Public Funds, Private Interest The Role of Private Companies in Shaping US Cybersecurity Policy Justin Katz Yale University Author Danai Benopoulou Graham Gonzales Hans Lei Marko Winedt Editors Fall 2018 This paper compares current cybersecurity policy with the Cold War military industrial complex to understand how links between the private cybersecurity industry and government impact federal policy. I. Introduction Collectively driven by increased awareness of cyber threats, fear of snooping by government agencies, and growth in intelligence budgets, the private cybersecurity industry has recently exploded. Global cybersecurity spending is predicted to hit $90 billion in 2018[1] and grow at an annual rate of above 20% to $232 billion by 2022.[2] Along with industry expansion, connections between private cybersecurity firms and the government have multiplied. Government intelligence agencies have enlisted the services of private companies for everything ranging from espionage operations[3] to the development of offensive capacities.[4] However, as government and industry deepen their ties, it becomes increasingly possible for misalignment between public and private interests to drive policy in the wrong direction. Given that US cybersecurity strategy is currently ill-defined and malleable, missteps could have impacts for decades. Nevertheless, collaboration between government and industry is also in its infancy, so the nature of public-private relations has yet to solidify. This means that is still time for the government to change course. This paper will analyze the evolving relationship between government agencies and private sector cybersecurity firms in four parts. The first will explore the forms of government contact with the broader cybersecurity marketplace. The second will consider historical connections between the defense establishment and private companies – the Cold War military-industrial complex and the use of private military contractors (PMCs) since the late-90s – as a template for potential policy risks associated with a modern alliance between defense and industry. The third will examine how that public-private cybersecurity connections are distinct from previous military-industrial linkages and analyze the policy implications of those distinctions. The last section will offer some ways to leverage the advantages of the private sector while minimizing harm. II. Government Contact with the Cybersecurity Industry Government agencies have developed ties with the cybersecurity industry in two main ways. First, agencies have spurred demand for information security technology both directly, through government contracts, and indirectly, by encouraging investment by the private sector. Second, a revolving door between government and the private sector has packed corporate boardrooms and staff ranks alike with former intelligence and defense personnel. With growing national security threats and opportunities in cyberspace, members of the defense and intelligence communities have emphasized the need to both secure US critical infrastructure and develop offensive cyber capacities. In response, Congress has approved growing budgets for cyber defense, allowing millions of dollars to go to contractors.[5] More recently, the Pentagon requested $8.5 billion for “cybersecurity-related activities,” while in the FY 2019 budget President Trump called for $15 billion in total cybersecurity spending, a 4% increase over fiscal year 2018 requests.[6] Growth in government demand for private cybersecurity services has directly fueled the industry’s expansion by causing the government to outsource a sizable share of its spending to private contractors.[7] Indeed, in DC, where most contractors are located, almost 24,000 new cybersecurity job openings were posted in 2015, about double that of the next highest region.[8] Government investment in cybersecurity has also indirectly led to market expansion. First, the shifting composition of federal budgets during the 8-year Obama administration in favor of cyber, encouraged large defense contractors to invest more in information security. Despite the overall shrinking of military spending, investment in cybersecurity significantly grew. In response, big tech-centered defense contractors like Boeing, Raytheon, and even consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton have created cybersecurity branches.[9] Seeking to win contracts with innovative new tools, these larger companies have continued to acquire boutique firms offering custom software with narrow applications.[10] Although the Trump administration won a substantial increase in defense spending as part of a February 2018 budget deal, those increases may be temporary, given that ten-year spending caps imposed by the 2011 Budget Control Act remain in place and could force steep cuts at the end of the decade.[11] Therefore, cybersecurity offers a more stable source of demand for contractors than traditional spending. Second, greater government interest in network defense suggests to private firms that cyber threats are widespread, meaning they should invest in their own cybersecurity capacities. While increasing their own cyber spending, federal agencies have published recommendations on how firms should bolster their defenses. For example, Obama’s 2013 executive order commissioning a framework for critical infrastructure protection stated that the government should “provide guidance” on which commercially-available cybersecurity services companies should buy.[12] The Trump administration has pursued continuity with Obama-era policies,[13] and in its 2017 National Security Strategy urged coordinated responses to major threats in both the private and public sectors.[14] Additionally, the intelligence community has invited private firms to attend classified briefings informing them about emerging cybersecurity threats. According to one NSA official, the meetings aim to “scare the bejeezus out of them.”[15] Frightened CEOs then turn to cybersecurity companies for help. The Chief Security Officer of Mandiant, a private security outfit, alleged that executives often buy the firm’s products after attending classified NSA briefings.[16] Federal policy decisions guide the industry’s scale and composition, so firms within the market have a clear profit interest in the government’s cyber strategy. That is not to say, however, that government officials are distorting the scale of cyber threats for private sector benefit. Scare tactics are often necessary to convince recalcitrant executives to make necessary upgrades. However, the outsized effect of federal policies on this industry risks creating real or perceived conflicts of interest. Many top cybersecurity firms are led by experts who once held high-level posts within law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Endgame, for example, sells zero day vulnerabilities and global maps of network weaknesses almost exclusively to government agencies.[17] Its board includes former NSA chief Kenneth Minihan and is chaired by Christopher Darby, the current CEO of the CIA’s venture capital arm.[18] CrowdStrike, a cyber forensics firm, boasts two former FBI officials as top executives – CEO Shawn Henry, former chief of worldwide cyber investigations, and the company’s general counsel, who served as the deputy head of cyber for the Bureau.[19] Many other senior administrators with experience in intelligence and defense sit on corporate boards or serve as executives at major cybersecurity firms.[20] The revolving door between government and the private sector exists for lower level employees as well. Some ex-hackers found their own companies. For example, Brendan Conlon, a Naval Academy graduate who worked as a hacker for both the NSA and CIA, recently founded Vahna, a firm that publicizes its employees’ time working for government agencies.[21] One former NSA official suggests that the best private security companies are founded by members of the “SIGINT” community, who apply the hacking skills they acquired during their time in government to assess system vulnerabilities and respond to breaches.[22] Large defense firms are especially interested in acquiring startups founded by former intelligence community members to secure contacts within the CIA, NSA, and the Pentagon. Knowing that big companies will scramble to buy their startup, government employees become more likely to move to the private sector. Lastly, even if government employees do not start their own company, they frequently move to the private sector with their training in hacking techniques. Though government agencies have taken pains to recruit technically skilled employees to work in their security and hacking divisions, the government lacks the resources to pay competitive salaries compared to the private sector. As a result, many military and intelligence personnel transition to industry work after receiving government training. The cycle has become so predictable that agencies now only plan to keep new hires for a few years.[23] Thus, almost all sectors of the cybersecurity industry have at least some form of contact with government. Private firms have an interest in shaping government cybersecurity policy for their benefit, and these firms may have a unique ability to do so based on these widespread connections. Of course, the revolving door between government and the private sector is not limited to the cybersecurity industry. However, this dynamic presents unique risks in the cyber sphere, given the differences between public and private interests in the cybersecurity industry and several unique characteristics of public-private relations on cybersecurity issues. The next two sections explore those concerns. III. The Cyber-Industrial Complex – Lessons from the Cold War and Private Military Contractors Relationships between the defense establishment and industries that seek government influence are hardly a new phenomenon. Throughout the Cold War, policymakers faced a military-industrial complex, where government demand for military goods and services propped up a lucrative defense contracting industry. In turn, this industry lobbied Congress and the Pentagon for ever-increasing levels of spending. More recently, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Pentagon hired PMCs for operational support. Common challenges between those two episodes demonstrate how ties between the cybersecurity industry and government could negatively impact policymaking. A. Increasing Costs and Threat Inflation From the beginning of the Cold War, connections between private contractors and government encouraged policymakers to overstate Soviet threats and waste money on unnecessary military buildup. A classic example is Eisenhower’s attempt to downsize the B-70 bomber program during his first term. The bomber program involved contracts with thousands of private firms, with production so dispersed that a majority of congressmen had at least one important supplier in their districts.[24] Immediately after announcing the cuts, Eisenhower met fierce opposition from Congress, which accused him of jeopardizing American national security by letting the Soviets outpace American airpower. Eventually, Eisenhower caved and reinstated the program. Air Force officials later testified that claims of a “bomber gap” were invalid, since US capabilities far exceeded those of the USSR.[25] Private contracting had introduced new benefactors of military spending with considerable leverage over policymakers. To justify higher expenditures that kept contractors’ factories running, lawmakers manufactured exaggerated threats. The use of PMCs has also created the potential for overstating threats. Over 60 firms serviced contracts worth billions of dollars during the Iraq War, carrying out many crucial combat operations.[26] However, much of the stated pretense for the Iraqi invasion was unfounded – the Bush administration’s claims that Hussein helped plan 9/11 and that the Iraqi government was nearing the acquisition of nuclear weapons ultimately proved incorrect.[27] It is beyond the scope of this article to speculate on whether the connections between top officials and private beneficiaries of the war – most notably Dick Cheney and Halliburton – motivated the administration to distort the Iraqi threat for financial gain. However, the perception that those ties influenced the invasion undermined the administration’s credibility and damaged Bush’s Iraq policy.[28] These incidents suggest two related concerns for cybersecurity policy: cybersecurity industry players may encourage government officials to overstate the risk of cyber-attacks for private gain, or the public will perceive that they are doing so. There is already evidence that industry interests have outsized influence in national conversations. Former intelligence personnel with a financial stake in private contractors use their credentials as ex-government officials to support extensive cyber operations. After the Snowden disclosures, some of the most stalwart defenders of NSA snooping had both impressive government credentials and deep financial stakes in the agency’s contractors. Stewart Baker, former NSA general counsel who testified before Congress claiming that cutting back PATRIOT Act surveillance programs would help terrorists, now lobbies for NSA contractors including SAIC and the Computer Sciences Corporation.[29] Jack Keane, a former four-star general who defended the NSA’s programs on cable news, is also a board member of the NSA contractor General Dynamics. Retired General Wesley Clark emphasized the need for the PRISM program while simultaneously taking payments from a private equity firm with substantial financial stake in NSA contractors.[30] Of course, there is nothing wrong with former top brass opining about what they consider important defense issues. However, given that officials enjoy a privileged place in national security conversations, conflicts of interest potentially open up avenues for abuse and may cause speculation about corruption. Relationships between local governments and private firms may prevent elected officials from checking threat inflation. From Maryland to Texas, local and state governments have designed tax incentives and run advertising campaigns seeking to create a “cyber Silicon Valley.” Some have even used tax dollars for direct investment in startups.[31] If tech firms set up shop in regions desperate to keep the jobs they provide, then the congressional representatives from those areas will likely lobby extensively for greater government funds devoted to cybersecurity. Representatives of cybersecurity districts may warn of a B-70 bomber-style “cyber gap” as an excuse to spend more on firms with local power. The notion that the cybersecurity industry can influence public threat perception through multiple channels is worrying. Given current trends and cybersecurity’s rapid growth, there is a risk of creating even more problematic relationships in a poorly-understood industry. Besides leading to wasteful and unnecessary spending, an overemphasis on threats could prevent policymakers from properly assessing tradeoffs between security and other interests such as Internet freedom and governance. Even if private actors do not put pressure on policymakers to distort threats for personal gain, the appearance of close ties between industry and government can create perceived conflicts of interest. This might in turn lower trust in government and limit officials’ ability to craft constructive policy. However, despite similarities, the risks of malignant cyber threat inflation and massive government waste are lower than during the Cold War or the invasion of Iraq. First, apparent overstatement of cyber threats is at least partially due to the fact that many do not take threats seriously enough. Therefore, apparent threat inflation may be more indicative of attempts to increase stakeholder attention on an important issue than private sector manipulation of government policy. Second, powerful private interests have an incentive to counter the cybersecurity industry’s threat narrative. Large tech companies recognize that overstating the cyber threats may encourage Congress to mandate that companies meet certain cybersecurity baselines. Since those firms want to avoid burdensome regulation,[32] they have an incentive to lobby lawmakers and make cyber threats seem less severe. B. Inefficiency Even if public-private ties do not drive unnecessary spending, they can drive up costs and make it more difficult for governments to provide necessary services. Theoretically, private contracting lowers government costs by leveraging the competitive forces of the market. Federal agencies can allow firms to bid against each other and award the contract to the company that makes the best offer. However, when firms have government ties, it becomes easier to spend money by lobbying to win more lucrative contracts rather than offering the best one. During the Cold War, private contracts were the products of political negotiation, not competitive bidding, so the firms with the best lobbyists secured the most lucrative contracts. The Pentagon sometimes passed over firms offering the lowest price to grant awards to the firm whose “turn was next.”[33] That process both increased costs by granting contractors monopoly power and privileged firms that already had connections in the system.[34] The use of PMCs increased costs in other ways. By offering salaries that exceeded military pay, contractors lured talented soldiers into the private sector. Then, the contractors sold their services to the government at a higher per-soldier cost to cover their overhead.[35] It is possible that links between the cybersecurity industry and government could create similar inefficiencies. First, former government workers now working as contractors can leverage connections to negotiate deals, even if they do not offer the best package. Second, as traditional defense contractors pivot towards the cybersecurity market, they may use their status as trusted collaborators to win awards over more competitive firms. The fact that many of the biggest cybersecurity contractors are companies with longstanding connections to the intelligence community could raise suspicions that the most entrenched firms, and not necessarily the best, receive government funds. Also, cybersecurity contracts may require that companies have security clearance, limiting the pool of competitors to insiders.[36] Third, cybersecurity firms poach the best technical personnel from government. If federal agencies contract government-trained hackers at a higher cost, then the government ends up paying more for an identical service. Already, some agencies, unable to keep sufficiently skilled technicians away from the private sector, plan on contracting with cybersecurity firms who hire government-trained personnel.[37] Although the government should leverage its own monopoly power to bring down prices and maximize efficiency, current trends suggest that the influence of private firms will serve to increase their margins and waste federal funds. C. Differing Roles and Constraints Even when the government and the private sector carry out similar functions, they occupy different roles and face different constraints. Those distinctions become clear when examining the PMC industry. Private contractors are just that: private. This means they can perform tasks that governments are either legally or politically constrained from doing. Relying on PMCs to carry out combat operations reduces the danger faced by US service members, thereby lowering the political barriers to conflict. Additionally, PMCs are not subject to congressional constraints – for example, the Bush administration used PMCs to circumvent limitations on US military involvement in the Colombian civil war.[38] While the US has used PMCs to expand its operational flexibility, contractors are in no way beholden to American interests. PMCs have worked with dictatorships, drug smugglers, and al-Qaeda-linked terrorist organizations.[39] By increasing demand for PMCs, US operations in Iraq encouraged investment in startups and the expansion of existing firms. As operations in Iraq wind down, those firms need new customers – and there is no guarantee that Washington will like them. US demand for privately-produced cyber weapons and security products raises similar concerns. First, private tools can provide ways for governments to evade legal prohibitions on certain cyber techniques. For example, while CrowdStrike CEO Shawn Henry worked at the FBI, he developed technology to remotely monitor a target’s computer undetected. However, the FBI needed a court order to use the technology. At CrowdStrike, he uses a similar tool, but, as a private entity, he can deploy it without going to court.[40] In an attempt to indict WikiLeaks’ founder Julian Assange, the Justice Department organized a group of small cybersecurity firms, mostly tied to the public-sector security community, to dig up dirt. The group planned to launch an intimidation campaign against WikiLeaks’ followers and discredit the organization by tricking it into publishing fake documents.[41] If performed directly by part of the federal intelligence community, such tactics would spark outrage. While that operation failed, it suggests that, by unloading dirty work onto private companies, the government could skirt political and legal barriers. That may seem like an attractive option in the short run, but in the long run it risks eroding public trust and landing intelligence agencies in even greater legal trouble once laws catch up with technological innovation. Second, the US government has no guarantee that cyber weapons firms will not peddle their wares to countries that threaten American interests. For example, the Mubarak regime and the Bahraini government cracked down on political dissidents allegedly using software purchased from Gamma, a UK firm.[42] US-based Blue Coat has sold Deep Packet Inspection, a technology used to censor journalists and track down dissidents, to Syria, Myanmar, Egypt, Qatar, China, and Venezuela, all countries with spotty human rights records.[43] At first blush, given that the US government does not deal with these companies, it seems that US connections to the cybersecurity industry have no bearing on the development of a worldwide network of cyber mercenaries. While demand from authoritarian regimes for surveillance products would exist regardless, US reliance on private firms to build cyber weapons compounds the problem in two ways. First, demand from the US government increases the size of the market. This is an issue in the market for zero-day exploits, cyber-attacks that exploit previously-unknown technical vulnerabilities. When the US pays millions in government contracts for zero-day exploits, it encourages more companies to enter the business, some of which will inevitably sell to whoever wants to buy.[44] Second, by buying exploits from private companies, the US legitimizes an international cyber arms market. That makes adversaries more likely to brazenly seek out private firms to meet their intelligence needs. An unregulated international trade in cyber vulnerabilities leads to the proliferation of offensive capabilities, multiplying the threats that the US will face in the future. IV. Unique Characteristics While many challenges look similar to those arising from past public-private relationships, several unique characteristics of the cybersecurity industry create new dynamics. First, government dealings with the cybersecurity industry are subject to higher levels of secrecy than most other public-private relationships. The intelligence community hides its contracts behind a shroud of hyper secrecy. One of the documents in the Snowden dump emphasizes the importance of preventing any association between the NSA and one of its contractors, the Computer Sciences Corporation.[45] Similarly, in 2010, Endgame’s modus operandi relied on avoiding any mention in media at all, let alone in relation to the NSA.[46] In this context, intelligence contractors often have better knowledge of the government’s projects than lawmakers, meaning they can use their inside scoop to lobby Congress and win even more contracts.[47] As a result, it is difficult to conduct an appropriate cost-benefit analysis of the tradeoffs associated with existing ties. Second, the cybersecurity industry has other customers besides the government. While PMCs and defense contractors can only sell their services to government agencies, most cybersecurity firms can market and develop products for the private sector as well. Therefore, the size, scope, and composition of the cybersecurity industry is largely determined by factors outside the government’s control. On the one hand, that means the government may have trouble reversing any negative effects of the industry on policy. If a strong cybersecurity industry causes poor government policy, rather than the other way around, then improvements in protocol surrounding agencies’ relationships with industry will not have much of an effect. On the other hand, if firms are participants in a broader private cybersecurity industry, then they will have to adjust their behavior to market realities. For example, if firms encourage government to adopt policies that lead to artificial demand for cybersecurity products, then they risk creating a bubble[48] that would hurt them financially if it bursts. Therefore, firms either avoid extensive lobbying for unnecessarily favorable policies, reducing their distortionary effect, or they engage in such lobbying and weaken their influence in government in the long run once the bubble bursts. Additionally, companies may have less of an incentive to engage in the sorts of problematic rent-seeking behavior explored earlier. If they cannot win government contracts, instead of spending millions on lobbying campaigns, firms might just look for customers in the private sector.[49] Finally, contracting may stymie vital information sharing. During the Cold War and the Iraq invasion, the Department of Defense could hire a single contractor (or group of contractors) to complete a single product or mission. The intelligence and defense establishment have largely replicated this model – single firms produce discrete software tools that the agencies subsequently integrate into their operational doctrine. However, in doing so, agencies lose the ability to work collaboratively and share information to solve important security problems.[50] In fact, with most contractors in direct competition with one another, firms are likely to guard their methods as proprietary secrets. In the current system, the only way contractors can integrate their teams to work on a single project is if one firm buys out another. But that, in turn, reduces competition in the industry as a whole, which can also stifle innovation. While certain characteristics of the cybersecurity industry allow it to self-correct for some of the negative policy effects of public-private ties, the government must take additional steps to be able to eliminate them all. V. Ways to Mitigate the Threat The government benefits from contact with the private cybersecurity sector – contractors allow the intelligence community to tap into the industry’s innovative power and give agencies the flexibility to temporarily increase the size of its workforce for time-sensitive projects. Therefore, policymakers should make changes that retain those benefits while minimizing the costs. First, government agencies should rely less on contractors and more on public-private partnerships to develop new technologies. For example, after Google told the NSA that hackers in China breached their networks, the NSA drafted a “cooperative research and development agreement” where the government and a firm collaborate to develop a new product. The government fronts the R&D costs, while the company participates in the development phase and has the right to patent and build the product designed. In addition, the government can “use any information gained from the collaboration.”[51] This sort of agreement allows the government to access the productive capacities of the private sector, but reduces superfluous spending. While under a traditional contract, a firm gets paid so long as it produces a desired product, under a public-private partnership such as the one formed between the NSA and Google, the firm only profits if they produce a useful tool that someone is willing to buy. Therefore, under this less traditional agreement, firms have no incentive to engage in completely spurious projects without any commercial value. Additionally, all tax dollars go directly towards research and development, eliminating the increased costs resulting from the markup rate that firms would charge the government under a traditional contract. Lastly, a less reliable stream of payments reduces the incentives for big contractors to acquire smaller ones and develop monopoly power in the industry, increasing the number of competitors in the industry and encouraging innovation. Second, the government should try to bolster its in-house cybersecurity capacity. If it can provide more of the services it needs on its own, then it can limit the prevalence and influence of cybersecurity contractors on policy. To do so, all agencies should include a non-compete clause in their employment contracts that prevents former employees from being hired back in a contracting role for a certain period of time.[52] Moreover, agencies should consider adding incentives to stay in government. Additional compensation would be a start, but government needs to find an incentive that is unique from the private sector, such as the intangible benefits of public service or additional prestige. Third, when the US does need to use contractors, it should improve its protocol for awarding contracts. Agencies should implement mechanisms to fast track approval of security clearances to allow more firms to compete in the bidding process, allowing the government to drive down the cost of securing contracts. Fourth, the government should negotiate multilateral agreements to prevent the export of cyber weapons systems to countries on the arms export blacklist for NATO, the US, and the EU. The EU and the US have already banned the export of surveillance technology to Iran and Syria, but efforts should go further. However, such an initiative faces two challenges. First, “cyber weapons” are difficult to define, given the overlap between offense and defense in the cyber sphere. Second, it seems almost impossible to control the cross-border flow of software over the Internet. Despite these challenges, a ban would at least discourage large firms in Western countries from selling to rogue regimes. Since those companies likely offer the best products, a ban would succeed in limiting the proliferation of advanced cyber technologies to adversarial actors. Finally, public and private actors alike should make efforts to increase transparency. Expanding in-house capacity and reducing reliance on contracts should make intelligence and defense agencies more accountable to the public. However, the best way to hold agencies accountable is to subject them to greater scrutiny. When former government officials make statements, media outlets and lawmakers should investigate and report their financial conflicts of interest. Then, policymakers can evaluate whether the speaker’s testimony is biased, enabling nuanced debate on US cyber threats. When intelligence agencies or the Pentagon request more money for cybersecurity, they should disclose, at least to Congress, specific details about how that money will be spent. That disclosure should make it easier to identify unnecessary spending, parse out corporate interests, and prevent agency officials from awarding contracts based on connections instead of merit, making bidding processes more competitive. Of course, some aspects of intelligence ought to be kept secret. But it is impossible to make informed policy judgments without some understanding of where money goes. Endnotes [2] "Cybersecurity Market by Solution (IAM, Encryption, DLP, UTM, Antivirus/Anti-Malware, Firewall, IDS/IPS, Disaster Recovery, DDOS Mitigation, SIEM), Service, Security Type, Deployment Mode, Organization Size, Vertical, and Region - Global Forecast to 2022." Markets and Markets Research. July 2017. Accessed April 18, 2018. https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/cyber-security-market-505.html. CAGR from author’s calculations. [3] Talbot, Daniel. "The Cyber Security Industrial Complex." MIT Technology Review. December 06, 2011. Accessed May 09, 2016. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/426285/the-cyber-security-industrial-complex/. [4] Robertson, Jordan, and Michael Riley. "US Contractors Scale Up Search for Heartbleed-Like Flaws." Bloomberg. May 2, 2014. Accessed May 08, 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-02/us-contractors-scale-up-search-for-heartbleed-like-flaws. [5] Bamford, James. "NSA Snooping Was Only the Beginning. Meet the Spy Chief Leading Us Into Cyberwar." Wired Magazine. June 13, 13. Accessed May 09, 2016. https://www.wired.com/2013/06/general-keith-alexander-cyberwar/. [6] United States. White House. Office of Management and Budget. Analytical Perspectives, Section 21: Cybersecurity Funding. Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 2018. 273-87. [7] Fox-Brewster, Thomas. "Embracing The Awful Irony At A Huge Counter-Terrorism Fair In Paris Days After ISIS Attacks." Forbes. November 22, 2015. Accessed May 09, 2016. http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/11/22/paris-hosts-milipol-homeland-defense-expo-after-isis-attacks/#7fc15fc97da6. [8] Sorcher, Sara. "The Race to Build the Silicon Valley of Cybersecurity." The Christian Science Monitor. December 2015. Accessed May 09, 2016. http://passcode.csmonitor.com/goldrush. [9] Bamford, “NSA Snooping.” [10] Byrt, Frank. "U.S. Defense Contractors Are Scrambling To Fill Massive Cyber Security Contracts." Business Insider. November 19, 2010. Accessed May 09, 2016. http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-is-spending-a-ton-on-defense-spending-in-cyber-security-2010-11. [11] O'Brien, Connor. "Military Hawks Win Big in Budget Deal — for Now." Politico, February 9, 2018. Accessed April 18, 2018. https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/09/budget-deal-military-hawks-333128. [12] Exec. Order No. 13636, 3 C.F.R. (2013). [13] Fazzini, Kate. "Under Trump, Some Subtle Cybersecurity Changes." The Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2017. Accessed April 18, 2018. https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2017/12/13/under-trump-some-subtle-cybersecurity-changes/. [14] United States. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 2017. [15] Harris, Shane. War the Rise of the Military-Internet Complex. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014. 180. [16] Ibid, 180. [17] Harris, @War, 104. [18] Greenberg, Andy. "Inside Endgame: A Second Act For The Blackwater Of Hacking." Forbes. February 12, 2014. Accessed May 09, 2016. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2014/02/12/inside-endgame-a-new-direction-for-the-blackwater-of-hacking/#5da8ea7a52d9. [19] Harris, @War, 109. [20] Benner, Katie. "Cybersecurity's Money Men." The Information. January 21, 2014. Accessed May 9, 2016. https://www.theinformation.com/cybersecuritys-money-men. [21] Harris, @War, 121. [22] Ibid, 120. [23] Ibid, 223. [24] York, Herbert. Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race. Simon and Schuster, 1971. Accessed May 11, 2016, 53. http://www.learnworld.com/ZNW/LWText.York.Race.Ch03.html. [25] Brito, Jerry, and Tate Watkins. "Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy." Harvard National Security Journal 3 (2011): 39-84. Accessed May 11, 2016. HeinOnline. 66. [26] Singer, Peter. "Outsourcing War." Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (March/April 2005): 119-32. 122. [27] Brito and Watkins, "Loving the Cyber Bomb?,” 43. [28] Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C.L. Rev. 989 (2005), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/ vol46/iss5/2. [29] Fang, Lee. "Many of the NSA's Loudest Defenders Have Financial Ties to NSA Contractors." The Intercept. May 12, 2015. Accessed May 11, 2016. https://theintercept.com/2015/05/12/intelligence-industry-cash-flows-media-echo-chamber-defending-nsa-surveillance/. [30] Ibid. [31] Sorcher, “The Race to Build the Silicon Valley of Cybersecurity.” [32] Etzioni, Amitai. "The Private Sector: A Reluctant Partner in Cybersecurity." Institute for Communitarian Studies, December 19, 2014. https://icps.gwu.edu/private-sector-reluctant-partner-cybersecurity. [33] Markusen, Ann. "Defense Spending: A Successful Industrial Policy?" International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 10, no. 1 (1986): 105-22. Accessed May 11, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.1986.tb00007.x. [34] Adams, Walter. "The Military-Industrial Complex and the New Industrial State." The American Economic Review 58, no. 2 (May 1968): 652-65. 658. [35] Singer, “Outsourcing War,” 129. [36] Chesterman, Simon. "‘We Can't Spy …If We Can't Buy!’" European Journal of International Law 19, no. 5 (November 2008): 1055-071. [37] Harris, @War, 223. [38] Singer, “Outsourcing War,” 126. [39] Ibid, 125. [40] Seabrook, John. "Network Insecurity." The New Yorker. May 20, 2013. Accessed May 11, 2016. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/05/20/network-insecurity. [41] Ibid, 115. The collaboration dissolved in 2011 when Anonymous hacked into one of the coordinators’ emails and released correspondences about the group’s plans. [42] Keating, Lucy. "Surveillance: A Thriving British Industry." The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. December 01, 2011. Accessed May 11, 2016. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/12/01/surveillance-a-thriving-british-industry/. [43] Reporters without Borders. Enemies of the Internet. Publication. 2013. 7. [44] Bamford, “NSA Snooping Was Only the Beginning. Meet the Spy Chief Leading Us Into Cyberwar.” [45] Shorrock, "How Private Contractors Have Created a Shadow NSA." [46] Greenberg, “Inside Endgame.” [47] Chesterman, "‘We Can't Spy …If We Can't Buy!’" [48] Some commentators think government policies might create a bubble. See Harris, @War, 122; for evidence that the value of cybersecurity firms has declined in the last year, see King, “Under Pressure, Cybersecurity Ripe for M&A This Year.” [49] Naturally, none of those principles strictly hold – look no further than the success of IT lobbyists in recent years to win government money. See Brito and Watkins, "Loving the Cyber Bomb?,” 69. [50] Chesterman, “We Can’t Spy…If We Can’t Buy!” [51] Harris, @War, 175. [52] The CIA already does this: see Chesterman, “We Can’t Spy…If We Can’t Buy!” References Adams, Walter. "The Military-Industrial Complex and the New Industrial State." The American Economic Review 58, no. 2 (May 1968): 652-65. Bamford, James. "NSA Snooping Was Only the Beginning. Meet the Spy Chief Leading Us Into Cyberwar." Wired Magazine. June 13, 13. Accessed May 09, 2016. https://www.wired.com/2013/06/general-keith-alexander-cyberwar/ . Benner, Katie. "Cybersecurity's Money Men." The Information. January 21, 2014. Accessed May 9, 2016. https://www.theinformation.com/cybersecuritys-money-men . Byrt, Frank. "U.S. Defense Contractors Are Scrambling To Fill Massive Cyber Security Contracts." Business Insider. November 19, 2010. Accessed May 09, 2016. http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-is-spending-a-ton-on-defense-spending-in-cyber-security-2010-11 . Chesterman, Simon. "‘We Can't Spy …If We Can't Buy!’: The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing ‘Inherently Governmental Functions’." European Journal of International Law 19, no. 5 (November 2008): 1055-071. Chief Financial Officer, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller). Defense Budget Overview: US Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2016. "Cybersecurity Market by Solution (IAM, Encryption, DLP, UTM, Antivirus/Anti-Malware, Firewall, IDS/IPS, Disaster Recovery, DDOS Mitigation, SIEM), Service, Security Type, Deployment Mode, Organization Size, Vertical, and Region - Global Forecast to 2022." Markets and Markets Research. July 2017. Accessed April 18, 2018. https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/cyber-security-market-505.html. Etzioni, Amitai. "The Private Sector: A Reluctant Partner in Cybersecurity." Institute for Communitarian Studies, December 19, 2014. https://icps.gwu.edu/private-sector-reluctant-partner-cybersecurity . Exec. Order No. 13636, 3 C.F.R. (2013). Fang, Lee. "Many of the NSA's Loudest Defenders Have Financial Ties to NSA Contractors." The Intercept. May 12, 2015. Accessed May 11, 2016. https://theintercept.com/2015/05/12/intelligence-industry-cash-flows-media-echo-chamber-defending-nsa-surveillance/ . Fazzini, Kate. "Under Trump, Some Subtle Cybersecurity Changes." The Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2017. Accessed April 18, 2018. https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2017/12/13/under-trump-some-subtle-cybersecurity-changes/. Fox-Brewster, Thomas. "Embracing The Awful Irony At A Huge Counter-Terrorism Fair In Paris Days After ISIS Attacks." Forbes. November 22, 2015. Accessed May 09, 2016. http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/11/22/paris-hosts-milipol-homeland-defense-expo-after-isis-attacks/#7fc15fc97da6 . Greenberg, Andy. "Inside Endgame: A Second Act For The Blackwater Of Hacking." Forbes. February 12, 2014. Accessed May 09, 2016. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2014/02/12/inside-endgame-a-new-direction-for-the-blackwater-of-hacking/#5da8ea7a52d9 . Harris, Shane. War the Rise of the Military-Internet Complex. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014. Keating, Lucy. "Surveillance: A Thriving British Industry." The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. December 01, 2011. Accessed May 11, 2016. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/12/01/surveillance-a-thriving-british-industry/ . King, Rachel. "Under Pressure, Cybersecurity Market Is Ripe for M&A in 2016." The Wall Street Journal. February 29, 2016. Accessed May 08, 2016. http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/02/29/under-pressure-cybersecurity-market-is-ripe-for-ma-in-2016/ . Markusen, Ann. "Defense Spending: A Successful Industrial Policy?" International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 10, no. 1 (1986): 105-22. Accessed May 11, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.1986.tb00007.x . Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C.L. Rev. 989 (2005), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/ vol46/iss5/2. O'Brien, Connor. "Military Hawks Win Big in Budget Deal — for Now." Politico, February 9, 2018. Accessed April 18, 2018. https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/09/budget-deal-military-hawks-333128. Office of the Press Secretary. "Cybersecurity National Action Plan." The White House. February 09, 2016. Accessed May 09, 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/fact-sheet-cybersecurity-national-action-plan . Panetta, Leon. Speech, The Global Threat of Cyber Attacks, Business Executives for National Security, New York City. Accessed May 11, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/secretary-panettas-speech-cybersecurity/p29262 . Robertson, Jordan, and Michael Riley. "US Contractors Scale Up Search for Heartbleed-Like Flaws." Bloomberg. May 2, 2014. Accessed May 08, 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-02/us-contractors-scale-up-search-for-heartbleed-like-flaws . Reporters without Borders. Enemies of the Internet. Publication. 2013. Seabrook, John. "Network Insecurity." The New Yorker. May 20, 2013. Accessed May 11, 2016. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/05/20/network-insecurity . Shorrock, Tim. "How Private Contractors Have Created a Shadow NSA." The Nation. May 27, 2015. Accessed May 09, 2016. http://www.thenation.com/article/how-private-contractors-have-created-shadow-nsa/ . Swartz, Jon. "Cybersecurity Spending to Hit $90 Billion In 2018: Report." Barron's. February 23, 2018. Accessed April 18, 2018. https://www.barrons.com/articles/cybersecurity-spending-to-hit-90-billion-in-2018-report-1519405299. Singer, Peter. "Outsourcing War." Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (March/April 2005): 119-32. Sorcher, Sara. "The Race to Build the Silicon Valley of Cybersecurity." The Christian Science Monitor. December 2015. Accessed May 09, 2016. http://passcode.csmonitor.com/goldrush . Talbot, Daniel. "The Cyber Security Industrial Complex." MIT Technology Review. December 06, 2011. Accessed May 09, 2016. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/426285/the-cyber-security-industrial-complex/ . United States. National Institute for Standards and Technology. US Department of Commerce. Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. 2014. United States. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 2017. United States. White House. Office of Management and Budget. Analytical Perspectives, Section 21: Cybersecurity Funding. Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 2018. 273-87. York, Herbert. Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race. Simon and Schuster, 1971. Accessed May 11, 2016. http://www.learnworld.com/ZNW/LWText.York.Race.Ch03.html .

The Brown University Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (JPPE) is a peer reviewed academic journal for undergraduate and graduate students that is sponsored by the Political Theory Project and the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society Program at Brown University. The Brown Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Volume III, Issue I scroll to view articles Current Issue Philosophy A Gravity Model of Civic Deviance: Justice, Natural Duties, and Reparative Responsibilities Woojin Lim Can You Rationally Disagree with a Prediction Market? Nick Whitaker The Panacea Problem: Indifference, Servility, and Kantian Beneficence Benjamin Eneman Read More Politics We the Prisoners: Considering the Anti Drug Act of 1986, the War on Drugs and Mass Incarceration in the United States Sophia Scaglion Read More Economics Read More State-Owned Banks and the Promise of an Equitable Financial Sector Elias van Emmerick No Place Like Home: Extending the Equity Home Bias Theory to Foreign Portfolio Investment in Emerging Markets Qiyuan Zheng Applications for JPPE Now open! See Available Positions

Transcendental Self Reconceptualizing the Idea of the Self within Western Philosophy: The Existence-Reason Binary and the Nonrational Transcendental Self Jennifer Kim Pomona College Author Ebba Brunnstrom Grace Engelman Alan Garcia-Ramos Fengyi Wan Editors Spring 2018 In order to overcome the existence-reason binary present in philosophy, I propose the notion of nonrational transcendental self. In philosophy, the ontological question asks, “How might a self understand its own being?” Views on the self were initially dominated by the rationalists, who argue that reason, rather than sense experience, reveals the true nature of things. In response, a subsequent movement called existentialism critiques rationalism for mistaking the human being as a stagnant thinker. Existentialists argue that human beings are not merely rational beings, but also dynamic subjects who experience and change. From the existentialist viewpoint, reason by itself is wholly incapable of capturing the subject’s lived experience. In my observation, the rationalist-existentialist debate gave rise to a conceptual binary, where existence and reason are mutually exclusive. It is my view that this binary hinders the revolutionary potential of existentialist philosophy. The binary is problematic because it disallows an alternative understanding of the self outside of reason and existence. There are complexities in our nature that occur outside the binary, such as our nonrational selves. If we continue to approach ontology without breaking the binary, we can never accurately or sufficiently answer the basic question of how to understand our own being. My answer to resolving the binary is to propose a rethinking of the self as nonrational and transcendental. First, I will induct nonrationality as an alternative to the binary that neither rejects nor is wholly subsumed under reason or its counterpart, existence. I begin by exploring examples of the transcendental self as exemplified in the Kantian subjects of moral and aesthetic judgments. I then introduce the notion of a nonrational transcendental self, which is the self that experiences and knows, but does not judge. Finally, I show that the nonrational transcendental self truly exists within us and reveals itself most clearly when we experience life alongside the question of suicide and when we experience a moment of beauty. The need to convey the nonrational transcendental self transpires from the restrictions of the binary. Therefore, I shall first identify the emergence of the reason-existence binary by tracing the use of reason and existence in historical ontological debates. The rationalist view of the self begins with Descartes, who articulates that rational self-reflection reveals the true nature of the human being as the thinking self, the eternal mind (Descartes – Translation: Haldane, 1991). Hegel, likewise, perceives reason as the proper lenses through which to discover the human being’s true nature and place in the world. In Hegelian philosophy, history is the linear unfolding of reason and all of our individual subjectivities are merely subsumed under this hyper-rational unfolding (Hegel – Translation: Hartman, 1953). Such extreme rationalism is challenged by the Kantian philosophy of transcendental idealism, which curtails the overreach of pure reason by designating it to a regulatory rule (Kant – Translation: Guyer and Wood, 1998). According to transcendental idealism, we are limited to knowing and perceiving phenomena (i.e. things as they appear in time and space). We do not have access to noumena (“things-as-they-are-in-themselves”) (Kant – Translation: Guyer and Wood, 1998). Reason, as our structural framework, can help us decide upon the truth of phenomena, but it cannot conclude anything substantial about noumena. As we are incapable of perceiving our noumenal selves, it is an illegitimate use of reason to attempt to rationally discover our true selves (Kant – Translation: Guyer and Wood, 1998). Consequently, Kant reintroduces the question of the self-understanding its own being, allowing existentialists to arrive on the scene and offer a viewpoint opposing the rationalists. Existentialism emerges with Kierkegaard’s publication of Either/Or in 1843. Kierkegaard points out that our singular viewpoint to life is our existing and subjective self. Objective truth only has meaning in relation to a knower, who is subjective and dynamic. Thus, Kierkegaard criticizes Descartes for mistakenly substituting the human being as an “infinitely indifferent” knower and explicitly rejects Cartesian rationalism as “a mirage [where] everything is and nothing becomes” (Kierkegaard – Translation: Hong and Hong, 1978). For Kierkegaard, reason, either as some ultimate methodology towards truth or as a priori structures of cognition and understanding, fails to account for our fundamental nature as those who experience. After Kierkegaard, existentialist thinker Heidegger published Being and Time in 1927. Being and Time reorients the ontological approach by introducing the concept dasein, which translates to being-in-the-world (Heidegger – Translation: Macquarrie and Robinson, 1962). In contrast to the rationalists who believe that true human nature can only be understood when abstracted away from experience, Heidegger argues that human beings are dasein and can know themselves only as they exist in the world. All philosophical inquiry on human nature must acknowledge our essential condition as dasein if it is to be accurate and effective. By contrast, ontology, which claims to understand human nature independent of its being-in-the-world, is illegitimate. Then, in 1943, another existentialist named Sartre published Being and Nothingness. Echoing Kantian thought, Sartre argues that we cannot ask what the nature of the human being in itself is. When we try to answer ontologically about our noumenal selves, we immediately establish a duality (between “I” as the subject and “I” as the referred-to object) that is essentially at odds with the oneness of self that we associate with the ‘true self’ (Sartre – Translation: Barnes, 1956). Instead of asking what being is, Sartre recommends that we ask how being is. In other words, what are our modes of being? Sartre states that the human being is a factical self, which refers to our physical being grounded in concrete circumstances (Sartre – Translation: Barnes, 1956). The human being is also a transcendent self, which means that we are not only our factical self, but also all of our negations and possibilities. For example, the seemingly insignificant waiter at a restaurant is not merely a waiter. That is, as a human being, the waiter’s existence does not depend on his or her being waiter. The waiter may be countless other things apart from a waiter and is still yet to be many things in the future. Sartre’s point is that our existence as human beings cannot be fully captured by the roles our factical selves play. For Sartre, the human being is essentially fluid and full of possibility (Sartre – Translation: Barnes, 1956). Therefore, Sartre considers that reason as logical form, which accepts negation and exclusion as definitive, cannot sufficiently account for the human being. My purpose in explicating the ontological debate between rationalists and existentialists is to show that within the philosophical tradition, there is a shift from understanding the human being as a stagnant thinker to an experiencing subject. I argue that the debate which motivated this shift in thinking also unintentionally produced a conceptual binary between reason and existence. Existentialism presents itself as a purposeful critique of rationalism. The language of the existentialists is intentionally contrasted to the language of the rationalists. The existentialists describe the true nature of the human being as subjective, dynamic, temporal, fluid, and grounded; rationalists, as objective, unchanging, eternal, and abstract. In reading existentialists’ work, the reader would think that the human being is essentially a dynamic subject in place of a stagnant thinker, but never both. Similarly, truth for the human being is seen as either subjective or objective, but not both. With such emphasized contrast, ‘existence’ becomes a concept that stands as a symbolic counterpoint to reason. This is the reason-existence binary. The reason-existence binary is undesirable and stunts the progress existentialism might make in answering the basic ontological question. The existentialists intended to reclaim the dynamic aspect of the human being in an effort to balance out the extreme rationalism preceding them. However, by presenting existence in contrast to, rather than alongside, reason, existentialism merely designated the human being to another extreme. The existentialists’ failure of a balancing act reveals itself as an issue within their own systems of thought. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre all grapple with tensions resulting from the binary within their own philosophies. Part I: Limitations of the Binary Manifested as Existentialist Tensions Kierkegaard’s Unintended Inverse Hegelianism When Kierkegaard states that “subjectivity is truth”, he effectively turns Hegel (who saw objectivity as the one legitimate truth) on his head (Kierkegaard – Translation: Hong and Hong 1978). Kierkegaard rejects the hyper-objective, linear, rational, and systematic nature of Hegelianism and purposefully aims to be anti-systematic and anti-rationalist. However, Kierkegaard himself proposes that an individual must go through three stages (the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious) in order to encounter a true self (Kierkegaard – Translation: Hong and Hong, 1978). These are the stages that an individual encounters when turning inward in his or her own subjectivity. The final stage climaxes in paradox and culminates in a person of faith. So then, it seems that Kierkegaard’s philosophy does entail a system that we must acknowledge in order to understand our own being. The irony is that by protesting objectivity with subjectivity, Kierkegaard unwittingly creates his own dialectical system and becomes the mirror image of the systematic and idealistic Hegelianism that he intended to counter. Theodor W. Adorno calls Kierkegaard’s philosophy “inverse Hegelianism” since the historical dialectic of objective ‘Reason’ in Hegelian philosophy is parallel to Kierkegaard’s inward dialectic of the subject’s subjectivity. Whereas the Hegelian subject must look further and further outwards to discover truth and the authentic self, the Kierkegaardian subject must turn deeper and deeper inwards to discover truth and the faithful self (Adorno – Translation: Hullot-Kentor, 1989). Thus, whereas Hegel’s setting and subject is all of history, Kierkegaard’s “objective inwardness strictly excludes objective history”, so that “history vanishes” in Kierkegaard (Adorno – Translation: Hullot-Kentor, 1989). However, without any sense of history, what is left in Kierkegaard’s philosophy is the abstract self posed against the abstract universal, interacting in a subject-object dialectic that Adorno calls “Hegel [inverted and interiorized]” (Adorno – Translation: Hullot-Kentor, 1989). That is, Kierkegaard neither avoids systematizing the process of the self understanding its own being nor refrains from abstracting (i.e. a self without a concrete history is an abstract self). In short, Kierkegaard fails to fully account for the existing subject and only manages to postulate it against the thinking subject. Heidegger’s Absurd Waiting Heidegger’s dasein is both being-in-the-world and being-not-of-this-world. That is, we cannot seek to understand our being as existing separate from the world we exist in and yet, there is the curious truth that we are born into and pass away from the world. We “come from” and “go away to” someplace not of this world. From this, Heidegger concludes that the significance and uniqueness of our time in this world are due to our temporality. As finite beings, every moment in time is unique. Our specific time also defines each of us as a unique being traveling different paths and encountering different ontological possibilities which become available to us by virtue of our specific past and present (Heidegger – Translation: Macquarrie and Robinson, 1962). Time is therefore responsible for determining the significance of all the opportunities we might have in this world. But since the importance of time itself is that it represents our sudden arrival and departure from this world from who knows where, then meaning itself also comes from who knows where. Heidegger wrote Being and Time in the 1920s and 1930s, directly after the First World War. Like the famous Lost Generation, Heidegger also addresses an era when the traditional ideologies and frameworks that gave us social identities and gave our actions meaning were quickly fading out. (Preceding Heidegger, Nietzsche defines that era as an era in which “God is dead” in contrast to previous generations which offered “God” and by extension, Christian morals, tradition, etc (Nietzsche – Translation: Nauckhoff, 2001). God and the institution of religion and tradition provided frameworks of significance which dasein could attach itself to find significance.) The era bore a sense of decay. The hollowness of a hollow man was no longer an individual problem, but an indicator of a lack of possibilities in the world of that generation. If the world shines through an authentic dasein (being-in-the-world), but the world itself is decaying, then an authentic dasein would decay instead of thrive. Heidegger recognizes this issue and offers the solution of reorienting dasein in order to increase its receptivity of meaning. Essentially, Heidegger states that if there is less meaning in the world, then we should be more receptive to it so that we can get more of it. If dasein is taken solely as a being in time, an increase in receptivity simply means a more anxious waiting for meaning to come. This is because meaning only comes from that “other world” where we came from to be born and where we go once we die. But Heidegger does not give any deadline for how long dasein must wait for meaning to appear. Indeed, he cannot even guarantee that meaning will ever come back. But if we are headed towards a meaningless world, we would be waiting forever. In Samuel Beckett’s “Waiting for Godot”, two individuals “actively” wait in a wasteland for “Godot”, an unknown figure who promises meaning, but cannot promise when, where, or how. This uncertain, but hopeful waiting depicts the issue that Heidegger’s solution runs into. In terms of time, Heidegger’s solution becomes a rather paradoxical (and apparently, parody-able) form of “active” waiting. Heidegger tries to reclaim our being from abstraction by positing dasein, but his philosophy is affected by the binary which separates existing from knowing. Ultimately, he ends up in a strange position of hopeful absurdism. In this position, he relies on a vague abstraction that renders even the being-in-the-world altogether hazy and opaque. Thus, despite Heidegger’s intent to have dasein reconquer itself as a grounded being, we arrive at a point where the absence of a metaphysical quality of dasein results, once again, in abstraction Sartre’s Difficulty with Dualism When Sartre introduces the factical self and the transcendent self to the reader, he explicitly states that this division exists only because they are necessary to parse out the modes of being. Sartre does not intend to propose a metaphysical dualism, where the factical and transcendent self are truly two different selves or beings. Although Sartre posits a disclaimer of his dualism, there is still ultimately a tension in saying that being-in-itself and being-for-itself are mutually exclusive and yet every human being is somehow both. Sartre’s preoccupation with being as always more than it appears in a given situation sits in direct contrast to reason, which only applies to appearances. This contrast motivates Sartre to depict human beings as half factual knowers and half fluid, illogical beings. This is an uncomfortable division both because our rational and existing selves do not exist unequivocally separate from each other and because we also have a nonrational self. Sartre himself identifies this issue as the “identity nihilation” or “internal negation” issue, stating that his view renders the self in a perpetually unstable equability where identity as absolute cohesion rejects diversity and unity can only be a synthesis of multiplicity (Sartre – Translation: Barnes, 1956). The self, as both whole and diverse, is never quite captured due to the oppositional nature between existence and reason that Sartre assumes. *** The binary itself is not easily grasped, but its effects are discernible. The tensions that emerge from the binary reveal that if the assumptions which underlie the argument are extreme and unfounded, the content itself is affected and distorted. To understand this in a more general sense, it is often what we consider possible, rather than the reality of the situation, which dictates the outcome. If we never venture down certain pathways because we never consider their existence, then those avenues of thought will never open to us, not because they cannot exist, but because we consider them unable to exist. The philosopher Derrida speaks to the violence of writing, of naming things, and of defining spectrums and hierarchies through names (Derrida, 1976). Writing separates, and it is within those separations that battles are fought. Writers always write in the context of previous thought, and so even though their intentions are to break cycles of thought, the methodology of writing itself binds them to reiterate the same structural violence that previous writers have also engaged in. In short, modern philosophers often end up writing within the dialogue set up by previous philosophers and find it difficult, if not impossible, to break out of that dialogue and introduce new possibilities. If the possibilities of the conversation are predetermined by restrictions on expression, the historical limitations will stunt the conversation and block the creation of new pathways of thought. While Kierkegaard provides an illuminating analysis of how Hegelianism neglected essential considerations for how the existing subject should come to understand itself, at the same time, Kierkegaard’s reactionary philosophy proves detrimental to the originality of his own philosophy. The content is simply turned on its head, but the ultimate goal of understanding remains out of reach. Heidegger’s concept of dasein reorients ontology into a humbler form, reminding us that we do not experience Being except as being-in-the-world and as being-towards-death. He criticizes the philosophical tradition of forgetting that our existence is wholly about being present-in-the-world. However, Heidegger falls prey to his own criticism when he separates human existence from whatever truth or meaning there was to be found in our existence. To Sartre’s credit, Sartre identifies and denounces the binary from the very beginning. Yet, despite this awareness, his own philosophy ends up depending on conceptual divisions born from the binary. What all of these philosophers point out but struggle to prove within their own philosophies is that the human being is always the meeting ground for both reason and existence. By imposing this binary, we become stuck with a mentality that cannot imagine outside of you are either this or that. There is no space for a new beginning because violence has already been done unto the space of possibility. While one side can point out the defects of the other, unfortunately, the inverse of a structure does not overturn the system nor introduce anything new, and so it cannot successfully escape the faults or solve the problems of the original structure. Inversion and rejection are still confined to the original sphere of thought and that influence is impossible to hide, even though the rest of the content may be revolutionary and inspiring. That is why the existence-reason binary limits existentialists’ answer to the ontological question of the self knowing its own being. Part II: Rethinking the Transcendental Self In light of the existence-reason binary, I offer an interpretation of a self that is transcendental and nonrational. The nonrational transcendental self is a transcendental self because it allows for a shift in perspective without loss of identity. It is nonrational because the shift is unconcerned with justifications. There is no categorizing or narrating the experience for a greater purpose. There is no expectation of ‘what ought to happen’. There is no need to prioritize anything within the experience. The nonrational transcendental self is the self that experiences its own being without having to focus or impose on it. It is the self that exists alongside the constant question of suicide and it is the self that arises when we experience moments of beauty. *** Section A: The Question of Suicide Camus famously said, “There is only one really serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Deciding whether or not life is worth living is to answer the fundamental question in philosophy” (Camus – Translation: O’Brien, 1991). Camus’ infamous line was already preceded by a long line of thinkers grappling with the morality and rationality of suicide. St. Augustine, inspired by Plato and followed by Aquinas, states the Christian prohibition on suicide. When intolerable evils descend upon us, the truly pious withstand the onslaught and prove their virtue, whereas those who escape by suicide have sullied God’s gift of life to us (Saint Augustine – Translation: Paolucci, 1962). Suicide was seen as the ultimate unrepentable sin. St. Augustine also considers suicide irrational, pointing out that if suicide is meant to preserve happiness or escape unhappiness by avoiding pain, then that is foolishness for there is no happiness to be found in either giving up in the midst of fighting evil or in knowing that you can commit suicide (Saint Augustine – Translation: Paolucci, 1962). Then, David Hume famously wrote a defense of suicide as a rational act, stating, “suicide is no transgression of our duty to God” (Hume, 1783). God granted all beings and things with their proper functions and powers (Hume, 1783). A river has the power to stop man because God willed it. Yet, if man is able to create machinery that utilizes energy from a river or can divert a river from its course, this interaction causes no discord in the creation and would not be a crime in the eyes of God (Hume, 1783). God has given us the ability to judge and enact such behavior. Likewise, Hume asserts that there is no crime of “turning a few ounces of blood from their natural channels” (Hume, 1783). In this case, God has given us the ability to judge and enact suicide. Furthermore, just as the river turns according to the laws of matter and motion, so does the human body react according to the laws of nature as set by God (Hume, 1783). Hume offers several situations in which suicide might be consistent with our self-interest (e.g. age, sickness, and misfortune), but is also quick to state, “no man ever threw away life, while it was worth keeping… for such is our natural horror of death” (Hume, 1783). Thus, if someone ultimately judges that he or she is in a situation so haunted by suffering that it cannot be relieved except through death, then not only is committing suicide not a moral transgression, but it is also a perfectly rational act. Richard Brandt furthers Hume’s argument that suicide can be rational by way of a utilitarian argument. Brandt argues that a rational agent can make a sufficiently informed comparison about the likely utility between the two possible futures of survival and suicide and make an intelligible and rational choice from there. However, in response to Brandt, Christopher Cowley suggests that the concept of rationality does not apply to suicide. Judgements about suicide, such as those espoused by Brandt, are certainly intelligible (Cowley, 2006). However, these judgments are “third-person descriptions… implicitly assuming rationality” and “[maintaining] a clinical detachment” so that we end up “talking about the victim rather than to or with the victim” (Cowley, 2006). Cowley thus points out that asking the rational question of “what would anyone do in this situation” is more an abstract hypothesis and less about the agent and the agent’s act of suicide (Cowley, 2006). Furthermore, debating the rationality of suicide misses a major point, that rationality is essentially future-oriented. We call an act rational or irrational by presupposing a future in which we will have to face the consequences of that act (Cowley, 2006). Therefore, while we might consider someone’s reason for suicide rational or irrational, suicide itself cannot be properly judged by rationality because it is the erasure of the future that is a precondition of judging an act as rational or irrational. Thus, Cowley “rejects the exhaustive dichotomy between rational and irrational” because both concepts “run out” and fail to provide a language that sufficiently accounts for a discussion on suicide (Cowley, 2006). Rationality presumes justification, which not only assumes a future but also abstracts from the subject’s experience. However, if Cowley’s point stands, then how are we to approach the question of suicide? Who is the agent in question, if not a rational agent? Insofar as suicide is a human question, the answer relies heavily on how we understand the human being. Here, I hope that my notion of the nonrational transcendental self will help articulate our experience with the issue of suicide. Notice this: Although Camus and others have posed the question of suicide intellectually, we actually experience this question at every moment of our conscious lives. We do not necessarily confront the question (in that we do not feel compelled to justify our existences to ourselves every passing second), but simply by virtue of living, we exist alongside it. The rational self often resists; justifications often mean “this despite that.” But the nonrational self simply exists, without justification, and therefore, without resistance. It does not strive to endure because it is not about life, it is simply living. When a wind passes through the grass, we do not think the grass “resists.” Instead, it simply exists in its swaying along with the wind. Afterwards, we reason that the wind made the grass sway, and while this is very much true, this is a justification after the initial experience, where reason serves as a convenient framework with which to understand and recognize our experiences. Thus, the nonrational transcendental self settles the anxiety of needing a reason to live in an arbitrary world by accepting that it simply is, outside of want and reason. As the question of suicide is reborn every moment, so this self co-exists alongside that question. Returning to Camus’ question, I realize that suicide is not simply a grand philosophical issue, but an ever-present question. Of course, as Cowley admits, suicide can be discussed in terms of rationality. I think that this makes sense. After all, suicide has a widespread effect, and it is only natural that we abstract from the agent and act itself in an attempt to more deeply understand why such tragic events happen. However, the question of suicide also exists separate from our reasons to live or die. We know this because we have all witnessed that the reality of suicide exists beyond rationality. Sadly, many people who have every reason to live also die. We, as survivors, turn to religion and philosophy and literature, searching for reasons that might explain why they had to go when clearly, they had so much to live for. But regardless of the many arguments we might construct to justify a longer life, the insurmountable fact is that they have passed out of this shared world. As such, suicide is neither rational nor irrational. It is nonrational, which means that although existence can be rationalized, existence is or is not despite the rationalization. Suicide, not as an act to be judged, but as a constant question hand-in-hand with living, illuminates this aspect of the self. The nonrational self is also transcendental. The common understanding of transcendental is “a noumenal realm above”, but the nonrational transcendental self in this situation is a “settling.” The self that transcends life-or-death is not a self that rises above existence, but a self that is simply situated in one’s own being. Even facing the question of suicide, the nonrational transcendental self does not reach towards immorality nor does it turn within itself. There is no extortion and no resistance. It simply exists as it is. It is the mind before the mind is filled with thoughts. It is the state of existence that occupies the middle ground between wanting to live and wanting to die. This middle ground is what often allows people to survive depression, which sometimes manifests as an indifference to life and inability to hope. Think about the reverse situation. Many people who feel they have no reason to live continue to live. Whether it is because we are depressed or uncertain or have simply never seriously entertained the question, we can exist without a reason to live. While Hume and Brandt rightfully argue that we can make value judgments about what sort of life is worth living, the rational argument does not account for the actual state of our existence. Why not? This is because for human beings, the absence of reason to live is not a reason to die. Therefore, to discuss suicide as though it aligns with a linear spectrum of rationality is to collapse this inequality and equate the absence of reason to live with a reason to die. This discounts the struggle that many depressed and/or suicidal people struggle through. But intuitively, we all understand this inequality and we recognize the significance of the inequality. It is why we feel that there is no reason sufficient enough to justify suicide. However, for this intuitive truth to be true, we must grant that the human being exists and sees itself capable of existing outside the reason-existence binary and occupying the middle ground of the nonrational transcendental self. Section B: The Moral and Aesthetic Judgment Before I further explain the notion of a nonrational transcendental self, I wish to reference other types of judgments that are nonrational. Since the kinds of judgments we make portray the kind of being we are, I think this will help us to imagine concepts of the self outside the existence-reason binary. *** After his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant pursued other capacities of self-representation and self-understanding in the Second and Third Critiques, respectively. The Critique of Practical Reason contains Kant’s moral philosophy, which is premised on the principle that we must understand ourselves as we appear to ourselves. In other words, even if reason postulates a phenomenal determinism in the physical world, since we appear to ourselves as moral beings and morality implies agency, we must also take ourselves to be agents capable of affect. The reasoning here is practical: Given how we appear to ourselves, we must believe the necessary condition which allows for this appearance. Specifically, given that we appear to ourselves as moral agents, we must necessarily take ourselves to be free agents (Kant – Translation: Beck, 1956). This differs from the pure reason of Kant’s First Critique, which was discussed as a cognitive capacity functioning largely to structure our experience through concepts and categories. However, the Kantian self that engages in practical reason and which makes the moral judgment is inequivalent to a nonrational transcendental self. The nonrational transcendental self is not concerned with its own appearance or with self-justifications. Kant’s moral judgment is nonetheless a rational judgment, only it has to do with practical reasoning, which is bottom-top because it reasons from appearance whereas pure reasoning, which structures based on a priori conditions of cognition and pure categories of laws and structures, works top-down. To translate this back into our discussion of suicide, saying that the nonrational transcendental self exists alongside the ever-present question of suicide is inequivalent to saying that a person has a moral incentive to live. The moral incentive often appears as a justification, supplying a ‘despite’ in an intellectual, but not necessarily existential problem. Kant’s Third Critique, the Critique of Judgment conveys the aesthetic judgment (i.e. a judgment of beauty). The aesthetic judgment employs the individual’s capacities of imagination and understanding to enter into the mental state of freeplay (Kant – Translation: Walkter, 1963). While both imagination and understanding draw inspiration from the manifold of intuition, they are pure faculties or free faculties. Imagination is the synthesis of a manifold of intuition, and the synthesis is not totally predetermined by the content of the manifold. For example, in imagination, the intuitions of a horse and a horn can be freely synthesized into a unicorn. Understanding is the realm of pure categories (in contrast to concepts which require and apply to specific objects). In understanding, there are unifying laws (e.g. causation) that shape our experience of phenomena without discriminating between empirical details. Then, for freeplay to be the interaction of two pure mental capacities means that the aesthetic judgment is “merely subjective” (Kant – Translation: Walkter, 1963). That is, freeplay occurs only when the subject has removed him/herself from the world (i.e. become a disinterested subject) and re-presented an object that is no longer in front of him/her to him/herself. The aesthetic judgment deals only with this re-presentation. So, an aesthetic judgment does not apply to the object itself the way concepts do. The aesthetic judgment is thus another judgment different from a purely rational judgment. However, there is a quirk in the aesthetic judgment: Despite being completely subjective, our aesthetic judgment necessitates an ought; that is, everyone else ought to agree with our judgment of what is beautiful. Although an aesthetic judgment cannot claim logical universal validity (since it does not refer to a concept), we present our judgments of beauty with a universal voice (Kant – Translation: Walkter, 1963). Thus, the aesthetic judgment “must involve a claim to subjective universality” (Kant – Translation: Walkter, 1963). For Kant, the aesthetic judgment, in bringing together subjectivity and universality, allows us to re-imagine or re-present the human as a being whose sociability and individuality are seamless. In this way, the aesthetic judgment offers an alternative to the existence-reason binary because freeplay, the pure categories of reason, is communicable. However, it is worth noting that there is something a bit sinister about the ‘ought.’ Imagine that in your encounter with the question of suicide, someone comes up to you and tells you that you ought to live. It is a patronizing remark on behalf of the speaker. Hence, this ‘ought’ which is essential in rendering a statement into a judgment and initially seems to prove the human capacity for freeplay and sociability, actually betrays that the aesthetic judgment is not only about subjective appreciation and value, but also assumes an objective universal validity. While the Kantian subject of the aesthetic judgment offers an alternative to the self shuttling back and forth within the reason-existence binary, it is also not quite equivalent to the nonrational transcendental self. The nonrational transcendental self has no reason to prescribe an “ought” to anyone else. Since it is free from reason or desire, it has no need to prove itself or to display its faculties by way of judgments. As we shall see, the nonrational transcendental self appears less in a judgment of beauty and more in a moment of beauty. Section C: From a Judgment of Beauty to a Moment of Beauty The meeting ground of reason and existence and the full-fledged appearance of the nonrational transcendental self occur in a moment of beauty. The novel The Elegance of the Hedgehog illustrates the reveal of the nonrational transcendental self in a moment of beauty. In the story, we meet a young girl named Paloma who very rationally comes to the conclusion that life is not worth staying for and that suicide is the best option (Barbery, 2006). At the end of the novel, Paloma rescinds this decision of suicide, not because she finds some rational reason that justifies her life or tells her that things are bound to get better, but because Paloma discovers for herself that what makes life worthwhile is the inexplicable and nonrational moments of beauty that one encounters amidst, alongside, and even within the suffering that seems to be most of life. Paloma’s life seems to take a turn for the better when she meets Madame Michel, the concierge, and Kakuro Ozu, a new occupant of one of the luxury apartments. But then, without any particular cause and certainly without a satisfying rational justification (i.e. a mad man’s dance is no reason for someone to die), Madame Michel is hit by an automobile and dies. Paloma feels then what it might mean to die, what it really means to face a “never again” (Barbery, 2006). In essence, she suddenly acquires a newfound awareness of her own experiencing. Then, Paloma experiences a moment of beauty. As she and Kakuro Ozu pass through a courtyard, both of them solemn with grief at Madame Michel’s passing, they hear music drifting down from above. Paloma “stopped short… took a deep breath and let the sun warm [her face while she] listened to the music drifting down from above” and she felt that: “There’s a lot of despair, but also the odd moment of beauty… It’s as if those strains of music created a sort of interlude in time, something suspended, an elsewhere that had come to us, an always within never… Beauty, in this world.” (Barbery, 2006) To explain why Paloma’s moment of beauty was transcendent, first we must consider how human beings are frequently obsessed with playing the heroes and heroines of our own lives, sometimes to the point of playing our own villains. We impose ourselves onto events and other people to try to fit them into our narratives, which we use to self-justify and to explain ourselves to other people. Recognition is important to us. We often have this deep-rooted fear that we will not exist unless we define ourselves, but these definitions do not seem to be authentic unless others acknowledge them. So, we attempt to paste certain labels onto ourselves to garner attention from others. In this way, rationalism (as justification of narratives and labels) is our long-valued method of proving to ourselves and others that we exist at all. Reason has suddenly gained the illusive quality of being necessary to exist. But whether it is the rationalists attaching existence to what is considered “objective” and “immortal” or the existentialists equating the self with subjectivity, the one thing that remains when all else is stripped away from us is a response to the same fear. The question of how the self might understand its being has long been motivated by the anxiety that our existence may not truly be an opportunity for narrative or significance. Thus, philosophy has a natural habit of referring the human being to things they consider visible and indispensable in the hopes that we, too, must be so. However, when Paloma experiences the beauty of music, residing in one ephemeral but suspended moment, her newfound awareness allows for a shift in perspective. With her mind settled from a deeper understanding of life, the beauty of the music enters and shifts her perspective so that in that moment, she is no longer concerned with proving, justifying, or defining her own existence. In that moment, she is no longer obsessed with playing the hero. Paloma assumes the role of passerby, allowing and enjoying the music that is taking center stage in her experience. Thus, our encounter with a moment of beauty allows us to relinquish our need to prove our own existences without threatening our identities and we re-situate ourselves into the existence of a passerby or watcher without considering it a degradation or loss of self, but as the self taking a deep breath and for a moment, just settling into itself. To step away from the need to justify ourselves and re-affirm ourselves is to experience our own being as transcendent and our energy as nonrational (i.e. directionless and not aiming to be applied to anything). In more casual terms, you just are and you are enough to appreciate the moment for what it is. This is why Kant’s moral self is not the nonrational transcendental self. Kant’s moral self arises from a need to understand ourselves given how we appear to ourselves, but the nonrational transcendental self, which is what we are when we encounter moments of beauty or when we live alongside suicide, is not concerned with how we appear to ourselves. Paloma describes the moment of beauty as a moment of “time suspension.” It is the “always within never.” This is interesting because time is one of the Kantian transcendental conditions. So, if we are in a realm of suspended time when we encounter a moment of beauty, then experiencing beauty is not a type of ‘knowing.’ Time and space are simultaneously extended and absorbed and the vanity of the self connected with these determinations fades away. To describe Paloma as “standing where the music is” is normally a confusion of terms that fails to define her, but it is the realm of the nonrational and transcendental, which is the same realm as the middle ground between the absence of a reason to live and a reason to die. Pure experience, which involves both existence and reason but is not confined by either, is an open realm where all things that ground us may shift with no threat to our existence. Furthermore, if Paloma’s experience happens in time suspension, then we cannot expect it to happen or try to prolong it. With time suspension, possibility and actuality exist only insofar as they exist in each other. But without expectation, there can be no prescription. Thus, the nonrational transcendental self which appears in a moment of beauty differs from the Kantian subject making an aesthetic judgment in that the former is not considered with universal recommendations. The nonrational transcendental self is the middle ground devoid of the three cornerstones that inevitably create binaries: expectation, justification, and definition. Another character in The Elegance of the Hedgehog is Jean Arthens, who is the son of the previous resident of Monsieur Ozu’s apartment. When we first encounter Jean Arthens, Renee describes him as “a drug addict, a sad wreck, … no more than a tortured body staggering through life on a razor’s edge” (Barbery, 2006). Through her encounter with him, Renee sadly recognizes that as human beings “we all must fall” at some point and that even before the fall, nobody quite knows “what [this war is that] we are waging, when defeat is so certain… Step by step we clear the path toward our mournful doom” (Barbery, 2006). But then, weeks later, Jean reappears as a far healthier person, somebody who, “once so very close to the abyss, has visibly opted for rebirth” (Barbery, 2006). Renee wonders at his transformation, asking herself, “How is one reborn after a fall?” (Barbery, 2006). Jean tells Renee that what “practically saved his life” was none other than the “pretty little red and white flowers” that Renee had planted (Barbery, 2006). He explains that although “[he did not] know why”, he “used to think about those flowers all the time… and it did [him] good” (Barbery, 2006). Renee is amazed that a “camellia can change fate” (Barbery, 2006). Renee could not have reasonably known that Jean would have viewed her flowers in such a miraculous manner. Jean himself could not have reasonably anticipated his reaction. But the why was unimportant. The flowers were beautiful to him and in that moment of beauty, the nonrational transcendental self came forth. After her encounter with Jean, Renee asks herself those unanswerable questions of life: “Did he see [the pathways of hell]? How is one reborn after a fall? What new pupils restore sight to scorched eyes? Where does war begin, where does combat end?” Her answer is: “Thus, a camellia” (Barbery, 2006). Renee’s answer does not make any rational sense. It is nonrational, and in a beautiful way, it is transcendental. Paloma’s music in the sunlight despite Madame Michel’s death and Jean Arthens’ camellias after a close shave with the abyss… For both Paloma and Jean, it was a moment of beauty that allowed them, not to somehow overcome their grief once and for all or even to be inspired to grit their teeth and endure, but to let go and excuse themselves from always having to save somebody else or save themselves. They no longer had to grapple with “why.” When the self sees its own transcendental non-rational being, it realizes that it is all things already. Conclusion I do not think that my reimagining of the self would escape Derrida’s wrath. As he rightly predicts, my attempt at explaining a nonrational transcendental self also succumbs to the same binary of worldly existence and reason that I critique in the first part of this thesis. In explaining why things are not some way, I find myself relying on the traits of that one way to explain my counterpoint. As Derrida points out, each new term we create in response to previous binaries is yet another appeasement for our constant need to commit violence against ourselves in the form of new justifications and differentiations, in service of so-called systematic thought. However, I believe that there are still important takeaways from my proposition of a nonrational transcendental self. First, while the nonrational transcendental self can express the binary, it is not merely the binary. It is whatever was before the binary existed. The importance of this first point is that we can open our minds to the fact that the binary did not always exist and is therefore not a necessary or restraining metaphysical truth of philosophy. In fact, I think we can come to see that up until the very point prior to the existence-reason binary, either existence or reason could have theoretically functioned like nonrationality. This binary was an arbitrary creation, which took its meaning from the circumstances it arose from (in this case, the existentialist push-back against rationalism). It is a useful binary in that it gives us a language in which to express our thoughts about two important aspects of the human being, but the danger of its arbitrariness is that we may slip into confusing its applicability into a metaphysical and necessary truth. So long as we can understand things existing beyond the binary, we shift ever closer to creating a theory which speaks true to both our experience and knowledge and are better able to step away from the temptation of fitting experience into theory. Likewise, the nonrational transcendental self, as revealed in its experience of a moment of beauty, challenges the strict distinction between the abstract and actual. Return for a moment to Kantian aesthetics. The Kantian subject of the aesthetic judgment is not identical with the nonrational transcendental self that experiences a moment of beauty for the former is defined by its capacities while the latter is unconcerned with its capacities and more engaged with the experience of beauty in that very moment. However, the Kantian notion of aesthetics is highly relevant because it illustrates the subject as able to merge abstraction and experience in the process of “freeplay.” This is significant because it illustrates that we do not have to sacrifice abstraction and conceptualization in order to experience actuality. In their efforts to reject rationalism, the existentialists try to do away with abstraction and conceptualization. However, anti-conceptualization only reinvents, rather than resolves, fundamental tensions. We see this clearly in Kierkegaard’s inverse Hegelianism. Even on the everyday level, it is plain that abandoning the abstract does not lead to freedom. Taking away all methods of conceptualizing and imagining possibilities forces a person to submit to his circumstances. His existence, in becoming only ‘actual’, is no longer connected to what is possible. In contrast, the experience of the nonrational transcendental self embraces abstraction so that a person’s subjectivity can extend beyond actuality into a more moving experience, where unrealized possibilities support the actuality of the present moment. The nonrational transcendental self is the grounds upon which object and subject experience each other as existentially inseparable (e.g. Paloma stands where the music is) as possibility and actuality shift into one another. When we experience the question of life and death (at every moment) or a moment of beauty, all conditions of an existing self are fulfilled without having to give a strict definition of its existence and capabilities. The nonrational transcendent self shows that the human being does not depend on rejecting rationality or proving its own subjectivity in order to exist as it is. Without asking for definition, the nonrational transcendental self appears to us in moments of life and beauty, demanding nothing of us except to pass through with an open mind. This is the aspect of the self that I believe became lost amidst the tensions of the existence-rationalism binary and is now reclaimed through the reimagining of the self. Footnotes 19 The "hollowness of a hollow man" is in reference to T.S. Eliot, The Hollow Men. (London: Oxford University Press, 1951). 20 This summary of Richard Brandt’s argument was quoted from: Christopher Cowley, “Suicide is Neither Rational nor Irrational” in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Vol. 9, No.5 (2006): p. 495. 21 I realize that transcendence is a highly loaded term. However, I specifically chose a term with a lot of baggage from the existence-reason binary in order to show that the word can be used outside of the binary. The more obvious term that I might use is “reorientational” or “resituational”. But I used transcendence to show that transcendence and reaching that freedom of shifting a position do not arise only from turning deeper within yourself or by abstracting further and further away, but simply by settling into yourself, as you are. 22 Self-justification in this context is reminiscent of the Kantian subject of the moral judgment and explaining ourselves to others is similar to the ‘ought’ that the Kantian subject of the aesthetic judgment imposes onto others. References Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy (Translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane). Reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Reason in History (Translated by Robert S. Hartman). Reprint, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1953. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason (Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Kierkegaard, Søren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript in The Essential Kierkegaard (Edited by Howard Hong and Edna Hong). Reprint, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978. Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time (Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson). Reprint, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1962. Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (Translated by Hazel Barnes). Reprint, New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1956. Kierkegaard, Søren. Stages on Life’s Way in The Essential Kierkegaard (Edited by Howard Hong and Edna Hong). Reprint, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978. Adorno, Theodor. Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic (Translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor). Reprint, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science (Translated by Josefine Nauckhoff). Reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Reprint, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. Camus, Albert. The Myth Of Sisyphus, And Other Essays (Translated By Justin O'brien). Reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1991. Augustine, Saint. The Political Writings Of Saint Augustine (Edited By Henry Paolucci). Reprint, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing Inc., 1962. David, Hume. Two Essays: Of Suicide And Of The Immorality Of The Soul. Reprint, Ann Arbor: Michigan University Library, 2008. Cowley, Christopher. "Suicide Is Neither Rational Nor Irrational". Ethical Theory And Moral Practice 9, no. 5 (2006): 495-504. doi:10.1007/s10677-006-9031-9. Kant, Immanuel. Critique Of Practical Reason (Translated By Lewis White Beck). Reprint, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merill Company, Inc., 1956. Kant, Immanuel. The Analytic Of The Beautiful In Critique Of Judgment (Translated By Walkter Cerf). Reprint, New York: The Bobbs-Merill Company, Inc., 1963. Barbery, Muriel. The Elegance Of The Hedgehog. Reprint, New York: Europa Editions, 2006. Heidegger, Martin. The Basic Problems Of Phenomenology. Reprint, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism Is A Humanism (Translated By Carol Macomber). Reprint, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945.

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John Taylor and Ben Bernanke on the Great Recession Who Was Right About What Went Wrong? Mikael Hemlin University of Gothenburg University of Oxford London School of Economics Author Hans Lei Leonardo Moraveg Neil Sehgal Editors Fall 2019 Download full text PDF (8 pages) In the autumn of 2007, the United States’ housing market collapsed, pushing the world economy to the brink of disaster. In the US, unemployment rates soared, trillions of dollars of wealth disappeared, and millions of Americans lost their homes in what is generally considered the most severe recession since the Great Depression of the 1930’s. In the aftermath, economists have diligently discussed the properties of the crisis, asking if it could have been prevented and if policymakers could have responded more prudently. The American economist John Taylor has accused US policymakers of paving the way for the housing bubble by conducting an excessively loose monetary policy in the years leading up to the crash, and of prolonging the crisis by responding with measures based on premises that were essentially misguided. Conversely, Ben Bernanke, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve and one of the main targets of Taylor’s critique, offers an opposing view. According to Bernanke, the low federal funds rates during the years 2002–2006 were sound, and did not contribute to the inflation of the housing market to the extent that Taylor describes. Rather, Bernanke claims, it was mainly regulatory flaws that caused the financial collapse, and the actions taken by policymakers prevented the financial system from imploding completely. This essay makes the argument that although monetary policy played a part in the build-up to the crash, it was by no means a defining factor. What sets the Great Recession apart from other economic downturns is the regulatory setting in which the housing bubble developed and the crisis unfolded. As such, the governors of the Federal Reserve are not culpable for the crisis’ occurrence. They, along with the US Treasury, are nevertheless culpable for the misguided policies that were enacted to resolve the situation. Much like Taylor suggests, the measures that were undertaken by the authorities rested on the false presumption that it was lack of liquidity rather than the persistence of counterparty risk that protracted the crisis. The situation could have been dealt with much more efficiently were it not for these misconceptions. Neither Taylor’s nor Bernanke’s argument is convincing on all counts. Rather, it is a combination of the two that offers the most accurate account of what happened. One of the main points of disagreement between Taylor and Bernanke is the role of the Federal Reserve’s loose monetary policy during the years 2002–2006 in inflating the housing market. While Taylor is right in claiming that excessively low interest rates generally accommodate the creation of bubbles, he wrongly alleges that his rule for monetary policy, the Taylor Rule, is detailed enough to work as a reference point for how monetary policy should be conducted, regardless of context. Indeed, as Bernanke argues, the monetary situation in the US in the period 2002–2006 was complex in ways that are unaccounted for in the Taylor Rule. For example, the recovery after the dot-com bubble burst in 2001 was rapid, but did not push down unemployment to the extent that conventional wisdom would suggest. The Taylor Rule does not explicitly account for unemployment, but instead expects it to follow inflation and output as described by Okun’s law and the Phillips curve. Taking into consideration the low inflation rates of the years in question, Bernanke’s argument that raising the FFR at that time would have been deflationary is hardly unfounded. Indeed, while mainstream economic theory would have predicted unemployment to diminish as the economy recovered after 2001, it would also have predicted inflation to fall to very low levels had the Federal Reserve raised the FFR over the period that Taylor suggests. Additionally, as Bernanke points out, the sharp increases in housing prices started in 1998, well before the period of the allegedly too loose monetary policy. Taken together, the evidence above indicates that while the low interest rates before the crisis played a role in inflating the housing market, it was not a major factor. The economic indicators of the time were ambiguous, and the Federal Reserve chose a policy path associated with avoiding the deflationary trap that had suppressed the Japanese economy over the past decades. Nevertheless, the Fed could have better appreciated the instability of the housing market and started raising interest rates in time to prevent the crash from turning into a worldwide financial disaster. If the FFR had been raised a couple of years earlier, the concealed risk in the securities markets could have been exposed without risking a system collapse. In such a scenario, it is plausible that the average creditworthiness of borrowers would have been higher, as lenders would not have had enough time to work their way down to the absolute bottom of the income/asset brackets. In Hyman Minsky’s words, financial practice would not yet have degenerated from “speculative finance” to “Ponzi finance.” As such, the mortgage default rates and banks’ leverage ratios would have been lower, and the recession more manageable. While monetary policy leading up to the crisis did contribute to its onset, the circumstances that magnified the crisis to a global collapse emerged as a result of the government’s exceedingly poor regulatory oversight. Taylor finds that the countries where housing prices rose the steepest were also the ones that deviated the most from his monetary policy rule. He argues that this serves as evidence that the Federal Reserve’s lax monetary policy played a significant role in setting the stage for the crisis. While this statement likely has some truth to it, it suffers from several shortcomings. As mentioned earlier, Bernanke underscores that the housing boom started in 1998 when the FFR was well over 5 percent. Against this background, it is more likely that the regulatory situation both in the US and elsewhere is to blame for the housing boom and subsequent crisis. In 1999, around the same time that Bernanke alleges the boom started, the Clinton administration partially repealed the Banking Act of 1933 (or the Glass-Steagall Act). The act was adopted after the Great Depression to improve financial stability, and essentially separated investment banks and hedge funds from commercial banks. After the repeal, it became legal for financial institutions of all types to merge, thereby making them “too big to fail” and allowing them to engage in larger-scale speculation. This paved the way for a moral hazard and exposed depositors to speculative risk in the process. In addition, the partial repeal failed to give the Securities and Exchange Commission authority to regulate and scrutinise financial institutions, thus allowing for the creation of riskier and ever-more opaque derivatives. As such, the abolishment of parts of the Glass-Steagall Act drastically increased the scale of speculative operations and weakened regulatory oversight, thus shrouding the securities markets in ignorance. Taylor elegantly compares the ensuing situation to a game of hearts, but with many queens of spades instead of just one. Everybody knew that most financial institutions’ balance sheets were riddled with queens of spades, i.e. toxic assets. The problem was that when the crisis hit, nobody could distinguish the toxic assets from the non-toxic ones, and thus, all assets of a kind sharply diminished in value. The indistinguishability of safe mortgage-backed securities from risky ones was in part due to the complexity of the financial instruments in question, and in part due to the failure of the rating agencies to accurately evaluate the risk of the constituent mortgages (Crotty, 2009). This is an issue of poor oversight as well; the rating agencies evaluated the riskiness of loans under the pressure of competition, and therefore consistently gave customers (e.g. banks) the ratings they required to sell off the loans as quickly as possible. Since there were no regulatory mechanisms in place to prevent this from becoming standard practice, it became hugely profitable for banks to grant loans to more or less anyone. The expansive access to credit led the housing market to boom. It is also worth mentioning that the expected future values of the homes that the mortgages financed were included as collateral in the risk evaluations. As such, the stability of the financial system was built on the premise that the US housing market could continue to boom indefinitely. This indicates that it was poor oversight, not lax monetary policy, that paved the way for the housing bubble and the subsequent crisis once the bubble burst. In the wake of the crisis, when the flow of financial transactions had frozen and market interest rates had skyrocketed due to the increased uncertainty and risk, the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury set out to stimulate the economy to prevent it from collapsing altogether. Based on what measures the policymakers chose to enact, it seems they diagnosed the problem to be insufficient liquidity. Taylor correctly claims that they were mistaken—it was excessive counterparty risk, not liquidity, that petrified the financial markets. Among other things, policymakers tried to stimulate aggregate demand by giving out over 100 billion USD in cash to US households. The effects of these cash infusions quickly subsided and had little to no effect in terms of economic recovery. Next, they tried to reduce the financial friction in the system by adopting the so-called Troubled Asset Relief Programme of around 700 billion USD. As the name suggests, the programme sought to relieve troubled financial institutions of bad assets. However, the legislative text lacked a predictable framework as to what kinds of assets would be bought up, at what prices, and what the targeted institutions should do with the money. The consequences were that uncertainty and counterparty risk persisted, and that most of the money was used to buy US Treasury bonds and other safe assets that did not reduce the financial friction in the system (Taylor, 2009). Essentially, the mistake that the policymakers made was to conceive of the crisis as one of liquidity rather than counterparty risk. If counterparty risk in the system is high, then financial friction is high, and if financial friction is high, then neither monetary policy nor fiscal stimulus can restart the economy. This is because the increased risk offsets the effects of any lowering of the FFR or an increase in aggregate demand. Had the problem been diagnosed as excessive counterparty risk from the outset, then predictable and targeted quantitative easing could have been used immediately to remove the toxic assets from the system, thereby decreasing risk and uncertainty. Eventually, quantitative easing was used, but it could have been done much earlier (Taylor, 2009). Neither Taylor nor Bernanke provides a satisfactory account of what went wrong before and during the Great Recession. Taylor is mistaken in claiming that the Federal Reserve’s lax monetary policy in the years leading up to the housing bust is to blame for the crisis. While this might have played a minor role, the fact that the boom began under rather strict monetary conditions and that the Federal Reserve had a strong rationale for its chosen policy path suggests that Bernanke is right that it was inadequate regulation that paved the way for the crash. Nevertheless, Taylor’s critique of the interventions that Bernanke’s Federal Reserve undertook to resolve the crisis is justified. Had it not been for Bernanke’s and other policymakers’ misconception of the crisis as a liquidity shortage rather than an issue of counterparty risk, the recession would have been much less painful. Thus, on a concluding note, future policymakers should enhance the discretion of regulatory authorities to prevent a similar situation from emerging again, and improve the targeting of interventions in the event of a crisis to ensure that they are potent enough to produce the desired effect. Works Cited Bernanke, Ben S. “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, January 03, 2010. www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.htm. Crotty, James. “Structural causes of the global financial crisis: a critical assessment of the ‘new financial architecture’,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 33, no. 4, 2009, pp. 563-580. doi.org/10.1093/cje/bep023. Dash, Eric. “A Stormy Decade for Citi Since Travelers Merge,” New York Times. April 03, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/business/03citi.html. FRED. “Effective Federal Funds Rate,” Last accessed November 15, 2018. fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS. FRED. “S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index,” fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA . Accessed November 15, 2018. Gorton, Gary, and Guillermo Ordoñez. "Collateral Crises." American Economic Review, vol. 104, no. 2, February 2014, pp. 343-78. dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.2.343. Greenwood, Robin, and David Scharfstein. “The Growth of Finance.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27, no. 2, Spring 2013, pp. 3–28. dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.27.2.3. Jones, Charles I. Macroeconomics. 4th ed. New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2018. Kaufman, George G. “Too big to fail in banking: What does it mean?” LSE Financial Markets Group Special Paper Series, Special paper 22, June 2013. www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/assets/documents/papers/special-papers/SP222.pdf. Krugman, Paul. The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2008. Maues, Julia. “Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall),” Federal Reserve History. November 22, 2013, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/glass_steagall_act. Miller, Richard A. “Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis and the role of equity: The accounting behind hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance.” Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, vol. 41, no. 1, 2018, pp. 126–138. doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2017.1392870. Taylor, John B. “Economic policy and the financial crisis: An empirical analysis of what went wrong.” Critical Review, vol. 21, no. 2-3, January 2009, pp. 341–364. doi.org/10.1080/08913810902974865. Trading Economics. “United States Unemployment Rate,” tradingeconomics.com/united-states/unemployment-rate . Accessed November 15, 2018.

Editorial board Foreword Volume I Issue II Introducing the second issue of JPPE Technological disruption has been a fact of the post-industrial world, producing the growth in productivity and efficiency that led to nearly unfathomable increases in opulence, standards of living, and wealth. It may, as a consequence, seem perplexing why so many of today’s leaders seem concerned about something so seemingly vastly beneficial as technological innovation. And yet, few economic shifts produce more anxiety than those involving the introduction of labor saving technology into the economy. This was true in the 19th century Britain, when the Luddites stood in such abject fear of the permanent redundancy of their labor that they took to murdering machine innovators and destroying designs. It was also true in the early 20th century, as agricultural innovations and new industrial designs dramatically reshaped the US economy. And it’s true again today, as artificial intelligence and digital technology make a wide array of occupations largely or entirely automatable. This has potentially profound implications for the world. As globalization, outsourcing, and the presence of winner- take all markets exacerbate income inequality in many countries, labor automation stands to make possibly significant numbers of jobs redundant, increasing returns to capital, and hastening the growth in inequality as productivity increases faster than wages. It’s the presence of these alarming trends that has driven us to dedicate the second issue of the Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics to the topic of technology and, specifically, technological disruption. We have done this by facilitating submissions from Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon and Brookings Institution President John Allen, both of whom have emerged as contemporary leaders on the front line to develop a politics that confronts some of the more perverse effects of technological innovation. As questions surrounding the effects of labor automation continue to garner more attention, the most popular solutions tend to take on at least one of two forms: education or social security. Ms. Sturgeon and Mr. Allen’s suggestions are therefore an apt encapsulation of the nature of the debate about how best to address technological displacement; the former discusses social security and the latter, education. Mr. Allen argues for a revaluation of modern education and training programs for workers and youths. He proposes that America’s continued dominance requires a strong investment in education programs that emphasize, for example, artificial intelligence, big data analytics, and super-computing. Meanwhile Ms. Sturgeon provides a strong case for considering a universal basic income as a possible approach to curtail the effects of labor automation on inequality. She highlights Scotland’s experiments with such a proposal and underscores the need for bold leadership to develop a new approach to social security befitting of a modern and more technological advanced era. Although this semester’s issue of JPPE is centered on the question of technological disruption, it also features essays from undergraduates on a wide range of topics. One piece discusses the relationship between private companies and US cybersecurity policy. Another considers whether secession is a viable solution to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. And, in Moral Manipulation, a student considers the ethics of corporate advertising campaigns through a Kantian paradigm. The Brown University Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics is deeply proud of both the feature articles and student essays published in this issue. As students— from Providence to Beijing— begin to grapple with a rapidly changing economy and socio-political climate, the number of novel challenges the rising generation faces is great. And in the Journal you are now reading, students and world leaders around the world provide a great number of equally novel solutions.

Politics Featured Section The European Union Trust Fund for Africa: Understanding the EU’s Securitization of Development Aid and its Implications Migena Satyal A Death Sentence Beyond Death Row: Helling v. McKinney and the Constitutionality of Solitary Confinement Hallie Sternblitz Vol. VIII | Issue I FREE EXERCISE AND IDENTITY IN CONFLICT: The Future of Parental Free Exercise Claims in Public Education Divergent colonial memories in south korea and taiwan: Institutional Legacies Danny Ly Vol. VII | Issue I The Burden of Innocence: Arendt’s Understanding of Totalitarianism through its Victims Elena Muglia Rewriting the Antitrust Setlist: Examining the Live Nation-Ticketmaster Lawsuit and its Implications for Modern Antitrust Law Katya Tolunsky The European Union trust fund for africa: Understanding the EU's Securitization of Development Aid and its Implications Migena Satyal A DEATH SENTENCE BEYOND DEATH ROW: Helling v. McKinney and the Constitutionality of Solitary Confinement Hallie Sternblitz Vol. VI | Issue II Schedule F And The Future Of Civil Service Protections Sasha Bonkowsky Does Social Media Strategy Help Politicians Stay in Power? Comparing the Cases of Modi and Bolsonaro Wendy Wang How Political Instability Unravels Religious Commitment in the Face of Uncertainty Navigating Uncertainty in Political Instability and Religiosity in Post-Arab Spring Egypt and Tunisia Abanti Ahmed Politics Archives Vol. IV | Issue II Refuting the myth of progressive secularism An Analysis of the Legal Frameworks Surrounding Religious Practice in France and Bahrain Bridget McDonald Ronald Reagan and the Role of Humor in American movement conservatism Abie Rohrig Vol. IV | Issue I Predictive Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System Evaluating the Racial Bias Objection Rebecca Berman From Bowers to Obergefell The US Supreme Court’s Erratic, Yet Correct, Jurisprudence on Gay Rights Sydney White The Unchurching of Black Lives Matter The Evolving Role of Faith in The Fight for Racial Justice Anna Savo-Matthews Vol. III | Issue II Rural Despair and decline How Trump Won Michigan in 2016 Bess Markel Vol. III | Issue I We The Prisoners Considering the Anti Drug Act of 1986, the War on Drugs and Mass Incarceration in the United States Sophia Scaglion Vol. II | Issue II All Power to the Imagination Radical Student Groups and Coalition Building in France During May 1968 and the United States during the Vietnam War Calder McHugh The Life Cycle of the Responsibility to Protect The Ongoing Emergence of R2P as a Norm in the International Community Maxine Dehavenon PeaceFul Animals A Look into Black Pacifism and the Pedagogy of Civil Rights in American Public Education Jade Fabello Vol. II | Issue I Two Forms of Environmental-Political Imagination Germany, the United States, and the Clean Energy Transition Nathan S. Chael Oedipus and Ion as outsiders The Implications and Limitations of Genealogical Citizenship Claire Holland Partisan Gerrymandering Re-Establishing the Political Question Doctrine in Gill v. Whitford Connor Maag Vol. I | Issue II Transparency and compliance The Strength of EU Lobbying Regulations Abigail Borges Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict Is Secession a Viable Solution? Tathyana Mello Amaral Imagined Isle Irish Catholic Identity in the Restoration Era Nathan Mainster Vol. I | Issue I American Jews The Political Behavior of American Jews A Public Choice Approach to Israel-influenced Voting Jake Goodman Racial Capitalism Racial Capitalism in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Challenging the Fallacy of Black Entitlement under Service Delivery Protests. Olerato Mogomotsi A.S.e.a.n The Long Game: ASEAN, China’s Charm Offensive and the South China Sea Dispute Hisyam Takiudin

Frequently Asked Questions How often do you publish? The Brown Journal of Philosophy, Politics and Economics publishes twice a year. Once in the Fall, and once in the Spring. How do you decide what to publish? The JPPE looks for pieces that are well-written, original, well-argued, well-researched, and timely. Possible contributions include, but are not limited to, research papers, literature reviews, critical comments, interviews, theses, PhD summaries, and articles written independently or for a class. How long should my submission be? We do not specify lengths for submissions because we recognize that certain essays may require more or less space than others. We do, however, expect that the essay is concise and justifies its length in all cases. How do I know if my work qualifies for the journal? The JPPE is an interdisciplinary journal. We are flexible and encourage submissions from a variety of fields, as long as the work has relevance within the disciplines of philosophy, politics, and/or economics. Most importantly, the work should be timely and offer some insight into a question with philosophical, political, and/or economic implications. What are my chances of getting published? All submissions go through a rigorous name-blind review and referee process. If the work passes the process the piece will be published. I do not attend Brown University. Can I still submit my work? Yes! We accept submissions from authors all over the world.