All Lesbians go to Pride Politics Previous Next BY Caitlin Barotz This paper delves into the complex issue of asylum-seeking by queer individuals escaping persecution. The paper begins by providing a historical context, tracing the evolution of asylum law, particularly focusing on the United States' recognition of sexual orientation as a valid ground for asylum. The landmark cases of Matter of Toboso-Alfonso and Pitcherskaia v. INS are explored, emphasizing the legal strides made in acknowledging the persecution faced by LGBTQ+ individuals. The core of the paper addresses the unique challenges faced by queer refugees and asylum seekers, highlighting the pervasive discrimination, oppression, and violence that LGBTQ+ individuals often experience even before fleeing their home countries. These challenges are exacerbated by logistical, financial, institutional, and psychological barriers that queer refugees encounter during their journey to safety and in the United States. The paper concludes with a comprehensive discussion of potential improvements to the asylum process for queer refugees. These include the need for better training for immigration officials to reduce bias, increasing diversity among immigration judges to provide a broader perspective, and employing specialized clinicians at the border to support queer refugees' mental health and establish trust. The ultimate aim is to create a more inclusive and equitable asylum system that recognizes and validates the unique experiences of LGBTQ+ individuals. This paper calls for systemic changes to ensure that seeking asylum is a more accessible and just process for those fleeing persecution based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. I. Introduction As the United States has become increasingly accepting of queerness, many nations remain highly repressive, criminalize homosexuality, and lack the legal protections to safeguard queer individuals from persecution.[1] 64 countries—one-third of United Nations member states—criminalize homosexuality, and a guilty verdict may result in imprisonment or the death sentence.[2] Some countries have instituted severe punishments for individuals who do not obey conventional gender norms and have barred non-traditional expressions of gender identity, such as cross-dressing.[3] In many of these countries, queer people often face barriers to employment, leading to financial challenges and preventing them from living successful lives.[4] Queer individuals around the world experience an alarming frequency of abuse rising above the level of mere harassment during their daily lives if they dare to express their sexual identity. For instance, there is a Russian criminal gang whose members pose as online romantic interests on gay dating apps and lure their victims in order to film, extort, and punish them for homosexual activity.[5] The group, called “Occupy Paedophilia,” has also seduced gay men over Facebook and has uploaded videos of their victims being attacked and humiliated to VKontakte, an anti-gay website, as well as YouTube and Twitter.[6] In cases like this, individuals seek out queer people in order to torment and abuse them. Even in countries where homosexuality identities are legal, queer people are mistreated by individuals who believe that queerness is wrong. As such, queer individuals are forced to conceal their identities, oftentimes from friends, family, and their larger social sphere.[7] As this persecution persists, an increasing number of queer people have begun seeking asylum in the United States. However, as the understanding of queer people as a solidly defined social group is still emerging, legal questions are posed when it comes to proving their right to persecution-related asylum or proving that one is queer. II. Understanding the Asylum Seeking Process For individuals seeking safety from persecution in their home country, receiving asylum in another nation can mean the difference between life and death. International asylum law evolved following World War II, where over 2.3 million individuals were displaced, and many sought refuge in other countries.[8] As of 2015, there are over 65 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, and this number continues to rise due to armed conflict, human rights abuses, and the global climate crisis.[9] The principle of non-refoulement, which is a key component of international law, states that governments cannot forcibly return anyone to their country of origin if their life or freedom is threatened due to their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.[10] However, although persecuted individuals have a right to non-refoulement, international law does not guarantee anyone the right to asylum.[11] As such, refugees who wish to stay in the country to which they have fled must apply for asylum, which is an extremely complex legal process, and many asylum claims are ultimately denied. Since the development of asylum law in the 1950s, there have been many advancements to allow individuals to claim asylum on the grounds of being persecuted for their sexual orientation. However, there are countless reports of queer individuals being denied asylum for reasons directly relating to their queer identity. In this paper, “queer” is used to refer to anyone who identifies with the LGBTQ+ community, including homosexual and transgender individuals. The United States has a rigorous legal procedure that refugees must complete in order to prove that they face persecution in their home country and gain asylum status. Since granting asylum is costly for the host country, the United States often denies asylum claims on technicalities even when applicants are able to meet all other criteria. Due to widespread persecution of queerness around the world, queer refugees face many unique challenges at every step of the refugee process, especially in proving their identities when making legal claims for asylum. As such, the asylum process must be improved to support queer refugees, ideally through intentionally decreasing the impact of judicial bias on asylum decisions and creating a support system for queer refugees. III. Queerness as a Legally Recognized Persecuted Social Group Entitled to Asylum Asylum is a status of protection that is granted to individuals who meet the technical definition of a “refugee” under international law. In order to gain asylum status, there are three baseline requirements that individuals must meet. First, the asylum-seeking individual must prove that they meet the definition of a refugee. A refugee is someone who is unwilling or unable to return to their home country due to persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”[12] Second, they must prove that they have been persecuted or experienced “conduct rising above the mere level of harassment.”[13] Third, the asylum seeker must prove that they fall within one of the five protected grounds and that their identification with at least one of these groups is a “central reason” for the persecution they faced or of which they have a well-founded fear.[14] Asylum applicants will have vastly different legal processes depending on the grounds on which they claim asylum. Securing asylum based on membership in a persecuted social group, as opposed to one of the other protected grounds, poses unique challenges in the refugee process due to the ambiguous nature of defining “particular social group” and the criteria required for recognition. Unlike race, religion, nationality, and political opinion, there is no set definition for what constitutes membership in a “particular social group” on the grounds of which someone can claim asylum. To be recognized as a particular social group, the group must be unique, identifiable, and individuals in the group must share a common characteristic that they cannot or should not be expected to change.[15] Most commonly under this category, the United States currently offers asylum to subjugated tribes and ethnic groups, members of persecuted occupations (for example, police officers), influential leaders who are being targeted for assassination, child soldiers, and LGBTQ+ individuals.[16] Seeking asylum on the basis of belonging to a particular social group means that individuals must first prove that they belong to this group, which is sometimes more ambiguous or harder to prove than characteristics like race or nationality. Next, applicants must prove that they have faced, or have a well-founded fear of, persecution. Finally, asylum seekers must substantiate that the persecution is directly due to their membership in this particular social group. In the United States, asylum is a “discretionary” status, meaning that even if individuals meet the definition of a refugee and are able to prove that they face persecution because of the group to which they belong, they can still be denied asylum.[17] These requirements for asylum prove to be uniquely challenging for queer individuals due to the fluidity in representing one’s sexual orientation and gender identity and the difficulty in proving one’s affiliation with the queer community. The legal precedent set by the court case Matter of Toboso-Alfonso was crucial in acknowledging queerness as a persecuted social group in the United States, providing a foundational basis for queer individuals to seek asylum. In this 1990 court case, a gay man from Cuba was found to be eligible for “withholding of removal,” or a form of relief similar to asylum status, on the basis that he belonged to the particular social group of homosexuals – this case was the first successful “relief-from removal” claim for persecution due to sexual orientation. Further, in order for one to gain asylum on the grounds of being part of a particular social group, the group must share a common characteristic that individuals cannot or should not be required to change.[18] The Matter of Toboso-Alfonso established homosexual identity as an “immutable characteristic” that one cannot or should not be required to change,[19] establishing queer identity as a protected social group from which people could claim asylum. The decision also reflected a change in the political attitude toward queerness from an inherently incorrect and deplorable lifestyle to an identity that deserves protection. The decision resulting from Pitcherskaia v. INS was also imperative to solidifying that persecution on the basis of sexual orientation can be a valid ground for granting asylum in the United States. This case centered around a lesbian from Russia who fled after being beaten and receiving death threats from police officers because of her sexual identity.[20] At first, her asylum claim was denied, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision in 1997, enshrining the precedent that sexual orientation can be a valid reason to grant asylum if the claimant can prove that the oppression they experienced was due to their sexual identity.[21] This case also emphasized that the government cannot use sexual orientation as a reason to deny asylum to an individual because it would violate the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause.[22] Recently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that “all alien homosexuals are members of a particular social group,” and other countries have ruled similarly.[23] The Pitcherskaia v. INS ruling also provided additional pathways for queer individuals to prove persecution on the grounds of being LGBTQ+. In most asylum cases, the asylum seeker must prove that the persecutor has harmed or intends to harm the individual because of their identity. The decision resulting from Pitcherskaia v. INS specifically mentioned that “the infliction of harm through methods or devices that cause extreme, cruel, and unusual pain, such as […] electroshock therapy” can be considered persecution.[24] This is significant for individuals seeking asylum on the grounds of sexual identity, because homosexuals are often subject to electroshock or other forms of conversion therapy in order to “cure” their sexual orientation.[25] As a result of this decision, courts have since determined that for queer individuals, persecution can occur even when the persecutor has no apparent intention to harm the individual.[26] This is often the case with electroshock therapy victims, as the objective of the perpetrators is often to “cure” the victim rather than to harm them.[27] As such, queer individuals are able to prove persecution due to sexual identity if they have been subject to or are being threatened with violent forms of conversion therapy, and this provides another way in which queer individuals can substantiate a well-founded fear of persecution in order to gain asylum. Despite all of these landmark court decisions, queer individuals still face significant obstacles when seeking asylum due to persecution based on their sexual identity. The United States has a legal duty to provide a safe haven for individuals fleeing persecution based on their sexual orientation or gender identity. Congress incorporated the definition of a refugee set by the United Nations 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol into United States immigration law in the Refugee Act of 1980.[28] As a signatory to both the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, the United States is legally obligated to provide protection to those who qualify as refugees.[29] As long as U.S. law establishes queerness as a persecuted social group and grounds for asylum status, which it has through previously mentioned landmark court cases, the United States must grant asylum to queer refugees who qualify for such protected status. IV. Challenges Faced by Queer Refugees The United States asylum presents individuals with a complex web of physical and legal challenges. There are seven standard steps that asylum seekers must complete in order to receive asylum status. Firstly, refugees must arrive in the United States, which requires crossing the United States’ border by land, sea, or air.[30] Asylum seekers must then apply for asylum within one year of their arrival in the country.[31] After one’s application is received by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), they must be fingerprinted and undergo a background check.[32] Next, the asylum seeker will be interviewed by the USCIS, at which point the court or asylum officer will determine whether or not the individual is eligible for asylum under the conditions previously stated.[33] On average, if an asylum seeker is approved at every step of the process, it can take several months to years to be approved for asylum.[34] However, although the asylum process is largely standardized queer individuals face unique barriers at specific stages of this process. Queer people face unique logistical, financial, institutional, and psychological challenges on their journeys to the United States in order to apply for asylum status. Because many LGBTQ+ individuals cannot publically express their queer identities, they cannot turn to family or friends for assistance when trying to flee.[35] Travel is costly, and people who are barred from the workforce on account of discrimination due to their sexual identities have trouble obtaining the funds needed to get to the United States.[36] Countries that criminalize queerness often invest in widespread surveillance, making it difficult for people to leave without revealing the reason for their departure.[37] For example, in Iran, where queerness is penalized under Iran’s Islamic Penal Code, a new repressive “Regulatory System for Cyberspace Services Bill” increases the state’s surveillance power and bans encrypted communication sites, Virtual Private Networks, (VPNs), and many social media platforms.[38] This gives state security and police forces the ability to surveil citizens’ use of certain websites with ease and impunity.[39] Further, the law prevents the queer community from accessing safe online queer spaces, such as Tinder, Bumble, Hinge, and Grindr, and hinders the ability for queer people to communicate with individuals outside of the country to plan their escape.[40] While traveling to the United States, queer refugees are often harassed by other refugees in refugee camps and have reported discrimination by immigration officials because of their sexual orientation.[41] For instance, asylum seekers have reported being deported by U.S. immigration officers despite voicing fears about returning to Mexico because of their LGBTQ+ identity, many of whom had previously faced abuse linked to their gender identity, expression, or sexual orientation.[42] These reports by Human Rights Watch also detailed severe abuse by Mexican border agents when queer asylum seekers attempted to enter the United States.[43] The multitude of challenges, from financial constraints to institutional barriers and the pervasive threat of discrimination, exacerbates the difficulties faced by LGBTQ+ individuals seeking asylum in the United States based on their sexual orientation or gender identity. Once in the United States, queer refugees also face discrimination upon arrival. There are countless reports of border patrol and other government officials exhibiting bias and prejudice against queer refugees upon their arrival which can be attributed to the inadequate training that these officials receive.[44] For example, in March 2022, the El Paso region’s official Twitter account for U.S. Customs and Border Control promoted homophobic content, liking several tweets containing homophobic slurs and criticizing gay U.S. representatives.[45] This incident clearly exemplifies the bias and prejudice that some U.S. Border Patrol officials hold regarding queerness. These discriminatory attitudes hinder refugees from being open and honest in their interview processes, which can be detrimental in proving an asylum claim.[46] There have also been instances in which queer refugees face abuse while detained in immigration centers in the United States.[47] In 2011 alone, Heartland Alliance’s National Immigrant Justice Center (NIJC) filed 17 reports of abuse of LGBTQ+ individuals in detention centres, including sexual abuse by detention guards and other detainees.[48] Abuse in immigration detention centers can lead to severe emotional and psychological trauma, which may also prevent refugees from recounting their full experiences coherently and confidently during their asylum interviews. Queer refugees also face unique legal barriers in proving their claims for asylum during the interview stage. As mentioned previously, a major requirement of the asylum process is proving that the individual claiming asylum is part of a particular social group that is persecuted. Since most queer people seeking asylum are forced to conceal their sexual and/or gender identities in their home country, there is often little to no evidence that they belong to the LGBTQ+ community. Many homosexual applicants have never been in queer relationships.[49] Others may have been in heterosexual marriages and may even have children from such marriages.[50] This can create substantial doubt in the minds of immigration judges as to the validity of an individual’s claim to a queer identity.[51] Applicants seeking asylum on other grounds may also have to hide aspects of their identities to escape persecution, but there are often other cultural, linguistic, or physical markers that can help prove their belonging in a persecuted community after they have fled, and similar markers do not exist for individuals trying to prove queerness.[52] Immigration judges have been known to resort to extensive interrogation to determine whether an individual is queer and thus deserving of asylum status.[53] However, these questions are often inappropriate and invasive since they deal with the applicant’s sexual history.[54] Asylum seekers have been asked sexually explicit questions such as, “Did you put your penis into X’s backside?”[55] This line of questioning not only creates an extremely uncomfortable environment for the applicants but also may reignite trauma that an applicant has surrounding the discrimination they face for being queer. The already difficult asylum process is not designed to recognize and accommodate the specificities of the queer experience, as LGBTQ+ asylum seekers are often denied asylum on technical grounds. An applicant’s claim could be denied simply because they failed to file their application within their first year of arrival in the United States.[56] Although this does not appear to relate to queerness on its surface, many queer applicants fail to meet this filing deadline because they are unable to “come out” during their first year in the United States.[57] Other applicants are denied asylum status due to criminal records in their home countries which disproportionately affects LGBTQ+ individuals from countries in which queerness is criminalized.[58] Further, applicants can be denied asylum if they are unable to prove their immigration history through employment records.[59] This is common for individuals from countries in which queer people are denied access to jobs and have been forced to work under the table and are therefore unable to provide proof of employment.[60] It is clear that queer individuals face additional barriers in the asylum process, proving that the unequal nature of the asylum seeking process is further amplified by an individual’s queer identity. Even if queer applicants are able to meet every qualification necessary to be granted asylum, they can still be denied asylum status due to the personal feelings of the immigration judge or asylum officer. Since United States asylum law operates on discretionary grounds, the adjudicator may use their own discretion to make an “adverse credibility finding.”[61] This means that an applicant can be denied asylum if the immigration judge does not believe that the individual’s story is credible.[62] An adverse credibility finding is largely reliant on the applicant’s physical presentation in relation to their queer identity, as some judges may want the individual to look visibly queer in order to grant them asylum.[63] For example, an immigration judge denied the asylum claim of a lesbian woman from Jamaica because the judge did not believe she was homosexual, stating “you don’t look like a lesbian.”[64] The woman’s credibility was questioned further when she stated that she did not attend a Pride march, and the judge responded, “all lesbians go to Pride.”[65] In this case and countless others, a refugee’s asylum status is heavily reliant on the adjudicator’s attitudes and assumptions about the queer experience, making asylum decisions highly variable from judge to judge. This is an experience unique to queer people, as the judge’s opinion of other marginalized identities often does not influence whether they are granted asylum. Immigration judges and asylum officers cannot make an “adverse credibility finding” against an applicant seeking asylum on the grounds of racial or religious persecution, and it should not be any different for those seeking asylum on the basis of sexual orientation. Whether or not an individual is granted protection from persecution should not be up to an adjudicator’s belief that the individual fits their perceived notions of a queer person. V. Proposals for a More Inclusive Asylum Process While the process for claiming asylum on the grounds of persecution due to one’s sexual orientation is extremely flawed, the basis for queer asylum law is fairly new, and, as such, there are many opportunities for improvement. Almost all interviews involving LGBTQ+ claims result in positive determinations of fear of persecution; between 2012 and 2017, 96.3% of queer asylum applicants were found to have been persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution.[66] This indicates that in order to better the asylum process for queer applicants, improvements in the asylum-seeking process should be focused around reducing discrimination and bias directed at queer individuals claiming asylum. The United States has little ability to change other countries’ attitudes and policies regarding queerness and cannot prevent persecution that occurs outside of its jurisdiction. However, the United States can implement domestic policies to improve refugees’ experiences after arriving in the country. First, there must be better training for immigration officers and border patrol in order to reduce prejudiced and biased attitudes towards queerness and help asylum seekers feel more comfortable discussing their queer identities. This training should be modeled after similar programs to mitigate bias against LGBTQ+ individuals by healthcare workers.[67] Effective strategies include those that increase knowledge about the specific needs of queer individuals, promote positive attitudes towards queerness, and increase comfort working with queer patients, all of which can be translated to a training program for immigration officials.[68] If immigration officials do not display discriminatory attitudes towards queerness, there will be fewer instances in which refugees refrain from expressing their queer identities. A refugee feeling comfortable to demonstrate their queer identity will ultimately be helpful in the asylum process and could be a key element in proving that they are part of the queer community. Next, since LGBTQ+ refugees are at greater risk of abuse while in detention centers, the United States should end the detention of queer refugees entirely. According to the United States Bureau of Justice statistics, 34% of detained bisexual men and 39% of detained gay men had reported experiencing sexual abuse while in detention, in comparison to only 3.5% of men who identified themselves as heterosexual.[69] Additionally, LGBTQ+ refugees are disproportionately subjected to elevated rates of verbal abuse and threats of sexual and physical violence.[70] As such, many human rights organizations strongly advocate for exploring more humane, safe alternatives to detention centers while queer individuals work to resolve their asylum claims.[71] Such alternatives can manifest as community-based programs, managed by non-governmental and non-profit organizations closely connected to the communities they serve.[72] These programs offer essential services, including legal guidance, representation, and access to social services such as medical care, while still ensuring asylum seekers’ compliance with immigration obligations.[73] Pilot models of community-based programs prioritize the development of trust between asylum seekers and the non-governmental organizations overseeing their asylum claims, aligning services with clients’ compliance with the legal requirements of the asylum process.[74] These programs have been shown to increase compliance with immigration proceedings and reduce obstacles to compliance that are created by detention centers.[75] While these initiatives are in their early stages, the elimination of immigration detention centers offers the promise of a more humane asylum process for queer refugees. In addition to implicit bias training, the United States must ensure that there is diversity of sexual and gender identity among asylum judges and immigration attorneys. An increased amount of diversity among immigration judges helps bring a wider range of perspectives and understandings about different identities.[76] Further, judges with diverse backgrounds are more likely to be impartial and fair in their decisions.[77] It is largely acknowledged that immigration court appointments strongly affect immigration court decisions; the Trump administration appointed over 350 new immigration judges, constituting two-thirds of the 520 federal immigration judges—and the asylum denial rate decreased from 54.6% in 2016 to 71.6% in 2020.[78] While other factors, such as court policy changes, also account for this decrease in asylum grants, many have attributed this in large to the lack of diversity in Trump’s appointments, revealing the importance of diversity of immigration judges in granting asylum claims.[79] People have since criticized President Joe Biden for failing to commit to racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in his appointment of immigration judges.[80] However, sexual diversity is often left out of this debate. The United States must employ more queer and gender nonconforming asylum judges in the same way diversity is considered for other aspects of identity. Ensuring greater sexual and gender diversity will limit the number of instances in which the decision to grant asylum to a queer individual is based on stereotypes of the community from an outsider’s perspective. A greater number of queer asylum judges would also increase the prevalence of the queer perspective in the asylum seeking process and in spaces where precedents regarding asylum law are set. Finally, the United States should employ more clinicians—including psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers—at the border who are specifically trained to help queer refugees. In cases where refugees are uncomfortable communicating with immigration officers, it is crucial to increase the availability of clinicians and mental health professionals with whom queer refugees may speak with upon their arrival in the United States. These clinicians will offer mental health support,[81] which is necessary for refugees who faced traumatizing experiences in and on their journeys out of their home countries. The clinicians will also be able to build trust with refugees and encourage full disclosure of their experiences.[82] Clinicians could use this evidence to testify in court in favor of the refugees during their asylum claims, which could be integral in granting asylum to an applicant.[83] If clinicians are able to establish a strong relationship with refugees, they may also be able to also assist the refugees in accessing other resources—such as specific healthcare needs, housing, and employment—to make the asylum process easier.[84] This will help create a supportive environment for refugees who may have had to conceal their identities for their entire lives. While it may be idealistic to assume that clinicians can seamlessly assist refugees in accessing various resources beyond their scope, any effort that can be made towards encouraging refugees to express themselves will be beneficial in validating refugees’ asylum claims. If their claims are granted, refugees who feel supported and secure in the United States will have an easier time establishing themselves in the country. V. Conclusion While significant strides have been made in recognizing queerness as a basis for asylum, there remains an imperative to bridge the gap between legal standards and the lived experiences of LGBTQ+ individuals seeking refuge. Queer refugees face unique burdens when it comes to claiming asylum in the United States, and these hurdles are exacerbated by the unique forms of persecution queer individuals in their day-to-day lives. Although there have been tremendous advancements made towards granting queer people asylum on the basis of being members of a particular persecuted social group, there are still many reforms that must be instituted in order to make the process more accessible and equitable for queer refugees. The United States, as a signatory to international conventions, bears the responsibility to ensure a more equitable and humane asylum process that genuinely safeguards the rights of queer refugees fleeing persecution. Such efforts demand a commitment to reforming policies, addressing biases, and providing holistic support for LGBTQ+ individuals seeking asylum, ensuring that their right to safety and protection is upheld without prejudice. The ultimate goal is the establishment of sexual identity and gender as a permanent grounds on which individuals can claim asylum; this will not only cement the idea that queer individuals experience persecution due to their identities, but also it will increase the prevalence and legitimacy of queer perspectives in asylum law. Until this becomes a reality, the United States must focus on reducing bias towards queerness among immigration officials, increasing the diversity of immigration judges, and creating a supportive environment for queer asylum seekers, all of which will be significant steps towards inclusivity and equity in asylum law. Works Cited ________________ [1] University of Virginia Department of Family Medicine. "Clinical Guidelines for the Primary Care of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Asylum Seekers and Refugees." Accessed May 8, 2023. https://med.virginia.edu/family-medicine/wp-content/uploads/sites/285/2021/03/LGBTQasylumseekers.pdf. [2] Wareham, Jamie. "New Maps Show Where It's Illegal To Be LGBTQ+ In 2023." Forbes, April 7, 2023. Accessed May 8, 2023. https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiewareham/2023/04/07/new-maps-show-where-its-illegal-to-be-lgbtq-in-2023/?sh=49e1420c7eaa. [3] Ibid. [4] University of Virginia Department of Family Medicine, "Clinical Guidelines for the Primary Care of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Asylum Seekers and Refugees." [5] "Gay 'Hunters' in Moscow Using Dating Apps to Target LGBT+ People." The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/gay-hunters-russia-moscow-apps-gangs-homophobia-a8865376.html (Accessed October 31, 2023). [6] "Russia's Violent Anti-Gay Groups on VKontakte." The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/11/russia-violent-anti-gay-groups-vkontakte-lgbt-sochi (Accessed October 31, 2023). [7] University of Virginia Department of Family Medicine, "Clinical Guidelines for the Primary Care of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Asylum Seekers and Refugees." [8] Hynes, P. (2021). “Who is a ‘refugee’ and who is an ‘asylum seeker’?” In Introducing Forced Migration. essay, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. [9] Ibid. [10] Ibid. [11] Ibid. [12] “Asylum in the United States.” American Immigration Council, October 18, 2022. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-united-states. [13] Topel, Kimberly D. “‘So, What Should I Ask Him to Prove That He’s Gay?’: How Sincerity, and Not Stereotype, Should Dictate the Outcome of an LGB Asylum Claim in the United States .” Iowa Law Review 102, no. 5 (2017). [14] Ibid. [15] “What Does the Term, ‘Particular Social Group,’ Mean for Asylum?” The Law Office of Yifei He, PLLC, May 18, 2022. https://yifeihelaw.com/2021/03/what-does-the-term-particular-social-group-mean-for-asylum/. [16] Ibid. [17] American Immigration Council, “Asylum in the United States.” [18] Ibid. [19] Topel, “‘So, What Should I Ask Him to Prove That He’s Gay?’: How Sincerity, and Not Stereotype, Should Dictate the Outcome of an LGB Asylum Claim in the United States .” [20] “A Brief History.” Immigration Equality, August 7, 2020. https://immigrationequality.org/asylum/asylum-manual/asylum-law-basics-2/asylum-law-basics/. [21] Ibid. [22] Ibid. [23] Ibid. [24] Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997). [25] Immigration Equality, "A Brief History." [26] Ibid. [27] Ibid. [28] American Immigration Council. "Asylum in the United States." https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-united-states (Accessed November 2, 2023). [29] Ibid. [30] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. "The Affirmative Asylum Process." https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/the-affirmative-asylum-process (Accessed November 1, 2023). [31] Ibid. [32] Ibid. [33] Ibid. [34] Ibid. [35] Ibid. [36] University of Virginia Department of Family Medicine, "Clinical Guidelines for the Primary Care of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Asylum Seekers and Refugees." [37] Ibid. [38] "Internet Protection Bill and Its Impact on the Queer Community," Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/the-internet-protection-bill-will-hurt-all-iranians-but-the-queer-community-will-have-the-most-to-lose/ (Accessed October 31, 2023). [39] Ibid. [40] Ibid. [41] Ibid. [42] Human Rights Watch, "US: LGBT Asylum Seekers in Danger at Border," Human Rights Watch, May 31, 2022, accessed [insert date accessed], https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/31/us-lgbt-asylum-seekers-danger-border. [43] Human Rights Watch, "US: LGBT Asylum Seekers in Danger at Border," Human Rights Watch, May 31, 2022, accessed [insert date accessed], https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/31/us-lgbt-asylum-seekers-danger-border. [44] "Internet Protection Bill and Its Impact on the Queer Community," Atlantic Council. [45] "El Paso CBP Twitter Account Promotes Conservative Homophobic Content," El Paso Matters, https://elpasomatters.org/2022/09/10/el-paso-cbp-twitter-account-promotes-conservative-homophobic-content/ (Accessed October 31, 2023). [46] Ibid. [47] Nguyen, Mytien, Ryan Handoko, Emmanuella Asabor, and Katherine C McKenzie. “A Gay Nigerian Man’s Journey to Asylum in the USA.” BMJ case reports, April 5, 2019. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6453367/. [48] Ibid. [49] National Center for Lesbian Rights. "Challenges to Lesbian Asylum Claims." San Francisco: National Center for Lesbian Rights, April 2013. Accessed May 8, 2023. https://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Resources_Challenges_Lesbian_Asylum_Claims.pdf. [50] National Center for Lesbian Rights. "Challenges to Lesbian Asylum Claims." San Francisco: National Center for Lesbian Rights. [51] Ibid. [52] Ibid. [53] Topel, “‘So, What Should I Ask Him to Prove That He’s Gay?’: How Sincerity, and Not Stereotype, Should Dictate the Outcome of an LGB Asylum Claim in the United States.” [54] Ibid. [55] Travis, Alan. "Gay asylum seekers in UK face 'sexually explicit' questions." The Guardian, October 23, 2014. Accessed May 8, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/23/gay-asylum-seekers-sexual-questions-uk-immigration. [56] Cory, Connor. “THE LGBTQ ASYLUM SEEKER: PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUPS AND AUTHENTIC QUEER IDENTITIES .” The Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 20, no. 3 (2019). [57] Ibid. [58] Ibid. [59] Ibid. [60] Ibid. [61] Ibid. [62] Ibid. [63] Ibid. [64] Topel, “‘So, What Should I Ask Him to Prove That He’s Gay?’: How Sincerity, and Not Stereotype, Should Dictate the Outcome of an LGB Asylum Claim in the United States.” [65] Ibid. [66] Flores, Andrew R., Bianca D.M. Wilson, and Kerith J. Conron. "Asylum Seekers and Refugees Who Identify as LGBTQ: Challenges, Realities, and Hopes for the Future." Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, March 2021. Accessed May 8, 2023. [67] Morris, et al. “Training to Reduce LGBTQ-Related Bias among Medical, Nursing, and Dental Students and Providers: A Systematic Review.” BMC Medical Education, August 30, 2019. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6716913/. [68] Ibid. [69] International Detention Coalition. “LGBTI Persons in Immigration Detention.” Victoria: Australia, June 2016. [70] Ibid. [71] International Detention Coalition. “LGBTI Persons in Immigration Detention.” Victoria: Australia, June 2016. [72] “Alternatives to Immigration Detention: An Overview.” American Immigration Council, July 11, 2023. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/alternatives-immigration-detention-overview. [73] Ibid. [74] Ibid. [75] Ibid. [76] Kuck, Charles H. "Diversity in Immigration Law Firms." Think Immigration, American Immigration Lawyers Association, 7 Feb. 2020, https://thinkimmigration.org/blog/2020/02/07/diversity-in-immigration-law-firms/. [77] Ibid. [78] Wolf, Rebekah. “First Round of Biden Immigration Judges Fails to Increase Diversity.” Immigration Impact, May 13, 2021. https://immigrationimpact.com/2021/05/13/immigration-judges-under-biden/. [79] Ibid. [80] Ibid. [81] University of Virginia Department of Family Medicine, "Clinical Guidelines for the Primary Care of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Asylum Seekers and Refugees." [82] University of Virginia Department of Family Medicine, "Clinical Guidelines for the Primary Care of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Asylum Seekers and Refugees." [83] Ibid. [84] Ibid.

The rise and effects of non-standard labour contracts in the Netherlands: An economic and historical analysis from 1970 to 2019 Economics Previous Next By Tommaso Tulkens Abstract This article analyses the rise of non-standard labour contracts (NSLC) and their effect on working compensation in the Netherlands since the 1970s. The analysis employs two two-way fixed effects models to examine the impact of NSLC on wages and pension benefits. The findings show a wage and pension benefits penalty associated with the adoption of on-call contracts. The wage penalty for on-call work is large even when controlling for hours worked. Temporary contracts are associated with a decrease in pension benefits. Younger and low-income workers face a larger wage penalty when engaging in non-standard employment arrangements. The historical analysis shows that the struggle against unemployment, political choices, union power, and the turn to a liberal market economy drove the trend towards NSLC. Falling transaction costs in firms likely encourage the use of market-mediated work. The findings are discussed in relation to monopsony power. Non-Standard Labor.docx .pdf Download PDF • 1.19MB

Schedule F And The Future Of Civil Service Protections Politics Previous Next BY Sasha Bonkowsky Civil service protections in the United States, such as merit-based hiring, employee tenure, and the dismissal appeal , have come under attack in recent years, most notably from former president Donald Trump’s proposed Schedule F that would strip those protections from many federal employees. Under Schedule F, thousands of federal positions would become political appointees who could be dismissed at-will. This paper examines the history and justifications for exempting positions from traditional civil-service protections, as well as the feasibility for Biden’s Office of Personnel Management to forestall Schedule F. I conclude that Schedule F would likely have negative effects on government performance and morale, but that the OPM may not be able to effectively prevent implementation of Schedule F in the event of Trump’s re-election. Word count: 4,059 Throughout President Donald Trump’s administration, he frequently attacked the federal bureaucracy for what he saw as its inefficiency or refusal to enact his policies. He was elected on promises of “draining the swamp” in American government; after the 2016 election, he repeatedly attacked a supposed “deep state” of insider operatives within federal agencies and departments who were ideologically opposed to him and used their positions in the bureaucracy, from which it was hard to dismiss them, to hamstring and block his agenda. Where Trump had appointment power, such as with agency heads or other political appointees, he was quick to remove those he saw as disloyal.[1] However, many of his attacks were limited to mere invective. In the vast American civil service comprising more than two million employees, only 4,000 of those are political appointees that the president can remove at will.[2] And in comparison to other democracies like the UK, France, or Japan, which all have similar civil service systems,, the US actually has many more political appointees[3]. The rest are career employees. Career civil servants are usually hired using a merit-based, competitive examination system, in which all prospective employees are given the same exam, and those meeting or exceeding a particular score are hired. Once in the federal bureaucracy—and after a probationary period of several months to a year—employees usually cannot be dismissed unless they are found to be significantly derelict in their duties, and they can appeal a firing to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which can investigate and reinstate an employee if they have been unlawfully dismissed. There are certain exceptions to this process, known as Schedules A through E, but they are only used when the usual processes are deemed “impractical.” In October 2020, Trump signed Executive Order 13957, which would have significantly increased the number of political appointees. It created a new category of positions within the federal bureaucracy—known as Schedule F positions—that would be exempted from regular civil service hiring procedures. Instead of the examination process, the president would be able to handpick employees for positions that fell under Schedule F and dismiss them at will without worrying about an appeal to the MSPB, as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found in its analysis of the order.[4] President Biden repealed the executive order during his first days in office, writing that it “undermined the foundations of the civil service and its merit system principles.” But such an action is hardly permanent—after all, another future president could easily reissue the executive order. To avoid that, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) issued a proposed rule in late 2023 that would prevent career employees from being excepted under Schedule F or a similar order. The proposed rule also stated that any employee who was reclassified as political appointee would still possess the same protections from being fired and could appeal any dismissal to the MSPB.[5] However, it’s unclear if this proposal will take effect before the 2024 election and a possible transition of power. This paper first examines civil service protections and common exemptions—especially those for current political appointees—in more detail, before turning to the possible effects of Schedule F and attempts to block it. Data from the past 10 years of OPM rulemaking demonstrates that, on average, rules take about a year to be finalized, meaning that if this civil service rule follows the usual timeline, it may be too late to go fully into effect before a Republican president or Republican Congress could repeal it. Civil Service Exceptions The US civil service already allows certain positions to be excepted from the competitive service in five categories: Schedules A, B, C, D, and E. Typically, prospective civil service employees must take a general exam, from which the highest scorers (and those with veteran’s preference) can be selected for hiring. However, this process can be slow, and does not cover specialized knowledge that an agency might require. Positions excepted under one of these schedules can be hired without this usual examination process when it is determined that the exam would make it impractical to recruit adequate numbers of students from qualifying institutions, (under Schedule D), when urgency is required (under Schedule A), or when selecting for particular experience (under Schedule B), among others.[6] Only one schedule deals with political appointments—Schedule C—and it functions most similarly to the proposed Schedule F. Schedule C allows excepted hiring for “positions which are policy-determining or which involve a close and confidential working relationship with the head of an agency or other key appointed officials”.[7] These are often positions like press secretaries for individual bureaus within agencies, White House liaisons, or confidential assistants to secretaries and undersecretaries. There are usually between 1,500 and 1,800 Schedule C appointments at any given time, with 1,725 at the end of the first Bush administration, 1,538 at the end of the Obama administration, and 1,566 at the end of the Trump administration. These political appointments within the civil service didn’t always exist, and like the present-day Schedule F, Schedule C was the subject of significant controversy when it was first carved out in 1956 under the Eisenhower administration. One Democratic senator decried Schedule C as “an attempt to turn the civil service into a Republican grab bag” on the Senate floor,[8] and the Democratic Party platform of 1956 stated that the Eisenhower administration’s policies “reflect prejudices and excessive partisanship to the detriment of employee morale”.[9] The director of the Civil Service Commission defended them in the New York Times, writing that “the American people in 1952 expected your Administration to put into effect your announced policies…it is of the most vital importance that…policy-determining officials should be subject to change with any change in political administration”.[10] Yet despite this public criticism, the Democratic-controlled Congress passed no legislation curtailing or ending Schedule C, and presidents of both parties have made use of Schedule C’s hiring authority. Several restrictions are placed on Schedule C positions and the ways in which they can be assigned. There are no “vacant” Schedule C positions which may be filled at will by the President—instead, any Schedule C positions must be approved by the director of OPM, and OPM’s authorization for those positions is automatically revoked when an employee leaves.[11] Additionally, when requesting Schedule C exception, the head of the requesting agency must submit a statement to OPM that the position was not created in order to detail the employee to the White House—that is, assign them to work in the White House while still being paid by their original agency. This requirement was added after a 1990 GAO report found that Schedule C appointees were being inappropriately detailed to the White House rather than performing the specified duties of their positions.[12] Though Schedule F and Schedule C may appear similar in their creation of low-level, politically appointed positions, the proposed Schedule F category would carve out much broader exceptions to the competitive service. Schedule C restricts its exceptions to appointments of a “confidential or policy-determining” character; Schedule F would allow exceptions to the competitive service for positions of a “confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy -advocating character.” Policy-making or policy-advocating are much broader terms than merely policy-determining, and their definitions are statutorily vague, meaning they could be applied to a much greater number of employees. The executive order drew its legal basis from Section 7511 of Title 5 of the US Code, which excludes employees “of a confidential, policy-determining, policy-making or policy-advocating character” from competitive examination procedures and protection from dismissal. Determination of whether an employee’s job fits these requirements are made by the President and required to be authorized by the head of OPM.[13] This exception, however, had never been put into practice before. The effects of Schedule F implementation are unclear. The executive order was issued in late October 2020, directing that agencies should submit a list of positions that would fall under Schedule F and their reasons for selecting those positions within 90 days (on January 19, 2021). Agencies were also directed to submit petitions to the Federal Labor Relations Authority to determine whether excepted positions under Schedule F would also be excluded from collective bargaining authorities.[14] Few agencies—15 in total, out of over 400 federal agencies—submitted information to OPM, many claiming that they needed more time. Of those, just four agencies submitted names and lists of positions for conversion: the International Boundary and Water Commission proposed converting just 5 employees of its 234, the Environmental Protection Agency proposed 579 employees of its 11,000,[15] the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission proposed 836 of its 1,166 employees, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) proposed 436 of its 527 employees.[16] One issue is these agencies are not particularly representative of the bureaucracy as a whole—the IBWC and FERC are independent commissions, and OMB is deeply embedded in the White House—and so it remains unclear exactly how many employees would be affected by a future implementation of Schedule F. However, the authors of Schedule F have definite intentions for its use and assumptions of how many employees it might affect. The executive order was largely crafted and written by James Sherk, a member of the Domestic Policy Council focusing on labor policy. In 2017, he submitted a memo entitled “Proposed Labor Reforms,” in which he argued for the possibility that “Article II executive power gives the president inherent authority to dismiss any federal employee. This implies civil service legislation,as well as other protections for federal employees, (such as preventing their dismissal for joining a union) are unconstitutional. If so, the President could issue an Executive Order outlining a streamlined new process for dismissing federal employees”.[17] Three years later, he would see that executive order realized in the creation of Schedule F. At a panel discussion for the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) in 2023, he continued to argue in favor of this proposition, saying that “every federal employee should serve at the pleasure of the president”.[18] Given the limited data submitted by agencies, there’s no set number of employees Schedule F might affect. Experts, and Sherk himself, have estimated around 50,000, although Sherk noted the number as a low estimate.[19],[20] In the same NAPA seminar, he said that “I think there's ways you could broaden the scope of the order…I think you could expand it beyond 50,000. Say to like, 200,000. 300,000.” Former Trump administration officials have reportedly “saved lists of previous appointees…as well as career officers they viewed as uncooperative and would seek to fire based on an executive order to weaken civil service protections”, although such lists have not been made public.[21] But having the ability to fire employees, or doing so, doesn’t necessarily mean the administration would be able to fill the positions. The Trump administration was slower than other administrations to nominate officials to key positions, other civil servants rated Trump appointees as less competent than previous Republican administrations or career civil servants,[22] and the Trump administration faced difficulties finding even officials to fill top-level positions.[23] While the Trump administration was able to authorize and fill about as many Schedule C positions as previous administrations, that doesn’t necessarily mean they would be able to fill Schedule F positions given the vastly larger number of them. Besides the numerical scope of its effects, Schedule F was also defended as necessary to improve the efficiency of the federal bureaucracy. The text of the executive order itself cited “long delays and substandard-quality work for important agency projects” as part of its rationale, and stated “agencies need the flexibility to expeditiously remove poorly performing employees”.[24] Many stakeholders that GAO interviewed acknowledged that the speed of federal hiring should be improved, and that Schedule F would streamline that process; one also told GAO that “employees in Schedule F positions should be…more motivated to quickly and effectively implement the President’s policy agenda”. Criticism of a slow-moving and unresponsive bureaucracy, in which onerous hiring procedures and strict removal protections hamstring the agencies themselves, has been long-standing. Presidents and agencies alike have bipartisanly seen problems in the hiring process and sought to reform it: the US National Performance Review in 1993 wrote that “hiring is complex and rule-bound” in the civil service; a Bush-era report from the Merit Systems Protection Board wrote in favor of reform that would “provide agencies the flexibilities they need to effectively manage” and recommended that OPM should “speed the process” of federal hiring;[25] and the Obama administration in turn issued guidance on simplifying and overhauling the civil service hiring process.[26] The picture is little better in terms of firing underperforming employees: it’s long been understood that civil protections reduce the power of incentives, such that employees in government see little connection between performance and job security.[27] But Schedule F seems unlikely to accomplish these reforms in a way that benefits government performance. Several of the stakeholders which GAO spoke to said that Schedule F could make recruitment of federal employees more difficult, as potential applicants might be leery of taking a Schedule F position if they believed they could be removed after a change in administration or for other political reasons. This is in line with the theory advanced by Gailmard and Patty, which states that civil servants are incentivized to build expertise when tenure provides them the stability to make such an investment.[28] David Lewis writes in his book The Politics of Presidential Appointments, drawing on the example of the OPM in the 1980s and 1990s, that, while “politicization helped change policy,” it came at the expense of “long-term agency capacity and reputation…experienced career professionals left the agency and it was hard to replace them [or] recruit bright young people to work in the agency.”[29] New meta-analysis of the meritocratic civil services on government performances found that associated practices such as tenure or merit-based hiring are broadly associated with stronger government performance and lower corruption. With an eye towards a potential future reissuing of the executive order, authors conclude that “converting career employees to Schedule F and removing their civil service protections is likely to degrade government performance”.[30] Rulemaking To Prevent the Reinstatement of Schedule F The Biden administration and Democrats more broadly share similar concerns about Schedule F’s potential impact on the federal government were it to be reinstated by Trump or another future administration. Congressional Democrats have attempted multiple times to pass bills which would prevent Schedule F’s reinstatement or add amendments blocking Schedule F to must-pass defense appropriation bills.[31] However, their efforts have been blocked by Republicans. Bypassing the legislative method, Biden’s OPM released on September 18, 2023, a proposed rule entitled “Upholding Civil Service Protections and Merit Systems Principles,” aimed as a regulatory method to prevent future administrations from reissuing Schedule F. The rule would: allow employees moved from the competitive service to the excepted service to retain their civil service protections unless the employee voluntarily relinquishes them. redefine “confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating”—the language which Sherk and the Trump White House relied on to craft the executive order—to mean only non-career, political appointees. allow employees moved from the competitive service to the excepted service to appeal the move to the MSPB. This would, in essence, cut out the heart of Schedule F: removing its legal basis and specifying that converted employees retain tenure protections, such that converting their positions to the excepted service does not make them at-will employees.[32] OPM draws its authority to make these changes from Chapter 75 of Title 5 of the United States Code, specifically 5 U.S. Code § 7514 and 5 U.S. Code § 7504, both sections which give OPM broad discretion to regulate civil service protections for federal employees. OPM also asserts its authority based on 5 U.S.C. 1103(a)(5) and 5 U.S.C. 1302 to make specific regulations about the procedures of moving employees between the competitive and excepted service, pointing out that OPM has repeatedly exercised that authority in the past (and indeed, regulated that movement in the implementation of Schedule F). The proposed rule closed its 60-day comment period on November 17, 2023, during which time it received 4,096 comments.[33] With the strong support of the Biden administration and the leadership of OPM behind it, the rule is expected to move forward.[34] However, the proposed rule has been the target of criticism by Republicans and people associated with the Trump 2024 campaign—which gives OPM a potential impending deadline. Almost certainly, if Trump wins the 2024 election and the rule is not finalized by his inauguration, he will direct the OPM to drop it; and even a finalized rule could be subject to overturning by a potential Republican Congress under the Congressional Review Act. The Congressional Review Act (CRA) is a tool that Congress can use to overturn federal regulatory actions, which was enacted as part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act in 1996. The CRA requires that agencies submit finalized rules to Congress and the GAO 60 legislative days before they take effect: if Congress passes a resolution of disapproval of the rule within that time period and the President signs it, or if Congress passes such a resolution over a presidential veto, then the rule cannot go into effect. Because of the threat (and exercise) of presidential veto power, rules have been overturned under the CRA only immediately following a change in presidential administration, in 2001, 2017, and 2021.[35] However, the deadline for finalized rules to avoid CRA review by a potentially hostile Congress or President is not just 60 days before a new president could be inaugurated (that is, late November). Congress has 60 legislative days to consider rules—and if Congress adjourns sine die during that period, the 60-day period resets in its entirety beginning on the 15th day of the new legislative session, in what’s known as a “lookback” period. In 2017, that meant that the Republican Congress was able to disapprove of rules finalized as far back as May 2016.[36] Thus, in order to be certain that it will go into effect, OPM must finalize its rule by mid-2024. But the question is if it will be able to do so by then. In the 2023 Fall Unified Agenda, published by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), OPM specified that it is targeting April 2024 for publication of a final rule.[37] Based on historical precedent, this would provide the rule enough time to avoid reconsideration and potential disapproval from the next Congress. But OPM’s projected timeline may be overly optimistic, given its past timelines in publishing final rules. I collected data on finalized OPM rules between 2023 and 2013 in the Federal Register and examined how long it took between publication of the proposed rule and publication of the finalized rule. Since OPM’s proposed rule at hand of upholding civil-service protections has been defined as “significant” under Executive Order 12866 (likely due to its potential to “raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates [or] the President’s priorities”), I restricted my search to only those rules which were similarly deemed significant, as they require a full review by OIRA that lengthens the rulemaking process. I also did not include OPM rules that were issued only as interim final rules rather than undergoing a full notice-and-comment period. The full list of all OPM rules meeting these criteria and their timelines can be found in Appendix A. Below are the summarized results: FIGURE 1: OPM RULEMAKING AVERAGE TIMELINE Notes: The timeline of OPM rulemaking is defined as the number of days between OPM’s publication of a proposed rule and the publication of a final rule. Several outlier rules took more than three years to be finalized. Data sourced from the Federal Register, 2013-2023. A graph of a graph with red dots and lines. Description automatically generated with medium confidence; See Figure 1 in References FIGURE 2. OPM RULEMAKING TIMELINE BY YEAR Notes: OPM published no significant final rules in 2017. Data sourced from the Federal Register 2013-2023. A graph of a number of days. Description automatically generated; See Figure 2 in References On average, it took 473 days between OPM issuing a proposed rule and OPM issuing a final rule. Even after eliminating the major outlier rule that took nearly 6 years to finalize, the data still suggests that it generally takes over a year to finalize a rule after it is proposed. Though the timeline varies slightly year by year, there is no clear pattern that would allow us to infer that the OPM of 2023-2024 finalizes rules significantly faster or slower than the OPM of, say, 2013-2014. If this timeline holds for OPM’s rule undercutting Schedule F, we can project that OPM will finalize the rule sometime in December 2024—too late to avoid a potential disapproval under the CRA. However, one case study of similar civil-service rulemaking demonstrates that potential CRA review is not the same as certain CRA review. On September 17, 2019, the OPM under Trump issued a proposed rule that would more strictly enforce the probationary period before employees were accepted to a competitive service position and sought to streamline civil service removal procedures.[38] In many ways, this rule was a precursor to Schedule F, drawing on the same language and reasoning about an ineffective federal government that couldn’t remove underperforming employees. The rule was finalized on October 16, 2020, a timeline which would have allowed the 117th Congress under unified Democratic control to review and disapprove it. They didn’t. It’s not entirely clear why not: congressional disapproval of rules cannot be filibustered in the Senate, and 20 days after their proposal can be discharged for a floor vote by a minority of 30 Senators. More likely, the Democratic Congress preferred to let rollback occur through the agency processes: there were only three rule disapprovals in total in 2021 of Trump-era rules, but many more were overturned by agencies’ new leaders. But that process takes time, and so it was only in November 2022 when OPM finalized its rollback, meaning the Trump-era changes were in place for almost two full years of the Biden administration. The OPM’s proposed anti-Schedule F rule would likely follow a similar track. An OPM under Trump would certainly seek to undo it, even if the rule is successfully finalized and put into effect without disapproval—but as in the case above, it would likely take them months or years to do so. A rule undoing this one would also be open to legal challenges that an executive order would not be, and the Trump administration faced significant challenges in successful rulemaking. Previous administrations succeeded in roughly 70% of challenges to agency actions, while the Trump administration had a dismal 23% success rate in legal challenges due to bypassing procedural requirements, providing incomplete analyses of policy effects, or taking action which exceeded an agency’s statutory authority.[39] Conclusion Whether or not OPM manages to finalize its rule and put it into effect successfully, the fight over the structure and protections of the civil service is unlikely to end in 2024 or beyond. In recent years, long-held civil service practices of non-politicization and tenure protections that were largely taken as established have come under increasing attack, largely from Republican officials and presidential candidates. In recent years, it’s the executive branch which has been most involved in determining the structure of federal civil service, from the Schedule F executive order to OPM’s proposed rulemaking, and attempts for similar legislation have been blocked or stalled out before making major progress, and research has largely focused on the president’s and agencies’ influence. But Congress has historically been the instrument of major changes to the civil service, from the Pendleton Act to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978—and it’s only recently that Congress has ceded that power to the executive. While research such as this examining the direction, scope, and timing of executive influence over civil service is certainly beneficial given the political context, one potential direction for further research could be an examination of Congress’ role in civil service in the past, and what potential legislative actions would be beneficial in future. 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Bellini, Jason. “Trump’s Tool for Undoing Obama-Era Regulations.” WSJ, 18 Feb. 2017, https://www.wsj.com/video/trumps-tool-for-undoing-obama-era-regulations/DA82F16D-2ED0-47F0-984B-A9A873E2F9A0. Carey, Maeve P., and Christopher M. Davis. “The Congressional Review Act (CRA): A Brief Overview.” Congressional Research Service, Feb. 2023. Davis Noll, Bethany. ‘Tired of Winning’: Judicial Review of Regulatory Policy in the Trump Era. 4426370, 22 Apr. 2021. Social Science Research Network, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4426370. Dawsey, Josh, et al. “In Trump’s Final Days, a 30-Year-Old Aide Purges Officials Seen as Insufficiently Loyal.” Washington Post, 14 Nov. 2020. www.washingtonpost.com, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-white-house-purge/2020/11/13/2af12c94-25ca-11eb-8672-c281c7a2c96e_story.html. Drezner, Daniel W. “Perspective | How Hard up Is President Trump in Staffing His Administration? Pretty Hard Up!” Washington Post, 19 June 2019. www.washingtonpost.com, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/06/19/how-hard-up-is-president-trump-staffing-his-administration-pretty-hard-up/. “Employment and Trends - September.” U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Sept. 2013, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employment-reports/employment-trends-data/2013/september/. Forum on Schedule F and the Future of the Public Service. Directed by NAPA WASH, 2023. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wSUY9ito9TM. Friedman, Drew. “Democrats Revive Anti-Schedule F Bill, with a Few Tweaks and a New Name.” Federal News Network, 14 Feb. 2023, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/congress/2023/02/democrats-revive-anti-schedule-f-bill-with-a-few-tweaks-and-a-new-name/. Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. Learning While Governing: Expertise and Accountability in the Executive Branch. University of Chicago Press, 2012. GAO. Civil Service: Agency Responses and Perspectives on Former Executive Order to Create a New Schedule F Category of Federal Positions | U.S. GAO. 28 Sept. 2022, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105504. Lewis, David E. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton University Press, 2008. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt7rnqz. Lewis, David E., and Mark D. Richardson. “The Very Best People: President Trump and the Management of Executive Personnel.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 51, no. 1, 2021, pp. 51–70. Wiley Online Library, https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12697. Makita, Jun. “A Study of the Functions of Political Appointees from a Comparative Perspective.” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, vol. 7, no. 1, Mar. 2022, pp. 146–61. SAGE Journals, https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911211036943. Moynihan, Don. “A Tangible Thing You Can Do Today to Fight Trump’s Takeover of the Federal Government.” Can We Still Govern?, 15 Nov. 2023, https://donmoynihan.substack.com/p/a-tangible-thing-you-can-do-today. Moynihan, Donald P. “Public Management for Populists: Trump’s Schedule F Executive Order and the Future of the Civil Service.” Public Administration Review, vol. 82, no. 1, 2022, pp. 174–78. Wiley Online Library, https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13433. MSPB. “Reforming Federal Hiring - Beyond Faster and Cheaper.” Office of Policy and Hiring, 2006. OIG. “Evaluation of the Department of State’s Use of Schedule B Hiring Authority.” OIG, 2018. OIRA. “View Rule: Upholding Civil Service Protections and Merit System Principles.” Reginfo.Gov, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202310&RIN=3206-AO56. Accessed 14 Dec. 2023. 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Rainey, Hal G. “Perceptions of Incentives in Business and Government: Implications for Civil Service Reform.” Public Administration Review, vol. 39, no. 5, 1979, pp. 440–48. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/3109918. Rein, Lisa, et al. “Trump’s Historic Assault on the Civil Service Was Four Years in the Making.” Washington Post, 24 Oct. 2020. www.washingtonpost.com, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-federal-civil-service/2020/10/23/02fbf05c-1549-11eb-ba42-ec6a580836ed_story.html. “SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS 1956.” CIA FOIA, 5 May 2010, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp63t00245r000100180018-2. Swan, Jonathan, et al. “Biden Administration Aims to Trump-Proof the Federal Work Force.” The New York Times, 15 Sept. 2023. NYTimes.com, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/15/us/politics/trump-biden-schedule-f.html. Swan, Jonathan, and Maggie Haberman. “Heritage Foundation Makes Plans to Staff Next G.O.P. Administration.” The New York Times, 20 Apr. 2023. 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Tables Table 1: OPM Significant Rules, 2013-2023 Rule Name Date Finalized Date Proposed Time Passed (Days) Appointment of Current and Former Land Management Employees 12/6/23 5/15/20 1300 Fair Chance to Compete For Jobs 9/1/23 4/27/22 492 Federal Employees' Retirement System; Present Value Conversion Factors for Spouses of Deceased Separated Employees 9/28/23 7/14/23 76 Retirement: Members of Congress and Congressional Employees 5/17/23 11/16/22 182 Access to Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) for Employees of Certain Tribally Controlled Schools 4/13/22 9/3/21 222 Enhancing Stability and Flexibility for the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program (FLTCIP)-Abbreviated Underwriting, Applications for FLTCIP Coverage, and Technical Corrections 11/16/22 6/3/22 166 Probation on Initial Appointment to a Competitive Position, Performance-Based Reduction in Grade and Removal Actions and Adverse Actions (repeal) 11/10/22 1/4/22 310 Temporary and Term Employment 12/1/22 9/14/20 808 Opportunities To Enroll and Change Enrollment in the FEHB Program During a Lapse in Appropriations; Continuation of Certain Insurance Benefits During a Lapse in Appropriations 4/2/21 7/20/20 256 Promotion and Internal Placement 6/8/21 12/16/19 540 Representative Payees Under the Civil Service Retirement System and Federal Employees' Retirement System 10/8/21 3/8/21 214 Federal Employees Health Benefits Acquisition Regulations: Self Plus One and Contract Matrix Update 3/25/20 4/2/19 358 Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Program: Clarifying Annual Rates of Pay and Amending the Employment Status of Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 9/24/20 6/29/18 818 Probation on Initial Appointment to a Competitive Position, Performance-Based Reduction in Grade and Removal Actions and Adverse Actions 10/16/20 9/17/19 395 Compensatory Time Off for Religious Observances and Other Miscellaneous Changes 4/29/19 8/30/13 2068 Examining System 5/3/19 10/29/18 186 Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program: Extension of Eligibility to Certain TRICARE-Eligible Individuals; Effective Date of Enrollment 6/7/19 11/19/18 200 Federal Employees' Retirement System; Present Value Conversion Factors for Spouses of Deceased Separated Employees 9/23/19 5/28/19 118 Federal Employees Health Benefits Program Flexibilities 4/27/18 12/19/17 129 Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Removal of Eligible and Ineligible Individuals From Existing Enrollments 1/23/18 12/1/16 418 General Schedule Locality Pay Areas 12/7/18 7/9/18 151 Veterans' Preference 12/7/18 12/27/16 710 Weather and Safety Leave 4/10/18 7/13/17 271 Career and Career-Conditional Employment 12/8/16 1/6/14 1067 Family and Medical Leave Act; Definition of Spouse 4/8/16 6/23/14 655 Access to Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) for Employees of Certain Indian Tribal Employers 12/28/16 8/31/16 119 Special Rights for Transferred Employees Under the Dodd-Frank Act Regarding Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance 9/1/16 1/6/14 969 Personnel Management in Agencies 12/12/16 2/8/16 308 Recruitment, Selection, and Placement (General) and Suitability 12/1/16 5/2/16 213 Designation of National Security Positions in the Competitive Service, and Related Matters 6/5/15 12/4/10 1644 Federal Employees Health Benefits Program Self Plus One Enrollment Type 9/17/15 12/2/14 289 Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Enrollment Options Following the Termination of a Plan or Plan Option 10/8/15 1/7/15 274 Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: FEHB Plan Performance Assessment System 6/30/15 12/15/14 197 Federal Employees Health Benefits Program; Subrogation and Reimbursement Recovery 5/21/15 1/7/15 134 Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program Eligibility Changes 10/30/15 11/13/14 351 Managing Senior Executive Performance 9/25/15 12/10/14 289 Solicitation of Federal Civilian and Uniformed Service Personnel for Contributions to Private Voluntary Organizations 10/23/15 8/17/15 67 Collection by Offset From Indebted Government Employees 1/6/14 5/2/11 980 Nondiscrimination Provisions 7/29/14 9/4/13 328 Phased Retirement 8/8/14 6/5/13 429 Electronic Retirement Processing 11/18/13 3/5/13 258 Excepted Service-Appointment of Persons With Intellectual Disabilities, Severe Physical Disabilities, and Psychiatric Disabilities 2/22/13 2/7/12 381 Garnishment of Accounts Containing Federal Benefit Payments 5/29/13 4/19/10 1136 Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Members of Congress and Congressional Staff 10/2/13 8/8/13 55 Expanding Coverage of Children; Federal Flexible Benefits Plan: Pre-Tax Payment of Health Benefits Premiums: Conforming Amendments 10/30/13 7/20/12 467 General Schedule Locality Pay Areas 1/24/13 11/26/12 59 Programs for Specific Positions and Examinations (Miscellaneous) 12/2/13 9/7/10 1182 AVERAGE: 473 days Figures Figure 1: OPM RULEMAKING AVERAGE TIMELINE Figure 2: OPM RULEMAKING TIMELINE BY YEAR

Fiscal Pressures and Democratic Engagement: The Differential Impact of Public Debt on Voter Turnout Across Levels of Governance in the European Union Economics Previous Next BY Alexandra Bertilsson Advised by Professor Henry Shim and Assistant Instructor So Hye Yoon Princeton University Economics Department HONOR PLEDGE I pledge my honor that this paper represents my own work and was completed in accordance with university regulations under the Honor Code. AI DISCLOSURE I disclose that I used Generative AI in the writing of this paper under the guidance of, and with the full knowledge of my faculty advisor. I assert that my use of Generative AI has been documented and detailed within this paper and that all prompts have been saved and can be produced on demand, if required. ABSTRACT This paper investigates how public debt influences voter turnout across national and supra-national elections, situating the analysis within a period marked by historically elevated debt burdens and mounting concerns over democratic participation in Europe. In particular, this analysis looks at whether voters differentiate national and EU-level responsibility when evaluating fiscal pressures and the decision to vote. By applying fixed effects regression models to panel data from 27 EU member states between 2000 and 2023, I find that debt does not uniformly affect voter turnout. Its impact is heterogeneous across economic contexts and levels of governance. In countries with more stable economies, high public debt drives voter turnout in European elections, but depresses voter engagement at the national level. In less stable economies, higher debt is actually positively associated with voter turnout and has no significant effect at the national level. Further analysis reveals that unemployment rates play a key mediating role in the relationship between debt and voter turnout: in countries with high unemployment, voters may view debt as a necessary response to economic hardship, while in low-unemployment economies, debt is often perceived as fiscal irresponsibility, leading to political disengagement or disillusionment. These findings contribute to the literature on economic voting and democratic accountability in multilevel governance systems. 1. Introduction “It must, indeed, be one of these two events; either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation.” David Hume, “Of Public Credit” Public debt is a critical instrument of fiscal policy: when used judiciously, it can stabilize output during downturns and fund essential investments. However, if it is mismanaged, it poses significant long-term risks. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act of 2020 – a $2.2 trillion stimulus package – illustrates this ambivalence. While it provided essential relief during the COVID-19 pandemic, it also increased the U.S. national debt from $23.2 trillion to over $27 trillion by the end of the year (U.S. Treasury, 2020). This shows one way fiscal expansions can support employment and output, while also eroding fiscal flexibility, crowding out investment, and triggering inflationary pressures. However, the U.S. experience also highlights an important contrast: EU member states confront far more stringent fiscal and institutional constraints than the United States, including the Stability and Growth Pact, supranational oversight through the European Commission and Council, and the absence of a fully centralized fiscal authority capable of providing large-scale countercyclical support. As a result, debt accumulation in the EU carries distinct political and economic implications. Member states cannot rely on the same degree of federal backstopping, face external surveillance of national budgets, and must navigate electorates that increasingly attribute responsibility not only to national governments but also to EU institutions. These features make the study of public debt particularly salient in the European context, where fiscal pressures interact with questions of democratic legitimacy, electoral engagement, and multilevel governance. While debt management falls primarily to national governments, economic governance in democratic systems is not exclusively the domain of technocrats – it is a collective task shaped by citizen engagement. In this view, elections are a critical mechanism through which voters influence fiscal and economic decision-making. Ideally, electoral outcomes reflect this dynamic, with voters acting as economic stakeholders who help shape the trajectory of national economic governance. This model presumes a unitary authority structure in which responsibility for economic conditions is clearly attributable to the national government. In reality, contemporary governance is increasingly multi-levelled. Institutions like the European Union now wield significant authority over economic policy, particularly in areas like monetary policy, fiscal rules, and budgetary oversight. This dispersal of authority complicates a core assumption of economic voting: that voters can accurately identify which political actors are responsible for economic outcomes. Attribution becomes blurred when national governments operate under supranational constraints, or when EU institutions shape the fiscal environment within which domestic policymakers must act. Moreover, despite extensive scholarship examining how macroeconomic indicators like inflation, unemployment, or growth influence vote choice, far less attention has been paid to how these conditions affect voter turnout – and even less to how public debt, a slow-moving but politically consequential fiscal variable, shapes citizens’ decisions to participate. By interrogating the link between public debt and turnout within this multi-level governance structure, this study speaks to an underexplored dimension of economic voting and democratic accountability. This paper addresses that gap by examining how voters respond to government debt in both national and supranational elections in EU member states. It investigates whether debt levels influence voter turnout, and whether this relationship differs across institutional scales and degrees of integration within the European Union. Given the current context of rising populism, Brexit, and persistently low electoral participation, understanding how fiscal pressures shape democratic engagement is both timely and policy-relevant. By focusing on debt – a complex, long-term economic indicator – this research contributes to broader debates on political accountability, democratic legitimacy, and the evolving contours of economic citizenship in multilevel governance systems. In short, it asks: Do voters distinguish between national and supranational responsibility when evaluating economic performance, and how does this attribution affect their decision to participate in elections? 2. Literature Review A central ambiguity in modern democracies – particularly those embedded in multi-level governance systems like the European Union – is how voters attribute responsibility for economic performance. When fiscal authority is divided between national and supranational institutions, the lines of accountability become blurred. This raises a critical question: in light of fiscal pressures, does this attributional ambiguity shape not only vote choice, but the more fundamental decision to participate in elections at all? A longstanding strand of research in comparative political behavior examines how economic conditions shape citizens’ willingness to participate in elections. Within this literature, Radcliff offers one of the earliest and most influential arguments linking macroeconomic performance to voter turnout. He frames economic downturns as a challenge to democratic responsiveness, contending that adverse conditions suppress turnout by discouraging “potential punishers” from participating (Radcliff, 1992, 444). This highlights a core assumption in economic voting theory – that political dissatisfaction naturally translates into higher electoral engagement – but overlooks the possibility that economic distress itself constrains political participation. This paper examines whether government debt affects not just political sentiment, but actual political participation. The economic voting literature traditionally focuses on vote choice, where elections serve as mechanisms of retrospective accountability (Merrifield, 1993, 657). It builds on the reward-and-retribution model, which defines elections as the tool by which voters endorse or penalize incumbents based on economic performance. A smaller but growing body of work examines the decision to vote at all. In his seminal work “Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout,” Rosenstone offers a dynamic model of turnout, arguing that economic hardship depresses participation by raising opportunity costs, fostering alienation, and shifting voter priorities toward material survival. Rosenstone’s approach echoes the pocketbook voter hypothesis, which assumes that individuals base political decisions on their immediate financial well-being. Other authors argue that economic adversity can serve as a mobilizing force, driving voter participation by heightening political engagement. Burden and Wichowski, for example, find that economic downturns increase turnout as citizens seek to hold leaders accountable and demand corrective policies (Burden & Wichowsky, 2014, 887). However, their study, like Rosenstone’s, focuses primarily on unemployment rates, reinforcing the literature’s tendency to privilege short-term, tangible economic indicators over more abstract macroeconomic conditions such as public debt. This paper adds to that tradition by introducing government debt as a longer-term, lower-salience economic factor, and asking whether it operates differently depending on the level of government responsibility. This allows for the possibility of heterogeneous effects across levels of governance. Understanding how macroeconomic precarity influences turnout requires understanding how voters assign responsibility for those conditions. In the EU context, this is particularly complex due to the intertwined national and supranational governance structures. At the national level, member states retain formal sovereignty and maintain their own governments, constitutions, legal systems, and many public policies. However, in key areas—especially monetary and fiscal policy—competence is partially delegated upward to EU institutions such as the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the Council of the EU. This pooling of authority constrains the fiscal autonomy of member states, meaning that national policymakers cannot fully control economic conditions within their borders. As a result, citizens may struggle to disentangle which level of government is responsible for macroeconomic performance. When decisions are made at the supranational level, democratic accountability can become more diffuse. Citizens often feel further removed from EU decision-makers, and this institutional distance can foster perceptions of alienation from policy outcomes enacted in Brussels. Hobolt & Tilley show that voters struggle to differentiate between national and supranational authority, often directing their anger towards the EU rather than local politicians. Specifically, they write that in the multilevel system of the EU, citizens face the additional challenge of distinguishing between the powers of multiple levels of government. They show that this effect is particularly strong for fiscal policy. This has direct implications for turnout: if voters perceive no clear locus of accountability, they may disengage altogether. Alternatively, they may enact rewards and retribution towards the ‘wrong’ political actors. This paper uses cross-level electoral variation to examine how attributional ambiguity shapes the relationship between debt and voter turnout. Relatedly, second-order election theory suggests that European Parliament elections are often viewed as lower-stakes contests, where voters express discontent or abstain altogether (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). This logic assumes that voters apply similar evaluative criteria to both arenas. However, if economic conditions, such as government debt, are interpreted differently depending on perceived responsibility, this challenges the second-order model’s assumption of apathy alone. When citizens perceive high public debt as stemming from EU-imposed fiscal constraints or supranational economic governance, abstention or protest voting may be directed toward the European level. Conversely, when debt is attributed to domestic fiscal mismanagement, national elections may become venues for mobilization. This is especially important in the context of the mobilization hypothesis: Garrick et al. (2014) suggest that voter engagement increases when elections are perceived as having greater political significance. Their findings imply that economic distress, amplified by rising debt burdens, can heighten the perceived stakes of elections—but not uniformly across levels of governance. As a result, public debt may either depress turnout (where responsibility seems diffuse and agency limited) or mobilize participation (where accountability appears clear). Recognizing this variation can help us understand how debt-related economic precarity shapes electoral behavior in multilevel systems such as the EU. 3. Hypothesis This paper investigates whether voters attribute fiscal pressures – specifically, public debt – to national governments or supranational institutions such as the European Union, and whether this attribution influences their decision to participate in elections. The existing literature suggests two competing theoretical mechanisms: Withdrawal Hypothesis: High public debt signals economic mismanagement, undermining political trust and fostering alienation. Under this framework, elevated debt levels are expected to depress voter turnout. Mobilization Hypothesis: High debt signals economic crisis or instability, heightening public concern and prompting voters to engage politically in hopes of influencing corrective policy. Here, debt is expected to increase turnout. Importantly, the applicability of these mechanisms may vary across levels of governance. If voters primarily hold national governments responsible for fiscal management, the relationship between debt and turnout should be more pronounced in national elections. Conversely, if voters perceive fiscal constraints as the product of supranational oversight – particularly EU fiscal rules and austerity measures – then this relationship may be stronger in European Parliament elections. Alternatively, if voters struggle to assign responsibility clearly in a multi-level governance system, the effect of debt on participation may be weakened or inconsistent. These considerations motivate the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: High levels of debt have no significant effect on turnout in national elections, as voters may not associate long-term fiscal indicators with national-level policy responsibility. The diffuse, abstract nature of debt renders it less salient in elections typically dominated by more tangible concerns, like inflation or unemployment. Hypothesis 2: High levels of public debt are associated with higher turnout in European Parliament elections, as voters turn to supranational institutions they perceive as more capable of managing broad, long-term macroeconomic challenges. Hypothesis 3: The relationship between public debt and turnout varies across EU member states - likely stronger in post-crisis economies like Greece or Spain, where debt is linked to supranational governance, and weaker in fiscally stable countries like France or Germany. 4. Data 1. Data Sources To test these hypotheses and examine the relationship between public debt and voter turnout, I used four data sources to construct a panel dataset containing data on 27 EU member states from 2000 to 2023. The following sections describe each source and how it was used. Dependent Variable: Voter Turnout Data Data on voter turnout was obtained from the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA), which provides consistent turnout figures for both National Parliamentary Elections and European Parliamentary elections across all 27 EU member states. To ensure comparability, I only used first-round turnout figures, as second-round data were inconsistently reported and may reflect strategic participation instead of baseline voter engagement. Turnout is measured as a proportion between 0 and 1 (e.g., 0.90 indicates 90% turnout). Independent Variable: Government Debt Public debt data, expressed as a percentage of GDP, was sourced from Eurostat, the European Union’s official statistical office. The variable reflects the general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio at current market prices, in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This measure includes all consolidated debt – currency and deposits, debt securities, and loans – across central, state, and local governments, as well as social security funds. Because excessive debt may raise concerns about repayment capacity, crowd out private investment, or trigger inflationary pressures, it serves as a meaningful indicator of fiscal stress. In this context, the key question is whether voters perceive these macroeconomic conditions as politically salient—and whether they link them to national or supranational institutions. Control Variables: Economic and Demographic Indicators To account for other structural factors that influence turnout, I include a range of economic and demographic controls: GDP growth (rate at which the monetary values of all goods and services produced within a country's borders grows from year to year), consumer price index (CPI), unemployment, education, net earnings, and the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI). Economic Indicators: GDP growth, CPI, and unemployment data were drawn from the World Bank. GDP growth is measured as the annual percentage change in real GDP. The CPI is indexed to a 2010 base year, and unemployment is expressed as a percentage of the total labor force. Including these controls ensures that the estimated effect of public debt is not conflated with broader macroeconomic fluctuations that may also influence political behavior. Socioeconomic Controls: Education and net earnings data come from Eurostat. Educational attainment is measured as the percentage of individuals aged 25–64 with tertiary education, capturing a key determinant of civic engagement. Net earnings refer to the average annual income of a single, childless individual earning 100% of the national average, measured in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) to ensure cross-country comparability. Both variables help account for socioeconomic status and life conditions that may shape an individual’s likelihood of voting. Control Variable: Institutional Quality Finally, I include the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. The EDI captures the integrity, fairness, and inclusiveness of electoral processes, serving as a proxy for institutional quality. Given the diversity of democratic institutions across the EU – from consolidated systems like France and Germany to newer democracies like Hungary and Poland – this index adjusts for cross-country variation in the strength and legitimacy of electoral systems. It also helps account for broader political and institutional factors that could mediate the relationship between debt and voter turnout. ________________ 2. Exploratory Data Analysis Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Year 648 2000 2023 EDI (V-Dem Index) 648 .84 .079 .44 .922 Debt (% of GDP) 648 60.247 35.527 3.9 209.4 GDP (% Δ year to year) 648 2.458 3.86 -14.839 24.475 CPI (base year 2010) 648 101.529 17.557 31.982 177.341 Unemployment (% of Labor Force) 648 8.338 4.271 1.805 27.686 EU Parliamentary Turnout (% of registered voting population) 106 .4645 0.186 0.131 0.913 National Turnout (% of registered voting population) 147 .6672 0.161 0.178 0.97 Education 642 28.009 9.948 5.4 54.5 NetEarnings (Purchasing Power Standards) 597 17995.357 7269.571 2729.65 38855.65 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables included in the analysis. The data reveal substantial variation across economic indicators and voter turnout, reflecting the heterogeneity of the EU’s political and economic landscape. The average government debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 60.25%, with a wide range spanning from 3.9% to 209.4%, indicating substantial fiscal disparities among EU countries. Voter turnout also varies considerably, with national elections exhibiting higher participation (mean = 66.72%) compared to European Parliament elections (mean = 46.45%). The Electoral Development Index (EDI), which measures the quality of electoral systems, has a high average of 0.84, though substantial variation across countries reflects differing electoral system maturities within the EU. Economic indicators display expected variation, with GDP growth ranging from a severe contraction of -14.8% to a rapid expansion of 24.5%, further underscoring economic disparities. The Consumer Price Index (CPI), indexed to the base year 2010, reveals substantial inflationary pressures across the period from 2000 to 2023. These descriptive patterns point to the need for fixed effects in the analysis to account for country- and year-level differences. A correlation matrix was generated to examine the pairwise relationships between all variables (Table 3). It inherently accounts for differences in scale between variables by dividing the covariance by the product of the standard deviations of the two variables. As a result, there's no need to standardize the variables beforehand. Table 3: Pairwise Correlation Matrix Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (1) Year 1.000 (2) EDI -0.017 1.000 (3) Unemployment -0.056 0.063 1.000 (4) EU Turnout -0.053 0.380 -0.152 1.000 (5) National Turnout -0.176 0.379 -0.258 0.761 1.000 (6) Education 0.709 0.274 -0.166 0.344 0.265 1.000 (7) GDP 0.047 -0.137 -0.005 -0.048 -0.088 0.113 1.000 (8) Net Earnings 0.239 0.622 -0.280 0.720 0.661 0.583 -0.178 1.000 (9) GDP 0.047 -0.137 -0.005 -0.048 -0.088 0.113 1.000 -0.178 1.000 (10) CPI 0.922 -0.079 -0.246 -0.073 -0.073 0.639 -0.066 0.238 -0.066 1.000 (11) Debt 0.318 0.298 0.545 0.053 -0.073 -0.011 -0.133 0.157 -0.133 0.154 1.000 The analysis reveals several factors influencing voter turnout in both national and EU parliamentary elections. A strong positive relationship exists between net earnings and voter turnout, with higher economic prosperity linked to increased political engagement, as reflected in the significant correlations with both EU (0.720) and National Turnout (0.661). Education also positively correlates with turnout, with moderate associations to both EU (0.344) and National Turnout (0.265), suggesting that more educated populations are more likely to participate in elections. Unemployment shows weak negative correlations with turnout (-0.152 for EU, -0.258 for national), aligning with the economic voting literature that suggests economic hardship may dampen voter engagement. While CPI and debt exhibit subtle correlations with voter turnout, their effects are relatively weak, indicating that inflation and government debt do not significantly influence participation in this dataset. Interestingly, debt is moderately correlated with unemployment (0.545), implying that higher debt burdens may contribute to economic strain and rising unemployment, potentially reducing political engagement. Ultimately, these results underscore the complex interplay of economic factors – especially earnings, education, and unemployment – in shaping voter turnout. One concern is that Debt and GDP are highly correlated, potentially introducing multicollinearity into the model. Indeed, the correlation matrix reveals a coefficient of -0.133 between debt and GDP. which is fairly weak, but still deserves our attention. While multicollinearity does not bias the estimates, it can inflate standard errors, making the true effects appear statistically insignificant. Estimates are not biased because the regression model remains correctly specified, with an error term mean of zero and regressors unrelated to the error term. Standard errors however may be inflated because when regressors are correlated, they contain overlapping information about the outcome and the model struggles to attribute this variation to one regressor or the other. This supports the interpretation that initial observed insignificance may be due to imprecision rather than the absence of an effect. Despite these relationships, there initially seems to be little systematic association between debt and turnout, as evidenced by Figures 1 and 2. [Reference: Figure 1] Figure 1: Scatterplot of National Turnout and Public Debt [Reference: Figure 2] Figure 2: Scatterplot of EU Parliamentary Turnout and Public Debt While the exploratory data analysis above – including the correlation matrix and the scatterplots – relies on raw, unstandardized variables for clarity and interpretability, all subsequent regression models use standardized versions of continuous variables. This ensures comparability across variables with differing units and scales and reduces the risk that high-variance variables dominate the analysis. Standardization also improves interpretability of regression coefficients and facilitates valid cross-variable comparisons. The transformation was done via Stata’s standardize command, applying the formula: Standardized Value = (Value - Mean of Variable) / (Standard Deviation of Variable) Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Standardised Variables Variable Obs Min Max Year 648 2000 2023 Standardized EDI 648 -5.055 1.032 Standardized Debt 648 -1.586 4.198 Standardized GDP 648 -4.48 5.703 Standardized CPI 648 -3.961 4.318 Standardized Unemployment 648 -1.53 4.53 Standardized EU Parliamentary Turnout 106 -1.791 2.408 Standardized National Turnout 147 -3.047 1.883 Standardized Education 642 -2.273 2.663 Standardized Net Earnings 597 -2.1 2.87 3. Clustering the Data Given the diversity among EU member states, I employed k-means clustering to group countries based on their economic, demographic, and electoral characteristics. This unsupervised learning method was chosen to identify natural clusters of countries with similar profiles. The optimal number of clusters was determined using the Calinski-Harabasz (CH) index, which evaluates the quality of clustering by comparing the variance within clusters to the variance between clusters. This method produced two clusters (CH-index = 8.83): Group 0 (group0 == 0): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden. Group 1 (group0 == 1): Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain. These clusters were then analyzed to assess whether different groups of countries exhibited significant differences in their political and economic profiles (Table 4). ________________ Table 4: Summary Statistics by Group (non-standardized variables) Group 0 N Mean SD Min Max Debt 240 66.499 31.408 7.4 154.3 GDP 240 1.55 2.555 -8.974 8.31 CPI 240 102.978 12.714 80.053 143.946 Unemployment 240 6.735 2.177 1.805 12.683 EU Parliamentary Turnout 40 0.57 0.185 0.368 0.913 National Turnout 46 0.788 0.124 0.412 0.924 Education 236 31.581 9.207 09.7 52.3 NetEarnings 239 24073.766 4852.083 13788.32 38855.65 EDI 240 0.884 0.021 0.836 0.922 Group 1 Debt 408 56.57 37.291 3.9 209.4 GDP 408 2.993 4.369 -14.839 24.475 CPI 408 100.677 19.828 31.982 177.341 Unemployment 408 9.281 4.879 2.015 27.686 EU Parliamentary Turnout 66 0.4 0.157 0.131 0.824 National Turnout 101 0.612 0.144 0.178 0.97 Education 406 25.933 9.782 5.4 54.5 NetEarnings 358 13937.424 5593.107 2729.65 30327.16 EDI 408 0.815 0.089 0.44 0.908 Group 0 exhibits a higher Electoral Development Index (EDI) with a mean of 0.884 (SD = 0.021) compared to Group 1’s mean of 0.815 (SD = 0.089), indicating stronger electoral institutions and less variability. Voter turnout also differs significantly; Group 0 demonstrates greater participation in both EU parliamentary elections (mean = 0.57 vs. 0.4) and national elections (mean = .788 vs. .612), reflecting a more robust democratic culture. Economic indicators further underscore the contrast: Group 0 shows a slow but stable GDP growth (mean = 1.55, SD = 2.555), while Group 1 experiences faster growth but more extreme fluctuations (mean = 2.993, SD = 4.369), and a lower debt-to-GDP ratio (mean0 = 66.499 vs. mean1 56.57). CPI inflation is higher in Group 0 (mean = 102.978) compared to the more stable mean in Group 1 (100.677), but this difference is not statistically significant (p =0.0537). Unemployment is notably lower in Group 0 (mean = 6.735, SD = 2.177), while Group 1 experiences higher unemployment (mean = 9.281, SD = 4.879), with more pronounced volatility. Additionally, Group 0 benefits from better socioeconomic conditions, with higher education (mean = 31.581 vs. 25.933) and net earnings (mean = 24073.77 vs. 13937.42). Overall, Group 0 exhibits stronger democratic institutions, more stable economies, and higher participation rates, while Group 1 faces greater volatility, weaker institutions, and lower levels of engagement and economic performance. These findings suggest that democratic strength, economic stability, and voter participation are interlinked, with Group 0 showing more favorable conditions for political and economic stability. Other factors that could have influenced this turnout are electoral system design, ease of registration and voting procedures, and level of trust in political institutions. 4. Handling Missing Data My data set contained two types of missing data: missing data in voter turnout in EU and National elections – which is normal due to the cyclical nature of election cycles – and missing data for Net Earnings (51 missing observations) and Education (6 missing observations). I selected turnout data as the focus of my missing data analysis because turnout is not randomly assigned. Certain individuals and groups are systematically more or less likely to vote. If these differences correlate with key explanatory variables (e.g., economic conditions, political engagement), then analyses of turnout may suffer from selection bias. By creating inverse probability weights, we adjust for differences in the probability of voting, ensuring that our results are not driven by non-random turnout patterns. This allows us to estimate relationships between variables (such as debt and turnout) in a way that better represents the full electorate rather than just those who are more likely to vote. Additionally, we know that countries that joined the EU after 2000 - like Bulgaria which joined in 2007, or Croatia which joined in 2013 - are underrepresented in EU turnout data because of structural differences in voting eligibility. A report from the Center of European Reform (CER) shows that structural adaptation (electoral registers, voting information, etc.) often lag in new members, creating a structurally lower turnout rate in early elections (Grant & Csaky, 2025). To make our sample more representative of the actual electorate, we use inverse probability weighting and give more weight to underrepresented observations. Finally, if education, income, or political attitudes disproportionately affect national turnout more than EU turnout, weighting helps balance these characteristics across groups, making the comparison more meaningful. 5. Methodology 1. Regression Model Specification To analyze the impact of government debt on voter turnout, I will begin by treating the dataset as a single cross-section, performing two pooled OLS regressions with standardized variables. Following this, I will run models that account for both identity and time fixed effects. This approach allows for a more detailed understanding of the relationship between government debt and voter turnout. Since the regressions will be conducted separately for Group 0 and Group 1, and with both fixed effects included, this will result in a total of eight regression tables. (3) National Parliamentary Turnoutit= α+ β⋅Government Debtit+ γ⋅Xit+i +t+ it (4) EU Parliamentary Turnoutit = α+ β⋅Government Debtit+ γ⋅Xit +i +t+ it Xit : Control Variables (GDP, CPI, Unemployment, EDI, Net Earnings, Education) i: Identity Fixed-Effects t: Time Fixed-Effects The fixed-effects model operates under the assumption that entity-specific fixed effects are correlated with the independent variables. This aligns with the economic intuition that a country's time-invariant characteristics are likely to influence the level of government debt it accrues. This assumption makes the fixed-effects model more appropriate for this analysis than the random-effects model, as the random-effects model relies on the assumption that the entity-specific effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables, which could make it produce biased estimates in the debt/turnout context. Finally, the fixed-effects approach is particularly valuable because it addresses omitted variable bias by effectively "differencing out" these unobserved, time-invariant effects. 6. Results Table 6 presents the results of the pooled OLS regression examining the relationship between public debt and voter turnout across a sample of 27 countries, combining Group 0 and Group 1. All variables are standardized to ensure consistent magnitudes and comparability of the coefficients. The table reports two specifications: Model 1, which is a pooled OLS regression with controls, and Model 2, which incorporates both time and identity fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Model 1 uses the weights “weight_national” and “weight_eu,” while Model 2 uses “avg_weight_national” and “avg_weight_eu” to ensure inter-country consistency. Table 6: Pooled OLS Regression (Group 0 & Group 1 Combined) Model 1 Model 2 No Fixed Effects With Fixed Effects (1) (2) (3) (2) VARIABLES National Turnout EU Turnout National Turnout EU Turnout Debt 0.0444 0.155 -0.167 0.126 (0.0715) (0.123) (0.187) (0.187) GDP Growth -0.0486 -0.0492 -0.146*** -0.0256 (0.0762) (0.0707) (0.0490) (0.145) CPI -0.582*** -0.450*** -0.335* -0.0433 (0.0953) (0.166) (0.188) (0.187) Unemployment -0.190*** -0.0510 -0.0927 -0.00488 (0.0683) (0.0979) (0.0616) (0.0968) EDI -0.118 -0.257*** -0.215*** -0.0711 (0.0819) (0.0884) (0.0723) (0.0878) NetEarnings 0.699*** 0.636*** 0.319 0.852** (0.0879) (0.154) (0.311) (0.335) Education -0.0313 0.123 0.291*** -0.00223 (0.0902) (0.142) (0.102) (0.218) Constant 0.139** 0.0168 0.337 0.126 (0.0626) (0.0886) (0.435) (0.187) Observations 133 101 133 101 R-squared 0.481 0.381 0.346 0.253 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The results suggest that debt does not have a statistically significant impact on voter turnout at either the national or EU level in any specification. In Model 1 (without fixed effects), debt appears to be positively associated with both national and EU turnout, but these relationships are not significant. After incorporating fixed effects in Model 2, the coefficient for debt on national turnout turns negative (-0.167), while it remains positive for EU turnout (0.126), but neither reaches statistical significance. This lack of significance indicates that debt alone is not a decisive factor influencing voter turnout when controlling for other economic and institutional factors. However, while debt may not directly mobilize voters, it still contributes to broader perceptions of economic performance, institutional legitimacy, and policy pressure – all of which shape turnout. The inclusion of fixed effects also suggests that unobserved heterogeneity – such as country-specific political or economic conditions – may be masking any potential direct effect of debt. Furthermore, the relatively small sample size (133 observations for national elections, 101 for EU elections) may limit the statistical power needed to detect more subtle relationships. Model 2 provides stronger evidence by accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. GDP growth significantly reduces national turnout (-0.146, SD = 0.0490, p < 0.01), suggesting that economic stability pacifies voters, weakening the mobilizing effect of economic downturns. Inflation also negatively impacts national turnout (-0.335, SD = 0.188, p < 0.1), reinforcing the "pocketbook voter" hypothesis, but is insignificant at the EU level. This reflects a broader feature of the European political landscape: economic grievances do not translate uniformly across governance levels. EU elections typically follow a second-order structure in which voters attribute primary economic responsibility to national governments rather than EU institutions. Consequently, macroeconomic indicators that influence participation domestically often have weaker or indeterminate effects in EU contexts. Similarly, higher electoral development (EDI: -0.215, SD = 0.0723) appears to foster complacency, reducing national turnout. Conversely, net earnings significantly boost EU turnout (0.852, SD = 0.335, p < 0.05), indicating that financial security enhances engagement in supranational elections. Education positively influences national turnout (0.291, SD = 0.102, p < 0.01), emphasizing its role in fostering civic participation. These findings highlight the economic and institutional drivers of turnout at national and EU levels. ________________ Table 7: Disaggregated Pooled OLS by Group (Group 0 vs. Group 1) National Turnout EU Parliamentary Turnout (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Group 0 Group 1 Group 0 Group 1 Debt 0.213 0.0262 0.578 0.0722 (0.248) (0.0850) (0.440) (0.0899) GDP 0.0864 -0.0220 0.189 -0.0619 (0.133) (0.0862) (0.188) (0.0736) CPI -0.530 -0.535*** -0.980 -0.398*** (0.382) (0.108) (0.793) (0.144) Unemployment -0.361* -0.123* -0.227 -0.00131 (0.208) (0.0737) (0.487) (0.0820) EDI 1.099** -0.160* 0.0853 -0.267*** (0.438) (0.0843) (0.723) (0.0808) NetEarnings 0.724** 0.609*** 0.892 0.631*** (0.337) (0.148) (0.781) (0.203) Education -0.252 -0.00706 0.271 0.104 (0.221) (0.104) (0.351) (0.159) Constant -0.485 -0.00436 -0.327 -0.0720 (0.477) (0.106) (0.766) (0.146) Observations 45 88 39 62 R-squared 0.284 0.325 0.128 0.342 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 7 presents the results of Model 1, an OLS regression analysis examining the relationship between economic and electoral factors and voter turnout, disaggregated by Group 0 and Group 1 countries. Group 1 consists of smaller, more vulnerable, and less stable economies, which exhibit distinct patterns of voter participation that are largely shaped by economic conditions and electoral development. When breaking the analysis down by country groups, more nuanced patterns emerge: Debt and National Turnout: In Group 0 (more stable economies), the relationship between debt and national turnout remains positive but insignificant (0.213, SD = 0.248). In Group 1 (less stable economies), the coefficient is much smaller (0.0262, SD = 0.0850), indicating little to no relationship between public debt and national turnout in these contexts. The stronger (though still insignificant) coefficient of 0.213 in Group 0 suggests that in wealthier economies, higher debt levels might weakly correlate with increased voter mobilization – possibly due to concerns over fiscal policy. Debt and EU Turnout: Interestingly, debt appears to have a much stronger (though still statistically insignificant) positive relationship with EU turnout in Group 0 (0.578, SD = 0.440) compared to Group 1 (0.0722, SD = 0.0899). This suggests that in wealthier economies, higher debt may trigger increased participation in EU elections, potentially due to concerns over EU-level economic governance or fiscal policies. However, the large standard errors make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions. Further tests that expand the panel dataset across time could help reduce standard errors and smooth noisy series. In Group 1, economic hardship – measured by CPI, unemployment, and low electoral development – depresses national turnout, while higher net earnings significantly boost participation (0.609, p < 0.01), underscoring the mobilizing effect of financial stability. In contrast, Group 0 countries, with stronger economies, exhibit greater turnout volatility. Here, while unemployment negatively affects participation, EDI becomes a positive predictor (1.099**, SD = 0.438), suggesting that in developed democracies, institutional strength fosters engagement. This refines earlier findings, showing that the negative EDI-turnout relationship in Table 6 was largely driven by Group 1’s weaker democracies. At the EU level, turnout in Group 1 remains sensitive to economic shifts, with CPI reducing participation (-0.398***, SD = 0.144) and net earnings increasing it (0.631***, SD = 0.203). In contrast, Group 0 countries show no significant EU-level effects, suggesting their voters perceive national economic conditions as more detached from EU governance. These findings suggest that Group 1 countries, as newer and more economically fragile EU members, exhibit greater reliance on supranational governance, making their turnout more responsive to economic fluctuations. Meanwhile, Group 0 countries, with stronger institutions and economic stability, experience less economically driven voter behavior, particularly at the EU level. ________________ Table 8: Fixed Effects Model by Group (Group 0 vs. Group 1) National Turnout EU Parliamentary Turnout (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES (Standardized) Group 0 Group 1 Group 0 Group 1 Debt 0.128 0.0123 -0.568** 0.368* (0.483) (0.281) (0.198) (0.201) GDP 0.451 -0.101* 0.00979 0.00506 (0.273) (0.0557) (0.167) (0.179) CPI 2.099 -0.453*** -0.307 0.205 (1.475) (0.133) (0.650) (0.308) Unemployment 0.229 -0.194 -0.0154 -0.0526 (0.279) (0.124) (0.123) (0.115) EDI -3.087* -0.267*** -1.036 -0.0855 (1.554) (0.0874) (0.567) (0.108) Net Earnings 0.422 0.605** 0.546 0.651 (1.136) (0.263) (0.367) (0.502) Education 0.489 0.442* -0.0202 0.0362 (0.644) (0.243) (0.191) (0.421) 2003.year 0.402 -0.928*** (0.532) (0.281) 2009.year -0.469 -0.457 0.155 -0.556** (1.655) (0.432) (0.362) (0.259) 2013.year -2.445 -0.629 -1.336** (2.939) (0.362) (0.480) 2014.year -2.363 -0.791* 0.336 -1.190** (3.370) (0.449) (0.732) (0.515) 2018.year -2.999 -1.160* (3.694) (0.550) Constant 4.096* 0.565 0.626 0.811 (2.036) (0.493) (0.595) (0.570) Observations 45 88 39 62 R-squared 0.757 0.497 0.701 0.246 # of Countries 10 17 10 17 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Debt and National Turnout: The effect of debt on national turnout remains insignificant in both groups, suggesting that after controlling for time-invariant country characteristics, public debt does not systematically drive national electoral participation. However, in Group 0, the sign remains positive (0.128), whereas in Group 1, it is close to zero (0.0123). This reinforces the earlier observation that in wealthier countries, concerns about debt may marginally influence national turnout, but the effect is too weak to reach significance. Additionally, EDI exhibits a significant negative association with national turnout in Group 0, reinforcing earlier findings that high levels of electoral development may inadvertently foster civic complacency, reducing voter participation. A similar trend is observed in Group 1, where EDI remains a strong negative predictor of turnout (-0.267***, SD = 0.0874). This effect is further compounded by the adverse impact of high inflation (CPI: -0.453***, SD = 0.133) on national turnout. However, economic stability appears to counterbalance these trends, as both higher Net Earnings (0.605**) and Education (0.442*) are positively correlated with increased voter participation, suggesting that financial security and educational attainment play key roles in mobilizing voters. Debt and EU Turnout: A striking result emerges in Group 0, where debt is now negatively associated with EU turnout (-0.568**, SD = 0.198, p < 0.05). The change suggests that in Model 1, variation in debt was partially capturing other country-specific factors that were not explicitly controlled for. Model 2 corrects for these influences, isolating the independent effect of debt on turnout. This new result suggests that in wealthier economies, higher debt levels may discourage participation in EU elections, possibly reflecting voter disillusionment with supranational economic governance. These patterns align with earlier arguments regarding responsibility attribution within multilevel governance systems. In wealthier democracies, voters may hold supranational institutions accountable for fiscal constraints, reducing the perceived value of participation, while in less stable contexts, debt may mobilize voters who view the EU as a corrective to domestic economic mismanagement. In contrast, in Group 1, debt is positively correlated with EU turnout (0.368*, SD = 0.201, p < 0.1), indicating that in less stable economies, higher debt may lead to greater electoral engagement at the EU level. This could reflect reliance on EU institutions for financial support or dissatisfaction with national-level economic management. It's important to note how debt coefficients shift sharply from Model 1 (pooled OLS) to Model 2 (fixed effects), highlighting the impact of unobserved heterogeneity. Table 7: Disaggregated Pooled OLS by Group (Group 0 vs. Group 1) National Turnout EU Parliamentary Turnout (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES (Standardized) Group 0 Group 1 Group 0 Group 1 Debt 0.213 0.0262 0.578 0.0722 (0.248) (0.0850) (0.440) (0.0899) Table 8: Fixed Effects Model by Group (Group 0 vs. Group 1) National Turnout EU Parliamentary Turnout (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES (Standardized) Group 0 Group 1 Group 0 Group 1 Debt 0.128 0.0123 -0.568 0.368 (0.483) (0.281) (0.198) (0.201) The most noticeable difference between the two specifications is that, for Group 0, the coefficient on debt jumps from being positive but insignificant in Table 7 (0.578) to being negative and significant at the 5% level in Table 8 (-0.568**). There are a number of possible explanations for these diverging coefficients. First, Table 8 presents a regression with fixed effects, controlling for time-invariant country-specific factors like political culture and institutional strength, which may alter coefficient magnitudes. The shift from 0.578 (Model 1, OLS) to -0.568 (Model 2, FE) suggests that failing to account for these fixed factors in Model 2 biased the debt coefficient upwards. The dramatic shift from a positive to negative coefficient also suggests that in Model 1, some variables may have been positively correlated with both debt and EU parliamentary turnout (fiscal policy, political trust…) that were confounding our estimations. Once fixed effects were included (Model 2), the true within-country effect of debt emerges as negative, meaning that for a given country, when debt increases over time, EU parliamentary turnout tends to decline. This could be due to political disengagement, austerity fatigue, or declining trust in supranational governments. The key takeaway is that fixed effects uncover a strong negative impact of debt on turnout in Group 0, which was obscured in pooled OLS models. This suggests that debt-induced political disengagement is a within-country phenomenon rather than a cross-country effect. To test which countries (if any) are driving the negative relationship between debt and turnout, I iteratively drop each country in Group 0 from the regression and observe how the coefficient on debt changes. For most countries in Group 0, removing them from the regression results in a relatively small change in the coefficient on debt, typically between -0.10 and -0.15 When Denmark is dropped, the coefficient on debt changes to -0.431, and when Germany is dropped, it changes to -0.427. These small shifts suggest that Denmark and Germany are not strongly influencing the relationship between debt and EU Parliamentary Turnout. Four countries stand out as main drivers of the relationship between debt and the outcome variable, because their removal results in much larger changes in the coefficient: (1) Austria: The coefficient on debt becomes -0.381, indicating that Austria is contributing to the negative relationship between debt and the outcome, but its removal moderately weakens the negative association between debt and turnout by 0.187 percentage points. (2) Belgium: The coefficient on debt becomes -0.361, again showing a similar moderate change, meaning Belgium is also playing a significant role in creating a negative relationship between turnout and debt. (3) Italy: The coefficient changes to -0.335, reflecting Italy's substantial impact on the debt-turnout relationship. (4) France: The coefficient becomes -0.603, the most extreme shift and the only one to make the coefficient MORE negative, suggesting that France has a particularly strong influence on the relationship between debt and the outcome. It also points to the fact that France could be an outlier benefitting from a “special case” status - not only are its economic and turnout trends not aligned with other Group 0 countries, French voters seem to be even less responsive to Debt than most others in Group 0. This could reflect the high levels of democratic development and stability in the country, as well as a possible trend of high voter participation in response to economic troubles. France’s unique economic or political circumstances might have been weakening the observed negative relationship between debt and turnout in your model. The result indicates that once France is excluded, the debt-turnout relationship among the remaining Group 0 countries becomes stronger and more consistent. The second noticeable insight is that we observe the opposite effect among countries in Group 1: the coefficient on debt jumps from being almost 0 and insignificant in Table 7 (0.0722) to being much larger and significant at the 10% level in Table 8 (0.368*). This stark jump in magnitude suggests that incorporating fixed effects controls for unobserved heterogeneity reduces a significant amount of omitted variable bias, and therefore produces far more accurate estimates of the impact of debt at the country level. As noted before, it seems that debt impact on EU parliamentary voter turnout is a within-country, rather than a cross-country phenomenon. Two more things: first, we emit a few hypotheses as to why Group 1 countries have a positive association between debt and turnout, in contrast to Group 0 countries. Countries that are in Group 1 - Croatia, Latvia, Romania, Hungary - tend to face greater volatility and unemployment, weaker institutions, and lower levels of engagement and economic performance. These are also countries that are relatively more recent members of the EU, and that have historically relied on and benefited from EU aid and financial stimulus packages. Debt - which is a country-level indicator of economic well being, is also impacted by supranational governance. It may be the case that both Group 0 and Group 1 voters are sensitive to public debt, but if for Group 0 voters it translates with disillusionment with supranational governance (many French citizens - and other members of more stable countries, express criticism towards ‘weaker’ and more reliant member of the EU) and austerity fatigue, Group 1 voters actually trust and turn to supranational bodies of governance for debt management and overall stability support. Another possibility is that Group 1 countries might have a higher proportion of politically active demographics (eg: younger voters, middle-class citizens) who see debt as a critical election issue, while group 0 countries may and do have an older, politically apathetic voter base, where economic hardship reduces the willingness to vote. Lastly, in Group 1, higher debt might increase concerns about EU fiscal policies, leading to greater voter engagement in European elections. In Group 0, voters might feel that EU policies are ineffective in addressing debt, leading to apathy. Second, we want to observe - like we did for Group 0 - if any countries in particular are driving this positive association between debt and turnout. For most countries in Group 1, removing them from the regression results in a moderate drop in the coefficient on debt, typically by about 0.2, often making it insignificant. This suggests that the relationship between debt and EU Parliamentary Turnout in Group 1 is more fragile and dependent on the inclusion of all countries. However, a few countries stand out as key drivers of the observed positive association between debt and turnout, as their removal results in much larger changes in the coefficient estimate: (1) Malta: The coefficient on debt drops to 0.103, and the p-value rises to 0.726, making it highly insignificant. This suggests that Malta plays a role in sustaining the positive relationship, but its removal destabilizes the estimate. The high p-value indicates that the remaining countries do not exhibit a strong debt-turnout relationship. (2) Poland: After Poland is excluded, the coefficient drops to 0.096, but the within-R² decreases to 0.0776, and the regression’s overall significance weakens. This suggests that Poland contributes to the strength of the relationship, though not as dramatically as other countries. (3) Spain: The coefficient drops to 0.064, and while the model fit slightly improves (within-R² = 0.1421), the coefficient remains insignificant. Spain is an important contributor to the positive association; its exclusion weakens the estimated effect of debt on turnout. The results indicate that unlike in Group 0, where some countries (e.g., France, Italy) strongly influenced the debt-turnout relationship in a consistent direction, the relationship in Group 1 is more fragile and heterogeneous. The fact that removing any individual country makes the coefficient insignificant suggests that the positive association between debt and turnout in Group 1 is not robust across all countries but is likely driven by a subset of influential cases. Future analyses could focus on exploring why some countries exhibit this relationship while others do not, potentially by examining country-specific economic conditions, political institutions, or voter attitudes toward debt. This sensitivity in Group 1 could stem from the small sample size; since there are only 17 countries in Group 1 (62 observations), removing one significantly alters the estimates. Country-specific factors may also be coming into play, with certain countries like Poland or Malta having unique political or economic dynamics that strengthen the observed relationship, while others do not. Finally, there may simply be voter behavior differences across all group 1 countries, making the overall trend unstable. Lastly we would like to run a regression analysis with interaction terms to identify if other economic variables actually mediate the impact of debt on turnout - focusing on EU parliamentary turnout since that is where we observe a somewhat significant relationship. ________________ Table 9: OLS regression of EU Turnout on Interacted Economic Variables EU Parliamentary Turnout Standardised Debt 0.008 (0.05) Standardized GDP -0.012 (0.26) Standardized Debt × GDP 0.019 (0.42) Standardized Unemployment -0.058 (0.73) Standardized Debt × Unemployment 0.063 (2.42)* Standardized Net Earnings 0.762 (3.50)** Standardized Debt × NetEarnings -0.026 (0.28) Standardized EDI -0.117 (1.31) Standardized Debt × EDI -0.189 (0.93) Standardized CPI -0.397 (2.62)* Standardized Debt × CPI -0.038 (0.56) Constant 0.045 (1.12) R 2 0.24 N 101 p<0.05; * p <0.01 The results indicate that net earnings have a strong positive effect on turnout (β = 0.7616, p = 0.002), suggesting that higher earnings are associated with increased participation. Inflation has a significant negative effect (β = -0.3974, p = 0.015), implying that higher consumer prices may discourage turnout. The interaction term between debt and unemployment is also significant (β = 0.0626, p = 0.023), indicating that as unemployment rises, the impact of debt on turnout changes. However, other interaction effects, including those involving GDP, net earnings, EDI, and CPI, are not statistically significant, suggesting that these economic factors do not strongly moderate the relationship between debt and turnout. The model as a whole is significant (F = 3.10, p = 0.0087), indicating that at least some of the included variables contribute meaningfully to explaining EU parliamentary turnout. The interaction between debt and unemployment shows that labor market conditions fundamentally shape how public debt influences voter turnout. In economies with higher unemployment, like those in Group 1, public debt may be perceived as a crucial policy tool for stabilizing the economy, funding social programs, and supporting job creation. Voters in these contexts may respond positively to higher debt levels, seeing them as necessary government intervention during economic hardship, which in turn boosts political engagement and turnout. Conversely, in low-unemployment economies like those in Group 0, the negative association between debt and turnout suggests that higher debt may be viewed as fiscal irresponsibility or a risk to economic stability, leading to political disengagement or disillusionment with government policies. This difference aligns with the only significant interaction term (Debt × Unemployment, p = 0.023), indicating that where unemployment is high, the negative effect of debt on turnout diminishes or even turns positive. This reinforces the idea that the economic narrative surrounding public debt is not universal – it is conditioned by the broader labor market, where debt can either mobilize voters seeking government action (high-unemployment economies) or discourage participation when fiscal discipline is prioritized (low-unemployment economies). 7. Conclusion This paper finds that the relationship between public debt and voter turnout is neither direct nor uniform across EU states. Instead, it is shaped by broader macroeconomic conditions, voter perceptions of fiscal policy, and the level of economic stability within a country. Across all models, public debt is not a significant predictor of national turnout, suggesting that while it may be politically salient, it does not independently drive participation once structural factors are accounted for. However, disaggregating by economic stability reveals a meaningful divergence in how debt drives participation. In more stable economies (Group 0), higher debt is weakly associated with increased turnout in national elections—but decreased participation in European Parliament elections. This suggests that voters perceive rising debt as a domestic issue necessitating national-level political engagement while simultaneously fostering disillusionment with EU governance. Conversely, in less stable economies (Group 1), debt has no meaningful effect on national elections but is positively associated with EU turnout, indicating that voters in more vulnerable contexts may turn to the EU for economic solutions, thus reinforcing supranational engagement. Interaction effects further illuminate these dynamics. The significant and positive interaction between debt and unemployment suggests that, where unemployment is high, voters view public debt as a stabilizing force that sustains government intervention and social protections. In contrast, in wealthier countries with lower unemployment, debt may be viewed less favorably – either as a sign of fiscal mismanagement or as a future burden on economic stability – resulting in reduced political engagement at the EU level. This finding offers a compelling explanation for why we observe a positive relationship between debt and turnout in Group 1 but a negative relationship in Group 0: in economies where unemployment is high, debt may be perceived as a necessary policy tool, whereas in more stable economies, it may instead generate political disillusionment or complacency. Nevertheless, these findings must be interpreted with caution. The relatively small sample size reduces statistical power, making it more difficult to detect small but meaningful effects. Additionally, while the use of fixed effects helps to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries, the possibility of omitted variable bias remains. Other macroeconomic or political factors, such as levels of political trust, public attitudes toward fiscal policy, or the salience of economic issues in election campaigns, could play a critical role in shaping the observed relationships. Moreover, these models primarily capture short-term dynamics, raising the question of whether the political consequences of rising debt may unfold over longer time horizons. Future research should explore whether the effects of debt on turnout are persistent or whether they evolve in response to shifting economic conditions, particularly in the context of economic crises or prolonged periods of fiscal austerity. Ultimately, these results highlight that the political implications of fiscal conditions depend heavily on the broader institutional and societal environment. In the context of Europe’s ongoing concerns about declining electoral participation, weakening trust in representative institutions, and the rise of rhetoric that challenges both national and EU-level authority, understanding how public debt shapes citizens’ engagement is paramount. By clarifying when and how fiscal pressures influence turnout across different layers of governance, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the democratic strains facing contemporary Europe. ________________ References Arcelus, F., & Meltzer, A. H. (1975). The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections. The American Political Science Review, 69(4), 1232-1239. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1955283 Burden, B. C., & Wichowsky, A. (2014). Economic Discontent as a Mobilizer: Unemployment and Voter Turnout. The Journal of Politics, 76(4), 887-898. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s0022381614000437 Bureau of Labor Statistics. (n.d.). EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG YOUTH — SUMMER 2024. New Release - Bureau of Labor Statistics. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/ https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/youth.pdf Cassel, C. A., & Luskin, R. C. (1988). Simple Explanations of Turnout Decline. The American Political Science Review, 82(4), 1321-1330. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1961763 Department of the Treasury and the Bureau of the Fiscal Service. (2012). Understanding the National Debt | U.S. Treasury Fiscal Data. Fiscal Data. Retrieved November 9, 2024, from https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/national-debt/ Georgian, A. (2024, October 11). French public debt reaches record high: Is France the sick man of Europe? - Talking Europe. France 24. Retrieved November 9, 2024, from https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/talking-europe/20241011-french-public-debt-reaches-record-high-is-france-the-sick-man-of-europe Grant, C., & Csaky, Z. (2025, May 9). Does EU enlargement require voting reform? Centre for European Reform. https://www.cer.eu/insights/does-eu-enlargement-require-voting-reform Hobolt, S. B., & Tilley, J. (2014). Blaming Europe? Responsibility Without Accountability in the European Union. OUP Oxford. Hume, D. (1752). Of Public Credit. Hume Texts Online. https://davidhume.org/texts/pld/pc Kitidi, K. (Director). (2011). Debtocracy [Film]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2SdfGsUDkC4 Merrifield, J. (1993). The institutional and political factors that influence voter turnout. Public Choice, 77, 657–667. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01047865 Radcliff, B. (1992). The Welfare State, Turnout, and the Economy: A Comparative Analysis. The American Political Science Review, 86(2), 444-454. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1964232 Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). NINE SECOND-ORDER NATIONAL ELECTIONS – A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN ELECTION RESULTS. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3-44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1980.tb00737.x Rosenstone, S. J. (1982). Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout. American Journal of Political Science, 26(1), 25–46. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2110837?origin=crossref Sigelman, L., Sigelman, C. K., & Bullock, D. (1991). Reconsidering Pocketbook Voting: An Experimental Approach. Political Behavior, 13(2), 129-149. https://www.jstor.org/stable/586038?seq=1 World Bank Group. (n.d.). What Explains Global Inflation. World Bank. Retrieved November 9, 2024, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/global-inflation Bertilsson

The Failure of Beauvoirian Punishment Philosophy Previous Next BY Albert Zhou Motivations and Failures of Beauvoirian Punishment as Depicted in “An Eye for an Eye” I. Introduction In the aftermath of World War II, Robert Brasillach was tried by the French government for treason, punishable by execution, as the author of prominent fascist newspapers. When a petition for Brasillach’s pardon was brought before distinguished French academics, Simone De Beauvoir withheld her signature. Beauvoir’s “Eye for an Eye” is an explanatory piece detailing her refusal to sign the petition. Through a reflection on post-war France’s bitter zeitgeist, Beauvoir outlines the motivations for punishment and how punishment ultimately falls short of its goals. This paper will begin with an analytical description of the motivations for two types of pre-defined punishment: revenge and judicial punishment. Revenge is a reactionary movement to reestablish a reciprocal relationship between the wrongdoer and the wronged; judicial punishment attempts to posit a society’s values when those values are threatened. After establishing the reasons for punishment, the paper will proceed to follow Beauvoir’s explanation for the failure of punishment. Though both revenge and judicial punishment are unable to accomplish their goals, Beauvoir still argues for acting with an intent to punish, as she believes punishment to be an indispensable tool to symbolically repudiate evil. II. Motivations for Punishment: Revenge vs. Judicial Punishment a. Motivations for Revenge Beauvoir commences “Eye for an Eye” by defining revenge as one of two primary purposes of punishment. To understand Beauvoir’s revenge, one must first understand her conception of evil. Evil occurs when one intentionally denies the existence of another’s humanity. Acts like torture, enslavement, and mutilation, men reduce their others to objects. This intent to degrade man is evil; it violates taboo. It incurs such a deep-seated hatred in man that his response is to call for the destruction of the atrocity’s source (for example, consider the murderous intent and death threats directed towards war criminals).[1] Eradication of evil requires the eradication of its creator. Revenge arises as a response to a free individual’s choice to commit evil. Naturally, a definition of the evil man must be considered. One could believe, as Socrates did, that individuals who commit evil deeds do so under the impression that “these acts [were] seeking a certain good, at the very least his own good”.[2] Temptations, sociological conditions, and mistakes might all drive a man to believe that he serves some good in committing atrocities. Even so, this man does evil. He chooses to commit evil, and no self-defined “good” can serve as his scapegoat. Furthermore, while Socrates’ excuse might appease Beauvoir’s judgement for lesser crimes, it especially fails when the offender is dedicated to greater wrongs. When he believes his actions contain some good, it is all the more important that he be made to perceive himself and his baseness from the perspective of his victims. Evil can also be described as a product of a man’s condition and not of his will. Because hatred and, by proxy, revenge are “aimed at the intention of an act”, violence seems to be an unjustifiable response.[3] However, when one’s actions incur evil, he intends to accomplish some project, even if it begets evil. For example, consider the father who flogs his son in hopes of toughening him. The evil is a necessary part of his intentions, even if evil is not his desired end. Furthermore, an evil act does not represent a man holistically. A one-time evil-doer may be charitable and well-intentioned throughout the entire duration of his life. Yet, he may be convicted of a sin expressed only as a singularity in his lived experience. If revenge now seems unwarranted, pardoning may appeal. One might say that man is more than his crime, and punishment serves no material “good”. His horrors are a semi-deterministic outcome of his situation. Regardless of what man does, his evils may be pardoned so that he may achieve redemption. However, as a framework, pardoning is unsatisfactory so long as humanity considers itself free. When a man chooses to dehumanize another, he does so of his own volition. Even if he may be pushed to do so, his condition does not inhibit freedom. And so long as man is a free being, his evil actions are rooted in himself. Man is only free in so far as he decides vis-a-vis his situation. He “must be held responsible for evil as well as for good” where “evil is that which one refuses in the name of the good, with no compromise possible.”[4] To give our existence meaning, we must assign meaning to our choices and be held accountable for them. Therefore, if we believe humanity to be meaningful, then the intentional rejection of good for evil is inexcusable. With these definitive claims regarding evil, what naturally follows is a condoned denouncement of such abominations. Revenge is permissible. In violating another, the wrongdoer destroys the symmetrical interpersonal relation. No longer are they two humans, each coexisting as an ambiguous being of both subjectivity and objectivity. No longer do they recognize the same ambiguity within the other. Instead, the wrongdoer posits himself as wholly subject and denies this subjectivity to his victim. This unnatural subject-object dichotomy is what begs a re-establishment of reciprocity, the true aim of revenge. To right the wrongs, compensation is required. The wrongdoer must “pay.” To return to the reciprocal dynamic, a reversal of states is required. One wants the other to understand his situation by undergoing it. Each tragedy and pain inflicted upon the victim must, in turn, be delivered by the victim onto the torturer.[5] The victim pronounces that he is not simply a thing to be abused without defiance; he, too, can inflict pain. The torturer learns that he is not sovereign; he can be made to feel like an object. This realization of one’s situation as reversible reinstates both parties in their ambiguity, and both are forced to recognize the other’s humanity. Notably, though one can seek retribution on behalf of another, a true outsider can never pursue “revenge” in this sense, as they are detached from the original mutual dynamic. b. Motivations for Judicial Punishment The guilty interacts with the victim via crime, whereas the victim is unable to interact with the guilty in the same sense. After his life has been maimed or his dignity destroyed, the victim cannot directly influence the guilty’s life without also lawlessly committing evil; he may only direct hatred towards the offender. Therefore, in seeking vengeance, violence must be committed in response to violence to strive for reciprocity. Because hatred is what makes punishment reactionary, punishment devoid of hate terminates this violent cycle. Judicial punishment arises as an alternative mode of punishment that bypasses the propagation of evil. It does not attempt to establish a reciprocity that I will later show to be doomed to failure.[6] Crime is dissociated from man to serve a higher purpose. As a state-sanctioned device, its ultimate function is to symbolically reject evil and put forth goodness. Judicial punishment is forward-looking. Rather than attempting to undo an already cemented past, judges aim to “restore a human community to its own idea of itself, to uphold the values the crime has negated.”[7] A crime and its individual impact cannot be erased. However, the evil represented by the crime can be expelled to champion a more virtuous society. Processes like imprisonment, banishment, and the revocation of citizenship all aim to purge society by casting out propagators of evil. Judicial punishment does not consider man as his whole. Rather, man is stripped of his context and situation. He is considered only in his criminal acts and their relation to society’s penal code. A Nazi is tried as a war criminal and murderer, not the father, husband, and son that he may be. Any humanity is merely a “substrate…of certain evil acts.”[8] Because man is taken as a symbol for his crime, punishment is purely a rejection of the crime he represents. Even the verdict is a symbol of man’s will to cast out evil. When the wrongs committed by an individual are severe, it is the duty of trial to denounce his actions. The death verdict serves as an example of this condemnation. Being the sentence “[endowed] with the greatest expressive power possible”, the death verdict reflects society’s contempt for certain perversions.[9] What follows is the execution of the verdict, a witness to the verdict’s gravity. Though the verdict is the actual denunciation of a crime, the execution ensures that the verdict is taken seriously. In judicial punishment, it is not the actual killing or imprisonment of the accused that affirms man’s will. Hatred, revenge, and violence are excised from the punishment so that social justice may do the affirming. III. Failures Ultimately, Beauvoir moves to describe each mode of punishment as failing to reach its goal, both having their respective fallacies. a. The Failure of Revenge Recall that revenge is an act whose true purpose is to reinstate ambiguity between two parties. In attempting revenge, full reciprocity is never re-established. In situations where atrocities are committed, for a true reversal of roles, the guilty party needs to realize both his and his victim’s ambiguity involuntarily. That is, if the wrongdoer voluntarily admits his guilt, he is allowed to retain autonomy. To experience an authentic ambiguity, the guilty cannot remain under the illusion of pure subjectivity and cannot come about this remorse by his own choosing. However, when permitted, the guilty’s subjectivity might stray towards resignation, rejection, denial, anger, or a plethora of other emotions that allow a bypassing of reciprocity.[10] An insufficiently violent revenge fails if the target is not subjected to violence at the mercy of another to feel his object condition. Alternatively, if the guilty is subjected to too much violence, ambiguity still is not felt. Excessive violence and inflicted pain leave the target “nothing more than panting flesh, which is unable to recognize its ruin and escapes into madness.”[11] The tortured man never feels remorse or ambiguity; he is too preoccupied and fixated on his pain to realize the delicacies of the reversal. Though the tortured man may feel like an object when abused, the seeker of revenge may desire that he remain conscious “to realize his ruin” and understand the situation when “congealed in despair.”[12] When torture is applied to the extremes, the target of revenge may “escape into madness” or find respite in unconsciousness.[13] By dying, he could terminate the process altogether before ever feeling the reciprocal nature of the revenge. Even in situations where the seeker of revenge is able to control his victim, he must “reckon with the temporal dispersion that limits his hold on the other’s consciousness.”[14] Revenge is not indefinite. The victim’s feeling of despair and reciprocity can only satisfy one’s hatred in the moments of its existence. Unfortunately for the punisher, the existence of revenge is impossible to perpetuate beyond death. The punisher may opt to prolong an artificed state of reciprocity that is never truly fulfilled, or hope that, through death, “the abjection of those last instants will be eternalized.”[15] Even in the freest cases, true prolonged reciprocity is unachievable. Vengeance also fails when vigilantes take on the mantle of justice. When an outsider inserts himself in revenge, he may only do so by proclaiming his participation as righteous. He posits his actions as rights, choosing to universalize the punishment as an individual. Not only is an outsider unable to partake in the re-establishing of reciprocity, but he also poses as a “sovereign consciousness” through his arrogance.[16] Even when vengeance is driven by authentic feelings, it is difficult to ensure that “the one seeking revenge has not been carried away by that will to power…”[17] If hate, zeal, and devotion are allowed to excuse acts of revenge, then violence will only beget violence, and revenge will only ever be a propagator of itself. b. The Failures of Judicial Punishment Judicial punishment also falls short of its goal. As a symbolic process, judicial punishment aims to expel symbols of evil from society. By promoting the individual to the evil he represents, the court makes a production of itself. Only through this promotion can the individual’s verdict signify a greater debasing of evil. Because judicial punishment spotlights the accused, it requires the accused to play his part. Very often, this staged charade fails when the accused defies the public’s expectations. The criminal can appear disassociated from his crimes.[18] Given the temporal delay between the crime and trial, the criminal is not fresh in memory. The memories of his crimes grow stale; those impacted may begin to feel more distant and grow in apathy. In this new context where the criminal’s evil is diminished, he is presented as a victim rather than a victimizer. The accused’s appearance and his demeanor allow him to elude the symbol of evil that the trial requires him to be. If the accused presents as dignified, society is forced to engage with him as a dignified and dying man. His humanity is returned to him, and he is no longer the symbol of evil that society wants to reject.[19] Consider, for example, John Wayne Gacy or Ted Bundy. Their charismatic demeanors in court allowed both serial killers to garner public sympathy. In situations like these, the accused ceases to be entirely inhumane, and society falters in its hatred. No longer is judicial punishment the resolute will of civilization to eliminate evil. Alternatively, the criminal may take on a cowardly appearance. In recognizing his own weakness, he excuses himself, refuses his guilt, and evades accusations. Though this criminal is met with disgust and hatred, the hatred never strikes him in his heart. He shows that he is impervious to remorse but not to self-pity, thereby rendering his trial meaningless. Regardless of where the accused identifies on the spectrum of cowardly to dignified, he must instantiate the evil that the trial targets. If he is dignified, judicial punishment becomes cruel. If he is cowardly, the spectacle of trial becomes meaningless and comical. For the criminal who behaves according to either of these extremities, judicial punishment never accomplishes its rejection of evil. Furthermore, judicial punishment fails to ever champion ambiguity as a value (even for criminals who elude both cowardice and dignity). The institutionalization of justice sacrifices a connection to the violated. Even though the accused and the wronged are undeniably intertwined, it poses evil as an abstraction and negates it by an abstract process. Attempting to universalize the individual interpersonal experience of ambiguity cannot succeed without the concrete reciprocal relationship between the accused and the wronged. Therefore, judicial punishment fails in both rejecting evil and promoting humanity. IV. Conclusions Beauvoir defines the aim of revenge to be the establishment of reciprocity in which ambiguity is made aware to both parties. Unfortunately, revenge cannot fulfill its purpose because of this very ambiguity. Man’s two-way condition of subjectivity and objectivity prevents one party from truly striking at the heart of the other.[20] In revenge, man either resides in his sovereign consciousness by himself or is forced into dehumanization by another. Whereas revenge cannot posit a set of values against the wrongdoers’ values because it is a private and illegitimate act, judicial punishment attempts to reach universality by representing society and societal values. The judicial system is a medium that reflects the will of society to handle the guilty.[21] However, it does not succeed in rejecting evil nor in promoting human ambiguity because the trial is too delicate of a performance, and it severs the criminal from the victim. Even though Beauvoir establishes that punishment is doomed to failure, she vehemently repudiates inaction. That is, failure should not impede action. As beings of ambiguity, the subject-object duality prevents individual choices from being obvious. Humans must learn to make choices “in the very heart of [their] ambiguity.”[22] Both individuals and society may recognize that revenge cannot reasonably reinstate justice. Even so, punishment is a necessity. Only in punishment do we recognize both the good and the evil within each freedom. Man punishes so that he may exercise his freedom and strive for good. ________________ References Beauvoir, S. de, Simons, M. A., Timmermann, M., & Mader, M. B. (2004). Philosophical Writings. University of Illinois Press. ________________ [1] Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings. (University of Illinois Press, 2004), p. 248. [2] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 255. [3] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 255. [4] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 257. [5] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 249. [6] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 251. [7] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 252. [8] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 252. [9] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 252. [10] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 250. [11] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 249. [12] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 250. [13] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 250. [14] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 250. [15] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 250. [16] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 251. [17] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 251. [18] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 253. [19] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 254. [20] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 258. [21] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 258. [22] Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, p. 259.

The Brown University Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (JPPE) is a peer reviewed academic journal for undergraduate and graduate students that is sponsored by the Political Theory Project and the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society Program at Brown University. The Brown Journal of Philosophy, Politics & Economics Volume VII, Issue I scroll to view articles Featured Articles Philosophy Body Ethics: Moving Beyond Valid Consent Christine Chen Non-Self Through Time Anita Kukeli Divisive Identities Exploring the Interplay of Personal and Social Identities Ella Neeka Sawhney The Captain and the Doctor George LeMieux Read More PoLitics Mine provides the coffin: An Examination Into Human Rights Abuses During the Extraction of Critical Minerals Philip Maxson free exercise and identity: The Future of Parental Free Exercise Claims in Public Education Max Choi Divergent Colonial memories in south korea and taiwan: Institutional Legacies Danny Ly Read More Economics Read More Not Paying income tax timely leads to significant financial losses for the governments. What design changes could be made to tax collection policy to minimize these delays? Aryan Midha One Planet, One Oklahoma: Exploring a Framework for Assessing the Feasibility of Localized Energy Transitions in the United States Anna Hyslop Applications for JPPE will resume in the fall! See Available Positions

Noah Tesfaye The Black Bourgeoisie: The Chief Propagators of "Buy Black" and Black Capitalism Noah Tesfaye Introduction Following the murder of George Floyd, there was a resurgence in a phrase all-too-common in the recent US political zeitgeist: “Buy Black.” Instantly, Black businesses received an overwhelming outpour of support as many non-Black people sought performative or material actions to support the Black Lives Matter movement. Centering the narrative and vision behind these ideas of “Buying Black” was not only affluent white people but the Black commercial media and the Black bourgeois at large (1). Amidst claims to defund and abolish the police, wealthy Black people called, as rapper and activist Killer Mike said in reference to Atlanta, “to not burn your own house down” but to instead support Black businesses and seek justice righteously (2). In this press conference with Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms, the stark contrast between the masses of Black people who own little to no land in the city and the select few bourgeoisie celebrities who proclaim “Buying Black” as a liberatory practice for Black people was evident. Therefore, developing a framework of a political economy of racialization allows us to view the racialized motivations of capitalism to diversify and maintain power with a critical lens. For instance, revolutionary scholar Cedric Robinson attributes the origins of racism to “the ‘internal’ relations of European peoples” (3). He maintains that racial capitalism arose from “the development, organization, and expansion of capitalist society [that] pursued essentially racial directions” (4). There is a vested interest in subverting claims of Black liberation by the Black bourgeoisie to build up the “myth and propaganda of Black buying power,” as Jared Ball coins in his book of the same title, to maintain their capitalist interests. It is through the collective efforts of the Black bourgeoisie to propagate Black capitalism that they accept the continued exploitation of working-class Black people. A Relevant History to US Racial Capitalism To develop a political economy framework of racialization and examine how Black people have assimilated into capitalism, it is imperative to center the conditions of Black Americans more broadly today. First, we will look at how race has played a role in the justification of the exploitation of Black people in America. Then, we will investigate how wealthy Black people have been able to exploit these conditions to further perpetuate such inequality within a racial capitalist hierarchy. Race is integral to understanding the economic position of Black people, not just because of the way Black people arrived on the continent but also in the legacy of government policies that have contributed to the economic segregation of today. As a result, Black people have next to no wealth in the United States; by 2053, it is estimated that median Black household wealth will be zero (5). The asset that many Americans often associate with wealth-building is buying a home. However, for decades, Black people have had little access to affordable housing and loans at market interest rates. Established in 1933, the Home Owners Loan Corporation institutionalized abstract criteria, such as “desirability,” to fulfill a loan (6). Furthermore, “the HOLC’s actions attributed property values to the racial or ethnic identity of residents then helped codify it into a national housing policy” (7). This resulted in the creation of domestic colonial projects through restrictions on the purchase of real estate and allowed for the “economic serfdom of Negroes by its reluctance to give loans and insurance to Negro businesses” (8). Meanwhile, mortgage lenders redlined neighborhoods by deeming populations as having “detrimental influences,” as a means to justify offering conservative loans with bad terms or no loans at all to Black people (9). Practices executed by the HOLC as well as state and local legislators to justify redlining also expanded into the creation of what is known as the “ghetto tax,” whereby grocery and convenience store items in inner-city communities were sometimes more expensive and sold under exploitative installment plans (10). It is not just that the economic conditions of Black people have been poor or fraught with challenges, but that with that context and contrast, a vision of “Buying Black” is hollow. Today, instead of focusing efforts towards highlighting the much higher risks Black people have faced concerning eviction since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Black bourgeois have asked Black people to build and support Black business (11). Origins of Black Buying Power & Black Capitalism The origins in this rhetoric about Black capitalism and “Buying Black” in more modern examples are not from Black Americans but from the US government. Corporate America, in conjunction with the Black bourgeoisie, further developed the rhetoric of Black capitalism to exacerbate racial inequality. As discussed in Franchise: The Golden Arches in Black America, it was the Nixon administration that began to prop up this vision for Black capitalism as a means towards suppressing radical movements. The author Marcia Chatelain notes that “[i]n lieu of supporting critical civil rights protections for fair housing and school desegregation, Nixon promoted legislation that provided business loans, economic development grants, and affirmative action provisions on federally contracted projects as a means of suppressing black rage and securing black endorsements” (12). Amidst Nixon’s efforts towards building his Southern Strategy and winning the 1968 presidential election, he ran on the premise that Black capitalism would ensure racial equality (13). Yet, due to the logistical restraints of there being so few Black entrepreneurs along with the clear intentions Nixon had in stifling revolutionary activity, Black capitalism was, from the outset, designed to selectively help Black people (14). What is more surprising than the Nixon administration seeking to subvert and crush Black radicals is the way in which wealthier Black people began to propagate Nixon’s agenda. As fast-food restaurants were being established in areas where Black people were offered franchisee licenses during the 1970s, Black “franchise pioneers believed that business would save the day and the days to come for their people” (15). Franchise owners were complicit in letting the federal government and those in control of capital across the country use the support of their businesses as a justification to divest from public programs and instead invest in less accessible resources. In the 1980s, Black fraternities and sororities, one of the more prominent symbols of the Black elite class, even went so far as to partner with McDonald’s on an advertising campaign commercial called the “Fraternity Chant” (16). If corporate America could get the Black bourgeoisie to more openly endorse and support policies centered around Black capitalism, instead of seeking people’s programs or organizing with Black liberation groups such as the Blank Panthers, US racial capitalism could persist. Significance of Race to Studying the Bourgeois There is no shortage of books, New York Times articles, or 60 Minutes segments on the racial wealth gap. Texts like How to Be an Antiracist or articles that imply that racial inequality is simply a matter of a “battle between the souls of America” do not adequately address, with nuance, the Black bourgeoisie’s influence on upholding racial capitalism (17). Rather than seeking to identify how and why these conditions continue to be perpetuated, many point to “the government” or “Republicans.” As Cedric Robinson theorized, race has been integral to capitalism since its foundation. Due to the development of neoliberalism in the US and the heightened sense of individualism in a consumerist society, Black neoliberal politics manifests into upholding the status quo of American politics rather than taking significant measures to directly address inequality. Amidst the advancement of globalization spearheaded by the Clinton administration, the Black working class was abandoned even further due expansion in the prison industrial complex, aided by the passing of the Crime Bill of 1994. This, in conjunction with the rise in the commercialization of hip hop and mainstream Black art writ large, helped propel Black individualism to its prominent position today as an antagonism to the “superpredator” attitude the likes of Hillary Clinton and other politicians had for Black people. Black people can also utilize and exploit racial capitalism to their benefit at the expense of others. To really understand how Black people continue to be exploited and disincentivized from seeking collective organization and liberation, we must look beyond Black entrepreneurship, Twitter, and Black real estate Instagram pages, for these are individualized success stories within racial capitalism. In their article “Black Politics & the Neoliberal Racial Order,” Michael C. Dawson and Meghan Ming Francis attempt to trace through the ways in which Black people have assimilated into neoliberalism and diversified capitalism. As they see it, Black neoliberalism emphasizes “self-reliance, excessive consumerism, and individualism” (18). To buy into capitalism, Black people must shed their traditions in collectivism and community-building. Neoliberalism demands Black people to concede grassroots organizing and to instead make the most of society as it is currently constructed. That became the central mindset and rhetoric espoused as the Black bourgeoisie began to take shape. Former President Barack Obama once equated “raising one’s children, paying a decent salary,” and other private, voluntary acts to “marching” (19). Rather than proposing Black people seek to remedy the conditions they face, the same conditions that are routinely echoed throughout mainstream media, Obama implied that mere existence was a form of fighting for one’s rights. This is an example of individualizing systemic oppression; instead of calling to dismantle the entire class system that exploits poor Black people, the Black bourgeois would rather make poor Black people feel as though they are largely responsible for their class position. Obama is asking Black people to focus on their own immediate conditions as a form of struggle, instead of demanding for a greater fight for Black liberation because that call protects his class interests and not poor Black people. The Black Bourgeois and their Propaganda What makes this development of Black neoliberalism so insidious is how “neoliberalism often allows small segments of communities to be helped through community/voluntary action and activists’ searches for best practices and policies” (20). The emphasis here is “small segments.” It is not that a Black business would not benefit from more financial support as we saw in the summer of 2020, but the larger ramifications of supporting Black businesses can only go so far when correcting for centuries of irreparable harm done to Black people in and by America. Black people can and continue to receive small wins amidst the continuously shrinking wealth within the population as a whole. If Black people are truly building power and seeking to create cooperative businesses that sustain communities instead of cultivating resources within capitalism, corporations would not advertise or publicly support Black businesses like they have since June. Are we supposed to presume that Oprah or Tyler Perry or any prominent members of the Black bourgeoisie are unaware of the centuries of inequality and believe that “Buying Black” will be a substantive fix for the plight of the Black masses? No. It is not to say that wealthier Black people are acting completely with malicious intent; however, Black bourgeoisie members collectively are helping sell and deliver this Black capitalism, “Buy Black” propaganda to the masses of working-class Black people. They continue to perpetuate and oftentimes expand on rhetoric that upholds Black capitalism by blaming individuals for not working hard enough or not being smart enough to make more money. “The Story of O.J” by JAY-Z, a song released in 2017, breaks down how Black people are not building enough wealth and how Jewish people spent money on real estate while Black people would spend it at the strip club. The song in short “is a metaphor for opportunities wasted due to poor individual choices and is meant, as Jay-Z has said, to be more than just a song, saying that it is really about ‘... we as a culture, having a plan, how we’re gonna push this forward...’” (21). In reality, “The Story of O.J.” symbolizes revisionist Black history - of the centuries of exploitation Black people have faced. As JAY-Z continues to profess that the only means towards freedom is to flip buildings, buy paintings, and “Buy Black,” his words limit the scope and imagination of the masses for a politic beyond the present conditions. Even if JAY-Z is from a working class background and he was lucky to attain massive success with his music, his current class conditions prevent him from adequately calling for more substantive changes to correct for centuries of Black inequality. To a similar end “the expressed ‘plan’ is to eschew politics in favor of a sole focus on economics, Black capitalist economics with buying power as a central philosophy as the ‘only hope’ for freedom, and all presented as progressive, pro-Black, empowerment messaging” (22). If there exists any chance to adequately analyze the US through a comprehensive political economy framework of racialization and come up with solutions to free people of such dehumanizing conditions, it must be with the consideration that even those of oppressed backgrounds can uphold racial capitalism. The Black bourgeoisie has shown through their actions that they are not interested in engaging substantively or seeking to liberate the masses because they themselves have become comfortable with the comforts of capitalism evenwhile the rest of their “people” suffer. Looking forward Black radical organizers in America today are not “interested in making capitalism fairer, safer, and less racist. They know this is impossible. Rather, they want nothing less than to bring an end to ‘racial capitalism’” (23). The policy proposition that rose to prominence again this summer, in spite of uprisings and more imaginative visions for a just world, was instead to “buy Black” and “support Black businesses.” It was through the likes of Killer Mike, Beyoncé, and other members of the Black bourgeoisie who touted such demands rather than stand in line with the movement-building going on in the streets. Rihanna, for example, benefits from Black capitalism because her consumers consider supporting her business as “woke” even as it is financed and backed by white capital. “Buying Black” can act as a means not just towards individualizing the ends of this policy plan, whereby the owner of a particular business will reap the benefits of sale, but it also individualizes the way that we as citizens need to behave. We are asked to consume and spend more rather than create and collectively stand together. It is not that the Black elites are unaware of the conditions that working-class, poor Black people face, but rather they collectively have sought to propagate this vision of “Buying Black” as a means to an end to centuries of state-waged war against Black people - an end for which there is no economic policy that could help the masses. There is a reason why James Warren coined this group in 2005 “The Black Misleadership Class.” The Black bourgeoisie traffic misinformation and are purposefully complicit in the continued strife of the masses of Black people in the United States. If we hope to build a political and economic vision for a world where Black people are no longer exploited, oppressed, marginalized, or silenced, it is crucial that we seek to contextualize both the race and class position of Black people within American society to then mobilize against the Black bourgeois and against US racial capitalism. If history is anything to go by, we must be prepared to stand and organize together, collectively, against the Black Misleadership Class to build a world where Black people can truly be liberated. Endnotes 1 The term “Black bourgeoisie” used here is not directly related to E. Franklin Frazier’s text Black Bourgeoisie in which the term is used to refer to the Black middle class rather than the Black capitalist class. Along these lines, by the capitalist class, I am referring to the class that does not earn money solely through labor but also through the accumulation and exchange of assets. 2 Emmrich, Stuart, “Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms’s Press Conference Shows True Leadership During A Crisis.” 3 Robinson, Cedric, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition, 2. 4 Ibid, 2. 5 Asante-Muhammad, Dedrick et al, "The Road to Zero Wealth: How the Racial Wealth Divide Is Hollowing Out America’s Middle Class,” 5. 6 Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta, “Back to the Neoliberal Moment: Race Taxes and the Political Economy of Black Urban Housing in the 1960s,” 189. 7 Ibid, 189. 8 Ibid, 191. 9 Ibid, 189. 10 Ibid, 195. 11 Thomas, Taylor Miller, “Coronavirus Relief Favors White Households, Leaving Many People of Color at Risk of Being Evicted.” 12 Chatelain, Marcia, Franchise: The Golden Arches in Black America, 14. 13 Weems, Robert E., and Lewis A. Randolph, “The National Response to Richard M. Nixon’s Black Capitalism Initiative: The Success of Domestic Detente,” 67. 14 Weems, 68. 15 Chatelain, Franchise, 15. 16 Ibid, 177. 17 Kendi, Ibram X, “A Battle between the Two Souls of America.” 18 Dawson, Michael C. and Meghan Ming Francis, “Black Politics and the Neoliberal Racial Order,” 46. 19 Ibid, 48. 20 Ibid, 48. 21 Ball, Jared, The Myth and Propaganda of Black Buying Power, 2. 22 Ibid, 2. 23 Robinson, Black Marxism, xi. Works Cited Asante-Muhammad, Dedrick, Chuck Collins, Josh Hoxie, and Emmanuel Nieves. Rep. The Road to Zero Wealth: How the Racial Wealth Divide Is Hollowing Out America’s Middle Class. Institute for Policy Studies, September 2017. https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The-Road-to-Zero-Wealth_FINAL.pdf . Ball, Jared A. The Myth and Propaganda of Black Buying Power. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Chatelain, Marcia. Franchise: The Golden Arches in Black America. Liveright, 2020. Dawson, Michael C., and Megan Ming Francis. “Black Politics and the Neoliberal Racial Order.” Public Culture, vol. 28, no. 1 78, 2015, pp. 23–62, https://doi.org/10.1086/685540 . Emmrich, Stuart. “Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms’s Press Conference Shows True Leadership During A Crisis.” Vogue, May 2020. Frazier, E. Franklin. Black Bourgeoisie. The Free Press, 1957. Kendi, Ibram X. “A Battle between the Two Souls of America.” The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, November 16, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/americas- two-souls/617062/ . Robinson, Cedric J. Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. University of North Carolina Press, 1983. Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta. “Back to the Neoliberal Moment: Race Taxes and the Political Economy of Black Urban Housing in the 1960s.” Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society, 2012. Thomas, Taylor Miller. “Coronavirus Relief Favors White Households, Leaving Many People of Color at Risk of Being Evicted.” POLITICO. POLITICO, August 7, 2020. https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/07/coronavirus-relief-racial-eviction-392570 . Weems, Robert E., and Lewis A. Randolph. “The National Response to Richard M. Nixon’s Black Capitalism Initiative: The Success of Domestic Detente.” Journal of Black Studies 32, no. 1 (September 2001): 66–83. https://doi.org/10.1177/002193470103200104 . Previous Next

Anna Savo-Matthews The Unchurching of Black Lives Matter: The Evolving Role of Faith in the Fight for Racial Justice Anna Savo-Matthews The Black church was at the center of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s. In the early 1990s, American society began a trend in secularization, whereby many Americans began to identify less with religious institutions. This societal shift, coupled with the rise of social media, has had a marked impact on racial justice movements. To illustrate how secularization has affected protest, this work compares the Civil Rights Movement with Black Lives Matter and specifically examines the decline of the Black church’s organizational capacity in Jacksonville, Florida. Faith has long been closely intertwined with racial justice movements. Scholars of Black liberation theology believe that Jesus is the God of the oppressed, someone who stands with those struggling for freedom. This religious movement was born from civil-rights activism of the 1960s, and it continues to inspire activists to this day (1). Furthermore, the Civil Rights Movement’s close relationship with the Black church has been well documented, as the church provided organizational support that was crucial for the movement’s success (2). When comparing the Civil Rights Movement to more recent racial justice movements, more specifically the Black Lives Matter protests during the summer of 2020, the Black church has had a less prominent role in organizing and mobilizing protestors. However, spirituality still had a great influence over the content of the protests, as protesters often draw from a greater plurality of religious inspiration than the Civil Rights Movement did (3). In line with findings on a national scale, local reporting has found that spiritual rituals were incorporated into the Black Lives Matter protests in Jacksonville. Prayer, vigils, and altars were incorporated into the protests, and the rhetoric used by many organizers and protestors reflected common religious tropes. The Civil Rights Movement and the Black Church The impact of religion on the Civil Rights Movement has been well documented. Both in terms of organization and content of protests, the Black church had an enormous effect on the Civil Rights Movement. The Black church was an autonomous sphere, owned and controlled by Black people, within a larger societal context where Black people were excluded economically, socially, and politically. As a result, in terms of structure, the Black church was the primary organizational center for the Civil Rights Movement (4). The church provided a network of charismatic clergymen who were “economically independent of the larger white society,” a regular meeting place free from surveillance, and a membership that was united by a rich culture and similar political aims (5). As a result, the Black church gave the Civil Rights Movement many resources crucial for a successful social movement. Additionally, the content of the protests themselves were often based on religious teachings from the Black church; one would have to look no further than Martin Luther King Jr.’s speeches to see its influence. In one of his most famous speeches, “Eulogy for Martyred Children,” King draws upon Christian notions of martyrdom and applies these sentiments to the fight for racial equality. Older martyrdom accounts—like those of Perpetua and Felicity, or animal sacrifices found in Leviticus—speak of suffering and death transformationally powerful, sometimes for entire communities. King employs a similar theme in his speech, claiming that the children who lost their lives “died nobly,” and that “the innocent blood of these little girls may well serve as a redemptive force that will bring new light to this dark city” (6). Furthermore, King’s speeches often explicitly draw connections between his faith and the modern-day fight for racial justice, saying “They did not die in vain. God still has a way of wringing good out of evil. History has proven over and over again that unmerited suffering is redemptive” (7). When an innocent life is lost due to senseless violence, it can be a rational response to try to make sense of the tragedy. In this way, martyrdom accounts serve an important social function, allowing communities to grapple with tragedy in a meaningful way. Furthermore, these tragedies can be leveraged politically. Many sociologists consider martyrs to be “tangible cultural resources” that can be used to motivate social and political movements. The violence inflicted on a martyr can “galvanize a course of action” and rally a community around their cause (8). Black Lives Matter and Secularization Originally founded in 2013 following the acquittal of George Zimmerman, the Black Lives Matter movement began to build a more prominent national profile in the wake of the deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner, who were both killed by police in the summer of 2014 (9). The Black Lives Matter movement reached a new level of public support following the murder of George Floyd, and it is estimated that tens of millions of people participated in protests across the country in 2020 (10). As a result of its large and diverse membership, the movement is very decentralized; however, the general aims of the movement include police reform and reallocating police department funds to invest in Black communities directly. In contrast to the powerful, direct influence the Black church had on the Civil Rights Movement, Black Lives Matter’s religious influences are far less straightforward, and this is especially apparent in the movement’s organization. Sociologists and political scientists have contended that the Civil Rights Movement and Black Lives Matter movement have markedly different structures. Professor of political science Dewey Clayton has noted that the leadership structure of the two organizations are “vastly different,” describing Black Lives Matter’s structure as “highly decentralized and unstructured” (11). He suggests that, rather than the Black church, social media is the new movement center for Black Lives Matter, contributing to its decentralized nature. Other scholars and researchers have confirmed that social media has played a “core role” in the proliferation of the movement, as platforms like Twitter and Instagram allow for the “documentation of cases of police violence” against both “individual African Americans” and “BLM protests,” which can draw emotional responses from casual users of social media (12). Because of its heavy use of social media, Black Lives Matter “does not want one leader,” but rather encourages leaders from all over the country to “engage in grassroots organizing in their local communities” (13). Jamal Bryant, a clergyman who spoke at Freddie Gray’s funeral, acknowledged this shift in leadership and noted that his role in Black Lives Matter is more limited, saying, “The difference between the Black Lives Matter movement and the civil-rights movement is that the civil-rights movement, by and large, was first out of the church. The Black Lives Matter movement, largely speaking, is not” (14). However, despite the Black church’s receding role in the organization of the movement, the influence of religion and spirituality on the Black Lives Matter movement is still apparent on a national scale. Founders of the movement, like Patrisse Cullors for example, practice Ifà, a religious tradition from Nigeria. She describes her spirituality as having a huge influence on her protests, saying that , “seeking spirituality had a lot to do with trying to seek understanding about [her] conditions… and how [she understands] them as part of a larger fight, a fight for [her] life.” In Black Lives Matter more broadly, researchers have found that protests often incorporate a wide variety of religious rituals, from invoking “the names of abolitionist ancestors'' to “the creation of sacred sites and alters at locations of mourning” to “purification, protection, and healing practices'' like burning sage (15). Overall, Black Lives Matter has incorporated rich religious pluralism into the national movement, as it draws inspiration from Native American, Buddhist, and African religious traditions, in addition to Black Protestant traditions (16). Scholars have found that Black Lives Matter draws from a broader source matter than the Civil Rights Movement did, and others argue that “the Black church is not the only religious well from which Black movements have historically drawn,” and Black Lives Matter is no different (17). Given the broad variety of faiths that Black Lives Matter draws inspiration from, Erika Gault argues that “we are actually seeing more religion, not less” (18). Younger activists from Baltimore described their own beliefs similarly; they did not necessarily have a diminished sense of spirituality, but they felt a need to express their religious beliefs outside of formal institutions. Brion Gill, a 25-year-old organizer, recounted that many of her friends within Black Lives Matter identify as “spiritual but not religious” and claim that they want “a relationship with the Creator” but don’t wish to manifest that “within the church space” (19). BLM’s move away from formal religious organizations fits within social trends more broadly. Around the turn of the century, sociologists began to describe a new theory of secularization, which emphasized that faith is still a “powerful force at the individual level” despite a decline in religious institutional authority (20). Theorists from this newer perspective, sometimes called neosecularization theorists, emphasize that religion is not necessarily “declining… They believe that it is changing” (21). These findings are similar to those articulated in a major study by Hout and Fischer, who found that the number of Americans who identified themselves as having no religious preference increased significantly in the late nineties. From the early ‘90s to the early 2000’s, the number of adults who reported having no religious preference doubled, from roughly 7 percent, to 14 percent (22). However, despite this increase, a significant portion of the population still retains spiritual beliefs: “Over two-thirds (68 percent) of adults with no religious preference expressed some belief in God or a higher power in 1998 or 2000; one-fourth said they do not doubt that God really exists” (23). Thus, the decrease in identification with formal institutions is not driven largely by a decrease in religious sentiment, but rather a stronger desire to disassociate from organized religion. This urge to express religious beliefs often originates from a desire to distance oneself from the conservative political views often associated with religious institutions (24). The sudden decline in religious identifications correlated with the rise of the Religious Right, as “religious conservatives definitely received more attention in the press in the 1990s than during earlier years” (25). Therefore, the authors argue that the rise of the Religious Right initiated dissociation with religious institutions among left-leaning individuals. Hout and Fisher stress that a decline in religious identification is most attributable to a dislike of the Religious Right, and not a result of a decline in religious sentiment or ideas: “The key fact, in sum, about people who express no religious preference is that most are believers of some sort, and many are quite conventional” (26). One of the most commonly used metrics to gauge the religiosity of an individual is the frequency with which they pray. This metric was cited by the authors of this study, and they noted that of the respondents who claimed no religious preference, “Relatively few are secular, agnostic, or atheist; most actually pray. Their most distinguishing feature is their avoidance of churches” (27). Therefore, we may expect contemporary activists to still express religious beliefs and participate in religious rituals in protest, even though they may not be guided by any specific institution. The authors of this article actually raise concerns regarding the future of religious institutions and their connections to social and political movements, asking the question of how the “spiritual but not religious” trend will affect new social movements (28). Overall, secularization in the Black Lives Matter movement seems to be widely consistent with a general nationwide trend towards secularization. While formal religious institutions have less power in influencing behavior and social movements, religious beliefs are still held by a majority of those who participate in the BLM movement. This seems to be the general consensus among scholars who have studied the movement; that, while the movement is no longer organized through the church, spirituality still has a great influence on the movement, and at times, protest can even be a spiritual act. To examine these claims, I will take a closer look at one specific city. To get a sense of how the shift from ‘churched’ social movements to a decentralized movement plays out in a specific city, I will compare Jacksonville’s Civil Rights Movement to its Black Lives Matter movement. Jacksonville and Racial Justice Jacksonville has an extensive history with the Civil Rights Movement. For a considerable portion of time, the primary method of challenging segregation in Jacksonville was through litigation. The City Council segregated numerous public services: streetcars, saloons, theaters. There were long, drawn-out attempts to overturn these and other segregation policies like unequal pay, and an “all-white Democratic primary” (29). However, the courts ruled against African American attorneys seeking to challenge segregationist policies. As a result, civil rights activists turned to civil disobedience. One of the most well-known events in the history of civil rights activism in Jacksonville occurred on August 27, 1960, when a group of African American men staged a sit-in to protest segregation in local businesses and lunch counters (30). The group of protestors were attacked by a group of over 200 Ku Klux Klan members, armed with baseball bats and axe handles. The lunch counters were desegregated in the months following this protest. Although African American communities in Jacksonville had pushed for desegregation in the past, many locals see Axe Handle Saturday as the true start of the Civil Rights Movement in Jacksonville. A first-hand account from protestor Rodney Hurstdetails the planning that went into this protest. His account demonstrates the importance of the Black church. In Hurst’s view, the Black church was a lifeline for the Civil Rights Movement: “the civil rights movement in Jacksonville would not have survived without the support of Black pastors and their churches” (31). Along with providing a support network for protestors, Black churches were the meeting place for the NAACP meetings during the fifties and sixties, providing resources for a legal organization responsible for many local civil rights victories (32). The NAACP’s efforts were crucial in desegregating businesses and public services in Jacksonville. In the months following Axe Handle Saturday, the NAACP Youth Council continued a boycott of downtown merchants, and in the following year the NAACP and business leaders reached an agreement to desegregate the lunch counters (33). Turning to the Black Lives Matter protests that took place decades after the Civil Rights Movement, it is apparent that Jacksonville mirrors national religious trends. While Jacksonville’s Civil Rights Movement used the Black church as its main movement center, taking advantage of its resources and member base, the Black Lives Matter protests were organized in a more decentralized manner, often relying on social media to spread awareness of police violence and information about upcoming events and protests. Over the course of the summer of 2020, several waves of protests were held in Jacksonville; from May 30th to June 8th, the city saw thousands of protestors participate in marches in the downtown area (34). Smaller marches occurred sporadically throughout the greater Jacksonville area in the subsequent weeks. A smaller march took place near Atlantic and Neptune Beach on June 28th. An inter-faith group held a Juneteenth celebration live stream discussing racial injustice on June 19th, and a group of Black ministers hosted a press conference in front of the Duval County Courthouse on June 8th (35). Another wave of protests occurred on July 10th, as protestors blocked off portions of highways around the downtown area (36). Consistent with findings on a national scale, the Jacksonville protests were largely organized through social media; websites like Twitter and Instagram played a crucial role in spreading information throughout the Jacksonville community. Social media accounts were started at several Duval county high schools to document instances of racial profiling; the accounts generally followed a similar format: “they’re titled “Black At [the respective school]” and allow students, parents, and faculty to submit posts where they document racist experiences they’ve had at their respective high school, which are shared publicly on the Instagram account (37). Kiara Alexis, a young community organizer born and raised in West Jacksonville, described the crucial role Twitter played in diffusing information throughout her community, saying “Twitter has become this hub… the news won’t tell you what’s going on, but people on Twitter, they’re gonna come up there and they’re gonna give it to you” (38). Diversity in Spirituality Again, in line with findings on a national scale, although the church was not the main avenue through which protests were organized, religion and spirituality still had a notable impact on the content of the protests. Moments of prayer were incorporated into many of the protests that took place in Jacksonville. One notable example took place on June 3, outside of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office, where faith leaders led a prayer before a press conference on police accountability (39). Rituals and prayers were not only seen in smaller protests: one of the largest rallies that took place in Jacksonville was the “Reflective Walk” for Floyd in which over 1,000 participants prayed before marching throughout Jacksonville’s San Marco business district and residential areas (40). Even protests that were planned by secular organizations, like The Women’s March Jacksonville Chapter, involved spiritual ceremonies. The Women’s March held a two-hour long remembrance ritual on June 4, where “candles were lit in memory of those who died by police or racial brutality, plants watered on a table as each was remembered.” Participants at this protest were encouraged to express their “sorrow and disgust over the racial division in this country” (41). Jacksonville’s protests often seem to embody what sociologist Emile Durkheim would identify as “collective effervescence,” referring to the emotional effect experienced by individuals when they collectively perform religious rituals; when people come together and perform the same action together, they may feel ‘outside of themselves.’ Durkheim describes this process in Elementary Forms of Religious Life, saying that “When collective life reaches a certain degree of intensity it awakens religious thought… vital energies become overstimulated, sensations stronger; there are even some that are produced only at this moment” (42). In this moment, collective effervescence then strengthens group identity. The common usage of prayer in protest likely serves a similar function; overall, rituals like group prayer serve an important, unifying force during protests, allowing the protester to step outside of themselves and feel a greater sense of unity with those they are protesting with. Aspects of the Jacksonville protests encourage such an experience. For example, Chapter President Bonnie Hendrix was reported as saying “I felt it was time for black people to have the podium to raise their voice, to be heard, to let the pain and anguish of years of oppression, out,” acknowledging the heightened emotional experience that was produced by the remembrance ritual (43). Even disregarding the use of rituals like prayer and reflection, protests exhibited religious characteristics in other ways. When activists described their motivations for protesting, they often directly or indirectly referenced their religious beliefs, often echoing sentiments in speeches from the Civil Rights Movement. On June 8th, several dozen ministers from local Black churches read a letter addressed to Jacksonville mayor Lenny Curry, Sheriff Mike Williams, and various other city and state officials. The letter called for a variety of reforms that asked for increased transparency and communication between police and community members. Some of the demands included roundtable discussions with black officers, increased sensitivity training, and increased diversity in leadership (44). Martyrdom narratives were incorporated into the minister’s press conference as well, as one minister was quoted as saying “It was as a result of George Floyd that all of a sudden a choir began. A choir of people from all across this nation have come together to lend their voices together in harmony for the express purpose of making sure that people can be treated fair.” In a similar manner to how martyrdom narratives were used during the Civil Rights Movement, the pain and suffering inflicted upon George Floyd can be the impetus for social change. In the quote from Rev. Williams, there are themes of unity and healing, demonstrating similar themes to those used by Martin Luther King Jr. in his “Eulogy for Martyred Children” as well as older martyrdom accounts, like those in Leviticus, where the loss of innocent life has the power to transform an entire community. In honor of Juneteenth, a holiday commemorating the end of slavery, the Interfaith Center of Northeast Florida held a livestream, connecting the protests that took place this summer to the fight for equality during the Civil War. Religion again played a large role in the motivations for those participating in the conversation. In describing her motivations for fighting for justice, Rev. Juana Jordan referenced Matthew 10 as an inspiration for resilience in her activism, saying “[Jesus] says people are gonna harass you, and he talks a lot about… using your voice. If you are a part of the family, if you are gonna do what I’m doing, people are gonna come against you. But there’s some responsibilities that you have” (45). In a later comment, Rev. Juana again connected the notion of equal rights to Scripture, saying “I believe in communion, there is more than enough at the table. When Jesus laid out the table, he stretched the table to make sure everybody could come around” (46). This livestream reiterated a common theme from Hurst’s personal account, where faith gives activists resilience in their work. Conclusion In conclusion, faith still plays a prominent role in Black civil rights movements, but its role has been complicated due to recent trends in secularization and the rise of social media. Although social media has replaced the Black church as the organizational center of the movement, spirituality has proved itself to be indispensable to the movement due to its ability to unify protesters through rituals. Finally, spiritual beliefs also seem to be a powerful source of motivation for those who participate in protest, providing inspiration to continue persevering when met with opposition. With this sudden shift towards a more decentralized movement center, it will be interesting to see if Black Lives Matter will be able to achieve the same legislative successes as the Civil Rights Movement. Endnotes 1 “Black Liberation Theology, in its Founder’s Words,” NPR, 2008. 2 Morris, Aldon D , The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change, (The Free Press, 1986). 3 Gleig, Ann and Farrag, Hebah, “Far from Being anti-religious, faith and spirituality run deep in Black Lives Matter,” The Conversation. 4 Morris, Aldon D , The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change, 4. 5 Ibid. 6 King, Martin Luther, “Eulogy for the Martyred Children,” Carnegie Mellon University. 7 Ibid, 221. 8 DeSoucey et al, “Memory and Sacrifice: An Embodied Theory of Martyrdom,” ( Cultural Sociology, 2008), 114. 9 Luibrand, Shannon, “How a death in Ferguson sparked a movement in America,” 2015. 10 Buchanan, Quoctrung, and Patel, “Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History,” 2020. 11 Clayton, Dewey M, “Black Lives Matter and the Civil Rights Movement: A Comparative Analysis of Two Social Movements in the United States,” Journal of Black Studies , Vol. 49 no. 5, 2018. 12 Bolsover, Gillian, “Black Lives Matter discourse on US social media during COVID: polarised positions enacted in a new event,” The University of Leeds, Centre for Democratic Engagement, 2020. 13 Clayton, Dewey M, “Black Lives Matter and the Civil Rights Movement: A Comparative Analysis of Two Social Movements in the United States.” 14 Green, Emma, “Black Activism, Unchurched,” The Atlantic, 2016. 15 Gleig, Ann and Farrag, Hebah, “Far from Being anti-religious, faith and spirituality run deep in Black Lives Matter,” The Conversation. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Green, Emma, “Black Activism, Unchurched.” 20 Yamane, David and Roberts, Keith A, “Secularization: Religion in Decline or Transformation?” Religion in Sociological Perspective, (SAGE Publications, 2015), 25. 21 Ibid. 22 Hout, Michael and Fischer, Claude, “Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations,” American Sociological Review , vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 165-190, (April 2002), 166. 23 Ibid, 173. 24 Ibid, 168. 25 Ibid, 179. 26 Ibid, 175. 27 Ibid, 175. 28 Ibid, 178. 29 Crooks, James B, “The history of Jacksonville race relations. Part 2: Struggling for equality,” The Florida Times-Union, 2021. 30 Ibid. 31 Hurst, Rodney L, “It was never about a hotdog and a Coke,” Wingspan Press, 2008. 32 Ibid. 33 Woods, Mark and Soergel, Matt, “Ax Handle Saturday: The segregated lunch counters are gone, but the ‘Jacksonville Story’ continues,” 2020. 34 Avanier, Erik, “Thousands march through San Marco during peaceful demonstration,” 2020. 3 5 “The Spirit of Juneteenth,” YouTube, Uploaded by Interfaith Center of Northeast Florida, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flDBJx_HWhM&feature=youtu.be 36 Cravey, Beth R. and Patterson, Steve, “Black Lives Matter protesters march through downtown Jacksonville; 3 arrested,” The Florida Times-Union, 2016. 37 Bloch, Emily, “Students at Jacksonville’s elite schools discuss racism — often anonymously,” The Florida Times-Union, 2020. 38 “The Spirit of Juneteenth,” YouTube, 50:13. 39 “Photos: Jacksonville Black Lives Matter protests in the wake of George Floyd’s death,” The Florida Times-Union, 2020. 40 Ibid. 41 Scanlan, Dan, “Jacksonville Residents continue protests in support of black lives,” The Florida Times-Union. 2020. 42 Durkheim, Emile, “The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,” ( Oxford University Press: 2001), 317. 43 Scanlan, Dan, “Jacksonville Residents continue protests in support of black lives.” 44 Savo-Matthews, Anna, “Black ministers call for Jacksonville reforms amid unrest,” The Florida Times-Union , 2020. 45 “The Spirit of Juneteenth,” YouTube, 61:28. 46 Ibid, 66:54. Works Cited Aron, Hillel. “These Savvy Women have Made Black Lives Matter the Most Crucial Left-Wing Movement Today” LA Weekly. November 9, 2015. http://www.laweekly.com/these-savvy- women-have-made-black-lives-matter- the-most-crucial-left-wing-movement-today/. Avanier, Erik. “Thousands march through San Marco during peaceful demonstration.” News4Jax . June 3, 2020. https://www.news4jax.com/news/local/2020/06/03/city-says-to-expect- emergency-personnel-in-san-marco- square-due-to-scheduled-walk/ “Black Liberation Theology, in its Founder’s Words.” NPR. March 31, 2008. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89236116 Bolsover, Gillian. “Black Lives Matter discourse on US social media during COVID: polarised positions enacted in a new event.” The University of Leeds, Centre for Democratic Engagement. August 21, 2020. https://arxiv.org/ pdf/2009.03619.pdf Bloch, Emily. “Students at Jacksonville’s elite schools discuss racism — often anonymously.” The Florida Times-Union. June 16, 2020. https://www.jacksonville.com/story/news/local/2020/06/16/students-at-jacksonvillersquos- elite-schools-discuss-racism-mdash-often-anonymously/112296954/ Buchanan, Quoctrung, and Patel. “Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History” The New York Times. July 3, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size. html Clayton, Dewey M. “Black Lives Matter and the Civil Rights Movement: A Comparative Analysis of Two Social Movements in the United States.” Journal of Black Studies . Vol. 49 no. 5, pp. 448-480. March 21, 2018. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021934718764099? journalCode=jbsa Cravey, Beth R. and Patterson, Steve. “Black Lives Matter protesters march through downtown Jacksonville; 3 arrested.” The Florida Times-Union. July 10, 2016. https://www.jacksonville.com/news/metro/2016-07-10/story/black-lives-matter-protesters- march-through-downtown-jacksonville-3 Crooks, James B. “The history of Jacksonville race relations. Part 2: Struggling for equality.” The Florida Times-Union. September 5, 2021. https://www.jacksonville.com/story/opinion/columns/guest/2021/09/05/james- crooks-history- jacksonville-race-relations-struggling-equality/8210831002/ DeSoucey et al. “Memory and Sacrifice: An Embodied Theory of Martyrdom.” Cultural Sociology. Vol. 2, no.1, pp. 99-121. 2008. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1749975507086276 Durkheim, Emile. “The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.” Oxford University Press. Translated by Carol Cosman. 2001. Farrag, Hebah H. “The Role of Spirit in the #BlackLivesMatter Movement: A Conversation with Activist and Artist Patrisse Cullors.” Religion Dispatches. June 24, 2015. https://religiondispatches.org/the-role-of-spirit-in-the-blacklivesmatter-movement-a- conversation-with-activist-and-artist-patrisse-cullors/ Gleig, Ann and Farrag, Hebah. “Far from Being anti-religious, faith and spirituality run deep in Black Lives Matter.” The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/far-from- being-anti-religious- faith-and-spirituality-run-deep-in- black-lives-matter-145610 Green, Emma. “Black Activism, Unchurched.” The Atlantic. March 22, 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/black-activism-baltimore- black-church/474822/ Hout, Michael and Fischer, Claude. “Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations.” American Sociological Review . vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 165-190. April 2002. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3088891?seq=1 Hurst, Rodney L. “It was never about a hotdog and a Coke.” Wingspan Press. Jan 1, 2008. “The Spirit of Juneteenth.” YouTube. Uploaded by Interfaith Center of Northeast Florida, June 24, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flDBJx_ HWhM&feature=youtu.be King, Martin Luther. “Eulogy for the Martyred Children.” Carnegie Mellon University. http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=- file&item=434085 Luibrand, Shannon. “How a death in Ferguson sparked a movement in America.” August 7, 2015. CBS News. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-the-black-lives-matter-movement-changed- america-one-year-later/ Morris, Aldon D . The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change . The Free Press. January 1, 1986. Savo-Matthews, Anna. “Black ministers call for Jacksonville reforms amid unrest.” The Florida Times- Union. June 8, 2020. https://www.jacksonville.com/story/ news/local/2020/06/08/black- ministers-call-for-jacksonville-reforms-amid-unrest/112295624/ Scanlan, Dan. “Jacksonville Residents continue protests in support of black lives.” The Florida Times- Union. June 4, 2020. https://www.jacksonville.com/sto- ry/news/local/2020/06/04/jacksonville- residents-continue-protests-in-sup- port-of-black-lives/112302732/ “Photos: Jacksonville Black Lives Matter protests in the wake of George Floyd’s death.” The Florida Times-Union. June 7, 2020. https://www.jacksonville.com/photogallery/LK/20200607/PHOTOGALLERY/607009988/PH/1 Vandenboom, Liza. “The Faith of the Black Lives Matter Movement.” Religion Unplugged. July 10, 2020. https://religionunplugged.com/news/2020/7/10/ the-faith-of-the-black-lives-matter- movement Woods, Mark and Soergel, Matt. “Ax Handle Saturday: The segregated lunch counters are gone, but the ‘Jacksonville Story’ continues.” The Florida Times-Union. August 21, 2020. https://www.jacksonville.com/story/news/ history/2020/08/21/jacksonville-civil-rights-demonstrators-took-action-60-years-ago-ax-handle-saturday/5620995002/ Yamane, David and Roberts, Keith A. “Secularization: Religion in Decline or Transformation?” Religion in Sociological Perspective, Sixth Edition. SAGE Publications. 2015. Previous Next

Rebecca Berman Predictive Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Evaluating the Racial Bias Objection Rebecca Berman Increasingly, many courtrooms around the U.S. are utilizing predictive algorithms (PAs). PAs are an AI that assigns risk [of future offending] scores to defendants based upon various data about the defendant, not including race, to inform bail, sentencing, and parole decisions with the goals of increasing public safety, increasing fairness, and reducing mass incarceration. Although these PAs are intended to introduce greater objectivity to the courtroom by more accurately and fairly predicting who is most likely to commit future crimes, many worry about the racial inequities that these algorithms may perpetuate. Here, I scrutinize and subsequently support the claim that PAs can operate in racially biased ways, providing a strong ethical objection against their use. Then, I raise and consider the rejoinder that we should still utilize PAs because they are morally preferable to the alternative: leaving judges to their own devices. I conclude that the rejoinder adequately, but not conclusively, succeeds in rebutting the objection. Unfair racial bias in PAs is not sufficient grounds to outright reject their use, for we must evaluate the potential racial inequities perpetuated by utilizing these algorithms relative to the potentially greater racial inequities perpetuated without their use. The Racial Bias Objection to Predictive Risk Assessment ProPublica conducted research to support concerns that COMPAS (a leading predictive algorithm used in many courtrooms) is unfairly racially biased. Its re- search on risk scores for defendants in Florida showed: a. 44.9% of black defendants who do not end up recidivating are mislabeled as “high risk” (defined as a score of 5 or above), while only 23.5% of white defendants who do not end up recidivating are mislabeled as “high risk.” b. 47.7% of white defendants who end up recidivating are mislabeled as “low risk,” while only 28% of black defendants who end up recidivating are mislabeled as “low risk” (1). Intuitively, these findings strike us as an unfair racial disparity. COMPAS’s errors operate in different directions for white and black defendants: disproportionately overestimating the risk of black defendants while disproportionately underestimating the risk of white defendants. In “Measuring Algorithmic Fairness,” Deborah Hellman further unpacks the unfairness of this kind of racialized error rate disparity: First, different directions of error carry different costs. In the criminal justice system, we generally view false positives, which punishes an innocent person or over-punishes someone who deserves less punishment, as more costly and morally troublesome than false negatives, which fails to punish or under-punishes someone who is guilty. The policies and practices we have constructed in the U.S. system reflect this view. Defendants are innocent until proven guilty, and there is a high burden of proof for conviction. Because of this, the judicial system airs on the side of producing more false negatives than false positives. Given the widely accepted view that false positives (punishing an innocent person or over-punishing someone) carry a greater moral cost than false negatives (failing to punish or under-punish- ing a guilty individual) in the criminal justice system, we should be especially troubled by black defendants disproportionately receiving errors in the false positive direction (2). A black defendant mislabeled as “high risk” may very well lead judges to impose a much longer sentence or post higher bail than fair or necessary, a cost that black defendants would be shouldering disproportionately (in comparison to white defendants) given the error rate disparity produced by COMPAS. Second, COMPAS’s lack of error rate parity is particularly problematic due to its links to structural biases in data used by PAs. Mathematically, a calibrated algorithm will yield more false positives in the group with a higher base rate of the outcome being predicted. PAs act upon data that suggest a much higher base rate of black offending than white offending, and this base rate discrepancy can reflect structural injustices: I. Measurement Error: Black communities are over-policed, so a crime committed by a black person is much more likely to lead to an arrest than a crime committed by a white person. Therefore, the measured difference of offending between black and white offenders is much greater than the real (statistically unknowable) difference in offending between black and white offenders, and PAs unavoidably utilize this racially biased arrest data (3). II. Compounding Injustice: Due to historical and ongoing systemic racism, black Americans are more likely to live in conditions, such as poverty, certain neighborhoods, and low educational attainment, that correlate with higher predicted criminal behavior. Therefore, if and when PAs utilize criminogenic conditions as data points, relatively more black offenders will score “high risk” as a reflection of past injustices (4). To summarize, data reflecting unfair racial disparities are necessarily incorporated into COMPAS’s calculations, so unfair racial disparities will come out of COMPAS predictions. For all of these reasons—the high cost of false positives, measurement error, and compounding injustice—lack of error rate parity is a morally relevant attack on the fairness of COMPAS. By being twice as likely to label black defendants that do not end up re-offending as “high risk” than white defendants, COMPAS operates in an unfairly racially biased way. Consequently, we should not use PAs like COM- PAS in the criminal justice system. Rejoinder to the Racial Bias Objection to Predictive Risk Assessment The argument, however, is not that simple. An important rejoinder is based on the very reason why we find such tools appealing in the first place: humans are imperfect, biased decision-makers. We must consider the alternative to using risk tools in criminal justice settings: sole reliance on a human decision-maker, one that may be just as susceptible, if not more, to racial bias. Due to historical and continuing forces in the U.S. creating an association between dark skin and criminality and the fact that judges are disproportionately white, judges are unavoidably in- grained with implicit or even explicit bias that leads them to perceive black defendants as more dangerous than their white counterparts. This bias inevitably seeps into judges’ highly subjective decisions. Many studies of judicial decision-making show racially disparate outcomes in bail, sentencing, and other key criminal justice decisions (5). For example: a. Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang (2018) find, “black defendants are 3.6 percentage points more likely to be assigned monetary bail than white defendants and, conditional on being assigned monetary bail, receive bail amounts that are $9,923 greater” (6). b. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, “between 2005 and 2012, black men received roughly 5% to 10% longer prison sentences than white men for similar crimes, after accounting for the facts surrounding the case” (7). Consequently, the critical and challenging question is not whether or not PAs are tainted by racial biases, but rather becomes: which is the “lesser of two evils” in terms of racial justice: utilizing PAs or leaving judges to their own devices? I will argue the former, especially if we consider the long-term potential for improving our predictive decision-making through PAs. First, although empirical data on this precise matter is limited, we have reason to believe that utilizing well-constructed PAs can reduce racial inequities in the criminal justice system. Kleinberg et al. (2017) modeled New York City pre-trial hearings and found that “a properly built algorithm can reduce crime and jail populations while simultaneously reducing racial disparities” (8). Even though the ProPublica analysis highlighted disconcerting racial data, it did not compare decision-making using COMPAS to decisions made by judges without such a tool. Second, evidence-based algorithms present more readily available means for improvement than the subjective assessments of judges. Scholars and journalists can critically examine the metrics and their relative weights used by algorithms and work to eliminate or reduce the weight of metrics that are found to be especially potent in producing racially skewed and inaccurate predictions. Also, as Hellman suggests, race can be soundly incorporated into PAs to increase their overall accuracy because certain metrics can be distinctly predictive of recidivism in white versus black offenders. For example, “housing stability” might be more predictive of recidivism in white offenders than black offenders (9). If an algorithm’s assessment of this metric were to occur in conjunction with information on race, its overall predictions would improve, reducing the level of unfair error rate dis- parity (10). Furthermore, PAs’ level of bias is consistent and uniform, while the biases of judges are highly variable and hard to predict or assess. Uniform bias is easier to ameliorate than variable, individual bias, for only one agent of bias has to be tackled rather than an abundance of agents of bias. All in all, there appear to be promising ways to reduce the unfairness of PAs—particularly if we construct these tools with a concern for systemic biases—while there currently does not appear to be ready means to better ensure a judiciary full of systematically less biased judges. The question here is not “which is more biased: PAs or judges?” but rather “which produces more racially inequitable outcomes: judges utilizing PAs or judges alone?” Even if improved algorithms’ judgments are less biased than those of judges, we must consider how the human judge, who is still the final arbiter of decisions, interacts with the tool. Is a “high risk” score more salient to a judge when given to a black defendant, perhaps leading to continued or even heightened punitive treatment being disproportionately shown towards black offenders? Simultaneously, is a “low risk” score only salient to judges when given to a white defendant, or can it help a judge overcome implicit biases to also show more leniency towards a “low risk” black offender? In other words, does utilizing this tool serve to exacerbate, confirm, or ameliorate the perpetuation of racial inequity in judges’ decisions? Much more empirical data is required to explore these questions and come to more definitive conclusions. However, this uncertainty is no reason to completely abandon PAs at this stage, for PAs hold great promise for net gains in racial equity because we can and should keep working to overcome their structural flaws. In conclusion, while COMPAS in its current form operates in a racially biased way, this factor alone is not enough to forgo the use of PAs in the criminal justice system: we must consider the extent of unfair racial disparities perpetuated by tools like COMPAS relative to the extent of unfair racial disparities perpetuated when judges make decisions without the help of a tool like COMPAS. Despite PAs’ flaws, we must not instinctively fall back on the alternative of leaving judges to their own devices, where human cognitive biases reign unchecked. We must embrace the possibility that we can improve human decision-making by using ever-improving tools like properly crafted risk assessment instruments. Endnotes 1 ProPublica, “Machine Bias.” 2 Hellman, “Measuring Algorithmic Fairness,” 832-836. 3 Ibid, 840-841. 4 Ibid, 840-841. 5 National Institute of Justice, “Relationship between Race, Ethnicity, and Sentencing Outcomes: A Meta-Analysis of Sentencing Research.” 6 Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang, “Racial Bias in Bail Decisions,” 1886. 7 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Federal Sentencing Disparity: 2005-2012,” 1. 8 Kleinberg et al., “Human Decisions and Machine Predictions,” 241. 9 Corbett-Davies et al., “Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness,” 9. 10 Hellman, “Measuring Algorithmic Fairness,” 865. Bibliography Angwin, Julia, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, Lauren Kirchner. “Machine Bias.” Pro- Publica. May 23, 2016. https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bi- as-risk-assessments-in-criminal- sentencing. Arnold, Savid, Will Dobbie, Crystal S Yang. “Racial Bias in Bail Decisions.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 133 , no. 4 (November 2018): 1885–1932. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy012. Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Federal Sentencing Disparity: 2005-2012.” 248768. October, 2015. https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fsd0512_sum.pdf. Corbett-Davies, Sam, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller, Sharad Goel, and Aziz Huq. “Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness.” In Proceedings of the 23rd acm sigkdd international conference on knowledge discovery and data mining , pp. 797-806. 2017. Hellman, Deborah. “Measuring Algorithmic Fairness.” Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper, no. 2019-39 (July 2019). Kleinberg, Jon, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mul- lainathan. “Human Decisions and Machine Predictions.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 133, no. 1 (February 2018): 237–293. https://doi. org/10.1093/qje/qjx032. National Institute of Justice. “Relationship between Race, Ethnicity, and Sen- tencing Outcomes: A Meta-Analysis of Sentencing Research.” Ojmarrh Mitchell, Doris L. MacKenzie. 208129. December, 2004. https://www. ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208129.pdf. Acknowledgments I would like to thank Professor Frick and Masny for teaching the seminar “The Ethics of Emerging Technologies” for which I wrote this paper. Thank you for bringing my attention to this topic and Hellman’s paper and for helping me clarify my argument. I would like to thank my dad for helping me talk through ideas and providing feedback on my first draft of this paper. Previous Next

Kimberly Ramos Authenticating Authenticity: Authenticity as Commitment, Temporally Extended Agency, and Practical Identity Kimberly Ramos The everyday concept of authenticity presupposes the existence of an underlying, unchanging self to which to be authentic. However, with the rise of bundle theories in philosophy of mind and neuroscience, it is unlikely that we have an essence of self to which to be authentic. In this case, should we abandon the concept of authenticity entirely or formulate a new account of it? I argue that authenticity is still important to one’s everyday life, particularly when making difficult decisions about one’s identity in terms of morals, goals, and values. Rather than being true to an objective essence of self, I argue that we can be true to the self as a construct (a self-concept). We create this self-concept with consistency and steadfastness in our commitments, as well as our ability to be an agent that fulfills those commitments. Thus, authenticity and self- hood are more about undertaking important projects and a creative process of becoming rather than unearthing and expressing an essence of self. Just be yourself. Embrace your most authentic life. Or, if you like, “To thine own self be true.” We often encounter such pithy aphorisms. Some of us might find such advice to be helpful because it pushes us to pursue a career or life path that brings out the best version of ourselves. On the other hand, such advice could also induce anger because of its irrationality and emptiness. The self, as others of us might point out, is just a construct, so what is there to be “true” to? Or perhaps the whole concept of authenticity is simply confusing. We might agree that it is good to be authentic to one’s self but find it confusing as to what sort of identity this means for our own lives. We might, like philosopher Elisabeth Camp, pose this question: “What is my true self, such that I should pursue and cultivate it?” The everyday, common view of authenticity assumes that (1) we possess a “true” self, and (2) we ought to embrace this “true” self. But as more is learned about the mind and brain, it seems increasingly unlikely that a true, underlying self exists. Dr. Christian Jarrett, a writer for the British Psychological Society, mentions a study conducted by Strohminger et al. Strohminger and her colleagues observed that belief in an underlying “true” self is common across cultures, and inherent in this belief is the concept of authenticity. However, they are skeptical that this true self actually exists because such a self would be “radically subjective” (1). We see this sort of radical subjectivity in a study conducted by Quoidbach et al. The study found that people tend to underestimate the amount of change they will undergo in the future. They believe that their personality, core values, and preferences will be preserved over time, even though these attributes have already changed from the past to the present (2). The belief in the consistency of the self and its preferences is radically subjective in that it is based on feeling alone—it is not based on objective fact or essence. If at least some personality traits and values can and do change over the course of one’s life, then the common view of authenticity does not seem plausible. There is no true and essential self to which to be authentic because the self is not immune to change. An action which is authentic to me today might not be authentic to me in ten years. If this is the case, then how am I to decide what is most authentic: my past values, my current values, or my future values? In rejecting true and essential self, philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists including Douglas Hoftstader, Thomas Metzinger, and Daniel Dennett have turned to bundle theories. David Hume, one of the first bundle theorists, expresses the general sentiment of bundle theories in viewing the self as a series of “bundled” perceptions that change from moment to moment (3). As such, bundle theorists declare there is no rational reason to believe in an enduring self over time. Under their view, a new self exists each moment. If no enduring and underlying self exists, then pursuing the everyday view of authenticity seems somewhat futile. Authenticity would only be possible to a given self at the singular moment it exists, which does not seem satisfying given that, from a practical standpoint, we view the self as a consistent entity, at least on a day-to-day basis. This paper is dedicated to redefining the way we commonly think about authenticity and the self. Is there even a “true” self to be authentic to? And why should we desire authenticity at all? Three Cases: Authenticity as a Common Concern Before discussing more of the practical reasons for desiring authenticity at length, I will begin with a few “real world” examples to illustrate authenticity as a common concern within one’s daily life. (a) Neryssa and Her Corporate Job : Neryssa dislikes her current job as a human resources manager at a large corporation that manufactures soda. Though she enjoys working with people, the corporation’s product and mission don’t align with her personal values. She desires a job that feels more representative of the person she takes herself to be, but she isn’t sure if her job should even matter in terms of her sense of identity and values. (b) Rowan and Their College Major : Rowan needs to decide between a major in English or in History. On the one hand, they love literary analysis, especially as it applies to the fantasy genre. On the other hand, they also enjoy detangling and reconstructing historical narratives. When they think about the job prospects of each, they find each option to be about equal. Rowan wants to pick the major that “fits” them best, but at this juncture, both choices seem equally well-fitting. Which should they choose? (c) Julia and Her State Senate Campaign : Julia is running for election to the state senate. Her platform emphasizes environmental consciousness, especially in contrast with her opposition, who takes donations from large corporations that con- tribute to the climate crisis. Julia’s team suggests that she run a slander ad that, while not conveying outright lies, strongly insinuates that the opposition is cheating on his partner. While the ad would help Julia win the election and implement environmentally sustainable legislature, Julia isn’t sure that she can condone the ad. She takes herself to be someone who “plays by the rules” and holds herself to high moral standards. What should she do? In each of these three examples, authenticity plays a role in the decision making process of the individual involved (4). In (a), Neryssa desires a job that feels more authentic to her person. A job which represents her values is important to Neryssa, and thus, authenticity is relevant to her creating a life she enjoys. In (b), Rowan wants to know which of two options is more authentic of them to choose. Like Neryssa, they want to make a choice that will lead to a fulfilled and enjoyable life. In (c), Julia must choose between becoming a state senator and her morals. An understanding of authenticity might help her decide between these two options. I would wager that we, like Neryssa, Rowan, and Julia, have come up against similarly difficult decisions that challenge who we take ourselves to be and leave us wondering what decision is most authentic. I would also wager that the simple advice “Just be yourself!”would not help much in the situations described above. The purpose of this paper, then, is to provide a novel account of authenticity that (1) takes into account the lack of an underlying “true” self in light of bundle theories, and (2) helps us confront difficult decisions in which one’s identity is in question. Ultimately, I will propose a commitment-based account of authenticity, in which the personated, socially-constructed self and the commitments it makes are the basis for determining authentic action. A “True” Self? A Foray Into Bundle Theories and a Postmodern Ac- count of Authenticity Discussions about the self often turn to psychology and the brain. Following John Locke and his discussion of substance in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , the view of the self shifted from one of body or spirit to one of psychological substance, particularly consciousness (5). But, as philosopher David Hume later pointed out, the brain and its associated consciousness do not have a substance of self. In more modern terminology, this means that there is no lobe or neural center that constitutes an essence of self, which is an inherent entity upon which one’s identity is founded. Rather, the self is the “bundle” of thoughts and impressions present at any moment (6). These bundles pass away and give rise to new thoughts and impressions. Thus an entirely new self arises that bears no necessary or logical connection to the previous self. To support his argument, Hume asks us to turn inwards and observe the contents of consciousness: For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I al- ways stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist (7). If we look inwards, we can find only perception. We can also find memories, but these are the revival of past perceptions (8). We do not find any singular thing that we could call an essence of self. Hume does not completely negate the existence of the self. There is certainly something that perceives. But, Hume argues that given the evidence, we cannot extrapolate beyond this fairly minimal conception of the self—what Elisabeth Camp more recently calls a “bare skeletal ego.” Again, the self just is perception. Science writer and neuroscientist David Eagleman offers an updated view of how bundle theories apply to the biology of the brain and thus supports bundle theories originating from Hume: So who you are at any given moment depends on the detailed rhythms of your neuronal firing. During the day, the conscious you emerges from that integrated neural complexity. At night, when the interaction of your neurons changes just a bit, you disappear...the meaning of something to you is all about your webs of associations, based on the whole history of your life experiences (9). Like Locke, Eagleman locates the self in consciousness, which he describes as “detailed rhythms of neuronal firing.” And when this neuronal firing shuts down perception during sleep you “disappear,” reflecting Hume’s claim that when we are “insensible” of perceptions we do not really exist (10). The self is perception and neuronal firing, and this neuronal firing impacts the way we experience and interpret the world. Hume’s description of the self is the foundation for most modern bundle theories. Thomas Metzinger, a German philosopher, similarly undermines belief in an essence or substance of self: “There is no such thing as a substantial self (as a distinct ontological entity, which could in principle exist by itself), but only a dynamic, ongoing process creating very specific representational and functional properties” (11). Like Hume, modern bundle theorists doubt an underlying self that exists over time and endows one with a sense of “I,” which is closely tied to one’s perceived personal identity and autonomy. While bundle theorists claim we do not have any rational reason to believe in a sense of “I,” they do admit its practical necessity, as well as the human inability to abandon it. Douglas Hofstadter expresses the utility of the sense of “I” in I Am a Strange Loop : “Ceasing to believe altogether in the ‘I’ is in fact impossible, because it is indispensable for survival. Like it or not, we humans are stuck for good with this myth” (294). It is natural and practical for an individual to construct a sense of “I” to navigate the world, make future plans, and distinguish herself from others. As Hofstadter states, a sense of “I” is thus necessary to survive in and engage with the world. If there is an objectively existing self, it is momentary and fleeting. And, in being solely composed of processes and perceptions, it is not an entity we can be perfectly authentic to over time. Nor is there an essence of self that we can stake personal identity upon. Instead, our sense of “I” comes from the temporally and subjectively existing selves we construct as useful “myths” (12). Let us call this subjectively existing entity the “self-concept” for the sake of clarity. The common view of authenticity, however, assumes that there is “true” underlying self to which to be authentic to. Under this view, authenticity is the expression of one’s “real” self. But, as bundle theorists have stated, there is not an underlying, temporally-extended self to em- brace! How can we be authentic to something that isn’t objectively real, if at all? Beyond proclaiming that personal identity is a construct, bundle theorists do not offer us any answers about authenticity. Still, I think bundle theorists would likely embrace what Varga and Guigon call a “postmodern” view of authenticity. This account of authenticity abandons an essential self and embraces a more minimal construction of self and authenticity: Postmodern thought raises questions about the existence of an underlying subject with essential properties accessible through introspection. The whole idea of the authentic as that which is “original”, “essential”, “proper”, and so forth now seems doubtful. If we are self-constituting beings who make ourselves up from one moment to the next, it appears that the term “authenticity” can refer only to whatever feels right at some particular moment (13). The bundle theorist, in viewing the objectively existing self as a continual and ever-changing process, would endorse the idea of a “self-constituting being” that makes itself up from “one moment to the next” (14). Thus postmodern authenticity is merely whatever feels right at some particular moment. And if we reject an essential, underlying self—which, given the psychological evidence from Strohminger, Quoidbach, and bundle theorists, I think we should—it seems we are left to embrace the postmodern account of authenticity. However, I do not find the postmodern conception of authenticity satisfying because we do not view ourselves as beings that make themselves up from one moment to the next. Rather, we wake up each day believing that we are more or less the same person we were the day before, with the same projects and goals, social relationships, and values. In our three “real world” examples, the postmodern view of authenticity gives Neryssa, Rowan, and Julia no direction as to what sorts of values or projects they ought to pursue to feel personally fulfilled. It may be true that they are just bare Humean selves from a purely objective standpoint, but they don’t view themselves as such. Consider if, in virtue of the postmodern account of authenticity, we were to tell them, “Well, just do what feels right in the moment.” They would probably respond along the lines of, “The problem is I don’t know what feels right in the moment, and the choice I make will impact my future. I don’t want to make the wrong choice!” They view themselves as people who are concerned about their futures, their well-being, and their personal projects. Neryssa, Rowan, and Julia all regard themselves as selves that exist over time with relatively consistent attributes. I think it is likely that most humans view themselves as selves that exist throughout time with somewhat consistent attributes, too. For instance, if I go to sleep liking the song “Piano Man” by Billy Joel and having a desire to learn the song on the guitar, I expect to wake up the next morning with the same sort of preferences and goals. And in taking myself to be a person with specific aspirations, I necessarily find myself interested in my future and what it holds for me. On the pain of speaking for a reader, I find it probable that they conceive of themselves in this manner, too. Elisabeth Camp offers further practical reasons for embracing a sense of “I” concerned with authenticity beyond the bare Humean ego. She argues that the sense of “I” allows an individual to make sense of and evaluate her life given her values and goals, to select relevant characteristics of selfhood and thus form a meaningful identity through which to understand herself, and to create and carry out future plans based on the self-concept she wants to create or maintain (15). Camp’s three listed benefits of a sense of “I” point to authenticity: we want to know who we are, if we have lived up to what we want to be, and how to best preserve a sense of self. In the service of self-understanding and pursuing a fulfilling life, we ought to care about a sense of “I” along with authenticity and its application to our lives. For an account of authenticity to be useful, then, it should take into consideration our perceived existence as temporally-existing selves with an eye to the future and the values and projects we hope to fulfill. In other words, a more satisfying and practical account of authenticity should work alongside our intuition of hav- ing a “true self,” even if the true self turns out to be more of a construct than an objectively existing entity. This new account of authenticity seems to be related to being loyal to a constructed self-concept. To restate, this account should (1) take into account the lack of an underlying “true” self in light of bundle theories, and (2) provide us with some direction in confronting difficult decisions in which one’s identity is in question or at stake. The Self-Concept and Concerns of Self-Deception In this section, I will define the self-concept and discuss some difficulties self-deception poses to the self-concept, though ultimately I think we can table such difficulties. Before we address the wider question of how one might be authentic to the somewhat subjective self-concept, we need to first define the self-concept. Here I will draw from Elisabeth Camp’s character model of self. This model describes the objective self as possessing “a distinctive way in which a particular ‘I’ inhabits, interprets, and engages with the world—a particular nexus of dispositions, memories, interests, and commitments” (16). These dispositions, memories, and interests, fit in with our earlier discussion of a psychological, Humean ego if we view them at a singular point in time. The self, as Camp defines it, is not so much a unified identity that endows one with a sense of “I.” Rather, it is a particular way of experiencing and interpreting the world. Here, it is worthwhile to note that these interests and dispositions constitute a “something” that makes up the bare, Humean ego. I do not wish to misrepresent Hume or bundle theorists in saying that there is no self whatsoever. Instead, we should recognize that the bare Humean ego is an existing self, an underlying “something” that makes up an individual. The problem regarding authenticity we find with the Humean ego is its impermanence and lack of a unified, temporally existing identity. The underlying Hueman ego is not an essence or substance of self that can endow us with a sense of “I” and a lasting identity. The bare Humean ego allows us to say “I exist,” or “Something that is me is here having experiences,” or perhaps even, “At this current moment, I would like to have a glass of lemonade,” but it would not allow us to say anything about the kind of person we are, especially if the statement has to do with a characteristic or commitment that is meant to describe us over time—perhaps something to the effect of, “I am the type of person to pursue graduate study.” So the Humean ego endows one with momentary consciousness but not a sense of self or identity. Camp believes that an individual comes to an understanding of herself when she posits a “self-interpretation,” and thus forms the meaningful identity the bare Humean ego lacks. Camp compares a self-interpretation to a theory, as both create a coherent pattern or explanation “by electing and structuring a coherent unity out of [a] teeming multiplicity [of evidence].” Camp remarks that we can evaluate the effectiveness of a self-interpretation in the same way we would evaluate a theory. The more disparate elements it unites, the stronger the theory and related self-interpretation. Just as many theories can be equally probable or valid, so too can multiple self-interpretations. Likewise, when interpreting a body of data, there are clearly some interpretations that are better than others. While many interpretations may be on a par in strength, we can still distinguish between “bad” theories, which are not much grounded in the evidence nor realistic, and “good” theories, which take into account the available body of evidence for realistic interpretations. Let us say that the self-concept is the self-interpretation an individual embraces as the “best” explanatory theory for themselves given the current evidence. The self-concept is one’s understanding of their experience of the world. It is also the constructed identity that unifies one’s dispositions, memories, and interests. Thus, it is the self-concept that endows one with a sense of self and identity. I want to emphasize that even though one’s self-concept is subjective, there are limitations to its construction. The self-concept relies on objective evidence: the particular dispositions, interests, and memories held by an individual. This evidence is publicly accessible, too. Irish philosopher Philip Pettit remarks that an individual is a “figure in the public world, characterized by public properties” (17). The dispositions and interests held by an individual influence her behavior, actions, and statements. As such, the evidence becomes accessible to the public and available for use in forming a self-interpretation. Though the interpretation itself is subjective in how one decides to connect evidence and organize it into a meaningful pattern, an individual’s dispositions and interests remain objective because they exist without any given meaning. For example, say that Cassandra has an interest in almost every genre of music: country, hip hop, indie, classical—she likes it all. Before interpretation, this is simply an objective fact. Cassandra’s friend, Russel, believes that Cassandra likes many different genres of music because she is an open-minded person. Cassandra, on the other hand, believes that she likes so many genres because she had friends with varied music tastes growing up. Cassandra and Russel take an objective fact and then attribute meaning to it through interpretation. I would compare this sort of interpretation to the construction of historical narratives. Historians share the same set of facts about a historical event, but how they choose to connect them and endow them with meaning will vary. Given the objective nature of these public properties, we can blame an individual for a particularly self-deluding interpretation. For instance, a man who believes he is Napoleon might point to some evidence as reasons for him forming such a self-concept—perhaps he has a talent for tactical strategy and horseback riding— while ignoring glaringly contradictory evidence such as the fact that he is not French and he was not born in 1769. But this is a quite obvious case of self-delu-sion. What about more ambiguous, “real life” cases? I do not want to venture too far into this topic, but I would like to put forth a general means of avoiding, or at least living, with self-delusion. Firstly, we ought to approach self-concepts with the understanding that we are constructing theories, and like theories, self-interpretations are provisional. They can and should be replaced when new evidence comes to light, and if we are individuals that are dedicated to self-understanding and epistemic respectability, we ought to undergo regular introspection to uncover new evidence or re-contextualize old evidence. I think it is likely that we do so already. As fairly self-centered creatures, we like to talk about our lives with our acquaintances. Much of the time, this naturally incorporates interpretation of the self. Perhaps you spend some time talking with a friend over lunch about why you like horror movies. That evening, you discuss with your partner why they feel unfulfilled by their current job. Before bed, you silently think about whether you are the sort of person who would be happy adopting a child. With our recognition of self-concepts as provisional comes a sense of what Laurie Paul calls “epistemic humility.” We can be wrong about the sort of person we think we are, and so we must approach the self-concept knowing that we will likely get quite a few things wrong. Perhaps you thought you were the sort of person who values their career over family, but once you were faced with the actual choice to stay home and raise children or accept a promotion, you found that your priorities lay with family. What is most authentic for us to do is not always represented by the current self-concept, and this only comes to light when we encounter a choice that tests our self-concept. These choices are an integral part of self-discovery. Once again invoking epistemic humility, it seems that we are never fully done defining the self-concept. There will always be additional evidence generated or uncovered through events that test or reveal one’s character. Thus, we should accept that the self-concept is a provisional entity which we must continually discover and refine. Authenticity as Commitment, Temporally Extended Agency, and Practical Identity An Existing Definition of Authenticity Charles and Guigon pose this question in their entry on authenticity in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “What is it to be oneself, at one with one- self, or truly representing one’s self?” They contrast this more complicated view of authenticity of self with the authenticity of objects, in which the latter is defined as the state of being “faithful to an original” or a “reliable, accurate representation” (18). While I agree that the authenticity of a self is more complicated than that of objects, I see no need to generate an alternative definition of authenticity if we can produce a “standard” to which an individual might be faithful. The existing thing being judged for authenticity in terms of faithfulness to an original or reliability in representation is a particular self-concept. Our account of authenticity will need to explain how we can temporally extend the self-concept and thus create a standard to be faithful to over time. The next natural question has to do with what it means to say that a person is a “reliable, accurate representation” of themselves (19). To form a “reliable, accurate, representation” of oneself, there are two primary “keys”: commitment and tempo- rally-extended agency, both of which I will discuss in the remainder of this section. The Personated Self, Commitment, and Agency The first key to a new account of authenticity lies in commitment. Here I will make use of Philip Pettit’s discussion of commitment and selfhood. Though Pettit primarily focuses on selfhood and identity in his article “My Three Selves,” I believe we can extend his conclusions to our current discussion of authenticity. According to Pettit, a person is defined as an “agent with the capacity to personate,” where personation is the act of presenting a persona and “inviting[ing] others to adopt [this] picture of who you are” (20). For instance, say that my friend asks me to keep a promise and I agree to do so. In doing so, I am making a claim about myself and a commitment to that claim: I will keep my friend’s promise. If I want my personated self to be relied upon, I ought to do as I said I would and keep the promise. If I do not, my earlier claim is compromised in its assertion as the truth. An individual must “live up to their words in practice: they act as the attitudes communicated would warrant" (21). In effect, the individual treats their personated self as real and, in living up to their personated self, invites others to do the same. In doing as I said I would, I fulfill the persona I set forth, thus endowing it with a sense of provisional reality. Here we come up against an objection. In making commitments or endorsing a particular self-interpretation, it would seem that an agent must be almost narcissitically focused on the creation of the self-concept at any given moment. Pettit’s own view is in tension with this sort of narcissism: “To return to a point made earlier, however, this self is not a construct that I intend to create as such...That claim ties personhood, implausibly, to a highly intellectualized form of reflection and a pattern of self-scripting that sounds downright narcissistic, as critics have suggested” (22). Relying on a “highly intellectualized form of reflection” poses a problem because it would require us to undergo a good deal of reflective agony about the person we take ourselves to be every time we make a commitment. Furthermore, it is entirely possible for an individual to possess a rich identity without undertaking highly intellectualized reflection. I think that we can still be quite conscious and aware of the commitments we endorse without being overly focused, or even highly aware of, the personated self we are creating in most cases. The following example will help us overcome this objection. Say that you ask me to drive you to the mechanic to pick up your car. I will likely say yes barring a major inconvenience. When I agree to drive you to the mechanic, I do not fully conceptualize the person that I believe myself to be. Rather, I feel as a matter of good will that I should help you out. If you were to ask me why I drove you, I could come up with the answer upon momentary reflection: I agreed because I take my- self to be the sort of person to help out a friend in a bind. But I don’t take the commitment itself to be constitutive of my self-concept unless prompted by some out- side inquiry or internal reflection. Furthermore, in such moments of self-reflection I do not focus on a singular commitment but a larger collection of commitments that I attempt to arrange into a meaningful pattern, thus forming a self-concept. Pettit echoes this sort of intermittent reflection, writing, “...it is important that it may take effort to achieve a full knowledge of who and how in this sense I am... Thus, it may take time and trouble for me to develop such a sense of where I am committed” (23). In other words, the personated self is something we make somewhat unconsciously through conscious commitments, and it is only later, through adequate reflection, that we develop a “sense of where we are committed,” and thus a self-concept to which to be faithful to (24). Now we can return to the initial example of my promissory commitment to my friend. In keeping my promise to my friend, I find that I have been faithful to my commitment in this particular instance. If I expand this promissory commitment to be constitutive of my self-concept and thus the sort of person that I take myself to be, I will as a matter of principle continue to fulfill my promises. If I successfully keep such commitments, my actions, behaviors, and claims will accurately and reliably represent my self-concept. My friend will accept that I am the sort of person to keep a promise, given that I continue to keep promises when called upon to do so. So authenticity relies on the fulfillment of the commitments one sets forth as constituting their self-concept (or at least, a sincere attempt to fulfill such commitments). With commitment comes the second key: temporally extended agency. As Pettit suggests in his definition of a person, persons are a particular sort of agent—an individual or entity that undertakes or performs an action (25). When we make commitments, we become agents concerned with values, goals, and policies that are enacted over time. American philosopher Michael Bratman uses the goal of writ- ing a paper as an example of temporally extended agency: I see my activity of, say, writing a paper, as something I do over an extend- ed period of time. I see myself as beginning the project, developing it over time, and (finally!) completing it. I see the agent of these various activities as one and the same agent-namely, me. In the middle of the project I see myself as the agent who began the project and (I hope) the agent who will complete it. Upon completion I take pride in the fact that I began, worked on, and completed this essay. Of course, there is a sense in which when I act at a particular time; but in acting I do not see myself, the agent of the act, as simply a time-slice agent. I see my action at that time as the action of the same agent as he who has acted in the past and (it is to be hoped) will act in the future (26). Similarly, an individual can make a commitment to be a particular sort of person that acts in a particular sort of way, and then carry this commitment over time. The individual does not view their self-concept and associated commitments as a “time-slice agent,” even if the Humean self changes from moment to moment (27). Rather, commitments connect both the personated self and the self-concept through time. Harry Frankfurt, another American philosopher, similarly argues that the individual makes plans and acts in virtue of the commitments which she cares about, and thus becomes “inherently prospective; that is, [she] necessarily considers [herself] as having a future” (28). So too do such plans entail a “notion of guidance” along with a “certain consistency or steadfastness of behavior; and this presupposes some degree of persistence” (29). To re-emphasize my point, though we may objectively be bare Humean selves, on the basis of forming commitments and endorsing them over time, we create a provisional sort of self that is temporally extended in terms of agency and identity. Even if the objective self shifts from moment to moment, the commitments we endorse remain somewhat consistent and thus so does the self-concept. Furthermore, for our self-constituting commitments to have a real impact on who we take ourselves to be and how other people perceive us, they must be somewhat consistent. Like a theory, a self-concept should accurately “predict” future behavior and actions—if a self-concept were not consistent, it would not have much credibility or trustworthiness for those around us. Nor would it be a source of guidance and meaning for the individual. To sum, a personated self arises out of one’s commitments (and more generally, one’s intent to act/actions). A personated self is temporally extended into a more unified identity when one is faithful to their commitments, though a reflective understanding of this identity is not yet present. To construct the self-concept and achieve a level of self-understanding, the collection of commitments are arranged into a meaningful pattern as if to say, “I am this sort of person because I have made several commitments of this kind in the past, and I would like to continue doing so.” The self-concept, though subjective, gives us a standard to which to be authentic and guides our future actions in the service of preserving authenticity. We decide who we are and who we want to be, and then we do our best to fulfill the self-concept we conceive. At the core of authenticity, we find a steadfastness and consistency towards one’s commitments. I also believe that the required degree of faithfulness to a commitment is normative. I cannot give a full account here, but if we accept Quoidbach’s conclusion that core values, personality traits, and preferences change over time, then we should also allow commitments and authenticity to shift over time. An individual should be required to uphold her commitments for as long as they accurately rep- resent the person she takes herself to be at present. In this manner, our novel ac- count of authenticity occupies a median position between that of bundle theorists and a true and essential self. The self-concept is stable from moment to moment unlike the self put forth by bundle theories. However, the self-concept is revised as one undergoes self-discovery and changes as a person, so it does not rely on consistent and core personality traits like the essential self. What is authentic to me today might not be authentic to me in ten years, though our account of authenticity allows for gradual changes over the course of one’s life. We are held to our commitments, but only to a point. Authenticity is, then, a moving target. How Commitments Originate Commitments and the behaviors and actions they endorse may seem arbitrarily chosen, especially if one does not have a given reason to endorse a particular self-concept over others. Here I will discuss how commitments originate and what reasons they are based on. First, I wish to introduce the concepts of fixed traits and free traits. According to personality psychologist Brian Little, a fixed trait is an inborn or “culturally endowed” personality trait such as introversion or conscientiousness (30). A fixed trait is “fixed” in virtue of its givenness. I cannot wake up and decide, as a matter of will, to no longer be an introvert. Free traits, on the other hand, are “tendencies expressed by individual choice,” such as cultivating an interest in soccer (31). However, Little also believes that fixed traits and free traits can coexist, particularly in how an individual chooses to modify fixed traits to fulfill a goal. In the spirit of our earlier discussion of temporally extended agency, Little states that we must “extend personality temporally ,” because over time, particular personality traits are emphasized or downplayed based on one’s core projects (32). A core project is defined as “meaningful goals, both small and large, that can range from ‘put out the cat, quickly,’ to ‘transform Western thought, slowly’” (33). Importantly, a longstanding core project related to one’s life work and identity resembles Pettit’s definition of commitments. Little uses himself as an example: as an introvert, he dislikes public speaking. However, he also values being a professor and sharing knowledge, and thus pushes himself out of his comfort zone during lectures and speeches (34). His commitment to teaching and imparting knowledge allows him to take a fixed trait and disposition, introversion, and treat it as a free trait for a limited amount of time to work towards his core project. Though it may not be authentic of Little to become a professional public speaker, it is still authentic of him to undergo public speaking engagements due to his commitments. Little’s self-concept might be the following: “I take myself to be an introvert, but if I have a cause I really care about, I’m willing to talk in front of a crowd and thus act as if I were an extrovert.” Little’s acting like an extrovert does not make him one, but rather invites others to view him as someone who can successfully engage a crowd with a speech regardless of introversion or extroversion. Therefore, commitments are based upon inborn and culturally endowed behavior, dispositions, and interests, although we might have some control over if and how we enact such traits. In his paper “The Importance of What We Care About,” Harry Frankfurt offers support for the necessity of given traits. He writes, “While what is antecedently important to the person may be alterable, it must not be subject to his own immediate voluntary control. If it is to provide him with a genuine basis for evaluations of importance, the fact that he cares about it cannot be dependent simply upon his own decision or choice” (35). We must start with some given and objective behaviors, dispositions, and interests, lest our entire constitution be entirely arbitrary. Though we cannot choose our given traits, I believe we still have a degree of freedom in which traits cultivate and express. We can, as Millgram argues, “take an interest in something, in the hope of finding it interesting” because we are curious and will ourselves to look into a new interest (36). The same sort of curiosity and flexibility applies to behaviors and dispositions. We cannot fundamentally change these characteristics, but perhaps we can be curious enough to see how flexible they are in our expression of them. Like Little, we can undertake a project that pushes us outside of our comfort zone. This allows us to observe how freely we can manipulate a fixed trait. There is a balance between commitments we undertake knowing that we will have to alter fixed traits and commitments which we accept because we acknowledge we have particular fixed traits. Thus, another consideration of authenticity is understanding how far and for how long we can push ourselves past fixed traits until we experience what Little calls “burnout” (37). We might also find that there are behaviors and interests that we simply cannot enact or adopt, try as we might. A few years ago, I tried to cultivate an interest in ornithology. Though I was curious, I could not adopt or sustain the interest, and eventually abandoned my attempts at doing so because it did not bring me any pleasure and I had no other strong reasons to keep trying. On the other hand, there are behaviors and interests that we simply cannot abandon or downplay. While I cannot bring myself to be interested in ornithology, I find it difficult to remain uninterested in The Bachelor when it airs. Perhaps my lack of interest in ornithology and my inability to abandon interest in The Bachelor are the result of my not trying hard enough. To this sort of objection, I reply that I have no reason to try harder, nor a further interest in doing so. I might try harder to develop an interest in ornithology if I had a commitment or core project that related to it, such as spending more time with a friend who likes bird watching. I might also try harder to abandon my interest in The Bachelor if I read a scientific article about the detriment of reality TV to the human brain, which would be in tension with my greater commitment to intellectual health. As it stands, I don’t have any further interest or relevant commitments that would have me try harder to mold these traits. Thus, part of living authentically might be realizing which of our traits are involuntary and which of our traits are voluntary—in other words, which traits are decidedly fixed and which traits are some- what mutable. Living authentically is a balance of acceptance and choice in terms of forming and fulfilling commitments, as well as discovering what commitments we can and cannot enact. Our account of authenticity has arguably come to resemble Harry Frankfurt’s account of freedom of will. Frankfurt argues that freedom of will relies on the hi- erarchical ordering and endorsement of desires and volitions (38). Likewise, I believe authenticity relates to ordering one’s commitments by their strength, especially when we are faced with two competing commitments. Authenticity comes from the commitments we endorse, and one commitment, such as the inborn tendency to be introverted, can be overridden by a stronger commitment and accompanying desire such as the commitment to be a professor that engages in public speaking with the desire of imparting knowledge. Therefore, another aspect of authenticity is reflecting upon what one cares about, and then determining, either by an act of will or an acceptance of one’s nature, which of these values “overrides” the others. Our new account of authenticity also bears relation to Christine’s Korsgaard’s description of practical identity. In deciding which commitments to make, we create policies or “laws” which dictate future actions: “When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself” (39). Korsgaard further supports my assertion that commitments are expressions of the self-concept. Making commitments builds what Korsgaard calls one’s “practical identity,” which is “a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.”40 Where the personated self focuses on the making of commitments to present a self to others, the practical identity emphasizes making commitments to define and justify the actions of a self. Indeed, Korsgaard’s description of integrity might as well be discussing authenticity: Etymologically, integrity is oneness, integration is what makes something one. To be a thing, one thing, a unity, an entity; to be anything at all: in the metaphysical sense, that is what it means to have integrity. But we use the term for someone who lives up to his own standards. And that is be- cause we think that living up to them is what makes him one, and so what makes him a person at all (41). Along with authenticity and practical identity comes a sense of “integration” or “oneness” of self. The commitments, values, interests, and actions of an individual come together under the self-concept to form a rational pattern. Korsgaard additionally indicates another consideration in our search for authenticity: we should attempt to form commitments that exist in harmony with each other rather than in tension. In doing so, we form a self-concept better equipped for consistency and steadfastness. Practical and Existential Reasons for Committing Once you have made a commitment, why should you keep it? Let’s return to our earlier example: I tell my friend that I’m the sort of person to keep a promise, and he asks me to promise that I will attend his jazz concert tomorrow evening. What are the consequences of my failure to show up and fulfill my promise? Pettit offers three excuses that I might use in such a situation, which we will apply to our discussion of authenticity. The first is an excuse of circumstance (42). Say that I call my friend after the concert and profusely apologize for missing the event. However, I have a relevant excuse for the context. At the last minute, a family member of mine was admitted to the hospital and my presence was needed. With this excuse (as long as it is true), my friend excuses me from living up to my earlier promissory commitment. In fact, I could use an excuse of circumstance as many times as necessary, though it is unlikely that I would be able to genuinely use such excuses unless I were an incredibly unlucky person. We can regard ourselves as acting authentically in this situation because, although we had two competing commitments, we fulfilled the commitment we felt was stronger. If my friend understands my self-concept and rationally approaches the situation, he will likely understand why I valued my commitment to aiding my family in an emergency over attending his jazz concert. In this context I suffer little to no consequences for failing to uphold my promissory commitment. The other two excuses are less so the product of uncontrollable circumstances but of mental states or events. They result in interpersonal consequences. The first is an appeal to being misled by one’s mind. Say that I tell my friend that I truly thought I could make a promise to go to his concert, but when the occasion arose, I found that I simply could not keep it. Perhaps I remembered that I don’t like crowds, and therefore could not attend the concert. My initial willingness was an instance of self-delusion, or at the very least, a lack of self-knowledge (43). If I use this excuse, my friend would begin to see me as easily misled and too quick to form self-judgments. What kind of person, he might ask, forgets that they dislike crowds? Certainly not a person who is properly introspective. My friend would regard me as untrustworthy when it comes to my statements about commitments, and thus would disbelieve elements of my self-concept. If my self-concept does not match up with my personated self and its actions, then I have failed to act authentically. I will suggest that authenticity is an attractive quality in a friend and necessary for a steady relationship. If I continue to be inauthentic, then I might destroy our relationship. The second excuse is a matter of changing one’s mind (44). Say that I was not misled when I made the prior commitment, but I decide I no longer want to keep my promise. Besides being outrightly rude in changing my mind about this commitment, I also appear “wishy-washy,” or indecisive, to my friend. I make commitments without thinking about what they entail. My friend would regard me as unreliable and “flaky.” I would fail to be faithful to my commitments, and it might cost me my reputation. My friend would be less likely to rely on me and to let me rely on him in return (45). Again, authenticity is necessary for maintaining stable interpersonal relationships (46). Beyond potentially losing a meaningful interpersonal relationship, breaking commitments bears pressing existential implications. Varga and Guigon, in quoting Sartre, express a worry about the “cost” of breaking self-constituting commitments: If an agent acts against her commitments, she risks the “radical transformation of her being-in-the-world.” If I say that I am the type of person to keep a promise and then fail to do so, I will have to take this new behavioral evidence into account. If I fail to keep a promise multiple times, then my action is not simply out of character—it is my character. If I avoid deceiving myself, I will have to admit that I am not the type of person to keep a promise, and thus must change my self-concept. My personated self, the outward persona which I present to others through my attitudes and actions, would come apart from my practical identity and self-concept. I would lose who I take myself to be. Korsgaard adds to this worry: “Consider the astonishing but familiar ‘I couldn’t live with myself if I did that.’ Clearly there are two selves here, me and the one I must live with and so must not fail” (47). Here, she elaborates upon the discomfort of losing who one takes themselves to be. As we have previously seen in the case of the personated self vs the self-concept, there is a tension between who we take ourselves to be and who we really are by virtue of our behavior and actions. I would have to live with the knowledge that I want to be someone who keeps their promises, but, based on my actions, I can no longer claim this commitment as part of my self-concept. Again, if I do not delude myself, I have to recognize that I am not a reliable person nor a good friend when it comes to promises. As Korsgaard points out, I would have trouble “living” with myself; my self-esteem would suffer. Indeed, this sort of asymmetry in my personated self versus my self-concept has some serious consequences if I let it infect too much of my being: It is the conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us that give rise to unconditional obligations. For to violate them is to lose your integrity and so your identity, and no longer to be who you are. That is, it is no longer to be able to think of yourself under the description under which you value yourself and find your life worth living and your actions worth undertaking. That is to be for all practical purposes dead or worse than dead (48). This is quite the cost. If I value being the sort of person who keeps their promises, then I would find it difficult to exist with the knowledge that I am someone who does not do so. While I think Korsgaard’s statement here is overly dire in terms of breaking only a few loose commitments, she illustrates the real and pressing threat that losing one’s authenticity poses. If I fail to live up to several of my commitments, especially those which I designate as highly integral to my self-concept, I risk creating a life in which I find no value, meaning, or self-esteem. My personated self would be so far removed from my desired self-concept that I would feel the disconnect Korsgaard mentions between “me and the one I must live with” (49). Such an existential state is likely the source of statements such as, “I am a stranger to myself,” and “I do not recognize myself any longer.” Finally, having long-term commitments is part of an enjoyable life and the avoidance of boredom. Little and Frankfurt concur on this end. Little is quoted as saying, “Human flourishing is achieved through the sustainable pursuit of one’s core projects,” which can be reframed as lasting commitments to one’s goals (50). Frankfurt, too, identifies final ends as the driving purpose of one’s life: “If we had no final ends, it is more than desire that would be empty and vain. It is life itself. For living without goals or purposes is living with nothing to do” (51). We need commitments as final ends in order to build fulfilling and interesting lives. Further- more, commitments stave off the encroachment of boredom. Boredom, Frankfurt claims, threatens one’s “psychic survival” (52). Besides losing a sense of personhood, a lack of commitments and the development of boredom would endanger one’s mental existence and inner life. We can see, from discussing the existential implications of breaking commitments, even more reasons to pursue authenticity. Applying Our New Account of Authenticity Now that we have a new account of authenticity, let’s return to the three cases we posed earlier. How does our new account of authenticity offer guidance to Neryssa, Rowan, and Julia? For (a), we would first ask Neryssa how much her job contributes to her sense of identity, and thus, her self-concept. If she does not stake much of her identity upon her job, then for the sake of authenticity, she does not need to search for a new job. If she does take her work to be a large part of her identity, then she will need to search for a new job because the current job is in tension with her self-concept and the person she takes herself to be. We would also ask Neryssa how much the company’s product and mission misalign with her personal values. If she works for a corporation that espouses anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric while simultaneously taking herself to be someone who supports LGBTQ+ rights, she might, as Korsgaard warns, find it difficult to “live with herself.” Let’s say that Neryssa does stake a fair amount of her identity on her job. In addition, let’s say that the company’s values are greatly misaligned with Neryssa’s values. We would say that it is more authentic of Neryssa to leave her current job and search for a job that is representative of her values and the person she takes herself to be. We might even counsel her and suggest that, in staying in a job that is in tension with her self-concept, she risks burnout, the loss of her sense of identity, and general dissatisfaction. Furthermore, she might find it difficult to even commit to a job that she cannot fully endorse. In terms of authenticity alone, we would say that it is best for Neryssa to search for a new job. In (b), it would be helpful if we suggest that Rowan reframe the question. Instead of worrying about which major is the most authentic choice, we would remind Rowan that authenticity is not an expression of an essence of self. Rather, authenticity is a commitment to the self-concept, or, the self they take themselves to be. Therefore, they should ask themselves which major they would find themselves most capable of committing to. Can they envision a long-term commitment to either history or literature? In reframing the question in this way, we take away the agony related to the question, “What kind of person am I?” and turn our attention to a new question: “What kind of person would I like to be?” This question is prospective and forward-looking, and it emphasizes that there is no truly “right” choice (although some choices might be more “right” than others). We make a choice “right” by committing to it, given that we have the capability and interest necessary to commit to it in the first place. In Rowan’s case, they have the added benefit of being able to change their major. Say that Rowan declares an English major, but after a semester of classes, realizes that they would much prefer life as a history major. They can now change their commitment and self-concept. Thus, Rowan’s case endows us with a bit of advice for ourselves. When we can, we might try out a choice or experience before making a commitment to it and staking our identity upon it. For example, say that you are interested in becoming a parent. Before committing to parenthood (which, unlike a college major decision, cannot be reversed once chosen), you might spend some time taking care of young children and talking to their parents about the pros and cons of raising a child. While spending time with young children and talking to parents cannot fully replicate the actual experience of becoming a par- ent, you would at least have a clearer idea of what parenthood entails. In (c), we would remind Julia that her decision for or against the attack ad will become evidence that constitutes her self-concept. This is because decisions of this nature are “expressive of yourself” (Korsgaard 83). She needs to evaluate which she values more: the ultimate goal of her campaign, which is to promote environ- mentally sustainable legislature; or her personal morals and commitment to “playing by the rules.” If she runs the attack ad, she commits to being the sort of person who values the greater cause over her personal morals. If she decides against the attack ad, she commits to being the sort of person who values her personal morals over the greater cause, even if the greater cause is quite worthy. What we are asking of Julia is similar to what we asked of Rowan: “What sort of person would you like to be?” As we did with Neryssa, we would tell Julia to make the commitment that results in a self-concept she can “live with.” Though running the attack ad might help Julia win the election, the victory will mean little if she has sacrificed the self-concept that she wants to embody. Or perhaps Julia determines that she values the ultimate goal of her campaign more than her personal morals. In doing so, she commits to a new self-concept, one that values the greater good over her personal qualms. What matters in Julia’s case is that she decides in relation to a self-concept she can endorse and commit to, and thus continue past the decision with minimal tension between the person she takes herself to be and the person she acts as. Her self-concept, whatever it ends up being, will also influence how she reacts to and values future decisions, so it is imperative that she be able to commit to this new self-concept over time. I hope these three examples properly illustrate how one would use this new account of authenticity in real-world situations. I believe authenticity is of greatest importance when we are faced with difficult, self-constituting decisions. On a day- to-day basis, we might find it unnecessary to ask whether an egg salad sandwich or a hamburger is a more authentic lunch choice. However, it is necessary to spend time reflecting upon the self-concept and authenticity when the choice we face has clearly life-altering consequences or stands to change the way that we conceive of ourselves. And though authenticity may be an important factor in how one makes decisions and conceives of themselves, it is not necessary that authenticity and steadfast commitments constitute a morally admirable or respectable life. A person could commit to being flaky, to being a nuisance to their friends, or to being a criminal mastermind all while still being authentic. On a final note, it may seem as if one cannot help but be authentic if, at the end of day, authenticity amounts to a sincere commitment to one’s self-constituting choices. It seems like Neryssa could just as easily authentically embrace the practicality of keeping her current job as she could embrace the authenticity of seeking more fulfilling work, as long as she fully commits to her choice. However, I do not think this new account of authenticity is too weak regarding the tension between the personated self and the self-concept. Again, I will use the quote from Korsgaard: “Consider the astonishing but familiar ‘I couldn’t live with myself if I did that.’ Clearly there are two selves here, me and the one I must live with and so must not fail” (53). Sometimes the person we take ourselves to be is markedly different from the behavior we exhibit and values we espouse. In these situations, we have two options. One option is to accept a new self-concept in light of new behavioral evidence. Alternatively, we can change ourselves or our lives, thus pursuing greater harmony between the person we act as and the person we take ourselves to be. The discomfort of not being able to live with oneself is what holds us to a stricter attribution of authenticity. Conclusion From the initial doubt that bundle theories cast upon the necessity and nature of authenticity, we find ourselves with a novel account of authenticity centered upon steadfastness to the commitments which we take as integral to our self-concept. It is this self-concept that endows us with a sense of “I” and identity. When the actions and behavior of the personated self successfully act as a “reliable, accurate representation” of the person we take ourselves to be, we are authentic to that sense of identity. When faced with difficult decisions which have the potential to shape who we take ourselves to be, it may help to ask ourselves not what is most authentic of some underlying essence of self, but what we would find most natural to commit to. With this sort of direction, we will hopefully continue to construct self-concepts which we can “live with” and bring fulfillment and satisfaction to our lives. Endnotes 1 Christian Jarrett, “There Is No Such Thing as the True Self, but It’s Still a Useful Psychological Concept,” 2017. https://digest.bps.org.uk/2017/08/22/there-is-no-such- thing-as-the-true-self-but-its-still-a-useful-psychological-concept/ 2 Jordi Quoidbach, et al., “The End of History Illusion,” Science , vol. 339, (2013), 98. 3 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , (Oxford: 1896), 134). 4 There are other considerations at play in each scenario. For instance, in (c), there are also considerations of ethics. In (a) and (b), there are considerations of practicality and utility in regards to selecting a job and a college major. Still, authenticity plays a role in what the agent chooses and how they decide to value considerations of ethics, practicality, and utility, so each scenario will involve authenticity in some way, although authenticity might not be the only deciding factor. 5 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book II: Ideas , 118. 6 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , 134. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, 11. 9 David Eagleman, The Brain: The Story of You , (New York: Vintage Books, 2015), 34-35. 10 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , 134. 11 Thomas Metzinger, “Self Models,” Scholarpedia , 2007. 12 Douglas Hofstadter, I Am a Strange Loop , (Basic Books: 2007), 294. 13 Somogy Varga and Charles Guignon, “Authenticity,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 2020. 14 Ibid. 15 E Camp, “Wordsworth’s Prelude, Poetic Autobiography, and Narrative Constructions of the Self,” Retrieved 2021, from https://nonsite.org/wordsworths-prelude-poetic- autobiography-and-narrative-constructions-of-the-self/. 16 Ibid. 17 Philip Pettit, “My Three Selves,” Philosophy , vol. 95, no. 3, 2020, 6. 18 Varga and Guignon, “Authenticity.” 19 Ibid. 20 Philip Pettit, “Philip Pettit: My Three Selves. Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture 2019,” YouTube , uploaded by RoyIntPhilosophy, 2019, www.youtube.com/ watch?v=DUzuNVuEIYA. 21 Pettit, “My Three Selves,” 7-8. 22 Ibid, 18. 23 Ibid, 19. 24 Three more brief notes. (1) It is possible that the first time I make a commitment to be a certain sort of person that the commitment does require substantive reflection and narcissistic intellectualization. But hereafter, the fulfilling of the commitment is somewhat automatic as a matter of policy. If I find no difficulties in fulfilling my commitment (say, a competing commitment), it should be easy for me to do so with little reflection. (2) Some decisions concerning commitments do require substantive reflection and narcissistic intellectualization, along with an awareness of both. However, these sorts of commitments are likely “tests of character” or life-changing decisions, so they warrant such agonizing and reflection. I have in mind the decision to marry someone, to have a child, to go to war, to change careers, etc. (3) Here we can easily see how “taking stock” of one’s life might prompt a series of new commitments and the abandonment of old ones. We look back on the commitments we have made and decide, through the gradual making and fulfilling of new commitments, to form a new self-concept. In instances of conscious change, we would be aware of the new commitments we make—we would be more “mindful” of the personated self being created than we naturally find ourselves to be. 25 Pettit, “My Three Selves,” 7. 26 Michael Bratman, “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency,” The Philosophical Review , vol. 109, no. 1, 2000, 43. 27 Ibid. 28 Harry Frankfurt, “The Importance of What We Care About,” Synthese , vol. 53, no. 2, (1982), 260. 29 Ibid, 161. 30 Susan Cain, Quiet , (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 209. 31 Craig Lambert, “Introversion Unbound,” Harvard Magazine , July 2003, www.harvardmagazine.com/2003/07/introversion-unbound.html. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Cain, Quiet , 209-210. 35 Frankfurt,“Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy, Inc. , vol. 68, no. 1, (1971), 18. 36 Elijah Millgram, “On Being Bored Out of Your Mind,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , vol. 104, (2004), 179. 37 Lambert, “Introversion Unbound.” 38 Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” 15. 39 Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 83. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid, 84. 42 Pettit, “My Three Selves,” 17. 43 Ibid, 9. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid, 19-20. 46 By authenticity in relationships, I do not mean "showing your true self." Many of our relationships might only exist because we present ourselves in a curated fashion. So authenticity in relationships might simply be keeping one’s commitments. However, as in our discussion of free trait theory, there is a limit to which we can keep up an image that is in tension with our given traits. Authenticity in a relationship is, once again, a balance between the person we are for others (free or mutable traits) and the person we cannot help but be (fixed traits). 47 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity , 84. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Lambert, "Introversion Unbound." 51 Harry Frankfurt, "On the Usefulness of Final Ends." Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 41, (1992), 6-7. 52 Ibid, 12. 53 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity , 84. Works Cited Bratman, Michael E. “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency.” The Philosophical Review , vol. 109, no. 1, 2000, pp. 35–61. JSTOR , www. jstor.org/stable/2693554? seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. Cain, Susan. Quiet . New York, Crown Publishers, 2012. Camp, E. (2020, September 17). Wordsworth’s Prelude, Poetic Autobiography, and Narrative Constructions of the Self. Retrieved February 19, 2021, from https://nonsite.org/wordsworths- prelude-poetic-autobiography-and-narrative-constructions-of-the-self/. Eagleman, David. The Brain: The Story of You . New York, Vintage Books, 2015. Frankfurt, Harry G. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 66, no. 23, 1969, pp. 829–39. JSTOR, www.jstor. org/stable/2023833. Frankfurt, Harry G. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” Journal of Philosophy, Inc. , vol. 68, no. 1, 1971, pp. 5–20. JSTOR , www.jstor. org/stable/pdf/2024717.pdf? refreqid=excelsior%3A4fc27219ea9ee0fb- c13044d020500b1. Frankfurt, Harry. “On the Usefulness of Final Ends.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 41, 1992, pp. 3–19. JSTOR , www.jstor.org/stable/23350712seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. Frankfurt, Harry. “The Importance of What We Care About.” Synthese , vol. 53, no. 2, 1982, pp. 257– 72. JSTOR , www.jstor.org/stable/20115802?se- q=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. Hofstadter, Douglas. I Am a Strange Loop . Basic Books, 2007. Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature . Oxford, 1896. The Online Library of Liberty , people.rit.edu/wlrgsh/HumeTreatise.pdf. Korsgaard, Christine M. The Sources of Normativity . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, doi:10.1017/CBO9780511554476. Jarrett, Christian. “There Is No Such Thing as the True Self, but It’s Still a Useful Psychological Concept.” Research Digest , The British Psychological Society, 22 Aug. 2017, https://digest.bps.org.uk/2017/08/22/there-is-no-such-thing-as-the-true-self-but-its-still-a- useful-psychological-concept/. Lambert, Craig. “Introversion Unbound.” Harvard Magazine , July 2003, www.harvardmagazine.com/2003/07/introversion-unbound.html. Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book II: Ideas . Edited by Jonathan Bennett, Jonathan Bennett, 2007, www.earlymoderntexts.com/ assets/pdfs/locke1690book2.pdf. Melchert, Norman. The Great Conversation: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy . New York, Oxford UP, 2007. Metzinger, Thomas. “Self Models.” Scholarpedia , 2007, www.scholarpedia.org/article/Self_models#The_phenomenal_self-model_.28PSM.29. Millgram, Elijah. “On Being Bored Out of Your Mind.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , vol. 104, 2004, pp. 165–86. JSTOR , www.jstor.org/sta- ble/4545411? seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. Millgram, Elijah. “On Being Bored Out of Your Mind.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , vol. 104, 2004, pp. 165–86. JSTOR , www.jstor.org/sta- ble/4545411? seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. Pettit, Philip. “My Three Selves.” Philosophy , vol. 95, no. 3, 2020, pp. 1–27, doi:10.1017/S0031819120000170. Pettit, Philip. “Philip Pettit: My Three Selves. Royal Institute of Philosophy Annu- al Lecture 2019.” YouTube , uploaded by RoyIntPhilosophy, 28 Oct. 2019, www.youtube.com/ watch? v=DUzuNVuEIYA. Quoidbach, Jordi, et al. “The End of History Illusion.” Science , vol. 339, 4 Jan. 2013, pp. 96–98., doi:https://wjh-www.harvard.edu/~dtg/Quoidbach%20 et%20al%202013. Varga, Somogy, and Charles Guignon. “Authenticity.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Stanford Center for the Study of Language and Information, 20 Feb. 2020, plato.stanford.edu/entries/authenticity. Previous Next

Aash Mukerji The Growing Incoherence of Our Higher Values Aash Mukerji Nihilism is perhaps the most commonly misunderstood notion in Friedrich Nietzsche’s writings. Not only do many wrongly believe Nietzsche to advocate for nihilistic behavior, but many also see nihilism as the loss of all value and synonymous with the belief that everything is meaningless and valueless. In reality, Nietzsche defines severe nihilism as “the conviction of the absolute untenability of existence when it comes to the highest values that are acknowledged”(1). For Nietzsche, nihilism thus does not necessarily reduce the individual to a living lump of ennui. Rather than lacking all value judgements, Nietzsche portrays nihilism as a condition characterized by the absence of justifiable higher values. This supposed depletion in justification comes from Nietzsche’s infamous assertion of the death of God; Nietzsche held that modern science has made “belief in the Christian God unbelievable” (2). Nietzsche believed that without divine reasons to cherish our higher values, we would ultimately lose them entirely. Moreover, Nietzsche characterizes nihilism primarily as a cultural phenomenon—the societal loss of higher values precedes and causes the affective individual symptoms of nihilism. Nietzsche sees this cultural wave of nihilism as a looming threat; he predicts that humanity is on the brink of succumbing, to becoming nothing more than a group of “last men” Last men are characterized by the aforementioned deficiency in higher values, effectively rendering them incapable of justifying any goals that do not immediately benefit them (3). Nietzsche makes the impending nature of nihilism clear in Zarathustra , where the titular character is confronted by a chorus of individuals who actually wish to become last men (4). Nietzsche’s assertion of the imminence of nihilism was something of great interest to me as it seems that, even in the last two hundred odd years, our higher values have not been lost entirely. Nonetheless, I was not ready to entirely discount Nietzsche’s worries concerning our higher values, and this paper discusses a different manner in which our relationship with them may be deteriorating. In the wake of the death of God, what we are losing may not be our higher values themselves, but instead the unifying principles that require consistency and soundness among them. I will argue that we are progressing towards a world where our higher values are maintained but do not necessitate coherence in order to inform and justify our actions. Indeed, some incoherent higher values evidently already enjoy primacy over other kinds of values. I will attempt to demonstrate this by showing that, though contemporary society has preserved various higher values, individuals and communities frequently act in ways that conflict with those values without recognizing any logical inconsistency. This implies that what is missing from our higher values is the necessity for harmony with our actions and the other values we hold. In this paper, I will discuss some ideologies maintained today that seem to fit the characterization of higher values but conflict with our day-to-day activities and other values. I will attempt to supply some explanation for what causes this incoherence both through a Nietzschean lens and through the analysis of media culture within the framework of Jean Baudrillard. I believe both perspectives provide valuable insight into the mechanics of what is going on. Throughout this paper, I essentially seek to prove that we have retained our higher values but are losing their coherence and structure. First and foremost, we must establish some higher values that have been preserved. In my view, the most prevalent ones seem to be the political and social ideologies we subscribe to individually and culturally. For this paper, I will primarily consider liberalism and conservatism in America as typical instances of these types of values. To distinguish higher values from other more standard values, I will make use of the criteria detailed by Katsafanas in his paper, “Fugitive Pleasure and the Meaningful Life: Nietzsche on Nihilism and Higher Values.” These criteria include demandingness, tendency to generate tragic conflicts, regular induction of strong emotions, professedly great import, exclusion of other values, and propensity for creating communities (5). As far as I can tell, political ideologies seem to instantiate all of these criteria. They are certainly demanding; liberals and conservatives both generally see their chosen credo as the “correct” way to live and believe that it is immune to any sort of compromise. For either group, their ideology does not (in theory) allow them to be frivolous with their moral and political choices or to deviate from the prescribed guidelines is often perceived as a violation of some sort of ethical code. When conflict between our political ideologies and other higher values is acknowledged, such discord is often seen as tragic. For instance, nearly everyone has heard of individuals that have experienced, or have themselves experienced, intense strife with family members due to political disagreements. Family, as a general construct, is widely treated as a higher value. Familial bonds are demanding insofar as compromising them is seen as betrayal of the highest degree, they induce powerful emotions, acting for the sake of one’s family is seen as sufficient to explain most actions, family is often presented as taking priority over all other pursuits in life (to the point of being exclusionary), and family, of course, instantiates strong communities. So, when we experience conflicts between our political ideology and our family, such conflicts are nothing short of agonizing. Is it morally permissible to cut off one’s family members because they are conservative or liberal or libertarian? Is the gap in ideology something so forceful that it ought to trump deep familial bonds? Such questions are not easy to answer (for most) and the dilemma one finds oneself in when faced with them is most definitely viewed as a tragic one. Even if one is not sold on the status of family as a higher value, there are numerous others that can be substituted to illustrate my point. Here I will include a brief clarification that will prove important further on in this paper: The conflict between higher values must be acknowledged. My characterization of political ideology as a higher value relies partially on the notion that if one identifies a conflict between one’s political ideology and another higher value, then such conflict will be viewed as tragic. However, should one have an unrecognized logical conflict between one’s ideology and another higher value for whatever reason (for instance due to growing incoherence in our higher values), then this trait does not go unfulfilled merely because such a conflict goes unnoticed. Elicitation of strong emotions when it comes to political ideology needs no lengthy justification. One merely needs to survey the landscape of almost any social media platform to witness the masses loving, hating, condemning, and worshiping political figures. Likewise, it seems obvious that we believe political ideology is more important than the vast majority of things in our lives. At their core, ideologies such as liberalism and conservatism exist to function as banners of the things we value most in life. For the strong liberal or strong conservative, the very essence of what it means to live a good life is often synonymous with their dogma. Lastly, it is needless to say that political ideology has become exclusionary in nature and is prone to instantiate powerful communities. This phenomenon is represented best by the American political system where, by being part of one community, you are by default excluded (and often even looked down upon) by rivaling groups. As people increasingly and overwhelmingly define themselves and others based on their choices in politics, one’s ideology is commonly seen as central to one’s character. The intense political polarization that has resulted from this is testament to just how exclusionary political ideology has become and how robust the coalitions formed based on such ideology can truly be. Thus far, I have endeavored to establish political ideologies as common examples of higher values that are still held by people today. From here, I aim to show that such higher values are not being lost, but rather becoming increasingly incoherent. To this end, I would invite my reader to consider how party politics works in America. Generally speaking, the Democratic Party is meant to model liberalism and represent liberal people, and, conversely, the Republican Party is supposed to model conservatism in action. But can we confidently say that those values are the basis upon which each party unerringly acts? I have instead found their condition to be best described by the ideas of Baudrillard, whose framework I will use to illustrate what is going on. Of contemporary society, Baudrillard says: “Abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory - precession of simulacra” (6). In short, rather than our values and ideals informing the models we use to structure society, the models have begun to determine our values. In this case, instead of political parties typifying our liberal or conservative ideals, it seems increasingly true that the parties are influencing and warping our values. If we accept this Baudrillardian understanding, it seems evident that what retains vital importance in modern society is not our higher values themselves but the models that now precede them. This account also explains why incoherence of higher values seems to be on the rise; we still perceive our higher values to be what drives our society forward, even though this is not the case, which causes a disconnect between the individual and the weight of their own values. In addition, because our models have started to inform our values, we are no longer able to distinguish which actions we take on behalf of a higher value and which we take on behalf of a mere imitation of one. Even worse, the solution is no longer as simple as critically analyzing our values in order to discriminate between which ones are legitimate and which ones are mere simulacra; our genuine higher values have started to emulate the misshapen versions of them embodied by our models. The Baudrillardian fall from grace notably has two distinct steps: First, the models of our values (in this case our political parties) seem to operate completely independently from, and often in contradiction with, our actual values. Second, in a more sinister fashion, our values themselves are altered in a manner that breeds incoherence and an inability to grasp the inconsistencies in our beliefs. This transmutation occurs, on Baudrillard’s account, through media culture (7). This fits nicely with my argument, as it seems overwhelmingly obvious that the media is now inextricably entwined with politics, meaning our political ideology is especially susceptible to modification by mass media. For those readers who are skeptical about the weight Baudrillard and I are assigning to media culture, I will justify this further on in this paper. For now, however, I will provide some evidence that the process I have just described is in fact reflective of our society. First, consider America’s involvement in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine. For the fiscal year 2021, the Trump Administration sought $3.8 billion to support Israel’s military spending (8). Theoretically, this should be a big concern for Republicans. Since the reduction of taxes and minimization of governmental scope are undoubtedly two of the main goals of conservatism, and purportedly the Republican Party, it seems as though the Party ought to support decreasing tax-funded aid to Israel. And yet, studies show that the vast majority of Republicans believe that Trump has “struck the right balance” in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (9). As we can see, even if reducing our financial assistance to Israel is in the best interests of conservatism, self-identified conservatives consistently act contrary to this because that is what their party leaders convey to them. A Republican might object to this characterization, on the grounds that America has a responsibility to intervene in areas where it has deemed human rights violations are occurring. But if that is the case, then how can the Republican simultaneously support the construction of a border wall designed to prevent persecuted Latin Americans from fleeing for their lives? (10). The significance of all this is that the status of our higher values, in relation to their models, becomes dubious. This issue seems to mimic the first step quite clearly in our Baudrillardian process. The U.S. support of Israel is but one example of this phenomenon wherein actions resulting from our models are completely separate from the actions that would normally be dictated by our higher values. Next, let’s discuss an example of the second step of the Baudrillardian framework. Firearm legislation is another controversial issue in America at the moment, with various groups holding drastically different positions on whether one has the right to bear arms. Through this issue, I hope to demonstrate the ways in which the incoherence of higher values can lead to illogical stances on both ends of the political spectrum. When it comes to gun control, conservatives are generally in favor of fewer restrictions. This is largely consistent with core conservative beliefs, such as minimizing government input on private lives and preserving the liberties provided by the second Amendment. As a matter of fact, widespread gun ownership is not only morally permissible but even necessary , many conservatives say, in case the state ever decides to infringe on the rights of its citizens or coerce them without due cause. For the conservative, guns are thus a mode through which the individual can retain power over the state. So far, nothing seems wrong. But issues arise when other beliefs, supposedly in line with the same brand of conservatism, are added to the mix. While retaining this belief in the need, and indeed the moral right, to protect oneself from an unjust state as one sees fit , conservatives in America today are also associated with the position that it is unpatriotic and morally reprehensible to kneel during the anthem or otherwise protest the brutality and violence that occurs through the arm of the state, i.e., the police. It seems to me that simultaneously holding these two beliefs is something that is very difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. And yet, these are often considered standard conservative and Republican positions in our society. Contemporary liberals do not fare much better when their higher values are analyzed in this context. For the liberal, government institutions in America have a long history of systemic racism and oppression of minorities and lower classes. Such institutions thus ought to be overhauled or rectified, the logic goes, in order to form a society that reflects more liberal values. Yet at the same time, there is a common liberal view that guns are instruments of death and should be withheld from all except government employees who require them for their job, such as police officers and military personnel. But this view seems to remove an opportunity for the individuals oppressed by the state to gain power, and instead places that power squarely in the hands of the oppressors. The liberal cannot have their cake and eat it too; to believe that the police should be defunded because of their routine violence against the people they ought to be protecting, and simultaneously believe that the state should have full authority and exclusive control over all firearms, seems problematic at best. Even if the liberal attempts to avert this problem by going even further and asserting that nobody should own a gun, then a similar problem arises. It is still the same oppressive and racist state that takes guns away from people. It is still the same state that ultimately retains the power in this scenario. These are just some ways in which our higher values have begun to show signs of incoherence. Unlike our first step, this second step is no longer just a matter of us acting in line with our models while wrongly believing that they are reflections of what we ultimately value. If we could stop after the first step, there would still be a dim hope of redemption. If one can be shown the inconsistencies between their values and the actions of their party, it seems as though they can revise their mode of life. But the incoherence of the second step is far more deadly. Our higher values themselves are being changed; they are becoming muddled and losing intelligibility rapidly. Recommitting oneself to one’s values when faced with inconsistency is already exceptionally difficult but refashioning one’s values when faced with complete incoherence is even more demanding. Gun control is just one example of this, but these types of discussions all beg the same question: Are conservatives and liberals determining what their party stands for, or is it their parties that are deciding what the ideology stands for? It may be, in the words of Baudrillard, “no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. It is a question of substituting the signs of the real for the real” (11). This Baudrillardian diagnosis of society is explained by many factors, but primary among them is the rise of media culture. Overwhelmingly, the types of media we consume has come to define what it means to be social in our culture. The interactions we have with friends, family members, significant others, strangers, all are determined by the media we absorb. Take romantic encounters, for instance. The ways in which we decide how we ought to act towards our partners, what sort of romantic gestures are considered socially acceptable, what kind of boundaries we set, are all largely, if not entirely, defined by what we have seen in social media, films, television, advertisements, and so on. One need look no further, Baudrillard says, than to observe that, “whoever is underexposed to the media is desocialized or virtually asocial” (12). Such a state of affairs would be fine, of course, if most forms of media faithfully represented and depicted our higher values, but the opposite seems to be the case. Consider the social phenomena commonly referred to as “virtue signaling” or “performative activism.” In particular, let us contemplate the cases in which one virtue signals without actually doing much to pursue that virtue. In cases like these, many remain unaware of their hypocrisy and nonetheless believe that they act virtuously when, in fact, they are merely presenting the facade of virtue. The mere posting of a black square on one’s Instagram account without any further action to support African American communities comes to mind as a relevant example of this. One might say that all individuals who engage in such signaling do so consciously—they are aware that they are “faking it” in order to achieve popularity, acceptance into a social group, or something of this nature. But this seems like an overly pessimistic claim, and I would characterize the phenomenology of such individuals differently. I would argue that most people that act in these ways genuinely believe that they are pursuing their ideal of a virtuous life. They do not recognize that their virtues (which are closely related to, if not synonymous with, their higher values) are not informing their actions. Rather, they are acting according to the media-warped model of what it means to instantiate that virtue. To make this more concrete, take the notion of equality to be a higher value or virtue that one strives towards. If equality was truly what was informing the behavior of the virtue signaling person, then such a person would seemingly recognize that their actions are not satisfying that higher value. Thus, it seems much more likely that what the virtue signaler is motivated by is not the pure higher value of equality, but rather an incoherent version of it altered by media culture. The people who post black squares on their Instagram and then go about their daily life feeling excellent about their stand against police brutality and institutionalized racism certainly feel as if they have higher values (e.g., equality, liberalism), but such values have been rendered incoherent. The proof of this incoherence is of course that their higher values are (even partially) satisfied by trivial actions that provide no substantive change in one’s way of life or the world. In addition, as referenced earlier, such people do not experience the tragic feelings that are meant to accompany conflict between higher values because they do not recognize that such conflict exists in the first place. We can perhaps judge from the outside that there seems to be an objective disconnect between these people’s purported higher values and their actions, but the growing incoherence of their values prevents the perpetrators themselves from coming to the same conclusion. At this juncture, one might object that if our higher values have become so vacuous that they can be fulfilled by such superficial action, then it is likely that they are not higher values at all anymore. In this regard, it would seem that we have ultimately returned to Nietzsche’s hypothesis and lost our higher values entirely. To this I would reply that these incoherent higher values may very well be vacuous, but they retain their status, nonetheless. Political ideology, for instance, still instantiates all the higher value criteria, as I have discussed. What this shows is that our immediate societal condition is distinct from that of the last man. We still have the capacity to cherish things in all the right ways and set goals for ourselves beyond immediate gratification, it is just that the things we cherish and the goals we set may be severely distorted. Now that we have touched on how our current situation is different from the last man, a question naturally arises: What would Nietzsche say about the state of our political ideology? When it comes to politics, Nietzsche is remarkably silent. Try as one might, it is rare to find Nietzsche discussing political ideology at great length. Though he is often found criticizing democracy as a “conspiracy of the whole herd against [its] shepherd,” this does not amount to much in the form of a distinct political structure (13). We also get some cryptic allusions to the merits of a natural order-based caste system in The Antichrist , but this discussion seems less about the desirability of the castes and more about how even this sort of ideology is preferable to the life-negating belief system that characterizes Christianity (14). Rather than focusing on political structures in service of the many, it seems like Nietzsche was more interested in particular individuals that could serve as paragons of vice or virtue. Napoleon is an oft-cited example of someone Nietzsche admired very much, going so far as to name him one of the “profound and largeminded men of [the] century” (15). But Nietzsche’s view of Napoleon as a higher man could justify an entire paper by itself, and such analysis is not particularly relevant to our discussion of higher values. Rather than present Nietzsche’s (scarce) ideas on political ideology, it seems more fruitful to examine how concepts like the death of God might have led to our current predicament. Nietzsche, of course, saw the loss of higher values as a direct result of the absence of a divine entity able to furnish our choices and goals with meaning. But what may be more potent than the loss of objective meaning is the loss of the structure installed by that divinity. Organized religion generally aims to provide a clear system concerning the fulfillment of our higher values. It lays out, for instance, what constitutes a sin, how to worship properly, and so on. Ergo, religion serves to enforce a uniformity between our actions and our values. It is fundamentally designed not to allow individuals to both violate their own higher values and escape with a morally sound conscience. But without religion, this necessity for consistency between our higher values and our behavior is damaged. There is no eternal damnation, no divine punishment, no karmic justice to threaten us to maintain such cohesion, and so we lose it. What all of these topics have in common, from virtue signaling to contradictory stances on gun control, is the apparent inconsistency in the higher values that allow such behaviors to take place. Ultimately, I would suggest that the path the individual in contemporary American society has taken is distinct from the condition of the last man that Nietzsche fears. Higher values persist, as I have endeavored to show, but the logical consistency required to fulfill them properly seems to be rapidly deteriorating. Nevertheless, if one wishes to remain compatible with Nietzsche’s theory, then we could perhaps frame the current state of society as merely one of the final steps on our inevitable trajectory to becoming last men. After all, it does seem plausible that the degeneration of the coherence of our highest values will eventually lead to the loss of them entirely. Such an understanding does raise some concerns, however, as discarding our higher values (“believing in their untenability” as Nietzsche puts it) seems to require one to be aware of their unintelligibility. Insofar as we have reached a state where our higher values no longer even need to be consistent in order for us to act on them, one can wonder whether we will ever collectively reach a position where we realize the inconsistencies exist so deeply in our higher values that they must be abandoned altogether. Still, there is certainly a Nietzschean argument to be made that there must be a limit to how incoherent our higher values can get before we rid ourselves of them in disgust. As it stands now, even though our higher values have garnered significant incoherence, they can still be said to represent us faithfully for the most part. For example, though issues like gun control demonstrate some glaring problems that require rectifying, I would argue American liberals and conservatives still tend to largely act on the values at the core of their ideology. Single-payer healthcare is a good instance of this: Liberals largely support it on the basis of their beliefs about equality and human rights, while conservatives largely do not because it would result in less individual freedom and greater taxes (16). Thus, though I have spent the majority of this paper painting quite a dismal picture, our higher values do not seem close to collapsing entirely. We may not have to resign ourselves to the fate of the fabled boiling frog, insofar as the coherence of our higher values continually gets worse without us noticing. One could certainly make a compelling case that when the incoherence gets to a stage where it overwhelms the proper functioning of our higher values, we will desert them. At such a juncture, it appears we would have no choice but to become last men. At any rate, if one is really committed to the Nietzschean hypothesis, one could call the state we are currently inhabiting that of the “penultimate man” (or better yet penultimate person, for the sake of inclusivity and alliteration). Endnotes 1 Friedrich Nietzsche, et al., Writings from the Late Notebooks , (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 205. 2 Friedrich Nietzsche and Walter Kaufmann, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs: Translated, with Commentary by Walter Kaufmann, (Random: 1974), 343. 3 Friedrich Nietzsche, et al, Nietzsche: Thus Spoke Zarathustra , (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 129. 4 Ibid, 130. 5 Paul Katsafanas, “Fugitive Pleasure and the Meaningful Life: Nietzsche on Nihilism and Higher Values: Journal of the American Philosophical Association,” Cambridge Core , (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 9-11. 6 Jean Baudrillard and Sheila Faria Glaser, Simulacra and Simulation , (University of Michigan Press, 2019), 2. 7 Glenn Yeffeth, Taking the Red Pill: Science, Philosophy, and Religion in the Matrix , (Benbella Books, 2003), 74. 8 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , Congressional Research Service, 2020, fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf. 9 “U.S. Public Has Favorable View of Israel's People, but Is Less Positive Toward Its Government,” Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy , 2020, www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/04/24/u-s-public-has-favorable-view-of-israels-people-but-is-less-positive-toward-its-government/ . 10 Suzanne Gamboa, et al., “Why Are so Many Migrants Crossing the U.S. Border? It Often Starts with an Escape from Violence in Central America,” NBCNews.com , 2018, www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/central-america-s-violence-turmoil-keeps-driving-families-u-s-n884956 . 11 Baudrillard andGlaser, Simulacra and Simulation , 2. 12 Ibid, 55. 13 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, (Auckland, NZ: Floating Press, 2010), 67. 14 Ibid, 57. 15 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil , (New York, NY: Dover Publications, 1998), 256. 16 Bradley Jones, “Increasing Share of Americans Favor a Single Government Program to Provide Health Care Coverage,” Pew Research Center , 2020, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/29/increasing-share-of-americans-favor-a-single-government-program-to-provide-health-care-coverage/ . Bibliography Baudrillard, Jean, and Sheila Faria Glaser. Simulacra and Simulation . University of Michigan Press, 2019. Gamboa, Suzanne, et al. “Why Are so Many Migrants Crossing the U.S. Border? It Often Starts with an Escape from Violence in Central America.” NBCNews.com , NBCUniversal News Group, 22 Oct. 2018, www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/central-america-s-violence- turmoil-keeps-driving-families-u-s-n884956. Jones, Bradley. “Increasing Share of Americans Favor a Single Government Program to Provide Health Care Coverage.” Pew Research Center , Pew Research Center, 30 Sept. 2020, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/29/increasing-share-of-americans-favor-a-single- government-program-to-provide-health-care-coverage/ . Katsafanas, Paul. “Fugitive Pleasure and the Meaningful Life: Nietzsche on Nihilism and Higher Values: Journal of the American Philosophical Association.” Cambridge Core , Cambridge University Press, 22 Sept. 2015, www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american- philosophical-association/article/abs/fugitive-pleasure-and-the-meaningful-life-nietzsche-on- nihilism-and-higher-values/449B756CD8E5DC8139A701AC195F33F8. “Most Border Wall Opponents, Supporters Say Shutdown Concessions Are Unacceptable.” Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy , Pew Research Center, 21 Aug. 2020, www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/01/16/most-border-wall-opponents-supporters-say- shutdown-concessions-are-unacceptable/. Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil . Dover Thrift Editions. New York, NY: Dover Publications, 1998. Nietzsche, Friedrich, and Walter Kaufmann. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs: Translated, with Commentary by Walter Kaufmann . Random, 1974. Nietzsche, Friedrich, et al. Nietzsche: Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Cambridge University Press, 2006. Nietzsche, Friedrich, et al. Writings from the Late Notebooks . Cambridge University Press, 2016. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. The Antichrist. Auckland, NZ. Floating Press, 2010. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel . Congressional Research Service, 16 Nov. 2020, fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf. “U.S. Public Has Favorable View of Israel's People, but Is Less Positive Toward Its Government.” Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy , Pew Research Center, 30 May 2020, www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/04/24/u-s-public-has-favorable-view-of-israels-people-but- is-less-positive-toward-its-government/. Yeffeth, Glenn. Taking the Red Pill: Science, Philosophy, and Religion in the Matrix . Benbella Books, 2003. Previous Next

Catherine Nelli Interview with Danielle Bainbridge Catherine Nelli Danielle Bainbridge is a professor of theater, African American Studies, and Performance Studies at Northwestern University. Her background is in theater, English, African American Studies, and American Studies. She completed her undergraduate degree at the University of Pennsylvania in 2012 in English and theater and completed her PhD in African American Studies and American Studies—cultural history—in 2018 from Yale. Interview has been edited for clarity. JPPE : I’ll start by asking you to introduce yourself, your background, and your research, as well as the questions you find most interesting or important to explore at the moment. Bainbridge : Right now, my most important questions or areas of inquiry are thinking about the intersections of race, disability, gender, sexuality—like, how do we perform difference on stage? As well as thinking about the important role than performance and theatre and art have played in the establishment of new nations or nationalism. To that end, I’m working on two projects. The first one is called Refinements of Cruelty , and I’m collaborating with NYU press at the moment hopefully to place the book there. The book is about 19th and early 20th century sideshow and freak show performers who were born with physical disabilities and also born into slavery, and the process through which they were doubly subjected to systems of oppression, both as disabled people and also as enslaved Black people. So that book is my primary project. My secondary project is a general history book that’s called How to Make a New Nation . It’s about the performances of nationalism in early postcolonial nation-states. So I’m curious about how things like the professionalization of the Olympics, early TV politics, radio broadcasts, who gets put on the money, and the building of monuments. How these performative objects were used to establish the idea of nation and to recognize nation on an international scale. So those are the kind of questions that I’m thinking about right now. JPPE : Our journal is focused on interdisciplinary scholarship, and I know that what you do is very interdisciplinary as well. I’m curious how your work has benefited from interdisciplinary practices. Bainbridge : My background in every phase of my academic career has been very interdisciplinary. As a double major in college, I was always thinking of the intersections of history, literary analysis, theatrical history, theatrical performance studies, and performance practice. That was where I started to ask these questions and when I was introduced to scholars who were also thinking through that critical lens. And then when I went to graduate school, I was in an interdisciplinary PhD program because African American Studies is a field that encompasses lots of other disciplines. So you think through political science, anthropology, sociology, and history, and you’re thinking about all of these questions at the same time. And American Studies was similarly oriented, even though it was a degree that really focused on cultural history. So, I think that interdisciplinary work became really interesting to me at an early phase of my career. When I was an undergrad, I didn’t think of it as a career, I just thought of it as college. But by the time I started thinking about wanting to be a professor and wanting to teach at the undergraduate and graduate level, I was really curious about how I can bring different kinds of media and different kinds of inquiry in different fields together. Some of that was also influenced by the fact that I’m a practitioner—I’m an artist. I do creative scholarship, digital media work, and digital storytelling like my PBS series Origin of Everything . I have also done some docuseries work with Youtubers and PBS. And I’m currently working on a couple different shows, like some of the Crash Course series through Complexly, which is a company that focuses on making educational media for young people. Right now, I’m really invested in how scholarship can be brought to larger audiences outside of the academy through digital media in a democratic way, where it’s not necessarily about how much you can afford but more about your natural curiosity and desire to learn. I am also a writer. I write for theater, and I’m working on my first documentary that just got funded. I’m always trying to look for new ways to interpret information and translate it for different audiences. It’s appealing to me to think about interdisciplinary work as something that combines disparate fields. I think that sometimes, when we say interdisciplinary, we mean fields that are adjacent to each other, that are touching. But for me, combining theater, digital media, performance, documentary, and mashing these things together makes me excited because it stretches me as a scholar to think about the ways that I could actually benefit people and the way that my work travels through the world. Sometimes when you think in strict disciplinary lines, your work has a narrower reach. And I’m really interested in how I can reach people. I really want them to learn and be excited about the things I present, so I’m always looking for interdisciplinary ways to bring stuff to new audiences. JPPE : What’s the relationship between the scholar and the artist, and what’s the importance of that relationship? Bainbridge : It wasn’t always the smoothest transition. When you enter a Ph.D. program, you’re really there to commit to doing book-length and article-length research. That’s the discipline; that’s what’s expected of you. And I think it’s really important stuff, I mean, I wouldn’t be able to do any of the public-facing work I do if folks weren’t writing books and articles about it because I’m not an expert in everything that I make videos about. And I think that at the heart of our fields, book projects and articles are really the foundation. But I think because I had a background in theater and then went to grad school for more cultural history and African American Studies, it became important to me to continue to express myself. I always say that the difference for me between being an artist and a scholar is that I try to let every project express itself as what it wants to be. If I have an idea for something and I think, “This would be a really fun script,” or, “This really wants to be an essay,” or “This really needs to be in my book,” I try to make those decisions very consciously, about what’s the best way for this information to be shared with a larger audience and what does this piece of information demand of me as a maker, as a creator. There are plenty of things that I think, “Oh, this would make a great 12-minute online video, really punchy, good graphics, and people will be into the question,” and that’s a good primer for folks who are thinking about gender, race, sexuality, ethnicity, international politics, or whatever. Sometimes I have ideas like that, and then sometimes I have ideas like my documentary that I think, “Oh, this really demands a longer look and a more intense focus.” So it all depends on what the archive and that object I’m studying or the subject I’m studying demands, and how best to translate that for people to learn from it. JPPE : What is the subject of your documentary? Bainbridge : I am working on a documentary right now called Curio . In 2018, I was Artist in Residence and also a facilitator and writer of a piece called Curio: A Cabinet of Curiosity , which was based on the research for my book Refinements of Cruelty . It is focusing specifically on the lives of Millie and Christine McKoy who were two conjoined twins born in 1851 in North Carolina, who were touring the world and became international celebrities as freak show performers. So, they would sing and dance and there was also a heavy amount of exploitation and medicalization in their archive. The McKoy twins were who I started researching in grad school when I decided to work on freakshows and the intersections of slavery and disability. So, I am really intimately acquainted with their archive, and I made this performance piece out of it that a group of undergraduate students at the University of Pennsylvania staged. I loved working with those students, I think that they were really game to do a lot of weird stuff with me. I had them learning the handbell, I had them singing songs from the 19th century, they were tied together in a conjoined dress, and they were doing all sorts of really weird and experimental stuff with me. I learned a lot from that process, and I always wanted to rewrite and then restage it. So, in my early days at Northwestern—I came here in fall of 2018 as a postdoc right after the play had opened—I did spend some time with the piece thinking about revamping it. And then, you know, the world turning upside down the next academic year because it was 2019-2020 and COVID happened and all theaters went dark, and there was no opportunity to rethink the work, except in my own head. So I started thinking, wouldn’t it be great if I can make a documentary, because it combined my interest in digital media and my experience making these explainer videos and docuseries. It would be great to do a documentary that combines some of the creative elements of music from the play with traditional documentary storytelling. So, I started working on that idea and thinking it’d be great to do it, especially because it was funny that I started to see this explosion of digital theater overnight since there weren’t any opportunities to perform except on Zoom or through recorded stuff. And I just wanted an opportunity to combine my areas of interest under this same topic, so I pitched it to Northwestern for a research grant and I got some funding. And now I’m going to be working on that for the next year and a half or so, making maybe a 20- to 30-minute documentary that combined some of the elements from the stage production that I thought were really successful along with traditional documentary storytelling, like interviewing the McKoy descendents, looking at archival footage, and you know, figuring out ways to bring that story to life and to a larger audience. JPPE : Theater and performativity are in a rudimentary sense acted and therefore fictitious, but in recent years I think we’ve had a wider awareness that it isn’t that simple. So, how does the theory that you study translate into real world politics, representation, and change? And can you speak about this in relation to your Refinements of Cruelty? Bainbridge : It’s interesting because I’ve always been interested in the work of people like Moisés Kaufman, Anna Deavere Smith—people who do documentary theatre, just because it offers something really insightful and interesting, especially Anna Deavere Smith, I’m a big admirer of her work. So I think, when I write and when I create stuff, I do know where the line between reality and fiction is, I think that’s the first step, but I am also really interested in ways that theater could impact and bring about empathetic and lasting political and social change. I do think that the pieces that we make and things we put into the world have an impact on the way we view representation, on the way we view politics, on the way we view people from groups that aren’t our own. And so, when I’m teaching my students, it’s not just that I want them to be good storytellers, or good creators of fiction. I also want them to be good people, good global citizens, good people who think about the world in really critical and crucial ways. And I think there’s so much to be said for performance in general. Not only the creation of it, but the consumption of it is this huge engine for empathy and huge engine for understanding. So, when I’m making work or when I’m thinking about theater or writing criticism, I’m thinking about it in those ways—specifically about how we can create lasting and sustained social and political change through the creation of art. And I don’t think every piece is for every person. But I do think that there’s a lot that can be done. And a lot of artists are thinking really critically, especially as we’re starting to see new generations of artists making work that’s really critically looking at race and gender, not that these things are new, but that they’re really important questions that are being brought up. I do think there is a history of work making new social movements or new social possibilities for people. JPPE : What is the most impactful example of art that has created or propelled lasting change or social movements? Bainbridge: One of the things I teach is a course on African American theater history that starts in the 19th century and ends with A Raisin in the Sun . And I think most of my students who are young, Gen Z, savvy, politically active folks think of Raisin in the Sun as that old-fashioned play from the 50s that they had to read in high school or early college. And the thing for me about why I staged the class this way that ends with Raisin is that we have all of this activity of Black theatrical innovation and genius that comes before it. We have plays from Black artists in the 19th century, we studied things like slave narratives, we study Frederick Douglass’s oratory, we look at W.E.B. DuBois’s theories of artist propaganda, we look at some of the darker aspects of the representation of Black people like blackface minstrelsy, Vaudeville—you know, performance of minstrelsy as well as early instances of Black people performing in blackface. So we also see some of that as well in this time period. But what I want to chart for my students is the slow progress that we start to see in Black representation from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century. We start to see improvements in realism, improvements in domestic drama, and then we have this revolutionary moment with A Raisin in the Sun , where it’s this big critical success, but it’s also one of the first plays that we see by a queer, radical Black woman that represents Black people as people and fully human. And so by the time my students arrive at A Raisin in the Sun , you can see that they’re excited, that they say, “Oh my god, finally something that looks like real people, fully fleshed out people.” And I think oftentimes, Hansberry’s work gets read as conservative because it comes from a particular historical moment, but actually, it was this radical revelation in the representation of Blackness on popular stages. And it represents early emerging Pan-African identities through the character of Beneatha, it talks about the role of gender through characters like Ruth and Mama Younger and Walter. We see early integration politics that represent Black desire as not a desire for integration because they want to be in proximity to whiteness or close to whiteness, but because they want greater opportunity for themselves and their children. That subtlety and that keen hand that Hansberry has was so revelatory, and I really like having it at the end of the quarter so that students can finally put it in its context and say, “Oh, this really was a lot different than what came before it. This really is espousing something radical and fresh when you think about what came before it.” So that’s one of my favorite examples, and then I also teach the second half of that course, which is A Raisin in the Sun to contemporary theater. JPPE : What has been your research methodology on the Refinement of Cruelty project, and what has surprised you or not surprised you the most about the process? Bainbridge : As a writer, I write a lot of creative nonfiction, as well. And I was really surprised by what the archive demanded of me in terms of ethics. I'm looking at this archive of people who were exploited, essentially, in multiple ways. And I'm trying to make sense of this story while I'm also having complicated and complex feelings as a Black woman, as someone who has experienced the trials and tribulations of the American healthcare system, and medicalization and fetish, and all of these other things. And so, you know, when I first started the project, it was 2012. So it's been, like 10 years. So that's overwhelming. But I think when I first started the project, I was just surprised by how hard it was for me to look at the material, because I primarily before then had been studying feminist theatre from Jamaica in the 1980s. So it was more celebratory and more self-fashioning, because these women were creating their own stories and writing their own work, deciding what went into the archive. Things about the performers I study largely when they're either against their will or without their consent, at the very least. And so methodologically, I started thinking through two primary questions. The first was, what does it mean to enter something into the archive? What does it mean, to put something on the official record? And the second question was, what are the ethics or responsibility that I have as a Black queer woman telling this story? What do I need to do to make this feel okay? The first question I kind of answered with what I'm theorizing is the future perfect tense of historical recording. The future perfect is a tense that you see in romance languages, like Latin and Spanish, which is the past tense of the future. So it’s, “it will have been.” I started to fool around with that idea because I thought, when you are entering something into the record as a historical actor, as someone who is concerned with history—so say, I have things that I think are historically significant, I entered into an archive—I’m concerned with how history is going to be told 10 years from now, and 15 years from now and 100 years from now, that's why I put it in the archive. I wanted to trace sort of what those impulses were, and why people began to think through those terms. And I thought the archive that I was engaging in, especially because a lot of it is ephemera, and sort of freak show stuff, and things that people think of as lowbrow culture, I was thinking, why would someone enter this in an archive? What's the impetus? And why are they thinking that historians 100 years from now should be able to view this? They put this in a protected place for a reason. And then the second question methodologically, I'm answering was what I'm calling an ethnography of the archive. So it's a lot of auto-ethnographic writing that I do about archival ethics, essentially. And I put that in the project itself and fold it into it itself because I think one of the things that felt unsatisfying to me was speaking in the sort of disembodied historian’s third-person voice. I wanted it to feel as if I was considering the questions of what the archive is demanding of me and my own subject position as a descendant of slaves. And I started doing that writing mostly in grad school to satisfy myself. It wasn't something that I thought would really end up in the project. And then when I saw that people were responsive to it, and that the questions being asked by this ethnography of the archive were leading me somewhere methodologically, I started writing more and more and more and more. So I think you really have to consider what the archive demands of you before you start working. Because if I was working on another archive, or a completely different subject, I don't think I would have the same questions. JPPE : Right, so really considering positionality. Bainbridge : Yes. JPPE : What are the cultural and economic legacies of the freakshow and performance archive that you’ve found? Bainbridge : There are some interesting economic quirks of these archives. In one chapter of my manuscript, I call it the “Alternative Ledgers of Enslaved Labor.” That’s where the economic angle of this archive really becomes most evident. The chapter itself focuses on this really long ledger kept by Chang and Eng Bunker, who are two other subjects in my study. Chang and Eng were conjoined twins, just like the McKoys. They spent most of their life in North Carolina, just like the McKoys, but they were actually born in Thailand, or then known as Siam. They are the twins around which the phrase “Siamese twins” was established, so they are the original so-called “Siamese twins.” This ledger is interesting to me particularly because they are included in my study not because they were enslaved, but actually because they were racialized, BIPOC people who were slave owners. When they retired from the freakshow stage, they invested their money in buying two adjacent plantations, they married two white sisters—each married to one sister—and they divided their time between these two plantations, they owned a few dozen slaves, and they invested all their money in Confederate currency. So ultimately, we all know the historical outcome of this, that Confederate current went defunct. It became valueless after the war ended, and they were forced to re-enter the freakshow stage as performers, essentially to support their family and to support themselves. I’m interested in this ledger, particularly because it’s so detailed and so nitty gritty, but it doesn’t recount any of the expenses of all of the enslaved souls that lived on these plantations. So it doesn’t have a lot of information about the women and men that they enslaved, but it has things like, “gave daughter five cents to repair her gloves,” “25 cents in postage for publicity, five flyers,” I’m sifting through this ledger primarily to think about ways that performance labor is recorded, but slave labor is erased. And I’m also curious about how we think about performance labor through these enslaved performers. So folks, not like the Bunkers, but more like the McKoys and Blond Tom Wiggins and Joice Heth, who are other people who are in my study. I’m interested in how we could reconfigure this as not just performance practices, but thinking about labor because at its heart, slavery is a labor system. It is an economic system—to live in a slave society is an economic system. So I’m thinking through scholars like historian Stephanie Smallwood’s Saltwater Slavery , I’m thinking through things like Jennifer Morgan’s Laboring Women , where they think really intimately about the connection between finance and enslavement and what it means, particularly for Black women. I’m curious about how all these things could be read through performance, where we’re not necessarily seeing these performers do things like pick cotton, or perform housework, or take care of children because they were presumed to be valueless, essentially, because of their physical disability. But many of them ended up becoming the prize of their master’s plantation because their performance labor actually netted more money than they could do any of those domestic tasks or fieldwork. So I’m curious about that relationship and how it can be explicated. JPPE : Switching over to your project on nation and how the nation is imagined and born, what is the relation between literature and performance and the idea of nationhood? How do postcolonialism and Black Feminist Theory interact with, shape, or reflect these ideas and forces? Bainbridge : I first became interested in this topic because I was teaching a class which used to be called State-Funded Theater of the Americas and now is called State-Funded Theater of the US and Caribbean, which looks at state-funded theater from the 20th century after postcolonial movements have started to emerge in the 1930s until about the 1970s. It is concerned with why and how so many states, these newly formed independent nations, as they were entering the postcolonial period, why they were funding theater. That was my initial question that started the idea for the book. What is it about theater or these plays—you know, they’re funding plays by Dereck Walcott about the Haitian Revolution, they’re funding plays by Sylvia Winter, they’re funding plays by lesser-known playwrights and we’re seeing this explosion of work from really important folks who would later become important poets, playwrights, postcolonial theorists, and they’re essentially being put to work by these states making theater? And then at the same time, in the US during the Great Depression, we start to see things like the Works Progress Administration and the Federal Theater Project, which are funding what they’re calling “Negro Units,” in the parlance of the day, of all-Black theater companies that are doing this really interesting work. I was introduced to a book by a scholar named Stephanie Batiste, who wrote a book called Darkening Mirrors . The book is about how these Negro Units of the Federal Theater Project were also thinking about US imperialism and internationalism in their performances because they often staged things like a production of Macbeth that’s set in Haiti or a version of The Mikado that’s set in the Pacific. And they’re doing these really interesting internationalist works, and I was also really taken in by a book called Sachmo Blows up the World which thinks about how Black jazz artists were sent around the world during the Cold War essentially as ambassadors of American identity. I became interested in all of these questions around the same time, which is: why is it important to use art to express national identity or a nationalist identity? I really started thinking about how these works could be connected, and I started to find other examples of how these places, these newly formed nations were thinking about their own national identities. Then the second thing I became really interested in was the professionalization of the Olympics, which sounds completely disparate and sounds like it has nothing to do with it, but basically I wanted to know how the Olympics went from being what was considered an amateur event—so, one of the requirements of the Olympics prior to, I want to say the 1970s or earlier, was that folks had to be amateur athletes, so they couldn’t be making money, either from sponsorship or they couldn’t be involved in professional leagues. And this was supposed to be a leveling of the playing field, but also was a big hallmark of the Olympic Games. As that transitioned to becoming this multibillion-dollar industry with TV ads and Coca-Cola sponsorships and all this other stuff, we start to see some of these newly independent nations start to get this greater recognition beyond the scope of their political impact. So we start to see places like my family’s home country of Jamaica become really famous for track and field, even though on the international politics scale, they weren’t considered a necessarily huge player by other nations because of global anti-Blackness and general disregard for Caribbean politics. So, we see smaller nations get this chance to now be considered competitors of larger nations. Those are the two archives that I started digging around in that made me want to ask these questions, and as I got more and more into thinking about these things, I just started pulling that thread and saying, “What are other instances of ways that nations perform their own identity?” I started thinking about monuments because we were in this endless news cycle of Confederate monuments being torn down and colonial monuments being torn down around the world. And then I started thinking, “Well, what’s another performance that’s supposed to signify something?” And I started looking into the performance and writing of national anthems, who gets put on money, who becomes a national hero, who’s considered an emblem of the nation? And I think all of these questions come because I am a scholar who’s deeply invested in Black Feminist Theory. They come from a Black Feminist perspective because I’m not just concerned with how we perform masculine leadership in new nations. I’m concerned with how all of these disparate things come together, but I’m also curious about the performance of nationalism or the performance of the nation-state particularly because I just haven’t had as many satisfying answers. I have a rule, basically: if I’m in a meeting and I have an idea, I have to be willing to do the thing that I’m suggesting, or else I don’t suggest it, because I hate being that person who says, “It’d be great if someone …would do this.” I have a similar thing with my scholarship, which is: if I have a question and it needs answering, I should probably write it down and write the answer because I can’t wait on someone else to do the project or do the thing. The question of nationhood became really interesting to me, not because I’m so much invested in the idea of the nation-state, but because these early independent countries as they’re starting to formulate their own idea of themselves, are turning to things like parades, and festivals, and literature, and theater, and are funding it at an incredibly high rate in comparison to what we see today. I mean, now it’s hard to get money out of a government to do anything artistic because other things are considered more practical. But it’s curious to me that so many nations are experiencing that same impulse at the same time—they’re saying “Oh, it’s important for us to have anthem, it’s important for us to have a national team at the Olympics, it’s important for us to put on plays and give people a sense of cultural heritage and pride.” It just seemed like too many coincidences not to be something, and that’s really where the idea came from. JPPE : How has the relationship between nationhood and culture and performance in literature or literary methods shifted over time and geography? How have different power systems influenced this? Bainbridge : From what I’ve done in terms of preliminary research and writing the proposal, in the early days of these postcolonial movements, there was a lot of effort made to put a good face on independence. There was a sense of celebration, liberation, where we start to see things like emerging Pan-Africanism, Black Nationalism, a sort of international perspective that’s thinking of people of color and oppressed people as in league with each other, as having shared destinies. And I think that’s really, really fascinating. I also think that as time goes on, and we start to see some of the hangover of postcolonial excitement, we start to see less and less of these performances, at least in my early stages of research for this second project. While there’s this big boom at the beginning of, “we need to have plays and pageantry and all this stuff to celebrate postcolonial identity,” it starts to slowly wane, not necessarily because I think the interest in promoting cultural identity goes away, but because other emerging issues of forming an independent nation come to the fore, things like being recognized internationally, economic downturn, the strength of the dollar—these become more prevalent at the front. As many nations became sort of undermined by the international community, we just see less and less of it. That’s the trajectory that I’m tracing now. Why is there this period of just explosion of creativity? And then the creativity doesn’t go away, the creation doesn’t go away, but some of the funding goes away, and when people are less inclined to put money behind something, it becomes less visible. And now, my work as a historian is to trace what became less visible. JPPE : Did the burst of creativity also come during independence movements? Bainbridge : Yeah, so we start to see them in the line with a lot of independence movements. I start the book with Aimé Césaire’s and others’ formulation of Négritude in the 1930s, which is interesting because Césaire himself is a politician, poet, theorist, global citizen—you know, he’s doing all this stuff. So I start with that, and then I think as time goes on—like anything, creativity is a plant, it needs water to grow, it needs funding to grow, it needs support to grow—we start to see people investing, especially because a lot of these early politicians had a sense of culture and literature that was more acute. They’re reading Marx, they’re reading cultural theory, they’re exchanging ideas, they’re organizing festivals and things together. There’s a lot of shared destiny in their thinking. But I think, because the idea of nation-state often gets framed, especially from a Western perspective, as individualistic—there’s the idea that you have to support and protect the boundaries and borders and we hear that rhetoric all the time here in the US—we start to see that it doesn’t disappear, people are still engaging and writing and making the stuff, but we just see a shift in focus, and I think that’s really where art reaches its limit a little bit. JPPE : How can theory and literature help us understand modern imperialism and the continuing legacies of past imperialism? Bainbridge : That’s really a great question. I’ll reference again Stephanie Batiste’s book because I think she does an excellent and really articulate job of discussing the connection between imperialism and performance. I do think that the work we make in any given historical moment is informed by what’s happening around us. Even if you set a sci-fi thriller in the year 3500, it’s informed by the moment you write it in. We know that implicitly as people who study literature and study performance, but I think it’s also curious as we start to see work now take up that charge but in a commercial sense. The work that I study was primarily funded by governments, and I’m interested in that aspect of things, but I was teaching the Swing Mikado (or the all-Black cast of the Mikado ) to my students a couple weeks ago, and one of them brought up—so I can’t take credit for this—they brought up that it’s really interesting to see that this moment is so concerned with US militarism and involvement around the world, and we’re coming off the wake of World War I, launching right into World War II, and then the Korean War and Vietnam, and we’re seeing all these things. And they made an analogy between the Swing Mikado or the all-Black cast of the Mikado and Hamilton , and how those two things speak to each other. They were saying that if the question of the moment when Swing Mikado came out in the 1930s was emerging US military involvement and imperialism, then the question of Hamilton is the hangover and wake of multiculturalism and what moment we’re in now as a society. And there’s lots to be said about Hamilton , I don’t know if I necessarily need to go down that rabbit-hole, but one thing that I find fascinating about it—and I didn’t see a live production, I saw the Disney Plus recording of the stage version—is that I think the music is actually quite good but I think that what it’s doing in terms of cross-racial casting is actually really confusing and not necessarily as successful as people think. So, I’m curious about that connection because, if the question of that moment was emerging imperialism, the question of this moment is now entrenched imperialism coupled with the hangover of 90s and early 2000s multiculturalism, and the promise of that moment. When I was a kid in the 90s, multiculturalism was everywhere. There was this idea that if we just put people forward enough, if we just represent people enough, if we just have enough TV shows with diverse casts, that will solve the problem of race or solve the problem of classism or xenophobia. And now, many years later, we see the failings of that. But I think the hopefulness of something like Hamilton is directly linked to that movement and that moment. Previous Next