Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict Is secession a viable solution? Tathyana Mello Amaral Brown University Author Miles Campbell Ryan Saadeh Ethan Shire Editors Fall 2018 This paper assesses the viability of secession as a possible solution for the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in the creation of weak and unstable states that sought to establish their identity and place in the world. It triggered a wave of pervasive ethno-nationalism in Eastern Europe, led to a number of lasting military conflicts, and brought about the question of self-determination of minor ethnic groups like the Armenians, Chechens, and Kosovians. The Yugoslav Wars marked an important turning point in the history of the post-Soviet region because it resulted in the secession of Kosovo from Serbia in 2008 and created legal precedent for separatist groups. While the right to secede offers an answer to the resolution of ethnic conflicts, some scholars and theorists find it troubling. [1] The dispute between Georgia and ethnic Ossetians of the Transcaucasian region, now known as South Ossetia, highlights how the right to secede is still a point of controversy in international law. Historical Background: Nature of the Conflict Though the enmity between ethnic Georgians and ethnic Ossetians dates back to the 13th century when Ossetians were driven South from the Northern Caucasus Mountains to Georgian territory, it greatly intensified during the Soviet period.[2] During this period, South Ossetia was an autonomous administrative unit within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). As historian George B. Hewitt discusses, language policy was an important point of contention between the ethnic groups since Georgia pursued discriminatory policies against its ethnic minorities.[3] The Soviet Union’s early language policy granted a lot of freedom to ethnic groups as part of a “nativization” effort that sought to liberate and win over oppressed peoples. By the late 1930s, however, fears of emerging nationalism within the federation led to a change in policy to one of “Russification”. Georgia, however, was exempted from such policies until 1953 since its leader Joseph Stalin was a Georgian native. In 1936 Georgian was declared a state language and Georgianization became the policy of the day. In 1938 the state imposed the Georgian alphabet on the Ossetian language and prohibited minority language schooling, causing great tensions between the government and the ethnic minorities.[4] When the Russification policies reached the Georgian SSR, the Georgian Nationalist Movement proposed the 1988 Draft Language Law which aimed to oblige ethnic minorities to master the Georgian language.[5] These Georgian language policies, along with other discriminatory practices, thus created deep resentment among South Ossetians towards Georgians. It is important to note that the small state of Georgia is home to other separatist ethnic minorities, including Abkhazians in the West and Adjarians in the South. Although the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict has paralleled the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict since 1991 when violent conflict first erupted during the Georgian independence movement, this paper will exclusively focus on the South Ossetian conflict. The violent experience of the 1990s was a culmination of hundreds of years of conflict. Political scientist Stefan Wolff writes that “South Ossetians wanted to preserve and remain within the Soviet Union. The Ossetians believed that their survival as ethno-cultural communities distinct from the Georgian majority would be in acute danger in an independent Georgian state.”[6] The relationship between Russia and South Ossetia was reinforced by the fact that ethnic Ossetians had their own autonomous republic within Russia, namely North Ossetia-Alana. With the support of Russia, the South Ossetian separatists managed to put up a strong resistance against the Georgians.[7] In June 1992, shortly after the election of former Soviet Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadze as Georgian president, a ceasefire was signed in Sochi under Russian supervision.[8] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) sent a mission composed of troops from Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, and North Ossetia to facilitate negotiations toward a political agreement.[9] The OSCE mission successfully maintained peace until 2003 when President Mikhail Saakashvili rose to power through the popular Rose Revolution, and made the restoration of Georgian territorial integrity a major goal of the new government.[10] The administration’s policy led to a violent flare up in 2004 when the government cracked down on a symbol of interethnic cooperation: the Ergneti Market.[11] Though the black market was a major point of contraband trade, the introduction of a harsh taxation system in the market, as a part of Saakashvili’s anti-contraband operation, significantly harmed Georgian relations with Ossetians. The market was one of the only sites of direct interaction between the two ethnic groups. Relations were made even worse by the fact that one of the targeted groups in this operation was comprised of local officials and businessmen who profited from Russian and Ossetian trade connections.[12] Violence erupted during and after the shutting down of the market. Even more detrimental to interethnic relations, in 2006 it became public that the smuggling operation still existed, but that it was now run but the ruling Georgian elite.[13] The closing of the Ergneti Market was labeled a “missed window of opportunity” for conflict resolution by academic Doris Vogl. She argued that “during the rigorously implemented state-building process of the early Saakashvili government, the informal Georgian-Ossetian relations immediately lost momentum.”[14] The events of 2004 polarized and radicalized both Georgians and Ossetians and intensified the clashes between the ethnic groups in the prelude of the war of 2008. Though Georgia offered South Ossetia federal status in 2004, the leadership rejected this possible resolution.[15] Georgian policies in the early 2000s allowed Russia to offer more substantial and public support to the separatist Ossetians. Russia distributed passports to ethnic Ossetians and intensified political, economic and military ties with the separatist region. Arguably even more important, Russia observed growing relations between Georgia and Western powers like the United States. Georgia received 1.3 billion dollars of American financial aid and oversaw the construction of BP operated Baku–Supsa oil pipeline which runs through Azerbaijan and Georgia.[16] As Georgia began to pursue NATO membership, Russia was threatened by the possibility of having the Western coalition present in its own backyard. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr comment that before the 2008 war, “Georgia was moving rapidly toward Euro-Atlantic integration, and was doing so at a time when an increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy was being shaped by sphere of influence-thinking.”[17] With fears of further NATO expansion and growing US presence in the Caucasus, Russian policy was driven by global security concerns, dynamics of European and global geopolitical power. Also significant is the fact that dominant Western powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France supported and legitimized the secession of Kosovo from Serbia in February 2008. This allowed President Putin to cite the “Kosovo precedent” when signing a presidential decree on April 16th that established political, economic and social relations with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[18] Rising tensions between the two sovereign nations resulted in a five day war in 2008. Controversy surrounds who actually initiated the war on August 7th 2008,[19] as reports by the European Union and the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center agree that while Georgia made the first move, Russia significantly increased the number of troops and armaments in Abkhazia, and later in South Ossetia in the prelude to the war.[20] After five days of violent conflict, Georgia and Russia agreed to sign an armistice and engaged in peace talks sponsored by the European Union, the United Nations and OSCE. Russian military troops remained in South Ossetia in order to prevent Georgia from recovering the territory.[21] On August 25th, Russia recognized the sovereignty of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Western powers and institutions such as NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations strongly condemned this move as they believed it undermined the sovereignty of the Georgian state. In response, Georgia ceased all diplomatic relations with Russia. This made the peace process slow and ineffective as the co-sponsored EU-UN-OSCE talks in Geneva were the only mechanism for multilateral talks.[22] Since 2008, Russia has increased governmental, economic and social ties with the secessionist regions. The administrative border between South Ossetia and Georgia has also been pushed southwards and since the summer of 2015, South Ossetian-held territory includes a section of the Baku-Supsa pipeline. As Andrews Higgins puts it, the secessionist region is part of Russia’s “Frozen Zone”, which includes areas under Russian control that officially belong to neighboring states, such as Georgia’s Abkhazia, Moldova’s Transnistria, and Ukraine’s Crimea. Higgins also adds that these regions are “useful for things like preventing a NATO foothold or destabilizing the host country at opportune moments.”[23] Issues with the Secession of South Ossetia In his essay “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”, law professor and political scientist Donald Horowitz outlines a set of assumptions that are made about secessionist states which justify the right to secede. This right assumes that secession will produce a “homogenous successor” that will “respect minority rights,” and where “republican democracy is viable.”[24] It also assumes that secession will “result in a diminution of conflict.”[25] The case of South Ossetia can be analyzed as a natural secessionist experiment of history because the region has been a de-facto independent state for many years. The question then arises: have these assumptions materialized in the case of South Ossetia? In short, they have not. As Horowitz points out, secession “merely proliferates the arenas in which the problem of intergroup political accommodation must be faced.”[26] In the case of Georgia, ample evidence shows that ethnic conflict continues to haunt both Georgia and the de-facto independent state of South Ossetia. There were many reports concerning violations of human rights from both sides during the 2008 war. For example, a Human Rights Watch report showed that there was intentional destruction of Georgian villages by Russian-South Ossetian troops.[27] The majority of ethnic Georgians who resided in South Ossetia fled during the August 2008 conflict, but an estimated 20,000 still live in the disputed territory.[28] The Ministry for Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees of Georgia reported that there were 34,274 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from South Ossetia as of October 2014.[29] A UN survey shows that 56.9% of IDPs from South Ossetia are unable, but would like to return to their place of origin in cities like Tskhinvali, Znauri, Java, and Shida Kartli. This demonstrates how interethnic accommodations have failed to unfold with the creation of a separate state. Additionally, with no access to the territory except in preparations for the Geneva Discussions, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Georgian authorities have been unable to implement conventions regarding rights of refugees, stateless persons, and IDPs.[30] Russian troops regularly detain Georgian civilians for illegal crossings of the “administrative boundary line” (around 320 villagers were detained in 2015 alone).[31] In fact, the Freedom House Organization states that ethnic Georgians are barred from returning to the region unless they “renounce their Georgian citizenship and accept Russian passports.”[32] Therefore, the freedom of movement of Georgian citizens is constantly threatened in South Ossetia. In July 2017, the South Ossetian authorities also shared plans “to abolish the Georgian language schooling in the region’s ethnic Georgian populated areas beginning from the 2017/2018 academic year.”[33] The language policy proposed by the South Ossetian government recalls the discriminatory policies Ossetians were subjected to at the hand of Georgians during the Soviet period. Regarding the meaningful political participation of ethnic minorities, the Freedom House states that ethnic Georgians have refused or been barred from participating in the electoral process.[34] Freedoms of expression and of organization are also threatened.[35] As Horowitz argues, the treatment of this new ethnic minority is highly discriminatory. Therefore, in the case of South Ossetia, secession does not create a homogenous successor nor does it guarantee the respect of minority rights. In the case of South Ossetia, secession does not seem feasible unless the authorities make a commitment to guarantee the rights of its ethnic minorities. But, as Horowitz warns, “guarantees of minority protection in secessionist regions are likely to be illusory.”[36] While South Ossetia is considered a de-facto independent state, the viability of an independent republican democracy in South Ossetia is questionable when considering its high dependence on Russia. Historians Andreas Gerrits and Max Bader argue that “the economic and intergovernmental linkages with Russia … directly undermine the autonomy of the region.”[37] With a dual executive system, South Ossetia maintains political institutions based on those of Russia. The 2011 presidential election demonstrates the grip of Russia on the region’s politics and shows how the South Ossetian political process is highly susceptible to Russian influence. When a candidate who criticized strong ties with Russia won the popular vote, the Supreme Court annulled the results. Elections were repeated in 2012 with four new candidates, all pro-Russia.[38] As a result of the bilateral agreements signed in 2009, 2010, and 2015 that established economic, governmental and military links between Russia and South Ossetia, South Ossetia developed a high level of dependence on Russia.[39] Russia is South Ossetia’s only relevant trade partner, the ruble is the official currency, and South Ossetia’s imports and investments are exclusively from Russia.[40] More significantly, 91% of South Ossetia’s government budget is made up from Russian financial aid.[41] These limitations arguably derive from a lack of international recognition and from the consequences of the 2008 war. However, as Russian economist Mikhail Delyagin states, “South Ossetia does not exist as an independent economic entity due to its small size and extremely low-level management,” as well as due to its reliance on Russia’s long-term military presence to protect its territory.[42] As a result of this significant dependence on Russian aid, South Ossetia does not have a sustainable future as an independent nation. Another assumption that can be contested is that secession will lead to a diminution of violent conflict. This inevitable reality is highly flawed because devolution merely turns domestic conflicts into international ones. While a political divorce has not officially occurred, South Ossetia has been de-facto independent for at least 10 years. Though ethnic enmities linger, the recent history of the conflict shows how ethnic conflicts can mutate into primarily geopolitical ones when separatist movements thrive. University of Edinburgh Professor Emeritus John Erickson writes that the implications of Georgia’s Western push “are consequently dire for those [including high level Russian officials] who insist doggedly that the post-Soviet ‘space’ in its entirety, encompassing the former states of the Soviet Union, is and must remain a closed Russian geopolitical preserve.”[43] For Russia, the possibility of NATO encroachment on the South Caucasus precludes any significant decision concerning the separatist regions. As historian David J. Smith argues, German Chancellor Angela Merkle sealed the region’s fate when she said that the resolution of internal conflict was a prerequisite for NATO membership.[44] From that moment onwards, South Ossetia became a pawn in Moscow’s foreign policy strategy, described by Svante Cornell as a “revival of a classically modern, Realpolitik culture of security.”[45] The South Ossetian “secessionist” experience, along with that of other separatist states in Eastern Europe, illustrates how ethnic conflicts can be used to further geopolitical interests of powers like the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space. The internationalization of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict shows how secession does not necessarily lead to a diminution of violence. Therefore, the failure of South Ossetia to protect the minority rights of ethnic Georgians, its continued dependence on Russia, and likely mutation of ethnic conflicts into geopolitical ones suggests that secession is not a viable solution for this conflict. Implications There are no clear answers to Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. Though the director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies Cory Welt argues that “the reintegration of South Ossetia…poses no challenges to conventional understandings of democracy and human rights,” as time passes, the collective consciousness of both South Ossetians and Georgians acquires increasingly negative perceptions of the opposing ethnic group, making future interethnic cooperation difficult to achieve.[46] Additionally, the social linkage between South Ossetia and Russia continues to grow through the Russian domination of the media, the use of Russian as the lingua franca, and the promotion of educational exchange programs.[47] A symbolic link also comes from the large Ossetian diaspora in North Ossetia, an autonomous region within Russia. Thus, South Ossetia’s reintegration into Georgia becomes more unlikely by the day. With most citizens having dual citizenship to South Ossetia and Russia, further integration of South Ossetia into Russia can be anticipated. While Russia has not stated that it will pursue the annexation of the territory, its aggressive support of South Ossetia has managed to destabilize the region, prevent Georgia from joining Western organizations such as NATO. Moreover, through its involvement in Georgia, Russia has reasserted its influence in the Caucasus region. If secession occurred and South Ossetia was recognized as independent state by the international community, Russia would be encouraged to engage in even more aggressive foreign policy in the post-Soviet sphere of influence, possibly resulting in a domino effect of secessionist movements and a higher occurrence of violent conflicts. Georgia is a multiethnic country with two separatist movements (the experience of Abkhazia is very similar to that of South Ossetia), so the secession of one region would likely lead to that of the other. The disputed territories make up about one quarter of the Georgian territory, which means secession would severely destabilize the already weak country. The fear of a domino effect, not only in Georgia, but in other disputed territories that are currently under Russian control (i.e.: Crimea and Donbass, Ukraine; Transnitria, Moldova), is already a reality shaping international geopolitics. If the right to secede is accepted in relation to the South Ossetian dispute, the legal precedent set by Kosovo’s independence will be reaffirmed. With Russia’s “Frozen Zone” in mind, the emergence and legitimization of separatist movements of small and unsustainable regions can lead to the expansion of Russian sphere of influence in the post-Soviet territory and the further polarization of the present international political dynamics. Conclusion Peace talks and conflict resolution efforts have proven ineffective for almost 25 years, since both sides are committed to achieving predetermined preferential outcomes.[48] Both sides have been haunted by the impatience of political leaders such as President Saakashvili and by a lack of trust from both sides due to the lack of interethnic communication. But, most of all, the sides have been haunted by a pro-separatist Russian mediator. Cory Welt writes that Russia’s “function as a ‘hegemonic balancer’ interposed between conflicting parties resulted in the establishment of a level playing field for negotiations, allowing Abkhazia and South Ossetia to consider themselves equals to Georgia, not subordinates.”[49] While Georgia attempted to reach an acceptable political solution, the support from a major power endowed separatist group with a decisive sense of confidence and security that hindered the resolution of the conflict. Meanwhile, Western states and institutions failed to devise a coherent response to Russian policies that threaten stability and Europe’s own interests in the region. The de-facto independence of South Ossetia encountered a continued threat to rights of ethnic minorities, a strong dependence on Russia, and the quick escalation of violence in 2008 due to the internationalization of the conflict. The region’s experience thus supports the argument that secession is not a viable solution for ethnic conflict in the Caucasus. Endnotes [1] Donald L. Horowitz, “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede,” Journal of Democracy, 11. [2] George Hewitt, Discordant Neighbours: A Reassessment of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian Conflicts, (Leiden: 2003), 22 -23. [3] Hewitt, 41. [4] Sonya Kleshik, "I Am My Language: Language Policy and Attitudes Toward Language in Georgia" (Master's thesis, Central European University, 2010), 11 - 12 [5] Hewitt, 57 – 58. [6] Stefan Wolff, "Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia," Encyclopedia Princetoniensis. [7] Ibid. [8] Ibid. [9] Marietta Konig, "The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict ," OSCE Yearbook 2004 (Hamburg: 2004), 242. [10] Ibid, 238. [11] Doris Vogl, "Missed Windows of Opportunity in the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict – The Political Agenda of the Post-Revolutionary Saakashvili Government (2004-2006)," Failed Prevention: The Case of Georgia (Vienna: 2010), 68 – 71. [12] Vogl, 70. [13] Ibid. [14] Ibid, 72. [15] Wolff. [16] Cory Welt, “Balancing the Balancer: Russia, the U.S., and Conflict Resolution in Georgia,” Global Dialogue 7, no. 3-4 (Summer/Autumn 2005), 24. [17] Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, eds., The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015), 4. [18] Ibid, 7 – 8. [19] "The Blame Game," The Economist, October 03, 2009. [20] Ibid; Cornell, Popjanevski and Nilsson, “Russia’s War in Georgia”, 23 – 24. [21] Luke Hardinng and Jenny Percival, “Russian troops to stay in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” The Guardian, September 09 2008. [22] Wolff, "Georgia”. [23] Andrew Higgins, “In Russia’s ‘Frozen Zone,’ a Creeping Border With Georgia,” The New York Times, October 23 2016. [24] Horowitz, “Cracked Foundations,” 8. [25] Ibid. [26] Ibid, 9. [27] Up In Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009). [28] "World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Ossetians," Minority Rights Group International. [29] UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Intentions Survey On Durable Solutions: Voices Of Internally Displaced Persons In Georgia, June 2015. [30] UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees For the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report Universal Periodic Review: Georgia, January 2015. [31] Vicenews, The Russians Are Coming: Georgia’s Creeping Occupation, VICE News, November 04, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bv00Weif0Sw . [32] “Freedom In The World: South Ossetia," Freedom House, 2016. [33] Georgian Schools to be Abolished in S. Ossetia," Civil.Ge, July 28, 2017. [34] “Freedom In The World: South Ossetia”. [35] Ibid. [36] Horowitz, 6. [37] Andre W. M. Gerrits and Max Bader, "Russian Patronage Over Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Implications for Conflict Resolution," East European Politics 32, no. 3 (July 19, 2016). [38] “Freedom In The World: South Ossetia”. [39] Gerrits and Bader, “Russian Patronage”. [40] Ibid. [41] Paul Rimple, “Economics Not Impacting Russian Support for Georgian Separatists,” Eurasianet.org, February 13, 2015. [42] Mikhail Delyagin, "A Testing Ground for Modernization and a Showcase of Success," Russia in Global Affairs, March 8, 2008. [43] John Erickson, “Russia Will not be Trifled With: Geopolitical Facts and Fantasies,” in Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy, ed. Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), p. 260. [44] David J. Smith, "The Saakashvili Administration’s Reaction to Russian Policies Before the 2008 War," in The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015), 126. [45] Cornell and Starr, The Guns of August 2008, 196. [46] Cory Welt, “Balancing the Balancer: Russia, the U.S., and Conflict Resolution in Georgia,” Global Dialogue 7, no. 3-4 (2005), 12. [47] Gerrits and Bader, “Russian Patronage”. [48] Oksana Antonenko, "Failures of the Conflict Transformation and Root Causes of the August War," Failed Prevention: The Case of Georgia (Vienna: National Defence Academy and Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence, 2010), 83. [49] Welt, “Balancing the Balancer,” 2. References Antonenko, Oksana. "Failures of the Conflict Transformation and Root Causes of the August War." In Failed Prevention: The Case of Georgia, 79-93. Vienna: National Defense Academy and Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defense, 2010. "The Blame Game." The Economist. October 03, 2009. http://www.economist.com/node/14560958 . Cornell, Svante E., and S. Frederick Starr, eds. The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015. Cornell, Svante E., Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson. Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World. Singapore: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, August 2008. Delyagin, Mikhail. "A Testing Ground for Modernization and a Showcase of Success." Russia in Global Affairs. March 8, 2008. Accessed August 19, 2017. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_12538. Erickson, John. “Russia Will not be Trifled With: Geopolitical Facts and Fantasies.” Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy. Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan ed. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999). "Freedom In The World: South Ossetia." Freedom House. 2016. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/south-ossetia. "Georgian Schools to be Abolished in S. Ossetia." Civil.Ge. July 28, 2017. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=30309. Gerrits, Andre W. M. , and Max Bader. "Russian Patronage Over Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Implications for Conflict Resolution." East European Politics 32, no. 3 (July 19, 2016): 297-313. Goble, Paul A. "Russian 'Passportization'." The New York Times. September 09, 2008. Accessed August 17, 2017. https://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/09/russian-passportization/?_r=0. Hardinng, Luke and Jenny Percival. “Russian troops to stay in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” The Guardian. September 09 2008. Hewitt, George. Discordant Neighbours: A Reassessment of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian Conflicts. Leiden: Brill, 2013. Higgins, Andrew. “In Russia’s ‘Frozen Zone,’ a Creeping Border With Georgia.” The New York Times. October 23 2016. Jentzsch, Greg. "What are the main causes of conflict in South Ossetia and how can they best be addressed to promote lasting peace." The BSIS Journal of International Studies (2009). Kleshik, Sonya . "I Am My Language: Language Policy and Attitudes Toward Language in Georgia." Master's thesis, Central European University, 2010. Konig, Marietta . "The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict ." OSCE Yearbook 2004 (Hamburg: 2004). Rimple, Paul. “Economics Not Impacting Russian Support for Georgian Separatists.” Eurasianet.org. February 13, 2015. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Intentions Survey On Durable Solutions: Voices Of Internally Displaced Persons In Georgia. June 2015. http://www.refworld.org/docid/55e575924.html UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees For the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report Universal Periodic Review: Georgia. January 2015. Up In Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009. Vicenews. The Russians Are Coming: Georgia’s Creeping Occupation. VICE News. November 04, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bv00Weif0Sw. Vogl, Doris. "Missed Windows of Opportunity in the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict – The Political Agenda of the Post-Revolutionary Saakashvili Government (2004-2006) ." In Failed Prevention: The Case of Georgia, 59 - 77. Vienna: National Defence Academy and Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence, 2010. Welt, Cory. “Balancing the Balancer: Russia, the U.S., and Conflict Resolution in Georgia.” Global Dialogue 7, no. 3-4 (Summer/Autumn 2005), 22-36. Wolff, Stefan. "Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia." Encyclopedia Princetoniensis. "World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Ossetians." Minority Rights Group International. http://minorityrights.org/minorities/ossetians/.

Author Name < Back The Relationship Between Education and Welfare Dependency Aiden Cliff Abstract Several studies have described the correlation between welfare dependency and factors such as welfare conditionality, gender, and high school or college graduation rates. Using Annual Social and Economics Supplement Data (ASEC) from 2009 through 2019, downloaded from sources such as IPUMS CPS, this paper crafts an OLS regression model to find the relationship that years of completed education have on welfare dependency status. This paper concludes that there is a negative correlation between higher education levels and lower participation in the welfare system, with the completion of one additional year of schooling suggesting a decrease in the probability of needing welfare by 0.1%. While this correlation is small, it is still statistically significant in the linear probability model due to a large sample size (n = 145,431). After adding other explanatory variables, such as measures for race, biological sex, and employment status to control for endogeneity, further regressions confirm that there is still a statistically significant negative relationship between education and welfare dependency. These results suggest that policymakers should focus on educational subsidies over welfare subsidies to increase social mobility. I. Introduction Education is often referred to as an essential mechanism in promoting social mobility (Haveman, 2006). However, the rising costs of education in America have forced many individuals to require more income to pay off student loans. As a result, families who are enrolled in welfare programs are spending a larger portion of their income on student debt, correlated with an increased reliance on such welfare programs and a positive feedback loop that makes it more difficult to climb out of welfare dependency (Johnson, 2019). In addition, most welfare programs have substantial requirements that, rather than helping recipients to get out of poverty, restrain recipients from escaping the welfare system (Rupp et al, 2020). This, and other societal pressures, have forced lots of students to put a pause on their education and work at low-skilled jobs with minimal pay, keeping them reliant on welfare programs (Johnson, 2019). This vicious cycle will only cause more people to remain trapped within welfare programs, preventing them from escaping poverty and improving their livelihoods. Previous studies have shown that education levels are correlated with the probability of a welfare recipient returning to welfare in the future (London, 2008). Other studies have also shown how changes in the welfare system have improved welfare recipients' education qualifications and subsequently their employment opportunities (Hernaes, 2017). London’s (2008) study focused on how attaining a higher educational degree allows welfare recipients to improve their employment opportunities, reduce their welfare dependency, and reduce their overall family poverty levels by 63%. Meanwhile, Hernaes et.al (2017) found that more conditionality in welfare programs helped Norwegian teenagers from welfare-recipient families reduce their reliance on welfare programs; and lower the country’s high school dropout rate by 21%. In addition, Pacheo & Maloney (2003) found that intergenerational welfare participation differs between genders due to family characteristics such as household size and parents’ welfare dependency. As a result, young females tend to have lower educational attainment and are nearly two times as probable of relying on welfare in the future when compared to their male counterparts (Pacheo et al, 2003). Based on the insights offered by the studies above, this paper aims to contribute to this field by investigating the hypothesis that years of schooling completed reducing the probability of receiving welfare in the future. Factors of endogeneity will also be analyzed through the implementation of explanatory variables such as race (Courtney, 1996), sex (Bakas, 2014), number of children (Arulampalam, 2000), marital status (Hoffman, 1997), hours worked (Bick et al, 2018) and employment status (Arranz, 2004) into the regression model. These variables were chosen due to past publications finding possible links between this psychographics and demographics to welfare benefits. Preliminary hypotheses predict that there will be a negative relationship between the education level attained and the probability that an individual will receive future welfare. Using simple and multi-linear OLS regression analysis and the IPUMS-CPS annual data from 2009-2019, it has been observed that individuals with more years of schooling completed are less likely to be on welfare in the future. Data was chosen from this period because the American economy was beginning to recover from the 2008 Financial Crisis during this time. This allows us to observe correlations between education levels attained by individuals and whether they ended up in welfare programs more clearly. This paper will be presented as follows: Section II will cover previous research on how welfare conditionality, gender, and education levels affect welfare dependency. Section III will present information on how this data was obtained and explain the data-cleaning process along with the types of variables used throughout this paper. This section ends with explanations of how the data is verified through the four OLS assumptions. Section IV will cover econometric methodology which includes alternate functional forms explored and additional X-Variables tested through multiple regression along with methodologies we’ve used to control the endogeneity of independent and explanatory variables to ensure the fairness of the regression model. Section V highlights the results, the sample regression line, and statistically significant information regarding the regression analysis. Section VI contains the paper's conclusions where the results are evaluated and put into context within the field. The paper concludes with section VII, the appendix, where all tables, figures, diagrams, and supporting calculations are represented for reference. II. Literature Review The literature works that are presented here serve as important foundations in the field and provide extensive insight into the relationship between welfare dependency and education levels, along with how other variables might affect this relationship. The study conducted by Hernaes et al. (2017) found that the strict welfare conditionality, linking welfare to certain characteristics or traits in Norwegian welfare programs, has reduced welfare dependency while increasing the high school graduation rate among Norwegian welfare recipients. In the process, they used a logarithmic regression model (LRM) and regressed a dependent dummy variable that identifies welfare recipients who are 21 years old onto an independent variable that consists of family characteristics such as parent’s education background and cumulative income, to control for endogeneity. The study resembles this approach because the dependent variable that they’ve used is also a dummy variable that indicates welfare recipients. In addition, the study used other explanatory variables, in particular the recipient’s parental background, to control for the endogeneity of those variables on the probability of returning to welfare. However, Hernaes et al. (2017) emphasizes how family background affects teens’ probability of returning to welfare in the future through explanatory variables that focus on family characteristics. Whereas this study focuses more on how other individual characteristics such as education level, labor condition, and family status of the welfare recipient have affected the welfare recipient’s probability of returning to welfare programs in the future. Notably, a previous study indicated that there is a correlation between welfare recipients who have obtained a higher education degree with reducing their reliance on welfare programs, but only if they receive additional financial aid to support their college expenses. London (2006) uses data such as college attendance, college graduation rate, and personal characteristics, such as extraversion and race demographics, to predict the welfare recipient’s three outcomes: employment, return to aid, and poverty status. By controlling influencing factors that change over time – such as the rate of college enrollment – and making sure all omitted variables, – such as familial culture and personal motivation – are factored into the result, the study employs instrumental variable econometric models to calculate predictions. The study found that “college attendance, more than graduation, is an important predictor of future employment. At the same time, college graduation better predicts the probability of returning to aid or being poor within five years of leaving welfare” (London, 2006, p. 491). Specifically, the study quoted “college graduation rather than enrollment without graduation has an effect on recidivism, and only in the five-year interval” (London, 2006, p. 489). Their findings support this hypothesis that the education level a welfare recipient attains is crucial to the probability of returning to welfare in the future. Despite the similarities in the use of variables to investigate the issue, predicting the probability of return to welfare using college graduation and attendance is only a part of this study’s objectives. The study also conducts an investigation into how college graduation and attendance affect employment opportunities and family poverty levels. Another earlier study showed that genders might have different levels of welfare participation and education attainment. Pacheco & Maloney (2003) learned that females “have an estimated intergenerational correlation coefficient that is more than double that for males.” (Pacheco & Maloney, 2003, p. 371). The study uses simple regression models and inputs such as the number of years in formal education completed by age 21, family background characteristics (parent’s education qualifications and the number of children in the household), and the proportion of years where parents obtain welfare benefits to produce their findings. In addition, Pacheco & Maloney (2003) found that female welfare recipients whose families have a history of welfare dependency tend to remain in welfare programs. The study uses the same regression model to offer insight into how familial and cultural forces affect male and female probabilities of returning to welfare in the future. Nevertheless, Pacheco & Maloney (2003) offered insight into how gender might have altered the relationship between education levels and probability in return to welfare. III. Descriptive Statistics All of the raw data was downloaded directly from the CPS portion of the IPUMS website, which is a reputable federal source for time series and cross-sectional data. Annual Social and Economic Supplement Data (ASEC) from 2009 to 2019 was downloaded. These years were selected to obtain the most up-to-date data while also analyzing enough observations to create the best regression analysis possible. Twenty-one variables were analyzed within these years, the most important of which were EDUC and INCWELFR, the two variables that were altered and then used for the regression analysis. These variables were raw and included nearly 150,000 observations over the 11 years. The data was meticulously cleaned before running any regressions to test the hypothesis. The first variable cleaned was EDUC. The raw EDUC variable could hold any coded value from 1 to 125. These coded values did not reflect the true years of schooling any individual had, so a new variable was created: EDUC_REV, to accurately reflect the true years of schooling each individual has completed. The values for this new variable were generated using the observations for the EDUC variable alongside the specific numeric code utilized by CPS. For example, an individual who has obtained a high school diploma through 12 years of completed education would receive a value of EDUC=73 within the CPS data set. The data was cleaned so this specific value would now be EDUC_REV=12. This cleaning procedure was used for all possible levels of education within the data set. Individuals who were too young to receive any education at all were also removed from the data set (they were identified through EDUC=1 in the original data set). The focus then shifted toward the INCWELFR variable from CPS. This variable measures the dollar value of the income an individual receives from any source of government welfare benefits. In this study, the focus is on the effect that education has on the reception of welfare at all, not the amount of welfare that was received. This means the analysis is valid if an individual receives any form of welfare payments, and not focusing on the actual dollar value of said payments. So, for this reason, another new variable was created: WELFARE. This variable is a dummy variable that gets its values from the information in the INCWLFR variable. If the individual receives no form of welfare they will be assigned INCWLFR=0 in the data set. This same individual would be assigned a value of zero for the newly created variable (WELFARE=0 when INCWLFR=0). However, if an individual receives welfare in any form, regardless of the amount, they will be assigned a value of one for the new variable (WELFARE=1 when INCWLFR>0). Any individual who was not eligible to receive welfare in any form was denoted by INCWELFR=999999. These observations, many of which were individuals under 18, were removed from the data set to generate a less skewed, and more accurate, sample. Additional variables were also analyzed for the multiple regression analysis. These variables tested the effects of not only education, but also employment status, income, hours worked, marital status, gender, and number of children on the reception of welfare. These variables were used to try and control for endogeneity within the model and are further described in Table 1 of the appendix . Before the new variables could be put through a proper regression analysis, the four assumptions of an Ordinary Least Squares Regression Line had to be tested. If all of these assumptions hold true then the estimators of b1 and b2 would be BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimators) and all of the calculations done through STATA would be completely accurate. The first OLS assumption is that the expected error within a sample will be zero. This is noted as E[WELFARE_RES/EDUC_REV]=0 and this does hold true in this sample. The 95% confidence interval for WELFARE_RES does include zero so it is likely that the expected value of the error is zero and therefore the first OLS assumption is met. The second OLS assumption is that the data is homoscedastic. This is noted as Var(WELFARE_RES/EDUC_REV)=Sigma^2. However, since the dependent variable is a dummy variable, this regression takes the form of a linear probability model (LPM). By definition, every linear probability model has heteroscedastic data. Therefore, the second OLS assumption is not met. The third OLS assumption is that the data is free of clustering. This is noted as Cov(WELFARE_RES_i,WELFARE_RES_j)=0, meaning that the value of WELFARE for one value does not directly influence the value of any other observation within the data set. This influence usually occurs when two observations are within the same geographical unit. While there is no way to test if any observations are within the same geographical unit (such as the same household) due to confidentiality, the sample size is large enough and pulls from each region almost equally, so it would be extremely unlikely for any two observations to come from the same household. Therefore, for the sake of the regression, the third OLS assumption will be met. The fourth and final OLS assumption is that Y is normally distributed. This was tested by creating a histogram for WELFARE and seeing if it roughly resembled a bell curve. When this was done, it was obvious that the data was not normal. This is apparent through a multitude of factors but is most clearly shown by the high skewness, a value of over 16. Therefore, it was concluded that welfare was not normally distributed. However, since the sample size consists of 145,431 observations, the central limit theorem (CLT) is met. So, while the fourth OLS assumption failed to be met for this particular regression, it will not have a significant impact on the regression since the sampling distribution for WELFARE will still be normally distributed. In conclusion, the regression met two of the four OLS assumptions. Therefore, while the regression analysis will not be BLUE, it will still be significant since it is free of serious sampling errors. IV. Econometric Methodology While this paper mainly focuses on the linear probability model and the effect that education has on welfare dependency, other functional forms that could better fit the regression analysis were also considered to develop a more thorough analysis. This was done through the experimentation of the functional forms that the independent variable took. While the previous section discussed the linear form of EDUC_REV, exponential and logarithmic forms of this variable were also considered. The independent variable was only altered since the dependent variable is a dummy variable. Altering the value of the variable will not generate any different results since its domain is limited to {0,1}. Other explanatory variables, and the results they produced, are summarized in Table 5 of the appendix. While all of the functional forms tested would have produced statistically significant interpretations that support the hypothesis, although their interpretations would have been different, the original regression was still the most accurate for this particular data set. Other functional forms included EDUC_REV in quadratic, cubic, and log forms. These functional forms are used to emphasize the effects of EDUC_REV in order to match the data points. The original is the most accurate because it has the highest R-Squared value, a measure of how well the data points fit the linear regression line. These R-Squared values can be found in Table 5 but the linear model has the highest value of .0014. Since the linear regression between WELFARE and EDUC_REV has the most accurate regression line relative to the data set, this regression model was the basis from which all conclusions were drawn. Interaction terms were also analyzed by creating the term EDUC_UNEMP which was EDUC_REV multiplied by UNEMPLOYED. By using this interaction term, the possible effect of EDUCATION on WELFARE varying with UNEMPLOYED can be studied. The regression showed that when UNEMPLOYED is 0, the likelihood of WELFARE is constant plus b2. When UNEMPLOYED is 1 then the likelihood of being on WELFARE increases. This means that individuals who are unemployed are more likely to be receiving benefits from welfare. The motive that drives this is individuals who are unemployed do not receive any form of compensation or income outside of their welfare payments. Slope and Intercept dummy variables are additional variables added to this study. In this situation, the intercept dummy variable is UNEMPLOYED. The presence of UNEMPLOYED is represented with a 1 and causes an increase in the intercept, which translates to an increase in the probability of welfare. When describing this relationship on a graph there are two parallel lines and the difference between them is caused by the slope dummy variable. Both lines have the same slope and the probability gap of being on WELFARE remains the same at all levels. This is not the main difference between someone who is unemployed and someone who is employed. This supports the claims made through interaction term analysis in the previous paragraph. However, while the simple regression analysis supports the hypothesis, there could be other confounding variables that underlay such correlation seen between WELFARE and EDUC_REV. If these possible confounding variables are correlated with both WELFARE (controlling for EDUC_REV) and EDUC_REV, then it could make EDUC_REV an endogenous variable, indicating that EDUC_REV does not necessarily cause the decrease in the probability of an individual on welfare. To test this claim, a multiple regression analysis was run, including both EDUC_REV and a variety of other possibly confounding variables, for their possible effects on WELFARE. The results showed that the three variables with the largest effect on WELFARE were BLACK, MALE, and UNEMPLOYED. These are variables created within the data set describing an individual's race, gender, and employment status, respectively. All of these are strong contenders for possible confounding variables and the true reason the regression effect on welfare was observed, and therefore put EDUC_REV at risk of being an endogenous variable (Courtney, 1996; Bakas, 2014; Arranz, 2004). A full list of the additional X-Variables tested along with the multiple regression output can be found in Table 10 . That being said, this is not enough evidence to conclude that education levels are definitely an endogenous variable when describing the probability of receiving welfare. These possible confounding variables could be further analyzed if a more in-depth regression analysis was performed in future studies. V. Results After the data had been completely cleaned and verified for OLS assumptions, the regression of EDUC_REV on WELFARE was run. This regression showed the noncausal effect that years of completed education have on the probability of receiving welfare. If the hypothesis holds true, the Least-Squares Regression Line should have a negative slope, denoting that the more years of education an individual completes, the less likely it is that the individual receives welfare. The output for the regression analysis, as well as the full, scatter plot showing the Least Squares Regression Line for EDUC_REV against WELFARE, can be seen in Table 8 and Table 9 of the appendix. However, these figures can be summarized by the equation for the sample regression: WELFARE_hat = b1 + b2 EDUC_REV t-statistic = -14.27 WELFARE_hat = .015 - .001 EDUC_REV n = 145,431 (SE) (8.08e-4) (5.68e-5) p-value = 0 *** The most important value within the sample regression line for the hypothesis is -.001, or the slope of the regression line denoted as b2. Since b2 is a negative value, there is a negative correlation between the number of years of completed schooling (EDUC_REV) and the reception of welfare (WELFARE). While this value seems too small to have any real effect, it is still statistically significant. This is because the 99% confidence interval for b2 does not include zero because the standard deviation is extremely close to zero based on the large sample size. A hypothesis test at the critical level of .01 was also run to see if the value generated for b2 could be equal to zero. This test gave a critical value for b2 of -14.27 and a probability of B2 being equal to zero of zero. These results lead to the conclusion that it is statistically significant that as EDUC_REV increases, WELFARE decreases within the regression. In conclusion, while increases in education could have a small effect on the probability of relying on welfare, it is still a statistically significant effect. However, this does not prove that increases in education will decrease the probability of relying on welfare since ceteris-paribus does not hold true for this collected data set and a causal relationship is not established. This regression analysis supports the hypothesis that as an individual's education increases, the probability that said individual will rely on welfare as a source of income decreases (since b2 is a statistically significant negative number). By applying these findings, it was determined that as an individual’s years of completed schooling (EDUC_REV) increases by 1 year, the probability that the individual will receive welfare (WELFARE as a dummy variable) decreases by .001 or 0.1%. This is because the slope of the linear regression model, with a dependent dummy variable, is -.001 and the functional form analyzed is a linear probability model. While this relation is not inherently strong, and years of completed schooling do not have a large impact on the probability of receiving welfare, it is still statistically significant. Within the regression, b1 is also statistically significant. The value of b1 in this sample regression line is .015, or an applied .15%. By applying this value to the context of the study, it was found that the probability of an individual receiving welfare given that they have completed zero years of schooling is .15%. This number is positive so it is technically feasible and within the domain of the study. However, it is extremely unlikely that an individual has received zero years of schooling and is also eligible to receive welfare (Stephens, 2014). For this reason, the value of b1 was not a focus within these results. VI. Conclusion As stated above, this study shows a minor, yet the statistically significant, effect of EDUC_REV on WELFARE. These results indicate that there is evidence to support a possible relationship between higher levels of completed education and lower chances of an individual receiving welfare in the future. The thought process behind this regression is that individuals with higher education are more likely to land better jobs and therefore make more money, thus decreasing their need for welfare. While focusing on the simple regression model for the majority of the paper, important results when controlling for endogeneity through a multiple regression model were also found. This multiple regression analysis was performed while controlling for multicollinearity. Since none of these variables share a strong correlation (r > .8) with each other, it is okay to run a regression model with all of these X-Variables. The full correlation results can be seen in Table 11 of the appendix. AIC, BIC/SC, and R_Squared were also analyzed and are summarized in Table 12. Since the multiple regression model has more X-Variables, it has a larger potential to explain any variation in Y and is likely to be a better fit for the data. Even with the introduction of these additional X-Variables, the initial variable tested in the multiple regression analysis, EDUC_REV, was still statistically significant, as seen in Table 10 . Thus, even with controls for endogeneity, there is still a statistically significant negative correlation between the highest level of completed education and the probability of receiving welfare, only strengthening this paper’s claims. In relation to previous studies in part II, this study aligns with London’s (2006) conclusion that welfare recipients who have received a higher education degree have a lower probability of receiving welfare in the future, with the assumption that both genders fit into the conclusion. However, to what extent education attainment is beneficial to both genders and race remains questionable since the data lacked suitable information to investigate how omitted variables might have affected the relationship between the education level attained and the probability of receiving welfare. This paper has also failed to reproduce the findings that Pacheco & Maloney (2003) found. This paper did not control the age and time of welfare received by the recipient, whereas Pacheco & Maloney (2003) did. In addition, Pacheco & Maloney (2003) factors in the background of the welfare recipient’s parents, such as their income received from welfare, educational background, and race. This study, on the other hand, did not factor family characteristics into the regression model. This paper also failed to reproduce the results that Hernaes et. al (2017) produced because the nature of the data is different from Hernaes et. al (2017). First, Hernaes et. al’s (2017) dataset had the location of each welfare recipient’s municipality. The location variable allows Hernaes et. al (2017) to determine whether the welfare recipient was in a municipality that has stricter welfare policies or not. Second, Hernaes et. al (2017) was able to capture each municipality’s level of conditionality through survey responses collected in a report by a research institute. These are some of the features that the data, unfortunately, do not possess. This paper supports the theory that there is a correlation between the highest level of education completed and the probability of receiving welfare. Thus, more educated individuals are less likely to be dependent on welfare. In a broader context, policymakers could use this information to find more effective means for increasing social mobility, rather than investing heavily in welfare payments. Since there is possibly an inverse relationship between education and welfare, the federal government could create a new program to subsidize education rather than simply making payments to disadvantaged citizens. This would provide an economic incentive for individuals who were previously on welfare to attend school, making the entire nation more educated and more productively efficient as a result (Brown et al, 1991). However, while this paper could be used from a policy perspective, there are some drawbacks. The relationship between education and the probability of welfare is not proven to be causal after this analysis. This is because the ceteris-paribus condition does not hold true throughout the data and regression. In addition, this dataset has a limited scope regarding population characteristics. The dataset indicates the highest education level attained by the individual but does not indicate when they achieved that education. For example, some individuals might have dropped out of high school during their youth and returned to complete their high school degree after a long period of time. If that information is also provided in the dataset, that would open new frontiers on how education-level attainment influences the probability of receiving welfare. Before any change is enacted, especially on a governmental level, first proving a causal relationship would be recommended. This paper merely lays the framework for possible studies regarding welfare analysis in the future. This paper did support the hypothesis that as education levels rise, the probability that an individual becomes dependent on welfare decreases. Through the regression analysis, it was determined that there is a small, yet statistically significant, difference that education has on the probability of receiving welfare in the future. This trend could be utilized by policymakers to stimulate education as a means of reducing welfare dependency, creating a population that is not only less dependent on welfare payments, but more educated, and more productive as a result. Note: see "Full Editions," Volume IV Issue I for appendix. VIII. References Arranz, Jose Ma, and Muro, Juan. "Recurrent Unemployment, Welfare Benefits and Heterogeneity." International Review of Applied Economics . 18, no. 4 (2004): 423-41. Arulampalam, W. "Unemployment Persistence." Oxford Economic Papers . 52, no. 1 (2000): 24-50. Bakas, Dimitrios, and Papapetrou, Evangelia. "Unemployment by Gender: Evidence from EU Countries." International Advances in Economic Research. 20, no. 1 (2014): 103-11. Bick, Alexander, Fuchs-Schündeln, Nicola, and Lagakos, David. "How Do Hours Worked Vary with Income? Cross-Country Evidence and Implications." The American Economic Review. 108, no. 1 (2018): 170-99. Brown, Phillip, and Lauder, Hugh. "Education, Economy and Social Change." International Studies in Sociology of Education. 1, no. 1-2 (1991): 3-23. Cliff, Aiden, Rupp, Matthew, Lieng, Owen. “ A Study on the Relationship Between Education and Probability to Receive Welfare Assistance.” Boston University (2020): 204 Courtney, ME. "Race and Child Welfare Services: Past Research and Future Directions." Child Welfare. 75 (1996): 99. Gooden, S. (2000). Race and Welfare. Journal Of Poverty , 4 (3), 21-24. https://doi.org/10.1300/J134v04n03_02 Haveman, Robert, and Timothy Smeeding. "The Role of Higher Education in Social Mobility." The Future of Children 16, no. 2 (2006): 125-50. Accessed April 28, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3844794 . Hernæs, Ø., Markussen, S., & Røed, K. (2017). Can welfare conditionality combat high school dropout. Labour Economics , 48 , 144-156. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2017 . 08.003 Hoffman, Saul. "Marital Instability and the Economic Status of Women." Demography 14, no. 1 (1977): 67-76. Johnson, D. (2019). What Will It Take to Solve the Student Loan Crisis. Harvard Business Review. Retrieved 29 April 2020, from https://hbr.org/2019/09/what-will-it-take-to-solve-the-student-loan-crisis . Kim, Hwanjoon. "Anti‐Poverty Effectiveness of Taxes and Income Transfers in Welfare States." International Social Security Review. 53, no. 4 (2000): 105-29. London, R. (2005). Welfare Recipients' College Attendance and Consequences for Time-Limited Aid. Social Science Quarterly , 86 , 1104-1122. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0038-4941.2005.00338 . London, R. (2006). The Role of Postsecondary Education in Welfare Recipients' Paths to Self-Sufficiency. The Journal Of Higher Education , 77 (3), 472-496. Retrieved 28 April 2020, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3838698 Pacheco, G., & Maloney, T. (2003). Are the Determinants of Intergenerational Welfare Dependency Gender-specific. Australian Journal Of Labour Economics , 6 (3), 371-382. Retrieved 28 April 2020, from https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/46557521_Are_the_Determinants_of_Intergeneration al_Welfare_Dependency_Gender-specific Stephens, Melvin, and Yang, Dou-Yan. "Compulsory Education and the Benefits of Schooling." The American Economic Review. 104, no. 6 (2014): 1777-792.

Mission Statement Julian D. Jacobs '19 Daniel Shemano '19 Advisory Board Frequently Asked Questions CENTER FOR PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS Join jppe! The Brown University Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (JPPE) is a peer reviewed academic journal for undergraduate and graduate students that is sponsored by the Center for Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at Brown University. The JPPE aims to promote intellectual rigor, free thinking, original scholarship, interdisciplinary understanding, and global leadership. By publishing student works of philosophy, politics, and economics, the JPPE attempts to unite academic fields that are too often partitioned into a single academic discourse. In doing so, the JPPE aims to produce a scholarly product greater than the sum of any of its individual parts. By adopting this model, the JPPE attempts to provide new answers to today’s most pressing questions. Five Pillars of the JPPE 1.) Interdisciplinary Intellectualism: The JPPE is committed to engaging with an interdisciplinary approach to academics. By publishing scholarly work within the disciplines of philosophy, politics, and economics, we believe we are producing work that transcends the barriers of any given one field, producing a sum greater than its individual parts. 2.) Diversity: The JPPE emphasizes the importance of diversity in the articles we publish, authors we work with, and questions we consider. The JPPE is committed to equal opportunities and creating an inclusive environment for all our employees. We welcome submissions and job applicants regardless of ethnic origin, gender, religious beliefs, disability, sexual orientation, or age. 3.) Academic Rigor: In order to ensure that the JPPE is producing quality student scholarship, we are committed to a peer review process, whereby globally renowned scholars review all essays prior to publication. We expect our submissions to be well written, well argued, well researched, and innovative. 4.) Free Thinking and Original Arguments: The JPPE values free thinking and the contribution of original ideas. We seek excellent arguments and unique methods of problem solving when looking to publish an essay. This is one way in which JPPE is hoping to contribute to the important debates of our time. 5.) Global Leadership: By publishing work in philosophy, politics, and economics, we hope the JPPE will serve as a useful tool for future world leaders who would like to consider pressing questions in new ways, using three powerful lenses.

*Feature* JPPE INTERVIEWS, STEVEN PINKER: Free Speech, Protests, the “Alt-Right”, and Jordan Peterson Steven Pinker is an experimental psychologist who conducts research in visual cognition, psycholinguistics, and social relations. He grew up in Montreal and earned his BA from McGill and his PhD from Harvard. Currently Johnstone Professor of Psychology at Harvard, he has also taught at Stanford and MIT. He has won numerous prizes for his research, his teaching, and his nine books, including The Language Instinct, How the Mind Works, The Blank Slate, The Better Angels of Our Nature, and The Sense of Style. Fall 2019 JPPE : There’s considerable debate over the distinction between free speech and hate speech. How do we know when one meets the other? Is there a responsibility of college campuses or their students to help provide definitions or guidelines for these ideas and which views we believe are of academic merit? Pinker : There are limits on free speech that are recognized in all societies—even in the most libertarian societies when it comes to free speech—such as the incitement of imminent lawless activity, libel, extortion, and some cases of obscenity. There can be restrictions on the place, time, and manner in which speech is expressed. This is all contained in free speech jurisprudence. Nevertheless, those limits are pretty expansive in the United States, and I think laudably the “default” is the notion that speech is free except for very circumscribed exceptions. And that pertains to government strictures on free speech, which is not the same as the discretion that any outlet or platform has regarding who they give a voice to. And of course, a university is not going to invite any drunk on a soapbox in a public park or any ranter on Facebook. There are certain standards of scholarly accuracy and attention to academic literature. So I think the issue doesn’t arise in terms of whether a university ought to invite some provocateur who is just not part of the community of scholarly discourse and intellectual argumentation; but rather it arises when there are scholars who clearly do meet that standard but whose opinions just happen to be controversial, yet they can back up what they say with generally accepted academic standards. Of course, protests too are a legitimate form of free speech, so there can’t be any objections to protests. Although, there is jurisprudence; there are guidelines among defenders of free speech that you may protest but that you may not shut someone down. That is, there is no heckler’s veto, even though there can be of course protests that don’t disrupt the ability of heterodox views to be expressed. JPPE : From what you have observed, do you believe that students are keener to protest speakers than when you were an undergraduate? Pinker : I think there is a narrowing. It’s been going on for some time. It was certainly true when I was an undergraduate and that was a long time ago. And so despite some commentary, which blames it on the millennial generation or on generation z, there was plenty of this in my day. There is the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), which monitors disinvitations and speech codes, and it found that things have gotten a little bit better in 2018 compared to previous years. They’ve only been monitoring it for, I think, 10 or 15 years. Things definitely got worse until last year, but there have been ups and downs. FIRE also monitors de-platforming, which is a disruptive attempt to prevent speakers from speaking once they’re there; they monitor speech codes. My sense is it’s gotten worse, although it definitely existed when I was a student. JPPE : Did you participate in these kinds of protests? Pinker : No (laughs). JPPE : It seems somewhat arbitrary to determine who is of “scholarly merit”. Pinker : It’s kind of what academics do all the time. We referee one another’s grant proposals, manuscripts, and tenure cases. There are disputes. There are unclear cases. But there is definitely a difference between a Richard Spencer on the one hand and a Charles Murray or a Heather Mac Donald or Jordan Peterson on the other. JPPE : That last name—Jordan Peterson—is someone speaking to a large and predominantly male audience. How do you explain the Jordan Peterson phenomenon? Pinker : I agree it’s a puzzle who he is speaking to. I think he symbolizes for young men two things: one of them is an intellectual engagement that transgresses some of the very narrow boundaries in elite universities and in media like the New York Times. While he’s not alt-right or all of the things that people lazily accuse him of, he is not New York Times or Brown University. He is clearly an erudite and intelligent person. He was a professor first at Harvard, then at the University of Toronto. He is an extremely knowledgeable political psychologist and expert on psychological personality testing. He stretches the boundaries of what you can say, however, not into the territory of white supremacists or neo-nazis and other kooks and crackpots and nutcases. The other thing is that the demographic of young men he speaks to often feel so marginalized by, on the one hand, leftist feminist discourse in universities and, on the other hand, the kind of nihilistic immature culture in advertising, extreme sports, and popular culture, which seems to glorify immaturity, hedonism, and decadence. And I think they realize that someone just saying pretty banal things like “be mature, be responsible for what you say, and clean up after yourself”; that strikes them—caught between these two worlds—as something noble and revelatory. And it can’t be a bad thing that you have a charismatic guy telling young men to be responsible, not to hurt people, and to make their bed. It’s astonishing that it has to be said. But apparently it does. JPPE : You said that there were highly literate and highly intelligent people that gravitate to the alt-right. What do you make of the blow-back you received from that statement? Pinker : The New York Times reported it under an op-ed titled "How Social Media Makes Us Stupid". That was Jesse Singal who wrote that op-ed. For one thing, many people misinterpreted that because their impression of the alt-right is tiki-torch-holding-neo-nazis, whereas the people that call themselves alt-right are not that. I think their views are often quite noxious, and I’ve argued against them. But I know, since some of them are former students that write back to me—I mean Harvard graduates—, that it is a mistake to write them off as tiki-torch-holding-skinheads and neo-nazis. Some of them are smart; they are intelligent, and they feel that there are so many topics that are forbidden in standard university settings. And they feel that mainstream scholars can’t handle the truth and that they feel privy to a kind of forbidden truth, which I argued is dangerous because it means that rather extreme views proliferate in this community without themselves being criticized by opposing views or data that bear on those views. And they can actually blossom in a kind of noxious form if they’re not expressed in an arena in which they can be criticized.

The European Union Trust Fund for Africa: Understanding the EU’s Securitization of Development Aid and its Implications Migena Satyal Author Jason Fu Sophie Rukin Editors Abstract Migration policies in the European Union (EU) have long been securitized; however, the 2015 migration crisis represented a turning point for EU securitization of development aid to shape migration outcomes from various African countries. In 2015, the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (EUTF) was created at the Valletta Summit on Migration to address the drivers of irregular migration such as poverty, poor social and economic conditions, weak governance and conflict prevention, and inadequate resiliency to food and environmental pressures. The duration of this fund was from 2016-2021. Central to the strategy of the EUTF was addressing “root causes” however, the fund came with security dimensions. Under its objective of improved migration management, the EU directed capital to various security apparatuses in Africa to limit the movement of irregular migrants and prevent them from reaching Europe. This method diverted aid from addressing the existing problems faced by vulnerable populations in the region and contributed to practices and organizations that are responsible for implementing coercive measures to limit movement of migrants and committing human rights abuses. This paper examines the political and ideological motives and objectives behind the EU's securitization of development financing via the EUTF, how it has strategically used the “root causes'' narrative to secure these arrangements, and the ways in which this pattern of interaction is inherently neo-colonial. Introduction: The European Union Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa) was passed in November 2015 at the Valletta Summit on Migration where European and African heads of state met to address the challenges and opportunities presented through the 2015 migration crisis. African and European heads of state recognized that migration was a shared responsibility between the countries of origin, transit, and destination. They were joined by the African Union Commission, the Economic Community of West African States, states parties to the Khartoum and Rabat Process, the Secretary General of the United Nations, and representatives of the International Organization for Migration. The Valletta Summit identified the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement which became the guiding narrative to create and implement the EUTF. The Action Plan of the Summit stated, “the Trust Fund will help address the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement, and irregular migration by promoting economic and equal opportunities, strengthening the resilience of vulnerable people, security, and development.” Therefore, addressing these issues via development aid would limit irregular migration. The European Commission claimed that “demographic pressure, environmental stress, extreme poverty, internal tensions, institutional weaknesses, weak social and economic infrastructures, and insufficient resilience to food crises, as well as internal armed conflicts, terrorist threats, and a deteriorated security environment” needed to be addressed within the EUTF framework. However, the root cause narrative itself was partially based on assumption rather than empirical evidence. Economic data analyzing the correlation between economic development aid and migration show that the two variables have an inverse relationship. Economic and human development increase peoples’ ambitions, competencies, and resources, encouraging them to emigrate. Migration has a downward trend only when a country reaches an upper-middle income level. This concept is also known as a migration hump. Although EU officials were aware of this phenomenon, they ignored the underlying issues of the root causes narrative and proceeded to create the fund. Between 2016 and 2022 the EUTF dispersed approximately EUR 5.0 billion across 26 African countries in the Sahel and Lake Chad, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. This funding was on top of pre-existing EUR 20 billion annual aid from the EU to these geographical regions. Despite packaging the EUTF as development aid and extracting the money almost exclusively from the European Development Fund (EDF), which specifically targets economic, social, and cultural development programs, the EUTF fell within the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, introducing a security dimension to development financing. The EU and African partner countries used a significant amount of aid from the EUTF to bolster migration management initiatives via the funding and strengthening of security apparatuses that are responsible for targeting migrants within Africa, before they could embark on their journeys to European states. Under the EUTF, improved migration management constitutes “contributing to the development of national and regional strategies on migration management, containing and preventing irregular migration, and fight against trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants and other related crimes, effective return and readmission, international protection and asylum, legal migration, and mobility.” It includes increasing logistical capabilities by providing capital to train border agents, and bolstering surveillance infrastructure to monitor citizens’ movement, and expanding logistical capacities. In some cases, it also relies on encouraging certain policies in recipient countries to align with the priorities of the donor countries. As shown in EUTF annual reports (Figures 1.1-1.6), there was an increasing diversion of capital towards funding migration management projects in Africa, which came at the expense of economic development projects. By using aid to fund security goals, the EU securitized and politicized development financing. Securitization in migration policy refers to the externalization and extra-territorialization of migration control through border controls and reclassification of various activities like drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and delinquency of migrants as national security concerns. Still, some EUTF funding went towards projects geared at economic development. As stated in the Action Plan and shown in subsequent annual reports, the EUTF implemented programs that promoted job creation, education, entrepreneurship, and building resiliency. However, they also used the money from the development package to strengthen migration management initiatives and shift responsibilities to third countries in Africa, ultimately creating “legal black holes” where European norms about human rights did not apply. Despite the clear evidence of the EU’s contribution to abuses towards African irregular migrants, the EU continues to implement repressive policies through various externalization mechanisms and faulty narratives that have been empirically proven to not work – such as the root causes narrative – in order to further its own interests in the African continent. Research Question The practice of funneling capital toward security-related migration management projects raises the following question: Why has the EU opted to securitize its development aid through EUTF in the aftermath of the 2015 migration crisis? Furthermore, what are the implications of aid securitization in terms of development aid effectiveness, human rights practices, and the EU’s external legitimacy as a normative actor? To answer these overarching questions and understand the promotion and proliferation of migration policies through pacts like the EUTF requires an inward look into the European Union and its political and ideological interests in the migration policy domain. Therefore, I propose that the EUTF was a neo-colonial mechanism through which European member states could further their migration policy priorities into certain African states thereby reinforcing their colonial legacy hierarchies. Methodology First, I will provide background information about the EUTF, highlighting its objectives and strategies for development aid implementation and effectiveness. Then, I will provide quantitative data regarding the dispersion of money from the EUTF to show the increasing investments toward migration management schemes. Understanding these specificities and inherent challenges of the EUTF will contextualize my hypotheses. Next, I will support my hypothesis through case studies of specific EUTF security operations in African countries, analysis of the EU’s previous migration policies, interviews with African and European Union stakeholders about EUTF’s development and impact, and various theories to help explain how the EU navigates its migration policies. Finally, I will assess the implications of aid securitization in both Europe and Africa. My research will rely on official documents from the EU about its migration agenda and policies. It will also use data from academic journals and previous literature that have examined the trajectory of the EU’s migration-development nexus, specifically through the EUTF. Assessing the current nature of the EU’s migration policies will be useful in helping guide future policies. As migration becomes an increasingly salient issue, it is crucial to determine strategies or “best practices” that are humane and sustainable to address it. Adhering to human rights norms should be at the center of these policies. Background The Action Plan of the Valletta Summit was based on five priority domains: Reducing poverty, advancing socio-economic development, promoting peace and good governance. Facilitating educational and skills training exchanges between EU and EU member states as well as the creation of legal pathways of employment for migrants and returnees. Providing humanitarian assistance to countries needing food assistance, shelter, water, and sanitation. Fighting against irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and trafficking. Facilitating the return, readmission, and reintegration of migrants. During Valletta, Martin Schulz, the former President of the European Parliament stated, “By boosting local economies through trade, for example through economic partnership agreements and through ‘aid for trade’ programs, by investing in development and by enhancing good governance people will be enabled to stay where they want to be ‘at home.’” He reiterates that the purpose of the EUTF is not “fight the migrants” but rather, “fight the root causes of migration: poverty and conflict.” This seemingly proactive approach underscores the belief that addressing the primary drivers of migration by promoting development measures will empower people to remain in their respective countries by choice rather than feeling compelled to migrate elsewhere. “Root Causes”: Overlooking Evidence The problem with the EU’s understanding and use of the “root causes” narrative is that it ignores how wage differentials contribute to migratory patterns. Wage differentials refers to the discrepancy in wages for similar jobs due to factors like industry or geography. While development aid can be effective, it is not enough to redistribute wealth and address the deep structural inequalities of the global economy that drive migration to more developed and wealthier countries. Subsequent sections will elaborate further on the adoption of the root causes framing. EUTF Annual Aid Reports (2016-2022) As stated in the Valletta Summit political declaration, the EU was committed to “address the root causes of irregular migration” through the EUTF. However, aid allocation data (Figures 1-1.6) from EUTF annual reports, which highlight the distribution of aid in amount and percentage terms by geographical window and five of the EUTF’s objectives, show an increased prioritization of implementing migration management schemes at the expense of development projects between 2016 and 2022. In 2016 (Figure 1), when EUTF was in the implementation phase, EU officials distributed significantly more funds for economic development projects across North Africa, the Sahel, and Horn of Africa than any other domains which aligned with the root causes narrative that was emphasized at Valletta. In 2017 (Figure 1.1), the allocation for improved migration management significantly increased across the three regions. In North Africa, funding for economic development, strengthening resilience, and conflict prevention was eliminated while EUR 285 million was given to migration management. This pattern is strategic due to the geographic proximity of the region to southern European borders. In 2018 (Figure 1.2), North Africa remained the biggest recipient of migration management funds but did not receive funding for development projects. In 2019 (Figure 1.3), 31.56 percent of total funding was invested in migration management. In 2020 (Figure 1.4), 2021 (Figure 1.5), and 2022 (Figure 1.6), improved migration management projects continued to receive most funding at the expense of other objectives. The funding patterns outlined in these reports show the EU’s increased focus towards its migration objectives. Figure 1: EUTF Projects Approved in 2016 Figure 1.1: EUTF Projects Approved in 2017 Figure 1.2: Projects Approved in 2018 Figure 1.3: Projects Approved in 2019 Figure 1.4: Projects approved in 2020 Figure 1.5: Projects approved in 2021 Figure 1.6: Projects approved in 2022 Taking the background information and data into account, I will prove my hypothesis, explaining why the EU increasingly invested in migration management projects in the following sections. Defining Neo-Colonialism The concept of ‘neo-colonialism; was coined by Kwame Nkrumah’s Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, in which he argues that neo-colonialism is a contemporary form of colonialism that is perpetuated through less traditionally coerciece methods, such as development aid. This theory can be applied when assassing relations and interdependency between former colonial states with formerly colonized states. Interdependence is manufactured by former colonial powers that “[give] independence” to their subjects, only for them to follow up by allocating aid.” They speak about guaranteeing independence and liberation but never implement policies to preserve them in an effort to maintain their influence and objectives via unobstrusive and monetary means rather than directly coercive ones. As a result, these countries’ economic system, and thus their political policy, is “directed from outside” through foreign capital.” EUTF as a Neo-Colonial Instrument In the 19th and 20th centuries, European powers reshaped all aspects of African society, through colonialism, for their own strategic imperatives. These included, but were not limited to, extraction of material resources, manufactured dependency, and assertion of European institutions and policies at the expense of indigenous cultures and institutions. The complete overhaul of pre-colonial Africa interrupted economic and political development in the region and led to its continued structural subordination despite achieving independence from European colonial states in the 21st century. As a result, the repercussions of colonialism have contemporary implications in EU-Africa relations. During the colonial era, colonial powers used military power and additional forms of coercive strategies to assert foreign influence; currently, former colonial powers capitalize on the weaknesses of African countries and use political and economic measures to gain influence. Colonialism never disappeared, but rather, evolved into neo-colonialism. This concept is demonstrated in the framework of the EUTF which, despite being a development aid package and product of a seemingly coordinated multilateral process, imposed conditionalities and security measures on African states to achieve political goals in the field of migration. Under the EUTF, patterns of cooperation between European countries and their former colonies to limit migration are also prevalent, especially in the case of Libya and Niger. These initiatives safeguard colonial-era power structures and undermine the sovereignty of the respective African states. The EU took advantage of its status as a donor institution through three mechanisms that enforced hierarchies between African and European powers: The governance structure,designed to dismiss African stakeholder engagement EU’s imposition of positive and negative conditionalities to certain African states The strategic partnerships between European and African states to implement migration management programs These steps demonstrate the EU’s broader goals to assert their influence in the region’s migration policies by implementing security schemes, jeopardizing the needs of African states and the preservation of human rights in the process. The use of EUTF to conduct such projects signals the “de facto policy purchase” on the African government’s stance on migration. Consequently, African states become an “instrument” for European neo-colonial policies, especially in the migration domain. Eurafrica to Modern EU-Africa Relations The legacy and discourse of colonialism and neo-colonialism are not equal among EU member states. Many European countries were colonial powers, with the exception of Ireland and Malta, along with several central European countries that were subjugated to the authority of larger imperial powers. However, specific past actions hold little significance when discussing the broader nexus between European integration, the European Union, and colonialism. In Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism , Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson argue that there was a vast overlap between the colonial and European projects. Several African countries, under colonialism, have historically played a key role in efforts towards European integration and unity from the 1920s to the 1950s under the geo-political concept of Eurafrica. According to this idea, European integration would only occur through “coordinated exploitation of Africa and Africa could be efficiently exploited only if European states cooperated and combined their economic and political capacities.” The pan-European movement in the interwar period was based on conditions for peace through a “united colonial effort” in Africa. Eurafrica turned into a political reality with the emergence of the European Economic Community (EEC) made up of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany, along with colonial possessions that were referred to as “overseas countries and territories” (OCTs). For the EEC, Africa served as a “necessity,” “a strategic interest,” “an economic imperative,” “a peace project,” “a white man’s burden,” and “Europe’s last chance.” Put differently, “Africa was indispensable for Europe’s geopolitical and economic survival.” Africa became the guiding force of European integration and Eurafrica became a system through which colonial powers could preserve their empires. Eurafrica, in its original form, did not materialize because African countries took back control from European colonial powers, but its legacy is crucial to the development of the EEC and modern EU-Africa relations. Today, the EU describes its relationship with Africa in terms like “interdependence,” and “partnership of equals.” Nonetheless, the EU’s colonial past still plays a significant role in its foreign policy with Africa as it promotes the adoption of European rules and practices in its “normative empires.” The continuation of these empires has cemented core-periphery dynamics of interaction, which ultimately advances European interests, especially in the migration domain. Specifically, the EU’s externalization of border and migration management efforts to transfer the European model of governance to third countries have transformed them into “southern buffer zones” to curtail unwanted migration and enhance Europe’s sense of security. Such measures demonstrate the separation of physical borders from functional regimes in Europe’s fluid borderlands, which are antecedent to imperial practices when control was extended beyond territorial boundaries. These practices are evident in the EU’s security operations through pacts like the EUTF, EU-Turkey Deal, and Operation SOPHIA. These externalization policies ensure the continuity of the vision derived from the Eurafrica project in the 21st century. Conditional aid The EUTF was conditional as it leveraged development aid to finance security-related migration projects and imposed positive and negative conditionalities that were used as leverage for African cooperation. When the European Commission announced its Migration Partnership Framework in 2016, it stated that development and trade policies will use positive and negative conditionalities to encourage cooperation on EU’s migration management projects. The “more for more, less for less” framework embedded into development financing means that “African governments use migration cooperation as a bargaining chip for procuring finance through renting inherent powers of state sovereignty to control entry and exit.” This coercive and concessional method contradicts the nature of cooperation that was emphasized at the Valletta Summit in 2015 and undermines the autonomy of the African states as these conditionalities perpetuate neo-colonial practices. EUTF Governance Structure and Oversight The EUTF was a product of a multilateral decision-making process. However, its governance structure, which limits proper stakeholder engagement from African representatives, signals the EU’s push to prioritize its policies over development in Africa. The European Commission claims that it is taking a bottom-up approach where the EU delegations play a key role in identifying and formulating the EUTF through consultations and dialogues to build partnerships with local stakeholders (civil society organizations, national and local authorities, and representatives). Subsequently, proposals are created by the EUTF for African teams based on EU Commission Headquarters and EU delegations. Then, the proposal is submitted to the Operational Committee for approval. Once approved, the proposals are implemented via EU member states’ authorities, developmental and technical cooperation agencies, civil society organizations, international or UN organizations, and private sector entities. The governance of the EUTF is dependent upon the Strategic Board and Operational Committees for each of the three regions where the EUTF distributed funds. The Strategic Board is responsible for “adopting the strategy of the EUTF, adjusting the geographical and thematic scope of the EUTF in reaction to evolving issues, and deciding upon amendments to the guiding document establishing the internal rules for the EUTF.” The board is chaired by the European Commission and composed of representatives and contributing donors. The Operational Committee is responsible for “reviewing and approving actions to be financed, supervising the implementation of the actions, and approving the annual report and accounts for transmission to the Strategic Board.” In the Board and the Committee, the African partner countries can only act as observers and do not hold decision-making powers. This management framework is ineffective as it is designed to limit the participation of African parties that have more comprehensive knowledge regarding the needs of the continent and areas where funds need to be directed. However, they are structurally silenced. The classification of the EUTF as development aid from the EU to Africa also provided a loophole under which parliamentary oversight was not required. The European Development Fund, which operates outside the EU budget, funded most of the aid, bypassing conventional parliamentary procedures, allowing for swift implementation of the fund. As a spokesperson for the European Commission’s DG DEVCO claimed that simplifying the procedures allows for more flexibility so projects can be implemented earlier. Proponents of the fund believe that the easy implementation process is what makes it advantageous. However, opponents of the fund like Elly Schelien, a member of the European Parliament’s Development Committee, claimed that the EU Parliament has not been given “the right democratic scrutiny” of the fund. The framing of the fund as an “emergency instrument” led to retracted bureaucratic measures to increase effectiveness as project cycles were much shorter than traditional development programming. The consolidation of power to the EU institutions and representatives meant that EUTF projects were “identified at the country level under the leadership of the EU Delegations, discussed and selected by an Operational Committee.” Engagement from African stakeholders and civil society was not required. An interview with a representative from the Operational Committee revealed that EUTF “projects were simply approved without discussion. Negotiations took place upstream between EUTF managers, European agencies, EU delegations, and partner countries.” This form of decision-making amplifies hierarchical structures between European and African representatives. Strategic Partnerships Certain EU member states partnered with African states to implement migration management programs in which they exercised authority over the movement of migrants within Africa, especially in the origin and transit countries. Not only do these policies directly conflict with the EU’s stated commitments regarding development aid and cooperation with partner countries, but the EU’s agenda is antecedent to European empires leveraging local African officials to undertake security operations in the continent. Today, this exploitative relationship is parallel to the EU’s allocation of capital, military equipment, and capacity-building instruments to African representatives who adhere to the needs of EU leaders. This pattern is visible in various projects and funding executed under the EUTF. Though reluctant to enter into such agreements with Europe, African policymakers are forced into a “perpetual balancing act, juggling domestically-derived interests with the demands of external donor and opportunity structures.” This concession stems from inherent power asymmetry between relatively weak and powerful states, upholding colonial legacy hierarchies. Case Studies on Libya and Ethiopia In the following section, I use Libya and Ethiopia as case studies to provide evidence that EUTF’s prioritization of funding migration management projects, increasing policing and surveillance in these countries, and imposing positive and negative conditionalities are reflective of neo-colonial practices to assert dominance over the movement of African irregular migrants. I chose these countries to study because each one falls within one of the two geographical windows and serves either as a popular departure or transit country where the European Union is heavily involved in migration management projects. Libya Libya is a major departure country for migrants from West African countries of origin such as Nigeria, Guinea, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Mali, and Senegal. Italy demonstrated strategic interest in Libya due to its geographical proximity and colonial legacy. Between 2017 and 2022, the Italian Ministry of Interior (MI) led implementations of various migration management projects that sought to curb the arrival of migrants into Italy. In 2017, MI led the first phase of its project called “Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya” with a budget of EUR 42.2 million and a EUR 2.23 million co-financing from Italy. The principal objective of this phase was migration management. Focus areas included strengthening border control, increasing surveillance activities, combatting human smuggling and trafficking, and conducting search and rescue operations. The second phase of this project was launched by MI in 2018 until 2024 for EUR 15 million. This phase was focused on capacity-building activities and institutional strengthening of authorities such as the Libyan Coast Guard and the General Administration of Coastal Security. It also advanced the land border capabilities of relevant authorities and enhanced search and rescue (SAR) capabilities by supplying SAR vessels and corresponding maintenance programs. The beneficiaries of this project included 5,000 relevant authorities from the Libyan Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Ministry of Communications. The indirect beneficiaries include “future migrants rescued at the sea due to the procession of life-saving equipment to Libyan Coast Guard and General Administration for Coastal Security for them to be able to save lives.” Italy’s actions under the EUTF compromise the proper use of development financing tools by diverting them for the use of security-related projects. Its engagement and strengthening of Libyan security apparatuses such as the Libyan Coast Guard also undermine the values of human rights that EU member states claim to promote in their foreign policies as the Libyan Coast Guard is notorious for violating non-refoulment principles and committing human rights violations such as extortion, arbitrary detention, and sexual violence against migrants and asylum seekers. Recognizing brutal actions by the border authorities and the deplorable living conditions in detention centers in Libya, the Assize Court in Milan condemned the torture and violence inflicted in these centers. In November 2017, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights released a statement criticizing the EU’s support for the Libyan Coast Guard as “inhumane” as it led to the detention of migrants in “horrific” conditions in Libya. Despite institutional disapproval of the EU’s and Italy’s involvement in Libya, funding for these security projects continued. Ethiopia While Ehtiopia was never formally colonized, it remained under Italian occupation from 1935-1941 and subsequently fell under (in)formal British control from 1941-1944. The EUTF initiatives in Ethiopia do not show the same patterns of cooperation as seen in Libya and Niger, since Ethiopia served as a key interest to the EU due to its status as one of the main countries of origin, transit, and destination for migrants and refugees. EUTF report from 2016 highlighted that Ethiopia hosts over one million displaced people. It is also the biggest recipient of EUTF funding in the Horn of Africa. Its geographical proximity to countries like Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan has vastly affected its migration demographics, making it a focus area for the EU’s development aid under the EUTF. While there pre-existing migration management schemes in Ethiopia, they were concerned with the returns and reintegration of irregular Ethiopian migrants and refugees rather than building up the capacity of various security actors as seen in other regions. This objective was linked with positive conditionalities as the Third Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration links progress in the returns and readmissions field with more financial support for refugees that reside within Ethiopia. Additional projects in Ethiopia were geared towards economic development and focused on addressing the root causes as outlined in Valletta. Some of these initiatives included job creation, providing energy access, healthcare, and education to vulnerable populations which are in line with development cooperation. However, the European Union’s increasing focus on returns and readmission of Ethiopian migrants can decrease revenue derived from remittances which contribute three times more to the Ethiopian economy than development financing. This approach ensures the fulfillment of the EU’s migration interests while undermining Ethiopia’s economic needs. Ethiopian officials also expressed disappointment with the EUTF measures because they were guided by the EU’s focus on repatriation, thereby eroding migration cooperation with Ethiopia. In regards to EU interests in Ethiopia, an EU official claimed: “We can pretend that we have joint interest in migration management with Africa, but we don't. The EU is interested in return and readmission. Africa is interested in root causes, free movement, legal routes, and remittances. We don't mention that our interests are not aligned.” This non-alignment in interests is irrelevant to the EU because it is the more dominant actor and has the power to assert its priorities by using money as leverage. However, this pattern of interaction comes at the cost of losing cooperation with Ethiopian stakeholders and diverging finances from refugee and migrant populations in Ethiopia who need humanitarian assistance. Perspectives from Africa African representatives and ambassadors displayed suspicion about the fund’s motives and called on the EU to fund projects that increase economic opportunities in their respective countries. As Nigerien mayor of Tchirozerine Issouf Ag Maha stated, “as local municipalities, we don’t have any power to express our needs. The EU and project implementers came here with their priorities. It’s a ‘take it or leave it’ approach, and in the end, we have to take it because our communities need support.” Maha’s statement highlights the role the EU plays in shaping the direction of development money and how its priorities overshadow decisions and input from local officials, who are significantly more knowledgeable about the needs of their communities. Despite diverging interests and priorities, African officials concede to their demands because their communities require financial resources to alleviate hardships. President Akufo-Addo from Ghana claimed that “ instead of investing money in preventing African migrants from coming to Europe, the EU should be spending more to create jobs across the continent.” Similarly, Senegalese President Mackey Sall and former Chairperson of the African Union warned that the trust fund to tackle the causes of migration is not sufficient to meet the needs of the continent stating, stated that “if we want young Africans to stay in Africa, we need to provide Africa with more resources.” The allocation of aid to security-related projects comes at the expense of funding genuine development projects that align with the needs of African communities. It also takes advantage of the ‘cash-starved’ governments.” These statements underscore the necessity of the EUTF to direct capital towards structural and sustainable economic development as opposed to combatting, detaining, or returning migrants. However, the EU has not been responsive to these inputs from its African stakeholders despite stressing the importance of cooperation and partnership during the Valletta Summit. Reinforcing Power Imbalances The imposition of European policies and priorities through the EUTF takes advantage of African nations' relatively weaker economic standing and agency, showing that the political and security needs of powerful states and institutions determine where and how development aid is designated. It also shows the continued influence and intervention of European interests into their ostensibly independent former colonial holdings, therefore reiterating Nkrumah’s theory that foreign capital, such as development aid, can be used for the exploitation of developing countries by their former colonial powers. This hypocrisy goes against the EU’s normative approaches to its foreign policy while also continuing to reinforce power imbalances and colonial-era hierarchies between Europe and Africa. Discussion Critically examining the European Union Trust Fund in the broader context of EU-Africa relations demonstrates how EUTF represents a complex intersection of historical legacies, political interests and expediency, and political ideologies that determine attitudes towards migrants and refugees and thus, shape policy outcomes. These factors reinforce each other by showing the multifaceted nature of migration governance. The neo-colonialism lens in my hypothesis provides historical context to show how enduring colonial legacies continue to guide policies today. This lens also forms the basis for discourse about EU-Africa relations because of the visible power imbalances that are sustained through policies like the EUTF which are structurally designed to achieve European political interests at the expense of the needs of African states. As seen through the case studies on Libya, Niger, and Ethiopia, development aid is not always allocated for the benefit of the recipient. Rather, aid can be abused as a political tool to reach the objectives of the donor institutions. Despite the rhetoric of cooperation between stakeholders, preservation of human lives, equal partnership, and addressing root causes, as stated in Valletta, the strategic policy design of the EUTF highlights the persistence of neo-colonialism because it continues historical patterns of exploitation and hierarchies between Europe and Africa. Conclusion The findings in this paper show that EUTF was not merely a development instrument but also a political one that came with negative consequences for African irregular migrants. The securitization of aid along with the EU’s other externalization policies have not effectively solved the problems that have caused the migration crisis. Instead, it has reinforced them. The model of the EU’s migration policies under the EUTF has also created issues beyond the realm of migration. As discussed, it continues to sustain power imbalances between Europe and Africa, shift aid priorities, and undermine development goals.Addressing the migration crisis will require a paradigm shift in the EU migration policy domain. The EU needs to deviate away from a security-based approach to a holistic and rights-based approach. This ideological reform requires the EU to look inward to address its own limitations and failures by recognizing its neo-colonial practices, acting out of mutual rather than political interests, and lastly, collectively humanizing migrants and refugees arriving to Europe for safety and opportunities. Through these measures, the EU and African stakeholders can address the true root causes of migration – which stem from structural global inequalities. References “A European Agenda on Migration.” European Commission. 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Brooklyn Han, Patrick Leitloff, Sally Yang, Eddy Zou Is a UK Government commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals good for the economy and business in general? Brooklyn Han, Patrick Leitloff, Sally Yang, Eddy Zou One aspect of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs) is a sustainable use of natural resources and comprehensive environmental protection, mandating a significant change in economic and industrial practices (1). This discussion paper investigates the impact of a government commitment to the implementation of the UN SDGs relating to natural capital on the economy and business in the United Kingdom. We evaluate existing research and governmental policy declarations. The investigation finds that greater certainty around environmental regulations has a net benefit on business performance and that positive spillovers exist already. Policy gaps in waste and energy regulation exist. We also argue that a more accurate tracking of the progress in the SDGs leads to more commitment and better policymaking. This paper won the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) Renaissance Prize in April 2020 (2). I. Introduction In recent years, rising concerns over the environmental sustainability of human-driven economic practices have called for significant action. Len- ton et al. argue that the world may have already crossed several “tipping points” beyond which environmental degradation becomes irreversible, mandating immediate political and economic response (3). We thus choose to focus on natural capital-based Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in our discussion. Natural capital, defined as “stocks of the elements of nature that have value to society,” is used in combination with human, financial, and social capital to produce valuable goods and services (4). This differs from “natural resources” in the sense that natural capital is natural resources utilised to add value to society and the economy. It directly sustains human life, is not easily replenished, and is non-substitutable in certain cases, highlighting the need for sustainable use (5). We explore this with examples throughout our paper. Our SDGs of focus are: - Goal 12: Efficient use of natural resources and effective waste management - Goal 13: Climate change mitigation and adaptation - Goals 14 and 15: Preservation of water and land ecosystems Henceforth we refer to these goals as NC-SDGs. Figure 1. Natural capital-based Sustainable Development Goals (NC-SDGs) and auxiliary NC-SDGs We consider Goals 6, 7, and 9 as auxiliary NC-SDGs as they have targets relating to water ecosystems, fossil fuels as subsoil natural resources, and “environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes” respectively (6). Figure 1 provides a graphic summary. We refer to “commitment” as the integration of SDG targets and indicators in the design and evaluation of policies, as well as promoting awareness towards achieving SDGs in the indicated timeframe. In the following sections, we outline the UK-specific businesses and economy-wide benefits, then examine positive spillovers from current sustainable development policies. After identifying policy gaps, we reflect on the recent developments in measuring SDGs. II. Improved Business Performance There is strong evidence that environmentally sustainable practices improve business performance. Clark et al’s 2014 review of 200 studies on sustainability and corporate performance found that high environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards lowered costs of sourcing capital and improved financial performance in 90 percent of cases (7). Similarly, Flammer identified a positive causal impact of adopting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) proposals, such as incorporating SDGs in business operations, on accounting performance, labour productivity, and business sales in 2015 (8). Flammer did so by exploiting variation in corporate proposals that are mostly independent of confounding factors, such as the passage of shareholder proposals on CSR that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. Figure 2. The size of incremental SDG-related business opportunities in 2030. Notes : Only the largest opportunities are shown. Source: Business and Sustainable Development Commission, 2017. The implementation of SDGs also opens up new markets for UK businesses. A 2017 report by the Business and Sustainable Development Commission estimates that delivering SDGs in the four “economic systems’”—food and agriculture, energy and materials, cities, and health—can generate over £10 trillion (9) worth of business opportunities per year by 2030 (10). These closely relate to NC-SDGs (summarised in Figure 2) and are highly applicable in the UK. For instance, product-re- formulation strategies, which improve the nutritional content of processed food in the UK and enhance sustainable consumption (SDG 12), require total business investments of approximately £3.7 billion. This is significantly smaller than the estimated gains in Figure 2 (11). Further, this improvement to processed food is projected to improve the health of the population, saving a total of 1.7 million disability-adjusted life years. Healthy workers reduce the burden on the National Health Service by avoiding economic costs associated with falling ill or being hospitalised; they also work and consume more, which are major drivers of GDP. Figure 3. The size of incremental SDG-related business opportunities in 2030, with externalities added. Notes: Evidence at the global level suggests that pricing externalities adds market opportunities substantially. Source: Business and Sustainable Development Commission, 2017. In addition, as shown in Figure 3, adjusting prices to reflect the positive exter- nalities generated by a business focus on SDGs can add up to 40 percent of busi- ness opportunities in the four economic systems identified (12). Figure 4. Low-carbon innovation activity of EU ETS regulated companies compared with the counterfactual scenario. Source: Calel & Dechezleprêtre, 2014 Carbon pricing policies can have a significant effect on business incentives in creating sustainable innovations (13). Figure 4 shows that the introduction of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) has led to an increase in the number of low-car- bon patents from companies. There is potential for the UK government to further commit to SDGs through measures such as maintaining carbon pricing. Such a commitment would result in even greater benefits from encouraging businesses to invest in low-carbon innovations and creating new business areas. As Europe’s centre of sustainable funds management, the UK’s financial industry has long incorporated ESG standards into its investment criteria to support the growth of sustainable finance. One common method of sustainable finance is investment in an eco-friendly fund which applies ESG criteria and focuses its investment options in companies which are less carbon-intensive or earn green revenues. Eco-friendly funds generally design their own metrics of “climate aware- ness” and adjust portfolios towards companies and assets that perform better along those metrics. One example is the Future World Fund managed by Legal & General Investment Management, which only includes companies meeting minimum environmental standards and exposes itself more to companies which, in addition to meeting environmental standards, engage in environmentally friendly activities (14). In 2016, HSBC placed £1.85 billion of its UK employees’ pension savings into the Future World Fund (15). Reasons for HSBC’s decision are reportedly greater expected returns, improved company engagement, and a more widespread perception that addressing climate change should be the “new normal” (16). The notion that eco-friendly funds can generate returns is supported by empirical evidence: Morningstar, a global research agency, compared average return, success and survival rates of 745 sustainable funds with those of 4150 traditional funds. They found that irrespective of the type considered (bond or equities), and the country of origin (UK or abroad), rates of return on sustainable funds either matched or beat their traditional counterparts. Many businesses also publicly urge the government to further commit to strengthening private-public coordination in delivering SDGs (17). While SDGs are beneficial to businesses, without an active governmental commitment to NC-SDGs to address market failure, firms and the economy more broadly may not fully realise these benefits. Market failures, whereby markets fail to achieve socially efficient resource allocations, necessitate government intervention. Many green investments are currently uncompetitive as they involve early-stage innovations yet to be commercialised. Gillingham and Stock use 2018 data from the US Energy Information Administration to compute the costs of abating each ton of CO2 by replacing electricity generated by an existing coal-fired power plant with the cleaner alternative (18). As a comparison, the UK in 2019 proposed a £16 ($19.2) tax per tonne of CO2 emitted by installations. This effectively means abatement costs for switching to most feasible “cleaner alternatives” are much higher than social costs reflected by carbon tax schemes. Furthermore, solar and wind are among the cleanest forms of energy (Figure 5), yet Gillingham and Stock show that solar thermal and offshore wind are the most costly to implement (Table 1) (19). Table 1. New source generation costs when comparing to existing coal generation. Notes : The table shows engineering costs per ton of CO2 abated by replacing electricity gener- ated by a current coal-fired power plant with the new generation source. Source: Gillingham and Stock, 2018 The UK Energy Research Centre’s review of evidence on the timescale of technological innovations showed that across 14 innovations studies, it takes an average of 39 years for an innovation to be commercialised and deployed (22). Furthermore, Gillingham and Stock suggest that much of the “green investments” in renewable energy suffer from path dependence, whereby rates of return go up in the long run only with sufficiently high inputs (23). Furthermore, environmental externalities in current pollutive technologies are not internalised, leading to overproduction. Greener innovations thus tend to be under-funded by private markets, causing deadweight welfare loss for both consumers and producers (24). Consumers continue to suffer the consequences of pollution, while producers forego the opportunity to achieve better business performance in the long run as outlined above (25). Government finance such as the UK Energy Entrepreneurs Fund, which was launched in 2012 and invested £75 million of grant money by 2019, can support the incubation of businesses before they generate revenues. Figure 5. Solar and wind are among the cleanest forms of energy. Source: Ritchie & Roser, 2020. In addition, the government can provide a regulatory base to correct “imperfect information”. Standardisation prevents greenwashing, the act of labelling projects or bonds with detrimental or negligible impact on the environment as “green” to attract investors. Addressing the lack of clear common standards, cited as the largest source of investor uncertainty, can fuel demand for green bonds, which are bonds earmarked primarily for projects improving energy efficiency (SDG 7) (26). This is exemplified by the ASEAN’s adoption of comprehensive Green Bond Standards that categorise projects and specify the exclusion of fossil fuels (27). These actions reduce information asymmetries between firms and investors and may encourage the latter group to more confidently invest in green projects and bonds. The government can also help establish common reporting standards to lower the implementation costs of sustainability practices. HSBC found that 26 percent of the 1000 UK firms surveyed suggested that a confusion with ESG reporting undermined their sustainability practices (28). KPMG also found that one of the biggest barriers to sustainability for firms was the lack of common metrics to assess and compare performances (29). In 2020, the British Standards Institution (BSI) launched the first of its five-year initiative with the UK Government (BEIS) and the UK industry (City of London’s GFI) to develop consensus-based standards in sustainable finance (30). We argue that such country-wide standardisation is only achievable through regulatory changes directed by the government. While firms in the private sector can also attempt to establish uniform standards, their lack of enforcement power gives other businesses considerable discretion over which standards to adopt. This inconsistency not only raises search and adoption costs of standards, but also undermines uniform comparisons of companies’ performances along relevant dimensions. By contrast, government directives provide the incentive to report some common metrics, allowing investors and other stakeholders to better assess such information. Moreover, government-induced standards can go beyond helping companies assess their environmental impacts by tailoring case-specific solutions to incorporate environmental sustainability into existing business practices. This is illustrated by the BSI’s new ISO standards, which aim to allow businesses of all sizes to consider climate change adaptation while designing new policies, strategies, plans, and activities (31). The government can also exercise its authority to endorse consistent information and nudge consumer behaviour. For example, mandating businesses to disclose the environmental impact of their products through labelling highlights the impact of consumption choices and addresses consumers’ behavioural bias (32). Finally, government commitments to SDGs have the potential to improve coordination in the private sector. An example of such improved coordination is industrial symbiosis, where governments promote mutual synergies between firms from different industries. The UK’s National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP), matches participating firms that can use each other’s byproducts with the view that “one company’s waste is another’s raw material.” For example, the waste filter cake produced by an air conditioner manufacturer is used by a fuel manufacturer as an oil absorption agent. In five years, NISP diverted over 47 million tonnes of industrial waste, contributing to improvements in SDG 12, production expansions and costs reductions (33). III. Current Policies and Positive Spillovers In the first year alone, 90 percent of the actions in the 25 Year Environment Plan have been delivered or are being progressed (34). Further, complex interactions and positive spillovers between goals occur. In the NC-SDGs framework, the key areas include air quality, water quality, urban planning, and waste management. Commitments to cleaner air have shown significant progress. The World Bank suggests that 100 percent of the UK population has access to clean fuels and technology for cooking in 2020 (SDG 7.1.2) (35). The ONS also finds that the share of renewable energy in total energy consumption rose exponentially from 0.7 per- cent in 1990 to 10.3 percent in 2017 (SDG 7.2.1) (36). This is expected to enhance climate resilience and encourage the transition to an economy with a lower reliance on high-emission technologies (SDG 13.2.1). Recent policies further support the attainment of NC-SDGs. The Clean Growth Strategy seeks to align economic growth with “clean” development by improving industry efficiency and encouraging the transition to low-carbon transport (37). Climate change policies may shape incentives in technological change, promoting innovation (SDG 9) and sustainable infrastructural development (SDG 11). Secondly, a commitment to cleaner water sources is “good business” because it raises productivity and cuts costs for firms, according to researchers at the Stock- holm International Water Institute (38). Current policies such as the Nitrates Directive and the Water Framework Directive reduce contamination risk to water bodies while enhancing their quality. Such policies ensured that 100 percent of UK households have access to safe drinking water and are connected to wastewater treatment (39). Access to sanitary drinking water is vital for personal health, and healthy workers make valuable contributions to business and the economy. Thirdly, urban planning policies encourage infrastructure innovation. Congestion is a huge cost for the economy in terms of lost time spent waiting in traffic and the continuous emission of pollutants from vehicles. TomTom’s London traffic reports in 2017 to 2019 show that just shy of 150 hours per year are spent by each driver waiting in rush hour traffic jams (40). Further, greenhouse gas emissions from road transport make up 21 percent of the UK’s total greenhouse gas emissions, which motivate the importance of making road planning easier for vehicle owners (41). To maximise the value of public investment, the UK government has established a Transforming Cities Fund worth £2.5 billion to tackle congestion and promote smart traffic management. The government is also considering new vehicle types and innovative ways to simplify journey planning and payments as a part of their Future of Mobility Urban Strategy. The aspects of this strategy are to be tested with a £90 million investment in four “future mobility zones.” These policies complement the goal of achieving cleaner air; as the transport sector is the largest single contributor to greenhouse gas emissions at 34 percent of total emissions, introducing smarter vehicles and tackling traffic congestion can significantly reduce air pollution (42). Furthermore, there is a strong link between the sustainability of cities and communities (SDG 11) and the sustainability of an environmental ecosystem with which the cities and communities interact (43). Finally, waste management policies have also shown promise in maintaining cleaner environmental standards. Since 2000, the UK’s material footprint has shown a downward trend (44). Plastic waste has been a major area of focus for the government, with an aim to reach zero plastic waste by 2042 (45). Better waste management will benefit ecosystems on land and in water and preserve the quality of the resources that are necessary to everyday production and consumption. Further, achieving the sustainable management of natural resources (SDG 12.2) and promoting policies that are in accordance with such management (SDG 12.7) are closely associated with the development of sustainable transport and infrastructure (SDG 9). IV. Shortcomings of Current Policies Despite considerable progress in some areas, there is strong evidence to suggest that gaps still exist, particularly in waste management and energy efficiency. Current trajectories pose a considerable threat to the future availability of natural capital. This necessitates immediate action to be taken against these issues. Hazardous waste generated, such as used oils and chemical waste, rose by over 10 percent between 2010 and 2016 (46). This waste pollutes water bodies and threat- ens aquatic biodiversity. It necessitates greater purification efforts, resulting in major costs of production (47). Energy efficiency is plagued by policy inconsistencies. Relaxations on fracking rules, freezes on fuel duty, uncertainty around the future of carbon pricing, and the end of hybrid vehicle subsidies damage expectations about the government’s commitment to a low-carbon economy (48). Low per capita spending on improving household energy efficiency and uncertainty in the government’s target to up-grade “fuel-poor” homes have caused the improvement in median energy efficiency ratings to level off (Figure 6). The proportion of households in fuel poverty has not changed significantly despite the fuel poverty gap decreasing since 2014 (49). Households are considered fuel poor if their fuel costs are above the national median level and their residual income after fuel costs would fall below the poverty line. A combination of slack minimum energy efficiency regulations, high fixed costs and the fact that returns are typically distributed over the long term means that private incentives, which are based on a series of myopic optimisation, do not bring enough investments to meet current targets (50). Given that energy efficiency is one of the most effective ways to tackle fuel poverty, stagnant improvements in this area stall progress in indicators such as 9.4.1 (CO2 emission per unit of value added) (51). Figure 6. The improvement in median energy efficiency ratings between 2010 and 2015 has lev- elled off in recent years for fuel-poor households and all households Source: Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2018. V. Opportunities for Better Measurement Existing improvements in measurement enable policymakers to track progress on specific SDGs, analyse root causes of challenges in delivering SDGs and de- sign policies that address problems for specific stakeholders, to “Leave No One Behind” (52). The ability to establish quantitative targets for indicators that currently lack clarity will further enhance governmental commitment by reducing the propensity to take discretionary action and exploit the vagueness of said indicator(s). 70 percent of 180 SDG indicators reported using UK data are disaggregated (broken down into subcategories) by at least one variable, such as geographic region (53). This data can be used to compare the socio-economic impact of policies across regions, enabling policymakers to identify and target regional economic disparities. For example, researchers can use UK regional Google patent rank data to quantify regional distributions of economic spillovers from innovation in- vestments (Figure 7). Policymakers can then direct innovation spending to regions with stagnant productivity. Figure 7. A scatter plot of relative regional productivity and relative regional average spillovers for NUTS2 regions of the UK Notes : From this estimation, it is clear that targeting regions with below national average produc- tivity and high innovation spillovers can generate higher benefits. Source: Rydge, Martin & Valero, 2018. For NC-SDGs, we argue that the UK government can leverage the 100 percent coverage of climate action indicators and existing micro-level data to incorporate climate change-induced dynamics when investing in different parts of the UK. Existing literature suggests that foresighted infrastructure investments that con- sider dynamic effects of climate change, including inundation, sea-level rises, and floods, bring significant long-term economic welfare gains (54). An understanding of inter-linkages between SDGs allows policymakers to con- sider the distributional and long-term consequences of their decisions, thereby avoiding policy conflicts between different departments or omitting key areas of policy focus (55). For instance, the UN Statistical Division is collaborating with the ONS and other statistical agencies across developing countries to harmonise the use of indicators in understanding positive linkages between targets, to direct statistical reporting and policies to those with the greatest potential for positive externalities. Figure 8. Proportion of Global Indicators for each SDG that have data reported on the UK National Reporting Platform, as of June 2019. Source: UK Government, 2019b Greater governmental commitment to NC-SDGs is essential to accelerate im- provements in data measurement. As shown in Figure 7, among specific goals we focus on, there is substantial scope for improved data availability in Goals 12, 14, and 15. Many indicators require more details on how they can be met. For instance, none of the transboundary basin areas in the UK currently have an operational agreement on water cooperation (56). In addition to improving local and international water resource management, clarification will also help the UK maintain international ties, the importance of which has only increased since Brexit. VI. Conclusion Sustainable growth cannot be left to the private sector alone; a consistent, well-measured UK government commitment helps deepen the symbiotic relationship between stakeholders. This can help address market failures such as imperfect information and coordination problems in the private sector, where sustainable economic activity has the potential to take place on a large scale. Our assessment of current policies show that a stronger government commitment is consistent with current policy trajectories and that bridging existing policy gaps can deliver large gains. We have demonstrated the ways in which SDGs benefit the UK economy and businesses, such as reducing production costs through the maintenance of water sources, incentivising sustainable innovations through carbon pricing schemes, and strengthening the relationship between environmental ecosystems and the city. Environmental sustainability and economic growth are not always on a collision course. Rather, they should be viewed as complementary aims under the overarching goal of sustainable growth. With the advent of improved data collection methods and measurement of SDG indicators, we can better quantify progress towards a more sustainable future that benefits businesses and the economy. Endnotes 1 We thank Chiara Sotis and Judith Shapiro for their continued support and guidance. We are grateful to the ONS for initiating the prize and agreeing to the publication of the modified version of the paper. We would also like to thank the editors, Alice Jo and Jacob Zeldin, for their comments and suggestions which have significantly improved the paper. 2 www.ons.gov.uk/aboutus/whatwedo/programmesandprojects/economicstatisticstransformation/ theonsrenaissanceprize 3 Lenton, T. M., Rockström, J., Gaffney, O., Rahmstorf, S., Richardson, K., Steffen, W., & Schellnhuber, H. J. (2019). Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against. Nature, 575(7784), 592-595. doi: 10.1038/d41586-019- 03595-0. 4 HM Treasury (2020). The Green Book: Central Government Guidance On Appraisal and Evaluation. 5 Neumayer, E. (1998). Preserving natural capital in a world of uncertainty and scarce financial resources. International Journal Of Sustainable Development & World Ecology , 5(1), 27-42. doi: 10.1080/13504509809469967 6 United Nations General Assembly (2015). Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable development , A/RES/70/1. 7 Clark, G. L., Feiner, A., & Viehs, M. (2015). From the stockholder to the stakeholder: How sustainability can drive financial outperformance. Available at SSRN 2508281 . 8 Flammer, C. (2015). Does corporate social responsibility lead to superior financial performance? A regression discontinuity approach. Management Science, 61 (11), 2549-2568. 9 The original data is in USD. We employ an exchange rate of $1=£1.2. 10 Business and Sustainable Development Commission. (2017). Better Business Better World: The report of the Business & Sustainable Development Commission. 11 Dobbs, R., Sawers, C., Thompson, F., Manyika, J., Woetzel, J., Child, P., ... & Spatharou, A. (2016). Overcoming obesity: An initial economic analysis. McKinsey Global Institute, 2014. 12 Business and Sustainable Development Commission. (2017). Better Business Better World: The report of the Business & Sustainable Development Commission. 13 Calel, R., & Dechezleprêtre, A. (2016). Environmental policy and directed technological change: evidence from the European carbon market. Review of economics and statistics , 98(1), 173-191. Around 300 companies regulated under the EU ETS are included in the sample. “Non EU ETS companies” are a group of 3000 European companies that are not regulated under the EU ETS but operated in the same country and the same economic sector and are comparable in size and innovation capacity to companies regulated under the EU ETS. 14 Legal & General Investment Management (2016). The Future World fund range . 15 Flood, C. (2016, November 8). HSBC’s UK pension scheme to invest £1.85bn in eco-friendly fund. The Financial Times . 16 Bioy, H. & Boyadzhiev, D. (2020). How does European sustainable funds’ performance measure up? Morningstar. 17 UKSSD Network (2018). Measuring up: How the UK is performing on the UN Sustainable Development Goals. 18 Gillingham, K., & Stock, J. H. (2018). The cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Journal of Economic Perspectives , 32(4), 53-72. While they conclude that solar thermal and offshore wind technologies are the most costly to implement, we caution that these measures represent underestimates of true costs of abating CO2, given that they only consider mechanical switching and differ from costs of policy responses needed to encourage switching. 19 Ibid. 20 The original data is in USD. We employ an exchange rate of $1=£1.2. 21 While the technical note was later withdrawn due to further developments in Brexit negotiations, there have since been new calls and consultation processes for implementation of a Carbon Emissions Tax. 22 Hanna, R., Gross, R., Speirs, J., Heptonstall, P., & Gambhir, A. (2015). Innovation timelines from invention to maturity. UK Energy Research Centre . 23 Gillingham, K., & Stock, J. H. (2018). The cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Journal of Economic Perspectives , 32(4), 53-72. 24 Owen, R., Lyon, F., & Brennan, G. (2018). Filling the green finance gap: Government interventions supporting early-stage low carbon ventures. Academy of Management Proceedings , 2018(1), 16419. 25 One example would be Clark et al. (2015). 26 Climate Bonds Initiative (2019). Green Bond European Investor Survey. International Finance Corporation (2020). Green Bond Impact Report. 27 ASEAN (2017). ASEAN Green Bond Standards . 28 HSBC (2018). HSBC Navigator 2018 . 29 KPMG (2017). KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2017 . 30 British Standards Institution (2020a). B SI launches first sustainable finance guide setting standards for financial institutions to align to global sustainability challenges. 31 British Standards Institution (2020b). New international standard helps organizations adapt to climate change. 32 Ölander, F., & Thøgersen, J. (2014). Informing versus nudging in environmental policy. Journal of Consumer Policy , 37(3), 341-356. doi: 10.1007/s10603-014-9256-2. 33 International Synergies (2013). 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Ria Modak Khadi Capitalism: Gandhian Neoliberalism and the Making of Modern India Ria Modak The postcolonial invocation of Mohandas Gandhi brings to mind a singular image: Gandhi dressed in a simple dhoti and shawl made from khadi, or home-spun and home woven cloth, sitting in front of his spinning wheel. This recollection of Gandhi positions him as both the embodiment of Indian national consciousness as well as a figure outside or above modernity, insulated from the hegemonic influence of Western reason and secularism. Modernity, encapsulated by the socio- political, economic, and cultural institutions and frameworks birthed by post-Enlightenment rationality, is seen as incompatible with the fundamental tenets of Gandhian political philosophy. Yet, in researching the massive corpus of Gandhi’s collected writings and speeches, I found that his entanglements of modernity, cap- italism, and nationalism were less straightforward than conventional Indian historiography might suggest. Gandhi’s political philosophy offers an entry point to address fundamental questions about nation thinking, modernity, and postcolonial futurity: can the postcolonial subject articulate political possibilities that move beyond the nation state without sacrificing the material considerations of global capitalism? Put differently, is it possible to imagine and enact a world order that transcends the hegemonic structuring forces of Western modernity? These questions are particularly resonant as we come to terms with the price of modern progress, which, in the stark words of Horkheimer and Adorno, has left us a world “radiant with triumphant calamity” (1). Critiques of modern living are boundless, ranging from Frankfurt school critiques of its reification of reason to Subaltern Studies’ lamentations of Western epistemological hegemony (2) to arguments from the Black radical tradition that colonialism and modernity are inextricably linked (3). However, as scholars look beyond the modern Western intellectual tradition and locate alternative ways of being to create more liberatory political realities, it is crucial that we think critically about how radical these alternatives truly are. Some alternatives, like those found in Gandhi’s political philosophy, cannot help but be, to invoke the work of David Scott, conscripts of modernity. While historians and political theorists of contemporary India alike argue that Gandhi summarily rejected modern frameworks of nationalism, industrialism, and rationality itself, I contend that Gandhian political philosophy, rather than existing above the conceits of Western modernity, is intimately tied to Western civil society and its social, political, and economic manifestations. More specifically, it closely resembles neoliberal forms of social relations and economy. The fundamental methodologies and frameworks undergirding Gandhian political philosophy ultimately reinscribe the hegemonic global capitalist order even while they seem, on inspection, to articulate a radically different futurity. This paper’s critical intervention, then, challenges the underlying assumptions of conventional Indian historiography by exposing its inability to reckon with Gandhi as a fundamentally modern political figure entrenched in the machinations of globalized neoliberalism. I suggest that a more critical reading of Gandhi-- one that accurately locates his political philosophy as a modern intellectual contribution-- is necessary in order to make sense of India’s postcolonial future. After an outline of conventional Indian historiography and its fixation with Gandhi within the nationalist paradigm, I turn to elements of Gandhi’s political philosophy and political economy to expose its similarities to modern neoliberal ideology and economics. Nationalist Historiography: A Dominant Discourse The conventional story of the Indian nationalist movement emphasizes the role of prolonged popular struggle; the diverse political and ideological visions of its leadership; and a uniquely revolutionary atmosphere of freedom and debate (4). The first stage of the independence movement was defined by the cultivation of an elite consciousness and the emergence of moderate nationalist activity; statesmen and politicians like Dadabhai Naoroji and Gopal Krishna Gokhale sought to achieve piecemeal reform through constitutional methods while keeping faith in the British justice system (5). As these gradual efforts failed to bring about substantive change, a more extremist brand of nationalism emerged. Through the swadeshi movement, militant nationalists like Lala Lajpat Rai and Bal Gangadhar Tilak fomented wide-spread political agitation by boycotting British institutions and goods (6). In this highly charged political context, Gandhi launched several satyagraha , or non-violent resistance, campaigns, including the non-cooperation movement and the Quit India movement, successfully mobilizing the masses (7). The culmination of this protracted struggle for freedom was, of course, Indian independence and the ensuing violence of Partition. This dominant narrative of the Indian freedom struggle foregrounds nationalism as a guiding principle, first to unify the social, economic, and political demands of a vastly heterogeneous population, and later to create a sovereign and secular nation state that embodies the will of the people. In depicting nationalism as the primary structuring force in the making of modern India, the mainstream approach to Indian history is representative of other, more extreme, approaches to historiography, including Hindu nationalist, Marxist, and even subaltern perspectives. All Indian history, in other words, is told as nationalist history. Hindu nationalist retellings of the independence movement represent Indian nationalism as a brand of ethnic nationalism in which nationality is an inherent genetic characteristic (8). By villainizing Muslim subjects, it replaces the secular liberal state of conventional historiography with a Hindu state: the Indian nation is the Hindu nation (9). Marxist historiography, in contrast, traces the rise and fall of India as a socialist state through retelling history from below, analyzing the role of peasant revolts and general strikes in inciting nationalist fervor. It conceptualizes the positive aspects of the nationalist movement (i.e. the bourgeois-democratic values of secularism, women’s rights, freedom of the press etc.) as the initial points for a people’s front (10). While subaltern historiographical approaches drew inspiration from Marxist methods, their characterization of the nationalist movement splits Indian politics into elite and subaltern spheres, each of which articulated a unique form of nationalism (11). Each of these historiographical approaches, in summary, insist on reifying the defining characteristic of national- ism according to the field’s preeminent scholars: congruence between the political and national unit (12). Within this discourse, the figure of Gandhi emerges as the very embodiment of nationalist consciousness. During the freedom struggle, he acquired the informal, but highly popularized, title of Father of the Nation, an appellation which continues to inform Gandhi’s central role in Indian postcolonial imagination. Countless films, television programs, plays, and documentaries continue to memorialize his life and work both within and outside of India. From Richard Attenborough’s 1982 film Gandhi to Doordarshan’s 52 episode-long teleserial Mahatma, the figure of Gandhi continues to pervade India’s nationalist project (13). Gandhi plays a crucial role in the symbolic consolidation of state power: his birthday and death day are both celebrated as national holidays; his image appears on paper currency of nearly all denominations issued by the Reserve Bank of India; and the International Gandhi Peace Prize is awarded annually by the Government of India as a tribute to Gandhian ideals. From the independence movement to our own political moment, Gandhi and the nationalist project have fused into an inseparable unit. Contemporary theorists of Indian nationalism argue that the conflation of Gandhi and the nation can be attributed to Gandhi’s refusal to adopt the values and assumptions of Western modernity. Partha Chatterjee suggests that by rejecting the modernizing ethos of Western rationality, Gandhi remained unencumbered by the Enlightenment thematic: “[n]ot only did Gandhi not share the historicism of the nationalist writers, he did not share their confidence in rationality and the scientific mode of knowledge” (14). Dipesh Chakrabarty and Rochona Majumdar argue that Gandhi’s reliance on the Bhagavad Gita, a Hindu scripture, allowed for the articulation of a novel religio-ethical orientation in the realm of politics, which he saw as intrinsically linked to Western modernity (15). This seemingly wholesale rejection of Western modernity, according to many historians of modern and postcolonial India, is clearly visible in Gandhi’s public image (16). As he embraced his role as a satyagrahi, he traded the Western robes of the barrister for a simple dhoti and shawl made from khadi. Gandhi’s khadi attire was transformed into a material artifact of the nation defined in terms of the contemporary politics and economics of self rule (17). Gandhi’s physical appearance, in other words, paralleled his ideological distance from Western modernity. Gandhi’s rejection of modern social, political, and economic frameworks is often contrasted to other leading statesmen and intellectuals of Indian freedom. He is most frequently counterposed with Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister. Conventional Indian historiography narrates the differences between Gandhi and Nehru as such: where Nehru was a proponent of statist secular socialism driven by industrial growth, Gandhi was profoundly ambivalent about state intervention in agriculture and industry; where Nehru located India’s future in the creation of the modern city, Gandhi presented the self-sufficient and autonomous village as an alternative to modern civilization; where Nehru saw economic development as central to Indian independence, Gandhi sought self-purification and the cultivation of individual ethical consciousness (18). Scholars of modern India also juxtapose Gandhi’s religious orientation and appeals to Hinduism with the anti-caste, radical democratic humanism of B.R. Ambedkar, renowned Dalit leader and the architect of India’s constitution (19). Where Gandhi revered village life as a revival of the old social order, Ambedkar saw the village as a model of oppressive Hindu social organization which segregated upper caste communities from lower caste communities; where Gandhi turned to religion as a source of ethics, Ambedkar glorified the secular humanist ideals of the French Revolution; where Gandhi urged spiritual and religious education in Hindustani, Ambedkar demanded that English be used in schools to counter the Brahmin tradition of denying education and literacy to lower caste communities (20). In comparison to Nehru, Ambedkar, and others, Gandhian political philosophy is depicted in mainstream Indian historiography as irrefutably anti-modern. However, as I argue below, this characterization of Gandhi does not accurately reflect his political philosophy. Defining the Gandhian Problem Space Rather than articulating a radical alternative to Western modernity, Gandhian political philosophy was entrenched in the systems, structures, and frameworks of modernity, and more specifically, those of neoliberal capitalism. Before addressing the specifics of Gandhi’s political philosophy, it is first necessary to locate Gandhi more comprehensively within his problem space to better establish the stakes of my argument. In his work Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment, David Scott introduces the idea of the problem space, which he defines as “an ensemble of questions and answers around which a horizon of identifiable stakes (conceptual as well as ideological-political stakes) hangs” (21). Theoretical work cannot be read, in other words, without identifying the questions to which that work responds. Even while actors within a particular problem space may disagree on the answers in a particular scenario, they are all responding to the same set of unspoken questions while maintaining a shared sense of the stakes. Intellectuals, statesmen and activists may disagree on how to decolonize, for example, while implicitly agreeing that something must be done to address the condition of colonized people. In the previous section, I gestured to one aspect of Gandhi’s problem space by outlining the background against which he formed his ideas in the space and time of the Indian freedom movement; in that spatio-temporal location, Gandhi’s problem space was constructed by Hindu scripture and the formation of religion as ethics. However, the Gandhian problem space was not circumscribed by the borders of the Indian nation; rather, it existed concomitantly with other approaches to decolonization during the mid-twentieth century. On the whole, these other projects struggled, mostly unsuccessfully, to articulate a postcolonial future out- side the terms of nationalism and modernity. In the Anglophone Black Atlantic, statesmen and intellectuals like Kwame Nkrumah and Eric Williams proposed federalism and non-domination on the global stage as solutions to the problem of empire (22). In the Francophone Black Atlantic, Aime Cesaire and Leopold Sedar Senghor sought to transform imperial France into a democratic federation with former colonies as autonomous members of a transcontinental polity (23). Within this internationalist problem space of decolonization characterized by “an attitude of anticolonial longing, a longing for anti-colonial revolution,” actors from all over the decolonizing world sought to engage in a radical project of worldmaking. However, many reinscribed colonial legacies by adopting the institutions, bureaucracies, and borders of colonial domination. Within the context of this problem space, then, Gandhi’s apparent rejection of modernity took on additional stakes as one of the few truly radical alternatives to nation thinking and capitalist state formation, not just in the Indian context but in the decolonizing world as a whole. However, this perception of Gandhi’s ideological distance from modernity is fundamentally misguided. In the three sections that follow, I analyze some of the fundamental tenets of Gandhi’s political philosophy and political economy to draw conceptual linkages to neoliberal capitalism. I first consider Gandhi’s attention to the individual as a unit of analysis in the struggle for independence, and argue that his conceptualization of swaraj as self-purification elided a structural understanding of colonialism as an oppressive force. Next, I critique Gandhi’s political ideal of Ramarajya and analyze his rejection of Western civilization. Finally, I turn to his visions of political economy, and in particular, his fixation with khadi to argue that Gandhi’s economic programme was, in fact, far closer to neoliberalism than most scholars would admit. Before addressing Gandhi’s political philosophy in full, it is helpful to first situate my argument within the field of Gandhi studies and critiques of Gandhi. Beginning in the early twentieth century, trade unionists like Shripad Amrit Dange took issue with the conservative strains within Gandhi’s economic thought, comparing it to the ideology of Soviet leaders like Vladimir Lenin (24). Contemporary scholars of India have taken up these critiques, pointing to his defense of the propertied classes, his ambivalence toward trade unions, and his philosophy of trusteeship as evidence of his imbrication in modern systems of capitalism and nationalism (25). However, few scholars have taken a theoretical approach to Gandhian political philosophy as a whole; those that do characterize his anticolonialism as fundamentally opposed to the modern state (26). My intervention complicates both of these approaches by engaging in a theoretical and deeply normative consideration of Gandhian thought. Swaraj as Self Purification and the Cultivation of Neoliberal Social Relations In his seminal treatise on political philosophy, Hind Swaraj, Gandhi puts forth a unique definition of swaraj , or self rule, that offers several dimensions through which to understand the stakes and motivations of the freedom struggle. First, Gandhian swaraj must be understood through the praxis of the individual, who is “the one supreme consideration” (27): it is “in the palm of our hands... Swaraj has to be experienced by each one for himself” (28). The practitioner of swaraj is the individual, not society or community (29). Gandhi’s focus on internal moral transformation leaves ambiguous the role of coalitional organizing and community building. In addition, Gandhi’s notion of swaraj is not generated in reaction to the brutality of colonial rule, but rather it emerges from an inner commitment to self improvement: “What we want to do should be done, not because we object to the English or because we want to retaliate, but because it is our duty to do so” (30). The political power derived from swaraj, in other words, must not be regarded as an end in itself. Indeed, a third characteristic of Gandhian swaraj is that it is not predicated on self determination or economic independence: “Now you will have seen that it is not necessary for us to have as our goal the expulsion of the English. If the English become Indianised, we can accommodate them” (31). Rather, swaraj depends on moral development and ethical formation. As such, it is intimately tied to the cultivation of spiritual and religious sensibilities (32) rather than the material considerations of development and industry: “Impoverished India can become free, but it will be hard for an India made rich through immorality to regain its freedom” (33). Gandhian swaraj is not constructed exclusively by material forces, nor does it demand exclusively material solutions. Gandhi’s focus on the individual obfuscates the role of colonialism as a structure of domination. He locates the origins of colonial exploitation in the moral failings of the Indian populace: “The English have not taken India; we have given it to them. They are not in India because of their strength, but because we keep them” (34). Gandhi’s discussion of the emergence of colonial rule is, unsurprisingly, limited in scope; the subject of his analysis is the upper class, upper caste colonized elite: “Who assisted the Company’s officers? Who was tempted at the sight of their silver? Who bought their goods? History testifies that we did all this. In order to become rich all at once, we welcomed the Company’s officers with open arms” (35). His myopic focus on the individual blinds him to the many revolutionary movements led by farmers, mill-workers, and tribal communities to overthrow British rule that were organized on the basis of economic exploitation (36). Gandhi also absolves colonial officers from their role in fomenting religious tensions between Hindus and Muslims through a divide-and-rule policy: “The Hindus and the Mahomedans were at daggers drawn. This, too, gave the Company its opportunity, and thus we created the circumstances that gave the Company its control over India” (37). This revisionist retelling of Hindu-Muslim relations ignores the crucial role of colonial policies in exacerbating religious tensions. The Census of British India of 1871-1872 constructed modern Hindu and Muslim identities as incompatible while the 1909 Morley-Minto reforms created separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims (38), thus fracturing political power (39). Gandhi’s conceptualization of swaraj does not adequately address the systems that continued to uphold the violence of colonial rule through law, bureaucracy, and state violence. By privileging the individual over the systemic, Gandhi’s formulation of swaraj closely resembles the cultivation of neoliberal social relations. While neoliberalism as an economic principle only gained traction in the 1970s after the dissolution of post-war Keynesianism, it also embodies ideological principles which marshal values of human dignity, individualism, and freedom to theorize the free market as a force of domination (40). Ethics and morality under the ideology of neoliberalism, in other words, become highly individualized, as in the case of Gandhian swaraj . This moral dimension has been central to neoliberalism since the beginning of the twentieth century (41), and became particularly salient in the aftermath of the Second World War, when human rights discourse began to interface with neoliberalism to produce a modern version of the colonial civilizing mission by facilitating the emergence of a globalized market civilization in which individual rights and competitive market relations would spread across and within national borders co-constitutively (42). Neoliberalism as a method of understanding and critiquing social relations offers a theoretical framework through which to analyze Gandhian swaraj. To be clear, I am not conflating all forms of religiously inflected self making with neoliberal social relations. I am arguing specifically that Gandhian swaraj, in failing to attend sufficiently to the structural forces of colonial domination, mirrors the highly destructive individualism that constitutes a central feature of neoliberalism. In fact, the very religio-ethical orientation that Gandhi gravitated toward was used as a tool for collective liberation in the context of the Indian freedom movement itself. For example, Muslim revolutionaries like Ashfaqullah Khan and Abul Kalam Azad invoked Islam and Islamic liberation theology to mobilize In- dian Muslim subjects in the independence struggle by centering the mosque as a site of resistance and reciting the Quran and fasting for Ramadan while jailed as political prisoners (43). In contrast to Gandhian swaraj, their religious sensibilities confronted the colonial state by producing solidarity among many diverse Muslim communities. A Critique of Ramarajya: Caste, Capitalism and Gandhi’s Ideal Civilization To reiterate, Gandhi is understood by most scholars as rejecting modernity because of his scathing critiques of modern civilization. Modern civilization, rather than the violent state sanctioned brutality of colonialism, was responsible for India’s downfall according to Gandhi: “It is not the British people who are ruling India, but it is modern civilization, through its railways, telegraphs, telepoles, and almost any invention which has been claimed to be a triumph of civilization” (44). The West fell prey to the forces of materialism, hyperrationality, and uncompromising secularism, which are all the inescapable after-effects of modernity. Gandhi expresses his disdain for this civilization in no uncertain terms: “This civilisation takes note of neither morality nor of religion: this civilization is irreligion” (45). Even more lamentably, the West mapped these values onto the East through the process of colonialism. As such, he writes, “India’s salvation consists in unlearning what she has learnt during the past fifty years. The railways, telegraphs, hospitals, law- yers, doctors, and such like have all to go, and the so-called upper classes have to learn to live conscientiously and religiously and deliberately the simple peasant life, knowing it to be a life giving true happiness” (46). These critiques of modern civilization are taken as evidence of Gandhi successfully rising above the conceits of modernity (47). However, it is not enough to consider Gandhi’s critique of modern civilization; rather, we must also analyze his alternative to modern civilization to assess whether or not it breaks free of the very systems Gandhi is opposed to. The fundamental values of Gandhi’s civilizational ideal are distinct from those of what he refers to as modern or material civilization, but their enactment reinforces neoliberal values. He defines true civilization as “that mode of conduct which points out to man the path of duty” (48). True civilization is morally inflected, and therefore spiritually inflected. According to Gandhi, India once adhered to the tenets of true civilization and must work to recover them: “The tendency of Indian civilisation is to elevate the moral being, that of the Western civilisation is to propagate immorality. The latter is godless, the former is based on a belief in God. So understanding and so believing, it behoves every lover of India to cling to the old Indian civilisation even as a child clings to its mother’s breast” (49). True civilization was achieved in the past and can be achieved again if, Gandhi argues, India returns to its original methods of governance, agriculture, industry, and labor while modifying some of its less progressive elements like untouchability: “In order to restore India to its pristine condition, we have to return to it. In our own civilisation, there will naturally be progress, retrogression, reforms and reactions, but one effort is required, and that is to drive out Western civilisation” (50). The fundamental values of Gandhi’s civilization ideal defined a type of morality that was dependent on acting according to one’s duty. The fixation on duty as a morally and religiously constituted ideal is, as I hope to prove, entirely compatible with capitalism and casteism in their modern formulations. Before considering the theoretical implications of Gandhi’s civilizational ethos, it is first necessary to understand how he envisioned their political manifestations through Ramarajya, “ the non-violent state of Gandhi’s vision” (51), his most concrete articulation of an alternative to nation thinking. Admittedly, Gandhi was less concerned with the details of postcolonial institutions, instead preferring a “one step enough” approach (52). However, he wrote extensively on his conceptualization of the ideal state, which he derived from the ancient ideal of Ramarajya, the divine kingdom of Lord Ram. Ramarajya in Gandhi’s formulation consisted of a federation of self governing and semi-autonomous panchayats , or village councils. The authority of the federation would be limited to the coordination, guidance, and supervision of matters of common interest (53). As in the case of swaraj, Ramarajya asserted the supremacy of individual freedom; this individual freedom was to be manifested in each panchayat and the state itself (54). Yet, these individual freedoms were tempered by Gandhi’s insistence on maintaining the caste system. In order to overcome the “life-corroding competition” of materialism and capitalism, each individual must follow “his own occupation or trade” (55). The law of varna “established certain spheres of action for certain people with certain tendencies,” thus at once naturalizing and institutionalizing caste (56). The shadow of caste, a concrete manifestation of Gandhi’s civilizational ethos of duty and morality, hung over his Ramarajya. Caste as a structuring force in Gandhi’s Ramarajya was not simply an unsavory vestige of pre-modern India; it was central to creating a reformed political and economic system in the postcolonial context. While Ramarajya was highly idealized, in the decades following Gandhi’s death, the Indian government has tried to implement many of its elements through campaigns, most notably the 2014 Clean India Mission ( Swachh Bharat Abhiyan ). The Clean India Mission is a country wide campaign aimed to “achieve universal sanitation coverage” by eradicating manual scavenging, improving the management of solid and liquid waste, and sustaining open-defecation free behavior (57). It is undoubtedly inspired by Ramarajya: it was initiated on the 150th anniversary of Gandhi’s birthday; volunteers are known as swachhagrahis, clearly in reference to satyagrahis ; and its messaging invokes Gandhian ideals of morality and duty (58). Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself proclaimed, “I must admit that if I had not understood Gandhi’s philosophy so deeply, the programme would not have been a part of my government’s priorities” (59). Yet, the Clean India Mission relied on coercive state action in its interactions with Dalit and Adivasi communities because prevailing ideas of purity and pollution drawn from the caste system perpetuate open defecation in rural India. To spread its message to lower caste and tribal communities, the Clean India Mission relied on the spirit of neoliberal capitalism, aggressive branding, and the monetary aid of multi-million dollar conglomerates like Hindustan Unilever (60). Neoliberal capitalism was the vessel through which casteism could inflict harm (61). The very ideals of morality and duty, when enshrined in the caste system, allowed Ramarajya to exist in accordance with the principles of neoliberal capitalism and state violence. When put into practice, Gandhi’s Ramarajya was not a rejection of modernity and materialism, but rather a manifestation of the most oppressive elements of Western modernity. His ideal form of political governance was invoked to complete a fundamentally modernist project. Khadi Capitalism: A Critique of Gandhi’s Political Economy Just as Gandhi’s political philosophy was highly compatible with neoliberal capitalism, so was his political economy. Like his conceptualization of Ramarajya and political philosophy, Gandhi understood political economy as inseparable from ethical and religious pursuits. Through this religio-ethical lens , individual and societal economic interests were to be collapsed to avoid conflict between the two. Economic progress in the material sense was antagonistic to “real progress” in the ethical sense (62). As part of his political economy, Gandhi urged plain living, which entailed the curtailing of material desires to lead a more sustainable lifestyle: “More and more things are produced to supply our primary needs, less and less will be the violence” (63). He urged small-scale and locally-oriented production that would not require large-scale industrialization or the use of machinery. Gandhi also emphasized the dignity of all forms of labor and suggested that every person, no matter their class status, should engage in manual labor, which he called, after Leo Tolstoy, “bread labor,” to understand the plight of agricultural laborers (64). Plain living, small-scale production, and bread labor, in summation, formed the basis of Gandhi’s political economy. The khadi programme was essential in enacting Gandhi’s political economy. Khadi was meant to be the national industry to benefit the masses by providing supplementary work to unemployed rural hands. The economics of khadi included a plan to produce, distribute, exchange, and consume hand-spun yarn and cloth. Its effects were meant to diminish unemployment, augment economic productivity, and increase the purchasing power and of the poor. As it was geared towards India’s rural population, khadi could rely on only the most simple and accessible technologies: the loom and the spinning wheel. It also had to rely on a local re- source base for production and consumption (65). As such, khadi played a crucial role in defining the structures of exchange in Gandhi’s political economy: each village had to be self supporting and self contained to adhere to the khadi programme. According to this highly fragmented doctrine, villages should only exchange necessary commodities with other villages where they are not locally producible (66). Although khadi was meant to deliver material economic benefits to India’s rural population, as with other elements of Gandhi’s political economy, it also took on a profoundly moral dimension. It was integral to establishing what Gandhi referred to as a “non-violent economic order” (67). While mill-made cloth was cheaper than khadi, it relied on “dishonesty,” “violence and untruth,” which is why it had to be opposed (68). In the scope of Gandhi’s political economy, khadi was necessary to address the economic and moral needs of the Indian masses. In promoting the khadi programme, Gandhi articulated an unequivocal opposition to industrialism and, by extension, state socialism. Labor-saving machinery, according to Gandhi, was highly detrimental to the lives of rural Indians; it was antagonistic to both man’s labor and true civilization: “Machinery has begun to desolate Europe. Ruination is now knocking at the English gates. Machinery is the chief symbol of modern civilisation; it represents a great sin” (69). While states- men like Nehru urged state-sponsored large-scale industrialization to bring India’s economy onto the globalized stage (70), Gandhi insisted that “India does not need to be industrialised in the modern sense of the term” (71). His apathy towards state socialism was grounded in this uncompromising opposition to industrialism: if industrialism was a necessary step in implementing socialist policies, he would reject those policies. However, while khadi was avowedly anti-industrialist, it was not unambiguously anti-modern. Just as Gandhi’s political philosophy resembles neoliberal ethical formation by erasing the structural role of colonialism, khadi does the same by erasing the structural role of capitalism. Gandhi’s political economy addressed the problem of inequality primarily on the individual level by pleading for necessary changes in lifestyle to limit one’s needs and conceptualizing the economy in moral terms. The cultivation of individual economic health apart from the travails of industrialism and heavy machinery was the guiding principle in Gandhi’s political economy: ethics and morality became co-opted by the logic of neoliberal individualism. The more structural features of khadi -- its production, distribution, exchange and consumption schemes-- also reinforce aspects of neoliberal economy and ideology. The confluence of a lack of state regulation and the supremacy of individual will in the context of atomized, self-sufficient villages is not far from the neoliberal ideal that reifies individual rights and competitive market relations (72). Just as neoliberal ideology obscures class conflict by dissuading class consciousness through the vocabulary of individualism, the moral and ideological ramifications of khadi portray class warfare as an instrument of social violence and disharmony (73). Gandhian political economy sought to resolve economic inequality by pre- serving human dignity rather than ensuring material gains (74). Gandhi’s political economy, in sum, was not so distant from modern neoliberalism. Conclusion: Confronting the Postmodern Turn in Postcolonial Studies Thus, Gandhi’s political philosophy and political economy were not divorced from Western modernity. Contrary to the writings of most historians and political theorists of contemporary India, I suggest that Gandhi’s political thought closely resembles neoliberal ideology, social relations, and economy even while it may seem, on inspection, unequivocally anti-modern. The methodological individual- ism that undergirds his conceptualization of swaraj, the centrality of caste and labor division in his political ideal of Ramarajya and his khadi programme all point to significant conceptual linkages to neoliberal capitalism. Through a critical reading of his work, I contend that Gandhi was not above modernity: he was entrenched in the systems, structures, and ideologies of modernity. Understanding Gandhi’s political philosophy as a modern intellectual contribution is crucial in confronting the recent postmodernist and poststructuralist turn in postcolonial studies, which seeks to replace class analysis or history from below with textual analysis and cultural theory (75). This new orientation, through its methodological individualism, depoliticization of the social from the material realm, and wholesale refusal of programmatic politics, is both conservative and authoritarian (76). By prioritizing ideology over existing structures of domination, in other words, it fails to engage with the material realities of colonialism and capitalism. This brand of scholarship, as I prove, uses Gandhi as its shining example. In my paper, I have attempted to dislodge this conventional perception of Gandhi as the embodiment of pure Indian nationalism untouched by Western modernity by pointing to the material implications of his political thought. In doing so, I hope to challenge the postmodern impulse within postcolonial studies. More importantly, I strongly believe that a critical reading of Gandhi is necessary in our contemporary political moment. More than 250 million farm workers in India went on strike in November 2020 to demand better working conditions, including the withdrawal of new anti-farm bills that would deregulate agricultural markets by giving corporations the staggering power to set crop prices far below current minimum rates. Farmers are confronting neoliberal excess in its most globalized form, facing off against Prime Minister Modi as well as dozens of multinational corporations. While invocations of Gandhian political philosophy by far-right figures like Modi are often characterized as erroneous distortions of his thought within liberal nationalist scholarship, in reality they are the logical conclusions of his arguments (77). Within the corpus of Gandhi’s work lie the seeds of neoliberal exploitation. As farmers come to terms with an ever-growing and exploitative globalized economy, a careful examination of Gandhi’s political thought may inform what a just postcolonial future should, and shouldn’t, embody. Endnotes 1 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 1. 2 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 4. 3 Aime Cesaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000), 9. 4 Bipin Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947, (New Delhi, India; Viking, 1998), 14. 5 Sumit Sarkar, Modern India: 1885-1947, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 92. 6 Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy, (Routledge, 2017), 92. 7 Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, 110. 8 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 11. 9 Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (Bombay, India: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1969), 2. 10 Irfan Habib, Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perception, (New Delhi, India: Tulika, 1995), 10. 11 Gyan Prakash, “Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism,” The American Historical Review 99, no. 5 (1994): 1478. 12 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. 13 Shanti Kumar, Gandhi Meets Primetime: Globalization and Nationalism in Indian Television, (Baltimore: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 17. 14 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse, (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 96. 15 Dipesh Chakrabarty and Rochona Majumdar, “Gandhi’s Gita and Politics As Such,” Modern Intellectual History 7, no. 2 (2010): 338. 16 For a good scholarly overview, see Sanjeev Kumar, Gandhi and the Contemporary World, (Taylor and Francis, 2019). 17 Lisa Trivedi, Clothing Gandhi’s Nation: Homespun and Modern India, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), xx. 18 Surinder S. Jodhka, “Nation and Village: Images of Rural India in Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar,” Economic and Political Weekly 37, no. 32 (2002): 3347. 19 Arundhati Roy, The Doctor and The Saint: Caste, Race, and the Annihilation of Caste: The Debate Between B.R. Ambedkar and M.K. Gandhi (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017), 2. 20 Aishwary Kumar, Radical Equality: Ambedkar, Gandhi, and the Risk of Democracy, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017), 338. 21 David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 4. 22 Adom Getachew, Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 107. 23 Gary Wilder, Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 10. 24 Shripad Amrit Dange, Gandhi vs Lenin (Bombay, India: Liberty Literature Company, 1921), 15. 25 Vivek Chibber, Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital (London: Verso, 2013), 282. 26 Karuna Mantena, “On Gandhi’s Critique of the State: Sources, Contexts, Conjunctures,” Modern Intellectual History 9, no. 3 (2012): 535. 27 Mohandas Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 25 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1989), 252. 28 Mohandas Gandhi, Hind Swaraj and Other Writings, ed. Anthony J. Parel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 71. 29 Koneru Ramakrishan Rao, Gandhi’s Dharma, (New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 2017), 105. 30 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 116. 31 Ibid, 71. 32 I conflate these terms carefully: according to Gandhi, religion and morality could not be disentangled. Throughout Hind Swaraj, he emphasizes that they are entirely co-constitutive. 33 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 106. 34 Ibid, 38-39. 35 Ibid. 36 Subho Basu, Does Class Matter? Colonial Capital and Workers Resistance in Bengal, 1890-1937, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 238-62. 37 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 40. 38 Rajmohan Gandhi, Eight Lives: A Study of the Hindu-Muslim Encounter, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 6. 39 Of course, in reality this narrative is not so simple.There was a clear sense of difference and tension between Hindu and Muslim communities long before British rule. However, I argue that Gandhi’s telling of this history erases the role that British colonialism played in intensifying these tensions for political gain. 40 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 12. 41 Jessica Whyte, The Morals of the Market: Human Rights and the Rise of Neoliberalism, (La Vergne: Verso, 2019), 4. 42 Whyte, The Morals of the Market, 8. 43 Pran Nath Chopra, Role of Indian Muslims in the Struggle for Freedom, (New Delhi, India: Light & Life Publishers, 1979), 6. 44 Gandhi, “Letter to H.S.L. Pollack” in Hind Swaraj, 128. 45 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 36. 46 Gandhi, “Letter to H.S.L. Pollack” in Hind Swaraj, 129. 47 Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, 98. 48 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 65. 49 Ibid. 50 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 104. 51 Rao, Gandhi’s Dharma, 210. 52 G.N. Dhawan, The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, (Bombay, India: Popular Book Depot, 1946), 126. 53 Ibid, 282. 54 Raghavan Iyer, The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi, (New York: Oxford University Press), 86. 55 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 66. 56 Ramarajya also poses interesting and important questions about gender and patriarchy in village life, but unfortunately this line of inquiry is outside the scope of this paper. 57 “Swachh Bharat Mission,” Government of India, https://swachhbharatmission.gov.in/sbmcms/index.htm. 58 Swachh Bharat Mission,” Government of India, https://swachhbharatmission.gov.in/sbmcms/index.htm. 59 “PM Modi: Gandhi inspired me to launch Swachh Bharat,” Economic Times, Published October 2, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-modi-gandhi-inspired-me-to-launch-s wachh-bharat/articleshow/66045561.cms?from=mdr. 60 “Hindustan Unilever Limited: Spreading the message of Swachh Aadat across India,” The Hindu, Published April 30, 2018, https://www.thehindu.com/brandhub/hindustan-unilever-limited-spreading-the-message-of-swachh-aadat- across-india/article23729983.ece. 61 Anand Teltumbde, Republic of Caste: Thinking Equality in the Time of Neoliberal Hindutva, (New Delhi, India: Navayana, 2018), 24. 62 Gandhi, “Economic and Moral Development” in Hind Swaraj, 154. 63 Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 22, 143. 64 Ibid, vol. 12, 51. 65 Trivedi, Clothing Gandhi’s Nation, 81. 66 Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 51, 92. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 106. 70 Chibber, Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital, 249. 71 Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 51, 93. 72 Whyte, The Morals of the Market, 12. 73 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 16. 74 Madan Gandhi, Marx and Gandhi: Study in Ideological Polarities, (Chandigarh, India: Vikas Bharti, 1969), 32. 75 Sumit Sarkar, “The Decline of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies,” in Sarkar, Writing Social History (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 83. 76 Arif Dirlik, “The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism,” Critical Inquiry 20:2 (1994): 334. 328-56. 77 Mihir Bose, From Midnight to Glorious Morning? India Since Independence, (London: Haus Publishing, 2017), 122. Works Cited Basu, Subo. Does Class Matter? Colonial Capital and Workers Resistance in Bengal, 1890-1937. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004. Bose, Mihir. From Midnight to Glorious Morning? India Since Independence. London: Haus Publishing. 2017. Bose, Sugata and Ayesha Jalal. Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy. Routledge, 2017. Cesaire, Aime. Discourse on Colonialism. Translated by Joan Pinkham. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000. Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). Chakrabarty, Dipesh and Rochona Majumdar, “Gandhi’s Gita and Politics As Such,” Modern Intellectual History, 7, no. 2 (2010): 335-353 Chandra, Bipin. India’s Struggle for Independence , 1857-1947. New Delhi, India; Viking, 1998. Chatterjee, Partha. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse. Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1993). Chibber, Vivek. Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital. London: Verso, 2013. Chopra, Pran Nath. Role of Indian Muslims in the Struggle for Freedom . New Delhi, India: Light & Life Publishers, 1979. Dange, Shripad Amrit. Gandhi vs Lenin. Bombay, India: Liberty Literature Company, 1921. Dhawan, G.N. The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. Bombay, India: Popular Book Depot, 1946. Dirlik, Arif. “The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism,” Critical Inquiry 20:2 (1994): 328-56. Gandhi, Madhan. Marx and Gandhi: Study in Ideological Polarities. Chandigarh, India: Vikas Bharti, 1969. Gandhi, Mohandas. Hind Swaraj and Other Writings. Edited by Anthony J. Parel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). ———. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 12. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1989. ———. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 22. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1989. ———. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 25. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1989. ———. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 51. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1989. Gandhi, Rajmohan. Eight Lives: A Study of the Hindu-Muslim Encounter. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986). Gellner, Ernst. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Getachew, Adom. Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. Habib, Irfan. Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perception. New Delhi, India: Tulika, 1995. Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. “Hindustan Unilever Limited: Spreading the message of Swachh Aadat across India.” The Hindu. Published April 30, 2018, https://www.thehindu.com/brandhub/hindustan-unilever-limited-spreading-the- message-o f-swa- chh-aadat-across-india/article23729983.ece Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments. Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002. Iyer, Raghavan. The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi. New York: Oxford University Press. Jodhka, Surinder S. “Nation and Village: Images of Rural India in Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar.” Economic and Political Weekly 37, no. 32 (2002): 3343- 3353. Kumar, Aishwary. Radical Equality: Ambedkar, Gandhi, and the Risk of Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017. Kumar, Shanti. Gandhi Meets Primetime: Globalization and Nationalism in Indian Television. Baltimore: University of Illinois Press, 2005. Mantena, Karuna. “On Gandhi’s Critique of the State: Sources, Contexts, Conjunctures.” Modern Intellectual History 9, no. 3 (2012): 535-563. “PM Modi: Gandhi inspired me to launch Swachh Bharat.” Economic Times. Published October 2, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and- nation/pm-modi-gandhi-inspired-me-to-launch-swachh-bharat/ articleshow/66045561.cms?from=mdr. Rao, Koneru Ramakrishan. Gandhi’s Dharma. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 2017. Roy, Arundhati. The Doctor and The Saint: Caste, Race, and the Annihilation of Caste: The Debate Between B.R. Ambedkar and M.K. Gandhi. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017. Sarkar, Sumit. Modern India: 1885-1947. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989. Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar. Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? Bombay, India: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1969. Scott, David. Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004. “Swachh Bharat Mission.” Government of India. https://swachhbharatmission.gov.in/sbmcms/index.htm. Teltumbde, Anand. Republic of Caste: Thinking Equality in the Time of Neoliberal Hindutva. New Delhi, India: Navayana, 2018. Trivedi, Lisa. Clothing Gandhi’s Nation: Homespun and Modern India. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007. Whyte, Jessica. The Morals of the Market: Human Rights and the Rise of Neoliberalism. La Vergne: Verso, 2019). Wilder, Gary. Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015. Previous Next

Sydney White From Bowers to Obergefell: The US Supreme Court's Erratic, Yet Correct, Jurisprudence on Gay Rights Sydney White Abstract: The gay rights movement has seen consistent support from the US Supreme Court over the last 25 years since the ruling in Romer v. Evans (1996). Culminating in recent years with the Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) ruling, which legalized same-sex marriage nation- wide, the Court’s jurisprudence has been an odd combination of internally consistent and erratic. How have the justices reasoned through this shift in their court opinions? How has the Court’s level of scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of sexuality heightened while the level of scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of gender or race has simultaneously lowered? Furthermore, what might this mean for future court battles related to civil rights? In the last 35 years, there has been a rapid shift in laws concerning same-sex conduct and same-sex marriage in the United States. At the time of the 1986 Bowers v. Hardwick decision, 24 states and the District of Columbia outlawed sodomy (1). Although these laws purported to ban sodomy for all couples regardless of their sexual orientation, anti-sodomy statutes were primarily a means of curtailing the sexual activity of gay men (2). Today, by contrast, gay and lesbian couples are allowed to marry throughout the US. This paper explicates this major shift in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, particularly through an examination of the interplay between the due process and equal protection claims made by plaintiffs, as well as through an analysis of American federalism and the conflict between state and federal laws. I argue that such a shift is a normative good, as the right to marry guaranteed in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) grants gay couples greater hospital visitation privileges, marital status for tax purposes (such as inheritances), and ac- cess to numerous other privileges originally only allowed to heterosexual couples (3). Nonetheless, the Court’s jurisprudence over this time raises numerous questions. To what extent did the Court shift its level of scrutiny over the course of 35 years— from Bowers to Obergefell —without explicitly saying so? Is the Court’s use of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause in Obergefell contrived? In my view, the Court’s decision in Obergefell should not have been seen as a surprise; indeed, it was a natural extension of the Court’s jurisprudence on gay rights since Romer v. Evans (1996). Nonetheless, the Court’s equal protection and due process jurisprudence is riddled with inconsistencies on these issues, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts were right to point out the Court’s erratic invocation of different levels of scrutiny. Background and History: From Bowers to Lawrence Although overruled by Lawrence v. Texas (2003), Justice White’s and Justice Pow- ell’s reasoning in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) relies heavily on historical and precedential claims regarding the Due Process Clause. In 1982, a police officer entered the home of Michael Hardwick and found him having sex with another man. Hardwick’s conduct was illegal under a Georgia law prohibiting sodomy, which was defined as “any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another” (4). Although the district attorney decided not to prosecute, Hardwick filed a suit against Georgia’s attorney general, Michael Bowers, arguing that the anti-sodomy law was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected Hardwick’s claim. In the majority opinion, Justice White argued that no precedent had announced a right resembling that of the “claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy.” He, along with Justice Burger in a concurring opinion, indicated that proscriptions against sodomy have ancient roots in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards. In a more explicitly legal argument, they also suggested that anti-sodomy statutes were inherited from English common law and were thus enacted in colonial America. Their conception of fundamental rights is oddly similar to that discussed in later case Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), as it sought to consider any substantive due process claims by utilizing the framework of tradition and history as the precedent (5). In his dissent, Justice Stevens put forth a principle that would render itself crucial to future gay rights cases, arguing that “a policy of selective application must be supported by a neutral and legitimate interest—something more substantial than a habitual dislike for, or ignorance about, the disfavored group” (6). In the case of Bowers , for example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor inquired whether there was a legitimate state interest in curtailing homosexual conduct as a means to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS among gay men. In response, Harvard University Law Professor Laurence Tribe, on behalf of Hardwick, indicated that this was not Georgia’s stated interest. Furthermore, various amici curiae briefs submitted in the case argued instead that anti-sodomy statutes would be counterproductive in mitigating the spread of HIV/AIDS (7). With this in mind, it is clear that Justices Powell and Burger were correct: Georgia’s actual interest was seemingly the prevention of immoral conduct, and nothing more. As such, the Court has had to grapple with the question of whether a morality-based interest is sufficient to justify discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Although the Georgia sodomy statute was upheld in Bowers , the later Romer v. Evans (1996) case proved to be more of a success for gay rights advocates, as Justice Kennedy did not consider the morality interest to be sufficient to justify a statute against sodomy. This case arose as the state of Colorado passed a series of local ordinances that sought to ban discrimination in many sectors, including housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and welfare services.8 Notably, it contained a ban on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. This ban prompted Colorado voters to pass “Amendment 2,” which precluded future action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their sexual orientation. In this case, the Court considered whether the state of Colorado provided a sufficient rational basis for singling out gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, which the state justified on the basis of respecting citizens’ freedom of association and, in particular, the liberty of landlords or employers who had personal or religious objections to homosexuality (9). Nonetheless, in his majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy argued that such a rationale was too broad to allow for deference to the state, as it had no legitimate purpose or discrete objective (10). In contrast to Justice Kennedy, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the morality rationale was sufficient and that the Court was undermining the majority will of Americans (11). Scalia contended that Kennedy’s notion of animus—or decision-making motivated solely by dislike for a particular group—is allowed in various arenas of life. He noted: “But I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible—murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals—and could exhibit even ‘animus’ toward such conduct” (12). Scalia’s equivalation of murder and cruelty to animals to homosexuality was likely reprehensible then, as is it now. However, it also points to a crucial misconception in this case: that landlords or other groups of people may be discriminating against queer people on the basis of their conduct . In the Court’s hearing of Romer , Scalia argued that if one criminalizes homosexual conduct [ Bowers ], then it follows that one can discriminate against homosexuals as well (13). What Scalia failed to understand, however, and what lead counsel and future Colorado Supreme Court Justice Jean Dubofsky pointed out on behalf of respondents, is that Romer was about both conduct and sexual orientation. A person may be perceived as gay (when they are not) by a landlord, for example, and then discriminated against. In this regard, Scalia’s analogy does not hold, as murder, polygamy, and cruelty to animals are all forms of conduct, while homophobia can be directed at people regardless of whether or not they actually engage in homosexual conduct. In this regard, Scalia’s conflation of conduct and sexual orientation renders his analogy regarding the possibility for morality-based animus less persuasive. Scalia’s second argument was that the Court is an insulated institution of justices that have graduated from elite law schools, and so it had no business pushing its morality onto the good people of Colorado in Romer (14). While Scalia’s notion may have been theoretically viable, he failed to consider how his conception operates in a greater historical context. For example, as Laurence Tribe, counsel to Michael Hardwick, argued in the Bowers hearing, the majority of people in Virginia did not think that interracial liaisons were moral at the time of Loving v. Virginia (1967) (15). If the Court had relied on Scalia’s majoritarian claim regarding gay rights, volmany generally agreed upon cases, such as Loving , would have been decided differently. Following Romer , the Court made several decisions in favor of the gay community, such as in Lawrence v. Texas (2003). Lawrence mirrored the Bowers case in many regards, as it involved a police intrusion into the home of two men, John Lawrence Jr. and Tyron Garner, who were purportedly having sex (16). It differed in two crucial dimensions. For one, the Texas statute in question was specifically directed at prohibiting homosexual sodomy, while the Georgia law in Bowers targeted sodomy in general. The second difference was that Lawrence’s counsel, Paul Smith, argued that the Texas statute violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution, not just the Due Process Clause (17). Justice Kennedy argued in the majority opinion of the Court that the Texas statute was a violation of substantive due process, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor claimed that it also violated the Equal Protection Clause so its potential violation of the Due Process Clause need not be decided (18). Kennedy relied on two precedents in his jurisprudence in Lawrence : Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) for substantive due process and Romer v. Evans (1996) for equal protection (19). In Casey , the Court introduced a new substantive due process claim: dignity and respect for autonomy (20). As mentioned in regard to Romer , the Court started to level up its scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; Colorado gave a rationale regarding freedom of association, but the majority found that this was not a sufficient basis for Amendment 2. In Lawrence , Kennedy quotes Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers, in which he claimed that “individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons” (21). Following this logic, Kennedy disagreed with the Bowers decision, and it was overruled by Lawrence . Analysis of Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence indicates the potential legal consequences that could have arisen if Justice Kennedy had not drawn on precedents from both Casey and Romer . O’Connor argued that the fact that the Texas statute was only aimed at same-sex sodomy resulted in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Unlike Kennedy, O’Connor did not rely on Casey but rather the liberal precedent of Romer (22). In her rational basis analysis, she asserted that “moral disapproval of [homosexuals], like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause” (23). O’Connor’s decision in Lawrence was therefore much narrower and more minimalist than Kennedy’s, as she implied that a sodomy statute would still be constitutional while a same-sex sodomy statute would not. If O’Connor’s minimalist stance had been adopted by the rest of the Court, however, it seems that very little change would have occurred. In The Most Activist Court in Supreme Court History , Thomas M. Kerk notes that O’Connor’s reasoning would have only rendered four states’ same-sex anti-sodomy statutes unconstitutional (24). States would have still been able to adopt anti-sodomy statutes in general, and in practice, these statutes would likely only have been applied in same-sex cases. Consequently, Kennedy’s use of legal reasoning from both Casey (substantive due process) and Romer (equal protection) was imperative to establishing a precedent in Lawrence that resulted in legitimate change for the privacy and dignity of same-sex couples (25). The Shift After Lawrence: The Legal Fight for Same-Sex Marriage Following Lawrence , change was certainly on the horizon for same-sex couples in the US, particularly with regard to marriage. Evan Gerstmann, Professor of Political Science at Loyola Marymount University, argues in Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution that Lawrence paved the way for lower courts to overturn bans on same- sex marriage (26). In November 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health that the state’s ban on same-sex marriage lacked a rational basis. The state had provided justifications for the ban, including “providing a ‘favorable setting for procreation,’” ensuring an optimal setting for child-rearing, and preserving state resources. Still, the Court rejected all three claims, stating that “...the [Massachusetts same-sex] marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due process or equal protection.” As a result, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex marriage (27). As more states began to allow same-sex marriage and the topic penetrated the national conversation, federal challenges concerning the definition of marriage reached the Supreme Court, such as in the 2013 case of United States v. Windsor . This case challenged the legality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which Congress had enacted in 1996 (28). In Windsor , Thea Spyer and Edith Windsor had been in a committed relationship since 1963. In the 2000s, they were living in New York, which recognized same-sex marriage ordained elsewhere but would not legalize same-sex marriage itself for a few more years (29). As Spyer’s health deteriorated, the couple married in Ontario, Canada and then returned to New York. Upon her death, Spyer left Windsor all that she had. Although the couple had been married, Windsor was unable to claim a marital estate tax exemption due to Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage as the “legal union between one man and one woman” (30). As a result, Windsor was required to pay $363,053 in estate taxes. For a heterosexual, federally sanctioned marriage, the entire estate tax would have been waived. When Windsor sought a refund, the Internal Revenue Service refused and claimed that Windsor was not a surviving spouse (31). Although Windsor had to first prove she had standing in the case, the central question in Windsor was whether or not the Defense of Marriage Act violated her right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment (32). Indeed, the Court found that the federal government failed to provide a sufficient rationale for DOMA, but did not explicitly point to the level of scrutiny that it used to come to this conclusion. During the hearing of Windsor , Paul D. Clement, who represented the House of Representatives, implored the justices to adhere to the rational basis test. He also provided the apparent justification of the federal government for the act: uniformity of the definition of marriage across states. DOMA had been passed in 1996, just as same-sex marriage was starting to be considered at the state level. In Clement’s view, Congress at the time became concerned that same-sex couples would travel to other states to be legally wed and then return to a state in which their marriage was not valid and insist that it remained so (33). Nonetheless, reading from a 1996 House Report, Justice Kagan pointed out another potential legislative rationale for DOMA, which was that “Congress decided to reflect an honor of collective moral judgment and to express moral disapproval of homosexuality” (34). Clement then argued that the report’s revelation of the intentions of some legislators did not necessarily lead to a failure of the rational basis test (35). Moreover, in his dissent in Windsor , Justice Scalia emphasized the rationale of uniformity, as well as his decades-old notion (dating back to Romer ) that the Constitution does not forbid the government to enforce traditional moral and sexual norms (36). Traditionally, sexual orientation has been relegated to the sphere of rational basis tests— immediate scrutiny often includes sex or gender and heightened scrutiny is often in regard to race (37). The level of scrutiny utilized is crucial to the level of protection given to a select class. The rational basis test, or rational review, is generally used in cases where no fundamental rights are at stake. In Windsor , Scalia also slighted Kennedy and the rest of those in the majority for their unwillingness to announce that they were using anything more than a rational basis test in their conclusion—a critical shift in the jurisprudence of gay rights cases. Scalia berated the majority members for their leveling up of protection for sexual orientation, writing that: “The opinion does not resolve and indeed does not even mention what had been the central question in this litigation: whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for more than mere rationality” (38). While the justices in the majority did not indicate that they were utilizing heightened scrutiny, it is notable that Justice Breyer pointed out in the Windsor hearing that for “rational basis-plus,” the rationale of uniformity might not be sufficient (39). Although flippant, this points to the possibility that the liberal justices were consciously raising the level of scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Scalia’s critique also points to a more serious concern for proponents of civil rights: erratic levels of scrutiny are not only the case for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but now also for discrimination on the basis of race. Berkeley Law Professor Russell Robinson argued that the Court has decidedly leveled up some types of scrutiny, particularly for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, while it has lowered it for issues of race (40). Arkansas Law Professor Susannah Pollvogt took this a step further, arguing that Kennedy’s analysis regarding the discrimination ordinance in Romer (1996) is incompatible with his analysis in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action (2014). In Schuette , Michigan voters had enacted a similar ordinance to that discussed in Romer which precluded future protections based on race, and Kennedy found that such an ordinance was constitutional (41). In this regard, it does seem that Scalia was correct: the justices that supported gay rights issues over the last 25 years had seemingly changed their level of scrutiny without announcing it. Although this may seem like a win to gay rights advocates, unconscious or unannounced changes regarding the Court’s level of scrutiny can have profound effects, particularly as the Court levels down its protections for race and gender. Windsor and Obergefell: A Resolution... Beyond the rational basis test, the Court was concerned about whether DOMA intruded on the principle of federalism and if the federal government could im- pose one uniform idea of marriage on the states (42). Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor suggests that the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges may not resolve the concern with federalism. He indicates that in Windsor, federalism was of grave concern to the majority and that a future case that would establish same-sex marriage at a federal level could meet serious challenges from the Court. He wrote that state governments are delegated authority on the matter of marriage and divorce, quoting Haddock v. Haddock (1906) (43). In this regard, he asserted that “DOMA, because of its reach and extent, departs from this history and tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage” (44). In a 2014 article entitled “Federalism as a Way Station, Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion,” Duke University Law Professor Neil S. Siegel acknowledged that the Court concocted their decision in Windsor to a certain degree (45). It is clear that imbued in the majority opinion was concern for federalism, equal protection, and substantive due process, but it is not as easy to discern where each concern lies or originates. In particular, Siegel noted the difference between Scalia and Roberts’ dissents. Roberts, for example, read the majority opinion as being concerned with federalism, although he himself thought that Windsor lacked standing (46). Scalia, by contrast, thought that the majority was more concerned with the malice directed at same-sex couples by the federal government, and, consequently, its intention to impose inequalities and restrictions on same-sex couples (47). Siegel argues that the Court resisted making a definitive judgment on either side and instead used the concept of federalism to push the country towards marriage equality. Thus, the rhetoric of federalism employed by Kennedy in the majority opinion, as well as the majority’s choice not to announce the level of scrutiny applied, may be used by the Court as a way station to a future resolution. Popularized by constitutional law scholar Alexander Bickel, this approach would seek to invite, as opposed to resolve, national conversation (48). Siegel’s interpretation may suggest that federalism was less of a concern to Kennedy and rather a means of rhetoric to push the Court in one direction. Obergefell v. Hodges itself also provides clearer guidance as to why the federalism notion in Windsor can be disregarded. In Obergefell , Justice Kennedy rooted his decision in the ever-changing due process jurisprudence, citing marriage as a fundamental right laid out in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) and Loving v. Virginia (1967) (49). Nonetheless, the Court hesitated to enforce a federal definition of marriage onto the states. At the onset of the hearing, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg asked Mary Bonauto, counsel for Obergefell, how to square the Windsor case with Obergefell , a case in which “the Court stressed the government’s historic deference to the States when it comes to matters of domestic relations” (50). Although Bonauto agreed with Justice Ginsburg’s characterization of Windsor , she suggested that Obergefell differed in an important way: the Court’s failure to affirm the right to same-sex marriage would result in a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Conversely, in Windsor , the Court struck down a definition of marriage for the states because it prevented equal protection. The two cases are thus an inversion of one another in this regard, allowing Obergefell to overcome the federalism concern of Windsor . On a constitutional level, however, Obergefell intertwined the notions of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in a manner akin to that of Lawrence . Indeed, Obergefell relied heavily on precedents from Lawrence, Romer , and Casey which were imperative for differentiating Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence . A similar process seemingly occurred with Obergefell . NYU Law Professor of Law Kenji Yoshino argues that while the Court relied on both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, it put greater faith in fundamental rights claims (51). In Loving , the equality and liberty claims were made in parallel to one another (52). In Obergefell , Justice Kennedy described them as interrelated and unable to be captured fully without one another. But just as O’Connor’s equal protection concurrence in Lawrence would have only resulted in the striking down of same-sex sodomy statutes, the enforcement of Obergefell may have been weaker had Kennedy not invoked the substantive due process claim in his decision. Theoretically, the Court’s use of both clauses should have prompted states to level up their protection for same-sex couples, as opposed to exiting the marriage licensing business altogether. As Yoshino notes, this was a concern in South Africa’s 2005 decision to legalize same-sex marriage, in which the Constitutional Court of South Africa warned against their “levelling down” of marriage licensing in the wake of the decision (53). Nonetheless, although the US Supreme Court attempted to use both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in Obergefell to mitigate such practices, the enforcement of Obergefell was not necessarily easy. One prominent example concerned Kim Davis, a county clerk in Kentucky, who refused to grant a marriage certificate to a same-sex couple on the grounds of freedom of religion (54). Yoshino asserts that actors such as Kim Davis “violate a due process ruling in a way that would not violate an equal protection ruling” (55). Such a sentiment mirrors the potential outcome of O’Connor’s opinion in Lawrence —had her opinion been carried out, the decision would have been toothless. Indeed, the entire jurisprudence of the Court in the area of gay rights seems to have some sort of internal consistency. This raises the question: following Romer and Lawrence , was Obergefell predictable? Ron Kahn, James Monroe Professor of Politics and Law at Oberlin College, argues that Obergefell could have been predicted by commentators that recognized the Court’s combination of formalist and realist conceptions of gay rights (56). At first glance, the Rehnquist Court and Roberts Court jurisprudence on issues of sexual orientation is a bit surprising, as Kahn remarks: “... the Supreme Court has reaffirmed and expanded implied fundamental rights and equal protection under the law for gay men and lesbians during a period of political dominance by social conservatives, evangelical Christians, and other groups who view the protection of their definition of family values as a central mission of government” (57). Integral to Kahn’s conception of the Supreme Court over these decades is whether or not justices understand the bidirectionality between legal principles (a more formalistic conception) and the “lived lives of individuals” (a more realistic conception) (58). In Windsor , for example, Kahn asserts that Justice Kennedy engaged in a realist form of decision-making as he discussed the burdens that DOMA placed on same-sex couples with regard to their married and family lives.59 Kahn traces this bidirectionality from Lawrence to Obergefell , arguing that he was able to anticipate Obergefell insofar as the case was internally consistent with its precedents, and it relied on the bidirectionality of realism and formalism (60). Final Remarks It seems less likely that Kahn could have anticipated the later developments of the Court’s jurisprudence on gay rights issues, particularly with the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights (2018). In this case, Jack Philips, a Colorado baker and owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, refused to create a wedding cake for a gay couple (61). Notably, this interaction occurred in 2012 before the Obergefell decision. Relying on the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, the Court ruled in a 7–2 decision that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s decision in favor of the gay couple violated the First Amendment. Kahn’s framework does not seem to suit this case; indeed, if the Court had an understanding of the lived lives of gay people, and the discrimination that they face, it may have provided greater weight to the commission. Instead, the Court found that the Commission had “clear and impermissible hostility” toward Philips (62). In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts asserted that the commission’s hostility revealed that Philips was not afforded the neutrality mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. Cases such as Masterpiece Cakeshop certainly cast doubt on the progress of gay rights advocacy. Regardless, gay rights advocates have achieved a series of victories over the last 35 years, from Romer in regard to discrimination ordinances, to Lawrence in regard to anti-sodomy statutes, to Windsor and Obergefell as the Court redefined marriage to include same-sex couples. Backlash, however, is still probable. Indeed, the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s decision in Goodrich in November of 2003 was likened to “an early Christmas gift to Republicans” prior to Massachusetts Senator John Kerry’s bid for the presidency in 2004 (63). Although Obergefell should have been anticipated, it certainly highlights the Court’s continued inability to state its level of scrutiny in regard to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which lends itself to conservative critiques. Many commentators have also found it problematic that the Court has leveled up its protection for sexual orientation while it it has simultaneously leveled it down for race. Nonetheless, it is promising that the Court has provided greater civil rights for the gay community. The Court’s internal consistency should be kept in mind for proponents of gay equality—even if its jurisprudence has been correct. The future of civil rights litigation hinges on it. Endnotes 1 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186. (U.S. Supreme Court 1986). See Justice White’s majority opinion. 2 Ibid. See Justice Stevens’ dissent. 3 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (U.S. Supreme Court 2015). See Justice Kennedy’s opinion, in which he lists the aspects of life in which rights are conferred on married couples: taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decision-making authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and visitation rules. 4 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186. (U.S. Supreme Court 1986). 5 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702. (U.S. Supreme Court 1997). 6 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186. (U.S. Supreme Court 1986). See Justice Stevens’ dissent. 7 Ibid. See oral argument. This line of questioning starts at 51:50. O’Connor states “Perhaps the state [of Georgia] can say its desire to deter the spread of a communicable disease or something of that sort,” to which Mr. Tribe replies. 8 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620. (U.S. Supreme Court 1996). See Justice Kennedy’s opinion. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 In Romer, Scalia argued that a ‘politically-powerful minority’ is acting against the majority will of Colorado: “the majority of citizens [is attempting] to preserve its view of sexual morality state wide against the efforts of a geographically concentrated and politically powerful minority to undermine it.” 12 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620. (U.S. Supreme Court 1996). Opinion Announcement - May 20, 1996. 13 Ibid. See oral argument: 52:57-53:36. Scalia asks: “It seems to me the legitimacy of the one follows from the legitimacy of the other. If you can criminalize it, surely you can take that latter step, can’t you?... Doesn’t... if the one is constitutional, must not the other one be?” 14 Ibid. 15 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186. (U.S. Supreme Court 1986). See oral argument: 35:41. Tribe states: “But, as this Court recognized in Loving against Virginia, where also a majority of the people of Virginia believed that interracial liaisons were inherently immoral and where for a long time a lot of people had believed that, this Court did not think that the Constitution’s mission was to freeze that historical vision into place.” 16 Dahlia Lithwick, “Extreme Makeover: The Story behind the Story of Lawrence v. Texas,” The New Yorker, Mar. 4, 2012, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/12/extreme-makeover-dahlia-lithwick. 17 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (U.S. Supreme Court 2003). See oral argument: 1:48-2:10. 18 Ibid. See Justice O’Connor concurrence. 19 Ibid. See Kennedy opinion. 20 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (U.S. Supreme Court 1992). 21 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (U.S. Supreme Court 2003). See Kennedy opinion. 22 Thomas M. Kerk, The Most Activist Court in Supreme Court History: The Road to Modern Judicial Conservatism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 219. 23 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (U.S. Supreme Court 2003). See Justice O’Connor concurrence. 24 Kerk, The Most Activist Court in Supreme Court History, 219. 25 Kenji Yoshino, “A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges,” Harvard Law Review 129, no. 147 (2015): 173. 26 Evan Gerstmann, Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution: We All Deserve The Freedom To Marry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), xii. 27 Ibid, xiii. 28 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (U.S. Supreme Court 2013). See Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. 29 N. S. Siegel, “Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion,” Journal of Legal Analysis 6, no. 1 (2014): 89, https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/lau002. 30 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (U.S. Supreme Court 2013). See Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. 31 Ibid. 32 In Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (U.S. Supreme Court 2013), the petitioners were denied standing. This was certainly a concern for Windsor; Roberts’ opinion indicated that he would have denied standing here as well. 33 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (U.S. Supreme Court 2013). Oral argument: 1:06:05. Clement gives the example of Hawaii here, which had considered legalizing same- sex marriage around the time that DOMA was enacted. 34 Ibid. Oral argument: 1:14:16. 35 Ibid. Oral argument: 1:14:40. Clement’s rebuttal was that the improper motive of a few legislators does not mean that DOMA would necessarily fail the rational-basis test: “This Court, even when it’s to find more heightened scrutiny, the O’Brien case we cite, it suggests, Look, we are not going to strike down a statute just because a couple of legislators may have had an improper motive.” 36 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (U.S. Supreme Court 2013). See Justice Scalia’s dissent. 37 Legal Information Institute at Cornell Law. “Strict Scrutiny. https://www.law.cornell. edu/wex/strict_scrutiny. 38 Ibid. See Scalia’s dissent. 39 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (U.S. Supreme Court 2013). See oral argument: 1:17:41. 40 Russell K. Robinson, “Unequal Protection,” Stanford Law Review 68, no. 1 (2016): 151. 41 Susannah William Pollvogt, “Thought Experiment: What If Justice Kennedy Had Approached Romer v. Evans the Way He Approached Schuette v. BAMN?,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2436616. 42 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (U.S. Supreme Court 2013). See oral argument: 1:16:09. Kennedy stated: “The question is whether or not the Federal government, under our federalism scheme, has the authority to regulate marriage.” 43 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (U.S. Supreme Court 2013). See Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. 44 Ibid. 45 Siegel, “Federalism as a Way Station,” 87. 46 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (U.S. Supreme Court 2013). See Roberts’ dissent. 47 Siegel, “Federalism as a Way Station,” 90. 48 Ibid, 87. 49 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (U.S. Supreme Court 2015). See Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. 50 Ibid. See oral argument. Within seconds (0:52), Justice Ginsburg asked this question: “What do you do with the Windsor case where the court stressed the Federal government’s historic deference to States when it comes to matters of domestic relations?” 51 Yoshino, “A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges ,” 148. 52 Ibid, 172. 53 Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, No. ZACC 19 (Constitutional Court of South Africa 2006). The Honorable Justice Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court of South Africa: “Levelling down so as to deny access to civil marriage to all would not promote the achievement of the enjoyment of equality. Such parity of exclusion rather than of inclusion would distribute resentment evenly, instead of dissipating it equally for all. The law concerned with family formation and marriage requires equal celebration, not equal marginalisation; it calls for equality of the vineyard and not equality of the graveyard.” 54 Alan Blinder and Tamar Lewin, “Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail Over Deal on Same- Sex Marriage,” New York Times , Sept. 3, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davis-same-sex-marriage.html. 55 Yoshino, “A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges ,” 173. 56 Ronald Kahn, “The Right to Same-Sex Marriage: Formalism, Realism, and Social Change in Lawrence (2003), Windsor (2013), & Obergefell (2015),” Maryland Law Review 75, no. 1 (2015): 271–311. 57 Ibid, 272. 58 Ibid, 275. 59 Ibid, 292. 60 Ibid, 302. “...specifically, Obergefell cannot be explained only on the basis of either formalist or realist elements.” 61 Noah Feldman and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Law , Twentieth edition, University Casebook Series (St. Paul: Foundation Press, 2019). Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. ___, 138 (2018). 62 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court 2018). 63 Michael J. Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage (New York: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2012), 183. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/swarthmore/detail.action?pqorigsite=primo&docID=5746877#. Bibliography Blinder, Alan, and Tamar Lewin. “Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail Over Deal on Same-Sex Marriage.” New York Times , Sept. 3, 2015. https://www.ny-times.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davis-same-sex- marriage.html. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186. (U.S. Supreme Court 1986). Gerstmann, Evan. Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution: We All Deserve The Freedom To Marry . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Feldman, Noah, and Kathleen M. Sullivan. Constitutional Law . Twentieth edition. University Casebook Series. St. Paul: Foundation Press, 2019. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (U.S. Supreme Court 2013). Kahn, Ronald. “The Right to Same-Sex Marriage: Formalism, Realism, and Social Change in Lawrence (2003), Windsor (2013), & Obergefell (2015).” Maryland Law Review 75, no. 1 (2015): 271–311. Kerk, Thomas M. The Most Activist Court in Supreme Court History: The Road to Modern Judicial Conservatism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004. Klarman, Michael J. From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2012. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (U.S. Supreme Court 2003). Lithwick, Dahlia. “Extreme Makeover: The Story behind the Story of Lawrence v. Texas.” The New Yorker, Mar. 4, 2012. https://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2012/03/12/extreme-makeover- dahlia-lithwick. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court 2018). Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, No. ZACC 19 (Constitutional Court of South Africa 2006). Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (U.S. Supreme Court 2015). Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (U.S. Supreme Court 1992). Pollvogt, Susannah William. “Thought Experiment: What If Justice Kennedy Had Approached Romer v. Evans the Way He Approached Schuette v. BAMN?” SSRN Electronic Journal , 2014. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2436616. Robinson, Russell K. “Unequal Protection.” Stanford Law Review 68, no. 1 (2016): 151–233. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620. (U.S. Supreme Court 1996). Siegel, N. S. “Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion.” Journal of Legal Analysis 6, no. 1 (2014): 87–150. https://doi. org/10.1093/jla/lau002. Legal Information Institute at Cornell Law. “Strict Scrutiny. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (U.S. Supreme Court 2013). Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702. (U.S. Supreme Court 1997). Yoshino, Kenji. “A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges.” Harvard Law Review 129, no. 147 (2015): 147-179. Previous Next

Travis Harper More Than Just a Thought Crime? A Retributivist View of Hate Crime Legislation Travis Harper Most are familiar with the common conception of a hate crime: a violent act that involves some form of animus towards a particular group, usually a protected class. “Hate crimes” are considered to be more morally reprehensible than their counterparts that are not motivated by any particular animus or hatred. Accordingly, different jurisdictions have enacted legislation criminalizing these types of acts, oftentimes associating them with harsher penalties than crimes committed for other reasons. Still, while hate crimes seem like a simple and intuitive concept, the actual statutes that different legislatures enacted to criminalize them tend to vary in their definitions and application. In the United States, for example, anyone who “willfully causes bodily injury to any person... because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person” shall be found guilty of a federal hate crime (1). Germany, however, takes a different approach. While “under German criminal law, ‘politically motivated’ (2) hate crimes do not constitute explicit offenses or give rise automatically to higher sentences,” judges have a wide latitude to take aggravating factors into account when sentencing (3). Germany does , however, have a statute which criminalizes those who “incite hatred against” and “violate the human dignity” of populations or individuals on “account of their belonging to a... national, racial, or religious group or a group defined by their ethnic origin” (4) Clearly, the concept of a hate crime is not as intuitive as it seems to be. Thus, the question remains: What is a “hate crime”? Moral and legal theorists have wrestled with this same question, along with raising other concerns. “Hate crimes” are unique in that their mens rea element, the requisite intent of the perpetrator in order to be found guilty of the crime, typically entails proving some form of hatred or bias. Thus, hate crimes effectively criminalize specific “hateful” mental states. Whether or not a person has committed a hate crime does not depend on their actual physical actions; rather, it depends on their motivations in doing so—whether they did so because of some animus towards their victim or a particular group of people. Naturally, this begs the question: To what extent is this justified? Can we punish offenders for their motivations in committing a crime along with their actions? Heidi Hurd, lawyer and legal theorist, sought to answer questions akin to these in her article, “Why Liberals Should Hate ‘Hate Crime Legislation’.” In doing so, Hurd argues that when “hatred and bias are construed as mens rea elements... they [become] alien to traditional criminal law principles”(5). She also argues that hate crime legislation—at least how it is conceived of today—is unjustifiable. Specifically, Hurd outlines that hate crime legislation has no place within our “act-centered theory of criminal punishment” and “liberal theory of legislation” because of the way it effectively criminalizes “emotional states... [that] constitute standing character traits rather than occurrent mental states (intentions, purposes, choices etc.)” (6). Hurd’s critique is quite comprehensive and forces all advocates for hate crime legislation to ask themselves: is there any justification for hate crime legislation that is in line with a liberal theory of legislation? This is the question that this paper seeks to answer. Through a critical analysis of Hurd’s argument, references to other legal theorists and philosophers, and empirical evidence, I will argue that within a retributivist theory of punishment, hate crime legislation is justifiable and morally accept- able. A retributivist theory of punishment prioritizes proportionality, the principle that the punishment associated with a crime varies based upon the severity of the crime, or how morally reprehensible the crime is, which can be determined by the amount of harm an action causes. I will argue that hate crimes cause more severe harm to the victim than do crimes committed for other reasons. Further, since hate crimes are unique in that they cause harm to both the victim and their community, they constitute both a public and private harm. Thus, not only is it morally acceptable, but rather it is required to make hate crimes distinct within the criminal law with increased punishment compared to crimes that are not committed due to any particular animus. Further, I will argue that hate crime legislation does not merely criminalize mental states or political beliefs; rather it criminalizes the explicit intent to cause increased harm to a specific group of people. This is a standard that any hate crime statute should make abundantly clear. It is worthwhile to clarify what this paper does not seek to address. This paper will not weigh the merits of a retributivist’s conception of punishment against that of a consequentialist; surely, a consequentialist’s justification of hate crime legislation would be vastly different, most likely focusing on the possible benefit that could arise from specifically criminalizing hate crimes. Additionally, the paper will not analyze hate crimes and hate crime legislation from a sociological perspective; rather, it will focus on the moral and philosophical implications that legislators must consider when drafting hate crime legislation. Hurd’s Argument Within her critique of hate crime legislation, Hurd offers two possible arguments in support of making hate crimes distinct within the criminal law, entailing harsh- er punishment. The first of these relies upon a precedent within Anglo-American common law. Specifically, it is not uncommon for those who have “particularly vicious reasons for action” to be more harshly punished (7). For example, some jurisdictions have enhanced punishments for pre-meditated murder, those that deliberately take the life of another. Hurd also highlights the existence of “specific intent crimes,” or “crimes that require defendants to commit prohibited actions with certain further purposes” (8). Burglary, for instance, is an example of a specific intent crime as it requires that someone “must break and enter with some further intention, say to steal, rape, or kill” (9). Hurd posits that neither of these doctrines serve as justifications for hate crime legislation, primarily due to her contention that “hatred” and “bias” are emotional states, not occurrent mental states like intentions. If this is the case, then hate crime legislation is inherently criminalizing mental states, leaving those who support hate crime legislation with two lines of argumentation. Firstly, they might argue that the types of hatred and bias typical to hate crime legislation, contending that, for example, “racial hatred or gender bias is morally worse than greed, jealousy, and revenge” (10), or any other motive for that matter. Secondly, they might further a utilitarian argument, claiming that “hatred and bias are uniquely responsive to criminal sanctions in a way that greed, jealousy and vengeance are not” (11). Both of these arguments, however, violate liberalism in the way that they arbitrarily choose a specific motive to be either considerably more morally reprehensible or responsive to criminal sanctions. I take two main responses to Hurd’s argument. First, I take issue with Hurd’s characterization of hatred and bias when they are construed as mens rea elements; hatred and bias can be considered to be occurrent mental states when they are understood as the intent of the actor to create the increased harms associated with hate crimes, not just the actor’s bigoted views in and of themselves. Second, even if this were the case, and hate crimes did criminalize bigoted views, I argue that considering hatred and bias to be particularly culpable mental states is justified. Hate crimes are considerably more morally reprehensible than crimes committed for other reasons because of the aforementioned increased harm they cause, and they deserve increased punishment accordingly. I will address these two concerns separately. Hate Crimes and Specific Intent Crimes One of the key concerns that Hurd addresses is the extent to which hate crime legislation can be drafted within the bounds of liberalism and Anglo-American Common Law. One of Hurd’s main contentions within her article is that hate crime legislation, at least in the way that it is conceived of today, criminalizes emotions or dispositions, as opposed to occurrent mental states. I argue that this is not the case, because of the fact that hate crime legislation does not and should not criminalize the mere fact that a perpetrator holds a specific belief; rather, it should criminalize their intention to cause specific harms to their victim and the victim’s community at large. Michael Moore, in his work The Moral Worth of Retribution, defines “intentions”—within a retributivist theory of punishment—as “function states whose roles are to mediate between background states of motivation and those (bodily) motion-guid- ing states of volition that are parts of actions” (12). Moore illustrates this distinction through the analogy of a person deciding to get their hair cut. The background state of this action is that they “desire to get a haircut,” their intention is the belief that “if [they] go to the barber shop, [they] will get a haircut” and finally, the “motion-guiding state of volition” is that they indeed make the decision in their mind to “go to that barber shop” (13). Thus, the intention that is relevant in regards to criminal liability is one in which the actor decides on a means to reach a specific goal. Applying this framework to hate crimes, the “emotional states’’ that Hurd references are not the intentions that are legally relevant; rather, they are background states of motivations. They are the deep desires of the actor. The intention , however, is the actor’s decision to act upon their bigoted motivations in order to accomplish a variety of goals, whether that be spreading a message, or intimidating members of the group they are targeting. The intention that is legally relevant is that an actor decided to resort to violence in order to spread their bigoted beliefs. Admittedly, most hate crime statutes do not make clear this distinction. Often, they simply mandate that the perpetrator chose their victim “for reason of” one of their specific identities. Thus, any hate crime statute must be clear in that if someone is to be convicted of a hate crime, then they must have intended to cause some specific harm to a particular community. With this understanding of intentions, the mens rea element of hate crimes does not criminalize an emotional state; rather, it criminalizes a specific intent to cause harm, not just to a person but to a broader community. As I will argue later, these harms are legally relevant because they cause hate crimes to be particularly more morally reprehensible than crimes committed for other reasons. Hurd’s critique, in this case, is mostly doctrinal, but it does carry key moral implications. Even if a hate crime causes considerably more harm, the physical action is not different from crime that is completely devoid of any hatred or bias motivation. Is it reasonable to criminalize someone based on the fact that they have hateful beliefs? Is this a violation of the liberalism that grounds Anglo-American common law? The next section of this paper seeks to answer these questions by discussing the morality of hate crimes. Hate Crime Legislation and the Harm Principle In order to justify the distinction within the criminal law between hate crimes and other crimes—particularly when they tend to carry harsher punishment—we must identify a principle that can aid in determining which actions are crimes, and the extent to which they should be punished, if possible. This principle must have two characteristics: (1) It must align and be consistent with a retributivist theory of punishment by being sufficiently “backward-looking” and (2) it must allow for the differentiation of crimes beyond mere moral intuition— differentiating crimes that are “worse” than others, deserving harsher punishment, while aligning with a liberal theory of punishment. John Rawls has famously characterized this theory as one that emboldens the state to enforce the “right” and not the “good” (14). These two specifications ensure that the justificatory logic underpinning hate crime legislation aligns with traditional Anglo-American common law principles, and falls within the scope of this paper and Hurd’s argument. The first of these specifications naturally flows from the scope of this essay. The principle used to justify any sort of hate crime legislation must be “backward-look- ing” or focused on the act itself. This is in opposition to any sort of principle or justification that is consequentialist or “forward-looking.” A consequentialist “approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question” (15), with the “party” at hand being society as a whole, or even the actor themselves. Clearly, a consequentialist’s justification of hate crime legislation is different than that of a retributivist, which this paper intends to address. The second consideration is directly relevant to Hurd’s argument and, naturally, my critique thereof. One of Hurd’s primary critiques of hate crime legislation is that, if “hate” as a mens rea element is not considered to be an “occurrent mental state,” then hate crime legislation effectively criminalizes emotional states. Further, Hurd argues that criminalizing emotional states shifts from a “liberal theory” to a “perfectionist theory” of criminal law. This “liberal theory” of the criminal law extends from the general theory of Political Liberalism. Specifically, in draft- ing legislation, criminal or otherwise, the “government should be neutral among competing conceptions of the good life” (16). Within a society, there will be multiple conceptions of the good life, and the government should only be emboldened to enforce rights that are the result of an “overlapping consensus” that mediates “among conflicting views” (17). Hatred and bias, when not directly connected to an action, are generally considered to be moral beliefs or character traits—and as Hurd notes, “liberals have long believed that theories that construe certain character traits as virtuous or vicious belong to the province of the Good, rather than the Right” (18). Considering that I intend to argue that hate crimes primarily carry harsher sentences due to their being significantly more morally reprehensible than crimes committed for other reasons, the principle used to justify this distinction must aid us in determining which crimes are indeed “more morally reprehensible” beyond one’s moral intuition which would align with a liberal theory of punishment. It is quite easy and normal to determine what crimes “feel” more morally reprehensible based upon our own individual moral intuitions. Legislators, however, cannot simply draft criminal legislation based upon their own subjective moral intuitions on a case to case basis; that would not be entirely consistent with political liberalism. Any principle that we use in determining which crimes are more morally reprehensible must not only be applicable to hate crimes, but to any crime which is being considered. As Aristotle notes, “all law is universal” and legislators must take into account and legislate based upon “the usual case” (19). Thus, the principle used to justify hate crime legislation must also be one that is universally applicable. The principle that is most fitting is the “harm principle,” or the concept that the only actions that can be considered crimes are those that cause harm to others or the public. The most classic explication of this principle can be found in the work of John Stuart Mill, in which he claims that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (20). Put simply, the government can justify criminalization and punishment, overriding some individual rights, based upon the degree to which one being punished has caused “harm” to others. This principle aligns with the two specifications outlined earlier. The harm principle is sufficiently retributivist; If one were to justify punishment based upon the harm principle they would be focusing on the actions of the individual. Applying the harm principle compels legislators to ask: How much harm did the individual cause in their actions? The answer to this question directly affects whether or not their actions are considered criminal and the extent to which they should be punished. Further, Mill was an ardent liberal, and naturally, the “harm principle” aligns with a liberal theory of punishment. The harm principle works upon the liberal logic that an individual has the right not to be subjected to undue harm. While the harm principle does meet the specifications laid out earlier, “nowhere does [Mill] give an explicit general stipulation” as to what constitutes harm. In order to understand how hate crimes should be considered under the harm principle, we must further define our understanding of “harm” (21). Joel Feinberg, in his work Harm to Others, provides a useful definition of “harm.” Concretely, Feinberg defines it as a “setback to interests” (22) that can relate to an individual or to a wider group of people, where interests are “a miscellaneous collection, [consisting] of all those things which one has a stake” (23). While there are nuisances that could be considered harms—a person’s stock performing poorly, for example, could certainly be understood as a setback to interest—these nuisances only become harms in the legal sense when they are the results of an invasion by others. Further, Feinberg provides that this “invasion” becomes legally relevant if the actor is “in a worse condition than [they] would have otherwise been had the invasion not occurred at all” (24). Take, for example, an instance of a person being physically violent towards another. Physical violence towards another person to which they did not consent would certainly be a setback to the victim’s interests—perhaps to their interests in their own health and wellbeing, especially if they had been injured. Further, they would most definitely be in a worse condition due to the physical “invasion” by the other person. Additionally, harms can also manifest themselves as public or private harms. There are many crimes that most would consider to be harms that do not thwart the interest of one specific person. Take, for instance, those who counterfeit money; they are not harming any one person; rather, they are harming society as a whole, thwarting the interests of society by negatively affecting the economy. Working with this understanding of harm and how it operates within the harm principle, we can begin to analyze hate crimes and the harms that they cause. Subsequently, we can begin to analyze whether or not they are considerably more morally reprehensible, warranting increased punishment. I argue that hate crimes indeed cause significantly more harm because they cause an increased amount of harm to the individual in addition to causing public harm as well. Hate crimes cause increased private harm to their victims given that hate crimes do not just attack a person ; they attack their identity as well, causing a fractured sense of security and identity and leading to a myriad of negative effects, or harms . “Crimes... communicate a message to the victim that they do not count and are not worthy of respect” (25) and once someone becomes the victim of a hate crime, they begin to cope and rationalize why they specifically were targeted. While those who aren’t victims of hate crimes could just cite that they were “at the wrong place at the wrong time,” victims of hate crimes cannot adopt this as a possibility. When one is the victim of a hate crime, they will know that they have been target- ed based upon an aspect of their identity, and this in turn causes their identity to become “central to their internal awareness of why they have been victimized” (26). The unique way in which hate crimes target identity causes a variety of immeasurable harms to victims. They often cite increased sentiments of shame and guilt compared to those that have been victimized for other reasons. Not only that, hate crime victims report increased levels of anxiety and depression compared to those that have been victimized for other reasons. Certainly these negative effects are setbacks to interests as defined by Joel Feinberg. They fracture the victim’s sense of self and cause actual physical ailments, leaving them in a much worse condition than that in which they would have been if they had not been attacked at all, and especially if they had not been victimized because of their identity. Beyond the increased harms that hate crimes cause to their victims, they also cause additional public harm uncharacteristic of crimes committed for other reasons: harm caused to the wider community of the targeted group. While hate crimes are attacks on specific individuals, they are more so “symbolic messages to society about the worthiness of certain groups of people” (27). This message is a signal to minority communities that they are “unequal, unwelcome and undeserving of social respect,” and more pertinently, this message is a threat as well. The message of hate crimes creates a heightened sense of vulnerability and insecurity amongst minority communities that leads to an intense fear of victimization, inhibiting community members from living life without extreme caution. Members of minority communities that have been affected by hate crimes often note that the “fear and anxiety” felt by the victims of hate crimes “spreads to other community members” (28). This can be considered a public harm within the framework of the harm principle that I outlined earlier. The effects that hate crimes cause to minority communities can be defined as a setback to interests; again, it is certainly within our interest to be able to live our lives without fear of persecution or assault. Hate crimes deprive minority communities of their ability to do so. When hate crimes are considered within the framework of the harm principle, it is clear that they are more morally reprehensible. Does this naturally lend itself to the conclusion that they deserve increased punishment? I argue that, within a retributivist theory of punishment, it does lend itself to this conclusion given the principles of proportionality. Within the retributive model proposed by Immanuel Kant, the degree of punishment should adhere to “the principle of equality, by which the pointer of the scale of justice is made to incline no more to the one side than the other” (29). Considering the concept of proportionality within the framework of the harm principle, the degree of punishment for a crime should be proportional to the harm created by the crime. If that is the case, then hate crimes surely warrant increased punishment because of the increased harms that they cause, not only to their direct victims, but also to the communities that they affect. Conclusion This paper sought to provide a justification for hate crime legislation that con- formed to the principles of liberalism and aligned with a retributive theory of punishment. I found that harsher punishment for violent crimes related to hatred or bias towards a specific group can be justified when examined using the harm principle. Because hate crimes cause considerably more harm to their victims and minority communities, they are considerably more morally reprehensible than crimes committed for other reasons. When assessing whether or not these increased harms warrant increased punishment, we can rely on the notion of proportionality —that punishment for a crime should be proportional to the harm it creates. When examined in this way, increasing criminal sanctions for hate crimes is justified. Further, there are a variety of considerations that need to be taken into account when drafting hate crime legislation: specifically, hate crime legislation should be written to construe the mens rea element of the crime to be the intent to cause the increased harms to the individual and the minority community. Hate crimes are intuitively more morally reprehensible. At first we may think that they deserve increased punishment based upon how these crimes make us feel ; however, we should constantly question ourselves, examining whether our gut moral instincts align with the moral doctrines that guide our actions and the criminal law. In this case, hate crimes do indeed deserve increased punishment based upon these moral doctrines. Thus, legislatures intending on criminalizing hate crime legislation, or any crime for that matter, should not only take doctrinal considerations into account, but should also consider the moral justifications for why these actions deserve criminal liability. If this is the case, the law will begin to be much more consistent and comprehensive with the moral doctrines that we have adopted as a society. Endnotes 1 “Hate Crime Acts,” 18 U.S.C § 249 (2009), https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC- prelim-title18-section249&num=0&edition=prelim. 2 According to the German Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, a “politically motivated” crime includes crimes committed for reasons of the victim’s race, “political opinion, nationality, ethnicity, race, skin color, religion, belief, origin, disability, sexual orientation.” 3 Human Rights Watch, “The State Response to ‘Hate Crimes’ in Germany: A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper,” Human Rights Watch, December 9, 2011, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/09/state-response-hate-crimes-germany. 4 “Incitement of Masses,” German Criminal Code § 130 (1998), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_ stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p1241. 5 Heidi Hurd, “Why Liberals Should Hate ‘Hate Crime Legislation,’” Law and Philosophy 20, no. 2 (2001): 216. 6 Hurd, 216. 7 Ibid, 218. 8 Ibid, 218. 9 Ibid, 218. 10 Ibid, 226. 11 Ibid, 226. 12 Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution (Oxford University Press, 2010), 449. 13 Michael Moore, “The Metaphysics of Basic Acts III: Volitions as the Essential Source of Actions,” in Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and Its Implications for Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 1993), 136–37. 14 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Ed., Columbia Classics in Philosophy (Columbia University Press, 2005). 15 Jeremy Bentham, “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/bentham-an-introduction-to-the-principles-of-morals-and-legislation. 16 Michael J. Sandel, “Political Liberalism,” Harvard Law Review 107, no. 7 (1994): 1766. 17 Sandel, 1775. 18 Hurd, 230. 19 Aristotle, “Politics,” trans. Benjamin Jowett, 1994, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.5.five.html. 20 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Batoche Books, 1859), 13. 21 D.G. Brown, “The Harm Principle,” in A Companion to Mill, ed. Christopher Macleod and Dale E. Miller (John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 411. 22 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others, vol. 1, 4 vols. (Oxford University Press, 1984). 23 Feinberg, 1:38. 24 Feinberg, 1:34. 25 Mark Austin Walters, “The Harms of Hate Crime: From Structural Disadvantage to Individual Identity,” in Hate Crime and Restorative Justice (Oxford University Press, 2014), 71. 26 Walters, 73. 27 Mark Austin Walters, 84. 28 Ibid, 84. 29 Morris J. Fish, “An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28, no. 1 (2008): 63. Bibliography Aristotle. “Politics.” Translated by Benjamin Jowett, 1994. http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.5.five.html. Bentham, Jeremy. “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.” Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/ben-tham-an- introduction-to-the-principles-of-morals-and-legislation. Brown, D.G. “The Harm Principle.” In A Companion to Mill , edited by Christopher Macleod and Dale E. Miller, 409–24. John Wiley & Sons, 2016. Feinberg, Joel. Harm to Others . Vol. 1. 4 vols. Oxford University Press, 1984. Fish, Morris J. “An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28, no. 1 (2008): 55–71. Hate crime acts, 18 U.S.C § 249 (2009). https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtm- l? req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section249&num=0&edition=pre- lim. Hirsch, Andrew von. “Injury and Exasperation: An Examination of Harm to Others and Offense to Others.” Michigan Law Review 84 (1986): 700–717. Human Rights Watch. “The State Response to ‘Hate Crimes’ in Germany: A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper.” Human Rights Watch, December 9, 2011. https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/09/state-response-hate-crimes-germany. Hurd, Heidi. “Why Liberals Should Hate ‘Hate Crime Legislation.’” Law and Philosophy 20, no. 2 (2001): 215–32. Incitement of masses, German Criminal Code § 130 (1998). http://www.gese-tze-im- internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p1241. Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty . Batoche Books, 1859. Moore, Michael. “The Metaphysics of Basic Acts III: Volitions as the Essential Source of Actions.” In Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and Its Implications for Criminal Law , 113–66. Oxford University Press, 1993. Thought Crime 94 ———. The Moral Worth of Retribution . Oxford University Press, 2010. Rawls, John. Political Liberalism . Expanded Ed. Columbia Classics in Philosophy. Columbia University Press, 2005. Sandel, Michael J. “Political Liberalism.” Harvard Law Review 107, no. 7 (1994): 1765–94. Walters, Mark Austin. “The Harms of Hate Crime: From Structural Disadvantage to Individual Identity.” In Hate Crime and Restorative Justice . Oxford University Press, 2014. Previous Next

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One Planet, One Oklahoma: Exploring a Framework for Assessing the Feasibility of Localized Energy Transitions in the United States Anna Hyslop Author Arjun Ray Arthur Shamgunov Benjamin Levy Editors Abstract Net-zero energy transitions, necessitated by the threat of climate change, need to occur on an international scale. However, powerful economic lobbies and political stagnation often mar the negotiation processes driving national and international action. In this context, local communities become increasingly important in achieving widespread emissions reduction objectives. This analysis centers on exploring a framework that evaluates the feasibility of net-zero energy transitions in U.S. localities. The framework highlights the technological and political feasibility of transitioning the electricity and transportation sectors of a given municipality. While such a framework does not capture the entirety of a community’s energy system, it nonetheless serves to address two sectors that dominate emissions production and energy usage. I apply this framework to the suburban community of Norman, Oklahoma, to both highlight the value of such analysis and to provide important information to local officials in my community. By collecting information from administrative and primary sources, this study documents forecasted decreases in the cost of renewable energy sources, residual emissions abatement technologies, and energy storage solutions for Norman. Further, an analysis of the local transportation sector reveals that the costs associated with public transit improvements—an important component of decarbonization in the transportation sector—generally ranged from 0.01-5.1% of the City’s 2023 budget (excluding national high-speed rail enhancements, which involve cost-sharing between local, state, and federal governments). I also examined the political feasibility of this transition, documenting the partisan preferences that may hinder clean energy implementation. My findings suggest that while technology costs may decrease, political opinion could hinder clean energy transitions in Oklahoma. The model of analysis employed throughout this study presents significant opportunities for further exploration of localized energy transitions in suburban areas and college towns, two types of municipalities often left out of transition scholarship. At the end of March in 2023, the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a Synthesis Report covering the burgeoning climate crisis. The report served as the sixth installment in a series designed to inform international climate negotiations with updated scientific findings. Within the first ten pages, the IPCC reaffirmed common scientific consensus, declaring that “human activities, principally through the emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming.” Increasing global temperatures pose threats to people throughout the United States. Coastal communities in states like Texas and Florida have experienced a greater volume of flooding in part due to sea level rise resulting from climate change. Out West, Zhuang et al. (2021) found that “anthropogenic warming…contributed at least twice as much natural variability to the rapid increase of fire weather risk” observed in the record-breaking fires of 2020 in California, Washington, and Oregon. These two studies, as a part of a growing academic literature, demonstrate the variability found in the impacts of climate change across geographies. The United States, for its part in contributing to the crisis, produced 6.0 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalents (Gt CO2eq) of greenhouse gas emissions in 2022, making up 11.2% of total global emissions. This makes the U.S. the second-largest global emitter behind China–which produced 15.7 Gt CO2eq in 2022–and puts it in the top ten global emitters per capita. With a population of approximately 4 million people, Oklahoma produces about 2% of the U.S.’s share of global emissions. Total emissions data for Norman, Oklahoma—home to the University of Oklahoma and the subject of this analysis—does not currently exist. If Norman, like many American cities, does not individually contribute much to the climate impact of the entire United States, then why does the possibility of a localized energy transition and a net-zero future for this municipality merit discussion? First and foremost, local communities play a critical role in achieving national carbon neutrality as they can overcome federal policy inertia. After the release of the first IPCC report in 1990, several transnational associations of municipalities–including Local Governments for Sustainability, Climate Alliance, and Energy Cities–were formed to help cities pursue climate targets in the face of “strong economic lobbies [that] were blocking national and international climate policies.” By belonging to these organizations, cities are granted legitimacy and support from other municipalities in pursuing localized climate policy action. Rutherford and Coutard (2014) further acknowledge the capability of cities to pursue climate work despite national gridlock, stating that “cities may have a window of opportunity for action on energy transitions by their distinctive…political and/or sociotechnical contexts compared with those at a national level.” The ability of cities to pursue sustainability work despite national constraints presents a compelling argument for exploring a local energy transition. Furthermore, greenhouse gas emissions—and the systems that lead to their release into the atmosphere—exist at local, regional, and national levels. Municipalities regularly make decisions regarding transportation, energy consumption, and land-use planning, three sectors that contribute heavily to total U.S. emissions. Collier and Löfstedt (1997) point out, however, that the financial and legal capacities of a city to enact local change vary greatly by location. Regardless of such limitations, changes at the community level contribute to broader national decarbonization objectives. The Biden Administration supported this argument in its long-term climate strategy, citing the importance of non-federal leadership—including municipalities—in reaching domestic carbon neutrality by 2050. Even smaller, suburban cities like Norman possess the power to radically reshape local transit and energy policy, addressing both its local carbon footprint and national carbon contributions. Third, Oklahoma—and Norman by extension—cannot escape the impacts of the climate crisis. The South Central Climate Adaptation Science Center predicts an average high temperature increase of more than 2 degrees Fahrenheit by midcentury without significant action to reduce emissions. The Fifth National Climate Assessment expands on these projected temperature increases, forecasting negative economic and public health consequences. The authors observed with high confidence that warmer temperatures and increasingly erratic weather patterns will “force widespread and costly changes” to the employment of Oklahomans. Additionally, climate change will result in increased water scarcity, animal extinction, and declining public health as extreme heat events become more common in the south-central United States. Tropical diseases and heat-related deaths are projected to increase in the warming region. Other public health impacts have already been observed in Tulsa, where the expansion of eastern red cedars—associated with longer pollen seasons—resulted in a 205% increase in allergic pollen intensity. Although the consequences of climate change borne by Oklahomans are largely not self-inflicted, we still bear responsibility for addressing our carbon footprint. Assessing Norman’s current capacity to transition to carbon-free consumption may encourage further action within Oklahoma’s cities, as only Oklahoma City currently pursues sustainable policy initiatives. Finally, analyzing the feasibility of an energy transition within Norman may spark further discussions about an energy transition in Oklahoma at large. Our local context incorporates both the resources of a nationally-recognized research institution and heavy dependence on the automobile. This combination of factors should make Norman—and other suburban college towns—a subject of interest. Drewello notes the importance of university partnerships in assessing “unique local situations” and generating innovative solutions. With access to the University of Oklahoma and its faculty, Norman offers a great opportunity for building a model to inspire a statewide or regional energy transition. Furthermore, our dependence on the automobile mirrors that of other suburban communities within the state; accordingly, any assessment of Norman’s potential for changes in the transportation sector can provide a framework for similar analyses within Oklahoma. In the Routledge Handbook of Energy Transitions , Miller et al. (2022) call for the systematic “mapping” of the policies, processes, and pathways needed to achieve regional carbon neutrality. The study offers a novel framework for analyzing the feasibility of net-zero localized energy transitions in the United States. Though Norman, Oklahoma, is used merely as an example of the application of this framework, the case study provides a model for similar analyses to be conducted in other localities. I focus on establishing this underlying framework for a local energy transition by assessing the current energy system and analyzing the technological and political feasibility of achieving a net-zero future in Norman. To conduct this assessment, I researched administrative, academic, news, and primary sources to gather cost estimates of different technologies. I also analyzed national and state-level assessments of public opinion on renewable energy development to understand the transition’s political feasibility. The remainder of this paper outlines the definitions and criteria used throughout the study, with an in-depth examination of Norman’s current energy system following soon after. Then, I offer an assessment of both the technological and political feasibility of pursuing an energy transition. My general conclusions from this research follow the feasibility assessments. I. Outlining the Energy Transition: Definitions and Criteria In this section, I provide an overview of several proposed definitions of energy transitions, as well as the objectives that such transitions seek to achieve. I then articulate this study’s interpretation of a net-zero energy transition and my justification for selecting such a definition. Finally, I conclude with an explanation of the criteria by which I will assess feasibility in later sections of this paper. Prior academic work provides many definitions that explain the fundamentals of energy transitions. Araújo (2022) postulates that basic energy transitions involve a “considerable shift in the nature or pattern of how energy is used within a system, including the type, quantity, or quality of how energy is sourced, delivered, or utilized.” Zinecker et al. (2018) offer a simpler yet similar definition to Araújo, defining energy transitions as “shifts… [in] the way people produce and consume electricity using different technologies and sources.” Drewello builds on the foundations provided by Araújo and Zinecker et al. to postulate that an energy transition “is nothing less than a revolutionary restructuring of the entire energy supply in the sectors of electricity, heat, and transportation.” Here, Drewello points out specific sectors involved in a transition. These three definitions articulate the basics of an energy transition, defined in this study as a fundamental, multi-sectoral shift in both the consumption and production of energy towards a net-zero future. A net-zero future achieves maximum emissions reductions while using carbon capture technologies to remove any residual emissions. Accordingly, net-zero transitions involve deploying renewable energy technologies–like solar, wind, and nuclear power facilities–at scale. I elected to study the feasibility of a net-zero energy transition with a framework inspired in part by the literature. In evaluating Norman’s current energy sector, I focus on two of the sectors highlighted by Drewello: electricity and transportation. These sectors compromise 53% of U.S. emissions, with transportation at 28% of the total. Although Norman may not observe the same trends in emissions as the greater United States, addressing emissions in these two sectors is of great national importance and should be relevant to an energy transition in Norman as well. The decision to focus on the electricity and transportation sectors represents the first layer of my analytical framework. The second layer consists of considering both the technological and political feasibility of making net-zero transitions in each sector. Sovacool and Geels (2016) provide justification for these considerations. They divide the elements of an energy transition into three “interrelated” categories: “the tangible elements of socio-technical systems…actors and social networks…[and] socio-technical regimes.” In practice, these three dimensions prove difficult to distinguish from each other, but still roughly suggest a division between the intangibles and the tangibles of energy transitions. This study understands political feasibility to be the intangibles of transitions—namely, public support for clean energy development–and technological feasibility to be the tangible elements of an energy transition, most notably the costs associated with shifting to renewable energy and developing emissions reduction techniques. II. Norman Now: Our Energy Today Of the 90 million megawatt-hours (MWh) of electricity generated in Oklahoma in 2023, 40 million MWh (or around 44%) of this generation came from renewable sources. Norman hosts two primary electric utilities: Oklahoma Gas and Electric (OG&E) and Oklahoma Electric Cooperative (OEC). OG&E provides generation, transmission, and distribution services across Oklahoma and parts of western Arkansas. While public data listing the number of OG&E customers in Norman is not currently available, it serves approximately 888,800 customers across its service territory. OG&E reports that 60% of the utility’s generation capacity comes from natural gas, 30% from coal, and 10% from renewable sources. This data also incorporates OG&E’s power purchases, which account for 58% of OG&E’s total generation portfolio. OG&E purchases this power from other producers in the Southwest Power Pool (SPP). As a member of SPP, OG&E’s energy could come from any generation site within the regional transmission organization (RTO) at any given time. SPP’s generation mix in 2022 consisted of 37.5% wind, 33.3% coal, 20.9% natural gas, and 8.3% of energy produced from other sources. This data mirrors SPP’s generation mixes from 2020 and 2021. In 2020, SPP produced 31.3% of its power from wind, 30.9% from coal, and 26.6% from natural gas. In 2021, 35.6% of SPP’s power came from coal, 34.6% from wind, and 20% from natural gas. Instead of generating its own power, OEC operates an electricity distribution business. OEC purchases its power from the Western Farmers Electric Cooperative (WFEC), a generation and transmission provider. WFEC possesses a diverse fuel mix, generating 30% of its power from renewable sources and 11% from coal and natural gas. Additionally, WFEC imports 42% of its electricity from SPP. Power purchased from the Grand River Dam Authority, Oneta Power Plant, and Southwestern Public Service provided the final 17% of WFEC’s generation mix in 2022. The complexity of power generation networks, exemplified by OG&E and OEC, makes it difficult to determine Norman’s exact energy landscape based on public data alone. Future applications of this framework may run into similar challenges due to public data limitations. OG&E’s and OEC’s connections to SPP mean that consumers in Norman could theoretically receive energy from anywhere in SPP at any given time. However, some consumers have a limited degree of choice in deciding where their electricity comes from. OG&E customers can opt-in to receiving power from the utility’s solar farms, while OEC allows its customers to purchase renewable energy certificates that support renewable generation. These programs are naturally limited in scope, and data regarding the number of customers choosing to participate in these initiatives is not currently available. While I cannot accurately provide a detailed picture of Norman’s electricity provision, I can use SPP generation data to construct general assumptions. As mentioned previously, the largest share of SPP’s electricity production came from wind power, indicating that Norman could theoretically receive a notable amount of our electricity from that source. This assertion can be extrapolated to other cities within SPP’s 14-state service territory, assuming that a city’s serving utility maintains membership in SPP and that SPP’s generation portfolio remains consistent across states. This second assumption, however, cannot be verified by publicly-available SPP data; as such, the statement remains largely speculative. Decarbonizing the electricity sector requires a combination of multiple technologies. Regardless of the combination, however, a net-zero transition necessitates either elimination or removal of the emissions from coal and natural gas power plants that supplied over 50% of SPP’s generation in 2022. Power plant emissions can be reduced through a replacement of generation fuels—in this case, via renewable energy—or a deployment of smokestack emissions-reduction technologies. Emissions that cannot be addressed through the replacement of generation fuels or other reduction technologies must be removed through carbon capture. The costs of these options are explored in depth in the “Technological Feasibility” section of this paper. An assessment of Norman’s current transportation sector consists of analyzing both private and public transportation. Oklahoman workers display a strong dependence on private forms of transit, with 77.8% driving alone to work in 2022. In comparison, 68.7% of U.S. residents display a similar commuting pattern. Furthermore, 9.4% of Oklahomans carpool and 0.3% use public transportation to get to work. Nationally, 3.1% of people use public transit and 8.6% carpool. Evidently, passenger vehicles predominate Oklahomans’ commutes. These vehicles are overwhelmingly gasoline-powered. Though data specific to cars owned by Normanites is not available, of the 4,287,900 total vehicles registered in Oklahoma, 83% are powered by gasoline. 0.5% of cars registered in the state are fully electric, while 0.8% are plug-in hybrid electric and 1.3% are hybrid electric. These trends reflect larger national patterns, as 85% of vehicles registered in the United States are gasoline-powered, while 1.2% are fully electric. Norman’s public transportation consists of five fixed bus routes, operated by EMBARK Norman, which serve local destinations six days a week. EMBARK Norman also partners with EMBARK OKC to provide weekday commuter service to Oklahoma City. Intracity service is free and the commuter route to Oklahoma City costs $3 per adult and $1.50 for qualifying riders. Buses are scheduled at least every hour on four out of the five routes. The Norman fixed-route fleet consists of 10 compressed natural gas (CNG) buses, 2 electric buses, and 1 diesel-powered vehicle. The paratransit fleet uses 9 CNG buses, 2 diesel buses, and 3 gasoline-powered shuttles. Additionally, the University of Oklahoma possesses four bus routes on its campus. Norman also has an Amtrak station, with service ending in Oklahoma City. In this study, I also include biking as a form of public transportation. In 2022, only 0.2% of Oklahomans biked to work. Given that much of Oklahoma lacks biking infrastructure, this finding is unsurprising. Current data on the number and type of bike lanes within Norman is not readily available. However, given Norman’s possession of bike-friendly infrastructure, we may safely assume that Norman’s commuter biking statistics are higher than the Oklahoma average. III. Technological Feasibility The exploration of Norman’s electricity and transportation sectors reveals the community’s overwhelming dependence on fossil fuels. In this section, I use estimated costs of different clean energy technologies as a metric for assessing the technological feasibility of a net-zero transition in Norman. My study of electricity-related feasibility primarily concerns the costs associated with increasing the share of low-carbon energy sources in power generation, incorporating power storage methods, and abating residual emissions. In the transportation sector, I consider different scenarios in which the City of Norman improves public transportation. I do not focus on action taken by individual Normanites (commonly termed “reductions in demand”), as such action falls outside the scope of the analysis I hope to provide. Evaluating the technological feasibility of a power-sector transition in Norman begins with an understanding of the costs associated with alternative energies. The levelized cost of energy (LCOE) “combines technology cost and performance parameters, capital expenditures, operations and maintenance costs, and capacity factors” into a statistic that helps researchers, government agencies, and private companies predict the costliness of different forms of energy per MWh generated. The LCOEs for various sources of energy in Cleveland County—where Norman is located—in 2023 dollars are reported in Table 1. Table 1: Data from NREL (2020); Lewis et al. (2022); IEA (2020). All costs—including cost projections—are in 2023 dollars, with inflation adjustment calculations made based on OECD (2024) data. County-level costs for key renewable energy technologies like solar and wind are expected to experience significant declines by 2050, while the costs of traditional fossil fuel generation facilities are expected to increase. Across the board, the median costs associated with renewable sources of energy in Cleveland County are expected to drop by 2050. Gas-induced power plants, on the other hand, are expected to experience cost increases, regardless of whether these plants incorporate carbon capture and storage (CCS) techniques into plant practices. Unlike gas-powered plants, however, coal is expected to experience cost declines, but will likely remain more expensive than solar, wind, nuclear, or even gas-powered generation. This insight is significant, as coal generation produces more emissions than natural gas and renewable resource generation. Since the county-level statistics parallel the patterns observed in state-level analysis (not pictured), I observe that the comparatively-high costs will likely discourage the use of coal within Oklahoma, reducing the state’s emissions. Decreases in renewable energy costs for Cleveland County, depicted in Table 1, indicate that our electricity sector may feasibly transition to renewable energy. However, the data provided for county-level costs by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) neglects to mention an increasingly-popular form of alternative energy: hydrogen power. The fuel is expected to play a critical role in decarbonizing personal transportation. Currently, steam methane reforming (SMR), a process dependent on fossil fuels, dominates hydrogen production in the United States. The implementation of CCS with SMR practices is expected to increase the LCOE of hydrogen production, but still maintains the “highest potential for low-cost clean hydrogen supply.” Transitioning to sources like wind and solar also requires measures to manage their intermittent nature. Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) are touted as the solution to the need for power storage. NREL reports that costs of utility-scale LIBs within Cleveland County will decrease approximately 53% by 2050, making the reality of incorporating this technology into a transitioned power grid increasingly plausible. This assertion is further supported by the declining prices of renewable power sources, allowing greater amounts of capital to be allocated to power storage instead of generation. Addressing residual emissions—those that cannot be easily reduced through the previously-discussed strategies—necessitates the usage of carbon capture technologies. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) involves removing carbon dioxide at its emission source. NREL already provides a Cleveland County LCOE for CCS in the context of natural gas generation, placing the 2020 LCOE at $60.06 and expecting a $68.3 LCOE by 2050. Global estimates from the International Energy Agency (IEA) further contextualize this data. Globally, the LCOE for CCS ranges from 17.87-143.02 USD per ton of carbon dioxide captured. Direct air capture (DAC), another emissions-reduction technology, captures carbon dioxide after its release into the atmosphere. The technology generally costs more than CCS, with global LCOE estimates ranging from 160.9-411.19 USD per ton captured. NREL’s forecasted costs to 2050 are helpful in evaluating the feasibility of a net-zero power sector transition. Such forecasting, however, remains difficult to find for transportation improvements. Instead, I rely on the costs associated with different public transit improvement scenarios that Norman explored in fiscal year 2023 (FY23). Table 2: Data from City of Norman (2021); City of Norman (2022); City of Norman (2024); Taylor Johnson at the City of Norman; Lazo (2023); Feigenbaum (2023). All costs are adjusted to 2023 dollars using data from OECD (2024). In 2021, the Norman City Council approved the Go Norman Transit Plan, a document detailing different transportation improvements anticipated for Norman’s bus system. Adding an additional bus route, Route 113, requires nearly $9 million in capital and operational investments. Increasing route frequency for two of the current bus routes entails expenditures of between $8.21-$8.91 million, depending on route length and the number of buses needed to achieve frequency improvements. Improving the frequency of Route 111 stops from a 30-minute to the ideal 15-minute frequency necessitates $11.55 million from the City. These frequency improvements are intended to make public transit options competitive with the convenience and consistency offered by single-passenger vehicular transport. Expanding route service often demands adding additional buses to the City’s fleet. To gather information on the historical costs of purchasing CNG and electric buses, I contacted Taylor Johnson, the Transit and Parking Program Manager for the City of Norman. Mr. Johnson offered information on the current fixed-route fleet and the previous costs of purchasing individual electric and CNG buses. One fixed-route CNG bus cost the City $639,741.79 in 2023 dollars, whereas an electric bus cost over $1 million in the same year. The cost estimates specific to certain route improvements cannot accurately predict the expected future costs of similar improvements. However, this information still provides an important overview of what such improvements may entail. Regardless of future inflation or specified costs associated with different projects, improvements to Norman’s bus system will cost millions of dollars to implement. As mentioned in the “Norman Now: Our Energy Today” section, Norman possesses one Amtrak station with service to Oklahoma City. Finding a cost estimate for adding additional rail lines or increasing train speed in Oklahoma is not currently feasible; therefore, I turned to two case studies of these improvements in other areas. Amtrak anticipates increasing the speed of the Washington-to-Boston route with new trains. This project, originally proposed in 2011, costs $3.11 billion in 2023 dollars. The proposed Dallas-to-Houston Amtrak project, involving the development of completely-new rail lines, costs a whopping $33.6 billion in 2023 dollars. Support for the development of additional Amtrak lines through Norman would need to occur at the state level; after all, as the two currently-proposed projects demonstrate, Amtrak projects are extremely expensive and involve multiple municipalities. While it is unlikely that Amtrak will expand coverage in Oklahoma in the near future–given the minimal demand for such infrastructure–this discussion still offers important context for comprehensive public transit considerations in the state. Bike infrastructure serves as the final area of analysis within the public transportation sector. For this exploration, I use data from an Association of Central Oklahoma Governments grant received by the City for air quality improvements. Adding two bike lanes cost the City $11,497.99 in total. Details on the length and cost of each individual bike lane were not provided by the City. Table 3: Data from City of Norman (2021); City of Norman (2022); City of Norman (2023); City of Norman (2024). *The “Actual Public Transit Expenditures” for FY24 have yet to be released; accordingly, I provided the City’s current estimate. During FY23, the City of Norman proposed and passed a $225,785,971 budget. As exemplified in Table 2, the costs of transportation improvements under Norman’s control ranged from 0.01% of the budget to 5.1% of the budget. Given the trends in public transit spending observed in Table 3, the budget typically allows enough flexibility for only one of the transit improvements detailed in Table 2 to occur. This finding suggests that substantial improvements to Norman’s public transit system will likely occur slowly, unless the City’s spending patterns change. The technology exists to support a net-zero energy transition. The challenge, then, comes with the cost of such technologies. As the NREL forecast predicts, renewable energy sources will likely continue to decline in cost, encouraging utilities to adopt these forms of energy for power generation. Additionally, both long-term energy storage solutions and residual emissions reduction technologies are anticipated to experience declining costs. Norman’s electricity sector, therefore, could realistically experience a clean energy transition in the coming decades, contingent on utility adoption of necessary technologies. The feasibility of adjustments to Norman’s transportation sector proves incredibly difficult to predict due to the challenge of obtaining cost forecasting data. Regardless of this limitation, the scenarios explored demonstrate realistic costs for the City, although the pace at which such projects are pursued may be slower than desired. IV. Political Feasibility In this study, political feasibility is more challenging to quantify and anticipate than technological feasibility. By its very nature, public opinion is dynamic, and the individuals surveyed often possess opinions that do not fit cleanly into prescribed party affiliations or expectations. Furthermore, creating an accurate measure of political support for an energy transition proves difficult, considering the complexity of interacting components in such a transition. Given these constraints, I focus this section on a broad investigation of the views on renewable energy development that are associated with national and statewide partisan identifications while acknowledging the complexity of these affiliations. I also highlight studies specific to Oklahoma that offer valuable insights into the nuances of support for a carbon-neutral energy transition. According to the Pew Research Center, 31% of Americans currently support the complete phasing out of fossil fuels across the United States, compared to the 68% that support the use of a fossil fuel and renewables mixture. This belief does not necessarily conflict with the net-zero transition proposal, as carbon capture techniques could theoretically support the strictly-limited use of fossil fuels. Regarding renewable energy development, 74% of Americans highlight this type of development as “the most important energy priority for the U.S.” when compared to “expanding [the] production of fossil fuels.” Evidently, national support for a net-zero future depends on the specific limitations of that energy transition. Attempting to break down support for the transition by political party causes further difficulties, as the opinions of both Democrats and Republicans do not always follow expectations. For example, 58% of Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents believe that fossil fuel expansion should operate as the U.S.’s top energy priority, but 70% of this group still support the development of more solar farms. 90% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning Independents give renewable energy priority over fossil fuels, but 51% “oppose phasing out fossil fuels completely” for right now. The responses to these questions do not clearly indicate partisan support for a net-zero future. For additional clarity, Kennedy et al. asked respondents about their opinions regarding the complete phase-out of fossil fuels. 87% of Republicans and Republican-leaning respondents reported a belief in the need to use a mix of fossil fuels and renewables in the near-term, while 51% of Democrats and Democrat-leaning respondents reported the same. Understanding national party positioning on the phase-out of fossil fuels, a component of net-zero energy transitions, contextualizes an analysis of Oklahoma’s current partisan makeup. As of January 15th, 2024, approximately 52% of Oklahoman voters are registered with the Republican party, while 28% are registered Democrats and 19% are registered Independents. However, these affiliations do not directly indicate voters’ position on energy transitions. Generally, 57% of American Republicans believe the U.S. should never stop using fossil fuels, a viewpoint likely shared by many Oklahoma Republicans given the historical importance of the fossil fuel sector within the state. Republican State Representatives and Senators also dominate our legislature. Only 20% of seats in the Oklahoma House and 16% of seats in the Senate belong to Democrats. The prevalence of the Republican party, when considered in the context of national survey data, indicates that political support for renewable energy development at the state level is likely low. The Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (IPPRA), based at the University of Oklahoma, surveyed 3,564 Oklahoma residents to gather “advice and guidance on how to develop socially sustainable solutions to water, carbon, and infrastructure problems in Oklahoma." This study revealed that 92% of the Democrats surveyed believe that greenhouse gas emissions are causing average global temperatures to rise, compared to the 38% of Oklahoma Republicans believing the same. Additionally, only 28% of Republicans surveyed believe that global warming has resulted in changes to Oklahoma’s weather patterns. In the context of Republican domination in the Oklahoma House and Senate, these findings further indicate that political support for measures addressing GHG emissions and climate change is likely minimal. Within Cleveland County, 47% of registered voters identify as Republicans, 30% identify as Democrats, and 22% identify as Independents (Cleveland County Election Board 2024). This data does not reveal Norman’s specific situation, as it includes registered voters throughout the entire county. Under such circumstances, I choose instead to refer to the state-level data described in the preceding paragraph. Using the data available to me, I provided an initial assessment of the political climate in Oklahoma. In doing so, I offer a broad overview of the expected political feasibility regarding a net-zero energy transition. My analysis of the state-level situation, contextualized in the presence of national polling data, indicates that support for the phase-out of fossil fuels in Oklahoma likely remains low. These findings cannot be directly applied to Norman’s specific local context. Further public opinion research should be conducted to determine the opinions of Normanites and their City Council members on the topic. Given the challenges in conducting this political analysis for Norman, similar obstacles may appear when applying this model to other municipalities. V. Conclusion Throughout this study, I offered and explored the applications of a particular model for analyzing the feasibility of localized energy transitions in the United States. Here, I will summarize the model and discuss the implications of both the framework and the case study I used to evaluate the framework. I derived the model of analysis employed throughout this study from observations of both U.S. emissions data and literature concerning energy transitions. I wanted to ensure that a localized energy transition focused on the sectors with the largest greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S.; thus, I chose to focus on the electricity and transportation sectors. This selection was reaffirmed within the literature, as explored in “Outlining the Energy Transition: Definitions and Criteria.” The next level of my analysis focused on evaluating the technological and political feasibility of transitioning each sector. I separated the discussion of technological feasibility by sector and highlighted the costs associated with clean energy developments accordingly. In the political feasibility section of my analysis, I largely focused on generalized public opinion data surrounding an energy transition due to the limited availability of data related to electricity and transportation decarbonization specifically. I articulated this framework of analysis through my case study of Norman, Oklahoma. The assessment of technological feasibility generally reflects declining costs in renewable technologies across Cleveland County, the United States, and the world. These declining costs appear to indicate that decarbonization in Norman is feasible. Given Oklahoma’s geographical conditions and expected cost declines, solar and wind energy could drive a transition away from fossil fuel dominance. Declining costs of utility-scale batteries will help mitigate the intermittent nature of these two sources. Additionally, nuclear energy possesses significant promise in helping Norman to achieve net-zero, especially given the apparent political support for nuclear energy within the state legislature. During the 59th regular session of the Oklahoma legislature, both the House and Senate passed Senate Bill 1535, which amended the Oklahoma Low Carbon Energy Initiative to include nuclear energy. The support for this legislation, however, does not mean that the legislature or the Public Utilities Commission will prioritize clean energy over fossil fuel interests in the future. Thus, predicting an energy transition in Norman remains exceedingly difficult. With regards to transportation, the City possesses the ability to fund both bike lane and bus route improvements, as costs for these advances ranged between 0.01-5.1% of the City’s 2023 budget. These costs are in line with the total amount of actual public transit expenditures made by the City in prior years. Improving and adding regional high-speed rail lines, however, proves increasingly expensive and is outside of the City’s regulatory purview. Accordingly, the City can realistically pursue localized public transit improvements over the next couple of years, ideally leading to decreased dependency on personal automobiles within Norman. The political preferences of Oklahomans possess a strong bearing on the overall feasibility of pursuing net-zero energy transitions. Republican domination in both the Oklahoma House and Senate indicates that statewide measures supporting energy transitions remain unlikely, especially given the general Republican stance on climate change and renewable energy versus fossil fuels. Data for Norman specifically cannot be found; accordingly, future research can focus on evaluating public opinion within the municipality. The difficulties present in ascertaining the feasibility of an energy transition in Norman reflect the limitations of the model I developed. First, this model does not cover all components of a municipality’s energy sector, leading to inconclusive predictions regarding the feasibility of total localized decarbonization. Second, the model relies on forecasting cost data, which is generated via a naturally uncertain practice. Third, the limited availability of publicly-accessible data—the backbone of this framework and my observations in Norman—weakens the conclusivity of assertions made using the application of the model to a given local context. This third component can be addressed in future uses of the model by obtaining access to private company and government data. Future applications of a similar framework possess ample opportunity for improving and innovating based on the foundation provided in this research. Regardless of its limitations, this model possesses significant implications for planning processes and improvements within my local community. Local strategic energy plans, which often possess decarbonization as a primary objective, rely on the type of in-depth analysis conducted throughout this report to accurately ascertain the current realities and future possibilities of local energy systems. Communities can use the model explored here as a guide in strategic energy plan development. Within Norman specifically, this paper provides critical analysis absent from the City’s long-term planning processes and suggests the need to develop some type of energy plan within the municipality. Climate change threatens all of humanity, regardless of one’s proximity to a coastline or dry zone. Addressing this crisis and preventing its exacerbation entails decarbonization across our energy systems. Throughout this study, I explored a framework to assess local energy transition feasibility and applied it to my local community. In doing so, I hope to encourage greater localized action in Norman and in the United States at large. 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