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Non-Self Through Time Anita Kukeli Author Hansae Lee Koda Li Nahye Lee Editors Buddhism, like other major religions, has a particular philosophical framework underpinning its teachings. In other words, Buddhism and other religions might be thought of as offering a set of answers to philosophical inquiries, such as questions about moral right and wrong or questions about our position in the universe. The area of philosophical inquiry with which this paper is concerned is the philosophy of self. What does it mean to be a person? Buddhism engages with this debate. Foundational Buddhist thought, or Theravada Buddhism, offers a particular conception of personhood called anatman , or “non-self.” The idea here is that the commonly accepted notion of the self if mistaken; we are not selves. Ordinarily, pre-philosophical reflection on the question of what a person is, one might likely respond that a person it a unified individual entity, such as you or me. Philosophical views depart from this common concept to varying degrees. Some define a person as a human body, comprised of cells and ultimately governed by biological processes. Alternatively, perhaps a person is a mind, constituted most fundamentally by their beliefs and feelings and decisions. Maybe personhood is some mix of the two, or something else entirely. In contrast, the Buddhist conception of personhood rejects the notion of the self as a definable single entity entirely. At first glance, this may seem unacceptable to someone unfamiliar with Buddhist teachings. However, by reproducing the arguments presented in early Buddhist texts, I will show that anatman is on its own a plausible view. I will argue that the real trouble for anatman arises when considered within the broader tradition of Buddhist thought, especially in regard to samsara and karma . Samsara refers to the Buddhist idea of a cycle of rebirth, closely related to karma. Both samsara and karma involve the self persisting from one lifetime to the next. But, if there is no self, how can it persist? Surely, for something to persist through time, that thing must exist. So, it seems that if we accept anatman , and there is no such thing as a self, then we cannot accept samsara or karma. To resolve this tension, there must be a description of this persistence through time that does not require the existence of a self. I will argue that the Buddhist concept of dependent arising accomplishes this, and therefore resolves the tension between anatman on the one hand and samsara and karma on the other. Anatman The argument for anatman derives from the concept of the five aggregates. This is a Buddhist concept that refers to five constitutive parts of a person. The five aggregates are translated various ways, but for the purposes of this paper I will offer them in simple terms. The five aggregates consist of 1) material form, 2) sensation, 3) perception, 4) volitional force, and 5) consciousness. A foundational Buddhist text, the Questions of King Milinda, includes a conversation in which a Buddhist monk named Nagasena purports that the self does not exist. His interlocutor, King Milinda, then asks, what is it that the name Nagesna is denoting? Does it refer to material form? To sensation? He continues through each of the five aggregates, and Nagasena responds that it is none of these (Milinda’s Questions 36). To explain how that may be, he uses an analogy of a chariot. A chariot is not its wheels nor its axle nor its pole, though it is also not an entity separate from these things (37). In this case, the whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. Therefore, the chariot, as an entity, doesn’t exist. Rather, “chariot” is merely a term used to denote a collection of things and nothing more. Similarly, Nagasena’s name is just a useful term referring to the collection of constitutive parts called aggregates, but not to an individual self (34). The self cannot be reduced to any one of the five aggregates, and it is also not an entity separate from them. Indeed, when understood in this way, the self simply doesn’t exist. Samsara Samsara , or the cycle of rebirth, is another foundational Buddhist concept. It posits that when someone dies, they are reborn. This means that each of us have past lives that we don’t remember, from which we died and were reborn. So, we persist through one lifetime into the next. This notion of samsara is closely related to the Buddhist concept of karma , which ascribes a desert component to this cycle. Karma drives the rebirth cycle by attributing the quality of the life into which a person is reborn to the actions of their past lives. If someone commited immoral acts in their past lives, they would face the consequences by being reborn into a hellish miserable life. Conversely, if someone committed good acts, they would be reborn into a happy beautiful life (Sayings 203). This causal explanation between the actions someone undertook in their past lives and circumstances of their current life is what’s referred to as karma . In foundational Buddhist thought, Karma governs the persistence within a person from one lifetime to the next, and thus is related to samsara . The concepts of saṃsāra and karma , hand in hand, appear to be incompatible with anātman . If we grant that no person can point to any of the five aggregates and claim — “That is me!” — but, at the same time, a person is nothing more than those aggregates, we can accept the claim that the self does not exist. That is the structure of the argument presented above by Nagasena. However, accepting that the life a person is living right now is a consequence of a life they lived in the past requires that that person is persisting over time. That is, if we are to correctly say that Anita, for instance, deserves the poor quality of her life because she undertook immoral actions in her past lives, it must be that the Anita experiencing this poor-quality life is the same Anita who undertook those immoral actions. Otherwise, the immoral actions of the past lives couldn’t be attributed to the person who is living the consequentially poor-quality life. So, karma and saṃsāra require persistence. However, if the self doesn’t even exist, surely it cannot have the quality of persisting over time. Persistence necessitates existence. This is the tension that arises with the consideration of anātman in conjunction with saṃsāra ; it seems we cannot accept one without rejecting the other — unless, that is, we have an account of non-self that involves persistence through time. Dependent Arising The concept of non-self can extend through the dimension of time with the inclusion of dependent arising. In another early Buddhist text, the Buddha delineates a series of causal chains. He says, “Conditioned by ignorance there are volitional forces, conditioned by volitional forces there is consciousness, conditioned by consciousness there is mind-and-body, conditioned by mind-and-body there are the six senses…” until he arrives at suffering (Sayings 210-211). This causal chain is called dependent arising. Within this series of states, each caused by an earlier one and causing the next, we find the five aggregates: between volitional forces, consciousness, and mind-and-body. So, the five aggregates we refer to when we speak of the self are themselves just parts within a system that extends beyond them. In this way, the non-self is positioned within a greater system of causal chains. If this understanding is applied to the earlier concepts of saṃsāra and karma , the tension between them and anātman may be resolved. Initially, the idea that there is a cycle of death and rebirth called saṃsāra seems to presuppose the existence of a self, particularly as an individual entity that persists through time. Moreover, the proposition, known as karma , that the conditions of one’s present life are a consequence of past lives ascribes continuity within a self as it undergoes multiple life cycles. It seems to follow from this that one’s past actions result in one’s current experiences, meaning that the person who commits the actions must be the same person who has the current experiences. So, there must be a self that persists. But, if the cycle of rebirth driven by karma is reconsidered through a lens of dependent arising, there is no need to account for the existence of an individual entity called a self. It need not be the case that there is a self who at one point both committed certain actions and is now experiencing the effects. There need not be an individual entity to which these actions are attributed. Rather, there can be certain actions committed and resultant effects being experienced. Indeed, the constitutive parts of a person, the five aggregates, are nothing more than steps within a greater causal chain. By accepting dependent arising, we can understand what was once necessarily the persistence of the self through time as, instead, a causal relationship and no more. Earlier states bring about later states. There is no self. Conclusion By including an account of non-self over time, such as dependent arising, the tensions between saṃsāra and anātman are resolved. The argument for anātman in a given moment, what I’ve referred to as static non-self, derives from the five aggregates. As expressed in the chariot analogy, a person is not any one of the five aggregates and a person is not anything more than them. Therefore, the existence of a unified self is a mere illusion. This is an important claim within Buddhist thought because it is included in a foundational teaching: that clinging to the self is the cause of suffering. This might be enough to motivate letting go of the idea of the self, for the purpose of ending suffering. However, the idea that clinging to the self causes suffering isn’t enough to justify the plausibility of non-self. It must also be consistent with other teachings in Buddhism. Initially, it seems to be incompatible with the teachings of saṃsāra and karma . These teachings seem to necessitate a self that persists through time, because surely it must be the same person who lives through the multiple lives involved in a particular cycle of rebirth driven by their own karma . But, if the self doesn’t exist even for a given moment, how can it exist from one moment to the next? Indeed, it doesn’t. This can be explained through the concept of dependent arising, a dynamic picture of non-self. Through this lens, the five aggregates are placed in a causal chain of events. This way, there can be causal continuity within a person's life — or lives — without there necessarily being a self. Past events cause later events, and so goes the cycle of rebirth. Finally, there is no incompatibility between anatman and the rest of Buddhist teaching, and it can be justifiably accepted as a plausible account. In this manner, dependent arising resolves the tension initially faced between anatman and saṃsāra . References Gethin, Rupert. 2008. Sayings of the Buddha : a selection of suttas from the Pali Nikayas, Oxford world's classics. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. Gethin, Rupert. 1998. The Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford [England] ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Author Name < Back Against the Mainstream: How Modern Monetary Theory and the Myth of Millionaire Tax Flight Challenge Conventional Wisdom Justin Lee Introduction Changing entrenched beliefs about economics is a difficult task, for it is challenging to distill fragmented facts into prudent judgements. As economic theories rely heavily on assumptions and macroeconomic statistics, a critical divergence exists between ideas most persuasive to the mainstream and those best supported by logic and empirical evidence. In this paper, I will analyze the central tenets of the modern monetary theory (MMT), a recent proposal that governments with sovereign currencies, rather than domestic taxpayers, solely finance all public spending. Furthermore, I will relate the misconceptions about public spending, which MMT rebuts, to the idea of millionaire tax flight, a novel refutation against claims of the severity of debt crises. I will demonstrate parallels in the history of reception and ideological grounds of these two concepts where epistemic and social structures preclude the acceptance of such arguments among “mainstream” economic ideas. Lastly, I will provide an overview of the possible groups that not only have vested interests in blocking these ideas but have also created certain inhibitive barriers to them. This report will use evidence to advocate on the two arguments’ behalf and will identify their shared characteristics that make them distinct from other contemporary policy issues. Background President Ronald Reagan once proclaimed: “We don’t have a trillion-dollar debt because we haven’t taxed enough; we have a trillion-dollar debt because we spend too much.” Such conventional wisdom forms when the vast majority of people come to accept a group of ideas as fact. The misconception that the federal government cannot “spend beyond its means” and that millionaires flee high-tax areas by any means necessary has been propagated through numerous channels - most notably, media outlets such as Fox News - over the years by combining both personal experience and “common sense.” What happens, however, when there is new data presented that goes against the stream of ideas already established? What if these novel ideas rely upon an entirely different logical foundation for their support? What if the “common sense” originally used as the basis for prior justifications was incomplete or even flawed? An idea does not become “conventional wisdom” and gain “acceptance into the mainstream” for its proven veracity; rather, it becomes accepted as an absolute truth through its promotion by influential media outlets and politicians. Recent history has taught us that some “plausible ideas” should not deserve their wide acceptance as scientific inquiry demands. Since the 1980s, for example, the concept of a non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) has been prominently accepted as an influential theory among most economists. A NAIRU is the unemployment rate of an economy associated with a constant rate of inflation; a rise in unemployment is associated with a decrease in inflation, whereas a decline in unemployment causes an increase. Despite the success of Milton Friedman's explanation for the “natural” rate of unemployment throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, economic data in the years since the mid-1990s have weakened Friedman’s case. The US economy has seen low unemployment and low changes in inflation as well as high unemployment and high changes in inflation. In fact, Robert Gordon pointed out the external supply shocks caused during the early 1970s in an effort to display “inflation initiated not by excess demand but by commodity shortages,” circumstances that are quite noticeable in the fluctuating consumption patterns and supply chain issues during the COVID-19 pandemic. In spite of these recent developments and their implications on Friedman’s original hypothesis, the NAIRU remains “an important building block of business cycle theory.” Figure 1: Unemployment Rate and the Percent Change in the CPI since 1950 Routinely, little efforts have been made to temper an “inflation equals bad” mentality that plagues the public in the United States every few years. Similar futile simplifications are made about raising taxes for the rich as politicians claim that the wealthy will flee in droves, causing large drops in tax revenue – a claim that relies largely on hypothetical posturing rather than definitive evidence in its favor. The resolution of these two policy problems requires the reversal of hardened opinions among the general public and hard-nosed experts alike. Rising prices can be inconvenient for many – businesses may need to change their “sticker” prices while workers may not be able to renegotiate with their employers for higher wages until the end of their current contracts. Likewise, most Americans are neither millionaires nor billionaires and may often have an incomplete perception of what their life decisions would be like if they were not burdened by personal financial pressures. Such misunderstandings include failing to account for one’s close network of friends, family members, neighbors, and co-workers that shapes one’s decisions to move. These circumstances are what make it so difficult to propose ideas that run counter to what many have grown to accept as convention. Analysis Perception versus reality Misconceptions about both MMT and millionaire tax flight stem from fundamental differences between public perceptions of the two phenomena and their true implications. The media is partly to blame for this misalignment. From deficit hawks in Congress to political pundits on talk shows, the term “government deficit” is commonly used as a pejorative to counter any argument in favor of increased public spending. While prominent public figures, including billionaire Elon Musk, may perceive the government budget as identical to the personal spending habits of everyday Americans or even small, local businesses, the reality is that the United States federal government – specifically the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve – is the only entity that retains the right to issue dollars. As a nation with a sovereign currency, the United States has complete discretion over its money supply and interest rates; it can also issue intergenerational debt. This could not be further from the truth for a household, which relies upon income to buy goods and services, or a business, which uses profits to fund production, investment in inventories, and innovation. As I will examine in further detail in a later section, the fallacies underlying perceptions of the federal budget reverberate across the political spectrum, ranging from cries for a smaller government during the Reagan/Thatcher era to proclamations of “tightening belts” by President Obama in his 2010 State of the Union Address. “Crowding out,” the idea that economic activity contracts with deficit-financed expenditures, is one of the most common rebuttals to increased public spending. The neoliberal view of the crowding out effect entails the government competing with private entrepreneurs for capital to finance public spending. However, proponents of the idea that private investment will be “crowded out” if a government spends “beyond its means” fail to consider that the United States is an issuer of its own sovereign currency. Any amount of public spending that exceeds tax revenue is merely printed and issued by the US Treasury. The purpose of selling bonds after an increase in government expenditures is not necessarily to finance these payments but rather to “prevent a large infusion of reserves from pushing the overnight interest rate below the Fed’s target level.” When the federal government chooses to increase deficit spending, US Treasuries take the place of the reserve balances and maintain the aggregate quantity of reserves in the financial system. In other words, “Uncle Sam [does not] enter the market in competition with other borrowers,” such as Citigroup or Morgan Stanley. We see a similar divide between perception and reality for the myth of the millionaire tax flight. According to the Global Wealth Report of 2021, only eight percent of Americans are considered millionaires, those presumably most knowledgeable about millionaire migration. However, the perception that millionaires will definitely flee their well-nested homes for lower tax regions lingers in a large segment of the non-millionaire population. In reality, while 47% of millionaire migrations in the United States from 1999 to 2011 were from high-tax to low-tax states, roughly 32% of such migrations occurred in the opposite direction. While this result is not insignificant, there is no discernible causal relationship in which a tax hike will dramatically force millionaires to states that have lower taxes - a prospect state governments may fear will drive down local tax revenues. Figure 2: Percent of US population migrating An interesting case study is seen in the counties that border the states of Oregon and Washington, all of which are located in a region with the highest relative difference in income taxes between bordering states. Logically, one would expect more millionaires to live in the state with relatively low income taxes – Washington – rather than the state with relatively high income taxes – Oregon. However, the data shows that millionaires tend to cluster in Oregon rather than Washington even after considering tax codes that have been in place for many years. While the story of the Oregon-Washington border is unusual – most data indicates that in other border regions, millionaires “tend to cluster on the low-tax side overall” – there is no evidence that outlines a significant causal relationship between areas of greater taxation and areas with higher rates of millionaire migration. Figure 3: Counties bordering Washington and Oregon Doomsday is coming! When new public spending measures are proposed to combat a recession, cries about the “debt ceiling” from fear-mongering politicians usually arise. Other figures, such as former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, flirt with the fallacy of cratering tax revenues caused by millionaire migration. If the rift between perception and reality presented earlier can be attributed to a lack of detailed economic expertise among the general public, then the parallels between MMT and the myth of millionaire tax flight presented here demonstrate how reality has been warped into shaping false narratives about the potential for drastic economic reform. Recent data indicating that unemployment and inflation do not perfectly align with the NAIRU theory presented in the background section may signal the dogmatic nature of academics within the field of economics. To illustrate this point, it is worth scrutinizing academic discourse relating to the 2008 financial crisis. For instance, “too big to fail” was a common platitude offered by economic “experts” in the early 2000s as a way to divert public scrutiny from concerning behavior among Wall Street banks, such as the rising number of mergers and increasingly predatory loans. However, once an impending economic disaster loomed and the federal government stepped in to rescue Wall Street, these same experts responded with confusion over where their models had gone severely wrong. As Nobel laureate Paul Krugman writes, “more important [than economists’ predictive failure] was the profession’s blindness to the very possibility of catastrophic failures in a market economy.” Meanwhile, the Troubled Asset Relief Program was welcomed with open arms by financial institutions seeking to rid their balance sheets of illiquid assets. Yet when it came to increasing public expenditure to support low- and middle-income Americans affected by the subprime mortgage crisis, academics such as then Treasury Secretary Larry Summers deemed public spending to be excessive and costly. This 180-degree shift in tone lies at the core of the MMT argument; the federal government had the ability to both provide greater fiscal stimulus and purchase Wall Street’s toxic assets because the United States is an issuer of its own sovereign currency. Figure 4: How MMT accounts for market/government interactions on taxation and public spending Likewise, politicians have boldly proclaimed that tax hikes on millionaires will lead to their disastrous departure. Using data from the same study presented earlier on millionaire migrations between 1999 and 2011, we see that overall migration patterns among millionaires tend to be very subtle with only 2.4% of them choosing to migrate. Only a small portion – just 0.3% – of the total millionaire population chose to migrate from a high-tax state to a low-tax state. Beyond ignoring the clear evidence that makes the millionaire tax flight argument dubious, politicians also downplay the importance of location as a crucial form of social capital. Figure 5: Migration Rates by Age, for Different Levels of Education While there are numerous interpersonal factors that contribute to a person’s decision to move, the strongest drivers of migration include the prospect of greater economic opportunity or an immediate danger that threatens personal safety, neither of which are of particular concern for the average superstar athlete or hedge fund manager. For a person who has attained a certain level of “elite income,” interpersonal relationships and connections are “immobile” factors that influence this person’s wellbeing far beyond their marginal tax bracket. Such considerations, which are undoubtedly important to the social interactions of any group of people, are conveniently left out in the propagation of the myth of millionaire tax flight. Like the challenges that proponents of MMT face, these obstacles prevent substantial reforms towards more equitable taxation laws. The bulwarks against change Contemporary discourse on public spending conveniently fails to acknowledge the ability for the Federal Reserve to curb massive inflation through their control of interest rates and untapped potential revenues from higher taxes on the ultra-wealthy. As discussed, deficit-averse politicians use fear-mongering and scare tactics to deter support for these ideas. Their adamance reveals a similarity between those who stand to lose if such policies are enacted. MMT economists view public spending as a way to stimulate a lagging economy and use their novel theory as a means to justify higher expenditures in areas such as social welfare, healthcare benefits, and infrastructure investments. The beneficiaries of such programs include the elderly, the poor, and the sick – more generally the non-millionaire/billionaire class. Since the start of neoliberalism’s grip on Washington in the 1980s, deficit hawks have decried the prospect of increased government spending on social programs. Yet, these same government officials openly endorsed the $8 trillion “War on Terror” as well as the allocation of billions of dollars in discretionary spending to the Pentagon every year. On the flip side of the deficit debate, tax reform has been on the legislative agenda for years, but in recent decades, such reforms have been more regressive than ones made in the past. Any effort to stymie raising taxes on millionaires has brought about a constant propagation of the myth of the millionaire tax flight by politicians and academics alike. Harvard economist Martin Feldstein claims that higher state taxes on the wealthy have little effect on redistributing income and merely lead to greater migration by the wealthy. Such misrepresentations of government finance and migration trends may originate from the entrenched view of such matters within economics. However, it is certain that political lobbying, particularly in the years after the Supreme Court’s Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision, has allowed the interests of the wealthy to be overrepresented in legislative decisions on public spending and tax reform. We often see that these obstacles prevent substantive action for other policy problems as well, such as combating climate change, dismantling the prison industrial complex, or engaging in international trade wars. In all of these instances, the vested interests of the donor class take charge. MMT and the myth of millionaire tax flight occupy unique positions among these challenging policy problems due to their potential for dramatic economic change among the benefiting stakeholders. It is even possible to create a parallel between the two ideas, as MMT views progressive taxation as a means to promote a more equitable society rather than as a hindrance for public programs. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that America’s millionaires use arguments such as the myth of millionaire tax flight to prevent higher taxation on the wealthy and the alarmism over deficits in order to curtail social spending. The rhetoric of politics Appealing to conventional wisdom is often a politically convenient argument to employ. Explaining every minute aspect of government finance takes time and effort and is – more importantly – unrelatable for most voters. The stagnation of real wages since the 1970s has forced middle- and lower-income households to grow accustomed to restricting their spending habits. Listening to rhetoric of their elected officials “wasting away” their hard-earned tax dollars can incite ire among constituents, making ideas such as modern monetary theory appear far-fetched. One study conducted by Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi indicates that such rhetoric has a meaningful impact on politicians’ public perceptions. This is perhaps the reason why the politicians mentioned in (Section A) were unanimous in agreement over concerns about the fiscal deficit. While the degree of this agreement varies between politicians, there appears to be a reluctance to take the MMT perspective on this issue. Perhaps the word “deficit” being written in big, red letters on the minds of voters on Election Day is political suicide for anyone who dares to be portrayed as a proponent of reckless spending. The convenience of political arguments against higher taxes on the rich is similar to that of arguments echoed in the debate against higher corporate taxes – that the wealthy and resourceful create jobs for others and therefore require lower tax rates to create opportunities for wealth that “trickle down” to the rest of the population. These long-established views have become entrenched in the common sense of the public and have rendered idiosyncratic ideas incapable of breaking into the mainstream. Conclusions and a Way Forward Both ideas examined in this paper rely upon very basic truths – (1) no one outside of the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve can issue US dollars, and (2) millionaires, no matter how much wealthier they may be than the average American, rely upon and seek to maintain their established social networks. Accepting these two statements as facts can drastically alter policy discussions on both public spending and taxation on a federal level. Time is arguably the most critical component to changing public perceptions of social spending and equitable tax reform. Even Stephanie Kelton, one of the leading experts on MMT, admits that she herself was skeptical upon her first encounter with the theory. The benefit of hindsight has revealed the shortcomings of the global economic order, especially in the aftermath of the Great Recession. The crisis presented itself as an opportunity for decisive action in a new direction, but instead, haste and imprudence allowed fiscal austerity to captivate the minds of leaders and economists around the world. While MMT is far from a panacea for all economic uncertainties, even economists who are more supportive of the traditional view on fiscal deficits, such as N. Gregory Mankiw, have recognized that MMT provides some useful insights that the traditional view may have historically overlooked. The COVID-19 pandemic may serve as an inflection point for a more active role of governments in markets as countries around the world have increased their public spending to avoid recessions. It is here, however, that an important limiting rule of MMT must be mentioned - inflation. In the event of large spikes in prices - as is the case at the time of this writing in Spring 2022 - using MMT as a blank check to drive up public spending would not be prudent and would likely make the inflationary crisis worse. During such times, coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities to adjust interest rates and temper expectations of future inflation is vital. Despite these limitations, circumstantial anomalies should not render the entire idea invalid. To truly tackle challenging policy problems, we must look to audacious economic ideas such as Modern Monetary Theory and refute arcane, baseless ones such as the myth of millionaire tax flight. 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Ria Modak Khadi Capitalism: Gandhian Neoliberalism and the Making of Modern India Ria Modak The postcolonial invocation of Mohandas Gandhi brings to mind a singular image: Gandhi dressed in a simple dhoti and shawl made from khadi, or home-spun and home woven cloth, sitting in front of his spinning wheel. This recollection of Gandhi positions him as both the embodiment of Indian national consciousness as well as a figure outside or above modernity, insulated from the hegemonic influence of Western reason and secularism. Modernity, encapsulated by the socio- political, economic, and cultural institutions and frameworks birthed by post-Enlightenment rationality, is seen as incompatible with the fundamental tenets of Gandhian political philosophy. Yet, in researching the massive corpus of Gandhi’s collected writings and speeches, I found that his entanglements of modernity, cap- italism, and nationalism were less straightforward than conventional Indian historiography might suggest. Gandhi’s political philosophy offers an entry point to address fundamental questions about nation thinking, modernity, and postcolonial futurity: can the postcolonial subject articulate political possibilities that move beyond the nation state without sacrificing the material considerations of global capitalism? Put differently, is it possible to imagine and enact a world order that transcends the hegemonic structuring forces of Western modernity? These questions are particularly resonant as we come to terms with the price of modern progress, which, in the stark words of Horkheimer and Adorno, has left us a world “radiant with triumphant calamity” (1). Critiques of modern living are boundless, ranging from Frankfurt school critiques of its reification of reason to Subaltern Studies’ lamentations of Western epistemological hegemony (2) to arguments from the Black radical tradition that colonialism and modernity are inextricably linked (3). However, as scholars look beyond the modern Western intellectual tradition and locate alternative ways of being to create more liberatory political realities, it is crucial that we think critically about how radical these alternatives truly are. Some alternatives, like those found in Gandhi’s political philosophy, cannot help but be, to invoke the work of David Scott, conscripts of modernity. While historians and political theorists of contemporary India alike argue that Gandhi summarily rejected modern frameworks of nationalism, industrialism, and rationality itself, I contend that Gandhian political philosophy, rather than existing above the conceits of Western modernity, is intimately tied to Western civil society and its social, political, and economic manifestations. More specifically, it closely resembles neoliberal forms of social relations and economy. The fundamental methodologies and frameworks undergirding Gandhian political philosophy ultimately reinscribe the hegemonic global capitalist order even while they seem, on inspection, to articulate a radically different futurity. This paper’s critical intervention, then, challenges the underlying assumptions of conventional Indian historiography by exposing its inability to reckon with Gandhi as a fundamentally modern political figure entrenched in the machinations of globalized neoliberalism. I suggest that a more critical reading of Gandhi-- one that accurately locates his political philosophy as a modern intellectual contribution-- is necessary in order to make sense of India’s postcolonial future. After an outline of conventional Indian historiography and its fixation with Gandhi within the nationalist paradigm, I turn to elements of Gandhi’s political philosophy and political economy to expose its similarities to modern neoliberal ideology and economics. Nationalist Historiography: A Dominant Discourse The conventional story of the Indian nationalist movement emphasizes the role of prolonged popular struggle; the diverse political and ideological visions of its leadership; and a uniquely revolutionary atmosphere of freedom and debate (4). The first stage of the independence movement was defined by the cultivation of an elite consciousness and the emergence of moderate nationalist activity; statesmen and politicians like Dadabhai Naoroji and Gopal Krishna Gokhale sought to achieve piecemeal reform through constitutional methods while keeping faith in the British justice system (5). As these gradual efforts failed to bring about substantive change, a more extremist brand of nationalism emerged. Through the swadeshi movement, militant nationalists like Lala Lajpat Rai and Bal Gangadhar Tilak fomented wide-spread political agitation by boycotting British institutions and goods (6). In this highly charged political context, Gandhi launched several satyagraha , or non-violent resistance, campaigns, including the non-cooperation movement and the Quit India movement, successfully mobilizing the masses (7). The culmination of this protracted struggle for freedom was, of course, Indian independence and the ensuing violence of Partition. This dominant narrative of the Indian freedom struggle foregrounds nationalism as a guiding principle, first to unify the social, economic, and political demands of a vastly heterogeneous population, and later to create a sovereign and secular nation state that embodies the will of the people. In depicting nationalism as the primary structuring force in the making of modern India, the mainstream approach to Indian history is representative of other, more extreme, approaches to historiography, including Hindu nationalist, Marxist, and even subaltern perspectives. All Indian history, in other words, is told as nationalist history. Hindu nationalist retellings of the independence movement represent Indian nationalism as a brand of ethnic nationalism in which nationality is an inherent genetic characteristic (8). By villainizing Muslim subjects, it replaces the secular liberal state of conventional historiography with a Hindu state: the Indian nation is the Hindu nation (9). Marxist historiography, in contrast, traces the rise and fall of India as a socialist state through retelling history from below, analyzing the role of peasant revolts and general strikes in inciting nationalist fervor. It conceptualizes the positive aspects of the nationalist movement (i.e. the bourgeois-democratic values of secularism, women’s rights, freedom of the press etc.) as the initial points for a people’s front (10). While subaltern historiographical approaches drew inspiration from Marxist methods, their characterization of the nationalist movement splits Indian politics into elite and subaltern spheres, each of which articulated a unique form of nationalism (11). Each of these historiographical approaches, in summary, insist on reifying the defining characteristic of national- ism according to the field’s preeminent scholars: congruence between the political and national unit (12). Within this discourse, the figure of Gandhi emerges as the very embodiment of nationalist consciousness. During the freedom struggle, he acquired the informal, but highly popularized, title of Father of the Nation, an appellation which continues to inform Gandhi’s central role in Indian postcolonial imagination. Countless films, television programs, plays, and documentaries continue to memorialize his life and work both within and outside of India. From Richard Attenborough’s 1982 film Gandhi to Doordarshan’s 52 episode-long teleserial Mahatma, the figure of Gandhi continues to pervade India’s nationalist project (13). Gandhi plays a crucial role in the symbolic consolidation of state power: his birthday and death day are both celebrated as national holidays; his image appears on paper currency of nearly all denominations issued by the Reserve Bank of India; and the International Gandhi Peace Prize is awarded annually by the Government of India as a tribute to Gandhian ideals. From the independence movement to our own political moment, Gandhi and the nationalist project have fused into an inseparable unit. Contemporary theorists of Indian nationalism argue that the conflation of Gandhi and the nation can be attributed to Gandhi’s refusal to adopt the values and assumptions of Western modernity. Partha Chatterjee suggests that by rejecting the modernizing ethos of Western rationality, Gandhi remained unencumbered by the Enlightenment thematic: “[n]ot only did Gandhi not share the historicism of the nationalist writers, he did not share their confidence in rationality and the scientific mode of knowledge” (14). Dipesh Chakrabarty and Rochona Majumdar argue that Gandhi’s reliance on the Bhagavad Gita, a Hindu scripture, allowed for the articulation of a novel religio-ethical orientation in the realm of politics, which he saw as intrinsically linked to Western modernity (15). This seemingly wholesale rejection of Western modernity, according to many historians of modern and postcolonial India, is clearly visible in Gandhi’s public image (16). As he embraced his role as a satyagrahi, he traded the Western robes of the barrister for a simple dhoti and shawl made from khadi. Gandhi’s khadi attire was transformed into a material artifact of the nation defined in terms of the contemporary politics and economics of self rule (17). Gandhi’s physical appearance, in other words, paralleled his ideological distance from Western modernity. Gandhi’s rejection of modern social, political, and economic frameworks is often contrasted to other leading statesmen and intellectuals of Indian freedom. He is most frequently counterposed with Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister. Conventional Indian historiography narrates the differences between Gandhi and Nehru as such: where Nehru was a proponent of statist secular socialism driven by industrial growth, Gandhi was profoundly ambivalent about state intervention in agriculture and industry; where Nehru located India’s future in the creation of the modern city, Gandhi presented the self-sufficient and autonomous village as an alternative to modern civilization; where Nehru saw economic development as central to Indian independence, Gandhi sought self-purification and the cultivation of individual ethical consciousness (18). Scholars of modern India also juxtapose Gandhi’s religious orientation and appeals to Hinduism with the anti-caste, radical democratic humanism of B.R. Ambedkar, renowned Dalit leader and the architect of India’s constitution (19). Where Gandhi revered village life as a revival of the old social order, Ambedkar saw the village as a model of oppressive Hindu social organization which segregated upper caste communities from lower caste communities; where Gandhi turned to religion as a source of ethics, Ambedkar glorified the secular humanist ideals of the French Revolution; where Gandhi urged spiritual and religious education in Hindustani, Ambedkar demanded that English be used in schools to counter the Brahmin tradition of denying education and literacy to lower caste communities (20). In comparison to Nehru, Ambedkar, and others, Gandhian political philosophy is depicted in mainstream Indian historiography as irrefutably anti-modern. However, as I argue below, this characterization of Gandhi does not accurately reflect his political philosophy. Defining the Gandhian Problem Space Rather than articulating a radical alternative to Western modernity, Gandhian political philosophy was entrenched in the systems, structures, and frameworks of modernity, and more specifically, those of neoliberal capitalism. Before addressing the specifics of Gandhi’s political philosophy, it is first necessary to locate Gandhi more comprehensively within his problem space to better establish the stakes of my argument. In his work Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment, David Scott introduces the idea of the problem space, which he defines as “an ensemble of questions and answers around which a horizon of identifiable stakes (conceptual as well as ideological-political stakes) hangs” (21). Theoretical work cannot be read, in other words, without identifying the questions to which that work responds. Even while actors within a particular problem space may disagree on the answers in a particular scenario, they are all responding to the same set of unspoken questions while maintaining a shared sense of the stakes. Intellectuals, statesmen and activists may disagree on how to decolonize, for example, while implicitly agreeing that something must be done to address the condition of colonized people. In the previous section, I gestured to one aspect of Gandhi’s problem space by outlining the background against which he formed his ideas in the space and time of the Indian freedom movement; in that spatio-temporal location, Gandhi’s problem space was constructed by Hindu scripture and the formation of religion as ethics. However, the Gandhian problem space was not circumscribed by the borders of the Indian nation; rather, it existed concomitantly with other approaches to decolonization during the mid-twentieth century. On the whole, these other projects struggled, mostly unsuccessfully, to articulate a postcolonial future out- side the terms of nationalism and modernity. In the Anglophone Black Atlantic, statesmen and intellectuals like Kwame Nkrumah and Eric Williams proposed federalism and non-domination on the global stage as solutions to the problem of empire (22). In the Francophone Black Atlantic, Aime Cesaire and Leopold Sedar Senghor sought to transform imperial France into a democratic federation with former colonies as autonomous members of a transcontinental polity (23). Within this internationalist problem space of decolonization characterized by “an attitude of anticolonial longing, a longing for anti-colonial revolution,” actors from all over the decolonizing world sought to engage in a radical project of worldmaking. However, many reinscribed colonial legacies by adopting the institutions, bureaucracies, and borders of colonial domination. Within the context of this problem space, then, Gandhi’s apparent rejection of modernity took on additional stakes as one of the few truly radical alternatives to nation thinking and capitalist state formation, not just in the Indian context but in the decolonizing world as a whole. However, this perception of Gandhi’s ideological distance from modernity is fundamentally misguided. In the three sections that follow, I analyze some of the fundamental tenets of Gandhi’s political philosophy and political economy to draw conceptual linkages to neoliberal capitalism. I first consider Gandhi’s attention to the individual as a unit of analysis in the struggle for independence, and argue that his conceptualization of swaraj as self-purification elided a structural understanding of colonialism as an oppressive force. Next, I critique Gandhi’s political ideal of Ramarajya and analyze his rejection of Western civilization. Finally, I turn to his visions of political economy, and in particular, his fixation with khadi to argue that Gandhi’s economic programme was, in fact, far closer to neoliberalism than most scholars would admit. Before addressing Gandhi’s political philosophy in full, it is helpful to first situate my argument within the field of Gandhi studies and critiques of Gandhi. Beginning in the early twentieth century, trade unionists like Shripad Amrit Dange took issue with the conservative strains within Gandhi’s economic thought, comparing it to the ideology of Soviet leaders like Vladimir Lenin (24). Contemporary scholars of India have taken up these critiques, pointing to his defense of the propertied classes, his ambivalence toward trade unions, and his philosophy of trusteeship as evidence of his imbrication in modern systems of capitalism and nationalism (25). However, few scholars have taken a theoretical approach to Gandhian political philosophy as a whole; those that do characterize his anticolonialism as fundamentally opposed to the modern state (26). My intervention complicates both of these approaches by engaging in a theoretical and deeply normative consideration of Gandhian thought. Swaraj as Self Purification and the Cultivation of Neoliberal Social Relations In his seminal treatise on political philosophy, Hind Swaraj, Gandhi puts forth a unique definition of swaraj , or self rule, that offers several dimensions through which to understand the stakes and motivations of the freedom struggle. First, Gandhian swaraj must be understood through the praxis of the individual, who is “the one supreme consideration” (27): it is “in the palm of our hands... Swaraj has to be experienced by each one for himself” (28). The practitioner of swaraj is the individual, not society or community (29). Gandhi’s focus on internal moral transformation leaves ambiguous the role of coalitional organizing and community building. In addition, Gandhi’s notion of swaraj is not generated in reaction to the brutality of colonial rule, but rather it emerges from an inner commitment to self improvement: “What we want to do should be done, not because we object to the English or because we want to retaliate, but because it is our duty to do so” (30). The political power derived from swaraj, in other words, must not be regarded as an end in itself. Indeed, a third characteristic of Gandhian swaraj is that it is not predicated on self determination or economic independence: “Now you will have seen that it is not necessary for us to have as our goal the expulsion of the English. If the English become Indianised, we can accommodate them” (31). Rather, swaraj depends on moral development and ethical formation. As such, it is intimately tied to the cultivation of spiritual and religious sensibilities (32) rather than the material considerations of development and industry: “Impoverished India can become free, but it will be hard for an India made rich through immorality to regain its freedom” (33). Gandhian swaraj is not constructed exclusively by material forces, nor does it demand exclusively material solutions. Gandhi’s focus on the individual obfuscates the role of colonialism as a structure of domination. He locates the origins of colonial exploitation in the moral failings of the Indian populace: “The English have not taken India; we have given it to them. They are not in India because of their strength, but because we keep them” (34). Gandhi’s discussion of the emergence of colonial rule is, unsurprisingly, limited in scope; the subject of his analysis is the upper class, upper caste colonized elite: “Who assisted the Company’s officers? Who was tempted at the sight of their silver? Who bought their goods? History testifies that we did all this. In order to become rich all at once, we welcomed the Company’s officers with open arms” (35). His myopic focus on the individual blinds him to the many revolutionary movements led by farmers, mill-workers, and tribal communities to overthrow British rule that were organized on the basis of economic exploitation (36). Gandhi also absolves colonial officers from their role in fomenting religious tensions between Hindus and Muslims through a divide-and-rule policy: “The Hindus and the Mahomedans were at daggers drawn. This, too, gave the Company its opportunity, and thus we created the circumstances that gave the Company its control over India” (37). This revisionist retelling of Hindu-Muslim relations ignores the crucial role of colonial policies in exacerbating religious tensions. The Census of British India of 1871-1872 constructed modern Hindu and Muslim identities as incompatible while the 1909 Morley-Minto reforms created separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims (38), thus fracturing political power (39). Gandhi’s conceptualization of swaraj does not adequately address the systems that continued to uphold the violence of colonial rule through law, bureaucracy, and state violence. By privileging the individual over the systemic, Gandhi’s formulation of swaraj closely resembles the cultivation of neoliberal social relations. While neoliberalism as an economic principle only gained traction in the 1970s after the dissolution of post-war Keynesianism, it also embodies ideological principles which marshal values of human dignity, individualism, and freedom to theorize the free market as a force of domination (40). Ethics and morality under the ideology of neoliberalism, in other words, become highly individualized, as in the case of Gandhian swaraj . This moral dimension has been central to neoliberalism since the beginning of the twentieth century (41), and became particularly salient in the aftermath of the Second World War, when human rights discourse began to interface with neoliberalism to produce a modern version of the colonial civilizing mission by facilitating the emergence of a globalized market civilization in which individual rights and competitive market relations would spread across and within national borders co-constitutively (42). Neoliberalism as a method of understanding and critiquing social relations offers a theoretical framework through which to analyze Gandhian swaraj. To be clear, I am not conflating all forms of religiously inflected self making with neoliberal social relations. I am arguing specifically that Gandhian swaraj, in failing to attend sufficiently to the structural forces of colonial domination, mirrors the highly destructive individualism that constitutes a central feature of neoliberalism. In fact, the very religio-ethical orientation that Gandhi gravitated toward was used as a tool for collective liberation in the context of the Indian freedom movement itself. For example, Muslim revolutionaries like Ashfaqullah Khan and Abul Kalam Azad invoked Islam and Islamic liberation theology to mobilize In- dian Muslim subjects in the independence struggle by centering the mosque as a site of resistance and reciting the Quran and fasting for Ramadan while jailed as political prisoners (43). In contrast to Gandhian swaraj, their religious sensibilities confronted the colonial state by producing solidarity among many diverse Muslim communities. A Critique of Ramarajya: Caste, Capitalism and Gandhi’s Ideal Civilization To reiterate, Gandhi is understood by most scholars as rejecting modernity because of his scathing critiques of modern civilization. Modern civilization, rather than the violent state sanctioned brutality of colonialism, was responsible for India’s downfall according to Gandhi: “It is not the British people who are ruling India, but it is modern civilization, through its railways, telegraphs, telepoles, and almost any invention which has been claimed to be a triumph of civilization” (44). The West fell prey to the forces of materialism, hyperrationality, and uncompromising secularism, which are all the inescapable after-effects of modernity. Gandhi expresses his disdain for this civilization in no uncertain terms: “This civilisation takes note of neither morality nor of religion: this civilization is irreligion” (45). Even more lamentably, the West mapped these values onto the East through the process of colonialism. As such, he writes, “India’s salvation consists in unlearning what she has learnt during the past fifty years. The railways, telegraphs, hospitals, law- yers, doctors, and such like have all to go, and the so-called upper classes have to learn to live conscientiously and religiously and deliberately the simple peasant life, knowing it to be a life giving true happiness” (46). These critiques of modern civilization are taken as evidence of Gandhi successfully rising above the conceits of modernity (47). However, it is not enough to consider Gandhi’s critique of modern civilization; rather, we must also analyze his alternative to modern civilization to assess whether or not it breaks free of the very systems Gandhi is opposed to. The fundamental values of Gandhi’s civilizational ideal are distinct from those of what he refers to as modern or material civilization, but their enactment reinforces neoliberal values. He defines true civilization as “that mode of conduct which points out to man the path of duty” (48). True civilization is morally inflected, and therefore spiritually inflected. According to Gandhi, India once adhered to the tenets of true civilization and must work to recover them: “The tendency of Indian civilisation is to elevate the moral being, that of the Western civilisation is to propagate immorality. The latter is godless, the former is based on a belief in God. So understanding and so believing, it behoves every lover of India to cling to the old Indian civilisation even as a child clings to its mother’s breast” (49). True civilization was achieved in the past and can be achieved again if, Gandhi argues, India returns to its original methods of governance, agriculture, industry, and labor while modifying some of its less progressive elements like untouchability: “In order to restore India to its pristine condition, we have to return to it. In our own civilisation, there will naturally be progress, retrogression, reforms and reactions, but one effort is required, and that is to drive out Western civilisation” (50). The fundamental values of Gandhi’s civilization ideal defined a type of morality that was dependent on acting according to one’s duty. The fixation on duty as a morally and religiously constituted ideal is, as I hope to prove, entirely compatible with capitalism and casteism in their modern formulations. Before considering the theoretical implications of Gandhi’s civilizational ethos, it is first necessary to understand how he envisioned their political manifestations through Ramarajya, “ the non-violent state of Gandhi’s vision” (51), his most concrete articulation of an alternative to nation thinking. Admittedly, Gandhi was less concerned with the details of postcolonial institutions, instead preferring a “one step enough” approach (52). However, he wrote extensively on his conceptualization of the ideal state, which he derived from the ancient ideal of Ramarajya, the divine kingdom of Lord Ram. Ramarajya in Gandhi’s formulation consisted of a federation of self governing and semi-autonomous panchayats , or village councils. The authority of the federation would be limited to the coordination, guidance, and supervision of matters of common interest (53). As in the case of swaraj, Ramarajya asserted the supremacy of individual freedom; this individual freedom was to be manifested in each panchayat and the state itself (54). Yet, these individual freedoms were tempered by Gandhi’s insistence on maintaining the caste system. In order to overcome the “life-corroding competition” of materialism and capitalism, each individual must follow “his own occupation or trade” (55). The law of varna “established certain spheres of action for certain people with certain tendencies,” thus at once naturalizing and institutionalizing caste (56). The shadow of caste, a concrete manifestation of Gandhi’s civilizational ethos of duty and morality, hung over his Ramarajya. Caste as a structuring force in Gandhi’s Ramarajya was not simply an unsavory vestige of pre-modern India; it was central to creating a reformed political and economic system in the postcolonial context. While Ramarajya was highly idealized, in the decades following Gandhi’s death, the Indian government has tried to implement many of its elements through campaigns, most notably the 2014 Clean India Mission ( Swachh Bharat Abhiyan ). The Clean India Mission is a country wide campaign aimed to “achieve universal sanitation coverage” by eradicating manual scavenging, improving the management of solid and liquid waste, and sustaining open-defecation free behavior (57). It is undoubtedly inspired by Ramarajya: it was initiated on the 150th anniversary of Gandhi’s birthday; volunteers are known as swachhagrahis, clearly in reference to satyagrahis ; and its messaging invokes Gandhian ideals of morality and duty (58). Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself proclaimed, “I must admit that if I had not understood Gandhi’s philosophy so deeply, the programme would not have been a part of my government’s priorities” (59). Yet, the Clean India Mission relied on coercive state action in its interactions with Dalit and Adivasi communities because prevailing ideas of purity and pollution drawn from the caste system perpetuate open defecation in rural India. To spread its message to lower caste and tribal communities, the Clean India Mission relied on the spirit of neoliberal capitalism, aggressive branding, and the monetary aid of multi-million dollar conglomerates like Hindustan Unilever (60). Neoliberal capitalism was the vessel through which casteism could inflict harm (61). The very ideals of morality and duty, when enshrined in the caste system, allowed Ramarajya to exist in accordance with the principles of neoliberal capitalism and state violence. When put into practice, Gandhi’s Ramarajya was not a rejection of modernity and materialism, but rather a manifestation of the most oppressive elements of Western modernity. His ideal form of political governance was invoked to complete a fundamentally modernist project. Khadi Capitalism: A Critique of Gandhi’s Political Economy Just as Gandhi’s political philosophy was highly compatible with neoliberal capitalism, so was his political economy. Like his conceptualization of Ramarajya and political philosophy, Gandhi understood political economy as inseparable from ethical and religious pursuits. Through this religio-ethical lens , individual and societal economic interests were to be collapsed to avoid conflict between the two. Economic progress in the material sense was antagonistic to “real progress” in the ethical sense (62). As part of his political economy, Gandhi urged plain living, which entailed the curtailing of material desires to lead a more sustainable lifestyle: “More and more things are produced to supply our primary needs, less and less will be the violence” (63). He urged small-scale and locally-oriented production that would not require large-scale industrialization or the use of machinery. Gandhi also emphasized the dignity of all forms of labor and suggested that every person, no matter their class status, should engage in manual labor, which he called, after Leo Tolstoy, “bread labor,” to understand the plight of agricultural laborers (64). Plain living, small-scale production, and bread labor, in summation, formed the basis of Gandhi’s political economy. The khadi programme was essential in enacting Gandhi’s political economy. Khadi was meant to be the national industry to benefit the masses by providing supplementary work to unemployed rural hands. The economics of khadi included a plan to produce, distribute, exchange, and consume hand-spun yarn and cloth. Its effects were meant to diminish unemployment, augment economic productivity, and increase the purchasing power and of the poor. As it was geared towards India’s rural population, khadi could rely on only the most simple and accessible technologies: the loom and the spinning wheel. It also had to rely on a local re- source base for production and consumption (65). As such, khadi played a crucial role in defining the structures of exchange in Gandhi’s political economy: each village had to be self supporting and self contained to adhere to the khadi programme. According to this highly fragmented doctrine, villages should only exchange necessary commodities with other villages where they are not locally producible (66). Although khadi was meant to deliver material economic benefits to India’s rural population, as with other elements of Gandhi’s political economy, it also took on a profoundly moral dimension. It was integral to establishing what Gandhi referred to as a “non-violent economic order” (67). While mill-made cloth was cheaper than khadi, it relied on “dishonesty,” “violence and untruth,” which is why it had to be opposed (68). In the scope of Gandhi’s political economy, khadi was necessary to address the economic and moral needs of the Indian masses. In promoting the khadi programme, Gandhi articulated an unequivocal opposition to industrialism and, by extension, state socialism. Labor-saving machinery, according to Gandhi, was highly detrimental to the lives of rural Indians; it was antagonistic to both man’s labor and true civilization: “Machinery has begun to desolate Europe. Ruination is now knocking at the English gates. Machinery is the chief symbol of modern civilisation; it represents a great sin” (69). While states- men like Nehru urged state-sponsored large-scale industrialization to bring India’s economy onto the globalized stage (70), Gandhi insisted that “India does not need to be industrialised in the modern sense of the term” (71). His apathy towards state socialism was grounded in this uncompromising opposition to industrialism: if industrialism was a necessary step in implementing socialist policies, he would reject those policies. However, while khadi was avowedly anti-industrialist, it was not unambiguously anti-modern. Just as Gandhi’s political philosophy resembles neoliberal ethical formation by erasing the structural role of colonialism, khadi does the same by erasing the structural role of capitalism. Gandhi’s political economy addressed the problem of inequality primarily on the individual level by pleading for necessary changes in lifestyle to limit one’s needs and conceptualizing the economy in moral terms. The cultivation of individual economic health apart from the travails of industrialism and heavy machinery was the guiding principle in Gandhi’s political economy: ethics and morality became co-opted by the logic of neoliberal individualism. The more structural features of khadi -- its production, distribution, exchange and consumption schemes-- also reinforce aspects of neoliberal economy and ideology. The confluence of a lack of state regulation and the supremacy of individual will in the context of atomized, self-sufficient villages is not far from the neoliberal ideal that reifies individual rights and competitive market relations (72). Just as neoliberal ideology obscures class conflict by dissuading class consciousness through the vocabulary of individualism, the moral and ideological ramifications of khadi portray class warfare as an instrument of social violence and disharmony (73). Gandhian political economy sought to resolve economic inequality by pre- serving human dignity rather than ensuring material gains (74). Gandhi’s political economy, in sum, was not so distant from modern neoliberalism. Conclusion: Confronting the Postmodern Turn in Postcolonial Studies Thus, Gandhi’s political philosophy and political economy were not divorced from Western modernity. Contrary to the writings of most historians and political theorists of contemporary India, I suggest that Gandhi’s political thought closely resembles neoliberal ideology, social relations, and economy even while it may seem, on inspection, unequivocally anti-modern. The methodological individual- ism that undergirds his conceptualization of swaraj, the centrality of caste and labor division in his political ideal of Ramarajya and his khadi programme all point to significant conceptual linkages to neoliberal capitalism. Through a critical reading of his work, I contend that Gandhi was not above modernity: he was entrenched in the systems, structures, and ideologies of modernity. Understanding Gandhi’s political philosophy as a modern intellectual contribution is crucial in confronting the recent postmodernist and poststructuralist turn in postcolonial studies, which seeks to replace class analysis or history from below with textual analysis and cultural theory (75). This new orientation, through its methodological individualism, depoliticization of the social from the material realm, and wholesale refusal of programmatic politics, is both conservative and authoritarian (76). By prioritizing ideology over existing structures of domination, in other words, it fails to engage with the material realities of colonialism and capitalism. This brand of scholarship, as I prove, uses Gandhi as its shining example. In my paper, I have attempted to dislodge this conventional perception of Gandhi as the embodiment of pure Indian nationalism untouched by Western modernity by pointing to the material implications of his political thought. In doing so, I hope to challenge the postmodern impulse within postcolonial studies. More importantly, I strongly believe that a critical reading of Gandhi is necessary in our contemporary political moment. More than 250 million farm workers in India went on strike in November 2020 to demand better working conditions, including the withdrawal of new anti-farm bills that would deregulate agricultural markets by giving corporations the staggering power to set crop prices far below current minimum rates. Farmers are confronting neoliberal excess in its most globalized form, facing off against Prime Minister Modi as well as dozens of multinational corporations. While invocations of Gandhian political philosophy by far-right figures like Modi are often characterized as erroneous distortions of his thought within liberal nationalist scholarship, in reality they are the logical conclusions of his arguments (77). Within the corpus of Gandhi’s work lie the seeds of neoliberal exploitation. As farmers come to terms with an ever-growing and exploitative globalized economy, a careful examination of Gandhi’s political thought may inform what a just postcolonial future should, and shouldn’t, embody. Endnotes 1 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 1. 2 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 4. 3 Aime Cesaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000), 9. 4 Bipin Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947, (New Delhi, India; Viking, 1998), 14. 5 Sumit Sarkar, Modern India: 1885-1947, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 92. 6 Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy, (Routledge, 2017), 92. 7 Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, 110. 8 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 11. 9 Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (Bombay, India: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1969), 2. 10 Irfan Habib, Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perception, (New Delhi, India: Tulika, 1995), 10. 11 Gyan Prakash, “Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism,” The American Historical Review 99, no. 5 (1994): 1478. 12 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. 13 Shanti Kumar, Gandhi Meets Primetime: Globalization and Nationalism in Indian Television, (Baltimore: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 17. 14 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse, (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 96. 15 Dipesh Chakrabarty and Rochona Majumdar, “Gandhi’s Gita and Politics As Such,” Modern Intellectual History 7, no. 2 (2010): 338. 16 For a good scholarly overview, see Sanjeev Kumar, Gandhi and the Contemporary World, (Taylor and Francis, 2019). 17 Lisa Trivedi, Clothing Gandhi’s Nation: Homespun and Modern India, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), xx. 18 Surinder S. Jodhka, “Nation and Village: Images of Rural India in Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar,” Economic and Political Weekly 37, no. 32 (2002): 3347. 19 Arundhati Roy, The Doctor and The Saint: Caste, Race, and the Annihilation of Caste: The Debate Between B.R. Ambedkar and M.K. Gandhi (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017), 2. 20 Aishwary Kumar, Radical Equality: Ambedkar, Gandhi, and the Risk of Democracy, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017), 338. 21 David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 4. 22 Adom Getachew, Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 107. 23 Gary Wilder, Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 10. 24 Shripad Amrit Dange, Gandhi vs Lenin (Bombay, India: Liberty Literature Company, 1921), 15. 25 Vivek Chibber, Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital (London: Verso, 2013), 282. 26 Karuna Mantena, “On Gandhi’s Critique of the State: Sources, Contexts, Conjunctures,” Modern Intellectual History 9, no. 3 (2012): 535. 27 Mohandas Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 25 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1989), 252. 28 Mohandas Gandhi, Hind Swaraj and Other Writings, ed. Anthony J. Parel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 71. 29 Koneru Ramakrishan Rao, Gandhi’s Dharma, (New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 2017), 105. 30 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 116. 31 Ibid, 71. 32 I conflate these terms carefully: according to Gandhi, religion and morality could not be disentangled. Throughout Hind Swaraj, he emphasizes that they are entirely co-constitutive. 33 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 106. 34 Ibid, 38-39. 35 Ibid. 36 Subho Basu, Does Class Matter? Colonial Capital and Workers Resistance in Bengal, 1890-1937, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 238-62. 37 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 40. 38 Rajmohan Gandhi, Eight Lives: A Study of the Hindu-Muslim Encounter, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 6. 39 Of course, in reality this narrative is not so simple.There was a clear sense of difference and tension between Hindu and Muslim communities long before British rule. However, I argue that Gandhi’s telling of this history erases the role that British colonialism played in intensifying these tensions for political gain. 40 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 12. 41 Jessica Whyte, The Morals of the Market: Human Rights and the Rise of Neoliberalism, (La Vergne: Verso, 2019), 4. 42 Whyte, The Morals of the Market, 8. 43 Pran Nath Chopra, Role of Indian Muslims in the Struggle for Freedom, (New Delhi, India: Light & Life Publishers, 1979), 6. 44 Gandhi, “Letter to H.S.L. Pollack” in Hind Swaraj, 128. 45 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 36. 46 Gandhi, “Letter to H.S.L. Pollack” in Hind Swaraj, 129. 47 Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, 98. 48 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 65. 49 Ibid. 50 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 104. 51 Rao, Gandhi’s Dharma, 210. 52 G.N. Dhawan, The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, (Bombay, India: Popular Book Depot, 1946), 126. 53 Ibid, 282. 54 Raghavan Iyer, The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi, (New York: Oxford University Press), 86. 55 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 66. 56 Ramarajya also poses interesting and important questions about gender and patriarchy in village life, but unfortunately this line of inquiry is outside the scope of this paper. 57 “Swachh Bharat Mission,” Government of India, https://swachhbharatmission.gov.in/sbmcms/index.htm. 58 Swachh Bharat Mission,” Government of India, https://swachhbharatmission.gov.in/sbmcms/index.htm. 59 “PM Modi: Gandhi inspired me to launch Swachh Bharat,” Economic Times, Published October 2, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-modi-gandhi-inspired-me-to-launch-s wachh-bharat/articleshow/66045561.cms?from=mdr. 60 “Hindustan Unilever Limited: Spreading the message of Swachh Aadat across India,” The Hindu, Published April 30, 2018, https://www.thehindu.com/brandhub/hindustan-unilever-limited-spreading-the-message-of-swachh-aadat- across-india/article23729983.ece. 61 Anand Teltumbde, Republic of Caste: Thinking Equality in the Time of Neoliberal Hindutva, (New Delhi, India: Navayana, 2018), 24. 62 Gandhi, “Economic and Moral Development” in Hind Swaraj, 154. 63 Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 22, 143. 64 Ibid, vol. 12, 51. 65 Trivedi, Clothing Gandhi’s Nation, 81. 66 Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 51, 92. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 106. 70 Chibber, Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital, 249. 71 Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 51, 93. 72 Whyte, The Morals of the Market, 12. 73 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 16. 74 Madan Gandhi, Marx and Gandhi: Study in Ideological Polarities, (Chandigarh, India: Vikas Bharti, 1969), 32. 75 Sumit Sarkar, “The Decline of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies,” in Sarkar, Writing Social History (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 83. 76 Arif Dirlik, “The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism,” Critical Inquiry 20:2 (1994): 334. 328-56. 77 Mihir Bose, From Midnight to Glorious Morning? India Since Independence, (London: Haus Publishing, 2017), 122. Works Cited Basu, Subo. Does Class Matter? Colonial Capital and Workers Resistance in Bengal, 1890-1937. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004. Bose, Mihir. From Midnight to Glorious Morning? India Since Independence. London: Haus Publishing. 2017. Bose, Sugata and Ayesha Jalal. Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy. Routledge, 2017. Cesaire, Aime. Discourse on Colonialism. Translated by Joan Pinkham. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000. Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). Chakrabarty, Dipesh and Rochona Majumdar, “Gandhi’s Gita and Politics As Such,” Modern Intellectual History, 7, no. 2 (2010): 335-353 Chandra, Bipin. India’s Struggle for Independence , 1857-1947. New Delhi, India; Viking, 1998. Chatterjee, Partha. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse. Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1993). Chibber, Vivek. Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital. London: Verso, 2013. Chopra, Pran Nath. Role of Indian Muslims in the Struggle for Freedom . New Delhi, India: Light & Life Publishers, 1979. Dange, Shripad Amrit. Gandhi vs Lenin. Bombay, India: Liberty Literature Company, 1921. Dhawan, G.N. The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. Bombay, India: Popular Book Depot, 1946. Dirlik, Arif. “The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism,” Critical Inquiry 20:2 (1994): 328-56. Gandhi, Madhan. Marx and Gandhi: Study in Ideological Polarities. Chandigarh, India: Vikas Bharti, 1969. Gandhi, Mohandas. Hind Swaraj and Other Writings. Edited by Anthony J. Parel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). ———. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 12. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1989. ———. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 22. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1989. ———. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 25. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1989. ———. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 51. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1989. Gandhi, Rajmohan. Eight Lives: A Study of the Hindu-Muslim Encounter. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986). Gellner, Ernst. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Getachew, Adom. Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. Habib, Irfan. Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perception. New Delhi, India: Tulika, 1995. Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. “Hindustan Unilever Limited: Spreading the message of Swachh Aadat across India.” The Hindu. Published April 30, 2018, https://www.thehindu.com/brandhub/hindustan-unilever-limited-spreading-the- message-o f-swa- chh-aadat-across-india/article23729983.ece Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments. Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002. Iyer, Raghavan. The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi. New York: Oxford University Press. Jodhka, Surinder S. “Nation and Village: Images of Rural India in Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar.” Economic and Political Weekly 37, no. 32 (2002): 3343- 3353. Kumar, Aishwary. Radical Equality: Ambedkar, Gandhi, and the Risk of Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017. Kumar, Shanti. Gandhi Meets Primetime: Globalization and Nationalism in Indian Television. Baltimore: University of Illinois Press, 2005. Mantena, Karuna. “On Gandhi’s Critique of the State: Sources, Contexts, Conjunctures.” Modern Intellectual History 9, no. 3 (2012): 535-563. “PM Modi: Gandhi inspired me to launch Swachh Bharat.” Economic Times. Published October 2, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and- nation/pm-modi-gandhi-inspired-me-to-launch-swachh-bharat/ articleshow/66045561.cms?from=mdr. Rao, Koneru Ramakrishan. Gandhi’s Dharma. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 2017. Roy, Arundhati. The Doctor and The Saint: Caste, Race, and the Annihilation of Caste: The Debate Between B.R. Ambedkar and M.K. Gandhi. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017. Sarkar, Sumit. Modern India: 1885-1947. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989. Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar. Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? Bombay, India: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1969. Scott, David. Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004. “Swachh Bharat Mission.” Government of India. https://swachhbharatmission.gov.in/sbmcms/index.htm. Teltumbde, Anand. Republic of Caste: Thinking Equality in the Time of Neoliberal Hindutva. New Delhi, India: Navayana, 2018. Trivedi, Lisa. Clothing Gandhi’s Nation: Homespun and Modern India. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007. Whyte, Jessica. The Morals of the Market: Human Rights and the Rise of Neoliberalism. La Vergne: Verso, 2019). Wilder, Gary. Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015. Previous Next

Author Name < Back Refuting the Myth of Progressive Secularism: An Analysis of the Legal Frameworks Surrounding Religious Practice in France and Bahrain Bridget McDonald This paper explores the idea that a secular state is inherently more progressive than a religious nation (a country with a designated state religion). Looking through the lens of freedom of religious expression, I argue that having a secular clause in a country’s constitution does not necessitate a higher degree of religious freedom. Decades of Western discourse linking secularism to modernization has created the notion that religious countries cannot foster free and prosperous societies to the level of secular nations. To refute this view, this paper builds on Talal Asad’s critiques of the contemporary secular model as Eurocentric. Additionally, I expand on the policy overlap discussed in John Bowen’s article comparing the French and Indonesian judicial systems. I employ a comparative case study model to evaluate the legal frameworks surrounding religious practice in France (a secular state) and Bahrain (a Muslim state). Findings indicate that although the two countries differ in terms of religion’s place in government, significant overlap exists between their laws impacting religious practice. I argue that in certain cases, Bahrain exhibits a higher degree of tolerance for religious expression than France. I conclude that religious states can value religious identity more than a secular country, therefore enabling select religious nations to foster religious freedom to equal or higher levels than their secular counterparts. However, more comparative research needs to be done to fully evaluate the dimensions of religious freedom in secular and religious countries. Introduction In the 2022 French presidential elections, news coverage of far-right candidate Marine Le Pen’s outlined platform – titled 22 Measures for 2022 – highlighted the second goal on her list: “Eradicate Islamist ideologies and all of their national territory networks.” Le Pen closely tied this sentiment to laïcité (secularism), a French value developed during the Revolution that established the foundation for a formal separation of church and state. Le Pen’s rhetoric has brought forth discussion on the role of secularism in the government and the impact of secular policies on the French Muslim community (Ataman, 2022). Though initially a primarily Western ideology, a clause pertaining to secularism now appears in 71 countries’ constitutions (World Population Review, 2022). These nations, referred to as constitutionally secular countries, are typically associated with higher GDP (Ruck, Bentley & Lawson, 2018), more socially progressive policies, and increased freedom. However, the recent ban on burqas and niqabs in secular countries has brought into question the progressive nature of secularism. France, Switzerland, Belgium, and Bulgaria have fully banned burqas, while various other European countries have banned the burqa to differing degrees. This trend, which has been criticized for discriminating against Muslims, demonstrates the complicated relationship between secularism and minority religious groups. France, the first European country to ban the burqa via a law prohibiting facial coverings (Erlanger, 2011), has taken further steps to target the Muslim community, including fining women for wearing a “burkini”– a full body swimsuit for Muslim women, that, unlike a burqa, does not have a facial covering (The Guardian, 2016). Labeled as a tactic to fight extremism, the burqa ban is one of many laws regulating Muslim practices and expressions of Muslim identity, such as pressuring imams to sign a charter of republican values (Williamson, 2020). The targeting of the Muslim community in France challenges the idea that secularism entails socially progressive policies. If secularism suppresses religious freedom, then perhaps it is not as progressive as many Westerners believe. This paper seeks to refute the idea that a secular country is inherently more progressive than a religious nation. I will evaluate the legal frameworks of a secular state and a religious state, focusing specifically on areas of law that impact religious expression. This study will center on France, a vocal supporter of secular values, and Bahrain, a Muslim state that has placed emphasis on improving religious freedom over the past decade. Ultimately, this paper argues that the inclusion of a secular clause in a nation's constitution does not necessitate a higher degree of religious freedom. Theoretical Framework In 1870, the term “secularism” was coined by British writer George Holyoake to describe a moral code that exists independently from religious doctrine. Today, secularism is defined as “ the principle of separation of the state from religious institutions” (Oxford Languages), though the degree to which secular countries separate church and state varies widely . For example, while Indonesia is constitutionally secular, the Aceh region of the country is under Sharia law. The discrepancies in how secularism manifests in countries’ legal structures necessitates further exploration on how secularism has historically been conceptualized and defined. Though many scholars have addressed secularism, much of the discourse has been from a Western perspective, which led to significant bias in early secular theory. Max Weber and Emile Durkheim’s work hypothesized that secularism and modernity were tied (Cannell, 2010); the authors identified the decline of traditional religious belief in Europe as the result of technological advancements and economic growth. One notable criticism of this theory came from Talcott Parsons, who claimed that the patterns of religious participation in Europe should not serve as an indicator for global secular trends (Cannell, 2010). Parsons further argued that Weber’s essay, The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism , exhibited a Eurocentric perspective (Cannell, 2010). Additionally, Protestant Ethic displayed sentiments of Western supremacy and presented capitalism as the ultimate economic system (Weber, 1905). Peter Berger is another critic of the theory that secularism is connected to modernization. He argued that traditional religious beliefs were not being abandoned and were instead evolving, and cited the development and upsurge of evangelism in the United States as evidence (Berger, 1999). Despite criticism, however, Weber and Durkheim’s theory remained prevalent for several decades (Cannell, 2010). This skewed academic perceptions of secularism and linked the concept to a Western and capitalist definition of progress. The absence of an internationally accepted definition of secularism, and varying religious, social, and governmental structures across the world further complicate how secularism is defined. However, newer discourse on secularism has reflected a more comprehensive view of the concept. In his 2003 book, Formations of the Secular, Talal Asad posited that the Western perception of secularism as progressive is inaccurate and underscored the Western European origins of contemporary secularism. Asad emphasized that liberal secularism should not apply to all societies and that it allows for the prohibition of certain religious practices; this paper adopts Asad’s stance and argues that the prohibition of religious practices legitimizes discriminatory policies. Further, Asad states that “the ideology of political representation in liberal democracies makes it difficult if not impossible to represent Muslims as Muslims … Because in theory the citizens who constitute a democratic state belong to a class that is defined only by what is common to all its members and its members only.” Using this lens, this paper asserts that French laws limiting religious practice in the public sphere further isolate religious minority groups. Asad’s contributions to secular discourse and his discussion on belonging and identity in a liberal democratic state lead to the question of whether constitutional secularism offers a higher degree of religious tolerance within a country when compared to a nation that has an established state religion. Through the collection and analysis of laws impacting religious practice in France and Bahrain, this paper seeks to support Asad’s conclusions and determine the degree to which constitutionally secular nations are able to promote religious freedom. Although previous comparative case studies on secular and Muslim countries are extremely limited, John Bowen’s article , Religious Discrimination and Religious Governance Across Secular and Islamic Countries: France and Indonesia as Limiting Cases (2010) offers a selection of preliminary findings and sheds light on areas in need of additional study. In the article, Bowen concluded that there is notable overlap in policy between France and Indonesia. Bowen argued that despite having different governmental structures and views on religion’s place in the public sphere, similar policies appeared in both countries. Additionally, Bowen called for further comparative study on the scope of this phenomenon to expand upon his research into other aspects and applications of secular policy. Building on observations on policy overlap between France and Indonesia, this paper explores the similarities and differences between France’s religious policies and those of Bahrain – a Muslim state. This comparison provides further insight into the legitimacy of the theory that secularism fosters higher levels of religious freedom. A. Measuring Religious Freedom The United Nations guarantees religious freedom in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. The UDHR and ICCPR incorporate a number of components into their definition of religious freedom: the freedom to adopt, change, or renounce a religion, freedom from coercion, the right to manifest one’s religion, the freedom to worship, the ability to establish and maintain places of worship, the right to display religious symbols, the ability to observe holidays, and protection from discrimination on the basis of religion. While there is no single, defined approach to measuring religious freedom, the definition provided by the UDHR and ICCPR allows for guidance in evaluation. Additionally, multiple non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have used different metrics to measure religious freedom, which, when combined with international standards for defining religious freedom, aid in understanding how to accurately assess the subject. For example, the Pew Research Center (PRC) measures religious freedom by analyzing both social and governmental restrictions on religious action (2016). Since constitutional secularism exists within the confines of state law, this paper focuses solely on governmental policies surrounding religious expression. The social perception of other religions and religious freedom, while important, does not relate directly to the argument and would be best analyzed in further studies. A second way of measuring religious freedom is through the framework used in Freedom House’s annual freedom reports, which ranks countries on a scale of 1 to 4 (1 being the lowest possible score) in a number of categories, including freedom of religious expression. In its 2020 reports, Freedom House asks, “Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?” to determine the level of religious freedom in a country. This paper uses this question, the presence of governmental restriction on religious action (as outlined by the PRC), and the components of religious freedom listed by the UDHR and the ICCPR as a definition of what religious freedom looks like in practice and utilizes the definition for legal analysis. Though there are many laws governing religion in France and Bahrain, this paper focuses on laws that directly impact religious practice. The paper highlights seven categories of law as markers of religious freedom. The groups of law reflect a combination of the approaches used by the Pew Research Center and Freedom House, as well as relevant components of the UDHR and ICCPR’s definition of religious freedom; each section examines an aspect of government restriction imposed on free religious practice (apart from Constitutional Status, which offers critical context on the legal setting in the countries), and categories selected answer whether individuals are free to practice in public and private. III. Background France’s deeply entrenched notion of laïcité, which allows for extreme criticism of religion in the public sphere, is contrasted by Bahrain’s stringent anti-blasphemy policies that protect all registered religions from criticism. Each of these ideologies is rooted in the history and culture of the two nations. This difference in approaching public discourse is one of various examples where France and Bahrain diverge in their policies surrounding religion. To understand policy-making relating to religious practice in France and Bahrain, it is necessary to establish baseline knowledge on the histories of the nations. A. France Religious History and Laïcité — Before the French Revolution, Catholicism was the official religion of France. The conversion of Clovis I in the late 400s tied France to the papacy, and later monarchs enjoyed close relations with the Church. Hundreds of years of Catholic influence on the French monarchy and corruption within both institutions contributed to growing resentment towards the Church, which peaked during the early stages of the French Revolution and subsequent Reign of Terror. Demands for a secular government were followed by the persecution and murder of Catholic clergy members in the late 1700s. Though Napoleon Bonaparte reconciled with the Catholic Church in 1801, France did not reinstate Catholicism as the national religion. Over the next century, France continued to dechristianize the public sphere, culminating in the Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l'État (1905 law on the separation of churches and state). Since the Revolution, France has developed a unique brand of secularism, laïcité, that goes beyond the separation of church and state, arguing that religious expression should remain outside the view of the public eye. This ideology has manifested itself in laws that prohibit the wearing of religious symbols in public schools and ban face coverings. The concept of laïcité has changed, however, since its original conception. As discussed by Eoin Daly (2012), secularism has moved beyond separating church and state and now acts as a justification to move differing religious identities into a private sphere and promote a French identity embedded in shared national values. A 2020 report by the French government offered clarification on the country’s reasoning surrounding laïcité: The freedom to express one’s religious convictions can be limited for the sake of public order, under conditions defined by the law. Freedom must, however, always be the rule, and the limitations the exception, in view of the constitutional principles enshrined in our Republic and France’s international commitments, with which such legal restrictions must be compatible. An additional outcome of laïcité is the prohibition of data collection pertaining to religious affiliation; this policy makes it somewhat difficult to gain a holistic picture of France’s religious landscape. The Religious Futures Project at the Pew Research Center (2016) estimates that 58.1% of the population is Christian, 8.3% is Muslim, and 31.9% is unaffiliated as of 2020. Notable trends include growth in France’s Muslim population (due to increased immigration from former French colonies in Africa), a consistent decrease in people identifying as Catholic, and increased growth in those identifying as unaffiliated. Of the 12 national holidays in France, 7 celebrate Catholic events, which seemingly contradicts France’s strict separation of national and religious affairs. France is currently scored as 3 out of 4 on freedom of religious expression by Freedom House (2020). Recent Events and Political Climate — Law surrounding religious practice in France has been heavily influenced by numerous terrorist attacks over the past decades. During the 1980s and 90s, France saw various attacks by numerous groups: Hezbollah, an integrist Catholic group, the Armed Islamist Group, and other non-religious groups like Action Directe (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003). The 2000s brought more deadly attacks, the majority of which had connections to Islamist groups. Following a series of bombings, shootings, and stabbings by various Islamist groups in 2014 and 2015, France enacted laws increasing government surveillance (Law Nº 2669, 2015) and anti-terrorism efforts (Law Nº 1353, 2014). Terrorist attacks led to a renewed emphasis on laïcité in the political sphere. Far-right isolationist parties led by politicians like Marine Le Pen incorporated anti-Muslim messaging in their campaigns, promising French voters safety from radical Islam (Fieschi, 2020). In this climate of frequent terror attacks and the rise of far-right parties, France created and amended legislation surrounding religious practice. B. Bahrain History — Bahrain, located off the coast of Saudi Arabia, fell under the control of various empires before declaring independence from the British in 1971 (Gardner, 2017). Known for its pearl beds and freshwater springs, the island was seen as highly desirable by political entities. This caused numerous changes in leadership. From the 1400-1800s, the territory of Bahrain was controlled by the Omanis, Portugal, Persia, the ‘Utub (a Sunni tribal confederation), and the United Kingdom (Gardner, 2017). Throughout the centuries of changing leadership, Bahrain developed a diverse population. The pearl trade brought merchants from all over the world, and the territory was exposed to many ideologies, religions, and cultures as a result of the various empires that had taken control of the island. Though small populations of Jewish, Hindu, and Christian people have lived in Bahrain over past centuries, Islam has been the predominant religion since its introduction to the indigenous population in the 640s (Gardner, 2017). The majority of Muslim Bahraini people identify as Shi’a. However, a smaller Sunni elite has ruled the country since the arrival of the Sunni al-Khalifa family, who came with the ‘Utub. Bahrain was declared a monarchy in 2002, headed by King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, who remains in power today. According to the Religious Futures Project at the Pew Research Center (2016), 69.7% of the population is Muslim, and within that group, roughly 60% is Shi’a and 35-40% is Sunni; 14.1% of the population is Christian, 10.2% is Hindu, and 2% is unaffiliated as of 2020. Bahrain is currently scored as 1 out of 4 on freedom of religious expression by Freedom House (2020). Recent Events and Political Climate — In 2011, Bahrain served as a starting point for the Arab Spring in the Gulf countries. The country saw massive protests from the Shi’a community, who decried unfair treatment by the Sunni government. The government reacted by killing and arresting protestors, destroying Shi’a mosques, and dismantling the traffic circle that had served as the uprising’s epicenter. Following condemnation by the international community and human rights organizations, King Hamad launched an investigation and resolved to enforce policies to improve tensions between the Shi’a and Sunni groups (U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom Report on Bahrain, 2020). While the initial success of these policies was contested, the government has taken significant steps in the past decade to ameliorate the state of religious freedom in Bahrain (USCIRF, 2020). The government, which had rescinded the citizenships of 1000 Bahrainis (most of whom were Shi’a) due to alleged security threats, reinstated over half of their citizenships in 2020 (USCIRF, 2020). While typically met with government hostility, the Shi'a holiday Ashura remained largely peaceful in 2020 and 2021; discourse concerning Ashura between the Sunni government and Shi’a clerics has eased tensions between the parties to allow for the celebration of the holiday. However, despite improvement, tensions remain between the Sunni and Shi’a communities. In terms of relations with non-Muslim groups, the Bahraini government is notably tolerant of other religions. There are 19 recognized religions in the country, all of which are able to practice their respective beliefs freely. IV. Methodology A. Overview This study aimed to determine whether the legal framework of a secular state fosters higher degrees of religious freedom than that of a religious state. This paper uses a comparative case study approach to ensure a balanced review of France’s domestic policy concerning religious practice. Further, the comparative case study model offers critical insight into the caveats of secular policy when implemented on a national scale. Bahrain was chosen as a comparative subject because it is a Muslim state in which members of various other religious groups reside. The primary goal of data collection was to gain a deeper understanding of the laws impacting religious practice in both countries. To effectively compare the two countries, specific areas of policy were chosen (listed in Table I) following the combined framework of Freedom House and the Pew Research Center described in the Theoretical Framework section. Primary qualitative data concerning policy was taken from law databases published by the French government. Secondary qualitative data was extracted from reports on Bahrain and France by the United States Commission for Religious Freedom (USCIRF), the United States embassy, and Freedom House country reports. The search process yielded a number of pertinent laws surrounding religious practices in France and Bahrain. B. Comparing Policy on Domestic Religious Practice Information on France’s laws was sourced from the government. Translations were provided by the author unless indicated otherwise. The United States State Department reports informed general knowledge on the legal framework surrounding religious practice. Due to the general inaccessibility of translated laws from a Bahraini government source, information about religious laws in Bahrain was obtained from United States government reports. Recognizing the potential bias of the United States government, only objective data (such as the description of laws) was used in this paper. Areas of crucial law were chosen after general study on legal frameworks surrounding religious practice; the categories of policy listed in Table I were selected because they represent the most direct interaction between the government and religious groups and reflect international standards for religious freedom as expressed by UDHR and ICCPR documents. It was imperative that both countries had laws falling under each assigned category, otherwise, policies could not be compared. Laws were evaluated based on the level to which they promoted or inhibited freedom of religious expression, and a compare and contrast approach was used, reflecting the style of Bowen. Larger implications and enforcement of the laws were not considered, as the repercussions of policy were too far-reaching to effectively encompass in this comparative case study. Instead, analysis of laws consisted of identifying common themes and key similarities and differences between the legal frameworks of France and Bahrain. Other peripheral areas of law could be colored by religious or secular ideologies, such as marriage laws. However, to keep the scope of this study appropriately narrow, peripheral policies were not considered. V. Results: Analysis of Legal Frameworks of France and Bahrain A. Constitutional Status The constitutional statutes of France and Bahrain are, as discussed earlier, on opposite sides of the ideological spectrum. These religious designations are detailed below for context. (i) France Article 1 of the French constitution states “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic.” (ii) Bahrain Article 2 of the Bahraini constitution states “The religion of the State is Islam. The Islamic Shari’a is a principal source for legislation.” B. Anti-Discrimination Laws (In Reference to Religion) Both France and Bahrain have clauses in their constitutions prohibiting discrimination against others on the basis of faith. Beyond their respective constitutions, both countries have enacted laws forbidding hiring and workplace discrimination in relation to religious affiliations, as listed below. (i) France [The internal regulation] may not contain provisions which would prejudice the employees because of their sex, morals, sexual orientation, age, family situation, origins, opinions, religious beliefs, physical appearance, name, or disability, when they have equal professional capacity capability (L. 122-35, 2008). (ii) Bahrain The labor law prohibits discrimination in the public sector on grounds of religion or faith. The law also stipulates recourse through a complaint process to the Ministry of Labor and Social Development to legal bodies in the event of discrimination or dismissal in the work place on the basis of religion (U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Bahrain, 2019). Analysis — The anti-discrimination clauses in both the countries’ constitutions have been further developed into active laws. The overlap of anti-discrimination policy in France and Bahrain shows that, in this case, a secular country and a religious state are able to promote religious freedom in the same capacity. C. Registration with the Government and Government Funding Both the French and Bahraini governments have registration processes in place for religious organizations. Recognition of a religious group by the respective governments allows for financial support, whether that comes in the form of subsidization or tax-exempt status. As government registration is tied to financial support in each country, the process allows the state to maintain relative control over the religious makeup of the nation; this is achieved to varying degrees in accordance with the requirements of the law. (i) France According to the 2019 USCIRF report on France: In France, religions are not required to register with the government. However, in order to receive official recognition, tax-exempt status or financial aid, religious groups must go through a number of processes. To receive tax-exempt status and official recognition as a religion, groups must apply as associations of worship, and to receive government funding, groups can apply as cultural associations. Religious organizations are able to qualify as both an association of worship and a cultural association, thus receiving tax-exempt status and government funding. It should be noted, however, that government funding is permitted only to go towards non-religious activities hosted by a religious group, such as educational programming. Despite Article 2 of the Law of 1905 Concerning the Separation of Church and State stating “ The Republic does not recognize, pay or subsidize any religion”, the French government owns and operates religious buildings built before 1905. Approximately 90% of Catholic buildings in France are subsidized by the government, while 12% of Protestant churches and 3% of Jewish temples are subsidized as a result of the law. There are no Buddhist or Muslim centers of worship subsidized by the government (French Senate report, 2015). (ii) Bahrain According to the 2019 USCIRF report on Bahrain: Bahrain’s government requires that religions register in accordance with their faith. Sunni and Shi’a organizations register with the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs and Endowments and register further with the Sunni and Shi’a Waqfs to receive funding. Non-Muslim groups must register with the Ministry of Labor and Social Development, during which they must provide a number of details (including minutes from meetings, personal information on founders and the group’s bylaws). Religious groups (Muslim and non-Muslim) are not allowed to receive funding from foreign donors, and money collection is monitored by the government. Analysis — Bahrain’s laws surrounding the funding of religious groups and registration with the government are more stringent than France’s. However, while France does not require registration, restrictions from funding and tax-exempt status for non-registered groups act as significant incentives in pushing organizations to submit an application to the government. In both cases, the government seeks access to information on religious groups, though Bahrain attempts to monitor activities to a more extreme extent than France. While this does not necessarily infringe on the status of religious freedom, the laws in both countries allow significant room for discriminatory funding. An example of this was displayed in a 2015 French Senate report that noted the vast majority of France’s 2,500 mosques receive little to no public funding while Catholic institutions are almost entirely subsidized, but pointed to Muslims’ inability to organize and register with the government as the reason for funding inequality (2015 French Senate report, 23). As this claim is difficult to quantifiably prove, it allowed the government plausible deniability on the lack of funding for Muslim organizations. In Bahrain, disproportionate funding for Muslim organizations is enshrined in the country’s laws. While France’s legal framework surrounding registration is not as strict as Bahrain’s in this case, policies in both countries enable an unequal distribution of funding. D. Religion in the Public Sphere: Freedom of Speech and Religious Symbols The French and Bahraini approaches to religion in the public sphere offer vastly different interpretations of the promotion of religious freedom. Nevertheless, both countries are stringent in their application of the law. (i) France France has various laws protecting freedom of speech. In reference to religion, Article 10 of the 1789 Declaration of Human and Civic Rights states that “no one may be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not interfere with the established Law and Order.” According to the 2019 USCIRF France report: In accordance with secular law, people employed by the government are not allowed to wear signs of religious affiliation in the workplace or in public spaces. A 2010 law prohibits face coverings in public places, including the wearing of a niqab or burqa; refusing to remove the face covering can result in a 150 euro fine. (ii)Bahrain Bahrain has anti-blasphemy laws that apply to all religions. The penal code calls for punishment of up to one year’s imprisonment or a fine of up to 100 dinars ($270) for offending one of the recognized religious groups or their practices, or for openly defaming a religious figure considered sacred to members of a particular group. The law stipulates fines or imprisonment for insulting an institution, announcing false or malicious news, spreading rumors, encouraging others to show contempt for a different religious denomination or sect, illegally gathering, and advocating for a change of government, among other offenses. The law prohibits anti-Islamic publications and broadcast media programs and mandates imprisonment of no less than six months for ‘exposing the state’s official religion to offense and criticism (USCIRF, Bahrain, 2019). Non-Muslims are not required to wear traditional Muslim clothing. The law allows non-Muslim places of worship to display religious symbols. Analysis — In summary, French law allows for extensive freedom of speech in reference to religion while Bahrain maintains strict laws on speech in reference to religion. Both of these policies purport to uphold religious equality; in France, one may critique any religion, while in Bahrain there is no tolerance for criticism of any religion. These laws are a clear example of where France and Bahrain diverge ideologically, but the difference in approach does not mean one policy is more effective than the other in promoting equal access to religious expression. In France, varying definitions of hate speech and the government’s high tolerance for criticism of religion can be exploited to target minority religions. In Bahrain, anti-blasphemy laws protect all religious groups from hate speech, but policy blatantly favors the interests of Muslim groups. While the laws in France and Bahrain are opposites in intention, they both result in bias towards the dominant religious group. When comparing the two countries, Bahrain allows for more freedom in expressing religious affiliation in public spaces. French laws prohibiting face coverings directly infringe on Muslim women’s abilities to fulfill religious duties, and the ban of ostentatious religious symbols in public settings does not allow citizens to express their religion freely. Religious dress is a significant aspect of many traditions, including Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. The prohibition of wearing religious garments violates an adherent’s beliefs and negates religious freedom. Bahrain does not have specific laws regarding religious dress, though it should be noted that societal norms dictate a culture of modesty. That being said, as this paper is reviewing formal law, Bahrain is significantly less stringent in the ruling of religious dress from a policy perspective. E. Religion in Education (i) France France’s attempts to keep religion out of the public sphere are clearly reflected in policies surrounding religion in the public school system. Public schools are secular. The law prohibits public school employees from wearing visible signs of religious affiliation and students from wearing “conspicuous religious symbols,” including the Muslim headscarf, Jewish skullcap, Sikh turban, and large Christian crosses (USCIRF, France, 2019). In terms of private education: By law, the government subsidizes private schools, including those affiliated with religious organizations. In 98 percent of private schools, in accordance with the law, the government pays the teachers’ salaries, provided the school accepts all children regardless of their religious affiliation. The law does not address the issue of religious instruction in government-subsidized private schools or whether students must be allowed to opt out of such instruction (USCIRF, France, 2019). (ii) Bahrain Because Bahrain is a Muslim state, religious instruction is heavily incorporated in the school system. The law regulates Islamic religious instruction at all levels of the education system. The government funds public schools for grades 1-12; Islamic studies are mandatory for all Muslim students and are optional for non-Muslims. Private schools must register with the government and, with a few exceptions (for example, a foreign funded and foreign operated school), are also required to provide Islamic religious education for Muslim students. Private schools wishing to provide non-Islamic religious education to non-Muslims must receive permission from the Ministry of Education (USCIRF, Bahrain, 2019). In terms of private education: The government also permits non-Muslim groups to offer religious instruction to their adherents in private schools (USCIRF, Bahrain, 2019). Analysis — While France maintains secularism within the educational system, the banning of religious symbols in schools infringes on religious freedom. As addressed earlier, the prohibition of religious garb violates the ability of an individual to freely practice their belief. Although Bahrain emphasizes Islam in education, the ability for non-Muslim students to opt out maintains religious freedom. Therefore, Bahrain allows for a higher degree of religious expression within the education system. F. Anti-Terrorism Policy The other sections of law described above have direct influence on the ability of religious adherents to practice their belief in the public and private spheres. Though anti-terrorism policy may not initially appear as an area of law that has an impact on religious freedom, both France and Bahrain have employed discriminatory practices labeled as tactics to fight extremism. (i) France The French perception of religion’s ties to terrorism is demonstrated by legislation that specifically targets religious institutions. Counterterrorism legislation grants prefects in each department the authority to close a place of worship for a maximum of six months if they find comments, writings, or activities in the place of worship “provoke violence, hatred or discrimination or the commission of acts of terrorism or praise such acts of terrorism.” The management of the place of worship has 48 hours to appeal the closure decision to an administrative court. Noncompliance with a closure decision carries a six-month prison sentence and a fine of 7,500 euros ($8,400) (USCIRF, France, 2019). In March 2021, a bill aimed at combating radicalism and separatism (titled Supporting Respect for the Principles of the Republic) was passed through the lower house of Parliament and went to the Senate. On April 13th, 2021, the Senate added stipulations to the bill that were viewed as harsher than the initial proposals (Woods, 2021). The original bill would, among other things, restrict people from home-schooling their children, crack down on polygamy and forced marriages, and make the sharing of someone’s private life and location illegal (N° 3649 rectifié, 2021). Excerpts from the edited bill are detailed below: If passed, the bill would, among other things, prohibit the wearing of the veil and other ostentatious religious symbols to persons accompanying school trips, allow the internal regulations of swimming pools and public bathing areas to prohibit the wearing of the burkini, and prevent the issuance and renewal of residence permits for individuals who are found to have expressed a rejection of the principles of the Republic (Loi confortant le respect des principes de la République, 2021). (ii) Bahrain There are penalties of up to five years in prison for encouraging or possessing materials that support “terrorist activities.” Bahrain imposed one round of sanctions against individuals and entities affiliated with the Iranian regime’s terror-support networks in the region. The government is also able to expel individuals who are suspected of terrorist activity (U.S. State Department, Report on Terrorism, Bahrain, 2019). In terms of reconciliation efforts between the Sunni and Shi’a communities: In coordination with the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, a team of Ministry of Education-appointed experts routinely reviews and develops the Islamic studies of the public school curriculum to emphasize shared Islamic values between different Sunni and Shi’a schools of thought, reject extremism, and promote tolerance and coexistence (USCIRF, Bahrain, 2019). Analysis — In both countries, many of the laws surrounding anti-terrorism efforts can be easily exploited to target specific groups of people. In France, the closing of worship centers has solely impacted mosques, while Bahrain’s expulsion policy has primarily impacted leaders of the Shi’a community. France’s new bill comes on the heels of a speech by President Macron condemning separatism in the country. While the legislative language does not name any religion directly, the explanatory statement preceding the bill states the following: An insidious but powerful communitarian entryism is slowly destroying the foundations of our society in certain areas. This entryism is essentially of Islamist inspiration. It is the manifestation of a conscious, theorized, politico-religious political project, the ambition of which is to make religious norms prevail over the common law that we have freely given ourselves (Loi nº 3649, 2021). Because the bill refers to Islamism as the reason for the legislation, much of the proposal is aimed directly at Muslim communities. The recently added stipulations show a harsher, more direct targeting of the Muslim community in France. Anti-terrorism policy in Bahrain targets members of the Shi’a community who are seen as causing separatism. This was prevalently displayed when the kingdom expelled a number of Shi’a individuals, who were eventually granted re-entry when no evidence of terrorist activity was found. In this sense, Bahrain and France are notably similar in their reasoning and justification for anti-extremist laws. VI. Discussion The results support the argument that a constitutionally secular country does not necessarily foster a higher degree of religious freedom than a religious state. Despite being ideologically opposed in reference to religion in government, France and Bahrain share overlaps in policy, as seen in the Anti-Discrimination Laws, Registration with Government and Government Funding, and Anti-Terrorism Policy sections of the analysis. Beyond policies that target or disproportionately impact a specific religious group, France and Bahrain employ inclusive anti-discrimination laws in their labor codes. In this case, both countries pledge to condemn religious discrimination in the hiring process or workplace. The countries employ similar registration policies for religious groups, directly tying legal access to practice and tax incentives to cooperation with state entities. A third overlap is in anti-terrorism efforts, often labeled as anti-extremist policies. France and Bahrain have enacted a number of alarming anti-extremism laws, often using vague wording (such as “terrorist activities” or “rejection to the principles of the Republic”) that hand significant power to the government’s interpretations of actions or words; the wording of laws allows for exploitation of the policies to fulfill specific agendas, as seen by Bahrain’s expulsion of Shi’a individuals and French policymakers’ justification for the “Supporting Respect for the Principles of the Republic” bill. While not all of the measures taken to combat extremism negatively impact specific religious communities, both countries have used anti-terrorism policies to target religious groups perceived as threatening to the state. A clear demonstration of the negative impacts of legislative rhetoric is reflected in the interchangeability of anti-terrorist and anti-extremist policies; in both countries, the targeted religious groups have become synonymous with terrorism. The similarities in the justifications and immediate outcomes of laws surrounding religious practice in France and Bahrain aid in showing that the label of “constitutionally secular” does not equate to increased levels of religious freedom, as both states are equally capable of implementing policies that positively and negatively impact religious expression. In the sections Religion in Education and Religion in the Public Sphere , France and Bahrain display significant differences in approach. In both cases, Bahrain exhibited higher degrees of tolerance for religious practice in public and for minority religious groups in general. France’s policies on wearing ostentatious religious symbols in public spaces disproportionately impact the Muslim and Jewish communities, all of whom have integrated religious garb into their belief systems. Further, while Bahrain emphasizes Islam in education, the country allows for non-Muslim students to opt out of those classes and does not prohibit students from wearing alternative religious symbols. France has yet to create laws around the ability of students to opt out of religious instruction at private schools, despite most private schools being funded by the government. France’s integration of discriminatory secular policy into the public sphere and the education system strengthens the argument that states with official religions, like Bahrain, can allow for higher levels of religious freedom in some areas of society. A potential explanation for this is how France and Bahrain approach religious identity. At its core, France’s secular ideology attempts to ignore religious identity altogether. Nonetheless, the rise of radical Islam in the country, a Christian-majority population, and the dynamics between France and Muslim-majority former colonial countries led to the French Muslim community becoming an easily-targeted scapegoat. In Bahrain, however, the historical presence of non-Muslim religions and a national understanding of the importance of spiritual affiliation have allowed for a legal framework cognizant of religious identity. This is not to say that Bahrain has created the ideal legal structure, but instead that the recognition of religious affiliation’s significance allows for development in the realm of religious freedom. France has shown regression in freedom of religious expression where Bahrain has displayed consistent progress; this trend further supports the theory that some religious states are appropriately situated to cultivate a society that offers higher degrees of religious freedom. The findings of this paper are consistent with Asad’s theory on secularism’s potential to be discriminatory and builds on Bowen’s observations of the French and Indonesian judicial systems. As showcased by secular laws in France disproportionately targeting and impacting Muslim individuals, the label of laïcité creates a wall of Western liberal ideology for policymakers to hide behind. Bowen argues that France and Indonesia, despite opposing views on the role of religion in the judicial system, adopt very similar policy positions. Bowen’s focus on how each of the countries deals with religious discrimination in the courts yields primarily positive observations, and he notes that the foundations of both systems attempt to promote fairness and equality. Bowen’s findings differ from the analysis of laws in this paper, which is likely because this paper focused on policy reaching beyond anti-discrimination laws and did not note the outcomes in judicial proceedings concerning religious discrimination. Even with the differences in tone between Bowen’s findings and the analyses in this paper, the outcomes of the study are in alignment with Bowen’s conclusion; despite being on different ends of the ideological spectrum, a secular state and a religious state bear significant resemblance to each other in terms of the legal framework. A. Addressing Inconsistencies with Freedom House The laws explored in this study paint a picture of France and Bahrain as both employing policies that negatively impact a specific religious group. In some instances, Bahrain displayed higher degrees of religious tolerance, despite the West’s view of secularism as more progressive. However, the findings of this paper are not reflected in Freedom House’s scoring of France and Bahrain on religious freedom in their respective 2020 reports. As discussed earlier, the NGO ranked France a 3 out of 4 and Bahrain a 1 out of 4 in response to the following question: “Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?” The laws discussed in the analysis portion of this paper display France’s various policies against public displays of religious affiliation; these laws blatantly interfere with expression of religious faith in public, implying that France should be scored lower than a 3 within the Freedom House framework. In the case of Bahrain, while there have been numerous infringements on religious freedom (specifically to target the Shi’a community), the report did not provide sufficient evidence to rank the country significantly below France. The report even notes that “non-Muslim minorities are generally free to practice their faiths.” Freedom House then discusses government discrimination against the Shi’a population by citing the events of the Arab Spring in 2011 (a reference that does not reflect the contemporary political atmosphere in Bahrain) and the arrest of Shi’a clerics accused of spreading messages of separatism. However, the report also states that “Shiite communities are free to carry out religious observances, such as the annual Ashura processions,” which exhibits a governmental commitment to religious freedom. Conversely, the 2020 French report describes current tensions saying, “Islamophobic rhetoric from prominent politicians and public figures on both the left and right is not uncommon. Multiple attacks at mosques throughout the country occurred in 2019.” After a review of the 2020 Freedom Reports for France and Bahrain, it appears that there is inconsistency in the way Freedom House scores religious freedom. While there are numerous valid criticisms of the state of religious freedom in both countries, Freedom House ignored many laws in both France and Bahrain when scoring, resulting in a potentially skewed and inaccurate representation of the legal frameworks that unjustifiably favors France. B. Limitations of Study This was a limited case study, so these findings are merely a reflection of the laws and policies addressing religious practice in France and Bahrain. While the framework used in this study could be applied to comparing religious freedom in other nations, other cases were not considered in this paper. Further limitations include the scope of the study, which consisted of governmental restrictions and focused on legal frameworks but did not address political rhetoric involvement in international treaties or agreements, or relations with secular and religious states. Further, this paper did not consider societal restrictions, which include the presence of anti-religious attacks, non-governmental groups that target religious communities, online rhetoric, and general hostility towards certain religious groups. Studies that explore these factors are necessary to gain a holistic understanding of the differing degrees of religious freedom in secular and religious countries. VII. Conclusion Comparing seven key areas of law within the French and Bahraini legal frameworks shows that there is significant overlap in legislation, intention, and policy outcomes. But how does this comparison link to the larger discussion around religious freedom and the validity of secularism? France, a country that prides itself on the value of laïcité, implements a number of discriminatory policies that predominantly impact Muslim citizens. In the public sphere, individuals who belong to faiths that utilize clothing as an expression of affiliation cannot practice their religions to the full extent. The idea of separating the religious self from the public self displays an understanding of religious belief as a secondary identity. For many, spiritual affiliation is a primary identity. Therefore, French laws surrounding religious practice are not applicable in a universal sense, nor do they foster a wide breadth of religious freedom for all faiths. Religious states, who are typically viewed as unable to foster high degrees of religious freedom, have equal opportunity to promote a religiously pluralistic society through legislation. While not all religious states choose to foster a space for minority religious groups, nations like Bahrain have made significant efforts to advance religious freedom. Though this study was limited to France and Bahrain, the countries are not outliers. While Bahrain deviates somewhat from other Gulf nations, Qatar, and to a lesser extent Oman, have legal frameworks in place to support spiritual pluralism and religious freedom. Other countries, such as Bhutan, Liechtenstein, Thailand, Andorra, and Brunei, are religious states viewed as fostering religious freedom. While there are religious states that suppress religious freedom, the analysis suggests that religious countries may be uniquely positioned to create legal frameworks inclusive of a population that views religious affiliation as a primary identity. Although Bahrain has not yet reached the point of fostering equal religious freedom for all groups, national policies show an understanding of the importance of ritual practice and religious identity. Beyond supporting the hypothesis, the findings of this paper suggest the need for a shift in thinking when evaluating secular and religious states. As displayed by the inconsistencies in scoring throughout the Freedom House annual reports on France and Bahrain, the West remains biased in favor of secular European systems of government. Moving forward, Western NGOs and government agencies should consider viewing religious affiliation as a primary identity when assessing legal frameworks and government policies instead of using a secular lens as the default perspective. 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The Burden of Innocence: Arendt’s Understanding of Totalitarianism through its Victims Elena Muglia Author Emerson Rhodes Meruka Vyas Editors Hannah Arendt set out to describe an ideology and government that burst past understandings of politics, morality, and the law asunder. In Origins of Totalitarianism , Arendt argues that totalitarianism could not fit into previous political typologies. Instead, it navigates between definitions of political regimes like tyranny and authoritarianism, as well as distinctions historically made between lawlessness and lawfulness, arbitrary and legitimate power. Even then, Arendt holds on to the idea that totalitarianism can be described and analyzed despite escaping traditional understanding as a political ideology and system. In the preface of the first edition, Arendt expresses this hope, writing that Origins was: “Written out of the conviction that it should be possible to discover the hidden mechanics by which all traditional elements of our political and spiritual world were dissolved into a conglomeration where everything seems to have lost specific value and has become unrecognizable for human comprehension, unusable for human purpose.” One of the traditional elements of our “political and spiritual” world that she inquires about are questions of innocence, guilt, and responsibility. How can these concepts, which have both moral and legal implications, be applied and understood in the case of Nazi Germany, a regime void of morality and legality? Many political theorists have explored Arendt’s understanding of guilt in her report Eichmann in Jerusalem . In the report, Arendt utilizes Adolf Eichmann’s case—a Nazi Party official who helped carry out the Final Solution—to provide a concrete example of someone who is guilty but does not fit traditional understandings of what is required to be criminally guilty. Alan Norrie points out that Arendt exposes the tension between Eichmann’s lack of criminal intent, mens rea , and his criminal and evil actions (Norrie 2008. 202). The totality of totalitarianism complicates his criminal guilt, as Nazi Germany rendered every member of society complicit in its crimes. To unpack this complex nexus of guilt and responsibility, Iris Young looks at two of Arendt’s essays; “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility” and “Collective Responsibility” (Young 2011, 90). Young outlines how Arendt understands guilt as centered on the self, while responsibility implies a relationship with the world and membership in a political community (Young 2011, 78). Guilt arises from an objective consequence of somebody’s actions (Young 2011, 79) and is not a product of someone’s subjective state. With this understanding, everybody in Nazi Germany was responsible (irrespective of whether they took up political responsibility), but not everybody was guilty. Those who acted publicly against the Nazi Regime, like the Scholl siblings, took up political responsibility in a positive sense (Young 2011, 91). Richard Bernstein, who also discusses Eichmann, shares this understanding with Young—Eichmann is criminally guilty, but bystanders are not. Bernstein, however, elucidates that the bystanders’ responsibility is imperative to understand because their complicity was an “essential condition for carrying out the Final Solution” (Bernstein 1999, 165). By focusing on the areas of guilt and responsibility and primarily looking at Eichmann, however, these scholars leave a theoretical gap in understanding the relationship between the victims—the stateless and Jewish people for Nazi Germany—and totalitarian ideology. These groups lack political responsibility within the totalitarian system because their innocence implies a separation from the world and a political community. In her essay “Collective Responsibility,” Arendt notes that the twentieth century has created a category of men who “cannot be held politically responsible for anything” and are “absolutely innocent.” The innocence of these victims and their apoliticality strikes at the heart of why Arendt postulates that totalitarian ideology and terror constitute a novel form of government—“[it] differs essentially from other forms of political oppression known to us such as despotism, tyranny and dictatorship.” Totalitarianism targets victims en masse , but their status as victims is not based on any action they take against the regime. While Norrie, Young, and Bernstein all address that Arendt thinks that any “traditional” conception of the relationship between law and justice cannot be applied to totalitarianism directly, by focusing primarily on Eichmann, they are missing and understanding of a group of people that allowed totalitarianism to explode these notions. By tracking and parsing through Arendt’s understanding of the innocents and innocence in Origins of Totalitarianism and placing it in conversation with her understanding of action in The Human Condition, I elaborate on the unique and lack thereof, political relationship between totalitarian ideology and the innocents. I argue that the condition of innocence of the victims represents the essence of totalitarianism’s unique form of oppression and negation of the human condition. The positioning of the innocents in a totalitarian society acts as a lens for how totalitarianism aims to reshape traditional notions of political, moral, and legal personhood. I demonstrate this by first outlining what created fertile ground in the 20th century for the condition of rightlessness of the innocents. Second, I highlight how the targeting of innocents in concentration camps lies at the heart of totalitarianism’s destruction of the juridical person—someone who is judged based on their actions. Third, I argue that by bending any notions of justice, totalitarianism destroys the moral person, a destruction that is best expressed in the innocents’ lack of internal freedom. Finally, I argue that all these components entail severing the victims from a world where they can appear and be recognized as humans. Overall, I contend that while many of the techniques unleashed on the innocents apply, to an extent, to everyone under totalitarianism, including people like Eichmann, the innocents represent the full realization of totalitarianism’ attempt to alter the essence of a political and acting person. To understand how totalitarian regimes created a mass of ‘superfluous’ people who existed outside the political realm, it is first necessary to highlight what conditions Arendt thinks sowed fertile ground for totalitarian domination and terror in the first place. A crucial condition is rooted in the failures of the nation-state in dealing with the new category of stateless people in the interwar period in Europe. Following WWI, multiethnic empires, like the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, dissolved, which led Europe to resort to the familiar nation-state principle—presuming that each nationality should establish its state. As Ayten Gundogdu writes, “the unquestioning application of this principle turned all those who were ‘ejected from the old trinity of state-people-territory’ into exceptions to the norm” (Gundogdu 2014, 31). These exceptions to the norm, as were Jewish people, could not be repatriated anywhere because they did not have a nation. Instead of integrating these minorities and making them fully-fledged political members, policies like Minority Treaties codified minorities as exceptions to the law. The massive scale of refugees that existed outside a political community left a set of people without any protections apart from the ones that the state gave out of their own prerogative and charitable actions. This stateless crisis crystallized, for Arendt, the aporia of human rights—even though human rights guarantee universal rights, irrespective of any social and political category, they are enforced based on political membership. Human rights end up being the rights of citizens, leading the stateless to a condition of “absolute rightlessness.” This condition of rightlessness does not entail the loss of singular rights—just like the law temporarily deprives a criminal of the right to freedom—but a deprivation of what Arendt calls the right to have rights. Defined by Arendt as a right to live “in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions.” Instead of being judged based on actions or opinions, the stateless are judged based on belonging to a group outside the nation. This innocence, an inability to be judged based on one’s deeds and words, is the defining mark of the statelessness’ loss of a “political status” (Arendt 1951, 386), which primes these groups of people for the particular form of oppression that totalitarianism entails. While the stateless and their condition of rightlessness was constructed even before Nazi Germany, the existence and the continuous creation of a mass of innocents lies at the core of the raison d’étre of totalitarian politics. According to Arendt, totalitarianism operates based on a law of Nature and History, which has “mankind” as an end product, an “‘Aryan’ world empire” for Hitler. Mankind becomes the “embodiment” of law and justice. Jewish people, under Nazi Germany, are portrayed as the “objective enemy” halting nature’s progression, whereby every stage of terror is seen as a further development that is closer to achieving the development of the ultimate human. This continuous need to follow a Darwinian law of nature leads Arendt to define one of totalitarianism’ defining features as the law of movement: the only way that totalitarian regimes can justify their existence, expansion, and domination, and it relies almost entirely on the group of innocents. The innocents are crucial components of the concentration camps because they are placed there alongside criminals who have committed an action. If they only targeted “criminals” or those that committed particular actions, the Nazi party would have scant logic to fulfill its law of movement. The “innocents” are “both qualitatively and quantitatively the most essential category of the camp population.” in the sense that they exist in an “enormous” capacity and will always be present in society. Totalitarianism relies on innocents because their existence removes any “calculable punishment for definite offenses.” Totalitarian politics aim, eventually, to turn everyone into an innocent mass that could be targeted, not because of their actions, but their existence. Even criminals were often sent to concentration camps only after they had completed their prison sentences, meaning they were going there not because of their criminal activity but rather arbitrarily, sacrificing a mass in favor of the laws of history and nature. The condition of rightlessness combined with total domination, exerted through the concentration camps, obliterates the juridical person for all the victims of totalitarianism. The juridical person is the foundation of modern understandings of law, constituting a person who bears rights and can exercise rights and who, in derogation of the law, faces proportional and predictable consequences. By destroying the juridical person and turning its victims into a mass of people who exist outside any legal framework and logic, totalitarianism operates beyond any previously conceived notions of justice. As Arendt explains: “The one thing that cannot be reproduced [in a totalitarian regime] is what made the traditional conceptions of Hell tolerable to man: the Last Judgment, the idea of an absolute standard of justice combined with the infinite possibility of grace. For in the human estimation, there is no crime and no sin commensurable with the everlasting torments of Hell. Hence the discomfiture of common sense, which asks: What crime must these people have committed in order to suffer so inhumanly? Hence also the absolute innocence of the victims: no man ever deserved this. Hence finally the grotesque haphazardness with which concentration camp victims were chosen in the perfected terror state: such punishment can, with equal justice and injustice, be inflicted on anyone .” By “traditional conceptions of Hell” tolerable to man, Arendt means a Hell where every individual will be judged based on their actions and nothing else on the day of the Last Judgment. Totalitarianism shatters this idea and any existence of an “absolute standard of justice” through the concentration camps, which creates Hell on earth but without any rightful last judgment. Even more importantly, because of these innocents and the arbitrariness and “haphazardness” of the way they are chosen, Arendt explains that state punishment can be “inflicted on anyone.” A tyranny targets the opponents of a regime or anyone who causes disorder, but totalitarianism cannot be understood through such a utilitarian lens. As Arendt points out in various places in Origins , without understanding totalitarianism’ “anti-utilitarian behavior.” it is difficult and impossible to understand its use in targeting people who commit no specific action against the regime. Concentration camps and terror materialize the law of movement like positive law materializes notions of justice in lawful governments. The guilty are innocents who stand in the way of movement. Totalitarianism does not only operate outside any traditional forms of legality and juridical personhood but also transcends any understanding of morality—the moral person is destroyed just as the juridical one is; and this is, once again, fully expressed through the treatment of innocents who become the ideal subject of totalitarianism. The ideal subject of totalitarianism lacks both internal and external freedom—which is precisely what is imposed on the victims. A lack of internal freedom implies an inability to distinguish right and wrong. As Arendt explains, “totalitarian terror,” in the concentration camps, achieves triumph when it cuts the moral person from “the individualist escape and in making the decisions of conscience questionable and equivocal.” The Nazi Regime achieved this by asking the innocent to make impossible decisions that involved balancing their own life and the ones of their families. This often involved a blurring of “the murderer and his victim.” by involving even the concentration camp inmates in the operations of the camp. Concerning this, Robert Braun talks about Primo Levi’s discussion of the complicated victim—explaining that those who survived the concentration camps are always seen as suspect because of these blurred lines (Braun 1994, 186). Arendt has a parallel opinion to Levi that focuses more on those victim’s subjective state, explaining that when they return to the “word of the living,” they are “assailed by doubts” regarding their truthfulness. The innocents represent the perfect totalitarian subject as their doubts represent an inability to distinguish between truth and falsehood, which Arendt describes as the “standards of thought.” What is most striking about the destabilization of conscience is that it results in an inability to a freezing effect and an inability to act. As Arendt explains, “Through the creation of conditions under which conscience ceases to be adequate and to do good becomes utterly impossible, the consciously organized complicity of all men in the crimes of totalitarian regimes is extended to the victims and thus made really total.” Regardless of what “good” entails, doing it entails committing an action that is for others. Doing good can be understood as analogous to how Young interprets Arendt’s understanding of political responsibility… further explaining how the victims are left to a condition of non-responsibility through their inability to both distinguish what is right and wrong, and act on it. The erasure of “acting” in totalitarianism gains new meaning, or rather a more comprehensive explanation, when looking at Arendt’s discussion of acting in The Human Condition. Arendt’s work in The Human Condition illuminates the full extent of why acting becomes impossible under totalitarianism, especially for its victims. As Nica Siegel explains, an essential aspect of her understanding of action in The Human Condition is the spatialized logic that grounds action in a space where one can “reveal their unique personal identities and make their appearance in the world.” Only in this way can an action take place as it has a “who”—a unique author—at its root, and thus has the potential to create new beginnings. With this understanding, totalitarianism is the antithesis of action for everyone, to an extent, but completely for the innocent. Totalitarianism removes their space to act internally—through the destruction of conscience explained in the previous section—and externally—removing any place to appear publicly. The innocent are removed from the rest simply by being in the concentration camps, isolated from everyone else but also from one another. This means that totalitarianism, in practice, removes any source and space for spontaneity. Arendt defines spontaneity in Origins almost identically to how she defines action in The Human Condition , saying that spontaneity is “man’s power to begin something new out of his resources, something that cannot be explained on the basis of reactions to environment or events.” This condition of the innocent also illuminates why creating new and making a political statement is impossible under totalitarianism. As Arendt explains, “no activity can become excellent if the world does not provide a proper space for its exercise.” As with many other tactics in totalitarianism, this lack of excellence and new beginnings is rooted in the fate of the innocents. Nobody’s actions can “become excellent” if they face the same consequences of the concentration camp as the mass of those who commit no action. This is why under totalitarianism, “martyrdom” becomes “impossible.” Just as totalitarianism assimilates criminals with innocents in their punishment, political actors are also assimilated to this category, as they are “deprived of the protective distinction that comes of their having done something,” just as the innocents are. What totalitarianism does to its victims is, therefore, a symptom of its wider perversion of human individuality and action in general. Even perpetrators like Eichmann lose their sense of individuality—A.J. Vetlesen has described the phenomenon as a double dehumanization between the victims and the perpetrator Every bureaucrat in Nazi Germany was replaceable and totalitarianism made them feel, paradoxically, “subjectively innocent,” in the sense that they do not feel responsible for their actions “because they do not really murder but execute a death sentence pronounced by some higher tribunal.” Jalusic argues that both aspects of humanization have in common, the “loss of the human condition.”, but what Jalusic misses is that Vetlesen, by arguing that it is the persecutors that dehumanize themselves to avoid personal responsibility and alienate themselves from their actions—thus going against the cog in the machine theory. The perpetrators retain a level of agency that is ultimately denied to the victims. The victims do not alienate themselves from their actions, as they cannot act in the first place. When Nazi officials send victims to the concentration camp, they lose any ability to appear and thus face a loss of the human condition, as Arendt describes in The Human Condition, “A life without speech and without action, on the other hand-and this is the only way of life that in earnest has renounced all appearance and all vanity in the biblical sense of the word-is, literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men” The emphasis she places on action as being an essential part of living “among men” explains why, according to her, totalitarianism, unlike other forms of oppressive governments, transforms “human nature itself.” While she uses the term “human nature,” she makes a strict distinction between human nature and condition in The Human Condition , arguing that it is impossible for us to understand human nature without resorting to God or a deity. Even in Origins , when talking about human nature, she criticizes those, like the positivists, who see it as something fixed and not constantly conditioned by ourselves. In light of her understanding of the human condition, I argue that Arendt means that totalitarianism undermines an essential part of the human condition, not human nature. Arendt views the human condition, as opposed to human nature, as being rooted in plurality. By plurality, she means that each individual is uniquely different but also shares a means of communication with every other individual, and thus, the ability of each individual to make themselves known and engage with one another. With this in mind, “human plurality is the basic condition for both action and speech,” as each individual can make a statement and be understood by others. The treatment of victims and their innocence as their defining factor highlights that fellow humans can distort and condition crucial aspects of our human condition in favor of laws that pretend that humans can instill justice and nature on earth. To a degree, totalitarianism subjects everyone to the conditions of “innocence” that victims face. What distinguishes the victims from other agents under totalitarianism is that they demonstrate the ability of totalitarian ideology to instill a complete condition of innocence by playing a person entirely outside any political and legal realm and, by extension, outside of mankind. Innocence under totalitarianism is not a negative condition—in the sense of not having done anything, not taking action—but it is primarily a lack of positive freedom—the ability to do something and act. Arendt’s understanding of innocence elaborates on the unique condition of superfluousness under totalitarianism. This ‘superfluousness’ is justified through a legal and political doctrine that explodes past legal and normative frameworks by being based on movement instead of stability. The law of nature is in a constant process of Darwinian development, with the superfluous innocents as the sine qua non to keep going. A lot of what happens to the innocents, as their obliteration of a space to act, does happen to everyone under totalitarianism; however, the innocents bear the full expression of totalitarianism and fight past notions of moral, political, and legal personhood. The innocents are not only cut off from this personhood but also from what Arendt thinks it means to be human, as they represent an inability to do what human beings do, which is to create beginnings through spontaneous action. The unique condition of innocence that the victims of totalitarianism face exposes totalitarianism’s own legal and political theory. The Law of Nature that Nazi Germany espouses here cannot exist without the realization of a group of innocents who prove the nihilistic idea that humans can be sacrificed for perfected mankind. As Arendt explains, the concentration camps are where the changes in “human nature are tested.” We can only understand how totalitarianism could occur by looking at this unique political erasure. The terror and fate of the innocents act as proof for everyone in the totalitarian regime that they could be next. The status of the victims also sheds lights on the inexplicable deeds that Eichmann committed, as Arendt writes that one of the few, if not only one, discernible aspects of totalitarianism is that “radical evil has emerged in connection with a system in which all men have become equally superfluous.” Totalitarianism proves that it is fellow humans who are dehumanized, albeit to a different degree, who completely sever an individual’s ties from political and legal structures meant to protect them. This conclusion and elaboration of the peculiar form of oppression and domination of totalitarianism has pressing practical and theoretical implications for modern-day politics. As Arendt explains, totalitarianism is born from modern conditions, and so looking at how modern polities can and do create superfluousness can be a thermometer for descent into totalitarianism. After all, it is important to remember that statelessness in the 20th century came before totalitarianism’s domination and terror. References Arendt, Hannah. “Collective Responsibility.” Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt , edited by S. J. James W. Bernauer, Springer Netherlands, 1987, pp. 43–50. Springer Link , https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3565-5_3. ---. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil . Penguin Books, 2006. ---. The Human Condition: Second Edition . Edited by Margaret Canovan and a New Foreword by Danielle Allen, University of Chicago Press. University of Chicago Press , https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/H/bo29137972.html. Accessed 8 May 2024. ---. The Origins of Totalitarianism . 1951. Penguin Classics, 2017. Benhabib, Seyla. “Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt’s Thought.” Political Theory , vol. 16, no. 1, 1988, pp. 29–51. JSTOR , https://www.jstor.org/stable/191646. Bernstein, Richard J. “Responsibility, Judging, and Evil.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie , vol. 53, no. 208 (2), 1999, pp. 155–72. JSTOR , https://www.jstor.org/stable/23955549. Braun, Robert. “The Holocaust and Problems of Historical Representation.” History and Theory , vol. 33, no. 2, May 1994, p. 172. DOI.org (Crossref) , https://doi.org/10.2307/2505383. Gundogdu, Ayten. Rightlessness in an Age of Rights . Oxford University Press, 2015. DOI.org (Crossref) , https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370412.001.0001. Jalusic, Vlasta. “Organized Innocence and Exclusion: ‘Nation-States’ in the Aftermath of War and Collective Crime.” Social Research , vol. 74, no. 4, 2007, pp. 1173–200. JSTOR , https://www.jstor.org/stable/40972045. Norrie, Alan. “Justice on the Slaughter-Bench: The Problem of War Guilt in Arendt and Jaspers.” New Criminal Law Review , vol. 11, no. 2, Apr. 2008, pp. 187–231. DOI.org (Crossref) , https://doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2008.11.2.187. 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Divisive Identities: Exploring the Interplay of Personal and Social Identities Ella Neeka Sawhney Author Aimee Zheng Faith Li Editors I. Abstract Personal and social identity, whilst existing as two different entities, combine and interact to form our overall individual identities. Personal identity centres around how an individual’s fundamental beliefs and commitments are shaped by their personal experiences, whilst social identity arises from one’s belonging to various social groups, including one’s social relationships. This essay juxtaposes arguments from Amartya Sen and Bikhu Parekh to argue that our personal and social identities are profoundly intertwined and thus should not be viewed as separate from one another. By drawing on theoretical frameworks and real-life examples, I demonstrate how Parekh’s model offers a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of individual identity which encompasses personal and social dimensions as dynamic entities. Thus, through a critical examination of Parekh’s model and Sen’s respective criticisms, this essay concludes that Parekh’s model, by acknowledging the plurality and diversity of identities as well as the complex interplay between personal and social identities, provides a robust defence of individual identity as comprised of personal and social identities, expertly addressing concerns raised by Sen. II. Introduction Classical problems within this idea of personal identity can be categorised into families. For instance, the persistence problem and the personhood puzzle both focus on questions regarding the continuity and ethical implications of self-identity. I choose to concentrate on ‘The Characterisation Question’ which delves into what comprises our personalities. This question is important as it is one that we grapple with daily, permeating all aspects of our lives. Specifically, I focus on the debate between Parekh and Sen, as I find this debate to have strong implications for understanding individual identity In this essay, I investigate Parekh’s twofold model of individual identity, scrutinising its effectiveness in addressing the concerns raised by Sen. My thesis contends that through his emphasis on plurality and diversity, Parekh efficiently responds to Sen’s concerns about the divisive potential of social identities, ultimately undermining Sen’s criticisms. First, I explore the intricacies of the concept of philosophical (including both personal and social) identity. Next, I explain Parekh’s model and juxtapose it against Sen’s criticisms. I then evaluate whether Parekh’s theory can escape Sen’s criticism of dogmatic sectarianism. Lastly, I debate Sen’s critique of over-conformity to social roles as a result of combining social and personal identity. Prima facie, our identity addresses the ubiquitous question ‘Who am I?’, encompassing the beliefs, ideas and qualities that shape a person’s character. Yet, philosophical identity, namely individual identity, explores the intricacies of how an individual may deduce their identity from their various distinctive features. This individual identity is what “distinguishes” (Parekh, 2009, p. 267) agents, functioning as a “predicate” (Sollberger, 2013) used to describe specific attributes of a subject and identify its differentiators. Individual identity comprises two components: personal (shaped by one’s personal life experiences) and social (arising from one’s belonging in groups or a relationship), according to Parekh (2009). By examining personal identity one can better understand and analyse ‘The Characterisation Question’: ‘What is it that makes me the unique individual I am?’, a question originally termed by Schechtman (2007) who presented ‘The Characterisation Question’ as: “The question of which beliefs, values, desires, and other psychological features make someone the person she is.. [it] concerns identity in the sense of what is generally called… an ‘identity crisis’” (p. 1) My analysis of ‘The Characterisation Question’ throughout the remainder of this essay investigates the features which define one’s personal identity and how they render a person differentiable from others. Moreover, viewing personal identity as “contingent and temporary” (Olson, 2023) suggests that one’s definition of self changes throughout one’s lifetime. For example, an only child’s identity shifts when becoming an older sibling, following their younger sibling’s birth. Hence, personal identity evolves alongside changing exogenous factors and is influenced by introspective processes, such as changing religious beliefs. III. Parekh’s model Parekh’s (2009) model of “overall” (p. 268) identity, alternatively referred to as individual identity, encompasses both personal and social identity. Parekh’s concept of personal identity centres around how an individual’s “fundamental beliefs and commitments” (ibid., p. 267) shape their perceptions of the world and their role within it. This recurrent journey of “self-definition” (ibid., p. 268) permits individuals to make sense of their convictions, including values, beliefs and opinions, thus developing their inner comprehension of personal identity. Moreover, Parekh describes social identity as a key aspect of individual identity, arising from one’s belonging to various social groups. He interprets social identity as “inherently plural” (ibid., p. 267), acknowledging its multi-layered influence on a person’s identity. Social identity includes relationships and groups a person feels they belong to, which play a crucial role in shaping their self-perception. Hence, these interconnected layers contribute to one’s personal identity, allowing social identity to, more broadly, impact individual identity. Yet, an interpretive challenge lies in Parekh’s vague explication of the relationship between personal and social identity, leaving the permeability of the boundary, and the extent of their interaction unclear. These ambiguities in Parekh’s model make it difficult to interpret how personal and social identities coalesce. This is showcased in Parekh’s example of the two teachers: “For one it is nothing but a job that she would readily give up if she got a better one”, for the other “being a teacher means a great deal to her. She identifies with it, sees it as an integral part of who she is and would not even dream of giving it up” (ibid., p. 274) Here, the first teacher is mechanically fulfilling their role, while the other integrates teaching into their personal identity. This quote illustrates the challenge of unravelling the complex, and deeply intertwined web of overlapping personal and social identities. The interpretive challenge concerning Parekh’s claim that may arise here is how individuals navigate their identities and to what extent their social identities integrate into their overall identities. Thus, I acknowledge that there are some tensions within Parekh’s view that are slightly contradictory. Namely, when comparing this difficulty in interpreting Parekh’s view of the interaction between personal and social identities with Parekh’s persistent assertion that our personal and social identities are inherently linked, inconsistencies arise. This is something that I shall discuss further in my discussion of ‘dogmatic sectarianism’. IV. Sen’s concerns Sen (2009) presents three key objections to Parekh’s model of personal and social identity which I outline below: The proposition that “a change in social affiliation would make one a different person altogether” is flawed. Our personal identity shouldn’t be “combinable” with our social identity as our social identities can change, without our overall identity changing (p. 286). “One’s personal identity is not threatened by one’s decision to depart from the activities of others belonging to the same group.” Moreover, over-emphasising our social identity results in a lack of reasoning and mutual understanding between members from different groups (p. 287). “Once the priority of a social affiliation is accepted as an integral part of one’s ‘overall identity’, something substantial is lost.” This leads to a person’s lack of deviation from their group’s views and affiliations (p. 288). Sen critiques Parekh’s viewpoint on the combinability of personal and social identity. Specifically, he faults Parekh for overemphasising the impact of social identity on overall identity, asserting that his view is likely to foster dissent hence contributing to societal divides. Sen (2007, pp. xiii-xiv) further encourages the separation of our social influences from our personal decisions. This derives from his argument that a singular or “dominant” social “classification” may hinder deviation from one’s societal or cultural norms, impeding personal decision-making abilities. He stresses that acknowledging our “pluralit[y] of identity” prevents rigid adherence to social groups so that our personal decisions are not entirely dictated by them. A. Dogmatic sectarianism A key feature of Sen’s (2009, p. 286) first criticism is that Parekh’s model is illogical in strongly combining personal and social identity because this view suggests that a change in social affiliation will result in an entire change of personality. Thus, Sen reasons that, according to Parekh’s model “a change of social affiliation would make one a different person altogether” (ibid.). From this, Sen asserts that a likely consequence is the emergence of “dogmatic sectarianism”, meaning that individuals unwaveringly adhere to a strict set of beliefs which often leads to ignorance towards the views of other groups. This creates a lack of willingness to deviate from these norms, as well as ignorance towards and dismissal of other groups’ perspectives, breeding intolerance and hindering understanding between groups. I applaud Sen for identifying the dangers of dogmatic sectarianism. Specifically, he recognises a person’s reluctance to stray from their group’s collective views can foster strong antagonism towards outsiders with different opinions. For Sen, one must separate their personal and social identities to prevent this phenomenon. He asserts that through uncoupling one’s personal and social identity, one can retain a part of their social identity and remain associated with that social group without sacrificing one’s entire personal identity. Hence, Sen warns against Parekh’s model which arguably sees individuals as rigidly tying their personal identity to their social identity. An example supporting Sen’s reflections involves the separation of personal identity from religious affiliations, which falls within social identity. The consolidation of personal and social identity can lead to “sectarian violence” (ibid., p.287). Per Sen’s second criticism: individuals overly emphasise their religious identity and struggle to find areas of agreement or understanding with other religious groups. This is evident in the Northern Ireland conflict; a strong ethnoreligious divide which created a divergence between Catholics and Protestants (Ferguson, 2016). For the Northern Irish, this rigid adherence to religious groups blurred the lines between religious and social identity, fuelling violence and hostility between them. The entrenchment of religious identity within personal identity demonstrates the risk of overly combining personal and social identities, creating a scenario where separation becomes nearly unattainable. Moreover, one must acknowledge that Sen does not assert that dogmatic sectarianism is an inevitable result of combining personal and social identity. Instead, it is only a possibility that poses a significant threat and should be avoided. Thus, he envisions more than one potential outcome of combining personal and social identity, demonstrating his open-mindedness and nuanced analysis. However, I find that Parekh’s flexible and plural model can escape Sen’s criticism of dogmatic sectarianism. This is because Parekh’s (2009) emphasis on plural identities and his encouragement towards the usage of “plural perspectives” (p. 276) prevents the dominance of one single identity. Parekh’s interpretation allows a person to recognise different aspects of themselves, which combine to influence their overall identity. Sen fails to recognise the potential of Parekh’s model and emphasis on “plural identities” to counteract any dangers of dogmatic sectarianism. Under closer examination of Parekh’s model, his awareness of plural identities can provide an alternative solution to Sen’s criticisms, thus demonstrating his model’s versatility and robustness. Parekh’s ability to respond to Sen’s criticism can be demonstrated by applying his model to the aforementioned example of the Northern Irish conflict. Taking a more pluralistic approach, one can see that his model does not succumb to the pitfalls of dogmatic sectarianism. If Northern Irish citizens embraced a pluralistic understanding of their identities, recognising their shared nationality in addition to their differing religious affiliations, conflict might have been reduced. Thus, mutual recognition of plural social identities allows Parekh to maintain his argument of multifaceted and inter-connected personal and social identities, defying Sen’s criticism that Parekh’s model encourages rigid and unfaltering social divides. Therefore, Parekh expertly responds to Sen’s criticism of dogmatic sectarianism as his pluralistic emphasis and encouragement to recognise our own diverse social identities counteracts Sen’s concern that tying personal and social identities fosters inflexibility. B. Over-conformity and Combinability of Social and Personal Identity Sen’s third point criticises Parekh’s model for its over-emphasis of social identity when combined with personal identity. He argues that excessively coupling our personal identities to societal and cultural norms, renders our personal identity secondary. Consequently, people become compelled to strictly adhere to their social norms, constituting a loss of their personal sense of self. Sen (2009) criticises the apparent “reductionism” of a person’s identity to one aspect of their social identity such as their ethnicity or nationality, (p. 288) which, as Sen believes, arises from combining personal and social identities At first glance, Sen’s argument seems logically valid as over-conforming to one affiliation could correspond with disregarding other aspects of one’s overall identity. Sen terms this “epistemic failure” (ibid.) whereby people cannot understand certain aspects of their identity because one affiliation has taken priority. He illustrates this with the example of different groups such as ‘British Muslims’ in which over-emphasising religious identity “miniature[ises] human beings and their many affiliations” (ibid.). This leads to a neglect of plural identifying elements beyond religion, whereby people are reduced to this “single category” (ibid.). Sen further demonstrates his argument by referencing British Bangladeshis who are merely “defined” (ibid.) as ‘British Muslims’. Although a majority of Bengalis in Britain are Muslim, this reduction disregards the distinct culture of Bengali individuals, which may be secular and not solely defined by their religion, demonstrating how combining personal and social identities oversimplifies the manifold nature of individual identity. Moreover, Sen’s argument is further developed by his assertion that over-simplifying our identities leads people to seemingly lose their innate autonomous abilities. By “reducing” (ibid.) one’s identity, it becomes very difficult for one to perceive their identity outside of their social categorisation, thus obfuscating decision-making and threatening individual autonomy. When an individual’s social affiliations determine their overall identity, they confine themselves to making decisions only within these affiliations. For example, women forced to conform to their societal gender role as homemakers may have to forgo personal endeavours that exist outside of the home. This demonstrates how over-emphasising gender as a social affiliation can confine women and prevent them from exerting their agency. However, I believe Parekh’s model withstands Sen’s criticism by recognising the complexity of our identity, where combined aspects of our identity influence decision-making. Particularly, he acknowledges that there is great “variation” (Parekh, 2009, p. 273) in our perception of what constitutes individual identity. Here, Parekh emphasises the diverse interpretations of our social identities which can be assigned varying importance to different aspects. He specifies people can “define and relate” (p. 274) to their societal roles in various ways, demonstrating an awareness that people may choose to identify with different social identities to varied extents. In the above example, British Muslims can challenge their simplistic categorisation by prioritising their religious identity differently. Consequently, Parekh’s model evades Sen’s criticism of over-conformity by acknowledging social identities as qualitative, rather than objective, with some holding greater significance. Sen argues that, in order to prevent over-conformity, individuals can and should completely separate their personal and social identities. Yet, I cannot deem this as feasible, as I believe that personal and social identity cannot be viewed as two separate entities; instead, they constantly combine and influence one another throughout our lives. Specifically, our personal values are often shaped by our social context and so aiming to separate this largely oversimplifies our complex human identity. For example, growing up adhering to the Sikh faith, I was taught the importance of seva (selfless service) and helping those less fortunate than myself. These values instilled in me a passion for charity and volunteer work, which have become an integral aspect of my personal identity. I thus find that my social identity as a Sikh is deeply intertwined with my personal values and I therefore find it inconceivable to attempt to separate them. Therefore, I find Sen’s proposed alternative to Parekh’s model–in which an individual must divide personal and social identities–incomprehensible in practice. V. Conclusion My essay explored Parekh’s twofold model of individual identity, focusing on its capability to respond to Sen’s criticisms. Firstly, I disputed Sen’s point of dogmatic sectarianism, articulating the ability of Parekh’s pluralistic framework to evade Sen. Next, I asserted that Parekh’s acknowledgement of the differing importance of each social identity refutes Sen’s claim that Parekh’s combined framework leads individuals to over-conform to their social identity above personal identity. Ultimately, I conclude that Parekh’s framework expertly responds to each of Sen’s concerns about the divisive potential of social identities. References Ferguson, N. a. (2016). Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Conflict in Northern Ireland. In Understanding Peace and Conflict Through Social Identity Theory (pp. 215-277). Springer, Cham. Olson, E. T. (2023, June 30). Personal Identity . Retrieved from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/identity-personal/ Parekh, B. (2009). Logic of identity. Politics, philosophy & economics , 267-284. Schechtman, M. (2007). Introduction . In The Constitution of Selves (pp. 1-3). Cornell University Press . Sen, A. (2007). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. Penguin Books India. Sen, A. (2009). 285The fog of identity. Politics, Philosophy & Economics , 251-352. Sollberger, D. (2013). On identity: from a philosophical point of view. Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Mental Health volume , Article number 29.

Jasmine Bacchus Tribes and Tribulations: Character as Property in Survivor Jasmine Bacchus Almost 600 contestants have appeared on the US version of Survivor , with only 82 of those contestants (approximately 13%) identifying as Black. Over the past twenty years, Black Survivor contestants have expressed that their portrayal on the edited version of the show misrepresents their lived experiences on and off the island. In 2020, a group of Black alumni joined together to produce a series of panels and discussions on race in Survivor and have argued that CBS, the show’s broadcasting network, has a responsibility to accurately and appropriately represent the experiences of their contestants of color. This paper explores character as a form of property and aims to showcase how intellectual property rights and the right to publicity function within the context of reality television. Ultimately, I argue that networks, such as CBS, should aim to balance their desire to produce an entertaining show with genuine attempts to accurately tell the stories of Black and Indigenous People of Color (BIPOC). After showcasing how CBS’s ownership of their contestant’s characters has uniquely harmed Black contestants, I will suggest steps CBS can take to improve their portrayals. I. Character on Survivor Survivor is an American television show created by Mark Burnett in 2000. The premise of the show is that 16-20 players, called “castaways,” are brought to a deserted island. The castaways are put into two teams, called “tribes.” In each episode, the two tribes compete against each other in a series of challenges. The losing tribe goes to “Tribal Council” where they collectively vote one player off of the island. This pattern continues until there are only two or three contestants left in the game; the final players then face a “jury” consisting of the last seven players that have been voted out of the game. The final players give speeches and the jury members cast their vote for the player they want to win the game. The winner receives the title of “Sole Survivor” and $1,000,000. As a reality TV show, Survivor is known for its memorable characters and character moments. When the show originally aired in 2000, one of the earliest marketing points was that the game was bringing sixteen people from different “walks of life”; the significance of bringing together different socioeconomic, racial, and geographic backgrounds made the show a televised social experiment. While the show still claims to bring together a diverse group of players, at home, audience members see characters carefully crafted by the network, rather than raw footage of sixteen strangers. The discrepancy between reality and their portrayal is what has sparked action from Black Survivor alumni. During the casting and editing process, contestants are typically shaped to fit specific archetypes. While Survivor producers aim to get contestants from a range of archetypes each season, many times Black contestants are repeatedly cast into the same roles or emphasized for the same shortcomings. Gervase Peterson (Season 1), Osten Taylor (S7), Tasha Fox (S31), and Keith Sowell (S38) received major storylines about their inability to swim, contributing to the harmful stereotype that “Black people can’t swim.” Alicia Calaway (S2) is primarily remembered for being aggressive and JoAnna Ward (S6) was shown as “overly religious.” Likewise, contestants NaOnka Mixon (21), Nick Brown (S2), and J’Tia Hart were primarily shown as being “lazy” and nonstrategic and were frequently shown taking naps and not participating in camp work. This seems to suggest that “laziness” is one of their core personality traits when in fact outside of the game, Mixon was a physical education teacher, Brown was a Harvard Law Student, and Hart was a nuclear engineer with a Ph.D. (1). Black contestants have argued that these repetitive, one-sided portrayals ignore the fact that the Black Survivor community is not a monolith. The contestants are multifaceted people, but by shoehorning them into the same narratives every season, they are inaccurately portraying the true personas of the contestants. While producers can only work with the footage they are given, Black contestants have argued that the showrunners focus on turning the footage into memorable moments without also highlighting their gameplay and strategy. While a white contestant may be given both a fun edit and strategic moments, Black contestants often are only highlighted when they do something to support their assigned archetype. These one-sided portrayals come at the expense of giving the contestants “proper credit” for the positive contributions they made to the game. Vecepia “Vee” Towery, winner of Survivor: Marquesas and the first African American contestant to win the game, has been known throughout the Survivor community for being a “boring” and “nonstrategic” player, yet during one of the Black Voices of Survivor panels, Vecepia spoke out about her edit: They flipped it and made me look like I was under the radar like I didn’t do anything to win that game. Even to the point that when we were watch- ing the episodes, people on my season would call me and email me like ‘that didn’t happen like that. Why didn’t they show you doing that?’ and I’m sitting there like I have no idea (2). With instances like Vecepia’s occurring regularly, Black Survivor contestants have joined together to campaign for better representation. Black alumni shared their stories in a series of podcasts known as the “Black Voices of Survivor”; the series is accompanied by a petition sent to CBS, which called for “anti-racism”; specifically, they called for CBS to “Ensure that cultural elements of the experiences of BIPOC are not exploited and their portrayal does not perpetuate harmful stereotypes” (3). This raises the question: to what extent do Black contestants have ownership over how they are portrayed on the show? The following sections explore the concept of a “reality tv character” and examine how intellectual property (IP) and publicity laws can be used to give individuals and corporations ownership over characters. II. Character as Property I believe that property functions in this setting as a means of character owner- ship. Denise Martinez defines “character” as “the aggregate of features and traits that form the individual nature of a person” (4). These traits and features are constructed by various elements, including the person’s “physical appearance, their background and personality, the words they use and the actions they take” (5). As I discuss character in this paper, I am referring to the aggregate of a contestant’s personalities, appearances, and actions, that edited together, make “a character.” Personality is a key component used to build a character. Deborah Halbert breaks a reality TV star’s personality into three parts. There is the “human persona,” which is the person in their everyday life, a functional persona, which represents the archetypal character the network aims to project, and a hybrid persona, which contains elements of both (6). What we see on television is the hybrid persona, where the “Reality TV star’s personality is combined with producer-controlled storylines and edits” (7). This, combined with other elements of their wardrobe and back- ground, create a reality TV character. Thus, the tension between the contestants and the network is over the ownership of these characters. By “character ownership,” I mean control over how the character, including the hybrid persona, is displayed in the edited final cut of the television show and any appearances of the character afterward. The law views character ownership in a couple of ways. Both IP and publicity rights have been invoked to claim ownership over a character. Reality TV characters, however, do not tend to receive intellectual property protections. In order for a character to be eligible for copyright, the creator must prove that the character is 1) “sufficiently Distinctive So as to Constitute an Original Expression” and 2) “constitute the story being told” (8). Martinez argues that reality TV characters are not sufficiently distinctive, as their “hairstyle, hair color, clothing (costume), and scenery change from one episode or season of a reality TV show to another”(9). Likewise, with ensemble casts, a singular Survivor contestant would not “constitute the story being told”: in other words, if that contestant was removed from the season, the show would still be able to proceed (10). While stereotypes themselves cannot be trademarked, trademarked characters, such as “Aunt Jemima,” have perpetuated negative stereotypes about the Black community (11). Some reality stars have sought trademark protection over certain aspects of their character as a way of claiming ownership over their “personal brand” (12). In the early days of Survivor , some contestants would use their experience on the show to propel them to higher celebrity statuses with hopes of making money off of their appearances (13). Contestants who received poor edits might have been excluded from those opportunities, however, even those who were offered opportunities were often denied participation by CBS.14 Sean Rector (S4) described his experience with this, stating “many of the opportunities that were offered to me from different networks, and even Viacom, were denied to me by SEG/Survivor and yet my image and catchphrases [are] exploited on merchandise and monetized by various different entities and I couldn’t even mention Survivor let alone try and make a living off of my experience” (15). While there is an interesting argument to be made that contestants are being robbed of the opportunity to profit off of their personal brand, I am primarily concerned about situations where CBS’s ownership of Black and POC characters cause contestants to be disproportionately affected relative to white contestants. While BIPOC contestants may experience less accurate portrayals than their counterparts, all contestants lack the ability to trademark these aspects of their brand. Ultimately, the ability to profit off of their appearance does not seem to be the primary concern raised by the Black Survivor alumni. III. The Survivor Contract What I see as the primary property issue here is the right to publicity, which “protects against the unauthorized appropriation of a person’s name, likeness, portrait, picture, voice and other indicia of identity or persona” (16). Survivor contestants give up their right to publicity when they sign the participation contract. During the early stages of the casting process, contestants who wish to continue in the casting process must sign a contract that releases their right to their portrayal during the show and after it airs. Deborah Herbert explains, “the contract grants CBS all rights to the name and likeness of the application, forever, even if the application is not recognizable” (17). If they are selected to participate on the show, “anything related to Survivor becomes the property of CBS” (18). Not only does the contract give CBS the rights to control how they are portrayed, but the network maintains full control over their “life story,” and this control extends after the show airs (19). Thus, once a contestant signs the contract, they relinquish any right to their storylines or narratives on the show, and technically cannot do or say anything after the show to contradict anything that was portrayed onscreen with- out facing a potential penalty (20). As a result, any interviews, talk shows, books, or appearances a contestant wants to make for at least three years after the show airs must be cleared by CBS first. With CBS having control over their narratives on the show and actions afterward, Black contestants have struggled to find ways to reshape their characters outside after the show has aired. Two of the four Black Survivor winners have expressed a desire to participate in positive outreach to the Black community after their show, however, they received little to no support from CBS to do so. Earl Cole, the winner of Survivor’s fourteenth season , Survivor: Fiji, was the first Black man to win the show and the first contestant to receive a unanimous vote at the end of the game. During “The Black Voices of Survivor: Roundtable,” Earl explained that after he won the show, CBS gave him a structured list of appearances and interviews to make. Earl noticed that most of the venues he was scheduled to speak at catered to a predominately white audience and asked CBS if he could make additional appearances at venues where he was more likely to reach a Black audience. However, he was met with opposition from the network. He explained: I thought that CBS would use this as an opportunity to actually try to get more Black viewers...[but] nothing happened. They did nothing for me. They didn’t promote me in any kind of way...like hey you know a Black dude just won for the first time, won unanimously...[But] I never got any of those opportunities, no promotional things, no marketing things (21). Wendell Holland, winner of S urvivor: Ghost Island experienced similar frustra- tion when trying to obtain access to clips from the show for speaking engagements. Wendell described his experience to the group, stating: We [the four Black winners] want to be great ambassadors for Survivor . We want to go to the community...scream from the mountaintops that we were on Survivor ...I spoke at so many places and I tried my hardest to acquire things. I would try to get clips from my show, I’d go through the proper channels, I would send messages to the people at CBS and they make me jump through so many hoops, and ultimately they wouldn’t give me anything, that I could show to like 700 kids (22). The anecdotes from Earl and Wendell showcase how little agency contestants have once they sign the contract and agree to participate on the show. While the argument can be made that players could have read the contract and refused to sign it, often reality TV contestants have limited legal understanding and when faced with a 100+ page document they may feel overwhelmed or unable to digest it all. While perhaps contestants should read the contract with an attorney present, often reality tv contestants are given a limited amount of time to sign and feel pressured to do so before the network replaces them with another candidate (23). In an interview for Entertainment Weekly, Sean Rector expressed regret for how the contract signing process went down, stating: I rarely have regrets in life, but if there were some regrets after doing the show, it would have been that I wished I would’ve legally understood the SEG/Survivor contract I signed. I wished they would’ve had more transparency and explanation as to why certain people were able to capitalize off of their experience and others were not (24). With the pressure to sign quickly and no legal counsel provided by CBS, Survivor contestants have signed away their right to publicity for the rest of their lives, making it challenging for contestants to remedy harmful on-screen portrayals. VI. Race and Character Portrayal – Finding Balance Given the extensive contracts they signed when they auditioned for the show, Black Survivor contestants do not retain any rights to publicity over their Survivor character. CBS has economic incentives to continue to structure their contracts in this manner, however as more stories of Black contestants begin to be made public, the network is facing pressure to better characterize their BIPOC contestants. Thus, if CBS continues to require contestants to sign away their right to publicity, they still may be held accountable when it comes to handling the characterization and life stories of marginalized individuals. Thus, how can networks balance exercising their autonomy over character creation (to craft an entertaining show), without putting marginalized groups in a position where they are forced to connect their likenesses to harmful stereotypes? In this final section, I will explain how and why CBS should take steps to better characterize their contestants of color, and how they can do so, without modifying their contract. Unique Harms to Black Contestants A negative reality television edit has the potential to harm any contestant, how- ever, I believe that stereotypical portrayals of predominantly Black contestants create unique harms to the Black community. In her study of race on reality TV shows, Katrina Bell-Jordan writes that reality television can “shape the reality of race and racism in the US” (25). For BIPOC contestants, their character portrayals shape not only their personal image, but how our society views African Americans. Bell-Jordan explains that the “editing and framing of footage depicting the experiences of ‘real’ people have the power to shape our understandings of the people, places and sociocultural issues presented on these programs” (26). People who watch Survivor may have limited real-life experience interacting with the Black community. Thus, portrayals of Black contestants can directly shape the way a person views the community. Likewise, at this point, many Black contestants have recognized how important it is to be depicted in a non-harmful light, and thus multiple Black castaways have spoken out about the pressure they felt to positively represent their ethnic group and avoid any editing traps while on the show. Thus, these players enter the show aiming to “dispel the myths about their respective group” (27). Often, they spend additional energy not only trying to play the game but being hyper-aware of their surroundings and their actions, so they can avoid alienating their tribe. This pressure is two-pronged. For example, while a white contestant may feel comfortable taking a nap after helping catch food for dinner, a Black contestant may feel an additional pressure to stay active, as they would not want their nap to become their main storyline. They are likely aware of the “lazy” stereotype that has been pushed on previous Black contestants and will want to make sure their fellow castaways have no evidence of them being lazy (as this would likely lead to them being voted out). They may also feel an additional level of anxiety around the producer’s ability to push the stereotype on them. While all castaways regardless of race are thinking about their in-game relationships and the final edit, Black castaways experience a unique pressure to avoid falling into stereotypical narratives historically pushed by the show. Navigating these one-dimensional negative portrayals may also make it more challenging for players to be invited back to play Survivor again. Many contestants dream about the chance to be invited back; another chance gives them more exposure, another once-in-a-lifetime experience, and another chance to win $1,000,000. Thus, not being invited back is incredibly disappointing to many players. Black alumni expressed frustration when Vecepia, the first Black contestant to win and the only Black woman to win, was one of the only winners not invited to play in the “All-Winners” season of Survivor . Unpopular characters are less likely to be invited back to play Survivor again; contestants with poor edits are often perceived negatively by the fanbase and thus denied another invitation. However, refusing to play into a stereotype may cause a player to be disliked by production, which could still lead to a negative edit (albeit a different one) or being “black- listed” from future invitations. Out of the 103 contestants who have been invited back to the show, only 11 of the invited castaways are Black (28). Knowing that they are invited back at a lower rate, Black and other BIPOC contestants face another level of complexity not faced by their white counterparts. Lastly, unbalanced edits can lead to Black stories being completely ignored. During Season 38 Julia Carter was the only Black castaway in her tribe. During the first few nights of the game, a fellow castaway used a racial slur. Julia reported feeling uncomfortable but remained silent due to a desire not to make her tribe uncomfortable or put a “target” on her back. Eventually, a white castaway stepped in and confronted the other contestant. After this incident occurred, Julia hoped that once aired, it would create a dialogue amongst viewers about language and race. However, CBS chose not to air any part of this incident, and many speculate that this was done to protect the reputation of the castaway who said the slur (29). In fact, Julia is known for being virtually erased from the entire season, receiving very few confessionals or moments at all (30). This story only came to light after Julia wrote an essay about the incident after the show aired. Unfortunately, Julia’s story of unaired racial incidents is not unique. When the edit chooses to ignore these contestant narratives altogether, they invalidate the lived experiences of Black contestants, while making no effort to make the game a more comfortable space for BIPOC players. Network Incentives to Address these Harms As I mentioned earlier, for many viewers, characters and their storylines are what makes a show like Survivor so interesting. Building drama, creating conflict, and putting contestants in challenging situations are essential parts of the show, and to do that effectively, production companies need to have blanket approval from the contestants. The contract enables CBS to have control over these creative elements of the show. By owning each contestant’s right to publicity, the network has creative freedom to produce a show that is entertaining to the public. Likewise, character creation is a time consuming, creative process. Retaining rights to these characters serves as an economic incentive for the company to create compelling ones that will generate high viewership. Likewise, part of being a reality TV contestant is the willingness to put yourself out there and risk potential failures or humiliations that may occur (31). Contestants should expect that any negative footage obtained is fair game to be used for the show. Likewise, the comprehensive contract allows producers to obtain “genuine” footage from contestants. Some aspects of Survivor , like the “gross” food eating challenges, are centered around the contestants not knowing what they are going to face. If contestants were to be given a contract that revealed everything that would happen to them, it would remove elements of drama and make it much less satisfying to watch their reactions (32). If CBS was required to receive editing approval from each contestant before airing a show, likely we would never see any conflicts (artificial or genuine), mess-ups, or moments of stupidity. While a contestant may not feel like they “signed up to be portrayed as an idiot,” by virtue of the genre, players should expect some level of humiliation. However, I believe that the harms created by CBS’s current portrayals combined with their contract make the game uniquely challenging for BIPOC players beyond the reasonable expectation of humiliation and drama. The game of Survivor is not “fair”—every player will experience varying levels of luck throughout their time on the show. However, the show is edited in a way that portrays, to the audience, a level of “fairness.” We are led to believe that at the start of the show, for all intents and purposes, each contestant has a relatively fair shot of winning. Yet, Black contestants are not only trying to play the game, but they also attempt to dodge negative stereotypes and positively represent their entire group, all while navigating their complex relationship with production. There is a whole new level of challenge for these contestants. One group of people consistently facing additional hurdles and challenges undermines this illusion of “fairness” that the network tries to create. Continuing to ignore these inherent disadvantages faced by players delegitimizes the game of Survivor . As these issues come to light, the show is at risk of losing the element of com- petition that makes the audience want to turn in each week to find out who moves on. Likewise, as the Black Survivors have begun to speak out about their concerns, CBS has faced lots of negative publicity for how they treat BIPOC contestants. As more Black contestants share negative experiences, future applicants of color may be deterred from applying to be on the show. CBS has already received negative publicity surrounding this issue, but a season of all white contestants would possibly put the show over the edge. Thus, the network now has two incentives to tackle this issue 1) the incentive to continue to stage Survivor as a “fair game” and 2) the incentive to respond to the negative publicity. I recognize that CBS has the economic motive to produce an entertaining show; retaining the right to publicity over their characters and IP ownership over their recordings gives them an incentive to create quality content. I do not believe that CBS needs to modify their contract as it currently exists. However, the network also has an incentive to improve the way they tell Black stories. The network should take steps to make these improvements. Suggestions for CBS Without modifying their contract, the Survivor team should take steps to minimize future harmful portrayals in the first place. The petition sent by the Sole Survivors Organization asked CBS to hire more BIPOC producers, casting directors, and editors to increase the likelihood that diverse stories are being told in a way that is respectful and accurate (33). A more diverse team would be more equipped to think about representing new archetypes and displaying important parts of each BIPOC castaway’s “life stories.” Likewise, CBS should also make it a priority to cast a more diverse group of players. Some of the pressure tied to a contestant’s feeling like they must “represent for their race” is the fact that Black contestants are only 13% of all players. Often, Black players find themselves one of maybe two African American contestants on a season. The limited amount of representation makes the stakes of an accurate portrayal even higher. The Sole Survivor Organization suggested 30% of the cast each season to people of color (34) and CBS has publicly expressed intent to work towards achieving a similar goal (35). Moving forward, the network should work to increase the number of diverse voices at all stages of production. Likewise, CBS should encourage contestants to speak out against inaccurate portrayals as they see fit. As we have seen with the Black Voices of Survivor podcast, contestants have already begun to speak about their experiences without authorization from the network. I believe that dialogues such as the Black Voices of Survivor should not only be permitted but encouraged; if contestants are encouraged to speak up, stories of stereotypical portrayals made public will put more pressure on the network to do a better job in future seasons. In cases where Black winners, like Wendell and Earl, want to speak in the Black community, the network should be more open to giving them access to materials from the show. No modification to their contract has to be made, but the network should be more diligent about approving and supporting the speaking engagements of BIPOC contestants. V. Conclusion Throughout this paper, I have showcased how Black Survivor contestants have felt inaccurately portrayed by CBS and I have examined their desire to receive ownership over their on-screen characters. The unique harms experienced by Black contestants reveal that an understanding of property driven by economic incentives can cause great harm to specific groups of people. I recognize that CBS’s property claims enable them to create compelling characters and produce their show without fear of interference from disgruntled contestants, however, their absolute character ownership has uniquely harmed BIPOC contestants. Thus, I suggested that CBS increase diversity amongst all aspects of the filming process and to encourage BIPOC contestants to speak up when they feel uncomfortable with their edit. While neither of these options will give these contestants the ability to trademark their catchphrases or control their edit, it is a step towards eliminating the pressures that come with harmful portrayals. Our systems do not seem to recognize when the creations we fostered create harmful, negative externalities. We seem to rely on the market to naturally eliminate creations that do more harm than good. In the case of CBS, public reaction is the only way to gauge if their show is net positive for society, however, controlling the contestant’s right to publicity functions as a way of managing public reaction through limiting public interactions. Thus, this issue is important to a discussion about property because it highlights how the economic benefits of property rights can lead to negative externalities that uniquely harm marginalized communities. In this case, property rights seem to foster innovation, but there is no formal system in place to check if the innovation, Survivor , is continuing to positively impact society (or even, a structured way to measure what constitutes a “net positive im- pact”). In this case, property rights do not have to be a zero-sum game where either the producers or the contestants are satisfied. Hopefully, the external pressure caused by the public will push CBS to engage with their BIPOC contestants. However, I recognize that the network may choose not to make any changes to their production teams or processes. Therefore, this issue has showcased to me that while property laws can foster creativity, they can also create societal harms that uniquely harm groups of people. Endnotes 1 Office of Economic Impact and Diversity. “Dr. J’Tia Hart.” Energy.gov, www.energy.gov/diversity/ contributors/dr-j-tia-hart. 2 Rob Has a Podcast, director. Black Voices of Survivor: Changing the Game of Survivor. YouTube, 1 Sept. 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=e7_rju1pneQ. 3 The Soul Survivors Organization, and J’Tia Heart. “A Petition for Anti-Racism Action by Survivor Entertainment Group.” MoveOn, June 2020, sign.moveon.org/petitions/a-petition-for-anti-racism-action-by- survivor-entertainment-group-2. 4 Martinez, Denise. “Character Ownership in Reality TV”. p. 5. 5 Ibid. 6 Halbert, Debora. “Who Owns Your Personality: Reality Television and Publicity Rights.” Survivor Lessons Essays on Communication and Reality Television, by Matthew J. Smith and Andrew F.. Wood, McFarland & Company, 2003, p. 42. 7 Martinez, Denise. “Character Ownership in Reality TV.” p. 6. 8 Ibid, p. 8. 9 Ibid, 11. 10 Ibid, 13 11 Greene, K.J. “Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and Gender: Lady Sings the Blues.” American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, vol. 16, no. 3, 2008, p. 375. 12 Greene, K.J. “Right of Publicity, Identity, and Performance K .J. Greene Article 4.” Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal, vol. 28, no. 4, 1 Oct. 2012, p. 870. 13 Collins, Sue. “Making the Most out of 15 Minutes.” Television &New Media, vol. 9, no. 2, Mar. 2008, p. 88, tvnm.sagepub.com. 14 Halbert, Debora. “Who Owns Your Personality” p.44. 15 Ross, Dalton. “Sean Rector Speaks out on Never Being Asked Back for ‘Survivor’.” EW.com, 9 Nov. 2020, ew.com/tv/survivor-marquesas-sean-rector-quarantine-questionnaire/. 16 Greene, K.J. “Right of Publicity” p. 866. 17 Halbert, Debora. “Who Owns Your Personality” p.44. 18 Ibid, 44. 19 Blair, Jennifer L. “Surviving Reality TV: The Ultimate Challenge for Reality Show Contestants.” Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review, vol. 31, no. 1, 2010-2011, p. 1-26. HeinOnline. 20 Halbert, Debora. “Who Owns Your Personality” p.44. 21 Rob Has A Podcast. “Black Voices of SURVIVOR Roundtable LIVE - June 24, 2020.” 22 YouTube, YouTube, 24 June 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=lqJM_05fFuk. JTiaPhD. “Tribes and Tribulations.” YouTube, YouTube, 27 June 2020, www.youtube.com/ watch?v=K7YK4DjRQwI. 23 Blair, Jennifer L. “Surviving Reality TV” p. 20. 24 Ross, Dalton. “Sean Rector Speaks out on Never Being Asked Back for ‘Survivor’.” EW.com, 9 Nov. 2020, ew.com/tv/survivor-marquesas-sean-rector-quarantine-questionnaire/. 25 Bell-Jordan, Katrina E. “Black.White. and a Survivor of The Real World: Constructions of Race on Reality TV.” Critical Studies in Media Communication, vol. 25, no. 4, Oct. 2008, p. 357. 26 Bell-Jordan, Katrina E. “Black.White,” p. 368. 27 Ibid, p. 353. 28 Survivor Wiki. “Returning Players.” Survivor Wiki, survivor.fandom.com/wiki/Returning_Players. 29 r/Survivor. “r/Survivor - Can Someone Explain to Me What Happened with Joe and Julia from Eoe and What Shes Ranting about? Is Joe Really Racist...” Reddit, Nov. 2020. 30 Eager Tortoise. “The Real Reason Julia Was Upset About Her Edit .” YouTube, YouTube, 6 Dec. 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=qCXaYeHROT0. 31 Mendible, Myra. “Humiliation, Subjectivity, and Reality TV.” Feminist Media Studies , vol. 4, no. 3, Jan. 2004. 32 Blair, Jennifer L. “Surviving Reality TV” p.19-20. 33 The Soul Survivors Organization, and J’Tia Heart. “A Petition for Anti-Racism Action by Survivor Entertainment Group.” MoveOn, June 2020, sign.moveon.org/petitions/a-petition-for-anti-racism-action-by- survivor-entertainment-group-2. 34 Ibid. 35 Hauser, Christine. “‘Survivor’ and Other Reality Shows Will Feature More Diverse Casts, CBS Says.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 11 Nov. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11/business/media/cbs-reality- tv-diversity.html. Works Cited Bell-Jordan, Katrina E. “Black.White. and a Survivor of The Real World: Constructions of Race on Reality TV.” Critical Studies in Media Communication , vol. 25, no. 4, Oct. 2008, pp. 353–372. Blair, Jennifer L. “Surviving Reality TV: The Ultimate Challenge for Reality Show Contestants.” Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review, vol. 31, no. 1, 2010-2011, p. 1-26. HeinOnline. Carter, Julia. “Push Me to the Edge: My Survivor Experience.” Julia Carter , 1 Nov. 2019, thejuliacarter.com/2019/06/06/push-me-to-the-edge-my-sur-vivor-experience/. Collins, Sue. “Making the Most out of 15 Minutes.” Television &New Media , vol. 9, no. 2, Mar. 2008, pp. 87–110., tvnm.sagepub.com. Copyright.gov. “Copyright in General.” Copyright , www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-general.html. Dillion, Kelly P, and Elizabeth B Jones. “How ‘Real’ Is Reality Television? Marginalized Group Representativeness in Competitive Reality Television Programming.” Psychology of Popular Media Culture , vol. 8, no. 3, 2019, pp. 319–328. Eager Tortoise. “The Real Reason Julia Was Upset About Her Edit .” YouTube , YouTube, 6 Dec. 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=qCXaYeHROT0. Gomez, Patrick. “‘I Was Called the N-Word’: Survivor All-Stars Share Stories of Racism.” AV Club , 26 June 2020, news.avclub.com/i-was-called-the-n- word-black-survivor-all-stars-rev-1844171814. Greene, K.J. “Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and Gender: Lady Sings the Blues.” American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law , vol. 16, no. 3, 2008, pp. 365– 385. Greene, K.J. “Right of Publicity, Identity, and Performance K .J. Greene Article 4.” Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal , vol. 28, no. 4, 1 Oct. 2012, pp. 865–887. Halbert, Debora. “Who Owns Your Personality: Reality Television and Publicity Rights.” Survivor Lessons Essays on Communication and Reality Television , by Matthew J. Smith and Andrew F.. Wood, McFarland & Company, 2003, pp. 37–56. Hauser, Christine. “‘Survivor’ and Other Reality Shows Will Feature More Di- verse Casts, CBS Says.” The New York Times , The New York Times, 11 Nov. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11/business/media/cbs-reali- ty-tv-diversity.html. JTiaPhD. “Tribes and Tribulations.” YouTube , YouTube, 27 June 2020, www.you- tube.com/watch? v=K7YK4DjRQwI. Mendible, Myra. “Humiliation, Subjectivity, and Reality TV.” Feminist Media Studies , vol. 4, no. 3, Jan. 2004. Office of Economic Impact and Diversity. “Dr. J’Tia Hart.” Energy.gov , www.ener- gy.gov/diversity/contributors/dr-j-tia-hart. r/Survivor. “r/Survivor - Can Someone Explain to Me What Happened with Joe and Julia from Eoe and What Shes Ranting about? Is Joe Really Racist...” Reddit , Nov. 2020, www.reddit.com/r/survivor/comments/jo012s/can_ someone_explain_to_me_what_happened_with_joe/?utm_source=share. Rob Has a Podcast, director. Black Voices of Survivor: Changing the Game of Survivor . YouTube , 1 Sept. 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=e7_rju1pneQ. Rob Has A Podcast. “Black Voices of SURVIVOR Roundtable LIVE - June 24, 2020.” YouTube , YouTube, 24 June 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=lq- JM_05fFuk. Ross, Dalton. “Sean Rector Speaks out on Never Being Asked Back for ‘Survivor’.” EW.com, 9 Nov. 2020, ew.com/tv/survivor-marquesas-sean-rector-quaran- tine-questionnaire/. The Soul Survivors Organization, and J’Tia Heart. “A Petition for Anti-Racism Action by Survivor Entertainment Group.” MoveOn , June 2020, sign. moveon.org/petitions/a-petition-for-anti- racism-action-by-survivor-enter- tainment-group-2. Survivor Wiki. “African-American Contestants.” Survivor Wiki , survivor.fandom. com/wiki/Category:African-American_Contestants. Survivor Wiki. “Returning Players.” Survivor Wiki , survivor.fandom.com/wiki/Re- turning_Players. Previous Next

How Political Instability Unravels Religious Commitment Even in the Face of Uncertainty Abanti Ahmed Author Hans Xu Koda Li Xuanyu (Willard) Zhu Editors Abstract This paper explores the dynamic relationship between political instability and religiosity in Egypt and Tunisia, with a focus on the period from 2012 to 2018. The central research question examines how individuals navigate uncertainty and address political challenges, influencing the role of religion in their lives. The argument posits that tangible solutions to political challenges diminish religious commitment, while a lack of such solutions fosters an increased reliance on religion. Drawing on a detailed analysis of events, protests, and economic conditions, the paper reveals that the perception of uncertainty can be controlled and the pursuit of tangible solutions demotes religion to a secondary role in individuals' lives. When addressing citizens' concerns during economic challenges, political repression, and societal grievances, policymakers should consider creating platforms for discussion, promoting religious tolerance, and offering practical avenues for positive change, which can be achieved through religious accommodation laws, interfaith dialogue initiatives, and religious endowments. These initiatives ease society’s broader challenge in engaging in open dialogue about the complex human response to political instability that encourages a reevaluation of how uncertainty is navigated. Introduction The periods after pivotal moments in American history, such as the September 11 attacks and the Great Depression, were marked by sharp, brief increases in church attendance as communities sought solace during troubling times. Religious communities are often the first place that people who feel like they have lost control seek refuge. Is this short-lived surge because they have found alternative solutions or because religion slowly loses its allure in the face of prolonged turmoil? Perhaps online communities provide a platform that empowers apostates to be open and therefore increases their visibility. Alternatively, escalating religious persecution and intolerance might contribute to a decline in religiosity, as individuals distance themselves from beliefs facing opposition. Yet, the root causes behind these shifts remain unclear. In this paper, I will explore the conditions under which political instability decreases religiosity. In the currents of geopolitical turmoil, economic upheaval, and rocky political transitions, one might expect religiosity to be a steadfast anchor, providing relief in uncertain times. Yet, as the Arab Spring swept across the landscapes of Egypt and Tunisia, leaving behind a trail of political transformations, the unexpected occurred: religiosity rather than standing resilient, underwent stark fluctuations. The Arab Spring marked a significant period of upheaval and change across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, characterized by widespread protests, demands for political reform, and calls for greater social justice. While Tunisia is often recognized as the birthplace of the Arab Spring, the movement’s mass protests and uprisings transcended national boundaries, influencing countries like Syria, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, and Bahrain, each with its unique socio-political context and grievances. In Egypt, if the period from 2012-2018 was marked by political turmoil, while the period from 2018-2021 focused on economic reforms and stability, then why did religiosity decrease during turmoil but increase during more stable times? In Tunisia, the opposite occurred; religiosity increased during periods of relatively more political instability from ongoing democratic transitions between 2018-2021 than between 2012-2018. In these two cases, fluctuations in religiosity trends were very similar over the same periods of time despite having divergent political outcomes. This is not to postulate that the essence of religion is solely a response to political instability or repression, nor does it assert that religion solely arises from a particular type of uncertainty. Rather, it underscores that within the realm of political instability, a condition that inherently diminishes religious commitment is a type of uncertainty that invites competitive resolutions that take precedence over religious avenues. Despite fluctuations in non-religiosity within a specific sub-group of the Egyptian population over the past decade, it has not exceeded 25%. Consequently, religion consistently maintains a primary role in the lives of the majority within this subset, highlighting its enduring significance and resilience amidst societal changes. My central thesis posits that when individuals are confronted with tangible solutions to alleviate the challenges that they attribute to their political instability, this set of solutions will take precedence over religious commitment. Religious commitment increases when individuals do not have access to these solutions and feel disillusioned by the future. Their perception of the future is important here, and I will discuss in these cases how these perceptions emerge and are sustained during political instability. Consequently, religion assumes a secondary role in individuals’ lives as it is outcompeted by alternative solutions that best alleviate their uncertainties. One secondary argument entails that overall trends of secularization, driven by societal shifts toward modernization, play a central role in diminishing religiosity. As societies modernize and prioritize democratic values, religious influence tends to decline. This argument suggests that broader secularization, marked by the declining significance of religion in public and private spheres, has an impact on individual piety. An alternative argument delves into the role of political Islam during periods of political instability. It suggests that individuals may attribute their political and economic grievances to religious frameworks, especially when political actors weaponize religion for political gains. This attribution may lead to a decline in religious commitment as people scrutinize religion's involvement in political decisions and its consequential impact on their daily lives. This paper will be structured as follows: First, I will discern the type of political instability I will examine. I will explore the types of uncertainties that come with political instability, and how uncertainty is tied to religious commitment. Then, I will showcase what happens to the role of religion when individuals perceive particular types of uncertainty to be present. Finally, I will introduce my cases of Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab Spring and explore how my proposed conditions of political instability are present in both despite their divergent transitions and outcomes. Theory Political instability exhibits diverse characteristics in terms of duration and intensity, ranging from brief upheavals to prolonged disruptions. My focus extends beyond a general assessment of political instability, emphasizing instances of uncertainty directly impacting citizens' daily lives and their perception of the world around them. This perception has cascading effects on how the role of religion is viewed, so I seek to analyze the relationship between individuals' perception of uncertainty with their resulting course of action and religious commitment. Religion, despite being an ancient phenomenon, can also be a psychological response to uncertainty and turbulent times. Religiosity is measured by attitudes toward religious practices, frequency of worship, and overall belief in God. When religion is tied to self-identity, changes within the political sphere are least impactful on individuals’ religiosity. In Lebanon, for example, individuals tend to identify with their religious and ethnic identities before an overarching national identity. In countries where people prioritize nationalism, ethnic divisions, and plurality of religion, the secondary nature of religion in everyday life makes it more susceptible to change in response to changes in the political sphere such as regime change, citizen repression, economic hardship, and military and police brutality. For instance, in Turkey, there are reports of decreased religiosity among youth and even self-reported accounts of hijabi women who wear the hijab in the public eye, but have said to have already “left Islam.” The Republic of Turkey—whose founding father, Ataturk, had revolutionized Turkey as a “modern” state, adopted a Latin alphabet in place of Ottoman Turkish, and removed religion in state affairs—has consequently experienced decades of secularization. Now, with President Erodgan, Turkish society reaches a crossroads with religion and secularization; as Erdogan increases the role of Islam in politics, such as reducing interest rates because “Islam demands it” while inflation increases. As a result, Turkish citizens attribute their economic challenges to religion. While religion may not be the direct cause of these difficulties, the deliberate political weaponization of Islam can contribute to this perception among the population. I postulate that there are two types of uncertainty: controlled uncertainty and random uncertainty. Under controlled uncertainty, individuals have an optimistic outlook that they have the power and agency to pursue tangible courses of action to relieve their uncertainties. In contrast, under random uncertainty, individuals have the pessimistic outlook that their uncertainties are beyond their control. This perception is coupled with a sense of disillusionment regarding the future. In Israel, for example, women responded to random uncertainty by participating in palm recitation to better cope with the uncertain conditions of the Second Intifada and the threat of terror. They inhibited both an absence of control over their uncertain circumstances and disillusionment with the future, which increased their reliance on rituals as a coping mechanism. Trauma is particularly powerful in identity formation, as it brings out what attributes and experiences individuals have in common. While existing research suggests that instability can heighten individuals' religious commitment by reminding them of their shared religious beliefs, this study aims to delve deeper by considering not just the presence of instability, but also its nature and activity. The activity of instability (e.g. living in a constant state of poverty vs. experiencing escalating instability) determines the type of uncertainty individuals perceive of their circumstances. When faced with controlled uncertainty, where the level of instability remains relatively stable, individuals may rely more on their religious beliefs as a source of solace and guidance. However, in situations of escalating instability, where uncertainty intensifies over time, individuals may be more inclined to explore alternative solutions beyond religion to address immediate challenges brought about by political instability. "The consequential secondary role of religion is supported by the notion of secular competition—when economic opportunities or social norms conflict with religious obligations—that individuals face when considering alternative solutions. For instance, during the Great Depression, as conditions worsened, many Americans cataloged the failures of capitalism and voluntarism, emphasizing citizens’ basic responsibilities to one another. Even conservative religious leaders began to join social workers and hungry Americans in calling for more vigorous federal intervention as they faced the suffering before them and their own inability to alleviate it. Their efforts took off in the summer of 1932, when tens of thousands of out-of-work World War I veterans and their families marched to Washington, DC to demand early payment of promised service bonuses. Yet as the federal government extended its place in Americans’ daily lives, leaders of some religious institutions feared for their own status. This historical example illustrates how under conditions of political instability, individuals may perceive a sense of control over their uncertain situation and may prioritize tangible courses of action over religious commitment due to the perceived favorability of the outcomes they desire." To determine, then, the conditions under which political instability decreases religiosity, I argue that when individuals face controlled uncertainty, their reliance on religion becomes secondary as alternative solutions with the potential for immediate favorable outcomes take precedence, but random uncertainty results in the increase in religiosity that many might predict. The cases of Tunisia and Egypt offer valuable insights into the dynamics between political instability, tangible actions, and the evolving role of religion under political instability. Case of Tunisia: Controlled Uncertainty In the case of Tunisia, the Arab Spring catalyzed in December 17, 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old street vendor in the impoverished city of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, self-immolated. This came after market inspectors confiscated some of Bouazizi’s wares, claiming that he lacked the necessary permit. Bouazizi’s suicide was the result of desperation rather than symbolizing a political cause, though it was publicly interpreted as an act of protest. Several reward systems were activated after Bouazizi's suicide. Bouazizi was considered as a "hero for Tunisians and the Arab world as a whole" by Tunisian film directors, assumed a martyr by the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) of Tunisia, and named TIME magazine’s person of the year in 2011. The publicized suicide of Bouazizi made many people in similar situations believe that suicide was an appropriate action for them as well. Bouazizi was a university graduate distraught with the inability to financially support his mother and siblings, reflecting the vast majority of Tunisians experiencing soaring rates of unemployment. In 2009, the overall unemployment rate in Tunisia was 13.3%, but 30% among Tunisia's youth, who made up almost a third of the total population. The Tunisian government decreased expenditures from 45% to 29% from the 1970s to the 1990s, lowering the quality of public goods and services. Hence, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, president of Tunisia from 1987 to 2011, along with his family and other elites, created and strengthened the inner circle of cronyism—political elites appropriating economic resources and creating privileges by preventing outsiders. Controlling half the country’s wealth, the enterprises they owned produced 3% of total output and employed only 1% of the labor force. In addition, Ben Ali never allowed genuine political opposition to emerge and elections were manipulated: In 1989, he supposedly garnered 99.3% of the vote; in 1994, 99.9% and five years later, 99.4%. Political opponents — in particular Islamists— were persecuted, tortured or forced into exile. Tunisia's press was censored. According to the theory of suicide proposed by French sociologist Emile Durkheim, Bouazizi's self-immolation would be best categorized as anomic suicide. This type of suicide occurs when individuals experience a chronic state of societal disorganization, where traditional sources of regulation, such as religion and government, fail to provide moral constraints in the face of an unregulated capitalist economy. Anomic suicide is often associated with a sense of disillusionment about the future, leading individuals to see self-infliction as a way out. It's important to note that self-immolation directly contravenes Islamic law, as the Quran prohibits harm to oneself. Therefore, Bouazizi’s act can be viewed as a poignant illustration of the prioritization of social circumstances over religious beliefs. Despite the religious prohibition, Bouazizi saw self-immolation as a desperate means to escape his dire socio-economic situation. This conflict between religious doctrine and the perceived urgency of his socio-economic plight highlights how individuals may prioritize immediate material concerns over religious commitments. After years of severe economic hardship, during which most Tunisians were struggling to survive while President Ben Ali’s family, friends, and allies were getting richer, Bouazizi’s self-immolation marked the tipping point. Tunisians began to protest. Tensions heightened on December 22nd when another young man from Sidi Bouzid climbed up an electricity pylon and electrocuted himself on the cables, saying he was fed up with being unemployed. The new wave of strikes first erupted on December 17th in Sidi Bouzid, and came after the labor unions announced that they would organize peaceful marches to urge the government to improve its performance in development and employment. A few days later, a teenager was killed when police in Sidi Bouzid opened fire on protesters. An interior ministry spokesperson said police had been forced to "shoot in self-defense" from protesters who were setting police cars and buildings ablaze. The Tunisian government had been trying to manage the crisis politically before using force and the Tunisian development minister traveled to Sidi Bouzid to announce a new $10m employment program. The Tunisian government’s concessions—often met with skepticism on its sincerity and implementation—were a response to the resilience and violence of the crisis, showing Tunisians that the government was reacting to their demands rather than solely resorting to violence. This instilled hope in Tunisians regarding the positive trajectory of their protests. Despite protests, the rich were getting richer, the poor were not only getting poorer, but also had no job prospects, no ability to express themselves, and no way of criticizing government policy. The protests that erupted in Sidi Bouzid were spontaneous, yet they were marked by a level of organization and sophistication that appeared grounded in the sheer determination of those who participated in them. Tunisians faced a more costly and risky path due to being the first country to protest, unlike Egyptians who benefited from the momentum generated in Tunisia. The cost of cronyism and corruption to Tunisia is much higher because it also hinders job creation and investment and contributes to social exclusion. The presence of cronyism exacerbates the costs of protest by increasing repression, legal and financial consequences, social stigmatization, and psychological toll for protesters. The fear of retaliation from security forces was high, and protesting carried significant risks, including arrest, torture, and disappearance. For Tunisians, the standard method of expressing dissent has been informally within the party framework, but the masses participate in riots and demonstrations. The first president of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987), carefully appointed members of the political elite and removed them from office in such a way as to prevent anyone from building up a political base to keep factions to a minimum. The Tunisian economy was heavily centralized around the ruling elite and suffered from widespread corruption and cronyism. Economic grievances were a major driver of the Tunisian uprising, and many protesters were motivated by frustrations with unemployment, poverty, and lack of economic opportunities. The economic challenges faced by Tunisians may have increased the perceived costs of protesting, as individuals risked losing their livelihoods or facing economic hardships as a result of participating in protests. In Tunisia, the uprising was driven by a broad-based coalition of activists, students, workers, and ordinary citizens who came together to demand change. Solidarity among protesters helped to mitigate some of the risks associated with protesting by providing emotional support, practical assistance, and collective action. From this, it is clear that Tunisians perceived their uncertainties as resolvable through risky actions, therefore partaking in actions that would immediately relieve their grievances rather than remaining disillusioned with their future, which ultimately decreased their religiosity during this period. On January 13, 2011, Ben Ali appeared on national television and made broad concessions to the opposition, promising not to seek reelection as president when his term would end in 2014. He expressed regret over the deaths of protesters and vowed to order police to stop using live fire except in self-defense. Addressing some of the protesters’ grievances, he said he would reduce food prices and loosen restrictions on Internet use. Ben Ali’s concessions did not satisfy the protesters, who continued to clash with security forces, resulting in several deaths. The next day, a state of emergency was declared, and Tunisian state media reported that the government had been dissolved, Ben Ali fled Tunisia, and that legislative elections would be held in the next six months. Ben Ali’s reign from 1987-2011 had ended and Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi, appointed by Ben Ali in 1999, assumed power. The aftermath of Ben Ali's departure marked a significant moment for Tunisia, as protests persisted despite the regime change. Protesters had gathered in the area to demand that the interim government step down and the current parliament be disbanded. Demonstrators were also asking for suspension of the current constitution and the election of an assembly that can write a new one, as well as organize the transition to democracy. There were daily protests that members of Ben Ali's Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) party were in the new government and thousands of largely peaceful anti-RCD protests emerged.36 After persistent clashes between protesters and armed forces, Ghannouchi announced his resignation particularly following the death of three people in the country's capital, Tunis: “I am resigning today because I am not willing to be a person that takes decisions that could cause casualties," he told reporters Sunday. He also questioned "why a lot of people considered their main target to keep attacking the government, although a lot of its members agreed to join in this critical time." Ghannouchi’s resignation can be seen as a tangible outcome of the protesters' efforts. It signifies that their voices were heard and that their actions had a direct impact on the political landscape. Ghannouchi's acknowledgment of the need to avoid decisions that could cause casualties reflects a recognition of the legitimacy of the protesters' grievances and a commitment to avoiding further violence. Bouazizi's actions were instrumental in differentiating between controlled uncertainty and random uncertainty, providing Tunisians with a tangible catalyst that transformed disillusionment into proactive engagement with the future. Role of Religion Becomes Secondary As people sought to find concrete control over uncertain circumstances amid political instability, their dedication to religious beliefs weakened. Involvement in organized protests, the confrontation of severe repression, and the navigation of severe economic hardships became the focal points of their attention, demoting religious commitment to a secondary position. In 2012, the Pew Research Center surveyed Tunisians and found that though democratic principles were high priorities, as were the economy and security. 92% said that improving the economy ranked as the most important priority while 79% said that it was very important to maintain law and order. Also, people found democratic freedoms more important than religious divisions. This shows that Tunisians found these economic and democratic principles to take precedence over other grievances they faced. In this time period, a perceived resolution for these priority issues was through civil resistance, demonstrations, general strikes, and self-immolations, that were leading to visible outcomes and relieving uncertainty in a way that religion was not. Outside the party system, Tunisians became politically active, especially Tunisian women, who protested the draft constitution, the economy, and the ruling coalition. Within this political context of newly found political liberalizations, similar to Egypt, various religious groups started coming out of the underground in order to take advantage of the political openings. As these political openings were prioritized, trust in religious leaders went down from 38% to 35% between 2012 and 2018 and those who say they are not religious increased from 18% in 2012 to 30% in 2018. Tunisian Muslims that attend mosques at least some of the time decreased from 52% in 2012 to 30% in 2018. Tunisia’s troubled economy was the biggest challenge in 2017. The national unity government took some measures to stimulate growth, but it struggled to implement key reforms. High unemployment, a rising inflation rate, and tax increases plagued Tunisians. In January 2018, protests erupted in more than a dozen cities over price hikes. This further emphasizes the continued prioritization of addressing economic challenges by the Tunisian people. Secularization In Tunisia, the decades of Ben Ali’s secular regime had excluded religion from the public sphere. Its cascading effects have led Tunisia to have notably lower religiosity than other Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries with the proportion of people who said they were not religious increasing from 15% in 2013 to over 30% in 2018. The ousting of Ben Ali created political opportunities for Islamists, yet the secularizing impact of his two-decade-long regime remains a compelling explanation for the decline in religiosity between 2012-2018. Following the dissolution and drafting of a new constitution in October 2011, Tunisia no longer enforced secularism through repression. Surveillance, restriction, and harassment of Islamist activists that were previously practiced by the government ceased during the year. The new draft gave rise to Islamists to fight for power. In the months that followed the 2010-2011 revolution, several hundred imams were replaced, often by violent Islamists who accused the imams of having collaborated with the former Ben Ali regime. By October 2011, the Ministry of Religious Affairs announced that it had lost control of about 400 mosques. 6 The “uncontrolled” classification means that a mosque’s imams were operating without the official authorization of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In Tunisia’s new political landscape, the content of prayer services was also no longer controlled by government authorities, a step many Tunisians approved of and viewed as part of the new liberties acquired through the revolution. In 2014, secular parties edged out Islamists at the polls. In the October parliamentary elections, Nidaa Tounes, a secularist political party, won 85 seats compared to 69 for Ennahda, an Islamist political party. Veteran politician Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi, the head of Nidaa Tounes and a former prime minister, was elected president in December. But turnout was lowest among the young, who ignited the Arab uprisings; among cities, the turnout was lowest in Sidi Bouzid, the birthplace of the uprisings that spread across the Middle East and North Africa. In 2016, Nidaa Tounes, the ruling secular party in Parliament, splintered. Ennahda founder Rachid Ghannouchi declared the Islamist party was abandoning political Islam. Amidst competition between Islamist and secular parties, when asked whether Turkey or Saudi Arabia is a better model for the role of religion in Tunisia’s government, 78% of Tunisians prefer the more secular Turkey, seeing it as a model for religion and politics. While the trends toward secularization during this period seemingly impact individual piety levels, the dominant controlled uncertainty factor holds greater significance, given that secularization has not been exclusive to this period and has prevailed since the era of Ben Ali. Despite the freedom of Islamist parties to enter political life, the government’s loss of control over regulating mosques, and new liberties granted toward religious freedom, levels of non-religiosity still prevailed. Political Islam In contrast to secularization efforts during Tunisia’s political transition, the country simultaneously experienced concerted efforts from Islamists to increase the role of religion in politics. During this period, the presence of political Islam coupled with economic and political insecurities might have led individuals to deviate from religious commitments as they witnessed greedy power grabs from both Islamists and secular parties who employed religion as a political instrument. From January to October 2011, an interim government moved toward reform, recognizing new political parties and disbanding Ben Ali’s party. On October 23, Ennahda, a moderate Islamist party, won the national elections and formed a coalition government with two secular parties. Ennahda first emerged as an Islamist movement in response to repression at the hands of a secularist, authoritarian regime that denied citizens religious freedom and the rights of free expression and association. In 2014, the new constitution incorporated mentions of Islam as the religion and culture of the Tunisian people while also establishing a state role for protecting freedom of religious worship and expression. Ennahda, formerly an Islamist movement, transitioned into a party of "Muslim democrats," distancing itself from the label of "Islamism" due to negative associations with radical extremism. This shift reflects a strategic response to counter the misinterpretation and abuse of Islam by radical groups like ISIS, positioning Ennahda as a moderate political force advocating for democratic principles. Ennahda’s re-labelling as “Muslim democrats” reflects frustration with outsiders not understanding its supposedly true democratic nature which may have resulted in individuals associating their challenges with these religious changes in governance and frustration with religion being politicized. Today, Tunisians are less concerned about the role of religion than about building a governance system that is democratic and inclusive and that meets their aspirations for a better life. However, the interplay between political Islam and religiosity is tied to perceptions of uncertainty. The prevalent economic hardships—regardless of the presence of political Islam—left Tunisians uncertain about the future. In 2011, 78% of Tunisians expressed optimism that the economy would improve to some extent within the following 2-3 years. However, by 2018, this hope had significantly dwindled, with only 33% of Tunisians maintaining confidence in a better economic outlook over the same timeframe. Case of Egypt Egypt stands as a prominent example of a country profoundly affected by the events in Tunisia. The success of the Tunisian Revolution in ousting President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali provided a template for dissent, inspiring Egyptians to rise up against the longstanding rule of President Hosni Mubarak. The images and narratives of Tunisian protesters challenging authoritarianism and demanding change resonated with Egyptians, fueling their own aspirations for political reform and social justice. In Egypt, decades of corruption, police brutality, media censorship, unemployment, and inflation led labor and youth activists, feminists, and individual members of the Muslim Brotherhood to protest. From the occupation of downtown Cairo’s Tahrir Square, to labor strikes, acts of civil disobedience, clashes with armed forces, and others, violence between protestors and the police resulted in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries. The wave of organized protests gained momentum following the oustings of Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi in 2011 and 2013, respectively. These pivotal events demonstrated to Egyptians that mass mobilization could be an effective means of addressing the longstanding issues they had endured. Despite Mubarak's lengthy rule from 1981 until his departure in 2011, previous protests had proven ineffective in leading to his resignation. However, the timely catalyst provided by Tunisia's Revolution ignited a sense of urgency among Egyptians, inspiring them to seize upon the pan-Arabist phenomenon sweeping the region. This newfound determination empowered Egyptians to confront their decades-long grievances head-on. Egyptians, seeking an immediate end to enduring abuse and corruption, embraced large, organized protests despite harsh governmental crackdown and threats of death. Their perception of the uncertainty faced during this period appeared to be remedied by protests and political changes, thereby diminishing the role of religion to a secondary position. The Egyptian case took advantage of the momentum that the Tunisian revolution brought, making it unique to examine the intricate relationship between their resistance and the decline in religious commitment, challenging the notion that religious avenues are the primary recourse during times of political instability. Controlled Uncertainty Egypt has been an authoritarian government since 1952 with periodic revolts and unrest. The causes of the 2011 protests against Mubarak also existed in 1952, when the Free Officers, who led the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, ousted King Farouk. Issues such as inherited power, corruption, under-development, unemployment, and unfair distribution of wealth have persisted as constants in Egyptian life since 1952. Successive Egyptian regimes have systematically used repression to ensure order. The authoritarian barter “bread and security for freedom” has been widely disseminated along with the notion that the country was not yet ready for democracy. Egypt has long grappled with a systemic pattern of human rights abuses and repression embedded in its governance, prompting citizens to attribute their crises directly to the government. While these challenges have persisted since 1952, worsening economic conditions, government corruption, and Mubarak’s rule, coupled with the influence of the Arab Spring ignited by the events in Tunisia, led Egyptians to unite in similar protests in 2011. The momentum from Tunisia became a catalyst, empowering Egyptians to engage in hands-on initiatives challenging Mubarak’s authoritarian government. President Hosni Mubarak's regime was also repressive, but opposition groups had more space for political activism compared to Tunisia, which lacked a traditional history of political dissent. Mubarak’s regime escalated violence against protesters significantly as protests enlarged with the anticipation of Mubarak’s resignation. Pro-Mubarak demonstrators targeted journalists, and, in what became known as the “Battle of the Camel," plainclothes policemen rode into Tahrir Square on camels and horses to attack unarmed protesters. The issuing of laws restricting public assembly allowed security officials to ban protests up to their discretion and were consequently allowed to use indiscriminate force on defying protestors. Egyptians mobilized protests in diverse ways and when they were repressed through laws restricting public assembly or with increasingly violent police responses, organized protests grew larger and more inflamed. Messages were picked out in stones and plastic tea cups, graffiti, newspapers and leaflets, and al-Jazeera's TV cameras which broadcast hours of live footage from the square everyday. When one channel of communication was blocked, people tried another. Mubarak had grown fearful of the protestors’ relentlessness—first pledging to form a new government, then promising not to seek another term in the next elections, and later becoming increasingly defiant about not stepping down—all the while asking protesters to return to normal. Eventually, Mubarak was forced to step down and the Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed leadership of the country on February 11, 2011. Protests still endured; during March and April 2011, SCAF granted a number of concessions to protesters’ demands in an effort to clear the streets of continued demonstrations. Human Rights Abuses Mubarak’s regime initially responded to the protests with brute force and tear gas, beating and arresting protesters. The regime responded to later increases in protest mobilization by shutting down internet service and mobile phone text messages, replacing regular police forces with the military, and imposing a curfew. This exemplifies a cycle of human rights abuses that not only heightened violent responses but also fueled additional protests, as Egyptians became increasingly outraged. Egyptians faced constant repression and abuse for decades under Mubarak’s rule, and used religious commitment as a coping mechanism before Tunisia catalyzed the Arab Spring, bringing newfound hope that Egyptians could better their circumstances. Since 2013, the military and security-led regime has reinstated its control over society and citizens with an iron fist, curtailing freedom of information and banning freedom of expression. Peaceful political participation and civil society activism, which were the pillars of the January uprising, have been de facto outlawed by the adoption of an arsenal of undemocratically spirited and restrictive laws. Protesting was costly and these laws banning public assembly made it much more risky for Egyptians to participate in protests, but the momentum of the revolution had assured individuals that there would be large turnouts, therefore bolstering their confidence in protesting as a means to confront the military and security-led regime. Egyptians, fueled by the momentum of their revolution and triggered by the ousting of Mubarak and Morsi, found empowerment in protesting. The logical nature of their efforts heightened hope for the future, as each overthrow or victory seemed to validate their path to stability. The move against Morsi deepened the political schism. Millions of Egyptians had taken to the streets against Morsi, but large numbers also protested the ousting of Morsi. A crackdown by security forces killed hundreds and Egypt declared a state of emergency. The emergency measures allowed security forces to detain people indefinitely for virtually any reason. They also granted broad powers to restrict public gatherings and media freedom. Gallup classifies respondents as thriving, struggling, or suffering, according to how they rate their current and future lives on a ladder scale numbered from 0 to 10 based on the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale. Egyptians gave their lives some of the worst ratings they ever have in the weeks leading up to former President Mohamed Morsi's removal from office. The 34% of Egyptians who rated their lives poorly enough to be considered suffering in June was up from 23% in January. Fewer than one in 10 rated their lives positively enough to be considered thriving. Role of Religion Becomes Secondary Fridays frequently became “days of rage” in Egypt and elsewhere because of the convenience of organizing would-be protesters during Friday prayers. Likewise, mosques themselves are often said to have served as organizational hubs for protest. Mosques functioned as a locus of anti-government agitation and logistical centers of preparation for demonstrations. While it may seem that protest activities at mosques contributed to an apparent increase in mosque attendance, thus suggesting elevated overall religious commitment, these places of worship primarily assumed roles as organizational centers during the peak of the protests, prioritizing logistics over prayer and religious services. Although, of course, mosques and Friday services were still attended for customary reasons, the dual functionality of the mosque introduced secular competition as highlighted earlier in the Theory section. Individuals are confronted with the dilemma of choosing between prayer and protest. Protest is a costly behavior that becomes progressively less risky as the number of participants increases. Hence, overall Mosque participation during the height of mass protests between the overthrow of Mubarak in 2011 to the beginning of El-Sisi’s presidency in 2014, declined. Prior to the Arab Spring, strength in religious beliefs were at high levels: the belief that things would be better if there were more people with strong religious beliefs decreased from 89.8% in 2005 to 83.4% in 2013. Additionally, the percentage of individuals with the belief that religious faith is an important quality in children decreased from 47.1% in 2005 to 27.7% in 2013. Muslims who say they attend the mosque at least some of the time decreased from around 85% in 2012-2014 to 75% in 2018-2019. Secularization In Egypt, as the regime experienced waves of regime changes and upheavals, the period between 2012-2016 witnessed efforts toward constitutional reform emphasizing the protection of civil liberties, the separation of powers, and the establishment of a democratic system of government. While Islam remained the state religion, the constitution also guaranteed freedom of religion and prohibited discrimination based on religion. The constitutional assembly was almost entirely composed of Islamists (Muslim Brothers, Salafis, and independent Islamists). Dozens of articles addressed individual rights and liberties of Egyptian citizens, which was more than the number of articles mentioning Islam. By enshrining these goals in the constitution, the government was held accountable, making failure to fulfill its constitutional obligations not just an act of inefficiency but anti-constitutional. Examples include Article 61, which demands to eradicate illiteracy within ten years; Article 66, which requires the state to provide opportunities for sports and physical exercise; and Article 184, which instructs the state to assimilate living standards across the country. While Islamist groups participated in the drafting of the constitution, the outcome reflected a broader commitment to democratic principles and social reforms driven by the demands of the people. In 2013, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi ousted Morsi and campaigned for the presidency on an anti-Islamist platform. He deemed the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, imposing restrictions on their operations and political activities. Liberals called the Brotherhood’s vision for Egypt “totally contradictory with the Egyptian national character,” which they argued respected pluralism of religion and the separation of religion and politics. The banning of the Muslim Brotherhood has likely contributed to the loss of faith in Islamist parties. El-Sisi also claimed that ‘the religious discourse in the Islamic World has lost the values of humanity in Islam’ and rejected the idea of an Islamic state. When he won the presidency in 2014, many moderate Muslims supported El-Sisi because he had taken a clear stand against Islamist radicalism and expressed a genuine desire to support a peaceful understanding of Islam. And in 2018, when El-Sisi ran again, he was re-elected with 97 percent of the vote, although the turnout was low and he faced virtually no competition. The crackdown against human rights defenders and independent rights organizations have made effective monitoring of the elections extremely difficult, especially with the number of organizations that were granted permission to monitor the elections being 44 percent fewer than in the last presidential election in 2014. This has resulted in elections facing criticism for not meeting the standards of a free and fair democratic process. This can also suggest that through negative partisanship, or the phenomenon of individuals forming their political opinions based on their opposition to certain individuals or parties, people viewed El-Sisi as either the best among limited options or endorsed his secularization efforts. Political Islam When governments weaponize a religion that the majority of their populations affiliate with, it is reasonable to link political Islam and individual piety to assert that piety levels and overall religiosity may decrease. This is a competitive argument because perceptions of Islam are directly shaped by how their governments implement Islamic laws, often at the expense of neglecting the needs of the people. Individuals are increasingly witnessing religion being wielded as a political tool. On one hand, they are promised welfare services in the name of Islam, while on the other hand, their repression is justified through the manipulation of Islamic texts. While El-Sisi initially presented himself as anti-Islamist, appearing on stage with the Coptic Pope, the Sheikh of Al-Azhar (the country's most esteemed institution of Islamic learning), and Galal al-Murra, a prominent Salafist, following the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, he privately holds conservative Islamic views. In A 2006 paper that Sisi wrote for the U.S. Army War College, he argued that democracy in the Middle East could only be of an Islamic nature, and that Islam provides the intellectual framework for his political beliefs. In addition, in 2011, when crowds protested against the military for imposing “virginity tests” on female protesters, Sisi declared that it was his responsibility to “decide if [protesters] were honorable.” However, the fluctuating influences of political Islam in Egypt between 2012-2018 indicate that it is not a strong enough condition on its own for political instability to decrease religiosity. Even the most liberal Egyptian party in 2012, the Free Egyptians Party, publicly defended a constitutional clause making the principles of Sharia the source of legislation. Even when the dominant strategy of the incumbent government was to combat political Islam—as has been the case since July 2013—the formal discourse of President El-Sisi included frequent mentions of the Qur'an and Hadith.33 The Muslim Brotherhood witnessed a consistent rise in support from July 2011 to February 2012 at 63%, followed by a sharp decline in April 2012 to 42%. Prior to the Brotherhood’s rise to power, many believed that its political inclusion would lead to its democratization and moderation. Throughout the eighteen days of demonstrations in January and February 2011 that toppled Mubarak, Brotherhood leaders were aware that the protests were not dominated by Islamist ideas but rather oriented toward the broad goals of freedom and social justice. As a result, Brotherhood leaders were deliberate in their strategies to appeal to voters by not expressing their Islamist views too overtly. This deception was caught on by Egyptians. Nevertheless, between 2011 and 2013, the old state chose to cooperate with Islamists, including the Brotherhood, to neutralize the revolutionary mood in the country. After coming to power, the Brotherhood quickly lost support among the main recipients of its social welfare network: the poor. The Brotherhood’s relationship with the poor was entirely clientelist and was concerned exclusively with creating an electoral base as opposed to developing a more substantive ideological or political relationship. It preferred to reproduce poverty as long as it translated into welfare recipients and, by extension, loyal voters. However, the strength of the argument that the presence of political Islam decreases religiosity diminishes when considering the current scenario, where political Islam exerts even more influence, and yet, religiosity has increased. This discrepancy suggests that the dynamics between political Islam and religiosity are subject to evolving perceptions of uncertainty. During the height of the revolution, Egyptians may have perceived their uncertainties about the future differently, driven by a sense of optimism and the belief in activism. In contrast, the present disillusionment with uncertainties about the future may be contributing to an enhanced role of religion in their lives. The increased religiosity could be a response to the perceived inadequacy of political solutions to address current challenges, prompting individuals to turn to religion as a source of guidance in times of persistent uncertainty. Conclusion I have posited that the conditions of political instability that decrease religiosity are controlled uncertainty and the secondary role of religion. When individuals are presented with concrete solutions to address challenges they attribute to their political circumstances, these solutions will assume greater significance than religious commitment. And when individuals lack access to these tangible solutions and experience disillusionment about the future, religious commitment tends to increase. The pivotal factor in this dynamic is individuals' perception of the future, and this analysis delved into how these perceptions manifested and endured during periods of political instability. Consequently, the outcome is a demotion of religion to a secondary role in individuals' lives, outcompeted by favorable solutions that emerge from the uncertainties they face. It's noteworthy that Egypt has faced challenges since the Mubarak regime, raising concerns about the possibility of a new Arab Spring. Despite the ongoing deterioration of human rights conditions, the intensity that characterized the Arab Spring has diminished. Reflecting on the revolution has yielded diverse opinions, with some viewing it as a success while others perceiving it as a failure. Although repression in Egypt may arguably be more severe today, the period between 2011 and 2016 marked a distinct phase. The ongoing debates surrounding the success or failure of the initial Arab Spring make it seem improbable for a similar movement to occur. Despite the immediate changes following the revolution, both Egypt and Tunisia continue to grapple with longstanding grievances. Tunisia, in particular, is confronted with economic challenges, with approximately 6,000 Tunisians joining ISIS, marking the highest per capita rate globally. Tunisians became disillusioned with post-revolution politics, especially well-educated youths, who experienced unemployment at extremely high rates. Despite the gradual political progress seen over the past seven years, economic rewards have yet to emerge, spurring some to radicalize. Some remaining questions that emerge are: Do individuals revert to heightened religious commitment after resolving political instability, or does the influence of tangible solutions have a lasting impact on their religious commitment? 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Alexa Stanger Happening on “Polished Society”: Towards a Theory of Progress and Corruption in the writings of Adam Ferguson and David Hume Alexa Stanger As two of the most important philosophical thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume and Adam Ferguson wrote formative texts in the philosophical discourse of modernity. Witnessing the emergence of commercial society and constitutional governments, both thinkers saw the classical republican model of politics, with its teleological bent and emphasis on cultivating the proper function of humans, as obsolete in the context of the commercial world. Neither civic virtue nor a pursuit of the proper function of humanity could explain the emergence of modern society—nor could they explain how commercial society might progress (1). In a sharp contrast to ancient philosophy, Hume and Ferguson realized the importance of locating their philosophy within a historical context. Even if the chief role of history is to serve as a record of the virtues or practices that have historically proved to be beneficial, Hume and Ferguson’s application of history provides a new prism through which people’s judgement might be filtered, introducing the space for a theory of progress. Indeed, the notion of humanity’s ability to progress, if not a belief in the inevitability of progress itself, is integral to both writers and to Enlightenment thought: “polished society,” where the full flourishing of the arts and sciences might be realised, was the logical progression of human society from its “rude” origins (2). The newfound importance ascribed to wealth, manners, and freedom meant that the ancient formulations of moral and civic virtue, such as those found in Plato’s writings, had to be re-evaluated in the context of the modern state. Nevertheless, Ferguson retains some notion of Classical teleology in his republicanism, a point where he diverges from Hume, in what Fania Oz-Salzberger describes as a “theory of commercial modernity with classical-republican linch- pins” (3). Where Hume has endless praise for the merits of modern society, Ferguson holds significant reservations. Hume’s vision of progress contains both a moral and a material character whereas Ferguson fears a deep tension between these two forces. Often neglected in Hume’s shadow, Ferguson is cast as the pessimistic commentator on bourgeois society, “a bemused, perplexed and rather worried observer of the kind of Civil Society which he sees emerging” (4). He sees the dark underside of commercial society that, whilst demonstrating how society has progressed from its primitive predecessors, might also plant the seeds of its corruption. In reading these two philosophers alongside one another, we might come to a better understanding of how the same philosophical current creates room for a theory of progress, a shining optimism in the path that industrialisation laid before human society, whilst retaining a sober skepticism of what might lie beneath the polish. An inquiry into Hume’s concept of human nature provides the basis for under- standing how polished society might arise and how this society might subsequently progress. His methodology thus deftly engages a set of timeless observations, namely those pertaining to human nature, within the context of humankind’s historical development. Today, “polished society” might be understood as a narrow, elitist notion of the values society should nurture, though in the Scottish Enlightenment this term referred to qualities of “polish” as an indispensable quality of civilized life and the foundation for progress in all aspects of society, not limited to politics but extending into art, religion, even the built environment. Hume famously declared that “reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions,” arguing that in spurring an agent to act, the feelings the action provokes surpass any rational analysis of outcomes (5). However, Hume arguably overstates his point: reason is not entirely removed from the equation when people assess whether or not to act. In fact, there is a significant level of rational exercise at work in the self-reflective process where people evaluate the sentiments attached to a certain action—an exercise introduced in Hume’s philosophy by his concept of justice. It is “the sense of virtue [...] deriv’d from reason, ” that facilitates a self-reflective process that corrects people’s natural near-sightedness (where the “strongest attention is confin’d to [oneself]”) in the interests of longer-term societal preservation (6). Hume thus strikes a necessary balance between rationality and sentiment in informing how a people have tempered their passion-directed actions as a result of living in society (7). More pertinent to an understanding of progress in Hume’s philosophy is his notion of humankind as fundamentally self-interested yet partially benevolent. Hume dismisses the Hobbesian state of nature as pure fiction. As Hume conceives the individual as being primarily directed by sentiment, the notion of human character as fundamentally sympathetic arises. The Humean individual is depicted as standing at the hub of a network of social relationships, and it is through assessment of how one’s action might not only be received by the individual themselves, but also by those around them that leads to moral sympathy in Hume’s formulation. This sympathetic construction of human nature gives rise to another concept in Hume’s philosophy: the “partial benevolence” of humanity (8). Hume sees self-interest, albeit attuned to how this self-interest might complement the broader interests of society, as the chief director of human action: “this avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society” (9). Although he indicates here how this self-interest might initially appear destructive and all-consuming, the consideration of the interests of “nearest friends” expands self-interest beyond the purely selfish. Unselfish self-interest is possible; though self-interest begins with an individual’s attention on their personal needs, awareness of the interests of close friends tempers this selfishness. The balancing of myopic focus on the self with the interests of an individual’s associates foreshadows the idea of partial benevolence, where a concern for the interests of one’s associates pulls at humankind’s naturally sympathetic imagination and shapes how closely one chooses to follow their self-interest. Partial benevolence becomes a check for this insatiability, channelling it into a useful form that motivates individuals to engage in an active life in order to satisfy their appetites. As people find a middle ground between self-interest and its blind pursuit, they make space for progress in the realm of polished society, be that commerce or the arts, whilst also solidifying the “bands of affection” that are necessary to the preservation of society. Consequently, these self-interested bands of affection might actually serve the public interest in the long-term through ensuring that an individual remains in society but also set the wheels of progress in motion. Similar to Hume, Ferguson also recognizes self-interest as a fundamental characteristic of human nature and emphasises the associational aspect of polished society, whereby humans inevitably interact and largely cooperate with one an- other in order to live. It is the “motive of interest” that “animate[s] the pursuits, or direct[s] the measures, of ordinary men” (10). Indeed, it is this associational tendency of humanity that Ferguson fears commercial society, overrun with the vicious effects of capitalism, will ultimately undermine. However, this notion of association—that a human is influenced by the relations he draws between himself and their fellow person—is extended to include not only interpersonal relations but also intergenerational and even intergovernmental ones: “man proceed[s] from one form of government to another, by easy transitions [...] the seeds of every form are lodged in human nature” (11). It is perfectly natural that one form of human society should build upon its predecessors’ society, conveying a linear progression of history in Ferguson’s political thought. The tendency of governments and human associations to build upon one another is a product of what Ferguson characterises as the tendency of “nations [to] stumble upon establishments” (12). He claims that it is not in human nature to “foresee” but rather to “know by experience” precisely what form of government might arise (13). Ferguson argues that humans learn from history what actions are most conducive to a stable society, enabling them to dispense with the errors of the past and thus embark on the gradual advancement of society: one generation builds on another. In this way, the inevitability of progress, even if this does not bar the possibility of regress, is ingrained in Ferguson’s philosophy through his view of history as a linear process. In fact, one might argue that what Ferguson sees as the failure of primitive societies is a prerequisite for his philosophy on the emergence of polished society. In his Essay on the History of Civil Society, Ferguson writes “Nations, which in later periods of their history became eminent for civil wisdom and justice, had, perhaps, in a former age, paroxysms of lawless disorder [...] The very policy by which they arrived at their degree of national felicity, was devised as a remedy for outrageous abuse” (14). Ferguson shows that in such national development, there was an intentional attempt on the part of their lawmakers to restructure their society in view of redressing past failings and avoiding their repetition. It is through understanding past mistakes, inquiring into why nations have failed, that humans might work toward progress. It is worth not- ing that Ferguson does not see history as a grand narrative documenting humans as passive, but sees history as directly driven by human action: “the attainment of one end is but the beginning of a new pursuit” (15). History is thus in part driven by humans’ insatiable self-interest, which requires them to be endlessly engaged in the workings of society, giving them an investment in their society that will be conducive to its progression. The social nature of human character, the fact that one is born into society and actively creates and participates in society’s custom, helps us understand the role of custom in Hume’s philosophy, which can then be applied to a theory of progress. Hume makes clear the importance of custom in explaining why certain values have been retained in human association and how these values shape our moral judgement: “each century has its peculiar mode in conducting business; and men, guided more by custom than by reason, follow, without inquiry, the manners which are prevalent in their own time” (16). The crucial role of custom in shaping human action becomes intuitive when connected to Hume’s concept of the natural sociability of humankind and his construction of human society. Furthermore, Hume’s understanding of custom helps resolve a potential logical break in his philosophy regarding the space for progress. If Hume’s philosophy emphasises the importance of sentiment, with all its changeability in directing human action and morality, one might question how progression can arise, when this notion implies a degree of consistency and gradual change. It is the role of sentiment in conjunction with history that turns these inconsistent actions of human nature into a pattern of action that we name custom. This custom, in turn, directs future human action while remaining a product of what was originally deemed moral by human sentiment: “habit soon consolidates what other principles of human nature had imperfectly founded,” and in this way history acts as a stabilising force (17). Although both Hume and Ferguson historicize human nature, they do not go so far as Hegel’s dialectic, where human nature itself is altered by human action in the unfolding of history and the synthesis of conflicting human interactions (18). In fact, Hume holds a rather conservative view of the influence of history on human action, stating that history’s “chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature” (19). This statement is potentially misleading if the “constancy” of human nature is misinterpreted as the predictability of human action: history does not serve only to erode difference and show the universal properties of human nature but also shows how these properties arose by accident but were retained as a result of their demonstrated usefulness in practice. In this conception of a human nature informed by historical events, Alix Cohen observes a malleable element of human judgement that overlays the selfish quality of Hume’s formulation of human nature, which is “influenced by society and political structures” (20). In fact, Hume emphasises the inconstancy of human nature: “‘tis difficult for the mind, when actuated by any passion, to confine itself to that passion alone, without any change or variation. Human nature is too inconstant to admit of any such regularity. Changeableness is essential to it” (21). It is precisely this inconstancy in human nature, unable to predict the workings of the imagination, that allows for history to enter onto the scene. By replacing reason with sentiment as the primary motivator for human action, Hume renders humankind susceptible to the influence of convention in directing one’s actions, because people realise that their actions have consequences and can predict how their actions might be received. This is not to say that a person becomes subject to, nor even the “slave of” passions, but rather that in critical self-reflection of how to direct their actions, the person is profoundly influenced by the passions that might arise from society’s regard for their actions (22). This is the necessary effect of Hume’s formulation of society as a network of relations and exposes a dynamism in human nature conducive to progress. Having demonstrated how both Ferguson and Hume conceive of humans as naturally social, influenced in their actions by custom and the “lessons of history,” one might now consider where a theory of progress fits into their philosophies. It has been established that both thinkers regarded modern, commercial society as the most artistically and technologically advanced form of society, where the arts and sciences flourish as never before (23). Furthermore, in preserving the beneficial consequences of human action as custom, the role of history makes room for the idea that commercial society tends toward building on such historical principles for overall betterment. Hume’s notion of justice as the safeguarding of property rights connects political stability with commercial activity: commercial activity, along with humankind’s naturally self-interested disposition, compels people to establish as well as to adhere to the rules of justice so that they might enjoy the fruits of a collective labour. In this way, the progress of political society goes hand in hand with the progress of economic thought: “polished society,” therefore, manifests both civic and commercial advancement. Furthermore, Hume posits leading an active life as almost part of human nature, suggesting that economic progress is the logical corollary of his formulation of humanity; he claims that it is not only the love of the fruit of labour but also the occupation itself that produces pleasure on pursuing activity as opposed to idleness (24). It is this dual satisfaction that such labour produces, including a sentimental element elevated above a purely material interest, that demonstrates how human nature might guide societal progress. Work invigorates the mind such that humankind has a selfish interest in seeing industry and the arts flourish; a person’s natural predisposition towards activity and commitment to their work thereby necessarily entails an aggregate progress. In considering the general progress of society, the notion of moral progress (or at least the evolution of tastes) also plays a constitutive role. In commercial society, Hume argues that “the possessor has also a secondary satisfaction in riches arising from the love and esteem he acquires by them” (25). The love of this secondary satisfaction gives rise to the potentially destructive human greed in commercial society that Ferguson so feared, but it nonetheless provides an impetus for humans to engage in commercial activity, such as trade and manufacturing. These secondary satisfactions deriving from said “love and esteem” (sentiments connected to a judgement of character and reputation) demonstrate how morality might also play a role in an assessment of economic progress. This sympathetic character of man- kind gives rise to these feelings of love and esteem, which are innately associated with the acquisition of wealth and status. In this way, it might be expected that the progression of morals, or at least an evolution of tastes, accompanies or even acts as a precondition for economic progress. However, an evolution of tastes does not necessarily constitute an evolution of morality in itself and Hume is noticeably conservative in his discussion of humankind’s capacity to attain “improvement of judgement.” He states that people “cannot change their natures [...] all they can do is to change their situation,” thus implying that moral advancement is not a consequence of societal progress, at least in the form of industrialisation or greater commercialisation (26). For better or worse, in his construction of moral sentiment as a reflexive phenomenon, Hume sees the cultivation of moral sentiment as secondary to the progress of economics, arts and even politics. Conditioned by custom and the perceptions that an individual holds of his fellow people, moral sentiment cannot actively determine progress but rather is shaped by it. Indeed, it is at this juncture that Ferguson comes into most direct conflict with Hume’s philosophy, as he resoundingly argues that moral progress is not a necessary consequence of societal progress. In fact, he argues that even in polished society, human nature is fundamentally unchanged, although such change would guard against its corruptive tendencies, such as greed: “there have been very few examples of states, who have, by arts or policy, improved the original dispositions of human nature, or endeavoured, by wise and effectual precautions, to prevent its corruption” (27). He verbosely writes of the destructive effects of commercial society, exposing people to the pursuit of wealth within the new commercial machinery of modernity without regard to their actions’ broader societal impacts. The “continued subdivision of the mechanical arts” in the progress of commerce heralds the emergence of an atomised society, where “the sources of wealth are laid open” and humankind, “ignorant of all human affairs [...] may contribute to the preservation and enlargement of their commonwealth, without making its interest an object of their regard or attention” (28). This introduces the notion that commercial society is the crucible where progress gains momentum but also paradoxically creates the corruptive forces that cause its decline: “The mighty engine which we suppose to have formed society, only tends to set its members at variance, or to continue their intercourse after the bands of affection are broken” (29). Ferguson argues that it is only humanity’s natural interest in self-preservation that, with re- flection and foresight, might lead humanity to temper their pursuit of gain so as to mitigate the total destruction of society. It is when these interests stray too far from national interest that society is rendered vulnerable, a risk that Ferguson sees as heightened in commercial society. However, where this interest takes the form of “enlightened interest,” humankind’s superior nature is capable of moderating this raw self-interest to orient it towards achieving something more elevated, namely the “ambition or the desire of something higher than is possessed at present” (30). Introducing an almost normative element to the object of natural self-interest, Ferguson’s philosophy draws closer to his classical predecessors and opens up a space for progress. Ferguson seems to believe that ambition, which might be thought of as the commercial variant of Aristotle’s drive for the proper function of humans, drives progress in society. However, there is undoubtedly a dark side to this ambition, which must be modulated. In order to protect society from unfettered ambition, Ferguson draws further on a quasi-teleological argument. Ferguson locates the seeds of corruption in humankind’s tendency to value material gain—either for the gain itself or the notions of esteem associated with the possession of great wealth—above other virtues more aligned with the public interest. The danger of polished society is this redefinition of virtue along commercial lines: the transferral of “the idea of perfection from the character to the equipage,” such that a pursuit of “virtue” leads to the desire to dominate one’s fellow citizen, subjugating the public interest to the private (31). Although this change in the concept of virtue is deeply troubling for Ferguson, he nevertheless admits that the drive towards this new “perfection of equipage” is a powerful incentive for people to engage in politics, stating that “the desires of preferment and profit in the breast of the citizen, are the motives from which he is excited to enter on public affairs” (32). This introduces a contra- diction in Ferguson’s work. His solution for retrieving bourgeois society from a cycle of progress and decline is to encourage “active political citizenry” among the populace, preventing the spirit of “servility,” which ironically accompanies the rise of industry, from also allowing the rise of tyranny (33). This argument for active political engagement has clear Aristotelian undertones, which become even more explicit in Ferguson’s solution for commercial corruption. In his view, the hope for bourgeois society lies in active political participation, ideally by the individual who might orient their actions to the public interest. In doing so, Ferguson believes the individual might “educate” the lower classes through leading by example and demonstrating how civic virtue might be combined with power and wealth. Such a politician is necessary for preventing public life from being perceived as “a scene for the gratification of mere vanity, avarice, and ambition” instead “furnishing the best opportunity for a just and a happy engagement of the mind and the heart” (34). However, if people enter politics out of purely ambitious motives (themselves the products of polished society’s new idea of perfection) can this ideal politician exist in reality? It is not ambition itself that causes problems, but how the object of this ambition might conflict with the responsibilities of public office. Ferguson makes some attempt to resolve this tension in proposing a cyclical progress of society, though this is also potentially at odds with his linear notion of history, writing that “when human nature appears in the utmost state of corruption, it has actually begun to reform” (35). Although Hume does not fear the corruption and decline of commercial society as Ferguson does, Hume’s theory of justice indicates a conservative view of the extent to which society might progress, particularly in the realm of political innovation. Where Ferguson casts conflict as a means through which political society might develop, stating that “the virtues of men have shone most during their struggles,” Hume strongly guards against rebellion except in the most desperate case (36). In order to prevent a habit of disobedience from arising, Hume argues that rebellion should only be “the last refuge [...] when the public is in the highest danger from violence and tyranny” (37). Since resistance may only be countenanced in the most dire situations, Hume appears to discourage political innovation, at least where it risks rebellion. Recalling how political progress and economic progress appear to go hand in hand in his philosophy, one might wonder whether he foresees a limit on societal progress. In the interests of preserving stability, Hume even discourages political innovation on the part of the wise individual: to “try experiments merely upon the credit of supposed argument and philosophy, can never be the part of a wise magistrate, who will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of age”—he will cater towards societal consensus (38). In this way, individual action is circumscribed, revealing a disconnect between progress at the individual and societal levels, even questioning the ability of the “wise” individual to drive societal progress. One might wonder what the benefits of moral improvement are if the finest person must cater to the most vulgar elements of society. Hume’s philosophy certainly allows for such moral progress but perhaps only to a point, which he regards as the commercialised bourgeois society that he found himself living in and has endless praise for (39). It is almost impossible to separate human nature, morality, and the role of his- tory from Hume’s and Ferguson’s theories of progress. Humankind’s historical context and indeed the level of refinement of the society that humans live in determines the customs that will shape their moral judgement. Being fundamentally self-interested and motivated by sentiment, it follows that people’s actions are directly influenced by the level of civilization manifest in their surroundings. One might worry that basing the promise of societal progress on the power of humankind’s sympathetic nature to direct their actions towards a public interest is inherently unstable, given the inconstancy of their passions. However, it is possible that an attempt to correct this inconstancy would be fruitless considering how societal progress changes what humanity considers virtuous or part of the pub- lic interest. In fact, Oz-Salzberger writes that “wealth, in the modern European state, could no longer be opposed to virtue; ‘virtue’ itself was being transformed into a civil rather than civic, moral framework” (40). It is this transformation of the notion of virtue, produced by commercial society, that Ferguson fears will lead to corruption, both on a moral and societal level. What is perhaps most innovative to the theory of progress that evolves in both Ferguson’s and Hume’s writings is the role of history. In their philosophies, history does not provide a blueprint for how society must progress nor is it deterministic in how the interactions of human societies might grease the wheels of history towards a more polished, liberated end. Rather, history is useful as a sociological instrument for demonstrating how beneficial practices that humans have “stumbled upon” come to be a part of their nature, without fundamentally changing their character. History does not determine morality nor human identity as such but rather provides an extra layer for understanding how human judgement has evolved and why certain customs have gained such power. In fact, history might safeguard societal progress against decline through preserving political wisdom that has been derived from history, encouraging society to learn from humanity’s past successes and errors. As both authors were writing in response to such historical moments as the English Civil War, it would be almost illogical to dismiss history’s role in informing their ideas of progress and corruption, especially when so much of what they wrote was being informed by the lessons of these historical moments—practical manifestations of how people’s actions might be shaped by history. Endnotes 1 See Christopher J. Berry’s The Idea of Commercial Society in the Scottish Enlightenment for a more in-depth analysis of how Scottish Enlightenment thinkers understood “commercial society”, a society that is neither polity nor clan but contains governments and institutions systematic in their division of labor. 2 John Varty’s essay elaborates on how Ferguson, Hume and other thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment formulated this idea of society’s progression from ‘primitive’ or ‘rude’ society’ to ‘civilized’ or ‘polished’ society. See John Varty, “Civic or Commercial? Adam Ferguson’s Concept of Civil Society,” Democratization 4, no. 1 (Spring 1997). 3 Fania Oz-Salzberger, “The Political Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment, edited by Alexander Broadie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),168. 4 Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals , (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995), 62. 5 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature . Ed. L.A. Selby-Biggs, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 415. 6 Hume, Treatise , 496 and 488. 7 David Miller describes this balance between the purely rational and the purely sentimental in the formulation of moral judgements in Hume’s philosophy as ‘mitigated scepticism’ (David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 41.). 8 David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology , 107. 9 Hume, Treatise , 491-2. 10 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 132. 11 Ferguson, Essay , 120. 12 Ibid, 119. 13 Ibid, 120. 14 Ibid, 230. 15 Ferguson, Essay , 205. 16 From Hume’s History of England , cited in Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p. 103. 17 David Hume, “Of the Origin of Government,” Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, edited by E. F. Miller, (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), 39. 18 Hume states that ‘all plans of government, which suppose great reformation in the manners of mankind, are plainly imaginary,’ (“Idea of A Perfect Commonwealth”, Essays, p. 514). By contrast, Hegel sees human nature as contextual and integrally social. For Hegel, the human mind is “a living unity or system of processes”, and, most importantly, is “world-historical”. Stating that “man is what he does”, Hegel argues that human nature is inherently linked to human action. For more reading on Hegel’s dialectic and his understanding of human nature, see Chrisopher J. Berry, Hume, Hegel and Human Nature (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1982). in particular 129-146. 19 From Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , cited in Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, 102. 20 Alix Cohen, “The Notion of Moral Progress in Hume’s Philosophy: Does Hume Have a Theory of Moral Progress?”, Hume Studies, 26, no. 1 (April 2000), 110. 21 Hume, Treatise , 283. 22 Ibid, 415. 23 Miller, Philosophy and Ideology , 124. 24 Hume discusses this in “Of Refinement in the Arts,” Essays. 25 Hume, Treatise . 26 Hume, Treatise , 537. 27 Ferguson, Essay , 195. 28 Ibid, 173. The division of labour, rather than being a form of justice in its Classical formulation, allows for the pursuit of self-interest that does not necessarily contribute to the overall harmony of society. Thus, although such specialisation might enable a general progress in mechanical and commercial arts as each individual devotes. themselves, albeit out of self-interested motives, towards advancing their field of expertise, it also leads to the weakening of an individual’s allegiance to the wellbeing of his society as a whole. This effect is also bolstered by man’s natural tendency to subjugate long-term consequences in the view of short-term gain. 29 Ferguson cited in John Varty, “Civic or Commercial? Adam Ferguson’s Concept of Civil Society,” Democratization 4, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 35. 30 From Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals , cited in Lisa Hill, “Adam Ferguson and the Paradox of Progress and Decline,” History of Political Thought, vol. 18, no. 4 (Winter 1997), 679. 31 Ferguson, Essay , 239. 32 Ibid, 245. Indeed, Ferguson argues that ignoring this fact is a corruption in itself: ‘the pretended moderation assumed by the higher orders of men, has a fatal effect in the state.’ (Essay, 245). 33 Hill, “Adam Ferguson and the Paradox of Progress and Decline,” 681. 34 Ferguson, Essay , 244. 35 Ibid, 278-9. 36 Ibid, 196. 37 Hume, “Of Passive Obedience,” Essays, 490. 38 Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” Essays, 512. 39 Hume indicates what this necessary balance might look like: ‘Some innovations must necessarily have place in every human institution; and it is happy where the enlightened genius of the age give these a direction to the side of reason, liberty, and justice: but violent innovations no individual is entitled to make. (“Of the Original Contract,” Essays, 477). 40 Oz-Salzberger, “The Political Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment,” 169. Bibliography Berry, Christopher J. “Sociality and Socialisation.” In The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment , edited by Alexander Broadie, 243-57. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Hume, Hegel and Human Nature. Dordrecht: Springer, Netherlands, 1982. The Idea of Commercial Society in the Scottish Enlightenment. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014. Cohen, Alix. “The Notion of Moral Progress in Hume’s Philosophy: Does Hume Have a Theory of Moral Progress?”, Hume Studies 26, no. 1 (April, 2000) 109-128. Ferguson, Adam. An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Gellner, Ernest. Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995. Hill, Lisa. “Adam Ferguson and the Paradox of Progress and Decline,” History of Political Thought , 18, no. 4 (Winter 1997) 677-706. Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature . Ed. L.A. Selby-Biggs. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Hume, David. Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, edited by E. F. Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985. Kalyvas, Andreas and Katznelson, Ira. “Adam Ferguson Returns: Liberalism through a Glass Darkly,” Political Theory 26, no. 2 (April 1998) 173-197. Miller, David. Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Oz-Salzberger, Fania. “The Political Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment.” In The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment, edited by Alexander Broadie, 157-77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pittock, Murray G. H. “Historiography.” In The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment , edited by Alexander Broadie, 258-79. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Varty, John. “Civic or Commercial? Adam Ferguson’s Concept of Civil Society,” Democratization , 4, no. 1 (Spring 1997) 29-48. Previous Next

Does Social Media Strategy Help Politicians Stay in Power? Comparing the Cases of Modi and Bolsonaro Wendy Wang Author Aimee Zheng Kate Tobin Editors Introduction While social media was initially touted as a force for good, such as its use during the Arab Spring’s pro-democracy protests in 2011, recently, major platforms have faced criticism for failing to sufficiently combat political disinformation and election interference. After all, one of the major controversies during the 2016 American presidential elections was the revelation of Russian meddling attempts on social media. Therefore, this paper will investigate the dynamics between social media strategies and political success, while also examining its larger effects on public discourse, voters, and political communication. It seeks to understand how leaders employ the digital sphere to gain and remain in power, with a focus specifically on populist leaders in semi-democratic states, namely Narendra Modi in India and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. The relative similarity of the regimes in which Modi and Bolsonaro rose to power enables a more precise isolation of the factors that have contributed to their distinct political outcomes. This comparative analysis aims to offer insight into the evolution of social media's impact on politics, and its implications for the resilience of populist leaders in semi-democratic regimes. Analyzing Politicians’ Relationship with Mass Media in Semi-Democratic and Democratic Countries While social media platforms were originally touted as a potential force for positive political change, such as during the Arab Spring, when they were used to coordinate and mobilize citizens to protest against authoritarian regimes,his quickly shifted when non-democratic actors realized they could also utilize social media just as effectively as pro-democracy activists to sow discord. In the case of the Arab spring, governments tracked protestors online, including those overseas, and attempted to silence them through relational repression, or threatening to hurt their relatives at home. Governments also pass legislation under the pretense of making the internet “safer,” yet in reality, such measures are often utilized to silence dissent. For example, in 2020, Turkey passed a law that allegedly aimed to curb “immoral” content.this legislation, however, also granted the Turkish government the right to remove content from platforms, and allowed for the storage of Turkish users’ data within the country. In 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan went even further, passing disinformation legislation that punished those who spread news that was inaccurate with up to five years in prison. Right before the 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections, Erdoğan then forced X (formerly Twitter) to ban access to several local opposition public figures’ accounts. Even before the popularization of social media, politicians placed significant emphasis on cultivating their public image to maximize electability, and have had to adapt as new mediums that have arisen. Politicians who quickly adapt to new forms of media have always gained an advantage. One of the most famous examples of this is the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon presidential debate, which was the first televised debate between American presidential candidates. Reportedly, viewers of the debate believed Kennedy won, while radio listeners tended to believe that Nixon performed better – a phenomenon that scholars have since replicated in experiments. Thus, it is possible that Kennedy’s adeptness in harnessing this newfangled technology just as it became commonly used among the general electorate contributed to his electoral victory. Politicians in today’s current political climate have similarly adapted to new mediums – notably social media – to gain electoral advantages. During the 2016 presidential elections, Donald Trump’s campaign benefited significantly from utilizing the expertise and staff of technology firms. S This advantage stemmed from the active involvement of social media companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google which initially courted political campaigns by providing advice on leveraging their platforms for digital advertising. This assistance enabled Trump’s campaign to target key demographic groups, swing voters, and supporters online, likely mitigating the Trump campaign’s relative staffing disadvantage.. In contrast, Clinton’s more well-funded and staffed campaign meant that it crafted most of its ads in-house, and treated the technology companies more like vendors instead of consultants. Even without the help of tech companies, politicians are recognizing the importance of utilizing data to effectively target key voters on platforms. For example, in the UK, Vote Leave, which campaigned for the UK to leave the EU ahead of the 2016 Brexit referendum, utilized personal data to target specific demographics and test which narratives voters were the most responsive to. The utilization of citizens’ data to more accurately target them with political messaging has, however, attracted controversy. This public controversy that such microtargeting attracts is exemplified by the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018, which revealed that the company collected the information of over 50 million Facebook users without their consent through a Facebook app that misleadingly told users that their information would be used for academic purposes. That data was ultimately used by the Trump campaign to precisely target voters, although whether this method was truly effective at swaying voters is uncertain.,, Interestingly, Trump had significantly more engagement with his social media content, following the old adage of “all press is good press,” which allowed him to overcome his disadvantage in traditional campaigning techniques. In particular, his provocative tweets received significant organic coverage from mainstream media, which allowed him to spend less on traditional media advertising. Additionally, Trump’s combative approach to tweeting proved effective, as an analysis of tweets before the 2016 election found that tweets about Clinton tended to be unfavorable.furthermore, her most popular tweets primarily focused on criticizing Trump rather than promoting her own candidacy. This is potentially reflective of a larger bias among social media algorithms, which have found that negative content is more likely to go viral. Therefore, it is unsurprising that in the 2016 election, negative content gained the most traction, reflecting the importance of social media in allowing politicians to personalize their appeals to voters. In recent decades, politicians have increasingly personalized their media strategies, conducting campaigns that encompass both their political agenda and personal brand. Media coverage not only focuses on the politician's policies and leadership capabilities, but also on their private life. While this behind-the-scenes content is, in general, generally just as polished and curated as performances on the campaign trail, by claiming to give voters a peek into their private life and personality, this content seeks to make the candidate more relatable and endearing to voters. Consequently, Trump’s openness about his extreme views and his use of colloquial language added an air of authenticity to his social media content that enhanced his populist claim of being of the masses. Trump’s social media presence, in particular, thus underscores how the advent of social media has opened up new avenues and methods through which politicians cultivate authenticity in pursuit of electoral success. By removing barriers between politicians and voters, social media allows politicians to communicate more directly with the electorate in an intimate and personal manner. This communication feels even more intimate now that social media has become synonymous with authenticity. Moreover, social media platforms provide politicians with the opportunity to strategically showcase their personality. Trump, in choosing to disregard basic grammatical and spelling rules and post rambling tweets, employed indexical signs, or signals alluding to his persona, to cultivate an appearance of authenticity. These distinctive features of his social media content seem to indicate that his tweets are a truer reflection of his personality relative to other politicians (such as Hilary Clinton) who sign off their tweets with their initials. Trump’s success also highlights how populist leaders are particularly well-positioned to benefit from the digitalization of the public sphere and the growing forms of direct communication between politicians and voters. The establishment of closer bonds between politicians and their support base make it easier for anti-establishment populists’ to fuel distrust in mainstream media and present alternative versions of facts. Consequently, populist and authoritarian leaders utilize social media to directly appeal to the public, bypassing critical voices like investigative journalists, thereby facilitating the spread of misleading or false information, as demonstrated by Donald Trump. Background on Modi and Bolsonaro Modi has been India’s Prime Minister since 2014, when his party, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won a landslide majority in India’s parliament. He is currently serving his second term as prime minister, following the BJP’s success in the 2019 elections. As a boy, Modi joined the Hindu nationalist paramilitary organization ‘Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’ (“National Volunteer Association,” or RSS), which heavily shaped his life and worldview. The RSS is a far-right Hindu nationalist group advocating for the establishment of a purely Hindu nation. Their vision leaves no room for India’s Muslim minority, leading to frequent accusations of inciting hatred towards Muslims. Modi dedicated almost 3 decades to organizing on behalf of the RSS, which is closely associated with the BJP. This ultimately played a significant role in propelling Modi to the forefront of the BJP’s electoral campaigns. He eventually became a BJP party spokesperson, establishing his public presence. He was subsequently appointed as the chief minister of Gujarat in 2001, during which time the state’s economy grew rapidly. India’s media landscape is fairly varied, as popular sources of news include everything from legacy publications such as The Times of India , to broadcasters such as NDTV, and BBC News, which tend to be relatively unbiased. Over 70 percent of Indian consumers get their news from their phones, and YouTube is a particular popular platform for accessing news. Notably, Indians are particularly interested in hyperlocal news, which they obtain through small, local publications and WhatsApp groups. That being said, India is one of the most dangerous places to be a journalist, and, in recent years, press freedom has declined as Modi and the BJP have increasingly attacked the freedoms of speech, judiciary, religion, and protest. Because of this, journalists often shy away from criticizing the government or reporting critically on the government out of fear of retribution.,, Jair Bolsonaro was the president of Brazil from 2019-2023, who after leaving the military, was elected to Rio de Janeiro’s city council, and then later represented the city in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies. He gained notoriety for his extremely conservative social views, and numerous sexist, homophobic, and racist comments. He also exhibited nostalgia for the previous dictatorship, a sentiment that persisted throughout his campaign and presidency. In 2018, amid widespread discontent following simultaneous economic, political, and social crises due to major corruption scandals, Bolsonaro won the presidency. However, his presidency was plagued by numerous controversies, including his deforestation of the Amazon and most notably, his poor handling of the COVID-19 crisis. During the pandemic, he seemingly expressed indifference to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Brazilians due to his lax COVID-19 policies, mocked those with severe cases of COVID-19, touted unproven drugs, and refused to wear a mask or get the vaccine. Furthermore, after losing his bid for reelection in the fall of 2022 and sowing distrust in the electoral system in the months leading up to the election, on January 8, 2023, Bolsonaro’s supporters attacked numerous Brazilian government buildings in protest of the results, an event that parallels the events in The United States on January 6, 2021. Brazil’s media landscape is dominated by several large private media conglomerates, including Globo, Record, SBT, Bandeirantes, and Folha, which are owned by politically connected individuals who distort coverage favorably. Similar to India, Brazilians also increasingly access news through their smartphones, and especially through YouTube, WhatsApp, and Facebook. Disinformation, especially in political discourse and online, continues to be a problem, although it was especially severe under President Bolsonaro, who frequently attacked the press. Folha, one of the major media conglomerates, even pulled its content from Facebook from 2018-2021 over fake news concerns., Moreover, Brazil is also one of the most dangerous places to be a journalist, as journalists have been killed by criminal groups, especially when reporting on Amazon-related environmental issues. Analysis Both Modi and Bolsonaro have taken fairly personalized approaches to social media. However, while Bolsonaro adopted this approach largely out of necessity, Modi’s decision to do so was a calculated one, as part of his general personalization of Indian politics. Thus, while Modi’s success mirrors those of leaders such as Erdoğan, who actively distort social media, in favor of their own regimes, through laws and the parliament, Bolsonaro appears to more closely resemble less successful populists like Trump. In Brazil, historically, airtime on radio and TV was one of the decisive factors in the election. This changed with Bolsonaro’s election, however, as he had less than 1 percent of all airtime. His ability to capture voters heavily active on social media and his ability to dominate conversations on those platforms helped him mitigate this disadvantage. Bolsonaro upended this traditional advantage through his personalized approach to social media, and especially his activity on the extremely popular WhatsApp. Similar to Trump, his lack of resources for a full-fledged marketing team turned out to be an advantage. Bolsonaro allegedly personally managed his WhatsApp account, and would heavily record his events, which his staff would then forward to supporters through his massive network of WhatsApp groups. Similar to how Kennedy leveraged televised debates to garner voter support, Bolsonaro’s “guerrilla marketing” capitalized on social media, proving particularly effective among its users. Consequently, it is unsurprising that Bolsonaro supporters had the highest rate of social media usage among supporters of all the major presidential candidates. However, it is possible that the personalized nature of Bolsanaro’s social media strategy arose from insecurity and personal hypersensitivity to criticism than from deliberate strategy. At one point, Bolsonaro posted a whole video on social media just to deny reports that he went to the hospital because of illness, instead claiming that he was at the hospital for “personal reasons.” Furthermore, during his 2018 campaign, there were strong accusations and evidence that he had encouraged supporters to pay digital marketing firms to flood WhatsApp with thousands of attack ads, implying that his own campaign team did not have the funds to do so. Consequently, Bolsonaro also resembled Trump in how he overcame a traditional media disadvantage through utilizing free press from posting inflammatory statements on social media that led to free, organic coverage in the mainstream media. Similar to Trump, Bolsonaro’s tendency to make extremely “politically incorrect” and offensive statements was endearing to supporters, who viewed his bluntness as a signal of authenticity. Modi was an early adopter of X, using it to interact with other politicians, convey his policy objectives, and notably, integrate social media into his campaign strategy well before the 2014 elections. But unlike Bolsonaro, Modi’s decision to do so was not out of lack of access to other forms of political messaging. Rather, this was the product of an extensive in-house public relations team and public relations firms that decided to intentionally cultivate an image of Modi as accessible to the people. Therefore,Modi’s ability to cultivate a social media presence that exudes authenticity authentically , especially during the 2019 elections, underscores his success at positioning himself at the center of the BJP’s political strategy. Notably, in both India and Brazil, Bolsonaro and Modi took advantage of WhatsApp’s popularity to coordinate campaigns and spread misinformation through a network of group chats that were extremely difficult to shut down. Not only does WhatsApp’s decentralized nature allow new groups to pop up easily after groups are shut down, but the app’s end-to-end encryption also makes it hard to monitor and identify the spread of misinformation within these groups. In India, the ruling BJP party pioneered the use of social media ahead of the 2019 elections, the first national election where a substantial proportion of the population, around 45 percent, had smartphones, compared to around merely 15 percent in 2014. The BJP effectively utilized group chats in WhatsApp, a platform which the vast majority of Indian smartphone users have downloaded, to target and spread regionally specific messaging, mirroring Trump campaign’s use of Facebook data to similarly micro-target key demographics. Specifically, in India, politicians relied on a network of hundreds of WhatsApp groups, each based in different regions, to coordinate and convey campaign messaging and logistics to supporters. Modi and his staff tailored tweets and messaging strategies, which were then shared with a network of hundreds of thousands of volunteers, who spread the messaging by the millions. In these group chats, the BJP also pushes rhetoric and disinformation that aimed to inflame religious tensions and stoke fear of the Muslim minority among India's majority Hindu population. Examples of disinformation included pornographic deepfakes of reporters critical of Modi’s role in anti-Muslim riots as governor of Gujarat, as well as less directly insidious falsehoods, such as inflated crowds sizes at his rallies., Similarly, in Brazil, where WhatsApp is one of the primary sources of information for its 120 million local users, Bolsonaro supporters paid digital advertising firms to run attack ads in various WhatsApp groups. Here, Bolsonaro’s supporters exploited the intimacy of these groups, similar to Modi and the BJP, enabling them to hyper-specifically target various groups, often with disinformation that spread rapidly and extensively. However, in Brazil, Bolsonaro’s digital content mostly preyed on the fears of those with socially conservative views and dissatisfaction with the establishment. Therefore, prime examples of popular misinformation on WhatsApp include a deep-faked image of former president Dilma Roussef next to Fidel Castro, and a picture allegedly depicting two male employees from Globo, one of the major media companies in Brazil, kissing, which was actually taken at a pride march in New York. Bolsonaro’s network of WhatsApp groups also shared the social media of those critical of Bolsonaro and coordinated mass campaigns attacking critics. More broadly, while both Modi and Bolsonaro rely on WhatsApp as the primary platform for disseminating election-related disinformation, they have extended their operations to other platforms as well. Bolsonaro exploited the popularity of online, partisan sites and social media as sources of news to spread information. A study of the Brazilian 2022 elections found that those who joined political groups on messaging apps such as WhatsApp and used partisan, online sites and social media as their sources of news were more likely to believe in election related-misinformation. Furthermore, every week Bolsonaro live streamed on YouTube, aiming to directly deliver disinformation to his supporters. In these streams, he primarily attempted to discredit the mainstream media, claiming to speak the authentic truth, despite primarily propagating borderline propaganda. Yet notably, unlike Modi, most of his attempts to reduce the independence of the press and institutions was primarily through rhetoric rather than direct suppression and censorship. Modi’s efforts to exploit social media to silence dissent were more extensive and refined, and contributed to his ability to concentrate power in a way Bolsonaro was unable to. Furthermore, he continues to actively suppresses critical content, recently banning access to a BBC documentary investigating his role in a deadly 2002 riot while he was Governor of Gujarat. Modi also weaponizes the regulation of platforms to coerce them into complying with content takedown requests. In 2021, Modi implemented new IT rules under the pretense of combating misinformation. However, these rules, which forced social media companies to hand over user data, take down any content the government deems “restricted,” and hire a local Chief Compliance Officer, seemed to be designed to facilitate the government’s ability to coerce platforms to remove unfavorable content. Under these new rules, the government threatened to sue X and even raided its Indian offices after it labeled BJP politicians’ tweets as manipulated media. Furthermore, Modi has been unafraid to go after major tech companies, and has exploited their fears of being cut off from the massive Indian market. Modi has also pressured X to block access in India to the accounts of Sikh activists and those who are critical of Modi. Modi has not hesitated to punish platforms who resist his demands, and has threatened to jail employees of companies such as Facebook for noncompliance with censorship requests. Furthermore, platforms have also found themselves caught up in the backlash after geopolitical spats. In the wake of deadly clashes at the India-China border in 2020, Modi banned TikTok. Notably, both Modi and Bolsonaro have employed social media platforms to spread false information that contributes to and exacerbates platform violence outside of elections. However, Modi is much more effective at intimidating potential dissenters and translating his network of supporters into tangible organized acts of violence. Modi’s ability to incite violence and his exploitation of and leaning into Hindu nationalism through the spreading of fake news about Muslims or lower castes has inflamed tensions and motivated real-life mob violence and hate crimes. Modi, however, has consistently refused to acknowledge acts of Hindu nationalist mob violence., Bolsonaro intentionally spread false rumors about voter fraud and irregularities in Brazil’s digitalized voting system. These actions resulted in him him having to participate in a runoff in 2018 and ultimately to his electoral loss in 2022. He spread these lies through interviews with traditional media and through directly appealing to users with disinformation on online platforms, for example, through his weekly YouTube live streams. These disinformation campaigns culminated in the January 8th riots in 2023. Unlike Modi, who was running for re-election, Bolsonaro’s social media strategy mirrored Trump’s in that his spreading of misinformation likely came from a place of weakness. Leading up to the presidential election in both instances, Bolsonaro and Trump both had seemingly long odds. Additionally, both of their social media strategies were influenced by their campaign’s limited resources. Therefore, it is likely that Bolsonaro’s dissemination of disinformation regarding electoral fraud in anticipation of the 2018 election stemmed from a sense of insecurity. After all, if Bolsonaro were genuinely confident he was going to win the election, he would not have prepared an explanation for a potential loss before the election even happened. Bolsonaro’s encouragement of violence following the 2022 elections also likely came from feelings of vulnerability and anger at the perceived humiliation of not winning the election. Contrary to Modi, however, outside of social media platforms, Bolsonaro’s network of supporters are less organized, and therefore, have engaged in less acts of violence and physical intimidation. Even the largest violent outbreak under Bolsonaro, the January 8th protests, were nowhere near as deadly or violent as Modi’s army was, as it was more of a last-ditch attempt at holding onto power rather than an intentional, organized, than a demonstration of strength., Similar to Trump, the January 8th riots in Brazil can be interpreted as a product of Bolsonaro lashing out due to a feeling of powerlessness and refusal to accept what he perceived as the embarrassment of not winning the election. Yet, despite the importance and widespread use of social media in the Bolsonaro’s campaigns, Bolsonaro was ultimately unable to retain power due to the differences in political structure between India and Brazil. Brazil has a federal presidential republic, meaning that similar to the US, power is split among the different executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and thus the president inherently has much less authority than the prime minister in India. Because of this, the other branches of government were able to check Bolsonaro’s authoritarian impulses. Specifically, the Brazilian Supreme Court, with its criminal jurisdiction over all public officials, including the president, as well as the Congress’ refusal to endorse Bolsonaro’s assault on judicial institutions, played significant roles in restraining him. Therefore, the judicial branch, in particular, was able to nullify Bolsonaro’s worst attempts at censorship or influencing social media to portray him more favorably. For example, in 2021, when Bolsonaro attempted to ban social media platforms from taking down certain types of misinformation, including misinformation about COVID-19, the Supreme Court and Brazilian Senate nullified the legislation. When Bolsonaro supporters refused to accept his defeat, one of Brazil’s Supreme Court justices ordered the accounts of some of the loudest protesters suspended. As a result of the January 8, 2023 riots, during which Bolsonaro supporters stormed government buildings in protest of the election results, the Superior Electoral Court banned Bolsonaro from running for election again until 2030. Therefore, Bolsonaro's political downfall demonstrates the limitations of social media propaganda when faced with strong institutional checks and balances. In contrast, India is a federal parliamentary republic, which generally leads to much more powerful heads of government, since the prime minister is determined by the majority coalition in the legislative branch. Thus, unlike in Brazil, in this political system, the executive branch inherently has influence over the legislative branch, which enabled Modi to shape government opinion much more rapidly. Therefore, while the combination of the independent judiciary and congress restrained Bolsonaro, Modi has been able to successfully erode the independence of government institutions, including the judiciary, which he has weaponized against opposition politicians through promoting friendly judges and punishing defiant ones. Thus, Modi bears similarity to Viktor Orban in Hungary, who was able to quickly weaken independent institutions due to his unified parliamentary supermajority. Furthermore, he also bears resemblance to Erdoğan, who held a 2017 referendum that amended Turkey’s constitution from a parliamentary to a presidential system. Erdoğan’s presidentialization of a parliamentary system allowed him to consolidate the powers of the leaders in a presidential and parliamentary system into one role while reducing the checks on these powers. Essentially, Erdoğan had centered his party's campaign for seats around his personal appeal, instead of the party's Similarly, Modi’s rise to power in 2014 diverged from historical norms in that, unusually for a parliamentary system, the BJP’s campaign centered around Modi’s appeal as prime minister. This presidentialization of parliamentary elections foreshadowed his ensuing consolidation of power. It is also important to consider how each leader fits into the broader historical context of their respective countries. Most importantly, Modi's social media disinformation campaigns are able to exploit tensions between different ethnic groups that have been present since India gained independence from the British. While Modi has increasingly centralized power under his leadership, his actions must be interpreted and understood in the context of his longstanding commitment to creating a Hindu nation, which has motivated him since he first joined the RSS as a youth. Modi’s actions and ideas align with a larger movement that has been in the works for far longer than he has been in power. Therefore, to understand Modi’s underlying motives, it is important to keep in mind historical events such as the bloody partition of the Indian subcontinent and the history of discrimination against Muslims in India. Since the chaotic 1947 partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan, which was done largely along religious lines and led to the death of approximately a million people, Muslims in India have continued to face discrimination. Modi has regularly deployed internet blackouts to silence dissent in the Muslim-majority federally administered Jammu and Kashmir states, which, in 2022, had the most internet shutdowns globally. Under Modi, anti-Muslim lynchings and hate crimes have risen rapidly, and Modi and the BJP have encouraged the spread of Islamaphobic conspiracy theories, such as the COVID-19 pandemic being a “Muslim plot.” Therefore, Modi’s ability to capitalize on the significant issue of religious divisions and focus his social media disinformation efforts around this specific issue, in a manner Bolsonaro could not, have contributed to his enduring resilience. In contrast, Bolsonaro relied on a broader variety of societal tensions,and it is probable that his inability to channel his efforts around a single issue contributed to his ultimate downfall. Bolsonaro positioned himself more generally as a populist outsider who was a break from the establishment. He fed on Brazilians general sense of discontent stemming from general political and economic turmoil to rise to power. However, once he was in office, despite attempting to frame himself as “anti establishment” and railing against “mainstream media,” he could no longer be considered as an outsider. Moreover, unlike Modi, who had substantial governing experience and political organizing experience from his time as governor of Gujarat and his work volunteering for the RSS, Bolsonaro’s status as a relative novice, which was especially evident during his poor management of crises like the pandemic. Before becoming president, Bolsonaro had only served as a legislator, and had limited connections within government, having spent most of his previous political career at the fringes of governmental circles. Furthermore, Modi’s close ties and history with the BJP and RSS naturally provided him with a significantly stronger and more entrenched base of support, forged over decades of advancement through the party ranks. In contrast, Bolsonaro’s frequent switches between political parties, both over the course of his career and even during his presidency, left him isolated and unable to secure substantial support in Congress. Therefore, Bolsonaro’s loss suggests that while social media may have propelled his unlikely presidency, it was not sufficient to maintain his grip on power, particularly coupled with his relative political inexperience. Furthermore, the resilience and independence of civil society and press in Brazil compared to India also helped curb Bolsonaro’s attempts to consolidate his power. For example, as soon as Bolsonaro was elected, protests broke out in several cities. Despite his initial threats to jail left-wing protesters, these threats proved empty as mass protests continued to occur during his presidency., Furthermore, interestingly, Bolsonaro’s attacks on journalists, instead of having a demoralizing effect, actually invigorated journalists, strengthening their resolve and resilience. In contrast, under Modi, the independence of the Indian press has been substantially eroded. The collective efforts of Modi’s online army of trolls, which issues death and rape threats, along with the BJP’s direct intimidation of critical journalists, and the pressuring of media companies to fire or punish disobedient reporters, have effectively coereced many journalists into self-censorship due fear of retribution. For example, in 2018, the gang-rape and murder of an eight-year-old Muslim girl who was kidnapped and tortured for days by a group of Hindu men only gained national coverage after foreign publications picked the story up. Even so, coverage was limited, especially since the BJP organized a rally in support of the accused rapists. Conclusion While both Modi and Bolsonaro disseminate fake news on social media to circumvent traditional media barriers and communicate directly with the electorate, their attempts to control the narrative stem from different motivations. Modi operates from a position of strength,silencing dissenting opinions and consolidating power across the state, whereas Bolsonaro operates from a position of weakness, striving to preserve his tenuous grip on power. Additionally, it appears that while social media strategy played a substantial role in both Bolsonaro and Modi’s rise, it was ultimately external factors specific to their broader context, namely the strength of political institutions and social cleavages that facilitated one’s success over the other. 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