, as privacy is the foundation of the personal life, as argued by Arendt, this leads to further commodification of the influencer’s personhood. E. Parasocial relationships and the commodification of intimacy Expanding further on interpersonal relationships and privacy, a remarkable phenomenon that can be observed in the interaction between the influencer and their audience is the formation of the so-called parasocial relationship. Hartmann defines parasocial interaction as “about users’ illusionary feeling of being in a mutual social interaction with another character while actually being in a one-sided non- reciprocal situation.” This means that individual fans are being deluded into thinking they have a personal relationship with the influencer they admire, while for the influencer this individual is just one of many and there is no personal connection attached. The influencer is aware of this effect and therefore deliberately builds their marketing strategy around the concept of parasocial interaction, which once again connects with the authenticity claim, and the subsequent use of ‘relatable’ insights into the influencer’s life. Schmid & Klimmt claim that repeated parasocial interaction will lead to the formation of a parasocial relationship. So, for influencer marketing to continue working, they will have to continue these interactions, as once the fan no longer feels like they have a deeper connection with the influencer, they might end up not supporting them anymore. This includes oversharing about private affairs and overall being overfamiliar with their audience, to be able to feign an intimate relationship between them and their individual followers. Due to the, albeit limited, opportunity of mutual communication between the audience and the influencer, negative side effects of this connection extend from the audience to the influencer. While we can still not speak of the same amount of two-sided interaction as in regular social relationships, as the audience is generally too big for the influencer to converse one-on-one, there is still more perceived reciprocation by the fans. Thus, the parasocial relationship stretches further and further, meaning the influencer will have to continue giving their audience increasingly more privy information; hence also further violating their own privacy, which has already been established as harmful. In analytical terms we can see the parasocial relationship as the commodification of intimacy. Because mostly one-sided social interactions get framed in an intimate manner, the fans perceive these as individualised intimate gestures, while it is in fact a generalised form of communication. It is important to stress that the motivation behind this interaction is to generate more value. Since, as earlier established, the more the influencer is able to build a convincing personal relationship with their audience, the more profits they are able to generate. Logically, following the theory of emotive dissonance, the influencer starts to conflate the fabricated relationships they have with individual fans with actual intimate relationships offline. Forming real life relationships becomes more difficult due to the blurred lines between real and fake connection; if a declaration of love is a sales technique in the digital world, what magnitude does that same word still have in private? Hence, the creation of parasocial relationships further leads to the commodification of the influencer, as more and more parts of their selfhood are used solely for generating economic value and are turned into the commodity-form, in this case intimacy and relationships. This eventually affects the influencer’s actual personal relationships, as they become alienated from intimacy. This largely ties in with how the lack of privacy in the public sphere has made it difficult for the influencer to not suffer from commodification on all aspects of what is traditionally regarded as part of the private life. V. The effect on well-being A. The framework of subjective well-being Most countries strive to achieve good well-being for their citizens, which is defined by UNESCO as “a feeling of satisfaction with life, a state characterised by health, happiness, and prosperity.” Governments calculate subjective well-being by using measures that can be self-reported, which allows individuals to evaluate their personal life satisfaction and other feelings on a scale. If the subjective well-being is considered high, this has positive effects on social relationships, health, income, and it further positively influences society. Shantz et al. found that alienation directly leads to emotional exhaustion and low well-being, along with being a major cause of burn-out. Thus, the earlier identified negative side effects of influencer culture have all shown to go directly against the desired high well-being. The observation can be made that due to the competitive nature of our current capitalist system and the resulting dynamic between the audience and influencer, the way influencer culture functions will always have negative effects on well-being; the influencer is burdened by alienation and commodification caused by how their private life is exposed to the public, hindering them from reaching full subjective well-being. B. Commodification and well-being Now the lines between the private and public have effectively blurred together and due to emotive dissonance these cannot be differentiated. The overwhelming presence of the creation of exchange value bleeding into the influencer’s personal life leads to them no longer choosing to decide in favour of their own well-being, leading to even privacy itself becoming commodified. Following this observation that there are no bounds to the commodification of the influencer’s private life, this analysis clearly supports the argument that this has a negative effect on well-being. Arguably the most unique way the influencer’s well-being is affected is the complete lack of privacy, as they have to use the technique of marketable relatability, that the traditional celebrity does not. This systematic lack of privacy has been linked to increased stress and decreased happiness. Moreover, multiple studies have found that emotional labour is correlated to faster burn out, such as Nam and Kabutey who found that the emotive dissonance that results from this type of labour more likely leads to burn-out than jobs where no use of emotional labour is made. A further finding includes that the risk of burn-out is higher in workers who fabricate their emotions, referred to as ‘surface acting’ by Hochschild, than those who participate in ‘deep acting,’ having trained themselves to experience the required emotions. Due to the fabricated nature of social media, influencers are most likely to participate in surface acting, therefore increasing their risk of burning out quickly. This argument is confirmed by Verduyn et al. who found that social media has negative effects on subjective well-being due to the social pressure attached to it. It is not rare for the negative well-being of influencers to be trivialised due to the fact that many earn significantly more than the average worker, with major influencers earning more than $2000 for an Instagram post. However, the assumption that monetary gain automatically nullifies the aforementioned negative effects of commodification is refutable. The evidence regarding the impact of wealth on well-being is mostly relative; for an impoverished individual receiving a small amount of money would significantly better their situation, while for a multi-millionaire it does not do as much. In the relevant context, it can be noted that due to the rapid nature of internet fame, the influencer often quickly moves from the former to the latter; while in the beginning of their career the rapid increase of income due to the increasing commodification of the self is likely to positively affect them, at a certain point the extra profits will no longer be enough to distract them from the fact that commodification is negatively impacting their personal lives. In conclusion, the poor well-being that is caused by the commodification of privacy and intimacy and the exploitation of emotional labour, overshadows the possible positive effects of the economic profits made. VI. Conclusion In the light of the dramatic increase in popularity in recent years, this article sought to analyse the influencer and how they are affected by commodification, to then establish the consequence of this on their well-being, through an interdisciplinary analysis. To do so, I firstly focused on linking Marxist analysis to the digital age. Hochschild’s emotional labour and the following effect of emotive dissonance, were repeatedly important during the analysis, as they linked together Marxist commodification and the influencer. Next, it was found that commodification is visible in all aspects of the influencer’s life, due to how authenticity, branding and agency are influenced by the marketability of the influencer. This has multiple consequences, but most noteworthy are the transformation from the person into the product as the commodity, the effect this has on the blurring of the public and private sphere, the following commodification of privacy, and lastly the parasocial relationship and the commodifying effect this has on intimate relationships. Thus, we are now able to answer the question asked in the beginning of this research: how does the commodification of the self on social media affect social media influencers’ well-being? This research can conclude that the influencer’s well-being suffers due to the negative effect of commodification, mostly due to the alienating impact of emotional labour and the inability to separate the public and the private. Well-being and alienation cannot co-exist, as they are essentially opposites: in the Marxist tradition, commodity fetishism leads to the alienation from the individual’s personhood, and would therefore never be able to live a satisfying life as required for well-being. Further empirical proof that shows the correlation between the emotional labour done by the commodified influencer and burn-out and unhappiness, exemplifies this theoretical finding. These findings can contribute to the existing literature, since the analysis gives a unique interdisciplinary overview into an under-researched phenomenon that is grounded both in the normative theory and the empirical evidence. 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How Political Instability Unravels Religious Commitment in the Face of Uncertainty: Navigating Uncertainty in Political Instability and Religiosity in Post-Arab Spring Egypt and Tunisia Abanti Ahmed Abstract This paper explores the dynamic relationship between political instability and religiosity in Egypt and Tunisia, with a focus on the period from 2012 to 2018. The central research question examines how individuals navigate uncertainty and address political challenges, influencing the role of religion in their lives. The argument posits that tangible solutions to political challenges diminish religious commitment, while a lack of such solutions fosters an increased reliance on religion. Drawing on a detailed analysis of events, protests, and economic conditions, the paper reveals that the perception of uncertainty can be controlled and the pursuit of tangible solutions demotes religion to a secondary role in individuals' lives. When addressing citizens' concerns during economic challenges, political repression, and societal grievances, policymakers should consider creating platforms for discussion, promoting religious tolerance, and offering practical avenues for positive change, which can be achieved through religious accommodation laws, interfaith dialogue initiatives, and religious endowments. These initiatives ease society’s broader challenge in engaging in open dialogue about the complex human response to political instability that encourages a reevaluation of how uncertainty is navigated. Introduction The periods after pivotal moments in American history, such as the September 11 attacks and the Great Depression, were marked by sharp, brief increases in church attendance as communities sought solace during troubling times. Religious communities are often the first place that people who feel like they have lost control seek refuge. Is this short-lived surge because they have found alternative solutions or because religion slowly loses its allure in the face of prolonged turmoil? Perhaps online communities provide a platform that empowers apostates to be open and therefore increases their visibility. Alternatively, escalating religious persecution and intolerance might contribute to a decline in religiosity, as individuals distance themselves from beliefs facing opposition. Yet, the root causes behind these shifts remain unclear. In this paper, I will explore the conditions under which political instability decreases religiosity. In the currents of geopolitical turmoil, economic upheaval, and rocky political transitions, one might expect religiosity to be a steadfast anchor, providing relief in uncertain times. Yet, as the Arab Spring swept across the landscapes of Egypt and Tunisia, leaving behind a trail of political transformations, the unexpected occurred: religiosity rather than standing resilient, underwent stark fluctuations. The Arab Spring marked a significant period of upheaval and change across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, characterized by widespread protests, demands for political reform, and calls for greater social justice. While Tunisia is often recognized as the birthplace of the Arab Spring, the movement’s mass protests and uprisings transcended national boundaries, influencing countries like Syria, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, and Bahrain, each with its unique socio-political context and grievances. In Egypt, if the period from 2012-2018 was marked by political turmoil, while the period from 2018-2021 focused on economic reforms and stability, then why did religiosity decrease during turmoil but increase during more stable times? In Tunisia, the opposite occurred; religiosity increased during periods of relatively more political instability from ongoing democratic transitions between 2018-2021 than between 2012-2018. In these two cases, fluctuations in religiosity trends were very similar over the same periods of time despite having divergent political outcomes. This is not to postulate that the essence of religion is solely a response to political instability or repression, nor does it assert that religion solely arises from a particular type of uncertainty. Rather, it underscores that within the realm of political instability, a condition that inherently diminishes religious commitment is a type of uncertainty that invites competitive resolutions that take precedence over religious avenues. Despite fluctuations in non-religiosity within a specific sub-group of the Egyptian population over the past decade, it has not exceeded 25%. Consequently, religion consistently maintains a primary role in the lives of the majority within this subset, highlighting its enduring significance and resilience amidst societal changes. My central thesis posits that when individuals are confronted with tangible solutions to alleviate the challenges that they attribute to their political instability, this set of solutions will take precedence over religious commitment. Religious commitment increases when individuals do not have access to these solutions and feel disillusioned by the future. Their perception of the future is important here, and I will discuss in these cases how these perceptions emerge and are sustained during political instability. Consequently, religion assumes a secondary role in individuals’ lives as it is outcompeted by alternative solutions that best alleviate their uncertainties. One secondary argument entails that overall trends of secularization, driven by societal shifts toward modernization, play a central role in diminishing religiosity. As societies modernize and prioritize democratic values, religious influence tends to decline. This argument suggests that broader secularization, marked by the declining significance of religion in public and private spheres, has an impact on individual piety. An alternative argument delves into the role of political Islam during periods of political instability. It suggests that individuals may attribute their political and economic grievances to religious frameworks, especially when political actors weaponize religion for political gains. This attribution may lead to a decline in religious commitment as people scrutinize religion's involvement in political decisions and its consequential impact on their daily lives. This paper will be structured as follows: First, I will discern the type of political instability I will examine. I will explore the types of uncertainties that come with political instability, and how uncertainty is tied to religious commitment. Then, I will showcase what happens to the role of religion when individuals perceive particular types of uncertainty to be present. Finally, I will introduce my cases of Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab Spring and explore how my proposed conditions of political instability are present in both despite their divergent transitions and outcomes. Theory Political instability exhibits diverse characteristics in terms of duration and intensity, ranging from brief upheavals to prolonged disruptions. My focus extends beyond a general assessment of political instability, emphasizing instances of uncertainty directly impacting citizens' daily lives and their perception of the world around them. This perception has cascading effects on how the role of religion is viewed, so I seek to analyze the relationship between individuals' perception of uncertainty with their resulting course of action and religious commitment. Religion, despite being an ancient phenomenon, can also be a psychological response to uncertainty and turbulent times. Religiosity is measured by attitudes toward religious practices, frequency of worship, and overall belief in God. When religion is tied to self-identity, changes within the political sphere are least impactful on individuals’ religiosity. In Lebanon, for example, individuals tend to identify with their religious and ethnic identities before an overarching national identity. In countries where people prioritize nationalism, ethnic divisions, and plurality of religion, the secondary nature of religion in everyday life makes it more susceptible to change in response to changes in the political sphere such as regime change, citizen repression, economic hardship, and military and police brutality. For instance, in Turkey, there are reports of decreased religiosity among youth and even self-reported accounts of hijabi women who wear the hijab in the public eye, but have said to have already “left Islam.” The Republic of Turkey—whose founding father, Ataturk, had revolutionized Turkey as a “modern” state, adopted a Latin alphabet in place of Ottoman Turkish, and removed religion in state affairs—has consequently experienced decades of secularization. Now, with President Erodgan, Turkish society reaches a crossroads with religion and secularization; as Erdogan increases the role of Islam in politics, such as reducing interest rates because “Islam demands it” while inflation increases. As a result, Turkish citizens attribute their economic challenges to religion. While religion may not be the direct cause of these difficulties, the deliberate political weaponization of Islam can contribute to this perception among the population. I postulate that there are two types of uncertainty: controlled uncertainty and random uncertainty. Under controlled uncertainty, individuals have an optimistic outlook that they have the power and agency to pursue tangible courses of action to relieve their uncertainties. In contrast, under random uncertainty, individuals have the pessimistic outlook that their uncertainties are beyond their control. This perception is coupled with a sense of disillusionment regarding the future. In Israel, for example, women responded to random uncertainty by participating in palm recitation to better cope with the uncertain conditions of the Second Intifada and the threat of terror. They inhibited both an absence of control over their uncertain circumstances and disillusionment with the future, which increased their reliance on rituals as a coping mechanism. Trauma is particularly powerful in identity formation, as it brings out what attributes and experiences individuals have in common. While existing research suggests that instability can heighten individuals' religious commitment by reminding them of their shared religious beliefs, this study aims to delve deeper by considering not just the presence of instability, but also its nature and activity. The activity of instability (e.g. living in a constant state of poverty vs. experiencing escalating instability) determines the type of uncertainty individuals perceive of their circumstances. When faced with controlled uncertainty, where the level of instability remains relatively stable, individuals may rely more on their religious beliefs as a source of solace and guidance. However, in situations of escalating instability, where uncertainty intensifies over time, individuals may be more inclined to explore alternative solutions beyond religion to address immediate challenges brought about by political instability. "The consequential secondary role of religion is supported by the notion of secular competition—when economic opportunities or social norms conflict with religious obligations—that individuals face when considering alternative solutions. For instance, during the Great Depression, as conditions worsened, many Americans cataloged the failures of capitalism and voluntarism, emphasizing citizens’ basic responsibilities to one another. Even conservative religious leaders began to join social workers and hungry Americans in calling for more vigorous federal intervention as they faced the suffering before them and their own inability to alleviate it. Their efforts took off in the summer of 1932, when tens of thousands of out-of-work World War I veterans and their families marched to Washington, DC to demand early payment of promised service bonuses. Yet as the federal government extended its place in Americans’ daily lives, leaders of some religious institutions feared for their own status. This historical example illustrates how under conditions of political instability, individuals may perceive a sense of control over their uncertain situation and may prioritize tangible courses of action over religious commitment due to the perceived favorability of the outcomes they desire." To determine, then, the conditions under which political instability decreases religiosity, I argue that when individuals face controlled uncertainty, their reliance on religion becomes secondary as alternative solutions with the potential for immediate favorable outcomes take precedence, but random uncertainty results in the increase in religiosity that many might predict. The cases of Tunisia and Egypt offer valuable insights into the dynamics between political instability, tangible actions, and the evolving role of religion under political instability. Case of Tunisia: Controlled Uncertainty In the case of Tunisia, the Arab Spring catalyzed in December 17, 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old street vendor in the impoverished city of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, self-immolated. This came after market inspectors confiscated some of Bouazizi’s wares, claiming that he lacked the necessary permit. Bouazizi’s suicide was the result of desperation rather than symbolizing a political cause, though it was publicly interpreted as an act of protest. Several reward systems were activated after Bouazizi's suicide. Bouazizi was considered as a "hero for Tunisians and the Arab world as a whole" by Tunisian film directors, assumed a martyr by the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) of Tunisia, and named TIME magazine’s person of the year in 2011. The publicized suicide of Bouazizi made many people in similar situations believe that suicide was an appropriate action for them as well. Bouazizi was a university graduate distraught with the inability to financially support his mother and siblings, reflecting the vast majority of Tunisians experiencing soaring rates of unemployment. In 2009, the overall unemployment rate in Tunisia was 13.3%, but 30% among Tunisia's youth, who made up almost a third of the total population. The Tunisian government decreased expenditures from 45% to 29% from the 1970s to the 1990s, lowering the quality of public goods and services. Hence, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, president of Tunisia from 1987 to 2011, along with his family and other elites, created and strengthened the inner circle of cronyism—political elites appropriating economic resources and creating privileges by preventing outsiders. Controlling half the country’s wealth, the enterprises they owned produced 3% of total output and employed only 1% of the labor force. In addition, Ben Ali never allowed genuine political opposition to emerge and elections were manipulated: In 1989, he supposedly garnered 99.3% of the vote; in 1994, 99.9% and five years later, 99.4%. Political opponents — in particular Islamists— were persecuted, tortured or forced into exile. Tunisia's press was censored. According to the theory of suicide proposed by French sociologist Emile Durkheim, Bouazizi's self-immolation would be best categorized as anomic suicide. This type of suicide occurs when individuals experience a chronic state of societal disorganization, where traditional sources of regulation, such as religion and government, fail to provide moral constraints in the face of an unregulated capitalist economy. Anomic suicide is often associated with a sense of disillusionment about the future, leading individuals to see self-infliction as a way out. It's important to note that self-immolation directly contravenes Islamic law, as the Quran prohibits harm to oneself. Therefore, Bouazizi’s act can be viewed as a poignant illustration of the prioritization of social circumstances over religious beliefs. Despite the religious prohibition, Bouazizi saw self-immolation as a desperate means to escape his dire socio-economic situation. This conflict between religious doctrine and the perceived urgency of his socio-economic plight highlights how individuals may prioritize immediate material concerns over religious commitments. After years of severe economic hardship, during which most Tunisians were struggling to survive while President Ben Ali’s family, friends, and allies were getting richer, Bouazizi’s self-immolation marked the tipping point. Tunisians began to protest. Tensions heightened on December 22nd when another young man from Sidi Bouzid climbed up an electricity pylon and electrocuted himself on the cables, saying he was fed up with being unemployed. The new wave of strikes first erupted on December 17th in Sidi Bouzid, and came after the labor unions announced that they would organize peaceful marches to urge the government to improve its performance in development and employment. A few days later, a teenager was killed when police in Sidi Bouzid opened fire on protesters. An interior ministry spokesperson said police had been forced to "shoot in self-defense" from protesters who were setting police cars and buildings ablaze. The Tunisian government had been trying to manage the crisis politically before using force and the Tunisian development minister traveled to Sidi Bouzid to announce a new $10m employment program. The Tunisian government’s concessions—often met with skepticism on its sincerity and implementation—were a response to the resilience and violence of the crisis, showing Tunisians that the government was reacting to their demands rather than solely resorting to violence. This instilled hope in Tunisians regarding the positive trajectory of their protests. Despite protests, the rich were getting richer, the poor were not only getting poorer, but also had no job prospects, no ability to express themselves, and no way of criticizing government policy. The protests that erupted in Sidi Bouzid were spontaneous, yet they were marked by a level of organization and sophistication that appeared grounded in the sheer determination of those who participated in them. Tunisians faced a more costly and risky path due to being the first country to protest, unlike Egyptians who benefited from the momentum generated in Tunisia. The cost of cronyism and corruption to Tunisia is much higher because it also hinders job creation and investment and contributes to social exclusion. The presence of cronyism exacerbates the costs of protest by increasing repression, legal and financial consequences, social stigmatization, and psychological toll for protesters. The fear of retaliation from security forces was high, and protesting carried significant risks, including arrest, torture, and disappearance. For Tunisians, the standard method of expressing dissent has been informally within the party framework, but the masses participate in riots and demonstrations. The first president of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987), carefully appointed members of the political elite and removed them from office in such a way as to prevent anyone from building up a political base to keep factions to a minimum. The Tunisian economy was heavily centralized around the ruling elite and suffered from widespread corruption and cronyism. Economic grievances were a major driver of the Tunisian uprising, and many protesters were motivated by frustrations with unemployment, poverty, and lack of economic opportunities. The economic challenges faced by Tunisians may have increased the perceived costs of protesting, as individuals risked losing their livelihoods or facing economic hardships as a result of participating in protests. In Tunisia, the uprising was driven by a broad-based coalition of activists, students, workers, and ordinary citizens who came together to demand change. Solidarity among protesters helped to mitigate some of the risks associated with protesting by providing emotional support, practical assistance, and collective action. From this, it is clear that Tunisians perceived their uncertainties as resolvable through risky actions, therefore partaking in actions that would immediately relieve their grievances rather than remaining disillusioned with their future, which ultimately decreased their religiosity during this period. On January 13, 2011, Ben Ali appeared on national television and made broad concessions to the opposition, promising not to seek reelection as president when his term would end in 2014. He expressed regret over the deaths of protesters and vowed to order police to stop using live fire except in self-defense. Addressing some of the protesters’ grievances, he said he would reduce food prices and loosen restrictions on Internet use. Ben Ali’s concessions did not satisfy the protesters, who continued to clash with security forces, resulting in several deaths. The next day, a state of emergency was declared, and Tunisian state media reported that the government had been dissolved, Ben Ali fled Tunisia, and that legislative elections would be held in the next six months. Ben Ali’s reign from 1987-2011 had ended and Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi, appointed by Ben Ali in 1999, assumed power. The aftermath of Ben Ali's departure marked a significant moment for Tunisia, as protests persisted despite the regime change. Protesters had gathered in the area to demand that the interim government step down and the current parliament be disbanded. Demonstrators were also asking for suspension of the current constitution and the election of an assembly that can write a new one, as well as organize the transition to democracy. There were daily protests that members of Ben Ali's Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) party were in the new government and thousands of largely peaceful anti-RCD protests emerged.36 After persistent clashes between protesters and armed forces, Ghannouchi announced his resignation particularly following the death of three people in the country's capital, Tunis: “I am resigning today because I am not willing to be a person that takes decisions that could cause casualties," he told reporters Sunday. He also questioned "why a lot of people considered their main target to keep attacking the government, although a lot of its members agreed to join in this critical time." Ghannouchi’s resignation can be seen as a tangible outcome of the protesters' efforts. It signifies that their voices were heard and that their actions had a direct impact on the political landscape. Ghannouchi's acknowledgment of the need to avoid decisions that could cause casualties reflects a recognition of the legitimacy of the protesters' grievances and a commitment to avoiding further violence. Bouazizi's actions were instrumental in differentiating between controlled uncertainty and random uncertainty, providing Tunisians with a tangible catalyst that transformed disillusionment into proactive engagement with the future. Role of Religion Becomes Secondary As people sought to find concrete control over uncertain circumstances amid political instability, their dedication to religious beliefs weakened. Involvement in organized protests, the confrontation of severe repression, and the navigation of severe economic hardships became the focal points of their attention, demoting religious commitment to a secondary position. In 2012, the Pew Research Center surveyed Tunisians and found that though democratic principles were high priorities, as were the economy and security. 92% said that improving the economy ranked as the most important priority while 79% said that it was very important to maintain law and order. Also, people found democratic freedoms more important than religious divisions. This shows that Tunisians found these economic and democratic principles to take precedence over other grievances they faced. In this time period, a perceived resolution for these priority issues was through civil resistance, demonstrations, general strikes, and self-immolations, that were leading to visible outcomes and relieving uncertainty in a way that religion was not. Outside the party system, Tunisians became politically active, especially Tunisian women, who protested the draft constitution, the economy, and the ruling coalition. Within this political context of newly found political liberalizations, similar to Egypt, various religious groups started coming out of the underground in order to take advantage of the political openings. As these political openings were prioritized, trust in religious leaders went down from 38% to 35% between 2012 and 2018 and those who say they are not religious increased from 18% in 2012 to 30% in 2018. Tunisian Muslims that attend mosques at least some of the time decreased from 52% in 2012 to 30% in 2018. Tunisia’s troubled economy was the biggest challenge in 2017. The national unity government took some measures to stimulate growth, but it struggled to implement key reforms. High unemployment, a rising inflation rate, and tax increases plagued Tunisians. In January 2018, protests erupted in more than a dozen cities over price hikes. This further emphasizes the continued prioritization of addressing economic challenges by the Tunisian people. Secularization In Tunisia, the decades of Ben Ali’s secular regime had excluded religion from the public sphere. Its cascading effects have led Tunisia to have notably lower religiosity than other Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries with the proportion of people who said they were not religious increasing from 15% in 2013 to over 30% in 2018. The ousting of Ben Ali created political opportunities for Islamists, yet the secularizing impact of his two-decade-long regime remains a compelling explanation for the decline in religiosity between 2012-2018. Following the dissolution and drafting of a new constitution in October 2011, Tunisia no longer enforced secularism through repression. Surveillance, restriction, and harassment of Islamist activists that were previously practiced by the government ceased during the year. The new draft gave rise to Islamists to fight for power. In the months that followed the 2010-2011 revolution, several hundred imams were replaced, often by violent Islamists who accused the imams of having collaborated with the former Ben Ali regime. By October 2011, the Ministry of Religious Affairs announced that it had lost control of about 400 mosques.6 The “uncontrolled” classification means that a mosque’s imams were operating without the official authorization of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In Tunisia’s new political landscape, the content of prayer services was also no longer controlled by government authorities, a step many Tunisians approved of and viewed as part of the new liberties acquired through the revolution. In 2014, secular parties edged out Islamists at the polls. In the October parliamentary elections, Nidaa Tounes, a secularist political party, won 85 seats compared to 69 for Ennahda, an Islamist political party. Veteran politician Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi, the head of Nidaa Tounes and a former prime minister, was elected president in December. But turnout was lowest among the young, who ignited the Arab uprisings; among cities, the turnout was lowest in Sidi Bouzid, the birthplace of the uprisings that spread across the Middle East and North Africa. In 2016, Nidaa Tounes, the ruling secular party in Parliament, splintered. Ennahda founder Rachid Ghannouchi declared the Islamist party was abandoning political Islam. Amidst competition between Islamist and secular parties, when asked whether Turkey or Saudi Arabia is a better model for the role of religion in Tunisia’s government, 78% of Tunisians prefer the more secular Turkey, seeing it as a model for religion and politics. While the trends toward secularization during this period seemingly impact individual piety levels, the dominant controlled uncertainty factor holds greater significance, given that secularization has not been exclusive to this period and has prevailed since the era of Ben Ali. Despite the freedom of Islamist parties to enter political life, the government’s loss of control over regulating mosques, and new liberties granted toward religious freedom, levels of non-religiosity still prevailed. Political Islam In contrast to secularization efforts during Tunisia’s political transition, the country simultaneously experienced concerted efforts from Islamists to increase the role of religion in politics. During this period, the presence of political Islam coupled with economic and political insecurities might have led individuals to deviate from religious commitments as they witnessed greedy power grabs from both Islamists and secular parties who employed religion as a political instrument. From January to October 2011, an interim government moved toward reform, recognizing new political parties and disbanding Ben Ali’s party. On October 23, Ennahda, a moderate Islamist party, won the national elections and formed a coalition government with two secular parties. Ennahda first emerged as an Islamist movement in response to repression at the hands of a secularist, authoritarian regime that denied citizens religious freedom and the rights of free expression and association. In 2014, the new constitution incorporated mentions of Islam as the religion and culture of the Tunisian people while also establishing a state role for protecting freedom of religious worship and expression. Ennahda, formerly an Islamist movement, transitioned into a party of "Muslim democrats," distancing itself from the label of "Islamism" due to negative associations with radical extremism. This shift reflects a strategic response to counter the misinterpretation and abuse of Islam by radical groups like ISIS, positioning Ennahda as a moderate political force advocating for democratic principles. Ennahda’s re-labelling as “Muslim democrats” reflects frustration with outsiders not understanding its supposedly true democratic nature which may have resulted in individuals associating their challenges with these religious changes in governance and frustration with religion being politicized. Today, Tunisians are less concerned about the role of religion than about building a governance system that is democratic and inclusive and that meets their aspirations for a better life. However, the interplay between political Islam and religiosity is tied to perceptions of uncertainty. The prevalent economic hardships—regardless of the presence of political Islam—left Tunisians uncertain about the future. In 2011, 78% of Tunisians expressed optimism that the economy would improve to some extent within the following 2-3 years. However, by 2018, this hope had significantly dwindled, with only 33% of Tunisians maintaining confidence in a better economic outlook over the same timeframe. Case of Egypt Egypt stands as a prominent example of a country profoundly affected by the events in Tunisia. The success of the Tunisian Revolution in ousting President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali provided a template for dissent, inspiring Egyptians to rise up against the longstanding rule of President Hosni Mubarak. The images and narratives of Tunisian protesters challenging authoritarianism and demanding change resonated with Egyptians, fueling their own aspirations for political reform and social justice. In Egypt, decades of corruption, police brutality, media censorship, unemployment, and inflation led labor and youth activists, feminists, and individual members of the Muslim Brotherhood to protest. From the occupation of downtown Cairo’s Tahrir Square, to labor strikes, acts of civil disobedience, clashes with armed forces, and others, violence between protestors and the police resulted in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries. The wave of organized protests gained momentum following the oustings of Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi in 2011 and 2013, respectively. These pivotal events demonstrated to Egyptians that mass mobilization could be an effective means of addressing the longstanding issues they had endured. Despite Mubarak's lengthy rule from 1981 until his departure in 2011, previous protests had proven ineffective in leading to his resignation. However, the timely catalyst provided by Tunisia's Revolution ignited a sense of urgency among Egyptians, inspiring them to seize upon the pan-Arabist phenomenon sweeping the region. This newfound determination empowered Egyptians to confront their decades-long grievances head-on. Egyptians, seeking an immediate end to enduring abuse and corruption, embraced large, organized protests despite harsh governmental crackdown and threats of death. Their perception of the uncertainty faced during this period appeared to be remedied by protests and political changes, thereby diminishing the role of religion to a secondary position. The Egyptian case took advantage of the momentum that the Tunisian revolution brought, making it unique to examine the intricate relationship between their resistance and the decline in religious commitment, challenging the notion that religious avenues are the primary recourse during times of political instability. Controlled Uncertainty Egypt has been an authoritarian government since 1952 with periodic revolts and unrest. The causes of the 2011 protests against Mubarak also existed in 1952, when the Free Officers, who led the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, ousted King Farouk. Issues such as inherited power, corruption, under-development, unemployment, and unfair distribution of wealth have persisted as constants in Egyptian life since 1952. Successive Egyptian regimes have systematically used repression to ensure order. The authoritarian barter “bread and security for freedom” has been widely disseminated along with the notion that the country was not yet ready for democracy. Egypt has long grappled with a systemic pattern of human rights abuses and repression embedded in its governance, prompting citizens to attribute their crises directly to the government. While these challenges have persisted since 1952, worsening economic conditions, government corruption, and Mubarak’s rule, coupled with the influence of the Arab Spring ignited by the events in Tunisia, led Egyptians to unite in similar protests in 2011. The momentum from Tunisia became a catalyst, empowering Egyptians to engage in hands-on initiatives challenging Mubarak’s authoritarian government. President Hosni Mubarak's regime was also repressive, but opposition groups had more space for political activism compared to Tunisia, which lacked a traditional history of political dissent. Mubarak’s regime escalated violence against protesters significantly as protests enlarged with the anticipation of Mubarak’s resignation. Pro-Mubarak demonstrators targeted journalists, and, in what became known as the “Battle of the Camel," plainclothes policemen rode into Tahrir Square on camels and horses to attack unarmed protesters. The issuing of laws restricting public assembly allowed security officials to ban protests up to their discretion and were consequently allowed to use indiscriminate force on defying protestors. Egyptians mobilized protests in diverse ways and when they were repressed through laws restricting public assembly or with increasingly violent police responses, organized protests grew larger and more inflamed. Messages were picked out in stones and plastic tea cups, graffiti, newspapers and leaflets, and al-Jazeera's TV cameras which broadcast hours of live footage from the square everyday. When one channel of communication was blocked, people tried another. Mubarak had grown fearful of the protestors’ relentlessness—first pledging to form a new government, then promising not to seek another term in the next elections, and later becoming increasingly defiant about not stepping down—all the while asking protesters to return to normal. Eventually, Mubarak was forced to step down and the Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed leadership of the country on February 11, 2011. Protests still endured; during March and April 2011, SCAF granted a number of concessions to protesters’ demands in an effort to clear the streets of continued demonstrations. Human Rights Abuses Mubarak’s regime initially responded to the protests with brute force and tear gas, beating and arresting protesters. The regime responded to later increases in protest mobilization by shutting down internet service and mobile phone text messages, replacing regular police forces with the military, and imposing a curfew. This exemplifies a cycle of human rights abuses that not only heightened violent responses but also fueled additional protests, as Egyptians became increasingly outraged. Egyptians faced constant repression and abuse for decades under Mubarak’s rule, and used religious commitment as a coping mechanism before Tunisia catalyzed the Arab Spring, bringing newfound hope that Egyptians could better their circumstances. Since 2013, the military and security-led regime has reinstated its control over society and citizens with an iron fist, curtailing freedom of information and banning freedom of expression. Peaceful political participation and civil society activism, which were the pillars of the January uprising, have been de facto outlawed by the adoption of an arsenal of undemocratically spirited and restrictive laws. Protesting was costly and these laws banning public assembly made it much more risky for Egyptians to participate in protests, but the momentum of the revolution had assured individuals that there would be large turnouts, therefore bolstering their confidence in protesting as a means to confront the military and security-led regime. Egyptians, fueled by the momentum of their revolution and triggered by the ousting of Mubarak and Morsi, found empowerment in protesting. The logical nature of their efforts heightened hope for the future, as each overthrow or victory seemed to validate their path to stability. The move against Morsi deepened the political schism. Millions of Egyptians had taken to the streets against Morsi, but large numbers also protested the ousting of Morsi. A crackdown by security forces killed hundreds and Egypt declared a state of emergency. The emergency measures allowed security forces to detain people indefinitely for virtually any reason. They also granted broad powers to restrict public gatherings and media freedom. Gallup classifies respondents as thriving, struggling, or suffering, according to how they rate their current and future lives on a ladder scale numbered from 0 to 10 based on the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale. Egyptians gave their lives some of the worst ratings they ever have in the weeks leading up to former President Mohamed Morsi's removal from office. The 34% of Egyptians who rated their lives poorly enough to be considered suffering in June was up from 23% in January. Fewer than one in 10 rated their lives positively enough to be considered thriving. Role of Religion Becomes Secondary Fridays frequently became “days of rage” in Egypt and elsewhere because of the convenience of organizing would-be protesters during Friday prayers. Likewise, mosques themselves are often said to have served as organizational hubs for protest. Mosques functioned as a locus of anti-government agitation and logistical centers of preparation for demonstrations. While it may seem that protest activities at mosques contributed to an apparent increase in mosque attendance, thus suggesting elevated overall religious commitment, these places of worship primarily assumed roles as organizational centers during the peak of the protests, prioritizing logistics over prayer and religious services. Although, of course, mosques and Friday services were still attended for customary reasons, the dual functionality of the mosque introduced secular competition as highlighted earlier in the Theory section. Individuals are confronted with the dilemma of choosing between prayer and protest. Protest is a costly behavior that becomes progressively less risky as the number of participants increases. Hence, overall Mosque participation during the height of mass protests between the overthrow of Mubarak in 2011 to the beginning of El-Sisi’s presidency in 2014, declined. Prior to the Arab Spring, strength in religious beliefs were at high levels: the belief that things would be better if there were more people with strong religious beliefs decreased from 89.8% in 2005 to 83.4% in 2013. Additionally, the percentage of individuals with the belief that religious faith is an important quality in children decreased from 47.1% in 2005 to 27.7% in 2013. Muslims who say they attend the mosque at least some of the time decreased from around 85% in 2012-2014 to 75% in 2018-2019. Secularization In Egypt, as the regime experienced waves of regime changes and upheavals, the period between 2012-2016 witnessed efforts toward constitutional reform emphasizing the protection of civil liberties, the separation of powers, and the establishment of a democratic system of government. While Islam remained the state religion, the constitution also guaranteed freedom of religion and prohibited discrimination based on religion. The constitutional assembly was almost entirely composed of Islamists (Muslim Brothers, Salafis, and independent Islamists). Dozens of articles addressed individual rights and liberties of Egyptian citizens, which was more than the number of articles mentioning Islam. By enshrining these goals in the constitution, the government was held accountable, making failure to fulfill its constitutional obligations not just an act of inefficiency but anti-constitutional. Examples include Article 61, which demands to eradicate illiteracy within ten years; Article 66, which requires the state to provide opportunities for sports and physical exercise; and Article 184, which instructs the state to assimilate living standards across the country. While Islamist groups participated in the drafting of the constitution, the outcome reflected a broader commitment to democratic principles and social reforms driven by the demands of the people. In 2013, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi ousted Morsi and campaigned for the presidency on an anti-Islamist platform. He deemed the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, imposing restrictions on their operations and political activities. Liberals called the Brotherhood’s vision for Egypt “totally contradictory with the Egyptian national character,” which they argued respected pluralism of religion and the separation of religion and politics. The banning of the Muslim Brotherhood has likely contributed to the loss of faith in Islamist parties. El-Sisi also claimed that ‘the religious discourse in the Islamic World has lost the values of humanity in Islam’ and rejected the idea of an Islamic state. When he won the presidency in 2014, many moderate Muslims supported El-Sisi because he had taken a clear stand against Islamist radicalism and expressed a genuine desire to support a peaceful understanding of Islam. And in 2018, when El-Sisi ran again, he was re-elected with 97 percent of the vote, although the turnout was low and he faced virtually no competition. The crackdown against human rights defenders and independent rights organizations have made effective monitoring of the elections extremely difficult, especially with the number of organizations that were granted permission to monitor the elections being 44 percent fewer than in the last presidential election in 2014. This has resulted in elections facing criticism for not meeting the standards of a free and fair democratic process. This can also suggest that through negative partisanship, or the phenomenon of individuals forming their political opinions based on their opposition to certain individuals or parties, people viewed El-Sisi as either the best among limited options or endorsed his secularization efforts. Political Islam When governments weaponize a religion that the majority of their populations affiliate with, it is reasonable to link political Islam and individual piety to assert that piety levels and overall religiosity may decrease. This is a competitive argument because perceptions of Islam are directly shaped by how their governments implement Islamic laws, often at the expense of neglecting the needs of the people. Individuals are increasingly witnessing religion being wielded as a political tool. On one hand, they are promised welfare services in the name of Islam, while on the other hand, their repression is justified through the manipulation of Islamic texts. While El-Sisi initially presented himself as anti-Islamist, appearing on stage with the Coptic Pope, the Sheikh of Al-Azhar (the country's most esteemed institution of Islamic learning), and Galal al-Murra, a prominent Salafist, following the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, he privately holds conservative Islamic views. In A 2006 paper that Sisi wrote for the U.S. Army War College, he argued that democracy in the Middle East could only be of an Islamic nature, and that Islam provides the intellectual framework for his political beliefs. In addition, in 2011, when crowds protested against the military for imposing “virginity tests” on female protesters, Sisi declared that it was his responsibility to “decide if [protesters] were honorable.” However, the fluctuating influences of political Islam in Egypt between 2012-2018 indicate that it is not a strong enough condition on its own for political instability to decrease religiosity. Even the most liberal Egyptian party in 2012, the Free Egyptians Party, publicly defended a constitutional clause making the principles of Sharia the source of legislation. Even when the dominant strategy of the incumbent government was to combat political Islam—as has been the case since July 2013—the formal discourse of President El-Sisi included frequent mentions of the Qur'an and Hadith.33 The Muslim Brotherhood witnessed a consistent rise in support from July 2011 to February 2012 at 63%, followed by a sharp decline in April 2012 to 42%. Prior to the Brotherhood’s rise to power, many believed that its political inclusion would lead to its democratization and moderation. Throughout the eighteen days of demonstrations in January and February 2011 that toppled Mubarak, Brotherhood leaders were aware that the protests were not dominated by Islamist ideas but rather oriented toward the broad goals of freedom and social justice. As a result, Brotherhood leaders were deliberate in their strategies to appeal to voters by not expressing their Islamist views too overtly. This deception was caught on by Egyptians. Nevertheless, between 2011 and 2013, the old state chose to cooperate with Islamists, including the Brotherhood, to neutralize the revolutionary mood in the country. After coming to power, the Brotherhood quickly lost support among the main recipients of its social welfare network: the poor. The Brotherhood’s relationship with the poor was entirely clientelist and was concerned exclusively with creating an electoral base as opposed to developing a more substantive ideological or political relationship. It preferred to reproduce poverty as long as it translated into welfare recipients and, by extension, loyal voters. However, the strength of the argument that the presence of political Islam decreases religiosity diminishes when considering the current scenario, where political Islam exerts even more influence, and yet, religiosity has increased. This discrepancy suggests that the dynamics between political Islam and religiosity are subject to evolving perceptions of uncertainty. During the height of the revolution, Egyptians may have perceived their uncertainties about the future differently, driven by a sense of optimism and the belief in activism. In contrast, the present disillusionment with uncertainties about the future may be contributing to an enhanced role of religion in their lives. The increased religiosity could be a response to the perceived inadequacy of political solutions to address current challenges, prompting individuals to turn to religion as a source of guidance in times of persistent uncertainty. Conclusion I have posited that the conditions of political instability that decrease religiosity are controlled uncertainty and the secondary role of religion. When individuals are presented with concrete solutions to address challenges they attribute to their political circumstances, these solutions will assume greater significance than religious commitment. And when individuals lack access to these tangible solutions and experience disillusionment about the future, religious commitment tends to increase. The pivotal factor in this dynamic is individuals' perception of the future, and this analysis delved into how these perceptions manifested and endured during periods of political instability. Consequently, the outcome is a demotion of religion to a secondary role in individuals' lives, outcompeted by favorable solutions that emerge from the uncertainties they face. It's noteworthy that Egypt has faced challenges since the Mubarak regime, raising concerns about the possibility of a new Arab Spring. Despite the ongoing deterioration of human rights conditions, the intensity that characterized the Arab Spring has diminished. Reflecting on the revolution has yielded diverse opinions, with some viewing it as a success while others perceiving it as a failure. Although repression in Egypt may arguably be more severe today, the period between 2011 and 2016 marked a distinct phase. The ongoing debates surrounding the success or failure of the initial Arab Spring make it seem improbable for a similar movement to occur. Despite the immediate changes following the revolution, both Egypt and Tunisia continue to grapple with longstanding grievances. Tunisia, in particular, is confronted with economic challenges, with approximately 6,000 Tunisians joining ISIS, marking the highest per capita rate globally. Tunisians became disillusioned with post-revolution politics, especially well-educated youths, who experienced unemployment at extremely high rates. Despite the gradual political progress seen over the past seven years, economic rewards have yet to emerge, spurring some to radicalize. Some remaining questions that emerge are: Do individuals revert to heightened religious commitment after resolving political instability, or does the influence of tangible solutions have a lasting impact on their religious commitment? 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The Brown University Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (JPPE) is a peer reviewed academic journal for undergraduate and graduate students that is sponsored by the Political Theory Project and the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society Program at Brown University. The Brown Journal of Philosophy, Politics & Economics Volume IV, Issue I scroll to view articles Volume IV Issue I Philosophy Authenticating Authenticity Authenticity as Commitment, Temporally Extended Agency, and Practical Identity Kimberly Ramos Can Pascal Convert the Libertine? An Analysis of the Evaluative Commitment Entailed by Pascal’s Wager Neti Linzer The Growing Incoherence of Our Higher Values Aash Mukerji The Necessity of Perspective A Nietzschean Critique of Historical Materialism and Political Meta-Narratives Oliver Hicks Read More Politics The Unchurching of Black Lives Matter The Evolving Role of Faith in The Fight for Racial Justice Anna Savo-Matthews From Bowers to Obergefell The US Supreme Court’s Erratic, Yet Correct, Jurisprudence on Gay Rights Sydney White Predictive Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System Evaluating the Racial Bias Objection Rebecca Berman Read More Economics God Save the Fish The Abyss of Electoral Politics in Trade Talks––a Brexit Case Study Eleanor Ruscitti The Black Bourgeoisie The Chief Propagators of “Buy Black” and Black Capitalism Noah Tesfaye Breaking Big Ag Examining the Non-Consolidation of China’s Farms Noah Cohen Read More Applications for JPPE Now open! See Available Positions

Editorial board Foreword Volume I Issue II Introducing the second issue of JPPE Technological disruption has been a fact of the post-industrial world, producing the growth in productivity and efficiency that led to nearly unfathomable increases in opulence, standards of living, and wealth. It may, as a consequence, seem perplexing why so many of today’s leaders seem concerned about something so seemingly vastly beneficial as technological innovation. And yet, few economic shifts produce more anxiety than those involving the introduction of labor saving technology into the economy. This was true in the 19th century Britain, when the Luddites stood in such abject fear of the permanent redundancy of their labor that they took to murdering machine innovators and destroying designs. It was also true in the early 20th century, as agricultural innovations and new industrial designs dramatically reshaped the US economy. And it’s true again today, as artificial intelligence and digital technology make a wide array of occupations largely or entirely automatable. This has potentially profound implications for the world. As globalization, outsourcing, and the presence of winner- take all markets exacerbate income inequality in many countries, labor automation stands to make possibly significant numbers of jobs redundant, increasing returns to capital, and hastening the growth in inequality as productivity increases faster than wages. It’s the presence of these alarming trends that has driven us to dedicate the second issue of the Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics to the topic of technology and, specifically, technological disruption. We have done this by facilitating submissions from Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon and Brookings Institution President John Allen, both of whom have emerged as contemporary leaders on the front line to develop a politics that confronts some of the more perverse effects of technological innovation. As questions surrounding the effects of labor automation continue to garner more attention, the most popular solutions tend to take on at least one of two forms: education or social security. Ms. Sturgeon and Mr. Allen’s suggestions are therefore an apt encapsulation of the nature of the debate about how best to address technological displacement; the former discusses social security and the latter, education. Mr. Allen argues for a revaluation of modern education and training programs for workers and youths. He proposes that America’s continued dominance requires a strong investment in education programs that emphasize, for example, artificial intelligence, big data analytics, and super-computing. Meanwhile Ms. Sturgeon provides a strong case for considering a universal basic income as a possible approach to curtail the effects of labor automation on inequality. She highlights Scotland’s experiments with such a proposal and underscores the need for bold leadership to develop a new approach to social security befitting of a modern and more technological advanced era. Although this semester’s issue of JPPE is centered on the question of technological disruption, it also features essays from undergraduates on a wide range of topics. One piece discusses the relationship between private companies and US cybersecurity policy. Another considers whether secession is a viable solution to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. And, in Moral Manipulation, a student considers the ethics of corporate advertising campaigns through a Kantian paradigm. The Brown University Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics is deeply proud of both the feature articles and student essays published in this issue. As students— from Providence to Beijing— begin to grapple with a rapidly changing economy and socio-political climate, the number of novel challenges the rising generation faces is great. And in the Journal you are now reading, students and world leaders around the world provide a great number of equally novel solutions.

The Mortal Futility of Contempt A Response to Macalester Bell’s Hard Feelings in the Era of Trump Jessica Li Swarthmore College Author Dorian Charpentier Galen Hall Nathan Mainster Ilana Duchan Editors Fall 2019 Download full text PDF (15 pages) Abstract In Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt , Macalester Bell argues that under certain circumstances contempt can be the appropriate—and indeed, even the best—response to answering those who exemplify what she calls the “vices of superiority.” But in grappling with our current political moment, this paper critiques Bell’s ethic of contempt. I argue that expressing contempt for those with whom we disagree is not effective in eliciting remorse or effecting change. In fact, contempt only further polarizes a body politic. Furthermore, I argue that contempt plays the role of holding others responsible less well than Bell thinks it does. Finally, I argue that a culture of contempt encourages in lockstep a culture of moral superiority. Theoretical Framework Contempt is in no short supply these days. In a politically turbulent era such as ours, contempt for public figures, institutions, and those with whom we vehemently disagree has become increasingly prominent. Calls to civility warn against this attitude, casting contempt as an ugly and corrosive emotion that damages our relations to one another and defies the respect we owe all persons. In Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt, Macalester Bell argues intrepidly against this consensus. She contends that under certain circumstances, contempt can be the appropriate—and indeed, the best—response to answering those who exemplify what she calls the “vices of superiority.” Racism, one such vice of superiority, is best responded to with counter-contempt, she argues, because “contempt corrects [the racist’s] status claim and helps to restore the equilibrium between the esteem and deference he takes himself to deserve and the esteem and deference he actually merits.” Bell concludes that upon further investigation, contempt holds an important and essential place in moral life. The outpouring of contempt surrounding the 2016 United States presidential election and its aftermath calls into question whether contempt is the best way of confronting the vices of superiority. As I will demonstrate, contempt has done nothing to disrupt President Trump’s behavior, who, I argue, epitomizes many of the vices of superiority. Contempt has also made politics more divisive, Americans more narrow-minded, and public discourse more impossible. As many Americans have experienced, talking about politics with friends and family has become so strained that many have decided to avoid broaching the topic altogether. And increasingly, in a public discourse of contempt, people are curating their news and social media to avoid encountering viewpoints that differ from their own. In grappling with our current political moment, this paper argues against an ethic of contempt. First, I summarize Bell’s account of contempt. Then, against her account I argue that expressing contempt for those with whom we disagree is not effective in eliciting remorse or effecting change. In fact, contempt only further polarizes a body politic. After responding to Bell’s arguments on contempt’s instrumental value, I turn to her arguments on contempt’s non-instrumental value. Bell claims that contempt is non-instrumentally valuable because it plays an important role in our practices of holding others responsible; but, I argue that contempt plays this role less well than she thinks. Finally, I argue that a culture of contempt encourages in lockstep a culture of moral superiority. My arguments taken together do not defend a strict prohibition against contempt; however, they do demonstrate that contempt is much more morally suspect than Bell admits. In Hard Feelings , Bell begins by examining the nature of contempt. As she prefaces at the beginning of the chapter, contempt is difficult to define and make distinctive from other emotions like resentment, disgust, and anger. Nevertheless, she outlines four of contempt’s central features. First, contempt is a response towards persons who have failed to meet an important standard, and who have as a result compromised their status . Second, contempt is a globalist emotion, meaning it takes whole persons as its object. Third, the contemnor "sees the contemned as inferior to her along some axis of comparison.” And fourth, and most paradigmatically, contempt involves withdrawal. In contrast with neighboring emotions such as anger or resentment which motivate engagement, contempt motivates withdrawal. Withdrawal, she argues, can look like “refusing to invite someone to a gathering or declining to shake someone’s hand” on the one hand; and radio personality Don Imus’ contemptuous comments about “the Rutgers women’s basketball team, referring to them as ‘nappy-headed hos’” or the Egyptian protesters who waved their shoes at then-President Mubarak in Tahrir Square, on the other. The former examples she calls “passive contempt”; the latter examples “active contempt.” Passive contempt treats the target as non-threatening, as beneath notice. Passive contempt involves withdrawal in a literal sense: evading or dismissing the target. Active contempt, on the other hand, presents the target as threatening and involves a different sense of withdrawal. With active contempt, the contemnor withdraws from the target by casting her as dangerous and morally less than. Bell writes in a later passage, “contempt is a demoting emotion [original emphasis] that presents its target as having a comparatively low status.” In other words, the active contemnor purposefully distances herself by portraying the target as someone to be looked down upon, not as someone to be capitulated to or reconciled with. Thus, in expressions of active contempt, there is an aspect of communication : the contemnor tries to communicate to the target that she is being disengaged, and why she is being disengaged. Bell’s subsequent discussion focuses primarily on “active contempt.” Bell then turns to the looming question: What makes contempt morally valuable? Bell argues that contempt is the most effective way of confronting and defeating the vices of superiority, a term which encompasses a number of vices such as arrogance, hypocrisy, and racism. As she explains, those who exemplify the vices of superiority see themselves as entitled to more esteem and deference than everyone else, and insist that others treat them as such. Bell is skeptical that we can challenge their superbia by simply discussing or reminding them of the equal worth of all persons. She elaborates in a compelling passage: For those who evince superbia do not have false beliefs about others’ moral standing ; instead, their main fault is taking themselves to have a comparatively high status and lording this presumed status over people in a way that expresses ill will. Given this, reminding the arrogant or hypocritical that others are just as worthy of respect won’t answer their vices. Such people may concede the point but continue to harbor superbia and see it as justified. In order to properly challenge the target’s perception of his superior status, one must attempt to make his inferior status felt. That is why contempt’s characteristic demotion is such an apt response to the vices of superiority. Contempt best addresses the vices of superiority, she argues. As she sketches out earlier, contempt demotes the target and presents the target as having a comparatively low status. Contempt “thereby negat[es] his sense of entitlement and undermin[es] his attempts at dishonoring or exacting esteem and deference.” Moreover, being the object of contempt can “provide us with a morally valuable second-personal perspective and can shake us into the realization that we have failed to meet certain basic standards.” The paradigmatic example is Elizabeth’s contempt for Darcy in Pride and Prejudice . Darcy began reflecting on his arrogance and in turn, began changing his ways precisely because he felt Elizabeth’s contemptuous attitude. Bell hedges, however, that contempt does not cause the target to feel remorse. Instead, “what apt contempt does is provide reasons to change: it puts those who evince the vices of superiority in a position to appreciate their reasons to change; the experience of being put down and disesteemed makes one’s reasons to change particularly salient.” Contempt is not only morally valuable as a means of answering the vices of superbia; it also holds non-instrumental value. According to Bell, contempt is “a way for persons to maintain their integrity,” and “a person of integrity is someone who not only does the right thing but also has the right attitudes toward her commitments.” Contempt is moreover constitutive of “holding persons accountable for their actions and faults” and ensuring that we hold ourselves to shared standards. In the brief paragraph in which she makes this argument, she writes: “While resentment demands that its target take responsibility for the wrong done, contempt demands that its target change her attitudes and overcome her superbia. Responding with apt contempt, then, is the clearest way of holding persons accountable for their superbia.” In short, contempt is part of the moral practice of blaming those who fail to adhere to certain standards. Bell is convincing insofar as she persuades us that contempt can, in some cases, help “put the target in a position to appreciate the reasons he has to change his ways.” The example of Darcy and Elizabeth in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice that Bell gives in her fourth chapter asserts her point forcefully; Elizabeth’s contemptuous rejection of Darcy’s proposal prompts in him a new awareness and inspires him to reform his character. However, Bell is less persuasive as to whether contempt is the best way of responding to the vices of superiority, and whether we ought to prefer an ethic of contempt to an ethic of anti-contempt. Does contempt always serve to jolt a person out of vice? What do we risk in contemning others? The rest of this paper interrogates these infirmities. As observers note, contempt is rife in contemporary politics. Screaming heads on television, Twitter trolls, and angry campus activists have become commonplace in American life. Yet, contempt has not proven effective in the ways that Bell anticipates. Perhaps the most glaring and well-known example of someone who exemplifies the vices of superiority is President Donald Trump. For example, he boasted about the purported successes of his administration to the United Nations General Assembly: “In less than two years, my administration has accomplished more than almost any administration in the history of our country.” He played more than six rounds of golf in his first month in the Oval Office, despite previously criticizing President Obama for doing the same thing. And he routinely fraternizes with white supremacists such as David Duke. Even his own supporters attest to his arrogance, hypocrisy, and racism. Michael Cohen, former lawyer and supporter of President Trump, said of him during his historic testimony before Congress: “He is a racist, he is a con man, he is a cheat.” Treating him with contempt, however, has not precipitated the kind of change that Bell anticipates, or as she argues, has not provided reasons for him to change. Despite the press exposing his hypocrisy for playing golf and the public responding with contempt on Twitter and Facebook, Trump continued to visit Mar-a-Lago for golf course outings. In a Twitter thread rebuking his behavior, dozens of people tweeted at Trump a picture of him tweeting in 2011, “I play golf to relax. My company is in great shape. @BarackObama plays golf to escape work while America goes down the drain,” except they crossed out “@BarackObama” from the picture and named Trump instead. Despite the widespread contempt he earned for his performance as president, coming from even his closest policy advisors, Trump said that “nobody’s ever done a better job than I’m doing as president.” In an anonymous op-ed, a senior official in the Trump administration called the president’s leadership style “impetuous, adversarial, petty and ineffective.” And despite the contempt he received from civil rights organizations like the ACLU, the NAACP, and the Anti-Defamation League, Trump continued to highlight crimes committed by black and brown people, therefore emboldening the alt-right. As just one of many instances, consider how Anthony Romero, the executive director of the ACLU, expresses contempt for Trump in an op-ed piece about the border wall “emergency” when he writes: Trump's emergency declaration is a blatant abuse of power in the service of his anti-immigrant agenda and a brazen attempt to subvert the constitutional separation of powers. The federal treasury isn't a bank account that the president can just raid whenever he's in a bind. It's taxpayer money that the Framers specifically left in the hands of Congress. Trump is seeking to thwart Congress' will. Now we are asking the courts to give Trump another lesson in how the Constitution works. In the face of overwhelming contempt, Trump incredulously persists in being hypocritical, arrogant and racist—not once expressing remorse for his actions. Against President Trump, contempt proves unsuccessful in confronting the vices of superiority. Bell might offer two responses here. First, she might respond that one counterexample does not defeat the instrumental value of contempt. In her account, she did not venture to argue that contempt is guaranteed to answer the vices of superiority. If we read her work charitably, sometimes contempt will work, sometimes it will not. But in order to maintain that contempt has instrumental value and that it is the best way of responding to the vices of superiority, Bell must insist that by and large, contempt is effective. Second, she might assert that Trump is incapable of taking up contempt, and therefore treating him with contempt is inappropriate. She explains in a chapter about contempt’s characteristic withdrawal: The target must be able to understand what it means to fail to meet a standard and must be able to change his ways if he comes to accept the claim implicit in contempt. If a person is unable to understand what it means to fail to meet a standard or is utterly unable to take steps to address his fault, then one could not morally address him through one’s contempt. Even if we concede both responses—that presenting President Trump as one counterexample is not fatal to her argument, and furthermore, that her account can accommodate for President Trump and exceptional persons who are similarly immune from expressions of contempt—her account still faces the fact that contempt is ineffective towards ordinary Americans. For example, much of America has treated Trump supporters, including those who voted for him more tepidly, with unbridled contempt. Here, I assume that those who adamantly support President Trump and the policies that he advocates also evince the vices of superiority. Take the following headlines: “Trump Won Because Voters Are Ignorant—Literally” which has the subtitle, “Democracy is supposed to enact the will of the people. But what if the people have no clue what they’re doing?”; “Maybe They’re Just Bad People”; “Racist Americans, Not Trump, Are The Problem. There Might Be A Cure.” Trump supporters are seen not merely as incorrect or misguided, but as terrible human beings. They are cast as bigots, uneducated hicks, and even “deplorables.” But liberal contempt has done very little, if anything, to change their minds. In general, Trump supporters still hold the same positions on policy issues, the President’s comportment, and his fitness to lead. As his steady approval rating shows, Trump remains exactly as overwhelmingly popular among Republicans as he was on the first day of his presidency. I argue that by and large, contempt has not prompted the national reckoning that Bell would expect on her account, nor has it inspired Trump supporters to rise to the standards that we have accused them of not meeting. Why is this the case? I argue that a culture of contempt in American politics is not as instrumentally valuable as Bell claims because it does not take effect in the way that she describes. Bell argues that contempt answers the vices of superiority by providing reasons to change. To reiterate the quote I cited earlier, she claims that contempt “puts those who evince the vices of superiority in a position to appreciate their reasons to change; the experience of being put down and disesteemed makes one’s reasons to change particularly salient.” Contempt in American politics, however, does not seem to function in this way. Contrary to Bell’s account, widespread and strenuous contempt has failed to make white supremacists better “appreciate their reasons to change.” Why? I argue that white supremacists do not feel the withdrawing effects of contempt because—and this is crucial—they champion the approval of the President. Although they may feel contempt from liberals, white supremacists are not “put down” or “disesteemed” precisely because they are bolstered by Trump when they witness him repeatedly accusing illegal immigrants of ruining the country. They witness him repeatedly associating himself with racists and repeatedly demonstrating fealty to alt-right groups. Consider how Trump began his 2016 presidential campaign by disparaging Mexican immigrants, saying: When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best—they’re not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. Consider how he has retweeted white nationalist accounts with handles such as “WhiteGenocideTM” without apology (Twitter has since removed this account). In the face of contempt, white supremacists have refuge in Trump, a figure with immense social and political cachet who tacitly approves their actions, and shares their views. Bell argues that contempt is supposed to withdraw from the target and thereby ostracize them from the moral community. But withdrawal is not meaningful if the target has recourse in a president who supports and often urges anti-immigrant rhetoric. Therefore, under the aegis of the president, white supremacists do not feel the withdrawing effects of contempt. Furthermore, I argue that contempt in American politics has not just been ineffective against the vices of superiority—it has only made matters worse. On all sides of the political spectrum, a culture of contempt has only entrenched the vices of superiority and alienated those whom we want to reform. To illustrate this point with an example, consider Hillary Clinton’s contemptuously calling half of Trump supporters a “basket of deplorables.” Ostensibly, this highly controversial remark was meant as a way to answer racist, sexist, and xenophobic behavior demonstrated by those who had vocally advocated for Trump. Instead, her comment was met with public outrage and retaliation. An avalanche of stories commenting on the striking phrase flooded the Internet, conservatives were incensed, and the divide between the Democrat and Republican body politic widened only further. Consider these tweets: “Treating people as subhuman—irredeemable/deplorable—is no way to run for POTUS,” by Tim Miller, a former Jeb Bush spokesman and fervent Trump opponent, and "What’s truly deplorable isn’t just that Hillary Clinton made an inexcusable mistake in front of wealthy donors and reporters happened to be around to catch it… It’s that Clinton revealed just how little she thinks of the hard-working men and women of America,” by Jason Miller, a senior communications adviser during the Trump campaign. As she explained in an apologetic statement that draws parallels with Bell’s arguments for the instrumental value of contempt, she intended for her contempt as a way to stand up to Trump’s turpitude and to commit herself and her campaign to moral values: But let's be clear, what's really “deplorable” is that Donald Trump hired a major advocate for the so-called 'alt-right' movement to run his campaign and that David Duke and other white supremacists see him as a champion of their values. It's deplorable that Trump has built his campaign largely on prejudice and paranoia and given a national platform to hateful views and voices, including by retweeting fringe bigots with a few dozen followers and spreading their message to 11 million people. It's deplorable that he's attacked a federal judge for his “Mexican heritage,” bullied a Gold Star family because of their Muslim faith, and promoted the lie that our first black president is not a true American. So I won't stop calling out bigotry and racist rhetoric in this campaign. But calling millions of people a “basket of deplorables”—people whom she wanted to persuade—only drove them further into Trump’s arms. The “basket of deplorables” gaffe only made matters worse, and not just because it was said by a presidential candidate trying to win over voters—in other words, not just because it was a bad political play. It was also because using contempt as a means to address the vices of superiority, in general, risks alienating those whom we want to reform. Interviews with dozens of lukewarm Trump supporters bear this out. A New York Times article reports that incessant attacks on Trump are causing his supporters to rally around the President. Ms. Anders, one of the interviewees, said that when she hears “overblown” attacks on Trump, “it makes [her] angry at them, which causes [her] to want to defend him to them more.” The Times reports that Trump supporters feel protective of the President when asked the all too common question “How can you possibly still support this man?”, as well as further removed from the contemptuous liberal. Contempt, instead of addressing the vices of superiority on the other side, has only polarized our politics and cultivated an atmosphere in which contempt is traded back-and-forth, to no end. Our contemptuous public discourse also casts doubt on Bell’s arguments for the non-instrumental value of contempt. Although contempt, I agree, is an important reactive attitude that is part of our practice of holding persons accountable, I argue that contempt does not play that role as well as Bell asserts. Recall that in Bell’s view, contempt holds persons accountable by demanding that its target overcome her superbia. How does contempt issue this demand? She explains, “Through contempt’s characteristic withdrawal, its subjects do not simply seek explanations or apologies; instead, the contemnor seeks the target’s character change. If the target does not attempt to change his ways, then the contemnor will see him as someone to be avoided altogether.” Elizabeth held Darcy accountable for his arrogance by withdrawing from him, and thus morally engaging him. Shunning a person who exemplifies the vices of superiority can serve as a sort of punishment, holding persons accountable, but I argue that it is a particularly ambiguous and precarious way of doing so. It seems to me that there is an inherent tension between contempt’s characteristic withdrawal and the demand that it makes on the target—and that this tension undermines, or at the very least severely limits, the non-instrumental value of contempt. By withdrawing from the target, the contemnor does not expressly communicate the demand. The target may misinterpret, or may even be completely oblivious of, what is demanded of him. Moreover, by withdrawing from the target, the contemnor does not enforce the demand. The target is not in any way compelled to comply with the contemnor’s demand, aside from being subjected to the sanction of her ostracism. And as I argued earlier, ostracism is rendered impotent when another person or group embraces the target instead. Bell anticipates some of these worries when she writes: “It is true that contempt’s withdrawal may be misinterpreted. Silence and withdrawal are multiply ambiguous in ways that other forms of address are not.” But she seems more optimistic about contempt’s successes than wary of its risks. She argues, “But while the ambiguity of withdrawal can be disorientating, this disorientation can also be constructive. As targets think about what elicited the withdrawal, they may, like Darcy, come to recognize contemptible aspects of their characters that they had long overlooked.” She is confident that “if a target of contempt believes that the contempt directed at him is apt, then he will [emphasis added] respond with shame and an attempt to ameliorate his character,” often arguing as though the target’s response of shame and the target’s attempt to ameliorate his character are empirical inevitabilities. But I contend that we should be more skeptical of contempt’s ability to hold persons accountable. The ambiguity and precariousness of contempt that I have been discussing are especially acute in public discourse. Amid the din of daily, back-and-forth contempt about whatever news is dominating the day, it becomes especially difficult to determine what claim an expression of contempt is making and to feel compelled to answer that claim, when instead the target can simply dig in her heels and meet contempt with counter-contempt. Bell insists that if we reject an ethic of contempt, we would lose “relationships of mutual accountability for our attitudes in which we hold persons to certain standards and are held to certain standards in turn.” This seems to me to be an overly pessimistic conclusion. Holding persons accountable does not necessarily require an ethic of contempt; holding persons accountable might involve a myriad of other emotions such as resentment, disgust, shame, indifference, anger, and disappointment. Consider Martin Luther King Jr.’s seminal “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” in which he responds to criticisms made by several religious leaders in the South regarding the nonviolent protests against segregation. At different points, Dr. King expresses disappointment, indignation, and anger. For example, he writes, “But despite these notable exceptions, I must honestly reiterate that I have been disappointed with the church,” and, “I guess I should have realized that few members of a race that has oppressed another race can understand or appreciate the deep groans and passionate yearnings of those that have been oppressed …” Note however that he does not express contempt for the clergymen. He does not dismiss their concerns or cast them as unforgivable human beings—despite all the good reason he has to do so. Instead, he takes up every line in their statement and thoroughly refutes each concern. By holding the church responsible for its hypocrisy without appealing to contempt, and indeed while remaining charitable, Dr. King demonstrates that “relationships of mutual accountability” are possible absent an ethic of contempt. In fact, one might argue that it was precisely Dr. King’s willingness to engage with his detractors that held them responsible and crucially served the success of the Civil Rights Movement. By countering each of their gripes head-on, relentlessly, it becomes unequivocally clear that their criticisms of the Birmingham demonstrations were made in bad faith and hold no water. Lastly, I argue that we should reject an ethic of contempt because a culture of contempt encourages in lockstep a culture of moral superiority. In treating those with whom we disagree contemptuously, we make the assumption that we are in the morally superior position to judge whether someone has violated the community’s standards. We appoint ourselves as arbiters of what is moral and what is immoral. Seeing ourselves as morally superior and others as morally inferior not only compromises our own character but also ignores the complexity of disagreement. Indeed, in expressing contempt for the Trump voter, much of America failed to listen to the many issues that Trump voters cared about—issues that Trump was addressing and Clinton was not. Pigeonholing Trump voters as immoral and bigoted obscured a broader debate about jobs leaving, terrorism, and the nuances of immigration. Ms. Anders, the interviewee whom I cited earlier, laments, “All nuance and all complexity—and these are complex issues—are completely lost… It’s either, ‘Trump wants to put people in cages, in concentration camps.’ Or, on the other side, ‘Oh the left just wants everybody to come into the country illegally so they can get voters.’ We can’t have a conversation.” Contempt has reached a fever pitch in public discourse and has shown no sign of abating anytime soon. In the context of our present political climate, I have argued that contempt is not as morally valuable as Bell claims it to be. Instrumentally, I have demonstrated that contempt is not effective in getting the target to reflect on his character and to make reforms. Moreover, contempt risks further dividing a body politic. Non-instrumentally, I have argued that contempt plays a much narrower role in holding persons accountable, given how ambiguous and precarious contempt is for the target who exemplifies the vices of superiority. I have also shown that it is possible to hold persons morally responsible without appealing to contempt. And lastly, I have argued that a culture of contempt encourages a culture of moral superiority, which not only compromises our own moral selves but also ignores the complexity of those whom we contemn. Taking seriously the arguments that this paper advances requires that our public discourse guards against contempt instead of embracing it. Works Cited Anonymous. “I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration.” New York Times. September 5, 2018. www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-resistance.html . Accessed April 7, 2019. Barlow, Rich. “Racist Americans, Not Trump, Are The Problem. There Might Be A Cure.” wbur . November 30, 2018. www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2018/11/30/donald-trump-racism-supporters-rich-barlow . Accessed April 7, 2019. Bell, Macalester. Hard feelings: The moral psychology of contempt . Oxford University Press. 2013. Blake, Aaron. “Why President Trump’s frequent golfing is even more hypocritical than it seems.” Washington Post . February 22, 2017. www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/22/president-trumps-frequent-golfing-is-even-more-hypocritical-than-it-seems-at-first-glance/?utm_term=.0199a7da3d9a . Accessed April 4, 2019. Brennan, Jason. “Trump Won Because Voters Are Ignorant—Literally.” Foreign Policy . November 10, 2016. foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/10/the-dance-of-the-dunces-trump-clinton-election-republican-democrat . Accessed April 7, 2019. Bump, Phillip. “Trump: ‘Nobody’s ever done a better job than I’m doing as president.’” Washington Post . September 4, 2018. www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/09/04/trump-nobodys-ever-done-a-better-job-than-im-doing-as-president/?utm_term=.be6e7a1bb7a5 . Accessed January 10, 2019. Burns, Alexander. “Choice Words From Donald Trump, Presidential Candidate.” New York Times . June 16, 2015. www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/06/16/choice-words-from-donald-trump-presidential-candidate . Accessed April 7, 2019. Choi, Matthew. “Trump bragged about his presidency and world leaders laughed.” Politico . September 25, 2018. www.politico.com/story/2018/09/25/trump-united-nations-brag-839820 . Accessed April 7, 2019. Desiderio, Andrew. “Cohen testimony on Trump: 'He is a racist. He is a conman. He is a cheat.'” Politico . February 26, 2019. www.politico.com/story/2019/02/26/cohen-trump-racist-conman-cheat-1189951 . Accessed April 4, 2019. Goldberg, Michelle. “Maybe They’re Just Bad People.” New York Times . November 26, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/26/opinion/trump-supporters-bill-white-bryan-eure.html . Accessed April 7, 2019. Higgins, Tucker. “Trump’s approval ratings are low but steady — possibly a good sign for his re-election chances.” CNBC . January 2, 2019. www.cnbc.com/2019/01/02/trump-approval-low-but-steady-possible-good-sign-for-2020-re-election.html . Accessed January 2, 2019. Holmes, Jack. “Trump’s Disgusting Retweets Suggest a Larger Problem is Brewing.” Esquire . November 19, 2017. www.esquire.com/news-politics/a13974149/trump-retweet-britain-first/ . Accessed April 7, 2019. King Jr., Martin Luther. "Letter from a Birmingham Jail." 26 UC Davis L. Rev. 791, 1992, 835. Lima, Christiano. “Hillary Clinton walks back 'basket of deplorables' remark.” Politico . September 9, 2016. www.politico.com/story/2016/09/hillary-clinton-basket-deplorables-227988 . Accessed January 9, 2019. Peters, Jeremy W. “As Critics Assail Trump, His Supporters Dig in Deeper.” The New York Times . June 23, 2018. www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/us/politics/republican-voters-trump.html . Accessed January 8, 2018. Romero, Anthony D. “ACLU on border wall 'emergency': We'll see you in court, President Donald Trump." USA Today . February 20, 2019. www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/02/20/aclu-lawsuit-trump-emergency-declaration-illegal-unprecedented-column/2920655002/ . Accessed April 7, 2019. Sparks, Grace. “How many Americans actually support Trump?.” CNN . September 27, 2018. www.cnn.com/2018/09/26/politics/actual-trump-support/index.html . Accessed January 1, 2019. Trump, Donald J. (@realDonaldTrump). “I play golf to relax. My company is in great shape. @BarackObama plays golf to escape work while America goes down the drain.” Twitter. December 30, 2011, 10:12 a.m. twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/152814332915363840?lang=en . Acknowledgements Thank you to Lou Chen for reading over the draft of this paper. And thank you to Professor Krista Thomason for being an invaluable interlocutor. Our discussion about Macalester Bell’s Hard Feelings motivated much of my thinking on contempt in public discourse.

Divisive Identities: Exploring the Interplay of Personal and Social Identities Ella Neeka Sawhney Author Aimee Zheng Faith Li Editors I. Abstract Personal and social identity, whilst existing as two different entities, combine and interact to form our overall individual identities. Personal identity centres around how an individual’s fundamental beliefs and commitments are shaped by their personal experiences, whilst social identity arises from one’s belonging to various social groups, including one’s social relationships. This essay juxtaposes arguments from Amartya Sen and Bikhu Parekh to argue that our personal and social identities are profoundly intertwined and thus should not be viewed as separate from one another. By drawing on theoretical frameworks and real-life examples, I demonstrate how Parekh’s model offers a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of individual identity which encompasses personal and social dimensions as dynamic entities. Thus, through a critical examination of Parekh’s model and Sen’s respective criticisms, this essay concludes that Parekh’s model, by acknowledging the plurality and diversity of identities as well as the complex interplay between personal and social identities, provides a robust defence of individual identity as comprised of personal and social identities, expertly addressing concerns raised by Sen. II. Introduction Classical problems within this idea of personal identity can be categorised into families. For instance, the persistence problem and the personhood puzzle both focus on questions regarding the continuity and ethical implications of self-identity. I choose to concentrate on ‘The Characterisation Question’ which delves into what comprises our personalities. This question is important as it is one that we grapple with daily, permeating all aspects of our lives. Specifically, I focus on the debate between Parekh and Sen, as I find this debate to have strong implications for understanding individual identity In this essay, I investigate Parekh’s twofold model of individual identity, scrutinising its effectiveness in addressing the concerns raised by Sen. My thesis contends that through his emphasis on plurality and diversity, Parekh efficiently responds to Sen’s concerns about the divisive potential of social identities, ultimately undermining Sen’s criticisms. First, I explore the intricacies of the concept of philosophical (including both personal and social) identity. Next, I explain Parekh’s model and juxtapose it against Sen’s criticisms. I then evaluate whether Parekh’s theory can escape Sen’s criticism of dogmatic sectarianism. Lastly, I debate Sen’s critique of over-conformity to social roles as a result of combining social and personal identity. Prima facie, our identity addresses the ubiquitous question ‘Who am I?’, encompassing the beliefs, ideas and qualities that shape a person’s character. Yet, philosophical identity, namely individual identity, explores the intricacies of how an individual may deduce their identity from their various distinctive features. This individual identity is what “distinguishes” (Parekh, 2009, p. 267) agents, functioning as a “predicate” (Sollberger, 2013) used to describe specific attributes of a subject and identify its differentiators. Individual identity comprises two components: personal (shaped by one’s personal life experiences) and social (arising from one’s belonging in groups or a relationship), according to Parekh (2009). By examining personal identity one can better understand and analyse ‘The Characterisation Question’: ‘What is it that makes me the unique individual I am?’, a question originally termed by Schechtman (2007) who presented ‘The Characterisation Question’ as: “The question of which beliefs, values, desires, and other psychological features make someone the person she is.. [it] concerns identity in the sense of what is generally called… an ‘identity crisis’” (p. 1) My analysis of ‘The Characterisation Question’ throughout the remainder of this essay investigates the features which define one’s personal identity and how they render a person differentiable from others. Moreover, viewing personal identity as “contingent and temporary” (Olson, 2023) suggests that one’s definition of self changes throughout one’s lifetime. For example, an only child’s identity shifts when becoming an older sibling, following their younger sibling’s birth. Hence, personal identity evolves alongside changing exogenous factors and is influenced by introspective processes, such as changing religious beliefs. III. Parekh’s model Parekh’s (2009) model of “overall” (p. 268) identity, alternatively referred to as individual identity, encompasses both personal and social identity. Parekh’s concept of personal identity centres around how an individual’s “fundamental beliefs and commitments” (ibid., p. 267) shape their perceptions of the world and their role within it. This recurrent journey of “self-definition” (ibid., p. 268) permits individuals to make sense of their convictions, including values, beliefs and opinions, thus developing their inner comprehension of personal identity. Moreover, Parekh describes social identity as a key aspect of individual identity, arising from one’s belonging to various social groups. He interprets social identity as “inherently plural” (ibid., p. 267), acknowledging its multi-layered influence on a person’s identity. Social identity includes relationships and groups a person feels they belong to, which play a crucial role in shaping their self-perception. Hence, these interconnected layers contribute to one’s personal identity, allowing social identity to, more broadly, impact individual identity. Yet, an interpretive challenge lies in Parekh’s vague explication of the relationship between personal and social identity, leaving the permeability of the boundary, and the extent of their interaction unclear. These ambiguities in Parekh’s model make it difficult to interpret how personal and social identities coalesce. This is showcased in Parekh’s example of the two teachers: “For one it is nothing but a job that she would readily give up if she got a better one”, for the other “being a teacher means a great deal to her. She identifies with it, sees it as an integral part of who she is and would not even dream of giving it up” (ibid., p. 274) Here, the first teacher is mechanically fulfilling their role, while the other integrates teaching into their personal identity. This quote illustrates the challenge of unravelling the complex, and deeply intertwined web of overlapping personal and social identities. The interpretive challenge concerning Parekh’s claim that may arise here is how individuals navigate their identities and to what extent their social identities integrate into their overall identities. Thus, I acknowledge that there are some tensions within Parekh’s view that are slightly contradictory. Namely, when comparing this difficulty in interpreting Parekh’s view of the interaction between personal and social identities with Parekh’s persistent assertion that our personal and social identities are inherently linked, inconsistencies arise. This is something that I shall discuss further in my discussion of ‘dogmatic sectarianism’. IV. Sen’s concerns Sen (2009) presents three key objections to Parekh’s model of personal and social identity which I outline below: The proposition that “a change in social affiliation would make one a different person altogether” is flawed. Our personal identity shouldn’t be “combinable” with our social identity as our social identities can change, without our overall identity changing (p. 286). “One’s personal identity is not threatened by one’s decision to depart from the activities of others belonging to the same group.” Moreover, over-emphasising our social identity results in a lack of reasoning and mutual understanding between members from different groups (p. 287). “Once the priority of a social affiliation is accepted as an integral part of one’s ‘overall identity’, something substantial is lost.” This leads to a person’s lack of deviation from their group’s views and affiliations (p. 288). Sen critiques Parekh’s viewpoint on the combinability of personal and social identity. Specifically, he faults Parekh for overemphasising the impact of social identity on overall identity, asserting that his view is likely to foster dissent hence contributing to societal divides. Sen (2007, pp. xiii-xiv) further encourages the separation of our social influences from our personal decisions. This derives from his argument that a singular or “dominant” social “classification” may hinder deviation from one’s societal or cultural norms, impeding personal decision-making abilities. He stresses that acknowledging our “pluralit[y] of identity” prevents rigid adherence to social groups so that our personal decisions are not entirely dictated by them. A. Dogmatic sectarianism A key feature of Sen’s (2009, p. 286) first criticism is that Parekh’s model is illogical in strongly combining personal and social identity because this view suggests that a change in social affiliation will result in an entire change of personality. Thus, Sen reasons that, according to Parekh’s model “a change of social affiliation would make one a different person altogether” (ibid.). From this, Sen asserts that a likely consequence is the emergence of “dogmatic sectarianism”, meaning that individuals unwaveringly adhere to a strict set of beliefs which often leads to ignorance towards the views of other groups. This creates a lack of willingness to deviate from these norms, as well as ignorance towards and dismissal of other groups’ perspectives, breeding intolerance and hindering understanding between groups. I applaud Sen for identifying the dangers of dogmatic sectarianism. Specifically, he recognises a person’s reluctance to stray from their group’s collective views can foster strong antagonism towards outsiders with different opinions. For Sen, one must separate their personal and social identities to prevent this phenomenon. He asserts that through uncoupling one’s personal and social identity, one can retain a part of their social identity and remain associated with that social group without sacrificing one’s entire personal identity. Hence, Sen warns against Parekh’s model which arguably sees individuals as rigidly tying their personal identity to their social identity. An example supporting Sen’s reflections involves the separation of personal identity from religious affiliations, which falls within social identity. The consolidation of personal and social identity can lead to “sectarian violence” (ibid., p.287). Per Sen’s second criticism: individuals overly emphasise their religious identity and struggle to find areas of agreement or understanding with other religious groups. This is evident in the Northern Ireland conflict; a strong ethnoreligious divide which created a divergence between Catholics and Protestants (Ferguson, 2016). For the Northern Irish, this rigid adherence to religious groups blurred the lines between religious and social identity, fuelling violence and hostility between them. The entrenchment of religious identity within personal identity demonstrates the risk of overly combining personal and social identities, creating a scenario where separation becomes nearly unattainable. Moreover, one must acknowledge that Sen does not assert that dogmatic sectarianism is an inevitable result of combining personal and social identity. Instead, it is only a possibility that poses a significant threat and should be avoided. Thus, he envisions more than one potential outcome of combining personal and social identity, demonstrating his open-mindedness and nuanced analysis. However, I find that Parekh’s flexible and plural model can escape Sen’s criticism of dogmatic sectarianism. This is because Parekh’s (2009) emphasis on plural identities and his encouragement towards the usage of “plural perspectives” (p. 276) prevents the dominance of one single identity. Parekh’s interpretation allows a person to recognise different aspects of themselves, which combine to influence their overall identity. Sen fails to recognise the potential of Parekh’s model and emphasis on “plural identities” to counteract any dangers of dogmatic sectarianism. Under closer examination of Parekh’s model, his awareness of plural identities can provide an alternative solution to Sen’s criticisms, thus demonstrating his model’s versatility and robustness. Parekh’s ability to respond to Sen’s criticism can be demonstrated by applying his model to the aforementioned example of the Northern Irish conflict. Taking a more pluralistic approach, one can see that his model does not succumb to the pitfalls of dogmatic sectarianism. If Northern Irish citizens embraced a pluralistic understanding of their identities, recognising their shared nationality in addition to their differing religious affiliations, conflict might have been reduced. Thus, mutual recognition of plural social identities allows Parekh to maintain his argument of multifaceted and inter-connected personal and social identities, defying Sen’s criticism that Parekh’s model encourages rigid and unfaltering social divides. Therefore, Parekh expertly responds to Sen’s criticism of dogmatic sectarianism as his pluralistic emphasis and encouragement to recognise our own diverse social identities counteracts Sen’s concern that tying personal and social identities fosters inflexibility. B. Over-conformity and Combinability of Social and Personal Identity Sen’s third point criticises Parekh’s model for its over-emphasis of social identity when combined with personal identity. He argues that excessively coupling our personal identities to societal and cultural norms, renders our personal identity secondary. Consequently, people become compelled to strictly adhere to their social norms, constituting a loss of their personal sense of self. Sen (2009) criticises the apparent “reductionism” of a person’s identity to one aspect of their social identity such as their ethnicity or nationality, (p. 288) which, as Sen believes, arises from combining personal and social identities At first glance, Sen’s argument seems logically valid as over-conforming to one affiliation could correspond with disregarding other aspects of one’s overall identity. Sen terms this “epistemic failure” (ibid.) whereby people cannot understand certain aspects of their identity because one affiliation has taken priority. He illustrates this with the example of different groups such as ‘British Muslims’ in which over-emphasising religious identity “miniature[ises] human beings and their many affiliations” (ibid.). This leads to a neglect of plural identifying elements beyond religion, whereby people are reduced to this “single category” (ibid.). Sen further demonstrates his argument by referencing British Bangladeshis who are merely “defined” (ibid.) as ‘British Muslims’. Although a majority of Bengalis in Britain are Muslim, this reduction disregards the distinct culture of Bengali individuals, which may be secular and not solely defined by their religion, demonstrating how combining personal and social identities oversimplifies the manifold nature of individual identity. Moreover, Sen’s argument is further developed by his assertion that over-simplifying our identities leads people to seemingly lose their innate autonomous abilities. By “reducing” (ibid.) one’s identity, it becomes very difficult for one to perceive their identity outside of their social categorisation, thus obfuscating decision-making and threatening individual autonomy. When an individual’s social affiliations determine their overall identity, they confine themselves to making decisions only within these affiliations. For example, women forced to conform to their societal gender role as homemakers may have to forgo personal endeavours that exist outside of the home. This demonstrates how over-emphasising gender as a social affiliation can confine women and prevent them from exerting their agency. However, I believe Parekh’s model withstands Sen’s criticism by recognising the complexity of our identity, where combined aspects of our identity influence decision-making. Particularly, he acknowledges that there is great “variation” (Parekh, 2009, p. 273) in our perception of what constitutes individual identity. Here, Parekh emphasises the diverse interpretations of our social identities which can be assigned varying importance to different aspects. He specifies people can “define and relate” (p. 274) to their societal roles in various ways, demonstrating an awareness that people may choose to identify with different social identities to varied extents. In the above example, British Muslims can challenge their simplistic categorisation by prioritising their religious identity differently. Consequently, Parekh’s model evades Sen’s criticism of over-conformity by acknowledging social identities as qualitative, rather than objective, with some holding greater significance. Sen argues that, in order to prevent over-conformity, individuals can and should completely separate their personal and social identities. Yet, I cannot deem this as feasible, as I believe that personal and social identity cannot be viewed as two separate entities; instead, they constantly combine and influence one another throughout our lives. Specifically, our personal values are often shaped by our social context and so aiming to separate this largely oversimplifies our complex human identity. For example, growing up adhering to the Sikh faith, I was taught the importance of seva (selfless service) and helping those less fortunate than myself. These values instilled in me a passion for charity and volunteer work, which have become an integral aspect of my personal identity. I thus find that my social identity as a Sikh is deeply intertwined with my personal values and I therefore find it inconceivable to attempt to separate them. Therefore, I find Sen’s proposed alternative to Parekh’s model–in which an individual must divide personal and social identities–incomprehensible in practice. V. Conclusion My essay explored Parekh’s twofold model of individual identity, focusing on its capability to respond to Sen’s criticisms. Firstly, I disputed Sen’s point of dogmatic sectarianism, articulating the ability of Parekh’s pluralistic framework to evade Sen. Next, I asserted that Parekh’s acknowledgement of the differing importance of each social identity refutes Sen’s claim that Parekh’s combined framework leads individuals to over-conform to their social identity above personal identity. 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