State-Owned Banks and the Promise of an Equitable Financial Sector Elias van Emmerick Pomona College April 2021 This paper will propose that state-owned banks resolve many of the issues facing commercial banks today. To substantiate this claim, it will investigate specific areas where a state-owned bank would produce more favorable outcomes than a commercial bank, trace the steps required to establish such a bank, and evaluate a contemporary example of a state-owned bank, the Sparkassen 1. Introduction The financial sector increasingly takes up space in our economy. What originated as a means to an end (a middleman to collect and distribute funds) has for many become an end unto itself. Top students from prestigious universities across the globe desperately pursue jobs at investment banks, hedge funds, and private equity firms. For example, more than a third of Harvard’s class of 2017 pursued finance or consulting upon graduating. In fact, the finance, insurance, and real estate industries make up one fifth of domestic GDP, more than any other sector. At the same time, this industry has often brought us close to financial collapse. Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz describes the financial sector’s work as being at least partly “rent-seeking”: an economic activity that redistributes wealth (often from the poor to the rich), but does not actually generate meaningful increases in overall economic growth. As an economist would put it, they do not grow the pie, they simply take a larger slice of it. This paper will aim to investigate to what extent state-owned commercial banks could alleviate some of the major issues related to the financial sector we see today, and how they could do so. Subsequently, the paper will detail how the creation of a public bank could happen, as well as evaluate two existing state-owned banks, the Bank of North Dakota and the German Sparkassen. Finally, it will summarize contemporary efforts to establish government-owned commercial banks in the United States. Throughout this paper, I use a number of terms in a particular way. Specifically, I will make frequent use of the terms “liquidity,” “public,” and “bank.” I will take “liquidity” to mean the M2 money supply: the amount of cash, checkings and savings deposits, and time deposits available in the economy at a given time. “Public” will refer to ownership of an entity by the government, rather than an entity being publicly traded on the stock market. Finally, “bank” will refer to the commercial kind unless otherwise noted. This last distinction is important to draw, as many of the conclusions reached in this paper would not transfer to investment or merchant banks. 2. The Rationale Behind a Public Bank America has had a tumultuous relationship with private financial institutions, and a number of historical figures struggled with determining the role a finance sector should play. Andrew Jackson wrote that “if Congress has the right under the constitution to issue paper money, it was given them to be used by themselves, not to be delegated to individuals or corporations.” Jackson referred to what many contemporary economists consider to be a significant flaw of the private banking system: control over the money supply. Economists traditionally assume that the federal government regulates the money supply. The Federal Reserve (the Fed) can control the money supply by trading Treasury notes with commercial banks, or the Treasury itself can physically print more bills in order to increase the money supply. It is inherently desirable to have a government without a profit motive perform this function—unchecked increases in the money supply would lead to devastating inflation and a loss of faith in our currency. Furthermore, this also means that the government is able to control the amount of money in the economy during times of crisis, and to some extent prevent liquidity from drying up. Control over the money supply is a useful policy tool that is best wielded by the state, with the interest of its constituents in mind. The reality is that, by and large, the money supply is heavily influenced by the decisions of commercial banks. Economists have reached a consensus on what is known as the “fractional reserve theory of money creation.” This theory states that banks must lend out a percentage of each deposit they receive, equal to the total deposit minus the “reserve requirement”⁠—an amount set by the Federal Reserve that banks are required to retain of each deposit— as an insurance against bank runs. After the bank lends out this percentage of a deposit, the person who receives the loan theoretically deposits that money in another account, where a part of it is loaned out, and so on. Every person in this chain now has additional money in their account, and their spending decisions will be made accordingly. The original deposit was multiplied; thus, money was “created.” Conversely, banks may also decide to call back their loans or refuse to issue new ones. In effect, this results in a removal of money from the money supply. The diagram below illustrates how liquidity in the system increases through this process. Image 1: Illustration of the fractional reserve theory of money creation given a 10% reserve requirement The unfortunate truth is that this method of money creation works to exacerbate any swings in the wider economic environment. When the economy is heating up (and thus is experiencing inflationary pressures), banks will be more eager to lend money, which in turn will increase the money supply, thereby further increasing inflation. When the economy is in a rut, fewer loans will be extended, contracting the money supply and further pushing down spending and aggravating potential deflation. When banks follow “rational incentives,” meaning that they become less risk averse during periods of growth and more risk averse during economic slowdowns, the economy does not always benefit. One could argue that the Fed is tasked with preventing these swings. During economic booms they raise interest rates, which curbs lending, and during busts they lower them, which in turn boosts spending. The problem is that the government is now acting as a middleman, when this is a system they are supposed to have complete control over. Commercial banks’ role as distributor of liquidity has other downsides. Since these banks are asked to maximize shareholder value, they are incentivized to extend capital only to those who are likely to repay it. Individuals or businesses that are deemed high-risk are penalized with high interest rates and other unfavorable loan terms. This is not incompatible with prevalent economic theories. The bank is assuming the risk, and for taking on higher risk should be eligible to receive a larger reward. However, a closer examination reveals the perversity behind this idea. Access to capital is essential for a number of activities that can lead to prosperity. Home ownership, starting a business, or going to college all typically require some form of lending. Low-income individuals are thus required to pay a higher price, both in absolute and relative terms, for these opportunities. It is morally bankrupt, as well as socially undesirable, to make loans more expensive for those who already have very little, and there is substantial evidence that this system contributes to the “poverty trap.” Studies have shown that low-income individuals on average do pay more for any kind of loan. The Federal Reserve also found a positive correlation between income and credit score, and a number of other studies have further shown that minorities typically have lower credit scores, even when the data is controlled for disparities in income. There is a strong negative correlation between credit scores and interest rates payable on loans—the lower your score, the more you are asked to pay. It is understandable that banks employ this system, but that does not mean that it is beneficial to society as a whole. In essence, the credit score system is a regressive tax—the poorer you are, the more you pay. The graph below shows the average credit score of each income group on a bar chart and superimposes the median mortgage rate for each credit score. There is a clear positive correlation between credit score and income level, and a negative correlation between credit score and median mortgage rate. This data shows that income is in turn negatively correlated with mortgage rates; that is, the lower one’s income, the higher their mortgage rate is likely to be. Image 2: Median credit score and mortgage rate versus income. A public bank could step in and resolve this issue. It could extend loans not with the intent of making a profit, but rather with the intent of stimulating the economy. This might mean providing loans to low-income communities at break-even interest rates, as they are likely to spend that money in a way that benefits the wider economy. A public bank could further act as a tool for policymakers. If politicians want to stimulate homeownership and reduce emissions, mortgages could become cheaper and car financing more expensive. A public bank would provide a direct way of injecting money into desirable areas of the economy. Banks’ focus on generating returns for their shareholders costs the general public in a number of other ways as well. Most Americans have their checking and saving accounts with one of the major banks—37.6% of all deposits were placed with one of the five largest banks, and 30.82% were placed with one of the three largest. In fact, the five largest American banks control 56.9% of all assets held by U.S. banks. Today’s financial sector can be (and has been) accurately described as an oligopoly—a few key players control such a significant share of the market that they are able to work together and set rates in a way that is favorable to them. In this case, savings rates are artificially held down. As mentioned before, banks make money from each dollar they receive in deposits. Unfortunately, almost none of that money returns to their clients. Savings accounts at most commercial banks generate negligible interest, and checking accounts frequently cost money for those who deposit under a certain amount. Interest rates offered on savings accounts remain low, even as the Fed has increased its discount rate. The below graph shows the federal funds rate as compared to the average interest rate Americans received on savings below $100,000. Both were lowered after the 2008 financial crisis in an effort to discourage saving and encourage spending, but the federal funds rate has since increased significantly. In contrast, the interest rate on savings accounts has remained mostly stagnant. The profits banks make on deposits can be approximated by the difference between these two rates—the less they pay to depositors and the more they charge for loans, the more profitable lending becomes. Image 3: Average interest rate on savings accounts versus the federal funds rate A public bank would primarily aim to further public interest rather than make a profit, and is therefore more likely to offer a savings rate that closely mirrors the discount rate. Not only would this provide customers with a better alternative to the rates offered by commercial banks, it might also force banks to match that rate if they want to retain their clients. In effect, this would constitute a redistribution of wealth from the banks and their shareholders to the general public. Although online banks currently offer higher interest rates on savings accounts, they are rather niche and lack the visibility to threaten larger banks. An accessible, well-known public bank could succeed where these online banks have failed and significantly drive up the average interest rate on savings accounts. A lack of profit incentive would also reduce a public bank’s exposure to risk. In the years leading up to the Great Recession, nearly every bank filled their balance sheet with subprime mortgages and risky derivatives, even though they were aware of the risks associated with these products. Banks simply could not explain to their shareholders that they were going to hold off on products that were generating sizeable returns for their competitors. Commercial banks’ profit incentive has at times generated genuine financial innovation, but more often than not has caused them to cut corners and harm communities. Wells Fargo, for example, was convicted of engaging in predatory lending throughout the US in the years leading up to 2008. The bank knowingly extended credit to those who were unlikely to pay it back, charging high upfront fees and then passing the actual debt on to other firms. Wells Fargo knew the risks involved, but ultimately decided short-term profits were more important. Unlike traditional banks, a public bank would not answer to shareholders, but rather to elected officials who represent the public’s best interest. Research has already shown that banks who answer to a large number of shareholders are more risk-averse than those who answer only to a select group of the corporate elite. These findings could be extrapolated to infer that a bank that answers to the general population would be significantly more risk-averse than current financial institutions. Public banks clearly offer a solution to many of the issues our financial system struggles with today. A wholly different incentive structure would allow these banks to deploy capital where it would stimulate the economy, rather than where it would only generate profits for the bank. The absence of a responsibility to shareholders would lead to higher interest rates on savings accounts and the adoption of a more sustainable risk profile. As a competitor to commercial banks, a public bank would realign the industry to be more concerned with the needs of its customers. Regardless of a public bank’s merits, the US is currently home to just one public bank, whose assets total $7 billion–about 0.004% of total commercial bank assets. The next section will investigate the steps required to create a public bank and discuss potential pitfalls in the process. 3. Creating a Public Bank During the 2008 recession, the government could have created a national public bank simply by taking over an existing commercial bank. The value of most commercial banks’ balance sheets had dropped drastically following the collapse of mortgage-backed securities, making them an easy target for takeovers. Although this solution may have ultimately generated more returns for taxpayers and fewer for wealthy shareholders than bank bail-outs did, it would have created a set of unique and difficult-to-solve challenges. Balance sheets would have to be cleaned of toxic and risky assets, and the bank would have to gradually reduce its exposure to financial products that are not in line with the mission statement of a public bank. Entire divisions that handled these products would have had to be laid off, and many clients might find that services they used would no longer be on offer. Luckily, our current economic outlook is a lot rosier than it was a decade ago, and few banks (perhaps with the exception of the ever-troubled Wells Fargo) seem in danger of failing any time soon. A public bank would thus need to be created from scratch—something that would allow for greater control over the bank’s structure and design. A number of states and cities (Vermont, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Los Angeles, San Francisco, etc.) have conducted or are in the process of conducting feasibility studies for the creation of regional public banks, and as such, there is a substantial range of literature available with detailed descriptions of the steps required to start such a bank. Although many studies have focused on public banks as providers of capital for infrastructure investment and providers of solutions for state financing needs, the basic principle behind their construction remains the same. The technicalities behind a bank’s creation are simple. The bank needs to have sufficient assets to begin lending, a few employees, and physical branches. Typically, feasibility studies assume the city or state responsible for creating the bank would move its current cash reserves to the new bank, thereby providing capital without the need for loans or other costly financing techniques. The only existing American public bank—the Bank of North Dakota—was initially financed by a $2 million bond offering in 1919, which would amount to about $29 million today. Research suggests that, due to the increased complexity of the contemporary economy, the required capitalization would be closer to $325 million. Since most states hold a multiple of that amount in commercial banks currently, it is unlikely that a bond offering would be necessary today. California, for example, holds nearly $15 billion in its “rainy day” fund alone. A public bank would have the local government as its sole shareholder, and any returns it made would be returned to the state or city in which it is located. As such, public banks would prevent capital drain to out-of-state bondholders and keep profits within the local economy. The creation of a public bank would be relatively uncomplicated, and a variety of feasibility studies have cited high potential upsides. For example, a public bank in New Jersey would generate about $16-21 million in additional state output, and raise state income by about $3.8-5.2 million, for every $10 million lent out. Furthermore, for every $10 million lent out the bank would add roughly 60-93 new jobs. Yet, strong opposition to the idea exists. In Maine, a bill to commission a study on the effects of a public bank failed to pass the state legislature, even though 72% of small businesses and farmers in the state supported the creation of a state-owned bank. Opponents often cite currently adequate availability of credit through commercial channels and increased risk to state assets as arguments against a government-controlled bank. Internationally, the idea has also fallen out of favor with economists, who claim that public banks are often inefficient and influenced by political pressures. The next section of this paper will investigate a current example of a state-owned banking system to determine the merits of these arguments. 4. Public Banks Today a. The Bank of North Dakota The Bank of North Dakota (BND) is the United States’ only existing example of a government-owned bank, and it is often cited as an example of the potential benefits of such an institution. The bank certainly has reported impressive figures since its founding in 1919. As shown in the graph below, it has made a net profit every year since its founding, even during the Great Depression and the Great Recession. Image 4: Yearly profits of the Bank of North Dakota Additionally, the bank has managed to return much of that profit to the state government, keeping North Dakota from running a budget deficit when other revenue sources have fallen short. The historical context surrounding the bank’s founding is oddly reminiscent of our contemporary situation—around the start of the 20th century, a populist movement in North Dakota renounced the high fees farmers were being charged by out-of-state financiers and pushed for a local bank that would be tasked with “promoting agriculture, commerce and industry.” Local commercial banks were concerned that a public bank would drive them out of business and managed to convince the legislature to impose strict limits on what would become the BND. Initially, the bank was “prohibited from opening branches, engaging in retail banking, and providing commercial lending other than farm real estate loans.” A number of these restrictions were later loosened, but the bank still is not a real substitute for a commercial bank. The BND operates conservatively, shows itself to be risk averse, and sees “maintaining a strong and stable balance sheet” as a key priority. In this sense, it has been hard to use the success of the BND as an argument for public banks in the broader United States. The bank does provide affordable loans for small businesses (albeit not for individual consumers), but “roughly 50 percent of the bank’s loan portfolio consists of loan participations and loan purchases from community banks,” rather than regular loans. During financial crises, the bank helps to maintain liquidity in the markets, but it does so by purchasing loans from smaller banks rather than by actively extending loans. The BND is a successful experiment in state-ownership of banks, but the restrictions imposed on it by the legislature prevent it from being a truly transformative force. Its lack of access to consumers and emphasis on cooperation with commercial banks mean that most North Dakotans are still forced to obtain the majority of their financial services from for-profit companies. Furthermore, the legislature’s eagerness to use profits from the BND for state expenditures means that the bank is still required to make a profit—the only difference is that this money goes back into the local community, rather than towards mostly wealthy shareholders. The bank’s conservative approach to investments may also not produce socially optimal outcomes seeing as many investments with significant potential upsides, such as small business loans or mortgages for low-income families, have a fairly high risk profile. Instead of maintaining a low-risk balance sheet, the BND could focus on providing loans that “serve a social purpose but that the private sector would find too risky.” It is also important to note that the BND has operated independently of political forces. Rick Clayburgh, president of the North Dakota Bankers Association and former state tax commissioner and state legislator, has said: “Our legislature... has kept their politics out of the governance of the Bank of North Dakota”. The supposed interdependence between public banks and the legislature is an oft-cited criticism against public banks, and this paper will explore the veracity of this claim further in the following chapters. In the case of the BND, concerns of the legislature influencing the bank’s decisions appear to be unfounded. The Bank of North Dakota is a successful institution, but it has hardly lived up to the disruptive potential of a public bank. More than anything else, the BND shows that merely having a state-owned bank is not enough to achieve the goals set out at the start of this paper—a bank has to provide a viable alternative to the commercial banking sector, as well as have a set goal of promoting investments that serve a social purpose, if it is to meaningfully change the way the finance sector operates today. b. Germany’s Public Banks: The Sparkassen Germany’s commercial financial sector consists of three “pillars”: commercial banks, cooperative banks (owned by their customers), and public banks. Examples of the last include the aforementioned Sparkassen and Landesbanken, which engage in wholesale banking, as well as the LBS Bayerische Landesbausparkasse, a public sector loan and building association. Sparkassen are a unique example of state-owned, easily accessible banks that offer basic commercial banking services to consumers and small- to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The Sparkassen have been operating since 1778 and were originally founded by merchants hoping to support local communities. Today, the Sparkassen have over fifteen thousand branches and control over €2 trillion in assets. The banks operate in a decentralized manner with strong geographic boundaries, meaning that each city or region has its own Sparkasse that serves local clients and provides loans for local investments. The banks are owned by the cities or regions in which they operate but are also are backed by a national organization that maintains a “rainy day fund” which Sparkassen can tap into, so that a region of Germany experiencing financial distress can obtain support from Sparkassen in prospering regions. Image 5: Representative structure of the Sparkassen system Germany’s Sparkassen are mandated by law to serve the public interest and promote regional development. In fact, their success is measured not by returns generated for shareholders or profit, but by their impact on the communities they serve. Stakeholder value, rather than shareholder value, is the key metric by which these banks are judged. Instead of generating profits for those who invested in the bank, the Sparkassen are required to deliver returns for local stakeholders. Such stakeholders include local residents, small businesses, and municipal governments. The banks are highly popular with their audience, with about 70% of all SMEs obtaining their financing from a Sparkasse. About 60% of all Germans interact with these banks in some way, with low-income families specifically making up the largest part of the Sparkassen’s customers. This broad reach is partly because of their indiscriminate approach to banking—they are mandated to not deny anyone a savings account, and they must provide the same rate of return for each customer. Furthermore, the legislature explicitly states that Sparkassen are supposed to “satisfy the credit demands of local businesses.” Besides serving customers and enterprises, Sparkassen fund socially desirable projects with the express intent of promoting the public interest. The banks together provided €488 million (about $550 million) to social projects in 2018 alone, and a 2015 report estimated that the banks added about €20 billion in value to local communities that year, equal to about 0.66% of Germany’s 2015 GDP. They also provide significant funding for start-ups, infrastructure repairs, and other socially desirable activities. Notwithstanding the several benefits associated with the Sparkassen system, the banks have been regularly criticized by European and American economists alike. Many of these critics primarily take issue with the concept of a state-owned bank rather than with a specific issue present in the system, but others have identified some salient flaws in the way the Sparkassen are run. Political involvement in the day-to-day operations of the banks has been and remains an area of concern. A study by the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel notes that, in the eight states they surveyed, 83% of the Sparkassen’s board chairs were current county heads or municipality heads. In five out of eight states, every single board chair was a current politician. More broadly, 18% of board members were politicians. Moreover, in the only state where politicians publicly declare their income, board chair fees made up an average of 12% of a politician’s income. The mayor of Regensburg, the fourth-largest city of Bavaria, is currently standing trial for accepting significant campaign donations from a real estate developer, allegedly in exchange for a favorable loan from the Sparkasse where the mayor held a board seat. Such cases are rare, but the degree of entwinement between politicians and the public banks is certainly cause for concern. Little research has been done on inefficiencies in the Sparkassen system caused by political entanglement, so the severity of these findings remains unclear. An American public bank could certainly model itself after the Sparkassen, but it might benefit from an explicit separation between currently serving politicians and the bank itself, if only to maintain public trust in the system. 5. Looking Forward: Public Banking Initiatives in the United States The public banking movement has seen a resurgence of sorts in the last decade, and a number of states and cities have introduced legislation to either establish a public bank or to conduct feasibility studies. Most notably, current New Jersey governor Phil Murphy ran his campaign partly on the promise of establishing a public bank, and he sponsored a bill on his first day in office to achieve that goal. Maine, Vermont, and New York have also voted on bills to establish state banks. Image 6: Public banking efforts by state Feasibility studies have generally predicted positive results. For example, a 2011 feasibility study predicted that a public bank would generate 3,500 new jobs in Maine, a 2013 study found that a public bank would create about 2,500 new jobs and $200 million in value added to the economy in Vermont, and a study for the city of Santa Fe found that every $1 million in lending from a public bank would generate an additional ten jobs in the local economy. Exceptions are the feasibility studies for California and DC. Both studies found that establishing a public bank would be legally difficult and capital intensive. The DC study is interesting in that it heavily relied on advice from the Federal Reserve, which stated that the income a city or state can gain by having a public bank is "relatively minor" and that the risk of losses is "real.” It is important to note that the Federal Reserve might have an inherent aversion to public banks, as these are not placed under the Fed’s supervision. Aside from this criticism, the DC study also found that public banks would spur local economic development and infrastructure investment, as well as reduce risk exposure of the financial system. The final version of the DC report is still being edited and is due to be released sometime later this year. Feasibility studies may have produced mixed results, but there has been nothing mixed about the legislative response to the idea of public banks. Maine’s bill was sent back from committee with a majority saying it should not pass. Vermont’s bill to establish a public bank did not pass either (although the legislature did approve $350 million in local investment instead), and New Jersey seems to have put its plans for a public bank on hold. As of today, North Dakota remains the only state with a public bank. The idea is seen as overly socialist by many, and as overly complex and costly by others. The DC feasibility study claimed that direct government spending towards socially beneficial programs would be far less complex and costly than establishing a public bank, which seems to be an argument that many lawmakers have bought into. Legal challenges also cause many legislators to view public banks unfavorably. Specifically, many state constitutions have provisions against “lending the credit of the state.” However, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Craig v. Missouri holds that such provisions “[do] not interfere with the power of a state to authorize banks to issue bank notes in the form of due-bills or of similar character, intended to pass as currency on the faith and credit of the bank itself, and not of the state which authorizes their issuance.” As such, banks (public or commercial) are able to provide credit that passes as currency. In Briscoe v. Bank of Commonwealth of Kentucky (1837), the Court held that Kentucky’s state bank did not violate the Constitution, as its loans contained “no pledge of the faith of the state for the notes issued by the institution.” The issue at hand is whether activities that are at the core of the bank’s operations (lending, investing, etc.) are explicitly backed by a government guarantee. If so, public banks would have an unfair advantage over private banks. So far, no proposal for a state bank has indicated that the bank would rely on such a state-sanctioned “pledge of faith,” and as such, it is unlikely that the constitutionality of a public bank could be challenged on these grounds. Furthermore, the Bank of North Dakota is proof that it is constitutionally permissible to operate a public bank. 6. Conclusion: An Uncertain Future There is a strong case to be made for the establishment of regional public banks throughout the United States. Increased control over the money supply, greater access to affordable loans for low-income families and small businesses, higher returns on savings accounts, and a lower risk profile would all result from having a public bank in place. As it stands, commercial banks largely engage in rent-seeking behavior. Predatory lending practices, low interest on savings accounts, and high credit card rates serve to generate profits for large banks by taking money from the economically vulnerable. The IMF has found that, as the financial sector grows relative to the size of the economy, inequality increases. Recent research by economists at Columbia University confirms this rise in inequality, and further found that this effect is not significantly offset by the easier access to credit financial markets supposedly provide. As it stands, encouraging progress is being made in many places. Feasibility studies are an important first step in moving this idea into the mainstream, and we might soon see a bill to establish a state bank appear in New Jersey. However, the unfortunate truth remains that lawmakers view public banks unfavorably. Beyond the practical hurdles associated with establishing one, there seems to be a general sentiment that a public bank would not fit with the capitalist ideals of the United States. Lenin’s claim that “without [public] banks, socialism would be impossible. The big banks are the ‘state apparatus’ which we need to bring about socialism [...]” has fundamentally linked the idea of a state bank with an overly leftist vision for many. I would argue that a public bank is fundamentally American. It is a state apparatus that enables the government to more efficiently support entrepreneurship, local communities, and infrastructure. A public bank, if given proper direction, could facilitate the achievement of the elusive American Dream. The Founders vocally opposed monopolies, championed a stable currency, and believed all should be able to acquire property and benefit from public infrastructure. Stiglitz wrote that, Rather than justice for all, we are evolving into a system of justice for those who can afford it. We have banks that are not only too big to fail, but too big to be held accountable. [...] The only true and sustainable prosperity is shared prosperity. Commercial banks today are hurdles keeping us from innovation, wealth creation, and achieving equality. A bank should facilitate the dreams of entrepreneurs from all backgrounds, not just those from Silicon Valley. It should not charge the poor more than the rich. In many ways, commercial banks violate some of the core values on which this country was founded. In short, there is nothing un-American about a state bank. 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Energy Embracing Renewable Energy for Sustainable Job Growth in West Virginia Jingpeng Shao Brown University Author Anna Corradi Phillip Squires Elizabeth Yeh Editors Spring 2018 Examining the intersection of climate change and rise of populism in West Virginia, this essay evaluates policies and represents recommendations to address the demand for quality jobs and long-term transition towards sustainable energy. Introduction The dependency on coal for energy generation lies at the intersection of two crucial issues that have come to define international political economy in the 21st Century–climate change and the rise of populism–thus illustrating the deep dissatisfaction with economic liberalization and globalization. In the US, coal lost its position as the dominant source of electricity generation for the first time in 2016 (30.4%) when it was surpassed by natural gas (33.8%) (EIA, 2017). This has contributed to a long-term trend of decline in coal employment, which began after the end of the Second World War and created a substantial source of economic, social, and political woes for the mid-Appalachian region known as the ‘Coal Country’. While campaigning for the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump proclaimed, “We’re going to put the miners back to work,” to a cheering crowd waving “Trump Digs Coal” signs in Charleston, West Virginia (C-Span - Trump, 2016). His landslide success in the state, beating Hillary Clinton’s 26.2% with 67.9% of the popular vote in November 2016, in part reflects the appeal of his vow to end the liberals’ “War on Coal,” which has allegedly destroyed jobs and with them the prosperity of the region. On the same day, West Virginians elected Democrat Jim Justice, who had promised to embrace coal and echoed Trump’s “jobs, jobs, jobs,” as governor. Such rhetoric has two main implications: that West Virginia’s fortunes are tied to coal, and that the decline of coal can be reversed. However, these are only myths and carry no fact-based weight. West Virginia’s economic woes are complex and must be addressed with a multitude of approaches. Instead of viewing renewable energy in a negative light and trying to dismiss it, the state should consider it as a viable source of job creation for the region. Dismantling the Environmental Protection Agency and related regulations such as the Clean Power Plan, all of which are meant to be combating climate change, is not the panacea when addressing the long-neglected demand for jobs in the region. In fact, it will lead to greater long-term woes with marginal short-term benefits. Instead, policymakers must embrace the shift in energy that is essential for climate change mitigation by transitioning to the sustainable energy sector and by investing in job creation to help people adapt to the movement towards a low-carbon economy. More specifically, instead of resuscitating coal mines and opening coal power plants, West Virginian legislators should first remove regulations that discourage renewable energy, then stimulate the demand for renewable energy and related jobs (such as energy efficiency) (GPO, 2011), and finally invest in (re)training programs to help unemployed (coal) workers. For any policy to be successfully executed, it must respect and understand the values and hardships of the region, as it confronts the two aforementioned myths. Therefore, this paper will begin by examining the two relevant problems in the international political economy: climate change and the rise of populism in the heart of the “Coal Country,” namely West Virginia. Such contextualization will provide the objectives and the evaluation criteria for the policies that will be compared. From those assessments, a set of policies recommendation will be constructed for legislators, with the goal of simultaneously addressing the demand for quality jobs and the long-term need to transition towards sustainable energy. Climate Change and the Clean Power Plan Climate change is an inherently global problem, one caused by greenhouse gas emissions (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and nitrogen trifluoride etc.) emitted across the world. Thus, this phenomenon has global repercussions, such as rising sea levels and more frequent extreme weather events (Tanner and Allouche, 2011). The transition to low-carbon energy, which focuses on limiting greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere (Frankfurt, 2017), is crucial to climate change mitigation. The 2015 Paris Agreement, with the overall objective of restricting the global temperature rise to below 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels, is an important milestone in the international cooperation that is crucial in combating climate change. A successful execution, however, depends entirely on the ability of member nations to stay committed to their reduction promises. Under President Obama, the US committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025. The energy sector, accounting for 31% of emissions, is the most influential sector in terms of US greenhouse gas emissions. The Clean Power Plan (CPP) of the Environmental Protection Agency (under section 111(b) of the Clean Air Act) is a key component of this effort, one that encourages the shift towards less polluting sources of energy. However, it is also portrayed as driving the “War on Coal.” To reach the overall goal of 32% reduction (compared to 2005 levels) in carbon dioxide pollution from American power plants, the act stipulates state-specific targets for carbon emission reduction. West Virginia’s target is to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from 72,319 thousand short tons in 2012 to 51,325 thousand short tons (only considering existing sources) or to 51,857 thousand short tons (considering both existing and new sources). That translates into a significant challenge: either a 37% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions per megawatt-hour (“rate-based” target), or a 29% reduction in total emissions from existing sources (a “mass-based” target, which is recommended by the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection’s Feasibility Report) (Van Nostrand, Hansen, and James, 2016). Under the CPP, each state chooses the combination of compliance measures necessary to achieve the goal, such as improving efficiency of existing power plants (“heat rate improvements” in the case of coal power plants), increasing the use of natural gas, increasing the use of renewable sources (hydropower, wind, solar), and reducing the demand for electricity. Thus, it is essential to focus on how increasing renewable sources of energy can be a possible source of sustainable job creation in West Virginia. In addition to legal challenges that immediately attempted to halt the enforcement of the Clean Power Plan, the executive order issued by President Trump on March 28, 2017 rolled back on the Obama-era climate change policies, including the CPP. The country was told such action was being taken in the name of energy independence, and the miners were told: “You’re going back to work.”(Davenport and Rubin, 2017) Absolving the US, the second largest carbon dioxide polluter in the world, from their commitment to climate change mitigation threatens to unravel the multilateral agreements in the global fight against climate change. Other countries also had to face a tradeoff between short-term economic development, and finding sustainable climate change solutions. This is particularly true for China and India (the first and third largest polluters), which have been dependent on coal as an inexpensive source of energy for moving their massive populations out of poverty. West Virginia is an example of the challenges faced in transitioning away from coal as a source of energy once the industry and infrastructures are established. Coal Country and Populism West Virginia’s coal has helped power the country since the Industrial Revolution, and the resulting period of prosperity bound coal to the regional identity. The dual myth – that the decline of coal is reversible and that coal still determines the prospects of West Virginia – continues to prevail at the heart of the Coal Country. These pervasive notions must be considered when designing and implementing policy that emphasizes a shift away from coal. Patrick Hickey, a political science professor at West Virginia University, reflects on the appealing rhetoric of the War on Coal: “It is political suicide to tell citizens the truth about coal.” (Dlouhy and Natter, 2017) Since World War II, the coal industry has experienced dramatic transformations that have led to a decreasing demand for labor. For instance, modern extraction techniques, such as “mountaintop-removal mining” and new machinery, have replaced the traditional pickaxes and shovels. Furthermore, coal operators and contractors have decreased from 250,266 in 1979 to 98,505 in 2015 despite steady output of coal (MSHA, 2015). In the past decade, the rise of cheap natural gas due to hydraulic fracturing (commonly known as “fracking”) has further decreased demand for coal miners. The changing relative prices of coal and natural gas have contributed to this market-driven shift from coal to natural gas. Between 2000 and 2008, natural gas was significantly more expensive than coal. However, with the onslaught of natural gas extracted from shale formations, the gap in prices has narrowed significantly since 2009 (EIA, 2016). Coal was the largest source for electricity generation until 2016, when natural gas (33.8% of US generation share or 1,380,295 gigawatt hours) surpassed coal (30.4% or 1,240,108 gigawatt hours) (EIA, 2017). By contrast, in 2011 natural gas accounted for 24.7% (or 1,013,689 gigawatt hours) and coal accounted for 42.3% (or 1,733,430 gigawatt hours). Because of the long time horizons of power plant construction and retirement (beyond the four year term of one president), these results illustrate the long-term trends in the energy generation industry. The US Energy Information Administration reported that American power companies have retired and converted 13,000 megawatts of coal-power plants, and plan to retire or convert 8,000 megawatts of coal-fired power plants by the end of 2017 (many without regards for recent changes in regulation) (EIA, 2017). This demonstrates how the Clean Power Plan is not, as Trump has argued, the sole or even the biggest culprit for the decline of coal. In fact, the CPP was never meaningfully enacted due to the Supreme Court’s decision to block implementation during the litigation of West Virginia v. EPA (Tsand and Wyatt, 2017). In the absence of real implementation, there is little basis for the argument that CPP has had any direct impact on the decline of coal. In other words, the CPP has been wrongly framed as the culprit of the socioeconomic problems associated with the decline of coal by certain politicians resorting to demagogic rhetoric. The realities of cheap natural gas with decreasing market demand for coal and increasing international support for clean energy cannot be easily reversed. Furthermore, the demand for coal outside of West Virginia also influences the West Virginian coal industry because it exports a significant amount of the coal it produces; in 2014, around half (50 million short tons) were shipped to other states and around one-third (34 million short tons) were exported internationally (EIA, 2017). Coal has long been the largest commodity the state exports by value: 25.3% (or $1.278 billion) in 2016, despite a 25.8% decrease since 2015 (which is consistent with past years) (US Census, 2017). The decrease can be partially attributed to the weaker international demand, especially from China, where the government is prioritizing and heavily investing in sustainable energy development in addition to cutting back on coal (Frankfurt, 2017). These industry-wide trends contradict the narrative of some politicians blaming job loss primarily on environmental regulations such as the Clean Power Plan. The second persisting myth is how West Virginia is tied to coal. For the last 25 years, coal has accounted for less than 5% of the state’s workforce (Cohen, 2016). Nevertheless, the cultural symbolism of coal remains incredibly influential and poignant for the community where, “even if you’re not directly connected to the industry, you may know family members or relatives or ancestors who were.” (Dlouhy and Natter, 2017) To West Virginians, the job of a coal miner once signified, and continues to evoke, a stable middle-class yearly income of $85,000 with many benefits. Being a unionized salary, this was the norm for the coal miners of previous generations, under the United Mine Workers of America (Tabuchi, 2017). The widening income inequality within the industry between the executives and the coal workers has also contributed to the sense of loss and nostalgia for the blue-collar workers of ‘Coal Country,’ which is exacerbated by the replacement of unionized long-term contracts with low pay short-term contracts (Tabuchi, 2017). When the middle-class loses the hope and security that accompanies a well-paying long-term job, populism branded with “jobs” swells quickly. Coal miners and their communities are proud of their heritage and identity, embracing their status as the soldiers powering America. Even an infamous Hillary Clinton quote promoting her $30 billion program for coal workers incorporated praise for coal miners: “Because we're going to put a lot of coal miners and coal companies out of business, right? And we're going to make it clear that we don't want to forget those people. Those people labored in those mines for generations, losing their health, often losing their lives to turn on our lights and power our factories.” (C-Span – Clinton, 2016) Her failed effort to reconcile the declining coal industry with opportunities in the renewable energy sector shows the importance of effectively communicating and convincing not only the coal community, but also blue-collar America, that the coal industry will be supported. Policy Objectives and Criteria For long-term prosperity in West Virginia, policymakers should consider renewable energy as a possible solution in order to simultaneously address the need for climate change mitigation and the demand for sustainable jobs as highlighted by the rise of populism. Without sufficient job creation, climate change efforts could fail to address the (potentially negative) impact on the greater economy, as pointed out by Dr. David Montgomery’s critique of a PERI study on EPA regulations, during the Senate Committee Hearing on Green Jobs and Trade: “the critical error, epitomized by PERI, and common to all the studies in the genre, is their failure to balance the jobs lost in the rest of the economy against those that may be gained as a result of the specific mandated investments… It ignores the increase in the cost of electricity caused by this policy and the effect of that higher cost on household real incomes, wages, productivity, investment in other sectors and economic growth.” (GPO, 2011) Environmental regulations could force policymakers to choose climate change mitigation over economic needs, which would put additional stress on an already sensitive economic situation. West Virginia will likely face the same challenge of dependency on a declining fossil-fuel industry (coal today) again in the future if steps towards renewable energy are not taken. Complying with environmental regulations such as the CPP is only the first step towards long term sustainability, as these policies may continue to perpetuate the dependence on relatively cleaner but non-renewable energy sources such as natural gas or “clean coal.” (Van Nostrand, Hansen, and James, 2016) Natural gas has already begun replacing coal across the nation and within West Virginia, as the state’s existing energy infrastructure and geographic location help make natural gas development significantly cheaper than renewable energy development. Still, the fundamental issue of long-term sustainability in energy generation can only be resolved by a shift (however gradual) towards renewable energy by shifting both market dynamics and state policy. Kate Gordon, the Vice President for Energy Policy at The Center for American Progress Action Fund, presents a strong long-term view: “‘green jobs’ stands for much more than just the jobs themselves. It stands for a whole new set of industries and investments that will make us as a country more competitive and our economy more sustainable in the long term.” (GPO, 2011) Without addressing the constituents’ economic and job demands in West Virginia, which have already contributed to the hopelessness and frustration of the community, populism will continue to rise and undermine the political will to participate in international cooperation for climate change mitigation. Success in creating desirable and sustainable jobs for the disenfranchised blue-collar workers can demonstrate the viability of a low-carbon economy and increase the appeal of combating climate change mitigation. Policy Evaluation and Recommendation Given West Virginia’s status as the fourth largest energy producing state (producing 4.6% of US electricity in 2013), its dependency on coal for generating 94% of that power in 2015, and the greater shift away from coal, there is significant space and potential for sustainable job creation in the renewable energy industry. In neighboring Ohio, which also has a history rooted in coal, there has already been significant progress made in the energy transition. The city of Toledo transformed itself into a center for solar innovation and production, thereby creating over 6,000 jobs (GPO, 2011). In order for there to be an increase in renewable energy investment, the demand for clean energy must be stimulated. The initial steps can be taken by removing the limits placed on net metering, and by allowing more distributed generation that would incentivize installations for renewable energy generation by individuals. The net metering system for solar energy systems’ owners calculates and charges their net usage of electricity, allowing for the excess electricity that these owners contribute to the grid to partially cancel out the electricity that they consume from the grid in the form of issued credits. Policymakers can work towards re-instituting its renewable portfolio standards by requiring investor-owned electric utilities and large retail suppliers to acquire 25% of electricity from alternative and renewable sources by 2025 (for which it became the first state to repeal in 2015) (EIA, 2017). Tax cuts, subsidies, and even loans and investment (perhaps with a combination of private and public funds) for larger utility-scale renewable energy projects can also be considered. However, measures must be taken to ensure long-term viability and responsible use of taxpayer money, and to confirm that incentives are not distorted. This first component of directly stimulating development in the renewable energy sector was missing in Hillary Clinton’s $30 billion “Plan for Revitalizing Coal Communities,” though it does share a similar recommendation for the following retraining program (Clinton, 2015). Secondly, West Virginian workers must be empowered to capitalize on job opportunities in growing renewable energy industries. Investing in retraining initiatives will bridge the gap between employers and employees by improving the skills of the overall labor pool. The success of such action is hopeful: on a smaller scale, the Coalfield Development Corporation’s programs have already demonstrated measurable success. They provide retraining to unemployed coal miners in different sectors: for instance, its “ReWire Appalachia” program uses the 33-6-3 model (33 hours of paid labor, 6 hours of higher education class time, and 3 hours of life-skills mentorship), and focuses on community-based solar projects, and could triple the amount of solar power in West Virginia (Coalfield, 2017). The impact of such program on boosting the solar industry and on empowering unemployed coal miners is indicative of a great initiative that should be scaled up with the support of West Virginia legislators. Regarding the criticism of the costliness of job training programs, cost projections can significantly differ depending on implementation (Louie and Pearce, 2016). Collaboration with potential employers in developing training programs with in-demand skills would also boost the effectiveness of the retraining program. This would not necessarily mean that taxpayers are funding training for certain companies, as long as there is a sufficiently large and diverse number of employers. As West Virginia faces economic challenges and transitional pressures, legislators should consider renewable energy as a potential source of job creation and economic growth. West Virginia has historically been one of the nation’s leaders in energy production. Therefore, rather than relinquish this position as a result of the decline in the coal industry, state officials should understand that fossil fuel sources, such as coal and natural gas, despite their low cost, do not represent the future of energy production and will likely be displaced by renewable energy sources. Thus, investing in clean energy development and retraining programs for present and future unemployed coal workers will allow West Virginia to maintain its status as a key energy producer for the US. However, state leaders must first push back against the dual myths, i.e. that West Virginia’s fortunes are tied to coal and the decline of coal can be reversed, which continually create resistance against alternative sources of energy. Once the myths are properly understood as such, climate change mitigation and the need for sustainable jobs can be transformed into two complementary pieces working together for West Virginia’s benefit. Together, they can create both long-term prosperity and a positive impact on climate change mitigation. Endnotes 3 The other important is adaptation, which focuses on adjusting to the adverse effects of climate change – especially important given how climate change impacts different regions unequally, often exacerbating preexisting poverty. 4 Granted, the poverty and need for electricity cannot be overlooked. 5 This uses controlled explosions on mountains to expose coal seams. 6 I do not agree with the entirety of his statement and was not able to evaluate the economic models. 7 Multiple variations of “Clean Coal” exist, including the aforementioned “heat rate improvements,” the more recent carbon capture and storage technologies that have pushed some coal companies to support the Paris Agreement. 8 The only source of industry investment funding is private, which could limit the scale at which demand for renewable energy can be stimulated. References United States Energy Information Administration. "Electricity Monthly Update", 2017. Presidential Candidate Donald Trump Rally In Charleston, West Virginia. Video. Reprint, Charleston, West Virginia: C-Span, 2016. Subcommittee on Green Jobs and the New Economy, of the Committee on Environment and Public Works. "Green Jobs And Trade: Hearings Before The Subcommittee On Green Jobs And The New Economy, Of The Committee On Environment And Public Works, 112Th Cong., 1St Sess. (2011)". Reprint, GPO, 2011. Tanner, Thomas, and Jeremy Allouche. "Towards A New Political Economy Of Climate Change And Development". IDS Bulletin 42, no. 3 (2011): 1-14. doi:10.1111/j.1759-5436.2011.00217.x. UNEP Centre, Frankfurt School. Global Trends In Renewable Energy Investment 2017. Ebook, 2017. http://fs-unep-centre.org/sites/default/files/publications/ globaltrendsinrenewableenergyinvestment2017.pdf. Van Nostrand, James M., Evan Hansen, and Joseph James. Expanding Economic Opportunity For West Virginia Under The Clean Power Plan. Ebook, 2016. http://energy.law.wvu.edu/files/d/585cffce-0aea-4535-84d0- 344591cfbb8/cpp-phase-ii-final.pdf. Davenport, Coral, and Alissa J. Rubin. "Trump Signs Executive Order Unwinding Obama Climate Policies". Nytimes.Com, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/climate/trump-executive-order-climate-change.html _r=0. Dlouhy, Jennifer A., and Ari Natter. "Trump’S Executive Order Won’T Save Coal Mining Jobs". Bloomberg.Com, 2017. https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-03-27/trump-s-order-won-t-resurrect-jobs-of-miners-key to-his-campaign. Mine Safety and Health Administration. "Average Number Of Employees", 2015. United States Energy Information Administration. "Natural Gas Expected To Surpass Coal In Mix Of Fuel For U.S. Power Generation In 2016", 2016. Tsang, Linda, and Alexandra M. Wyatt. Clean Power Plan: Legal Background And Pending Litigation In West Virginia V. EPA. Ebook. Reprint, Congressional Research Service, 2017. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44480.pdf. United States Energy Information Administration. "West Virginia State Energy Profile", 2017. United States Census Bureau. "State Exports From West Virginia", 2017. Cohen, Roger. "We Need ‘Somebody Spectacular’: Views From Trump Country". Nytimes.Com, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/opinion/sunday/we-need-somebody-spectacular-views-from-trump country.html?_r=0. Tabuchi, Hiroko. "Coal Jobs Prove Lucrative, But Not For Those In The Mines". nytimes.Com, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/climate/coal-jobs-prove-lucrative-but-not-for-those-in-the-mines.html em_pos=large&emc =edit_dk_20170502&nl=dealbook&nlid=76920780&ref=headline&te=1&_r=1. Hillary Clinton CNN Democratic Presidential Town Hall. Video. Reprint, CNN, 2016. Clinton, Hillary. "Hillary Clinton’S Plan For Revitalizing Coal Communities". Hillaryclinton.Com, 2015. https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets/2015/11/12/clinton-plan-to-revitalize-coal-communities Harold, Zack. "Revisioning Appalachia | Coalfield Development". Coalfield Development, 2017. http://coalfield-development.org/revisioning-appalachia/ . Louie, Edward P., and Joshua M. Pearce. "Retraining Investment For U.S. Transition From Coal To Solar Photovoltaic Employment". Energy Economics 57 (2016): 295-302. doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2016.05.016. Di Muzio, Tim, and Jesse Salah Ovadia. Energy, Capitalism And World Order: Towards A New Agenda In International Political Economy. Reprint, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Newell, Peter. Globalization And The Environment. Reprint, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.

*Feature* Greg Fischer Greg Fischer Mayor of Louisville, KY Spring 2018 I came to public service after spending 30 years working as an entrepreneur. In the business world, I found that the best way to accomplish goals was to envision a bright future, and then work hard in collaboration with others to make that vision a reality. That’s the approach I brought to city government when I became mayor of my hometown in 2011. Louisville, like our country as a whole, was still coming out of the Great Recession; unemployment was over 10 percent; we’d been losing jobs; and there was a general sense of anxiety about the future. My team and I worked to address those fundamental economic concerns but we also knew that you don’t solve one challenge by neglecting the others. To prime our city for 21st-century success, we needed to change Louisville’s culture, and that meant cultivating an attitude of optimism, while also working to strengthen the bonds among the members of our increasingly diverse city of 760,000. In my inaugural speech, I set out the three core values my team would use to guide our work: We would make Louisville a city of lifelong learning, a healthier city, and an even more compassionate city. I emphasized these values because they’re essential for citizens in any successful, modern, global city: Lifelong learning is essential because, in a world where we’re seeing constant technological, economic and societal changes, it’s the lifelong learners who are best equipped to adapt and thrive. Health, which we define as both human and environmental health, is the most fundamental human need. Compassion helps build what I call our city’s “social muscles” – the bonds that form among the members of our community and that help us stay united in challenging times. Our focus on compassion compels us to help everyone in our city regardless of race, gender, wealth, nationality or circumstance reach their full human potential. My decision to highlight compassion as a core value earned me some criticism from a few people who said it would make our city look weak, but it’s clear that compassion is a smart leadership strategy for any city. Seven years in, the results of our work show that compassion and economic growth can go hand-in-hand: Since 2011, our city has created over 70,000 new private sector jobs, opened 2,500 new businesses, reduced unemployment to 3.2 percent, and attracted nearly $13 billion in capital investment. Though we’re proud of these accomplishments, a city’s prosperity is only real when it is shared by all. That’s why it’s tremendously encouraging to see signs of growth in some of our historically underserved neighborhoods, particularly in west Louisville, where too many people have been hindered by racist practices like redlining and urban renewal in the 20th century. These were official government policies that targeted African-Americans in our community and many others. As public servants, we have an obligation to address these historic injustices. We’ve been working with partners in the public and private sectors to create opportunities in underserved areas, and have recently seen more than $800 million of public and private investment pour into west Louisville. City government is also working to clear the path to prosperity through programs that encourage entrepreneurs, job training and home ownership. We’re also working on digital inclusion, attempting to increase access to the tools of 21st-century learning and communication. Compassion fuels these and all our decisions at Louisville Metro Government because it’s the morally right approach and because helping more people realize their full potential helps our city reach its own. For example, if every Louisville family earning poverty-level wages earned a living wage, it would add almost $900 million to our city’s economy every year. That’s a win for everyone. One way we’re working to accomplish this is by creating opportunities for our young people. This year will mark the seventh year of our SummerWorks program, which we created to help counter the high rates of youth unemployment that lingered after the recession. Focusing on people ages 16-21, SummerWorks is now helping more than 5,000 youth find summer jobs with more than 170 local businesses, from mom-and-pop shops to Fortune 500 companies. We also have to continue working to help our citizens at every stage of their careers get the skills they need to compete and win in the careers of the future. Partnering with key local industries, we’ve helped establish public-private initiatives like Code Louisville, which provides free training in software coding, as well as the Kentucky Health Career Center and Kentucky Manufacturing Career Center. In addition, as a welcoming, globally-minded city, Louisville must support the members of our growing immigrant community. That’s why we provide the opportunity to earn professional certifications through our MTELL program: Manufacturing Training for English Language Learners. Our core values of compassion and lifelong learning come together in many of our programs, including the Compassionate Schools Project, which we launched in 2015 in partnership with Jefferson County Public Schools and the University of Virginia. Today, many of Louisville’s elementary school children are learning a revolutionary new curriculum that integrates mindfulness, compassion, nutrition, wellness and more into the school day to help our youth become better learners and better citizens. Creating pathways to opportunity also means removing barriers, including violent crime. We created our Office for Safe and Healthy Neighborhoods, whose mission is to encourage peace and health in every neighborhood and reduce the violence too often experienced by young adults in under-resourced communities. Safe and Healthy Neighborhoods works with local and national partners to fund and facilitate innovative programs such as Pivot 2 Peace, which identifies victims of violence from ZIP codes that have high rates of violent crime – and while those victims are recovering, a social worker visits them in the hospital and provides information about pathways to education, employment and more in an effort to break the cycle of violence. Compassion-driven programs like these have helped us respond to the challenges that Louisville, like any city, inevitably faces, and emerge stronger and more invested in one another and our collective future. Looking ahead to the future of Louisville (and I hope, other cities as well), the vision guiding us remains the same: I see a growing community that honors and learns from the past, lives fully in the present and prepares for the future. I see a thriving city that competes and wins in the global marketplace and whose reputation for compassion, innovation and opportunity continues to grow on the world stage. I see a sustainable city, filled with safe and healthy neighborhoods, where good health and prosperity are equally available to people of every age, race and background. I see a connected and compassionate city, where every person has the chance to reach their full human potential. Even as so much of our country and our world seems to be focused on division, and embracing an us-vs-them ideology, I remain optimistic about our future. That’s because I see so many determined people of all ages, races and backgrounds working to create a better future. They believe in what Louisville’s great native son Muhammad Ali called, “the work of the heart.” The world-champion boxer and humanitarian loved his hometown and in challenging moments, I take comfort from The Champ’s words, “All through my life I have been tested. My will has been tested, my courage has been tested,” he wrote in The Soul of a Butterfly. “My soul has grown over the years, and some of my views have changed. As long as I am alive, I will continue to try to understand more because the work of the heart is never done." The City is taking a holistic approach to our economic revitalization process by hosting hundreds of community conversations across the City to help inform decisions around major projects. After hearing from our residents, we’ve prioritized investing in innovative educational programming to address historic inequities; creating dynamic workforce programs more suitable for an inclusive new economy; and leveraging our inherent strengths to produce more sustainable growth.

Statelessness A Contradiction in International Law with Asymmetrical Regional Solutions Samantha Altschuler Brown University Author Ginevra Bulgari Vance Kelly Lillian Schoeller Editors Fall 2018 An analysis of statelessness and its difficulties as explored by case studies on Slovenia and Myanmar. “Witness accounts, satellite imagery and data, and photo and video evidence gathered by Amnesty International all point to the same conclusion,” contends Amnesty International. They continue, “Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya women, men, and children have been the victims of a widespread and systematic attack, amounting to crimes against humanity."[1] How exactly is a state able to perpetrate these crimes against its own citizens in the human rights age without consequence? The answer lies in the word “citizen.” According to Myanmar’s domestic law, the Rohingya are no longer considered citizens and thus do not hold the rights of citizens. They belong to no nation, are protected by no law. They are stateless. Introduction The phenomenon of statelessness has plagued the international community since the end of World War I. This paper investigates why, despite the rise of the human rights and refugee regimes, the issue of statelessness remains unsolved. To do so, it will review the legal reality of statelessness and then argue that there exists a fundamental contradiction in international law that makes statelessness uniquely difficult to address. This contradiction, which arises from international law simultaneously protecting the individual’s human right to nationality and the state’s right to determine its nationals according to domestic law, creates the opportunity to render peoples stateless. This paper will then examine two key case studies: Slovenia will represent a successful handling of statelessness while Myanmar will demonstrate a failure. After analyzing the similarities and differences between the two cases, this paper will suggest that given the legal ambiguity surrounding statelessness, the successful resolution of statelessness depends on the values and interests of the regional supranational organization to which the state in question belongs. Those regions that, shaped by their geographies and histories, are characterized by values and interests that support human rights and intervention are more likely to resolve issues of statelessness; those regions that place a higher value on sovereignty and have interests in non-intervention will be far less likely to intervene in states’ internal affairs. Defining Statelessness At this point, it becomes necessary to legally distinguish the stateless person from the refugee or internally displaced person (IDP). The refugee is legally defined as someone who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."[2] Refugees, in short, are citizens who fled their states for fear of persecution. Once outside their state, however, they are well protected under clear and strong international law. This is not to say that all states always uphold their obligations to protect refugees, but that legally the refugee outside his nation is entitled to safe asylum, medical care, schooling, work, and basic human rights and freedoms as would be extended to any other foreign legal resident.[3] An IDP is a citizen forced to relocate within his or her state “to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters.”[4] IDPs, by definition, cannot have crossed an international border. Unlike refugees who are outside their state and entitled to international protections, IDPs “being inside their country, remain entitled to all the rights and guarantees as citizens and other habitual residents of their country. As such, national authorities have the primary responsibility to prevent forced displacement and to protect IDPs.”[5] The 1948 Study on Statelessness conducted by the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons defines the stateless as “persons who are not nationals of any State, either because at birth or subsequently they were not given any nationality, or because during their lifetime they lost their own nationality and did not acquire a new one.”[6] The stateless, without citizenship, do not qualify as refugees or IDPs. Accordingly, they are not entitled to international refugee protections, nor are they protected by any state. Furthermore, acquisition of citizenship is not so simple as the above report might suggest; domestic laws often ban particular groups, primarily ethnic minorities, from acquiring citizenship. The domestic procedures for conferring citizenship are unique to each state, but typically include some combination of jus sanguinis and jus soli, that is right of blood (citizenship granted by parentage) and right of soil (granted by birth in the territory). Jus sanguinis laws prove particularly problematic, as they frequently serve to determine nationality along ethnic lines and in doing so render ethnic minorities stateless. The Difficulty: Contradiction in International Law The fundamental contradiction that allows for statelessness lies in the simultaneous sanctity under international law of the universal human right to nationality and the state’s sovereign right to determine its citizenship. The right to a nationality is upheld in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.[7] Furthermore, many international bodies and covenants assert that the right to a nationality protects against arbitrary deprivation of citizenship. The UDHR claims “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”[8] The ICCPR too holds that “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived the right to enter his own country.”[9] The ICERD further enshrines the “right to leave any country, including one’s own, and return to one’s country.”[10] In 2009, the United Nations Human Rights Council prepared a report on behalf of UN Secretary-General on “human rights and the arbitrary deprivation of nationality.” This report advocates, “The prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality, which aims at protecting the right to nationality, is implicit in provisions of human rights treaties that prescribe specific forms of discrimination.”[11] Article 27 states, “Deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness would generally be arbitrary unless it served a legitimate purpose and complied with the principle of proportionality.”[12] There is evidently no shortage of international conventions honoring the right to nationality and protection from arbitrary deprivation. At the same, however, international law grants the state the right to determine who is and is not a national. The Convention on Certain Questions Relating to Nationality law holds that “It is for each State to determine under its own laws who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality.”[13] The latter part of this 1st Article is rather confusing; which international conventions, customs, and principles it refers to is unclear. The case could and has be made by supporters of the human rights regime that it refers to international law discussed above. This would mean that states’ right to determine nationals would defer to international conventions protecting the right to nationality and protection from arbitrary deprivation. The opposite argument, favoring state sovereignty and the abundance of law protecting it, is bolstered by Article 2 of the same Convention, which states, “Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of the State.”[14] This lack of clarity and the soundness of both arguments allow for each state to choose whether or not to act in accordance with conventions protecting against statelessness, and for other states in the global community to interpret whether or not they consider those acts legal. Many attempts have been made to reconcile the legal disconnect between the universal right to nationality and the domestic right of the state to determine its nationals. One such example is Special Rapporteur Córdova’s Report on Elimination or Reduction of Statelessness for the International Law Commission written in 1953. In Article 14, Córdova writes that “international law may also restrict the authority of the State to deprive a person of its own nationality. There are cases in which international law considers that a certain national legislation is not legal because it comes into conflict with the broader interests of the international community.”[15] Article 15 further clarifies that “the right of individual States to legislate in matters of nationality is dependent upon and subordinate to the rules of international law on the subject, and that, therefore, these questions of nationality are not, as has been argued, entirely reserved for the exclusive jurisdiction of the individual States themselves.”[16] These statements, however, remain both controversial and difficult to enforce. While the spirit of international law is arguably in line with Córdova’s call for states to defer to international convention, the letter of the law protects the sovereignty of states and does not directly address the gap between the individual right to nationality and the state’s right to determine citizenship. Paul Weis, co-author of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, explains in his now standard work Nationality and Statelessness in International Law: “to the extent that there are no rules of international law imposing a duty on States to confer their nationality, and few, if any, rules denying or restricting the right of States to withdraw their nationality, one may say that statelessness is not inconsistent with international law.”[17] Without international law instructing the state to create in its domestic law a standard set of rules regarding citizenship, Córdova’s report is easily ignored or contested. Any such laws would constitute a breach of state sovereignty and it is extremely unlikely they will ever arise, at least in any form other than purely voluntary guidelines. Thus, the contradiction between the right of the individual and the right of the state remains, and with it the opportunity for states to deprive unwanted individuals, mainly ethnic minorities, of citizenship. Recognizing the weakness of international law concerning statelessness, the UN established the 1954 Convention relating to Status of Stateless Persons. Rather than address the cause of the problem by attempting to impose duties or restrictions on states, the Convention instead focused on easing the symptoms. According to the UNHCR, the “1954 Convention is designed to ensure that stateless people enjoy a minimum set of human rights.”[18] These rights, as will be discussed at greater length in the case studies below, are far from upheld. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, on the other hand, actually attempted to address the root of the problem by providing something very close to the laws Weis referred to as non-existent. It “requires that states establish safeguards in their nationality laws to prevent statelessness at birth and later in life… establishes that children are to acquire the nationality of the country in which they are born if they do not acquire any other nationality” and “sets out important safeguards to prevent statelessness due to loss or renunciation of nationality and state succession.”[19] This convention represents the most direct attempt to combat statelessness but has unfortunately been met with minimal success. Unsurprisingly, states were slow to forgo their right to determine citizenship. Only 61 states are party, as compared to the 83 that are party to the 54 Convention. Further, the two states that will now be discussed as case studies are not party to the convention, highlighting the weakness of protections for the stateless. Case Studies Having established that international law does not conclusively protect against statelessness, the question arises as to why statelessness is successfully addressed in some cases and not in others. In answering this question, this paper next presents an example of the successful resolution of an issue of statelessness, which occurred in Slovenia, and an example of the devastating consequences of statelessness left unresolved, which is currently occurring with the Rohingya people in Myanmar. While these two cases, of course, represent only two examples of statelessness, they were selected specifically to represent the two opposite ends of the spectrum, success and failure. Case Study 1: Slovenia The Republic of Slovenia is a rather young state, having only gained independence in 1991 amidst the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The Slovene desire for independence, however, stretches back much further. The ethnically Slovene people (not to be confused with the “Slovenian”, meaning of Slovenia) have throughout history belonged to various states and empires, including the Roman Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, and the Habsburg Monarchy. After World War I, Slovenes for the first time attained a degree of independence through participation in the formation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. The State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs later joined with Serbia to become the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. After occupation by Germany, Hungary, and Italy during World War II, Slovenia joined the SFRY. Under the rule of Josip Tito, Slovenia enjoyed considerable economic rights and freedoms that allowed their economy to flourish. Upon Tito’s death, politicians across the SFRY, most notably Slobodan Milosevic, mobilized support by taking advantage of existing ethnic hostilities. In addition to ethnic tension, the Slovenes felt exploited by the SFRY, which redistributed the fruit of their economic success to support the less successful economies of other SFRY republics. Slovenia held a referendum in 1990 and became independent in June of 1991. a. Rendering Stateless: Domestic Citizenship Law The history of subordination instilled in Slovenes the desire for not only independence but also the establishment of a national identity. After discontent with the communist and multi-ethnic SFRY, Slovenia was quick to write its independence into law with the drafting of a new constitution for a democratic and ethnically homogenous state. As occurred in many post-Yugoslav states, Slovenia’s constitution and citizenship laws defined the emergent state along ethnic lines. The preamble to Slovenia’s constitution invokes the identity of the majority ethnic group, Slovenes, reading “[Proceeding…] from the historical fact that in a centuries-long struggle for national liberation we Slovenes have established our national identity and asserted our statehood.”[20] Igor Štiks describes the way Slovenia drafted their new legislation, saying, “[W]hat initially presented itself as ethnic solidarity and a nationalist vision of recomposition of previously existed communities into neatly divided ethnocultural groups governing ‘their’ territory was soon enshrined in legislation” through the use of “citizenship laws as an effective tool for ethnic engineering.”[21] Under the SFRY system, each citizen held citizenship both to the SFRY and to one of its republics. The same month they achieved independence, June of 1991, Slovenia adopted the Citizenship Act of the Republic of Slovenia. The Act provided that those individuals who held both SFRY and Slovenian citizenship prior to the referendum on independence in 1990 (a year before Slovenia was actually independent) were automatically considered citizens. Those who were not had a six-month period to apply for citizenship, after which they would become illegal aliens.[22] While on its face this law may seem innocent enough, Štiks explains, “[T]he law itself becomes quite controversial when we consider that it enabled policies of ethnic engineering.”[23] After the six months passed, those who had not acquired citizenship, either because they had not applied or had not been approved, were rendered stateless. Slovenia now recognizes it left 18,205 people stateless, while the European Court of Human Rights places the number at 25,671.[24] Many of these citizens never applied for citizenship because they were born in Slovenia and assumed jus soli they were citizens, because they were simply unaware of the law at all, or because they did not understand it applied to them.[25] Others did attempt to apply, but were limited by the “short application period of six months, confusing procedures, numerous difficulties in obtaining all necessary documents at the moment of Yugoslavia’s break-up and subsequent escalation of violence, and finally by the overall political confusion since Slovenia was still legally part of the SFRY and was not internationally recognized until January 1992.”[26] Another group had their applications denied, for example, for failing to satisfy the requirement that they not “endanger public order”[27] (which was not defined) or that they possess “assured residence and sufficient income that guarantees material and social security.”[28] The government did not provide notification or explanation to those in danger of losing citizenship. Štiks explains that this “confusion was only partly the product of an unstable political context” and that the government in reality “created confusion intentionally. Arbitrariness could be found in many of the legal prescriptions and actual administrative practices, and was clearly part of a general strategy” under which “the citizenship laws and the procedures for acquiring new citizenship proved to be the main weapon of administrative ethnic engineering.”[29] The result was that those of ethnically Slovene descent were accepted jus sanguinis as citizens, while thousands of ethnic minorities, despite being born in Slovenia or having extended residence, were denied. Those ethnic minorities who did not acquire Slovenian citizenship were literally erased from the national registries overnight. “Their documents (e.g. passports, driver’s licenses and IDs) were invalidated. They lost all civic and social rights, jobs, health care and social benefits, and became ‘dead’ from an administrative point of view – they were izbrisani, i.e. erased.”[30] To be dead from an administrative point of view has very tangible consequences. Losing their citizenship meant the loss of both health care and legal employment, which in turn drove many to homelessness.[31] b. Domestic Response: Judicial Failure Though Slovenia enjoys a highly functioning judicial system, the numerous attempts of stateless peoples to bring their case to Constitutional Court saw very little success. In 1999, the Constitutional Court did find the Citizenship Act illegal and called on the legislature to correct it.[32] However, when legislation to do so was drafted, voter turnout was “less than a third of the 1.6 million electorate, and the Act was rejected by almost 95 percent.”[33] Mild, yet certainly insufficient, progress came in the form of an amendment to the Citizenship Act in 2002 creating a new article stating that “An adult may obtain Slovenian citizenship if he or she is of Slovenian descent through at least one parent and if his or her citizenship in the Republic of Slovenia has ceased due to release, renunciation, or deprivation or because the person had not acquired Slovenian citizenship due to his historical circumstances.”[34] Essentially, this amendment provided the option for ethnic Slovenes who had been rendered stateless in the confusion of 1991 to reclaim citizenship. It did nothing, however, for those who had been born in Slovenia to non-Slovene parents and thereby required citizenship jus soli. For these individuals, the new law introduced naturalization, which required the applicant “have lived in Slovenia for ten years,” “not constitute a threat to public order,” “fulfill his or her tax obligations and has a guaranteed permanent source of income,” and possess the “required knowledge of the Slovene language.”[35] This last requirement included a language examination where none existed before. Many of the stateless possessed insufficient mastery of the language, their first languages being Croatian, Serbian, Italian or Hungarian.[36] These requirements provided opportunity for ethnic discrimination, both obviously in the language examination and more subtly via the undefined “threat to public order.” c. International Response: Regional Intervention In 2006, the case of the stateless of Slovenia was brought before the European Court of Human Rights. After deliberation, the Court found “in July 2010 that Slovenia had violated the right to private life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”[37] Slovenia appealed and the case was taken up by the Grand Chamber, which held in July 2011 that Slovenia had breached Article 8, as well as Article 14, prohibiting discrimination, and Article 13, the right to an effective remedy.[38] The Court “ordered Slovenia to pay between €29,400 and €72,770 to each of the six applicants in the case,” which amounted to “€150 per person per month” [39] spent stateless. While this case represented only a handful of the erased, it has set both legal and normative precedent for other stateless persons of Slovenia, who now have 65 cases pending. [40] James Goldstone, executive director of the Open Society Justice Initiative, remarked, “This decision should enable thousands of the ‘erased’ to finally receive legal recognition…the judgment represents an important milestone in strengthening international norms against statelessness.”[41] Case Study 2: Myanmar “The word ‘Rohingya’ is a historical name for the Muslim Arakanese.”[42] Arakanese refers to the region formerly called Arakan, now a territory of Myanmar known as the Rakhine State. Arakan experienced periods of independence and domination until 1784, when it was “formally annexed by the Kingdom of Burma.”[43] This annexation later brought the ire of the British, who also had interest in the region. This resulted in the First Anglo-Burmese War, lasting from 1824 to 1826. It is important to note that this date of 1824 is now used in Myanmar as the marker of colonial rule. Research Professor Azeem Ibrahim explains, “Up to this point in time, the histories of Burma and Arakan were largely separate...”[44] A series of Anglo-Burmese wars thereafter ended in further British conquerings and their establishing “a clear division between a central region dominated by the Burman majority and outlying regions in which a complex patchwork of ethnic groups lived alongside one another.”[45] The ethnic origins of the Rohingya have recently been questioned. One group, including Ibrahim, contends “the Rohingyas settled in Burma in the ninth century, which, through the ages, have mixed with Bengalis, Persians, Moghuls, Turks, and Pathans, in line with the historically pluralistic population of Arakan State,” while the other considers them to be “illegal Chittagonian Bengalis who arrived as a by-product of British colonial rule.”[46] Unfortunately for the Rohinyga, the latter view has become widely accepted in Myanmar. In addition to being considered foreign, the association with British colonial rule is dangerous for the Rohingya. The British placed the ethnically Burmese Buddhist majority lower on the hierarchy during their rule than the Rohingya Muslims.[47] The Burmese deeply resented their inferior status, colonial rule, and the preferential treatment bestowed upon the Rohingya. Additionally, the Rohingya supported the British occupation. Ibrahim identifies this historical “link between religion, ethnicity and anti-British sentiment” as having a “profound influence”[48] in creating the intense ethnic hatred felt toward the Rohingya today. During World War II, Japan invaded and took over the region from the British. While the ethnic Burmese ranged from indifferent to supportive of the Japanese, the Rohingya supported British rule. This further heightened ethnic tensions in the area. The British recruited soldiers from both the Rohingya and ethnically Burmese, promising both groups independence after the war in exchange for their service. General Aung San famously led the Burmese to fight, first for the Japanese who made similar promises for independence, then later for the British. When Burma became independent in 1948, the Rohingya petitioned to join the Muslim state of East Pakistan. The petition was rejected, but had the effect of leading the “Burmese authorities to regard the Muslim population of Arakan as hostile to the new regime and to see them as outsiders whose loyalty lay with a different state. These events helped create a belief that only Buddhists could really be part of the new state.”[49] Burma’s history has been complex since achieving independence, but for the sake of brevity, it is here heavily condensed. Burma experienced a short period of democracy wracked with ethnic conflict and civil strife. General Ne Win first established a caretaker government, then later launched a military overthrow in 1962. Under military rule, Burma met protest and opposition with arrest and violence. In 1988, amid severe unrest, Ne Win stepped down. Student protests were met with police brutality, triggering demonstrations and further protests that were in turn met with military-grade violence. After a period of chaos and revolutionary fervor, General Saw Maung lead a coup, became Prime Minister, and instituted martial law. It was in 1989 that the military government changed the state’s name to Myanmar. Notably, in 1991, Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of famed General Aung San who had helped bring independence but was assassinated before it was realized, received the Nobel Peace Prize while under house arrest for her words regarding peaceful reform. Throughout the 2000s, the military government made several small steps to ease Myanmar into democracy, culminating in 2011 with political reform and the release of Suu Kyi from house arrest. Under the new democracy, Suu Kyi won a seat in parliament in 2012. She was elected to the presidency in 2015, but is constitutionally barred from the presidency. She is the de facto state leader, but called officially “State Counselor.” a. Rendered Stateless: Domestic Citizenship Law It was during the time of unrest in 1974 that an intense need to divert public dissatisfaction resulted in the Emergency Immigration Act. The Act “imposed ethnicity-based cards (National Registration Certificates), with the Rohingya only being eligible for Foreign Registration Cards (non-national cards).”[50] These cards represented the first step in depriving the Rohingya of their citizenship. The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma then defined citizenship jus sanguinis, giving it to those whose parents were citizens in 1947 – a time when the Rohingya were not formally citizens (as they had never been required to register, given their assumed citizenship jus soli).[51] Finally, in 1982, the Burmese Citizenship Law created categories of citizenship grouped by ethnicity. The groups were meant to align with length of bloodline prior to 1824 (the date marking the start of colonial rule). If a group was not considered indigenous prior to British rule, they were declared foreigners. This is what happened to the Rohingya, who subsequently became stateless. The Law includes steps for naturalization, but as Ibrahim explains, “[T]he one category that is excluded is someone born to two parents neither of whom are already citizens (the Rohingyas are therefore, by definition, excluded).”[52] In the most recent census (2015), “Rohingya” was not listed among the 135 ethnic groups, and their status as illegal residents was cemented. The stateless Rohingya have been systematically abused for decades, but in 2012 there was an incident wherein an ethnically Burmese Buddhist woman was raped by a Muslim Rohingya man that escalated the crisis.[53] Violence against the Rohingya became severe and their status as stateless both intensified the hatred directed towards them (as it confirmed their status as illegal Bangladeshis) and left them without legal protection or recourse. For his report for the Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Ullah conducted 29 interviews with Rohingya. He found the situation far worse than the lack of income or healthcare experienced by the erased in Slovenia. Rohingya women explained how their “status of statelessness makes them vulnerable to sexual attack at different levels by pirates, bandits, members of the security forces, smugglers, or other refugees.”[54] One interviewee, Mr. Kalam, explains his experience as follows: "We were born on this soil but we are called illegal migrants....my family is from Maungdaw, but we left a few days later the NaSaKa people raped my sister in front of my family members. My brother in-law tried to resist them but he was taken away by them and he never returned. They told us if we didn’t leave Myanmar they would kill us all brutally."[55] In October of 2017, Amnesty International reported that over 530,00 Rohingya attempted to flee the country.[56] Given Myanmar’s geographic position, that journey requires them to brave the sea. Ullah’s interviewees describe the danger of the journey, which included starvation, beatings, and observed suicide of many who threw themselves overboard.[57] Those who survived the crossing were often treated no better upon arrival. Human Rights Watch issued a report in 2009 entitled “Perilous Plight” following the emergence of graphic images of a group of Rohingya on board a boat from Myanmar to Thailand.[58] The report discusses “Thailand’s callous ‘push-back’ policy,"[59] calling out the Thai government for “saying that the Rohingya were economic migrants, not refugees, and that Thailand could not absorb the flow.”[60] Worse than sending the Rohingya back to Myanmar (which would breach non-refoulement laws if the Rohingya were legally refugees[61] , [62] ) is the reality that “In May 2015, gruesome mass graves were unearthed in southern Thailand, revealing scores of bodies belonging to mostly Rohingya refugees.”[63] The Rohingya represent the very worst possible outcome of statelessness. They exemplify the way in which a people without citizenship or refugee status become vulnerable. This vulnerability, when applied to a despised people, results in some of humanity’s darkest crimes, many of which are now being identified as ethnic cleansing[64] and crimes against humanity.[65] b. Domestic Response: Endorsement and Ignorance As described, there is an abundance of evidence supporting the fact that the violence against the Rohingya is state-sponsored. Ullah calls it “organized, incited, and committed by local political party operatives, the Buddhist monkhood, and ordinary Arakanese, directly supported by state security forces.”[66] There is no functioning judicial infrastructure to speak of in Myanmar, though if there were it would be useless given the intermittent application of martial law. Suu Kyi, to the great disappointment of the West who honored her with the Nobel Peace Prize, has been largely silent and apathetic regarding the Rohingya. She avoids using the word “Rohingya” in interviews, mentioning it only in connection with the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, a Rohingya resistance group, which she claims commits acts of terrorism.[67] In one interview, Suu Kyi downplayed the crisis to such an extent that she referred to it as a “quarrel.”[68] When cornered by the media, she claims the West exaggerates the crisis.[69] Furthermore, the government of Myanmar has been accused of interfering with humanitarian aid meant for the Rohingya. The Rahkine National Party spokesperson justified restricting the aid supply as follows: “When the international community give them [Rohingya] a lot of food and a lot of donations, they will grow fat and become stronger, and they will become more violent.”[70] In keeping with this logic, borders were shut to international agencies attempting to help the Rohingya, such as Médecins Sans Frontiéres (the French branch of the NGO Doctors Without Borders), in what the ISCI calls deliberate “state actions designed to systematically weaken the Rohingya community.”[71] c. International Response: Non-Intervention The international response has largely been that of naming and shaming. Both Amnesty International[72] and Human Rights Watch[73] have labeled the abuses in Myanmar as Crimes Against Humanity. The US has responded with words of condemnation. Rex Tillerson, US Secretary of State, stated in November of 2017, "These abuses by some among the Burmese military, security forces, and local vigilantes have caused tremendous suffering... After a careful and thorough analysis of available facts, it is clear that the situation in northern Rakhine state constitutes ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya."[74] Yet, the only action taken has come in the form of diplomatic visits, verbal urges, and sanctions that were lifted in 2015. The European Union also lifted their sanctions in 2013 (except for an arms embargo). The UN has crafted reports and condemnations, but there has been no mention of action beyond the normative sphere. The UN has plans drafted for providing the Rohingya in Bangladesh with resources and aid,[75] but despite the talk of crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, there has been no movement in the General Assembly toward humanitarian intervention beyond aid. On the regional level, Myanmar is a member of the new supranational organization ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). The 30th ASEAN Summit in April of 2017 notably did not include the crisis in Myanmar on its agenda and made no mention of it throughout the entirety of the Summit.[76] According to an article from The Diplomat, President Widodo of Indonesia expressed to Suu Kyi “that stability in Myanmar was important not only for the country but also the region.”[77] This passing comment, representing the most direct acknowledgement of the crisis from the Summit, is a far cry from intervention or even condemnation by fellow ASEAN states. As is typical of the culture of ASEAN (which will be discussed later at length), the problem is identified as an issue of stability rather than human rights. Bangladesh, which is not an ASEAN member, has worked with the United Nations Development Programme to create a Humanitarian Response Plan.[78] The Plan seeks to raise US $434 million for humanitarian aid, resources, and improved infrastructure in the host communities receiving the influx of Rohingya. The area to which most of the Rohingya arrive, Cox Bazar, has a “population of 2,290,000 predominantly Bengali Muslims, is one of Bangladesh’s poorest and most vulnerable districts, with malnutrition and food insecurity at chronic moderate levels, and poverty well above the national average.”[79] The Plan stressed the difficulty for Cox Bazar to accommodate the Rohingya who are “adversely affecting the food security and nutrition situation, and impacting the local economy by introducing a labor surplus which has driven day labor wages down, and an increase in the price of basic food and non-food items.”[80] The Plan also identifies a need for capital to address the issue of the increase in the illegal methamphetamine “yaba” coming from Myanmar and entering the local drug trafficking circles in Cox Bazar.[81] Case Study Analysis Similarities: Both cases of statelessness begin with the establishment of independent states freeing themselves from the influence of larger empires they felt exploited by. Slovenia emerged from the SRFY, while Myanmar gained independence from British colonial rule. Both states had preexisting ethnic tensions and upon independence used jus sanguinis citizenship laws as tools of ethnic engineering to establish national ethnic identities that privileged the ethnic majority over ethnic minorities. Slovenia’s citizenship law was written in 1990, while Myanmar’s was written just a few years prior in 1982. Both states are members of the UN and have affirmed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Both have chosen to join regional supranational organizations: Slovenia both the European Union and the Council of Europe, and Myanmar ASEAN. The Council of Europe has a doctrine of human rights, titled the European Convention on Human Rights, while ASEAN has formed the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and has included human rights law explicitly in their Charter.[82] Differences: While both case studies feature a recent history of independence, only Myanmar has a colonial history. Among the many long-term effects of colonialism is the exacerbation of deep ethnic tensions.[83] While the ethnic Slovenes had a desire to assert their independence and bolster their ethnic identity, they did not have a history of ethnic conflict rooted in colonial oppression. The ethnic majority of Myanmar, however, harbors a hatred of the Rohingya for their support of the British colonizers and their privileged position under colonial rule. This hatred, left to fester for centuries and passed down through generations, helps to explain the view of the Rohingya dominant in Myanmar: that they are Bangladeshi foreigners that have no place in Myanmar. Another difference, also attributable (at least in part) to colonial legacy, is in development status. Slovenia is affluent and highly developed, as is typical of European states. Myanmar, like many Southeast Asian states, has been a Least Developed Country since 1987. For the last thirty years, they have not been able to reduce their Economic Vulnerability Index the requisite degree to graduate to a Developing Country.[84] Development Status, of course, reflects the state economy, but it also includes rates of literacy, undernourishment, child mortality, and education.[85] These factors influence the political realities of states. Slovenia has had the opportunity to invest in infrastructure and education that allows for high quality of life, reduced ethnic divide, and high levels of institutionalization and rule of law. Myanmar, on the other hand, has not had the resources to engage in those opportunities, and instead faced poverty that only hindered rule of law, aggravated tensions, and made people susceptible to mobilization along ethnic lines by military and political opportunists. While both states are part of supranational regional organizations, the strength, values, and interests of these two organizations are vastly different. The Council of Europe, founded in 1949, is characterized by a culture committed to Human Rights. Being an old organization comprised of wealthy and like-minded states, it has been able to develop strong institutions. The interest in and capacity to enforce human rights law manifests in the strength of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. This culture of human rights and strength of institutions combined with an interest from regional states absorbing the stateless together brought the Court to convict Slovenia of breaching the European Human Rights Convention. Slovenia, under the weight of this powerful regional organization, conceded. Additionally, Slovenia is a new member of the EU and has such had an interest in accepting the EU’s human rights norms in order to cement their status as an EU member (and to avoid EU sanctions). The fledgling ASEAN, on the other hand, only recently adopted their Charter in 2008. As such, the organization is young, weak, and not highly institutionalized. While its Charter seeks to “protect human rights,”[86] it lacks any judicial infrastructure for doing so. It does, however, contain articles explicitly outlining: “respect independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN member states,”[87] “non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states,”[88] “respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion,”[89] and “abstention from participation in any policy or activity, including the use of its territory, pursued by an ASEAN Member State or non-ASEAN state or any non-State actor, which threatens the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political and economic stability of ASEAN Member States.”[90] From these articles it is abundantly clear that the culture of ASEAN is such that it values sovereignty and non-intervention far more than human rights. In addition to weak institutions and a culture that respects sovereignty, the ASEAN member states are not absorbing the Rohingya population and thus have no interest in intervention. Gruesome as it may be, the geographic reality of the Southeast Asian region is such that those who flee from Myanmar do so by boat, and many do not survive the oceanic crossing. Those who do are headed primarily to non-ASEAN member Bangladesh. The Rohingya who attempted to enter Thailand, which is an ASEAN member state, were either returned to Myanmar[91] or did not survive.[92] Findings: The Importance of Regional Asymmetry This paper maintains that nearly all of the above differences share a common factor: they are regional in nature. The realities of being a European state versus a Southeast Asian state are markedly different. These regions have different histories, resources, levels of institutionalization, values, cultures, and interests, all of which are reflected in the actions (or lack thereof) of their supranational organizations. Without clear international law, it falls on these regional organizations to choose whether to intervene on the part of the stateless in the name of human rights or to be silent and honor sovereignty. This essentially means that without the protection of international law, domestic law, or refugee law, the fate of stateless peoples is currently determined by the fortuity of geography. Should they be rendered stateless in a region with a strong, established supranational organization with a culture valuing human rights, their treatment will be wildly different than a stateless person born in a region with a young, weak supranational organization that values sovereignty. Conclusion This paper has demonstrated that the issue of statelessness is so difficult to address because of the fundamental contradiction in international law protecting the universal human right to nationality and the state’s right to determine who its nationals are. When these rights come into conflict, it remains unclear which law supersedes the other, thereby creating opportunities for deprivation of nationality. This paper examined one successful example of statelessness being addressed (Slovenia) and one devastating failure (Myanmar). The case studies reveal the common use of citizenship laws as tools of ethnic engineering in newly formed states. They also reveal the primary difference, and thus determining factor, to be regional. In these legally ambiguous situations it was the strength, values, and interests of the regional organizations that determined whether or not stateless peoples were protected. Moving Forward This paper contends that the highly unequal treatment of the stateless of Slovenia and Myanmar is unacceptable. Rather than allow the fate of the stateless to rest upon the nature of the regional organization in place, clear and strong legal rights and protections need be outlined for stateless peoples. One manner of achieving this goal would be an amendment to the laws of refugees to include stateless peoples. The refugee legally flees their nation for “well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.”[93] Amending the law such that this definition also includes persons fleeing for well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of statelessness would suffice. A second, more difficult, option would be to bolster a body of law specifically for stateless peoples (like that for refugees), as the current state of international law protecting stateless peoples is evidently insufficient. As the legal system stands now, the global community will likely not intervene in Myanmar until the crisis becomes so egregious as to invoke the Responsibility to Protect, and even then it is not clear if intervention will occur, and if so what form it will take. Endnotes [1] "Myanmar: Crimes against humanity terrorize and drive Rohingya out," Amnesty International, October 18, 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/myanmar-new-evidence-of-systematic-campaign-to-terrorize-and-drive-rohingya-out/ . [2] UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, September 2011, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ec4a7f02.html [accessed 16 December 2017] [3] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Protecting Refugees: questions and answers," UNHCR, February 01, 2002, http://www.unhcr.org/afr/publications/brochures/3b779dfe2/protecting-refugees-questions-answers.html . 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*Feature* Nicola Sturgeon Nicola Sturgeon is the fifth and current First Minister of Scotland and leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP). She is the first woman to hold either position and has been a member of the Scottish Parliament since 1999. She advocated that Britain remain in the European Union and has called for Scotland's place in the European single market to be protected. Sturgeon is notable as a campaigner for women's rights and gender equality. Sturgeon’s piece reflects on the merits of experimenting with a Universal Basic Income Fall 2018 Too many people in Scotland are being failed by the UK Government’s social security and employment support systems and we have seen rising poverty levels in recent years. Finding employment is sadly no longer the protection against poverty it once was, with in-work poverty now at an all-time high and the majority of adults and children in relative poverty living in households where someone is in paid work. Likewise, income and wealth inequality in Scotland and the UK, although it has been relatively stable for the last 20 years, has shown no sign of reducing. While there is no quick fix for wealth inequality, there are steps that governments can and should take to close the gap between the richest and poorest in society. We know sustainable and fair work is a long-term route out of poverty so we, and other administrations, must be committed to creating opportunities that support this. In Scotland, we have stressed the importance of promoting inclusive growth – growth which everyone has a fair chance to contribute to, and from which everyone in society can benefit. There are moral, economic and political reasons to support this. Our Economic Strategy focuses on the two mutually supportive goals of increasing competitiveness and tackling inequality. There are a wide range of factors that cause income inequality and these must all be addressed to effectively tackle the issue. In Scotland we have committed to reduce the gender pay gap and increase the labour market participation rates for disabled people and those from minority ethnic groups. New UK legislation which requires large listed companies to publish the pay ratios between their chief executive and their average worker, as well as their gender pay gap, will help maintain focus on such inequalities. While this is a step in the right direction, we would like this legislation to go further and require companies to publish what actions they will take to address such pay gaps. Both governments and businesses also need to address structures and cultures in workplaces that can perpetuate income inequality. Changing the perception of ‘valued’ jobs is one step to reducing such inequalities. For example caring jobs such as social care and childcare tend to be lower paid and undertaken in the main by women. It is argued that that the undervaluing of skills required to undertake caring jobs contributes to the low pay which characterises these and other low paid sectors. We are using the Living Wage Scotland initiative to highlight the value of workers in low paid sectors and encourage more employers to become Accredited Living Wage employers. In addition to taking steps to reduce income inequality, we also want to deliver a new Scottish social security system with dignity, fairness and respect at its centre to better meet the needs of the people of Scotland. We are already taking steps to improve the benefits being devolved to Scotland by increasing carer’s allowance, introducing the Best Start Grant for parents and carers on low incomes to help at key stages of children’s lives and transforming the disability assessment process. As well as the existing historic factors that can lead to wealth inequality, advances in technology and increasing automation of services means the world of work is constantly changing. That is why innovative ideas to tackle these new challenges should be debated by both current and future leaders. One such radical approach to social security which has gained attention recently is the idea of a universal basic income (UBI) – a universal, non-taxable, non-means tested payment made to all citizens from cradle to grave. It is paid regardless of past national insurance contributions, income, wealth or marital status. While a simple concept in principle, its implementation is highly complex. One of the main complexities of UBI is determining the level at which it is set – ranging from a minimum payment to prevent destitution to a higher level which on its own gives individuals an adequate but basic standard of living. It is usually assumed that UBI replaces all other social security payments and this is reflected in one of the most profound concerns around UBI – the impact it could have on people in poverty and people facing additional costs in their day to day life. As a universal benefit, it removes the stigma of ‘being on benefits’. That can only be good for society but there are concerns about whether governments will be able to afford both UBI and a generous welfare state. In Scotland, we already provide many universal benefits such as free school meals, personal care, prescriptions, eye tests and university tuition and the respective role of UBI and these benefits would have to be considered. Supporters of UBI suggest it provides a greater incentive for those out of work to take up employment and can encourage people to be more entrepreneurial as they already have a basic income to support them. Most models of UBI suggest that anything over the UBI value is taxed at a single rate. However, this does not align with our more progressive approach to income tax in Scotland where those who can afford to pay more will make a higher contribution through increasing tax rates to support better public services. The Scottish Government is supporting four local areas to carry out further scoping of the idea in Scotland. These pilots will help inform our thinking around the future of UBI in Scotland and I look forward to seeing the results. We want Scotland to be prosperous and reducing inequality is a key part of this. We believe we should tackle poverty and wealth disparities by sharing opportunities, wealth and power more equally.

One Planet, One Oklahoma: Exploring a Framework for Assessing the Feasibility of Localized Energy Transitions in the United States Anna Hyslop Author Arjun Ray Arthur Shamgunov Benjamin Levy Editors Abstract Net-zero energy transitions, necessitated by the threat of climate change, need to occur on an international scale. However, powerful economic lobbies and political stagnation often mar the negotiation processes driving national and international action. In this context, local communities become increasingly important in achieving widespread emissions reduction objectives. This analysis centers on exploring a framework that evaluates the feasibility of net-zero energy transitions in U.S. localities. The framework highlights the technological and political feasibility of transitioning the electricity and transportation sectors of a given municipality. While such a framework does not capture the entirety of a community’s energy system, it nonetheless serves to address two sectors that dominate emissions production and energy usage. I apply this framework to the suburban community of Norman, Oklahoma, to both highlight the value of such analysis and to provide important information to local officials in my community. By collecting information from administrative and primary sources, this study documents forecasted decreases in the cost of renewable energy sources, residual emissions abatement technologies, and energy storage solutions for Norman. Further, an analysis of the local transportation sector reveals that the costs associated with public transit improvements—an important component of decarbonization in the transportation sector—generally ranged from 0.01-5.1% of the City’s 2023 budget (excluding national high-speed rail enhancements, which involve cost-sharing between local, state, and federal governments). I also examined the political feasibility of this transition, documenting the partisan preferences that may hinder clean energy implementation. My findings suggest that while technology costs may decrease, political opinion could hinder clean energy transitions in Oklahoma. The model of analysis employed throughout this study presents significant opportunities for further exploration of localized energy transitions in suburban areas and college towns, two types of municipalities often left out of transition scholarship. At the end of March in 2023, the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a Synthesis Report covering the burgeoning climate crisis. The report served as the sixth installment in a series designed to inform international climate negotiations with updated scientific findings. Within the first ten pages, the IPCC reaffirmed common scientific consensus, declaring that “human activities, principally through the emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming.” Increasing global temperatures pose threats to people throughout the United States. Coastal communities in states like Texas and Florida have experienced a greater volume of flooding in part due to sea level rise resulting from climate change. Out West, Zhuang et al. (2021) found that “anthropogenic warming…contributed at least twice as much natural variability to the rapid increase of fire weather risk” observed in the record-breaking fires of 2020 in California, Washington, and Oregon. These two studies, as a part of a growing academic literature, demonstrate the variability found in the impacts of climate change across geographies. The United States, for its part in contributing to the crisis, produced 6.0 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalents (Gt CO2eq) of greenhouse gas emissions in 2022, making up 11.2% of total global emissions. This makes the U.S. the second-largest global emitter behind China–which produced 15.7 Gt CO2eq in 2022–and puts it in the top ten global emitters per capita. With a population of approximately 4 million people, Oklahoma produces about 2% of the U.S.’s share of global emissions. Total emissions data for Norman, Oklahoma—home to the University of Oklahoma and the subject of this analysis—does not currently exist. If Norman, like many American cities, does not individually contribute much to the climate impact of the entire United States, then why does the possibility of a localized energy transition and a net-zero future for this municipality merit discussion? First and foremost, local communities play a critical role in achieving national carbon neutrality as they can overcome federal policy inertia. After the release of the first IPCC report in 1990, several transnational associations of municipalities–including Local Governments for Sustainability, Climate Alliance, and Energy Cities–were formed to help cities pursue climate targets in the face of “strong economic lobbies [that] were blocking national and international climate policies.” By belonging to these organizations, cities are granted legitimacy and support from other municipalities in pursuing localized climate policy action. Rutherford and Coutard (2014) further acknowledge the capability of cities to pursue climate work despite national gridlock, stating that “cities may have a window of opportunity for action on energy transitions by their distinctive…political and/or sociotechnical contexts compared with those at a national level.” The ability of cities to pursue sustainability work despite national constraints presents a compelling argument for exploring a local energy transition. Furthermore, greenhouse gas emissions—and the systems that lead to their release into the atmosphere—exist at local, regional, and national levels. Municipalities regularly make decisions regarding transportation, energy consumption, and land-use planning, three sectors that contribute heavily to total U.S. emissions. Collier and Löfstedt (1997) point out, however, that the financial and legal capacities of a city to enact local change vary greatly by location. Regardless of such limitations, changes at the community level contribute to broader national decarbonization objectives. The Biden Administration supported this argument in its long-term climate strategy, citing the importance of non-federal leadership—including municipalities—in reaching domestic carbon neutrality by 2050. Even smaller, suburban cities like Norman possess the power to radically reshape local transit and energy policy, addressing both its local carbon footprint and national carbon contributions. Third, Oklahoma—and Norman by extension—cannot escape the impacts of the climate crisis. The South Central Climate Adaptation Science Center predicts an average high temperature increase of more than 2 degrees Fahrenheit by midcentury without significant action to reduce emissions. The Fifth National Climate Assessment expands on these projected temperature increases, forecasting negative economic and public health consequences. The authors observed with high confidence that warmer temperatures and increasingly erratic weather patterns will “force widespread and costly changes” to the employment of Oklahomans. Additionally, climate change will result in increased water scarcity, animal extinction, and declining public health as extreme heat events become more common in the south-central United States. Tropical diseases and heat-related deaths are projected to increase in the warming region. Other public health impacts have already been observed in Tulsa, where the expansion of eastern red cedars—associated with longer pollen seasons—resulted in a 205% increase in allergic pollen intensity. Although the consequences of climate change borne by Oklahomans are largely not self-inflicted, we still bear responsibility for addressing our carbon footprint. Assessing Norman’s current capacity to transition to carbon-free consumption may encourage further action within Oklahoma’s cities, as only Oklahoma City currently pursues sustainable policy initiatives. Finally, analyzing the feasibility of an energy transition within Norman may spark further discussions about an energy transition in Oklahoma at large. Our local context incorporates both the resources of a nationally-recognized research institution and heavy dependence on the automobile. This combination of factors should make Norman—and other suburban college towns—a subject of interest. Drewello notes the importance of university partnerships in assessing “unique local situations” and generating innovative solutions. With access to the University of Oklahoma and its faculty, Norman offers a great opportunity for building a model to inspire a statewide or regional energy transition. Furthermore, our dependence on the automobile mirrors that of other suburban communities within the state; accordingly, any assessment of Norman’s potential for changes in the transportation sector can provide a framework for similar analyses within Oklahoma. In the Routledge Handbook of Energy Transitions , Miller et al. (2022) call for the systematic “mapping” of the policies, processes, and pathways needed to achieve regional carbon neutrality. The study offers a novel framework for analyzing the feasibility of net-zero localized energy transitions in the United States. Though Norman, Oklahoma, is used merely as an example of the application of this framework, the case study provides a model for similar analyses to be conducted in other localities. I focus on establishing this underlying framework for a local energy transition by assessing the current energy system and analyzing the technological and political feasibility of achieving a net-zero future in Norman. To conduct this assessment, I researched administrative, academic, news, and primary sources to gather cost estimates of different technologies. I also analyzed national and state-level assessments of public opinion on renewable energy development to understand the transition’s political feasibility. The remainder of this paper outlines the definitions and criteria used throughout the study, with an in-depth examination of Norman’s current energy system following soon after. Then, I offer an assessment of both the technological and political feasibility of pursuing an energy transition. My general conclusions from this research follow the feasibility assessments. I. Outlining the Energy Transition: Definitions and Criteria In this section, I provide an overview of several proposed definitions of energy transitions, as well as the objectives that such transitions seek to achieve. I then articulate this study’s interpretation of a net-zero energy transition and my justification for selecting such a definition. Finally, I conclude with an explanation of the criteria by which I will assess feasibility in later sections of this paper. Prior academic work provides many definitions that explain the fundamentals of energy transitions. Araújo (2022) postulates that basic energy transitions involve a “considerable shift in the nature or pattern of how energy is used within a system, including the type, quantity, or quality of how energy is sourced, delivered, or utilized.” Zinecker et al. (2018) offer a simpler yet similar definition to Araújo, defining energy transitions as “shifts… [in] the way people produce and consume electricity using different technologies and sources.” Drewello builds on the foundations provided by Araújo and Zinecker et al. to postulate that an energy transition “is nothing less than a revolutionary restructuring of the entire energy supply in the sectors of electricity, heat, and transportation.” Here, Drewello points out specific sectors involved in a transition. These three definitions articulate the basics of an energy transition, defined in this study as a fundamental, multi-sectoral shift in both the consumption and production of energy towards a net-zero future. A net-zero future achieves maximum emissions reductions while using carbon capture technologies to remove any residual emissions. Accordingly, net-zero transitions involve deploying renewable energy technologies–like solar, wind, and nuclear power facilities–at scale. I elected to study the feasibility of a net-zero energy transition with a framework inspired in part by the literature. In evaluating Norman’s current energy sector, I focus on two of the sectors highlighted by Drewello: electricity and transportation. These sectors compromise 53% of U.S. emissions, with transportation at 28% of the total. Although Norman may not observe the same trends in emissions as the greater United States, addressing emissions in these two sectors is of great national importance and should be relevant to an energy transition in Norman as well. The decision to focus on the electricity and transportation sectors represents the first layer of my analytical framework. The second layer consists of considering both the technological and political feasibility of making net-zero transitions in each sector. Sovacool and Geels (2016) provide justification for these considerations. They divide the elements of an energy transition into three “interrelated” categories: “the tangible elements of socio-technical systems…actors and social networks…[and] socio-technical regimes.” In practice, these three dimensions prove difficult to distinguish from each other, but still roughly suggest a division between the intangibles and the tangibles of energy transitions. This study understands political feasibility to be the intangibles of transitions—namely, public support for clean energy development–and technological feasibility to be the tangible elements of an energy transition, most notably the costs associated with shifting to renewable energy and developing emissions reduction techniques. II. Norman Now: Our Energy Today Of the 90 million megawatt-hours (MWh) of electricity generated in Oklahoma in 2023, 40 million MWh (or around 44%) of this generation came from renewable sources. Norman hosts two primary electric utilities: Oklahoma Gas and Electric (OG&E) and Oklahoma Electric Cooperative (OEC). OG&E provides generation, transmission, and distribution services across Oklahoma and parts of western Arkansas. While public data listing the number of OG&E customers in Norman is not currently available, it serves approximately 888,800 customers across its service territory. OG&E reports that 60% of the utility’s generation capacity comes from natural gas, 30% from coal, and 10% from renewable sources. This data also incorporates OG&E’s power purchases, which account for 58% of OG&E’s total generation portfolio. OG&E purchases this power from other producers in the Southwest Power Pool (SPP). As a member of SPP, OG&E’s energy could come from any generation site within the regional transmission organization (RTO) at any given time. SPP’s generation mix in 2022 consisted of 37.5% wind, 33.3% coal, 20.9% natural gas, and 8.3% of energy produced from other sources. This data mirrors SPP’s generation mixes from 2020 and 2021. In 2020, SPP produced 31.3% of its power from wind, 30.9% from coal, and 26.6% from natural gas. In 2021, 35.6% of SPP’s power came from coal, 34.6% from wind, and 20% from natural gas. Instead of generating its own power, OEC operates an electricity distribution business. OEC purchases its power from the Western Farmers Electric Cooperative (WFEC), a generation and transmission provider. WFEC possesses a diverse fuel mix, generating 30% of its power from renewable sources and 11% from coal and natural gas. Additionally, WFEC imports 42% of its electricity from SPP. Power purchased from the Grand River Dam Authority, Oneta Power Plant, and Southwestern Public Service provided the final 17% of WFEC’s generation mix in 2022. The complexity of power generation networks, exemplified by OG&E and OEC, makes it difficult to determine Norman’s exact energy landscape based on public data alone. Future applications of this framework may run into similar challenges due to public data limitations. OG&E’s and OEC’s connections to SPP mean that consumers in Norman could theoretically receive energy from anywhere in SPP at any given time. However, some consumers have a limited degree of choice in deciding where their electricity comes from. OG&E customers can opt-in to receiving power from the utility’s solar farms, while OEC allows its customers to purchase renewable energy certificates that support renewable generation. These programs are naturally limited in scope, and data regarding the number of customers choosing to participate in these initiatives is not currently available. While I cannot accurately provide a detailed picture of Norman’s electricity provision, I can use SPP generation data to construct general assumptions. As mentioned previously, the largest share of SPP’s electricity production came from wind power, indicating that Norman could theoretically receive a notable amount of our electricity from that source. This assertion can be extrapolated to other cities within SPP’s 14-state service territory, assuming that a city’s serving utility maintains membership in SPP and that SPP’s generation portfolio remains consistent across states. This second assumption, however, cannot be verified by publicly-available SPP data; as such, the statement remains largely speculative. Decarbonizing the electricity sector requires a combination of multiple technologies. Regardless of the combination, however, a net-zero transition necessitates either elimination or removal of the emissions from coal and natural gas power plants that supplied over 50% of SPP’s generation in 2022. Power plant emissions can be reduced through a replacement of generation fuels—in this case, via renewable energy—or a deployment of smokestack emissions-reduction technologies. Emissions that cannot be addressed through the replacement of generation fuels or other reduction technologies must be removed through carbon capture. The costs of these options are explored in depth in the “Technological Feasibility” section of this paper. An assessment of Norman’s current transportation sector consists of analyzing both private and public transportation. Oklahoman workers display a strong dependence on private forms of transit, with 77.8% driving alone to work in 2022. In comparison, 68.7% of U.S. residents display a similar commuting pattern. Furthermore, 9.4% of Oklahomans carpool and 0.3% use public transportation to get to work. Nationally, 3.1% of people use public transit and 8.6% carpool. Evidently, passenger vehicles predominate Oklahomans’ commutes. These vehicles are overwhelmingly gasoline-powered. Though data specific to cars owned by Normanites is not available, of the 4,287,900 total vehicles registered in Oklahoma, 83% are powered by gasoline. 0.5% of cars registered in the state are fully electric, while 0.8% are plug-in hybrid electric and 1.3% are hybrid electric. These trends reflect larger national patterns, as 85% of vehicles registered in the United States are gasoline-powered, while 1.2% are fully electric. Norman’s public transportation consists of five fixed bus routes, operated by EMBARK Norman, which serve local destinations six days a week. EMBARK Norman also partners with EMBARK OKC to provide weekday commuter service to Oklahoma City. Intracity service is free and the commuter route to Oklahoma City costs $3 per adult and $1.50 for qualifying riders. Buses are scheduled at least every hour on four out of the five routes. The Norman fixed-route fleet consists of 10 compressed natural gas (CNG) buses, 2 electric buses, and 1 diesel-powered vehicle. The paratransit fleet uses 9 CNG buses, 2 diesel buses, and 3 gasoline-powered shuttles. Additionally, the University of Oklahoma possesses four bus routes on its campus. Norman also has an Amtrak station, with service ending in Oklahoma City. In this study, I also include biking as a form of public transportation. In 2022, only 0.2% of Oklahomans biked to work. Given that much of Oklahoma lacks biking infrastructure, this finding is unsurprising. Current data on the number and type of bike lanes within Norman is not readily available. However, given Norman’s possession of bike-friendly infrastructure, we may safely assume that Norman’s commuter biking statistics are higher than the Oklahoma average. III. Technological Feasibility The exploration of Norman’s electricity and transportation sectors reveals the community’s overwhelming dependence on fossil fuels. In this section, I use estimated costs of different clean energy technologies as a metric for assessing the technological feasibility of a net-zero transition in Norman. My study of electricity-related feasibility primarily concerns the costs associated with increasing the share of low-carbon energy sources in power generation, incorporating power storage methods, and abating residual emissions. In the transportation sector, I consider different scenarios in which the City of Norman improves public transportation. I do not focus on action taken by individual Normanites (commonly termed “reductions in demand”), as such action falls outside the scope of the analysis I hope to provide. Evaluating the technological feasibility of a power-sector transition in Norman begins with an understanding of the costs associated with alternative energies. The levelized cost of energy (LCOE) “combines technology cost and performance parameters, capital expenditures, operations and maintenance costs, and capacity factors” into a statistic that helps researchers, government agencies, and private companies predict the costliness of different forms of energy per MWh generated. The LCOEs for various sources of energy in Cleveland County—where Norman is located—in 2023 dollars are reported in Table 1. Table 1: Data from NREL (2020); Lewis et al. (2022); IEA (2020). All costs—including cost projections—are in 2023 dollars, with inflation adjustment calculations made based on OECD (2024) data. County-level costs for key renewable energy technologies like solar and wind are expected to experience significant declines by 2050, while the costs of traditional fossil fuel generation facilities are expected to increase. Across the board, the median costs associated with renewable sources of energy in Cleveland County are expected to drop by 2050. Gas-induced power plants, on the other hand, are expected to experience cost increases, regardless of whether these plants incorporate carbon capture and storage (CCS) techniques into plant practices. Unlike gas-powered plants, however, coal is expected to experience cost declines, but will likely remain more expensive than solar, wind, nuclear, or even gas-powered generation. This insight is significant, as coal generation produces more emissions than natural gas and renewable resource generation. Since the county-level statistics parallel the patterns observed in state-level analysis (not pictured), I observe that the comparatively-high costs will likely discourage the use of coal within Oklahoma, reducing the state’s emissions. Decreases in renewable energy costs for Cleveland County, depicted in Table 1, indicate that our electricity sector may feasibly transition to renewable energy. However, the data provided for county-level costs by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) neglects to mention an increasingly-popular form of alternative energy: hydrogen power. The fuel is expected to play a critical role in decarbonizing personal transportation. Currently, steam methane reforming (SMR), a process dependent on fossil fuels, dominates hydrogen production in the United States. The implementation of CCS with SMR practices is expected to increase the LCOE of hydrogen production, but still maintains the “highest potential for low-cost clean hydrogen supply.” Transitioning to sources like wind and solar also requires measures to manage their intermittent nature. Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) are touted as the solution to the need for power storage. NREL reports that costs of utility-scale LIBs within Cleveland County will decrease approximately 53% by 2050, making the reality of incorporating this technology into a transitioned power grid increasingly plausible. This assertion is further supported by the declining prices of renewable power sources, allowing greater amounts of capital to be allocated to power storage instead of generation. Addressing residual emissions—those that cannot be easily reduced through the previously-discussed strategies—necessitates the usage of carbon capture technologies. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) involves removing carbon dioxide at its emission source. NREL already provides a Cleveland County LCOE for CCS in the context of natural gas generation, placing the 2020 LCOE at $60.06 and expecting a $68.3 LCOE by 2050. Global estimates from the International Energy Agency (IEA) further contextualize this data. Globally, the LCOE for CCS ranges from 17.87-143.02 USD per ton of carbon dioxide captured. Direct air capture (DAC), another emissions-reduction technology, captures carbon dioxide after its release into the atmosphere. The technology generally costs more than CCS, with global LCOE estimates ranging from 160.9-411.19 USD per ton captured. NREL’s forecasted costs to 2050 are helpful in evaluating the feasibility of a net-zero power sector transition. Such forecasting, however, remains difficult to find for transportation improvements. Instead, I rely on the costs associated with different public transit improvement scenarios that Norman explored in fiscal year 2023 (FY23). Table 2: Data from City of Norman (2021); City of Norman (2022); City of Norman (2024); Taylor Johnson at the City of Norman; Lazo (2023); Feigenbaum (2023). All costs are adjusted to 2023 dollars using data from OECD (2024). In 2021, the Norman City Council approved the Go Norman Transit Plan, a document detailing different transportation improvements anticipated for Norman’s bus system. Adding an additional bus route, Route 113, requires nearly $9 million in capital and operational investments. Increasing route frequency for two of the current bus routes entails expenditures of between $8.21-$8.91 million, depending on route length and the number of buses needed to achieve frequency improvements. Improving the frequency of Route 111 stops from a 30-minute to the ideal 15-minute frequency necessitates $11.55 million from the City. These frequency improvements are intended to make public transit options competitive with the convenience and consistency offered by single-passenger vehicular transport. Expanding route service often demands adding additional buses to the City’s fleet. To gather information on the historical costs of purchasing CNG and electric buses, I contacted Taylor Johnson, the Transit and Parking Program Manager for the City of Norman. Mr. Johnson offered information on the current fixed-route fleet and the previous costs of purchasing individual electric and CNG buses. One fixed-route CNG bus cost the City $639,741.79 in 2023 dollars, whereas an electric bus cost over $1 million in the same year. The cost estimates specific to certain route improvements cannot accurately predict the expected future costs of similar improvements. However, this information still provides an important overview of what such improvements may entail. Regardless of future inflation or specified costs associated with different projects, improvements to Norman’s bus system will cost millions of dollars to implement. As mentioned in the “Norman Now: Our Energy Today” section, Norman possesses one Amtrak station with service to Oklahoma City. Finding a cost estimate for adding additional rail lines or increasing train speed in Oklahoma is not currently feasible; therefore, I turned to two case studies of these improvements in other areas. Amtrak anticipates increasing the speed of the Washington-to-Boston route with new trains. This project, originally proposed in 2011, costs $3.11 billion in 2023 dollars. The proposed Dallas-to-Houston Amtrak project, involving the development of completely-new rail lines, costs a whopping $33.6 billion in 2023 dollars. Support for the development of additional Amtrak lines through Norman would need to occur at the state level; after all, as the two currently-proposed projects demonstrate, Amtrak projects are extremely expensive and involve multiple municipalities. While it is unlikely that Amtrak will expand coverage in Oklahoma in the near future–given the minimal demand for such infrastructure–this discussion still offers important context for comprehensive public transit considerations in the state. Bike infrastructure serves as the final area of analysis within the public transportation sector. For this exploration, I use data from an Association of Central Oklahoma Governments grant received by the City for air quality improvements. Adding two bike lanes cost the City $11,497.99 in total. Details on the length and cost of each individual bike lane were not provided by the City. Table 3: Data from City of Norman (2021); City of Norman (2022); City of Norman (2023); City of Norman (2024). *The “Actual Public Transit Expenditures” for FY24 have yet to be released; accordingly, I provided the City’s current estimate. During FY23, the City of Norman proposed and passed a $225,785,971 budget. As exemplified in Table 2, the costs of transportation improvements under Norman’s control ranged from 0.01% of the budget to 5.1% of the budget. Given the trends in public transit spending observed in Table 3, the budget typically allows enough flexibility for only one of the transit improvements detailed in Table 2 to occur. This finding suggests that substantial improvements to Norman’s public transit system will likely occur slowly, unless the City’s spending patterns change. The technology exists to support a net-zero energy transition. The challenge, then, comes with the cost of such technologies. As the NREL forecast predicts, renewable energy sources will likely continue to decline in cost, encouraging utilities to adopt these forms of energy for power generation. Additionally, both long-term energy storage solutions and residual emissions reduction technologies are anticipated to experience declining costs. Norman’s electricity sector, therefore, could realistically experience a clean energy transition in the coming decades, contingent on utility adoption of necessary technologies. The feasibility of adjustments to Norman’s transportation sector proves incredibly difficult to predict due to the challenge of obtaining cost forecasting data. Regardless of this limitation, the scenarios explored demonstrate realistic costs for the City, although the pace at which such projects are pursued may be slower than desired. IV. Political Feasibility In this study, political feasibility is more challenging to quantify and anticipate than technological feasibility. By its very nature, public opinion is dynamic, and the individuals surveyed often possess opinions that do not fit cleanly into prescribed party affiliations or expectations. Furthermore, creating an accurate measure of political support for an energy transition proves difficult, considering the complexity of interacting components in such a transition. Given these constraints, I focus this section on a broad investigation of the views on renewable energy development that are associated with national and statewide partisan identifications while acknowledging the complexity of these affiliations. I also highlight studies specific to Oklahoma that offer valuable insights into the nuances of support for a carbon-neutral energy transition. According to the Pew Research Center, 31% of Americans currently support the complete phasing out of fossil fuels across the United States, compared to the 68% that support the use of a fossil fuel and renewables mixture. This belief does not necessarily conflict with the net-zero transition proposal, as carbon capture techniques could theoretically support the strictly-limited use of fossil fuels. Regarding renewable energy development, 74% of Americans highlight this type of development as “the most important energy priority for the U.S.” when compared to “expanding [the] production of fossil fuels.” Evidently, national support for a net-zero future depends on the specific limitations of that energy transition. Attempting to break down support for the transition by political party causes further difficulties, as the opinions of both Democrats and Republicans do not always follow expectations. For example, 58% of Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents believe that fossil fuel expansion should operate as the U.S.’s top energy priority, but 70% of this group still support the development of more solar farms. 90% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning Independents give renewable energy priority over fossil fuels, but 51% “oppose phasing out fossil fuels completely” for right now. The responses to these questions do not clearly indicate partisan support for a net-zero future. For additional clarity, Kennedy et al. asked respondents about their opinions regarding the complete phase-out of fossil fuels. 87% of Republicans and Republican-leaning respondents reported a belief in the need to use a mix of fossil fuels and renewables in the near-term, while 51% of Democrats and Democrat-leaning respondents reported the same. Understanding national party positioning on the phase-out of fossil fuels, a component of net-zero energy transitions, contextualizes an analysis of Oklahoma’s current partisan makeup. As of January 15th, 2024, approximately 52% of Oklahoman voters are registered with the Republican party, while 28% are registered Democrats and 19% are registered Independents. However, these affiliations do not directly indicate voters’ position on energy transitions. Generally, 57% of American Republicans believe the U.S. should never stop using fossil fuels, a viewpoint likely shared by many Oklahoma Republicans given the historical importance of the fossil fuel sector within the state. Republican State Representatives and Senators also dominate our legislature. Only 20% of seats in the Oklahoma House and 16% of seats in the Senate belong to Democrats. The prevalence of the Republican party, when considered in the context of national survey data, indicates that political support for renewable energy development at the state level is likely low. The Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (IPPRA), based at the University of Oklahoma, surveyed 3,564 Oklahoma residents to gather “advice and guidance on how to develop socially sustainable solutions to water, carbon, and infrastructure problems in Oklahoma." This study revealed that 92% of the Democrats surveyed believe that greenhouse gas emissions are causing average global temperatures to rise, compared to the 38% of Oklahoma Republicans believing the same. Additionally, only 28% of Republicans surveyed believe that global warming has resulted in changes to Oklahoma’s weather patterns. In the context of Republican domination in the Oklahoma House and Senate, these findings further indicate that political support for measures addressing GHG emissions and climate change is likely minimal. Within Cleveland County, 47% of registered voters identify as Republicans, 30% identify as Democrats, and 22% identify as Independents (Cleveland County Election Board 2024). This data does not reveal Norman’s specific situation, as it includes registered voters throughout the entire county. Under such circumstances, I choose instead to refer to the state-level data described in the preceding paragraph. Using the data available to me, I provided an initial assessment of the political climate in Oklahoma. In doing so, I offer a broad overview of the expected political feasibility regarding a net-zero energy transition. My analysis of the state-level situation, contextualized in the presence of national polling data, indicates that support for the phase-out of fossil fuels in Oklahoma likely remains low. These findings cannot be directly applied to Norman’s specific local context. Further public opinion research should be conducted to determine the opinions of Normanites and their City Council members on the topic. Given the challenges in conducting this political analysis for Norman, similar obstacles may appear when applying this model to other municipalities. V. Conclusion Throughout this study, I offered and explored the applications of a particular model for analyzing the feasibility of localized energy transitions in the United States. Here, I will summarize the model and discuss the implications of both the framework and the case study I used to evaluate the framework. I derived the model of analysis employed throughout this study from observations of both U.S. emissions data and literature concerning energy transitions. I wanted to ensure that a localized energy transition focused on the sectors with the largest greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S.; thus, I chose to focus on the electricity and transportation sectors. This selection was reaffirmed within the literature, as explored in “Outlining the Energy Transition: Definitions and Criteria.” The next level of my analysis focused on evaluating the technological and political feasibility of transitioning each sector. I separated the discussion of technological feasibility by sector and highlighted the costs associated with clean energy developments accordingly. In the political feasibility section of my analysis, I largely focused on generalized public opinion data surrounding an energy transition due to the limited availability of data related to electricity and transportation decarbonization specifically. I articulated this framework of analysis through my case study of Norman, Oklahoma. The assessment of technological feasibility generally reflects declining costs in renewable technologies across Cleveland County, the United States, and the world. These declining costs appear to indicate that decarbonization in Norman is feasible. Given Oklahoma’s geographical conditions and expected cost declines, solar and wind energy could drive a transition away from fossil fuel dominance. Declining costs of utility-scale batteries will help mitigate the intermittent nature of these two sources. Additionally, nuclear energy possesses significant promise in helping Norman to achieve net-zero, especially given the apparent political support for nuclear energy within the state legislature. During the 59th regular session of the Oklahoma legislature, both the House and Senate passed Senate Bill 1535, which amended the Oklahoma Low Carbon Energy Initiative to include nuclear energy. The support for this legislation, however, does not mean that the legislature or the Public Utilities Commission will prioritize clean energy over fossil fuel interests in the future. Thus, predicting an energy transition in Norman remains exceedingly difficult. With regards to transportation, the City possesses the ability to fund both bike lane and bus route improvements, as costs for these advances ranged between 0.01-5.1% of the City’s 2023 budget. These costs are in line with the total amount of actual public transit expenditures made by the City in prior years. Improving and adding regional high-speed rail lines, however, proves increasingly expensive and is outside of the City’s regulatory purview. Accordingly, the City can realistically pursue localized public transit improvements over the next couple of years, ideally leading to decreased dependency on personal automobiles within Norman. The political preferences of Oklahomans possess a strong bearing on the overall feasibility of pursuing net-zero energy transitions. Republican domination in both the Oklahoma House and Senate indicates that statewide measures supporting energy transitions remain unlikely, especially given the general Republican stance on climate change and renewable energy versus fossil fuels. Data for Norman specifically cannot be found; accordingly, future research can focus on evaluating public opinion within the municipality. The difficulties present in ascertaining the feasibility of an energy transition in Norman reflect the limitations of the model I developed. First, this model does not cover all components of a municipality’s energy sector, leading to inconclusive predictions regarding the feasibility of total localized decarbonization. Second, the model relies on forecasting cost data, which is generated via a naturally uncertain practice. Third, the limited availability of publicly-accessible data—the backbone of this framework and my observations in Norman—weakens the conclusivity of assertions made using the application of the model to a given local context. This third component can be addressed in future uses of the model by obtaining access to private company and government data. Future applications of a similar framework possess ample opportunity for improving and innovating based on the foundation provided in this research. Regardless of its limitations, this model possesses significant implications for planning processes and improvements within my local community. Local strategic energy plans, which often possess decarbonization as a primary objective, rely on the type of in-depth analysis conducted throughout this report to accurately ascertain the current realities and future possibilities of local energy systems. Communities can use the model explored here as a guide in strategic energy plan development. Within Norman specifically, this paper provides critical analysis absent from the City’s long-term planning processes and suggests the need to develop some type of energy plan within the municipality. Climate change threatens all of humanity, regardless of one’s proximity to a coastline or dry zone. Addressing this crisis and preventing its exacerbation entails decarbonization across our energy systems. Throughout this study, I explored a framework to assess local energy transition feasibility and applied it to my local community. In doing so, I hope to encourage greater localized action in Norman and in the United States at large. 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How Are You the Same Person as When You Were Ten: Favoring the Brain Criterion View over Animalist and Neo-Lockean Views Henry Moon Author Matthew Wong Daniel Coffield Editors I. Introduction I am the same person as when I was ten years old—this is common intuition [1]. In another sense, as I have a different body and psychology, it seems that I cannot be the exact same person as I was when I was ten years old [2]. In this paper I ask how exactly we were the same people when we were ten. This question is equivalent to asking what the persistence conditions for “an entity of our kind” to remain the same over time: call these diachronic persistence conditions [3]. In asking this question, we ask two separate questions (1) What should “entities of our kind” refer to? (2) What are the persistence conditions for these entities? First, I review the literature regarding the two most popular theories of personal ontology, or the study of what we are. In doing so, I will then introduce the brain criterion based on egoistic concern—the special concern about one’s future that arises from anticipation of continued existence. Providing justification in ontological coherence and ethical plausibility, I submit that the brain criterion is the superior ontology. In the second half of this paper, I will be responding to objections to the brain criterion, specifically regarding persistence by considering commonplace thought experiments. As a synthesis from these objections, indeterminacy thesis and multiple occupancy will be defended as part of the paper’s overall argument. II. What Should "Entities of Our Kind" Refer To? To determine the persistence conditions for some entity, one must start by specifying exactly what that entity is. I say this because whether entities can survive events is subsequent to what the entity is. For example, a square cannot survive being stretched in one axis whereas a rectangle can, because a square is defined must have four sides of equal length. This is to say, the persistence conditions of a square are informed by its ontology. In the same way, the persistence conditions for a person depend on personal ontology. Despite this, much of the contemporary literature on personal identity seems to treat personal ontology as a secondary question. Instead, the focus has been placed upon a gamut of thought experiments [4]. To this, in "What Are We”, Eric Olson blames “the unserious air of many discussions of personal identity” on this lack of focus on personal ontology [5]. There are two dominant answers to the persistence question: neo-Lockeanism and Animalism [6]. Neo-Lockeanism is the view that we are creatures with certain psychological traits essentially [7] Animalism says we are human animals essentially; we are identical with our human bodies. Each view is associated with at least one ontology. Neo-Lockean theory most popularly claims that we are constituted by our animal bodies or that we are temporal parts of our animal body. Most neo-Lockeans would not say we survive a permanently vegetative state, despite our animal bodies being able to survive, and to a neo-Lockean, this is an example of how we differ from our animal bodies. Animalists simply state that we are our human bodies; if our bodies were to enter a permanently vegetative state, we would enter that state as well. Neo-Lockean views lack the “metaphysical leg up” that ontologically focused views like animalism have [8]. Contrastingly, animalism often ignores normative concerns [9]. Despite this trade off between normativity and ontology, when we refer to others, we do not do so as moral agents and organisms separately, but as one unified forensic unit: otherwise this would be absurd [10]. Parfit also touches on similar ideas when he sets out two requirements that a theory of personal identity must satisfy [11] : (1) Whether a future person will be me must depend only on our intrinsic properties. It cannot depend on what happens to other people. (2) Since personal identity is of great importance, whether a future person is me cannot depend on a trivial fact. Parfit also seems to segregate requirements on the basis of (1) a strict ontological concern and (2), an ethical concern. What idea we have converged upon seems to be this: an account of personal identity (and thus, ontology) must be, as Olson puts it, both “ontologically coherent as well as ethically plausible” [12] In the following sections I will forward an account of personal ontology which describes entities of our sort as a human animal under two constraints: (1) That the entity has certain traits that warrant continuous egoistic concern (2) That the entity is the spatial part of a human animal in which (1) necessarily and sufficiently obtains (i.e part of the brain) Evaluating the contemporary two main theories of personal identity, along with our own as delineated above, I will recommend this account of personal ontology to have best fulfilled the need to be ethically plausible and ontologically coherent. A. Ethical Plausibility I propose that to say an account of personal ontology is ethically plausible is to say that it reasonably includes all entities that our normative and ethical concerns refer to when we use the everyday pronouns of ‘I’, ‘you’ or ‘we’, and reasonably excludes all entities that do not. Further, if it is said that you and I are ‘entities of our sort’, we can expect that normative claims which apply to you would also apply to me. We start with cases where the brain-criterion provides for a necessary liberalization of inclusivity. First, in contrast to animalism, brain views allow for entities of our kind to survive after brain transplantation. The common intuition that follows is that after the brain is transplanted into another person’s head, the entity follows with it [13]. Animalists must maintain that because the human organism is left behind and dies during the process of transplantation, we must die along with it. This is a strikingly unintuitive statement to endorse. On the other hand, because physical continuity of the brain is maintained and is presumably enough to warrant egotist function once transplanted, the brain criterion successfully represents the intuition that we would survive after transplantation. Second, in contrast to neo-Lockean continuity, we are able to account for individuals who lack meaningful psychological-connectedness, yet we must still include them as one of us. Jeff McMahan illustrates that in cases of Alzheimer’s, neo-Lockeans seem to imply that the individual ceases to exist and becomes a sort of “post-person.” [14] This is because insofar as a case of Alzheimer’s progresses so that almost no function of memory remains, neo-Lockean theories suggest that this is a case where the psychological connection is broken, and individuals cannot survive [15]. When considering the ethical plausibility of this, we suspect that instead, we would still consider the Alzheimer’s patient an entity of our sort, and that our normative claims and duties would still apply to them. Concretely, if the Alzheimer’s patient was my mother, just because she lacks psychological connection does not mean she is not “one of us”. In contrast to the brain criterion based on egoistic concern, as long as there is brain continuity supporting the function of egoistic concern, we may say the entity is one of us. For example an Alziemer’s patient still has egoistic concerns because she considers actions not as disconnected events that will only impact an entity similar but identical to herself (and that she exists only for a brief moment before her psychological connection deteriorates) but that her actions will influence her future. Note the difference here is that egoistic concerns need not be a degree of psychological unity in which even a semblance of qualitative identity is sufficiently obtained [16]. We see this when we consider two statements, that normatively we take as non-mutually exclusive: My mother has not been the same person recently and does not remember me. That woman who does not remember me is my mother. The first statement expresses our intuition that people can change drastically, even to the point where psychological unity according to a neo-Lockean would be lost. The second statement, however, speaks to our intuition that numerical identity can survive far more liberally, when considering strict psychological relation, than a neo-Lockean claims. Indeed, the exclusionary policy of the brain criterion is the most ethically plausible. There are also cases where the brain criterion restricts cases necessarily. The main difference between neo-Lockean views and general brain-views is that the brain-criteria explicitly requires a physical contingency. This is to say, a sufficient part of the brain which is necessarily part of a living being must remain continuously. From this, we can locate cases that should be excluded, such as that where an entity can survive a total loss of body. Neo-Lockeanism generally endorse teletransportation as an event in which we can survive. Despite whatever prima facie intuitions we may have, consider you were being transported, but a replica of an entity at some point B was created while you were still alive. Thus, you are not the entity at point B, and for there to be one entity, you must have been destroyed at point A [17]. Moreover, Animalist views consider a fetus and an individual in a permanently vegetative state to also fall under our general normative conventions, as they are simply stages in the human animal’s development. Extreme views notwithstanding, common ethical norms tell us otherwise: we have intuitions that it is permissible to kill an early stage fetus, for example, where we do not for toddlers [18]. This is a difference that Animalists do not account for. This difference is crucial in ontology: we say it is permissible to kill a week-old fetus because at that point it more closely resembles an unconscious collection of cells than the entity we normatively refer to we say “you” or “I”. The ethical norms about “entities of our sort” that Animalism implies do not match our commonly held ones; thus, we cannot say an Animalist conception of persons is ethically plausible. Considering both comparisons to neo-Lockean and Animalists views, it is only by using the definition of brains with egoistic concern that we can arrive at a superior ontology. B. Ontological Coherence To say that a theory is ontologically preferable to any other is to say that it answers key issues concerning personal ontology at as little cost in way of unfortunate implications that one must accept. In evaluating the seven main personal ontologies, Olson generally considers one issue as most important: the thinking animal problem. The thinking animal problem is the following argument: (P1) Presently sitting in your chair is a human animal. (P2) The human animal sitting in your chair is thinking. (P3) You are the thinking being sitting in your chair. (C) Therefore, the human animal sitting in your chair is you. The crux of the thinking animal argument is that insofar as rejection of P1-P3 requires us to accrue the cost of, as Olson puts it, an “impenetrable” [19] ontology, we must conclude that we are human-animals. By proving that we can escape this conclusion, we can prove the brain criterion is preferable to neo-Lockean theories which fall victim to the argument. I will now defend the second constraint using a generalization of the thinking animal problem: (P1) There is a spatial part of a human currently located where you are. (P2) The spatial part currently located where you are is thinking. (P3) You are the thinking being located in your chair. (C) Therefore, the spatial part of a human where you are is you. Note that this argument is analogous to the thinking-animal-argument so that we may adopt its conclusion. The difference is that the conclusion is such that we must be spatial-parts of the brain, some that we can be essentially reduced to a part of the brain. Note that any spatial part of an animal with greater inclusivity than what is necessary for a thinking part to think will fall trap to this argument, given the animal with greater inclusivity contained a non-essential part was incorrectly considered essential. This is to say that the argument implies “you” are identical to infinite smaller spatial-parts unless “you” refers to the smallest possible spatial-part of an animal which thinks. This smallest possible part is the only part that is not affected by the argument since, any less inclusive and the animal loses the property of thinking, so P2 falls, making the argument inapplicable. Dualist theories notwithstanding, this smallest spatial-part of a thinking animal must refer to some part of the brain, and so we have proven our second constraint on animalism. To conclude, this makes animalism and the brain criterion at least equal in ontological coherence, which combined with a brain criterion advantage in ethical plausibility allows us to recommend over the other theories. III. What Should “Entities of Our Kind” Refer To? Given we have answered first question of this paper, there are two main objections specifically to how the brian criteria persist : 1. That the brain-criterion is unnecessary and insufficient 2. That the brain-criterion is necessary but insufficient In this section, I will deal with both of these objections, and in doing so maintain that Brain Criterion is both sufficient and necessary. A. Unnecessary and Insufficient Parfit’s “combined spectrum” shows that any account based on “empirical fact” will have cases of indeterminate identity [20][21]. This is because any empirical criteria, such as psychological or physical continuity operate on a spectrum of absolute similarity to no similarity. If that is true, then there are cases on that spectrum where it seems that the connectedness between two entities is indeterminate to whether they are the same entity. Consider our brain criterion: existence is guaranteed in the case of 100% paradigmatic brain-function, and guaranteed false in the case of no function. However, there are cases in-between whereby it is indeterminate that consciousness is present: it is hard to see an argument for consciousness given 2% function, but what of 12% or 24%? There are two possible conclusions we can make of this: That indeterminacy cannot exist, and so some “further-fact” must be considered [22]. Or, we must allow for cases where indeterminacy arises. If we accept the consideration of a “further fact” in indeterminate cases, this implies the same further fact could determine the answer to the persistence question in any other case. What rejecting cases of indeterminacy entails is accepting a “further fact” ontology, such as immaterialism. I will comment that even if we cannot assuage the issue of indeterminacy, it may be preferable than to contend with the burden of proving dualism and other theories associated with immaterialism. In our paper’s defense of the brain criterion, indeterminacy would not mitigate claims that it should be recommended over animalism or neo-Lockean views –– both rely on empirical criteria. Yet as a foundational argument, I will contribute a defense of indeterminacy. Note that indeterminacy in things other than the existence of people is uncontroversial and common, for example, given a tallness spectrum where 7ft is guaranteed to be tall and 4ft guaranteed not to, there must be indeterminate cases of tallness in between. However, indeterminacy seems to be unreasonable when it comes to issues of persistence. Bernard Williams provides a thought experiment where one has to imagine that entity X, which is indeterminately identical to me, will be tortured tomorrow if indeterminacy is true. Does it follow that the feeling of great pain will be indeterminately felt by me? Noonan points out that this merely illustrates the “very great unnaturalness of this way of thinking” that is present in these cases, not that the cases themselves are unnatural [23]. Note then because it must be accepted that indeterminacy exists in other contexts, we must simply prove that indeterminacy in persistence is also acceptable. Many metaphysical arguments have been offered to this end; I will propose a practical one: to assume that issues of persistence must have determinate answers where other reducible substances do not is to assume there is something irreducible about selves. This begs the question on whether there selves are reducible in the first place, and thus we have no reason to reject indeterminacy in persistence. B. Necessary but Insufficient A hemispherectomy is a procedure where one half of the cerebrum is removed. Despite having half their brain removed, patients that undergo hemispherectomy expect to survive the operation. Our intuitions indicate they have good reason to make this assumption: we treat postoperative entities as the same people, and indeed, as their brain hemisphere adapts to serving the role of two, often cognitive function is returned as well [24]. In other words, if I receive a hemispherectomy, theoretically there seems to be enough brain continuity so that the resulting person is me. However, the reality is that whether you survive is indeterminate. If the brain criterion is necessary and sufficient in the light of indeterminacy, we must prove that for all conclusions that could be made, but are unobservable, there is still ethical plausibility and ontological coherence. If I end up in surgery or even if it is indeterminate that surgery kills me, the discussion ends here. Things are more complicated if you survive. Given that we can accept the transplantation of the cerebrum while maintaining continuity, it can be said that transplanting half of a brain also continues the entity. However, in a case there are two candidates, both sharing physical continuity of a human animal in which egoistic concern is retained, it seems that the brain criterion is insufficient to prove persistence which entity persisted. There are three interpretations to this case [25]. (a) I do not survive. (b) I survives as either candidate-A or candidate-B (c) I survive as both First consider (a), commonly referred to as the “non-branching view” [25]. Notice that I would survive if one half was destroyed, but in the case of both being preserved, I die. This seems immediately strange: How is double success considered a failure? Given the symmetry of the problem, (b) is incoherent as well, considering facts about both candidates are equal. We must then turn to (c), the only case in which brain continuity is sufficient. To avoid implicating that candidates A and B are the same, I forward that candidates A and candidates B are distinct entities that were once spatially coincident within the original, or multiple occupancy[26]. Given that either (a) or (b) are both untenable, the implication is that if one wants to reject “further fact” accounts, multiple occupancy must be endorsed [27]. Two things must be proven for us to adopt this: It does not affect the ethical plausibility of the theory It does not affect the ontological coherence of the theory If these two requirements are met, we will have a theory that sans fission preserves our original account and considering fission, will have the most realistic account in approaching it. C. Ethical Plausibility Let us first consider ethical plausibility. Firstly, given that pre-fission agents are unified, there is no change from our original theory. Moreover, the fact that an entity undergoes fission later down the road would not retrospectively change the normative considerations we give to the pre-fission entity. Does our criterion provide the most ethically plausible account of entities post-fission? Consider your spouse undergoing the fission operation. We may measure the ethical plausibility by considering how each post-fission theory affects your duties to your spouse. If (a) is true and whether your spouse lives if there is no second transplant but dies if fission takes place, if there is a gap in time between when half your spouse’s cerebrum is removed, and when it is transplanted into a host body, do you have marital duties toward your spouse during that gap where the second transplantation did not occur, but that these duties disappear the second the operation is successful? That our duty to people should be as arbitrary as the existence of another person seems strange. Strange conclusions are also reached when (b) is considered – why would you have the martial duty to love and be faithful to one of your spouse candidates and no qualms abandoning the other? If we maintain that it is immoral to abandon our duties on arbitrary facts, so (b) is also not a viable conclusion. (c) is the only scenario which is compatible with our conventional moral ideas. Yet it is also true that our commitments to our spouse are not exactly the same: they are, in a way, inflated. I must now commit to caring and providing for two bodies instead of one, being affectionate and loving to two bodies instead of one. However, while our duties to our spouse now split between two people is a commitment that is inflated, it is inflated based upon ideas we already accept as a posteriori moral—compare this to duties suddenly appearing and disappearing based on arbitrary facts. Consider a situation where your spouse is experiencing a mental health crisis. As a result of going through this situation, it is your duty to be more sensitive around them, spend more time and energy tending to their care etc—in other words, your commitment has been inflated. However, we accept this as a natural part of our duty because we hold a duty to a loved one in a difficult situation, despite having our commitments inflated. In the same way, our duties to a spouse do not change on account of this strange situation happening to them; duty is not situational. This is the principle that only multiple occupancy can reach, given all other seniors change duty based on the arbitrary details. Thus, being that it would be most accurate to say you have a duty to both, multiple occupancy is the most ethically plausible interpretation. What may be suspect is the impact on personal ontology. Multiple occupancy does not affect the arguments for ontological coherence we have laid out before if committing to its thesis does not require committing to additional burdens. We may prove this by considering each ontological assumption that our original theory could operate under and prove how multiple occupancy is compatible with the original metaphysical assumptions. Thus, if each assumption that is compatible with our original theory is also compatible with multiple occupancy, we can say that the original theory’s ontological coherence was not affected. There were two metaphysical assumptions we could make in which our account of personal ontology retained: that four dimensionalism was true, and that four dimensionalism was false. Under the assumption of four dimensionalism, the two separate entities after the fission operation are just temporal parts of the original entity that simply stand spatially distinct. This stands unproblematic among thinkers who accept four dimensionalism [29]. However, we require an account with the original metaphysical assumptions free of four-dimensionalism. Note that multiple occupancy seems absurd because common sense counting would suggest that 1 person becomes 2 people. We may resolve this by suggesting that it is possible to count 2 people before the fission operation as well. Before the operation, a singular entity is counted because counting was done by “spatio-temporal coincidence” rather than counting by identity [30]. This itself is also acceptable: if we can say that we can be identical to some entity that is not spatio-temporal coincident with us, as we do in everyday language when we say “my past self" or my “future self,” we are saying that identity and spatio-temporal coincidence represent two different things. Thus, given multiple occupancy can be integrated within either framework without necessitating a revision of our fundamental metaphysical assumptions, we can say it has not impacted the ontological coherence of the original theory. When we consider that both the ethical plausibility and ontological coherence has been preserved, while multiple occupancy is highly counter-intuitive, it must be accepted. IV. Conclusion In answering how we are the same person as when we were ten, I have considered two important questions in personal identity: what “we” are, which is a question of personal ontology, and how "we" persist. I have evaluated the merits of the brain criterion based on egoistic concern against both Animalism and Neo-Lockeanism, arguing that it is this paper’s variant of the brain criterion which best encompasses both ethical and ontological considerations when answering what “we” are. Then, I have argued that the persistence criteria which follow from the proposition that we are brains is necessary and sufficient, on the basis that one rejects a further fact ontology. What follows is the question of multiple occupancy, which seems quite counter intuitive when considering prima facie. However, multiple occupancy as I have proven, remains the only solution to deal with the cases of fission satisfyingly. Footnotes [1] Francisco Muñoz et al., “Spatio-Temporal Brain Dynamics of Self-Identity: An EEG Source Analysis of the Current and Past Self,” Brain Structure and Function 227, no. 6 (2022): 2167–79, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00429-022-02515-9 . [2] There is quite a lot of unintended semantic conflation in discussions of personal identity. Even the label by which we refer to it almost assumes person essentialism. When I use the term “person”, I refer to the colloquial usage, not the neo-Lockean kind, unless explicitly stated. Moreover, in usages where “person” may be easily conflated, I have substituted the more neutral “self” or “selves”. This is why I refer to the persistence questions with the set of rather than . Most clearly neutral is the term “entities of our sort”, which I have tried to use most often, but selves serves the same purpose with less of a word count cost. [3] Harold W. Noonan, Personal Identity (London: Routledge, 2019), 85-86 [4] David Shoemaker and Kevin Tobia, “Personal Identity,” The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology, 2022, 542–63, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871712.013.28, 9. [5] Eric Todd Olson, What Are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), v. [6] David Shoemaker and Kevin Tobia, “Personal Identity” [7] Eric T. Olson, “Personal Identity,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal [8] David Shoemaker and Kevin Tobia, “Personal Identity,” [9] Ibid [10] Marya Schechtman, Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 49-56 [11] Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 267. [12] Gendler, Tamar Szabo and Olson, Eric T, The Human Animal. (Philosophical Review, 1999) [13] Nichols, Shaun, and Michael Bruno. “Intuitions about Personal Identity: An Empirical Study.” Philosophical Psychology 23, no. 3 (2010): 293–312. doi:10.1080/09515089.2010.490939. [14] Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 47 [15] Lukas J Meier. “Memories without Survival: Personal Identity and the Ascending Reticular Activating System” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, no.5 (2023): 478–491. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad028 [16] Two things are qualitatively identical if they share all their properties, and numerically identical if they are not two, but one. [17] McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, 57 [18] Steinbock, Bonnie. “Abortion.” The Hastings Center, February 22, 2024. https://www.thehastingscenter.org/briefingbook/abortion/ . [19] Olson, What Are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology, 214. [20] Noonan, Personal Identity, 18 [21] Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 236 [22] Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 210 [23] Noonan, Personal Identity, 191 [24] Noonan, Personal Identity, 5 [25] Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 248 - 253 [26] Noonan, Personal Identity, 18 [28] Noonan, Personal Identity, 140 [29] Olson, “Personal Identity” [30] Noonan, Personal Identity, 139

How Political Instability Unravels Religious Commitment in the Face of Uncertainty: Navigating Uncertainty in Political Instability and Religiosity in Post-Arab Spring Egypt and Tunisia Abanti Ahmed Abstract This paper explores the dynamic relationship between political instability and religiosity in Egypt and Tunisia, with a focus on the period from 2012 to 2018. The central research question examines how individuals navigate uncertainty and address political challenges, influencing the role of religion in their lives. The argument posits that tangible solutions to political challenges diminish religious commitment, while a lack of such solutions fosters an increased reliance on religion. Drawing on a detailed analysis of events, protests, and economic conditions, the paper reveals that the perception of uncertainty can be controlled and the pursuit of tangible solutions demotes religion to a secondary role in individuals' lives. When addressing citizens' concerns during economic challenges, political repression, and societal grievances, policymakers should consider creating platforms for discussion, promoting religious tolerance, and offering practical avenues for positive change, which can be achieved through religious accommodation laws, interfaith dialogue initiatives, and religious endowments. These initiatives ease society’s broader challenge in engaging in open dialogue about the complex human response to political instability that encourages a reevaluation of how uncertainty is navigated. Introduction The periods after pivotal moments in American history, such as the September 11 attacks and the Great Depression, were marked by sharp, brief increases in church attendance as communities sought solace during troubling times. Religious communities are often the first place that people who feel like they have lost control seek refuge. Is this short-lived surge because they have found alternative solutions or because religion slowly loses its allure in the face of prolonged turmoil? Perhaps online communities provide a platform that empowers apostates to be open and therefore increases their visibility. Alternatively, escalating religious persecution and intolerance might contribute to a decline in religiosity, as individuals distance themselves from beliefs facing opposition. Yet, the root causes behind these shifts remain unclear. In this paper, I will explore the conditions under which political instability decreases religiosity. In the currents of geopolitical turmoil, economic upheaval, and rocky political transitions, one might expect religiosity to be a steadfast anchor, providing relief in uncertain times. Yet, as the Arab Spring swept across the landscapes of Egypt and Tunisia, leaving behind a trail of political transformations, the unexpected occurred: religiosity rather than standing resilient, underwent stark fluctuations. The Arab Spring marked a significant period of upheaval and change across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, characterized by widespread protests, demands for political reform, and calls for greater social justice. While Tunisia is often recognized as the birthplace of the Arab Spring, the movement’s mass protests and uprisings transcended national boundaries, influencing countries like Syria, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, and Bahrain, each with its unique socio-political context and grievances. In Egypt, if the period from 2012-2018 was marked by political turmoil, while the period from 2018-2021 focused on economic reforms and stability, then why did religiosity decrease during turmoil but increase during more stable times? In Tunisia, the opposite occurred; religiosity increased during periods of relatively more political instability from ongoing democratic transitions between 2018-2021 than between 2012-2018. In these two cases, fluctuations in religiosity trends were very similar over the same periods of time despite having divergent political outcomes. This is not to postulate that the essence of religion is solely a response to political instability or repression, nor does it assert that religion solely arises from a particular type of uncertainty. Rather, it underscores that within the realm of political instability, a condition that inherently diminishes religious commitment is a type of uncertainty that invites competitive resolutions that take precedence over religious avenues. Despite fluctuations in non-religiosity within a specific sub-group of the Egyptian population over the past decade, it has not exceeded 25%. Consequently, religion consistently maintains a primary role in the lives of the majority within this subset, highlighting its enduring significance and resilience amidst societal changes. My central thesis posits that when individuals are confronted with tangible solutions to alleviate the challenges that they attribute to their political instability, this set of solutions will take precedence over religious commitment. Religious commitment increases when individuals do not have access to these solutions and feel disillusioned by the future. Their perception of the future is important here, and I will discuss in these cases how these perceptions emerge and are sustained during political instability. Consequently, religion assumes a secondary role in individuals’ lives as it is outcompeted by alternative solutions that best alleviate their uncertainties. One secondary argument entails that overall trends of secularization, driven by societal shifts toward modernization, play a central role in diminishing religiosity. As societies modernize and prioritize democratic values, religious influence tends to decline. This argument suggests that broader secularization, marked by the declining significance of religion in public and private spheres, has an impact on individual piety. An alternative argument delves into the role of political Islam during periods of political instability. It suggests that individuals may attribute their political and economic grievances to religious frameworks, especially when political actors weaponize religion for political gains. This attribution may lead to a decline in religious commitment as people scrutinize religion's involvement in political decisions and its consequential impact on their daily lives. This paper will be structured as follows: First, I will discern the type of political instability I will examine. I will explore the types of uncertainties that come with political instability, and how uncertainty is tied to religious commitment. Then, I will showcase what happens to the role of religion when individuals perceive particular types of uncertainty to be present. Finally, I will introduce my cases of Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab Spring and explore how my proposed conditions of political instability are present in both despite their divergent transitions and outcomes. Theory Political instability exhibits diverse characteristics in terms of duration and intensity, ranging from brief upheavals to prolonged disruptions. My focus extends beyond a general assessment of political instability, emphasizing instances of uncertainty directly impacting citizens' daily lives and their perception of the world around them. This perception has cascading effects on how the role of religion is viewed, so I seek to analyze the relationship between individuals' perception of uncertainty with their resulting course of action and religious commitment. Religion, despite being an ancient phenomenon, can also be a psychological response to uncertainty and turbulent times. Religiosity is measured by attitudes toward religious practices, frequency of worship, and overall belief in God. When religion is tied to self-identity, changes within the political sphere are least impactful on individuals’ religiosity. In Lebanon, for example, individuals tend to identify with their religious and ethnic identities before an overarching national identity. In countries where people prioritize nationalism, ethnic divisions, and plurality of religion, the secondary nature of religion in everyday life makes it more susceptible to change in response to changes in the political sphere such as regime change, citizen repression, economic hardship, and military and police brutality. For instance, in Turkey, there are reports of decreased religiosity among youth and even self-reported accounts of hijabi women who wear the hijab in the public eye, but have said to have already “left Islam.” The Republic of Turkey—whose founding father, Ataturk, had revolutionized Turkey as a “modern” state, adopted a Latin alphabet in place of Ottoman Turkish, and removed religion in state affairs—has consequently experienced decades of secularization. Now, with President Erodgan, Turkish society reaches a crossroads with religion and secularization; as Erdogan increases the role of Islam in politics, such as reducing interest rates because “Islam demands it” while inflation increases. As a result, Turkish citizens attribute their economic challenges to religion. While religion may not be the direct cause of these difficulties, the deliberate political weaponization of Islam can contribute to this perception among the population. I postulate that there are two types of uncertainty: controlled uncertainty and random uncertainty. Under controlled uncertainty, individuals have an optimistic outlook that they have the power and agency to pursue tangible courses of action to relieve their uncertainties. In contrast, under random uncertainty, individuals have the pessimistic outlook that their uncertainties are beyond their control. This perception is coupled with a sense of disillusionment regarding the future. In Israel, for example, women responded to random uncertainty by participating in palm recitation to better cope with the uncertain conditions of the Second Intifada and the threat of terror. They inhibited both an absence of control over their uncertain circumstances and disillusionment with the future, which increased their reliance on rituals as a coping mechanism. Trauma is particularly powerful in identity formation, as it brings out what attributes and experiences individuals have in common. While existing research suggests that instability can heighten individuals' religious commitment by reminding them of their shared religious beliefs, this study aims to delve deeper by considering not just the presence of instability, but also its nature and activity. The activity of instability (e.g. living in a constant state of poverty vs. experiencing escalating instability) determines the type of uncertainty individuals perceive of their circumstances. When faced with controlled uncertainty, where the level of instability remains relatively stable, individuals may rely more on their religious beliefs as a source of solace and guidance. However, in situations of escalating instability, where uncertainty intensifies over time, individuals may be more inclined to explore alternative solutions beyond religion to address immediate challenges brought about by political instability. "The consequential secondary role of religion is supported by the notion of secular competition—when economic opportunities or social norms conflict with religious obligations—that individuals face when considering alternative solutions. For instance, during the Great Depression, as conditions worsened, many Americans cataloged the failures of capitalism and voluntarism, emphasizing citizens’ basic responsibilities to one another. Even conservative religious leaders began to join social workers and hungry Americans in calling for more vigorous federal intervention as they faced the suffering before them and their own inability to alleviate it. Their efforts took off in the summer of 1932, when tens of thousands of out-of-work World War I veterans and their families marched to Washington, DC to demand early payment of promised service bonuses. Yet as the federal government extended its place in Americans’ daily lives, leaders of some religious institutions feared for their own status. This historical example illustrates how under conditions of political instability, individuals may perceive a sense of control over their uncertain situation and may prioritize tangible courses of action over religious commitment due to the perceived favorability of the outcomes they desire." To determine, then, the conditions under which political instability decreases religiosity, I argue that when individuals face controlled uncertainty, their reliance on religion becomes secondary as alternative solutions with the potential for immediate favorable outcomes take precedence, but random uncertainty results in the increase in religiosity that many might predict. The cases of Tunisia and Egypt offer valuable insights into the dynamics between political instability, tangible actions, and the evolving role of religion under political instability. Case of Tunisia: Controlled Uncertainty In the case of Tunisia, the Arab Spring catalyzed in December 17, 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old street vendor in the impoverished city of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, self-immolated. This came after market inspectors confiscated some of Bouazizi’s wares, claiming that he lacked the necessary permit. Bouazizi’s suicide was the result of desperation rather than symbolizing a political cause, though it was publicly interpreted as an act of protest. Several reward systems were activated after Bouazizi's suicide. Bouazizi was considered as a "hero for Tunisians and the Arab world as a whole" by Tunisian film directors, assumed a martyr by the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) of Tunisia, and named TIME magazine’s person of the year in 2011. The publicized suicide of Bouazizi made many people in similar situations believe that suicide was an appropriate action for them as well. Bouazizi was a university graduate distraught with the inability to financially support his mother and siblings, reflecting the vast majority of Tunisians experiencing soaring rates of unemployment. In 2009, the overall unemployment rate in Tunisia was 13.3%, but 30% among Tunisia's youth, who made up almost a third of the total population. The Tunisian government decreased expenditures from 45% to 29% from the 1970s to the 1990s, lowering the quality of public goods and services. Hence, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, president of Tunisia from 1987 to 2011, along with his family and other elites, created and strengthened the inner circle of cronyism—political elites appropriating economic resources and creating privileges by preventing outsiders. Controlling half the country’s wealth, the enterprises they owned produced 3% of total output and employed only 1% of the labor force. In addition, Ben Ali never allowed genuine political opposition to emerge and elections were manipulated: In 1989, he supposedly garnered 99.3% of the vote; in 1994, 99.9% and five years later, 99.4%. Political opponents — in particular Islamists— were persecuted, tortured or forced into exile. Tunisia's press was censored. According to the theory of suicide proposed by French sociologist Emile Durkheim, Bouazizi's self-immolation would be best categorized as anomic suicide. This type of suicide occurs when individuals experience a chronic state of societal disorganization, where traditional sources of regulation, such as religion and government, fail to provide moral constraints in the face of an unregulated capitalist economy. Anomic suicide is often associated with a sense of disillusionment about the future, leading individuals to see self-infliction as a way out. It's important to note that self-immolation directly contravenes Islamic law, as the Quran prohibits harm to oneself. Therefore, Bouazizi’s act can be viewed as a poignant illustration of the prioritization of social circumstances over religious beliefs. Despite the religious prohibition, Bouazizi saw self-immolation as a desperate means to escape his dire socio-economic situation. This conflict between religious doctrine and the perceived urgency of his socio-economic plight highlights how individuals may prioritize immediate material concerns over religious commitments. After years of severe economic hardship, during which most Tunisians were struggling to survive while President Ben Ali’s family, friends, and allies were getting richer, Bouazizi’s self-immolation marked the tipping point. Tunisians began to protest. Tensions heightened on December 22nd when another young man from Sidi Bouzid climbed up an electricity pylon and electrocuted himself on the cables, saying he was fed up with being unemployed. The new wave of strikes first erupted on December 17th in Sidi Bouzid, and came after the labor unions announced that they would organize peaceful marches to urge the government to improve its performance in development and employment. A few days later, a teenager was killed when police in Sidi Bouzid opened fire on protesters. An interior ministry spokesperson said police had been forced to "shoot in self-defense" from protesters who were setting police cars and buildings ablaze. The Tunisian government had been trying to manage the crisis politically before using force and the Tunisian development minister traveled to Sidi Bouzid to announce a new $10m employment program. The Tunisian government’s concessions—often met with skepticism on its sincerity and implementation—were a response to the resilience and violence of the crisis, showing Tunisians that the government was reacting to their demands rather than solely resorting to violence. This instilled hope in Tunisians regarding the positive trajectory of their protests. Despite protests, the rich were getting richer, the poor were not only getting poorer, but also had no job prospects, no ability to express themselves, and no way of criticizing government policy. The protests that erupted in Sidi Bouzid were spontaneous, yet they were marked by a level of organization and sophistication that appeared grounded in the sheer determination of those who participated in them. Tunisians faced a more costly and risky path due to being the first country to protest, unlike Egyptians who benefited from the momentum generated in Tunisia. The cost of cronyism and corruption to Tunisia is much higher because it also hinders job creation and investment and contributes to social exclusion. The presence of cronyism exacerbates the costs of protest by increasing repression, legal and financial consequences, social stigmatization, and psychological toll for protesters. The fear of retaliation from security forces was high, and protesting carried significant risks, including arrest, torture, and disappearance. For Tunisians, the standard method of expressing dissent has been informally within the party framework, but the masses participate in riots and demonstrations. The first president of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987), carefully appointed members of the political elite and removed them from office in such a way as to prevent anyone from building up a political base to keep factions to a minimum. The Tunisian economy was heavily centralized around the ruling elite and suffered from widespread corruption and cronyism. Economic grievances were a major driver of the Tunisian uprising, and many protesters were motivated by frustrations with unemployment, poverty, and lack of economic opportunities. The economic challenges faced by Tunisians may have increased the perceived costs of protesting, as individuals risked losing their livelihoods or facing economic hardships as a result of participating in protests. In Tunisia, the uprising was driven by a broad-based coalition of activists, students, workers, and ordinary citizens who came together to demand change. Solidarity among protesters helped to mitigate some of the risks associated with protesting by providing emotional support, practical assistance, and collective action. From this, it is clear that Tunisians perceived their uncertainties as resolvable through risky actions, therefore partaking in actions that would immediately relieve their grievances rather than remaining disillusioned with their future, which ultimately decreased their religiosity during this period. On January 13, 2011, Ben Ali appeared on national television and made broad concessions to the opposition, promising not to seek reelection as president when his term would end in 2014. He expressed regret over the deaths of protesters and vowed to order police to stop using live fire except in self-defense. Addressing some of the protesters’ grievances, he said he would reduce food prices and loosen restrictions on Internet use. Ben Ali’s concessions did not satisfy the protesters, who continued to clash with security forces, resulting in several deaths. The next day, a state of emergency was declared, and Tunisian state media reported that the government had been dissolved, Ben Ali fled Tunisia, and that legislative elections would be held in the next six months. Ben Ali’s reign from 1987-2011 had ended and Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi, appointed by Ben Ali in 1999, assumed power. The aftermath of Ben Ali's departure marked a significant moment for Tunisia, as protests persisted despite the regime change. Protesters had gathered in the area to demand that the interim government step down and the current parliament be disbanded. Demonstrators were also asking for suspension of the current constitution and the election of an assembly that can write a new one, as well as organize the transition to democracy. There were daily protests that members of Ben Ali's Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) party were in the new government and thousands of largely peaceful anti-RCD protests emerged.36 After persistent clashes between protesters and armed forces, Ghannouchi announced his resignation particularly following the death of three people in the country's capital, Tunis: “I am resigning today because I am not willing to be a person that takes decisions that could cause casualties," he told reporters Sunday. He also questioned "why a lot of people considered their main target to keep attacking the government, although a lot of its members agreed to join in this critical time." Ghannouchi’s resignation can be seen as a tangible outcome of the protesters' efforts. It signifies that their voices were heard and that their actions had a direct impact on the political landscape. Ghannouchi's acknowledgment of the need to avoid decisions that could cause casualties reflects a recognition of the legitimacy of the protesters' grievances and a commitment to avoiding further violence. Bouazizi's actions were instrumental in differentiating between controlled uncertainty and random uncertainty, providing Tunisians with a tangible catalyst that transformed disillusionment into proactive engagement with the future. Role of Religion Becomes Secondary As people sought to find concrete control over uncertain circumstances amid political instability, their dedication to religious beliefs weakened. Involvement in organized protests, the confrontation of severe repression, and the navigation of severe economic hardships became the focal points of their attention, demoting religious commitment to a secondary position. In 2012, the Pew Research Center surveyed Tunisians and found that though democratic principles were high priorities, as were the economy and security. 92% said that improving the economy ranked as the most important priority while 79% said that it was very important to maintain law and order. Also, people found democratic freedoms more important than religious divisions. This shows that Tunisians found these economic and democratic principles to take precedence over other grievances they faced. In this time period, a perceived resolution for these priority issues was through civil resistance, demonstrations, general strikes, and self-immolations, that were leading to visible outcomes and relieving uncertainty in a way that religion was not. Outside the party system, Tunisians became politically active, especially Tunisian women, who protested the draft constitution, the economy, and the ruling coalition. Within this political context of newly found political liberalizations, similar to Egypt, various religious groups started coming out of the underground in order to take advantage of the political openings. As these political openings were prioritized, trust in religious leaders went down from 38% to 35% between 2012 and 2018 and those who say they are not religious increased from 18% in 2012 to 30% in 2018. Tunisian Muslims that attend mosques at least some of the time decreased from 52% in 2012 to 30% in 2018. Tunisia’s troubled economy was the biggest challenge in 2017. The national unity government took some measures to stimulate growth, but it struggled to implement key reforms. High unemployment, a rising inflation rate, and tax increases plagued Tunisians. In January 2018, protests erupted in more than a dozen cities over price hikes. This further emphasizes the continued prioritization of addressing economic challenges by the Tunisian people. Secularization In Tunisia, the decades of Ben Ali’s secular regime had excluded religion from the public sphere. Its cascading effects have led Tunisia to have notably lower religiosity than other Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries with the proportion of people who said they were not religious increasing from 15% in 2013 to over 30% in 2018. The ousting of Ben Ali created political opportunities for Islamists, yet the secularizing impact of his two-decade-long regime remains a compelling explanation for the decline in religiosity between 2012-2018. Following the dissolution and drafting of a new constitution in October 2011, Tunisia no longer enforced secularism through repression. Surveillance, restriction, and harassment of Islamist activists that were previously practiced by the government ceased during the year. The new draft gave rise to Islamists to fight for power. In the months that followed the 2010-2011 revolution, several hundred imams were replaced, often by violent Islamists who accused the imams of having collaborated with the former Ben Ali regime. By October 2011, the Ministry of Religious Affairs announced that it had lost control of about 400 mosques.6 The “uncontrolled” classification means that a mosque’s imams were operating without the official authorization of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In Tunisia’s new political landscape, the content of prayer services was also no longer controlled by government authorities, a step many Tunisians approved of and viewed as part of the new liberties acquired through the revolution. In 2014, secular parties edged out Islamists at the polls. In the October parliamentary elections, Nidaa Tounes, a secularist political party, won 85 seats compared to 69 for Ennahda, an Islamist political party. Veteran politician Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi, the head of Nidaa Tounes and a former prime minister, was elected president in December. But turnout was lowest among the young, who ignited the Arab uprisings; among cities, the turnout was lowest in Sidi Bouzid, the birthplace of the uprisings that spread across the Middle East and North Africa. In 2016, Nidaa Tounes, the ruling secular party in Parliament, splintered. Ennahda founder Rachid Ghannouchi declared the Islamist party was abandoning political Islam. Amidst competition between Islamist and secular parties, when asked whether Turkey or Saudi Arabia is a better model for the role of religion in Tunisia’s government, 78% of Tunisians prefer the more secular Turkey, seeing it as a model for religion and politics. While the trends toward secularization during this period seemingly impact individual piety levels, the dominant controlled uncertainty factor holds greater significance, given that secularization has not been exclusive to this period and has prevailed since the era of Ben Ali. Despite the freedom of Islamist parties to enter political life, the government’s loss of control over regulating mosques, and new liberties granted toward religious freedom, levels of non-religiosity still prevailed. Political Islam In contrast to secularization efforts during Tunisia’s political transition, the country simultaneously experienced concerted efforts from Islamists to increase the role of religion in politics. During this period, the presence of political Islam coupled with economic and political insecurities might have led individuals to deviate from religious commitments as they witnessed greedy power grabs from both Islamists and secular parties who employed religion as a political instrument. From January to October 2011, an interim government moved toward reform, recognizing new political parties and disbanding Ben Ali’s party. On October 23, Ennahda, a moderate Islamist party, won the national elections and formed a coalition government with two secular parties. Ennahda first emerged as an Islamist movement in response to repression at the hands of a secularist, authoritarian regime that denied citizens religious freedom and the rights of free expression and association. In 2014, the new constitution incorporated mentions of Islam as the religion and culture of the Tunisian people while also establishing a state role for protecting freedom of religious worship and expression. Ennahda, formerly an Islamist movement, transitioned into a party of "Muslim democrats," distancing itself from the label of "Islamism" due to negative associations with radical extremism. This shift reflects a strategic response to counter the misinterpretation and abuse of Islam by radical groups like ISIS, positioning Ennahda as a moderate political force advocating for democratic principles. Ennahda’s re-labelling as “Muslim democrats” reflects frustration with outsiders not understanding its supposedly true democratic nature which may have resulted in individuals associating their challenges with these religious changes in governance and frustration with religion being politicized. Today, Tunisians are less concerned about the role of religion than about building a governance system that is democratic and inclusive and that meets their aspirations for a better life. However, the interplay between political Islam and religiosity is tied to perceptions of uncertainty. The prevalent economic hardships—regardless of the presence of political Islam—left Tunisians uncertain about the future. In 2011, 78% of Tunisians expressed optimism that the economy would improve to some extent within the following 2-3 years. However, by 2018, this hope had significantly dwindled, with only 33% of Tunisians maintaining confidence in a better economic outlook over the same timeframe. Case of Egypt Egypt stands as a prominent example of a country profoundly affected by the events in Tunisia. The success of the Tunisian Revolution in ousting President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali provided a template for dissent, inspiring Egyptians to rise up against the longstanding rule of President Hosni Mubarak. The images and narratives of Tunisian protesters challenging authoritarianism and demanding change resonated with Egyptians, fueling their own aspirations for political reform and social justice. In Egypt, decades of corruption, police brutality, media censorship, unemployment, and inflation led labor and youth activists, feminists, and individual members of the Muslim Brotherhood to protest. From the occupation of downtown Cairo’s Tahrir Square, to labor strikes, acts of civil disobedience, clashes with armed forces, and others, violence between protestors and the police resulted in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries. The wave of organized protests gained momentum following the oustings of Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi in 2011 and 2013, respectively. These pivotal events demonstrated to Egyptians that mass mobilization could be an effective means of addressing the longstanding issues they had endured. Despite Mubarak's lengthy rule from 1981 until his departure in 2011, previous protests had proven ineffective in leading to his resignation. However, the timely catalyst provided by Tunisia's Revolution ignited a sense of urgency among Egyptians, inspiring them to seize upon the pan-Arabist phenomenon sweeping the region. This newfound determination empowered Egyptians to confront their decades-long grievances head-on. Egyptians, seeking an immediate end to enduring abuse and corruption, embraced large, organized protests despite harsh governmental crackdown and threats of death. Their perception of the uncertainty faced during this period appeared to be remedied by protests and political changes, thereby diminishing the role of religion to a secondary position. The Egyptian case took advantage of the momentum that the Tunisian revolution brought, making it unique to examine the intricate relationship between their resistance and the decline in religious commitment, challenging the notion that religious avenues are the primary recourse during times of political instability. Controlled Uncertainty Egypt has been an authoritarian government since 1952 with periodic revolts and unrest. The causes of the 2011 protests against Mubarak also existed in 1952, when the Free Officers, who led the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, ousted King Farouk. Issues such as inherited power, corruption, under-development, unemployment, and unfair distribution of wealth have persisted as constants in Egyptian life since 1952. Successive Egyptian regimes have systematically used repression to ensure order. The authoritarian barter “bread and security for freedom” has been widely disseminated along with the notion that the country was not yet ready for democracy. Egypt has long grappled with a systemic pattern of human rights abuses and repression embedded in its governance, prompting citizens to attribute their crises directly to the government. While these challenges have persisted since 1952, worsening economic conditions, government corruption, and Mubarak’s rule, coupled with the influence of the Arab Spring ignited by the events in Tunisia, led Egyptians to unite in similar protests in 2011. The momentum from Tunisia became a catalyst, empowering Egyptians to engage in hands-on initiatives challenging Mubarak’s authoritarian government. President Hosni Mubarak's regime was also repressive, but opposition groups had more space for political activism compared to Tunisia, which lacked a traditional history of political dissent. Mubarak’s regime escalated violence against protesters significantly as protests enlarged with the anticipation of Mubarak’s resignation. Pro-Mubarak demonstrators targeted journalists, and, in what became known as the “Battle of the Camel," plainclothes policemen rode into Tahrir Square on camels and horses to attack unarmed protesters. The issuing of laws restricting public assembly allowed security officials to ban protests up to their discretion and were consequently allowed to use indiscriminate force on defying protestors. Egyptians mobilized protests in diverse ways and when they were repressed through laws restricting public assembly or with increasingly violent police responses, organized protests grew larger and more inflamed. Messages were picked out in stones and plastic tea cups, graffiti, newspapers and leaflets, and al-Jazeera's TV cameras which broadcast hours of live footage from the square everyday. When one channel of communication was blocked, people tried another. Mubarak had grown fearful of the protestors’ relentlessness—first pledging to form a new government, then promising not to seek another term in the next elections, and later becoming increasingly defiant about not stepping down—all the while asking protesters to return to normal. Eventually, Mubarak was forced to step down and the Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed leadership of the country on February 11, 2011. Protests still endured; during March and April 2011, SCAF granted a number of concessions to protesters’ demands in an effort to clear the streets of continued demonstrations. Human Rights Abuses Mubarak’s regime initially responded to the protests with brute force and tear gas, beating and arresting protesters. The regime responded to later increases in protest mobilization by shutting down internet service and mobile phone text messages, replacing regular police forces with the military, and imposing a curfew. This exemplifies a cycle of human rights abuses that not only heightened violent responses but also fueled additional protests, as Egyptians became increasingly outraged. Egyptians faced constant repression and abuse for decades under Mubarak’s rule, and used religious commitment as a coping mechanism before Tunisia catalyzed the Arab Spring, bringing newfound hope that Egyptians could better their circumstances. Since 2013, the military and security-led regime has reinstated its control over society and citizens with an iron fist, curtailing freedom of information and banning freedom of expression. Peaceful political participation and civil society activism, which were the pillars of the January uprising, have been de facto outlawed by the adoption of an arsenal of undemocratically spirited and restrictive laws. Protesting was costly and these laws banning public assembly made it much more risky for Egyptians to participate in protests, but the momentum of the revolution had assured individuals that there would be large turnouts, therefore bolstering their confidence in protesting as a means to confront the military and security-led regime. Egyptians, fueled by the momentum of their revolution and triggered by the ousting of Mubarak and Morsi, found empowerment in protesting. The logical nature of their efforts heightened hope for the future, as each overthrow or victory seemed to validate their path to stability. The move against Morsi deepened the political schism. Millions of Egyptians had taken to the streets against Morsi, but large numbers also protested the ousting of Morsi. A crackdown by security forces killed hundreds and Egypt declared a state of emergency. The emergency measures allowed security forces to detain people indefinitely for virtually any reason. They also granted broad powers to restrict public gatherings and media freedom. Gallup classifies respondents as thriving, struggling, or suffering, according to how they rate their current and future lives on a ladder scale numbered from 0 to 10 based on the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale. Egyptians gave their lives some of the worst ratings they ever have in the weeks leading up to former President Mohamed Morsi's removal from office. The 34% of Egyptians who rated their lives poorly enough to be considered suffering in June was up from 23% in January. Fewer than one in 10 rated their lives positively enough to be considered thriving. Role of Religion Becomes Secondary Fridays frequently became “days of rage” in Egypt and elsewhere because of the convenience of organizing would-be protesters during Friday prayers. Likewise, mosques themselves are often said to have served as organizational hubs for protest. Mosques functioned as a locus of anti-government agitation and logistical centers of preparation for demonstrations. While it may seem that protest activities at mosques contributed to an apparent increase in mosque attendance, thus suggesting elevated overall religious commitment, these places of worship primarily assumed roles as organizational centers during the peak of the protests, prioritizing logistics over prayer and religious services. Although, of course, mosques and Friday services were still attended for customary reasons, the dual functionality of the mosque introduced secular competition as highlighted earlier in the Theory section. Individuals are confronted with the dilemma of choosing between prayer and protest. Protest is a costly behavior that becomes progressively less risky as the number of participants increases. Hence, overall Mosque participation during the height of mass protests between the overthrow of Mubarak in 2011 to the beginning of El-Sisi’s presidency in 2014, declined. Prior to the Arab Spring, strength in religious beliefs were at high levels: the belief that things would be better if there were more people with strong religious beliefs decreased from 89.8% in 2005 to 83.4% in 2013. Additionally, the percentage of individuals with the belief that religious faith is an important quality in children decreased from 47.1% in 2005 to 27.7% in 2013. Muslims who say they attend the mosque at least some of the time decreased from around 85% in 2012-2014 to 75% in 2018-2019. Secularization In Egypt, as the regime experienced waves of regime changes and upheavals, the period between 2012-2016 witnessed efforts toward constitutional reform emphasizing the protection of civil liberties, the separation of powers, and the establishment of a democratic system of government. While Islam remained the state religion, the constitution also guaranteed freedom of religion and prohibited discrimination based on religion. The constitutional assembly was almost entirely composed of Islamists (Muslim Brothers, Salafis, and independent Islamists). Dozens of articles addressed individual rights and liberties of Egyptian citizens, which was more than the number of articles mentioning Islam. By enshrining these goals in the constitution, the government was held accountable, making failure to fulfill its constitutional obligations not just an act of inefficiency but anti-constitutional. Examples include Article 61, which demands to eradicate illiteracy within ten years; Article 66, which requires the state to provide opportunities for sports and physical exercise; and Article 184, which instructs the state to assimilate living standards across the country. While Islamist groups participated in the drafting of the constitution, the outcome reflected a broader commitment to democratic principles and social reforms driven by the demands of the people. In 2013, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi ousted Morsi and campaigned for the presidency on an anti-Islamist platform. He deemed the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, imposing restrictions on their operations and political activities. Liberals called the Brotherhood’s vision for Egypt “totally contradictory with the Egyptian national character,” which they argued respected pluralism of religion and the separation of religion and politics. The banning of the Muslim Brotherhood has likely contributed to the loss of faith in Islamist parties. El-Sisi also claimed that ‘the religious discourse in the Islamic World has lost the values of humanity in Islam’ and rejected the idea of an Islamic state. When he won the presidency in 2014, many moderate Muslims supported El-Sisi because he had taken a clear stand against Islamist radicalism and expressed a genuine desire to support a peaceful understanding of Islam. And in 2018, when El-Sisi ran again, he was re-elected with 97 percent of the vote, although the turnout was low and he faced virtually no competition. The crackdown against human rights defenders and independent rights organizations have made effective monitoring of the elections extremely difficult, especially with the number of organizations that were granted permission to monitor the elections being 44 percent fewer than in the last presidential election in 2014. This has resulted in elections facing criticism for not meeting the standards of a free and fair democratic process. This can also suggest that through negative partisanship, or the phenomenon of individuals forming their political opinions based on their opposition to certain individuals or parties, people viewed El-Sisi as either the best among limited options or endorsed his secularization efforts. Political Islam When governments weaponize a religion that the majority of their populations affiliate with, it is reasonable to link political Islam and individual piety to assert that piety levels and overall religiosity may decrease. This is a competitive argument because perceptions of Islam are directly shaped by how their governments implement Islamic laws, often at the expense of neglecting the needs of the people. Individuals are increasingly witnessing religion being wielded as a political tool. On one hand, they are promised welfare services in the name of Islam, while on the other hand, their repression is justified through the manipulation of Islamic texts. While El-Sisi initially presented himself as anti-Islamist, appearing on stage with the Coptic Pope, the Sheikh of Al-Azhar (the country's most esteemed institution of Islamic learning), and Galal al-Murra, a prominent Salafist, following the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, he privately holds conservative Islamic views. In A 2006 paper that Sisi wrote for the U.S. Army War College, he argued that democracy in the Middle East could only be of an Islamic nature, and that Islam provides the intellectual framework for his political beliefs. In addition, in 2011, when crowds protested against the military for imposing “virginity tests” on female protesters, Sisi declared that it was his responsibility to “decide if [protesters] were honorable.” However, the fluctuating influences of political Islam in Egypt between 2012-2018 indicate that it is not a strong enough condition on its own for political instability to decrease religiosity. Even the most liberal Egyptian party in 2012, the Free Egyptians Party, publicly defended a constitutional clause making the principles of Sharia the source of legislation. Even when the dominant strategy of the incumbent government was to combat political Islam—as has been the case since July 2013—the formal discourse of President El-Sisi included frequent mentions of the Qur'an and Hadith.33 The Muslim Brotherhood witnessed a consistent rise in support from July 2011 to February 2012 at 63%, followed by a sharp decline in April 2012 to 42%. Prior to the Brotherhood’s rise to power, many believed that its political inclusion would lead to its democratization and moderation. Throughout the eighteen days of demonstrations in January and February 2011 that toppled Mubarak, Brotherhood leaders were aware that the protests were not dominated by Islamist ideas but rather oriented toward the broad goals of freedom and social justice. As a result, Brotherhood leaders were deliberate in their strategies to appeal to voters by not expressing their Islamist views too overtly. This deception was caught on by Egyptians. Nevertheless, between 2011 and 2013, the old state chose to cooperate with Islamists, including the Brotherhood, to neutralize the revolutionary mood in the country. After coming to power, the Brotherhood quickly lost support among the main recipients of its social welfare network: the poor. The Brotherhood’s relationship with the poor was entirely clientelist and was concerned exclusively with creating an electoral base as opposed to developing a more substantive ideological or political relationship. It preferred to reproduce poverty as long as it translated into welfare recipients and, by extension, loyal voters. However, the strength of the argument that the presence of political Islam decreases religiosity diminishes when considering the current scenario, where political Islam exerts even more influence, and yet, religiosity has increased. This discrepancy suggests that the dynamics between political Islam and religiosity are subject to evolving perceptions of uncertainty. During the height of the revolution, Egyptians may have perceived their uncertainties about the future differently, driven by a sense of optimism and the belief in activism. In contrast, the present disillusionment with uncertainties about the future may be contributing to an enhanced role of religion in their lives. The increased religiosity could be a response to the perceived inadequacy of political solutions to address current challenges, prompting individuals to turn to religion as a source of guidance in times of persistent uncertainty. Conclusion I have posited that the conditions of political instability that decrease religiosity are controlled uncertainty and the secondary role of religion. When individuals are presented with concrete solutions to address challenges they attribute to their political circumstances, these solutions will assume greater significance than religious commitment. And when individuals lack access to these tangible solutions and experience disillusionment about the future, religious commitment tends to increase. The pivotal factor in this dynamic is individuals' perception of the future, and this analysis delved into how these perceptions manifested and endured during periods of political instability. Consequently, the outcome is a demotion of religion to a secondary role in individuals' lives, outcompeted by favorable solutions that emerge from the uncertainties they face. It's noteworthy that Egypt has faced challenges since the Mubarak regime, raising concerns about the possibility of a new Arab Spring. Despite the ongoing deterioration of human rights conditions, the intensity that characterized the Arab Spring has diminished. Reflecting on the revolution has yielded diverse opinions, with some viewing it as a success while others perceiving it as a failure. Although repression in Egypt may arguably be more severe today, the period between 2011 and 2016 marked a distinct phase. The ongoing debates surrounding the success or failure of the initial Arab Spring make it seem improbable for a similar movement to occur. Despite the immediate changes following the revolution, both Egypt and Tunisia continue to grapple with longstanding grievances. Tunisia, in particular, is confronted with economic challenges, with approximately 6,000 Tunisians joining ISIS, marking the highest per capita rate globally. Tunisians became disillusioned with post-revolution politics, especially well-educated youths, who experienced unemployment at extremely high rates. Despite the gradual political progress seen over the past seven years, economic rewards have yet to emerge, spurring some to radicalize. Some remaining questions that emerge are: Do individuals revert to heightened religious commitment after resolving political instability, or does the influence of tangible solutions have a lasting impact on their religious commitment? 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Will Matheson Federal 5G Innovation Policy in the Context of Technological Competition between the United States and China Will Matheson Introduction Proponents of 5G pitch the technology as a societal panacea, leading to a ‘fourth Industrial Revolution’ complete with robotic surgeons and near-boundless economic growth (1). Such predictions are premature—the nascence of this technology makes impossible predictions of its economic, political, and societal implications (2). Nevertheless, just as each progression from 1G to 4G brought a greater impact than its predecessor, the transition to 5G holds substantial implications as the largest network overhaul in history, effectually causing tremendous innovation across facets of society. As such, beyond questions of bandwidth, spectrum allocation, and mobile capacity, questions of politics, cybersecurity, and national prestige have shaped the adoption of 5G. In particular, China and its “national champion” telecommunications company, Huawei, have become central to the political questions surrounding 5G. In 2020, Attorney General William Barr delivered a speech accusing China of having unfairly gained an advantage in 5G development through the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) market-distorting support of Huawei, seeming to imply the US is being cheated in this race and needs to begin playing by China’s rules (3). Similarly, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently warned business leaders in Silicon Valley to be aware of intense technological competition with China, suggesting the CCP and Chinese companies have engaged in widespread cheating to steal from US companies and gain a technological advantage over the US (4). This rhetoric draws attention to a more interesting trend: a shift in US government technology policy, particularly in the 5G space, and particularly driven by the Trump administration. As China gains global attention for its technological innovation in 5G, the US has reacted with increased intervention and control in the sector. Traditionally, US economic orthodoxy is associated with a free-market system, in which innovation derives from competition among private firms. Proponents of American capitalism, representing the economic doctrine of both major political parties, embrace this innovation model as a great strength of the system. As the US has shifted towards a more interventionist approach in spaces like 5G in reaction to China’s successes, supporters of this economic approach such as The Economist have, predictably, reacted with surprise and disapproval (5). Of course, this free-market depiction oversimplifies the US economy—the government has played significant and varying roles in technological innovation throughout history—but the shift in strategy matters. It also contradicts historical responses to similar cases of national competition. In the 1980s, fears of Japanese technological innovation outpacing that of the US’s were rampant, leading credible voices to call for direct government involvement in capital allocation analogous to Japan’s system (6). However, such a shift from a free market economy to the interventionist Japanese-style “industrial policy” did not happen. The US never picked specific companies or industries to drive economic growth, did not develop a vast bureaucracy to direct technology adoption and dispersion, and did not adopt widespread protectionist measures. Today, the US government’s shift in technology strategy is not yet on the scale of true industrial policy. However, comments from key Trump administration officials asserting a need to pick “the ‘horse’ we are going to ride in this [5G] race” and the administration’s embrace of tariffs suggest that the reaction to China’s innovation surge differs from the re- action to Japan’s 40 years ago, begging the question, why might the US shift now, but not then? This paper begins to investigate the factors motivating the shift in the US federal government’s 5G innovation strategy. To understand why the government’s reaction to China’s technological rise differs from its reaction to Japan’s, the paper investigates the influence the US-China relationship has on federal 5G strategy, with emphasis on the relative influence of concerns of national security and concerns of economic growth and development. The US’s relationship with China differs greatly from that of the US with Japan in the 1980s; increasingly, policy- makers view the relationship through the lens of great power competition. This essay considers how the differing security relationship with the People’s Republic of China may motivate this shift and investigates the specific ways it may manifest. Economically, the Trump administration’s policies represent a shift in economic orthodoxy in the US as industrial policy has become more mainstream. This strategy results from a reaction to global trade, particularly with China. While these motivations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, this paper’s test of the perceived strength of each motivation illustrates the relative influence of perceived security and economic challenges from China on the US’s domestic innovation strategy. It concludes that while both factors likely play a role in motivating US 5G innovation strategy, the security aspect of the relationship holds a stronger sway over the federal approach to innovation than does the economic aspect. Literature Review The scope of academic research specifically focusing on the US government’s recent shift toward greater intervention in 5G innovation is limited, likely due to the recency of this trend, its ongoing evolution, and the specificity of this change. However, numerous schools of thought have provided useful frameworks for understanding this evolution, and in some cases, academics have applied these frameworks to questions of US technology policy oriented toward China. The following sections delineate these bodies of literature as they apply to this evolution in US tech policy. The “New Cold War” and the Role of Historical Analogy Today, popular discourse increasingly frames the US-China relationship as devolving into a “new Cold War” (7). One key parallel emerging from this discourse is the systematic differences between American democracy and Chinese autocracy (8). At the same time, many challenge these claims, illustrating the multiplicity of views of China in popular discourse and the ongoing use of history as a mechanism to understand the Sino-American relationship (9). Certainly, the Trump administration has seemed to adopt a more confrontational stance toward China that belies a belief in great power competition, perhaps best embodied by its depiction of China as “revisionist” in the 2017 National Security Strategy (10). This discourse holds key implications for US policy. Given its empirical nature and the difficulties of understanding the present and future, history often serves as a heuristic for national leaders. Analogizing the Sino-American relationship to the Cold War will shape how leaders view the relationship and the policies they enact (11). However, a smaller body of literature instead finds that analogies serve more as post hoc justifications for policies (12). Of course, the framing of China as a wholly “revisionist” power that serves as an ideological and geopolitical foe oversimplifies the Sino-American relationship and China’s own behavior on the international stage at the expense of empirical accuracy (13). Nevertheless, the belief in such a “new Cold War” likely influences US policy toward China. Interestingly, some research suggests less conceptually complex leaders—defined as the level of sensitivity to information and its nuances within, measured by relative usage of high and low complexity words—use less sophisticated, more simplistic, and universalizing historical analogies in foreign policy decision-making (14). Political psychology naturally involves significant issues with validity, and this study’s sample size is limited. However, its implication suggests that Trump (a less complex leader by its measure of complexity) is particularly inclined to universalizing analogies such as framing the US-China relationship as a second Cold War. Such analogizing implies that the perception of great power competition with China may be motivating the shift in US technology policy. Indeed, the connection between memory of the Cold War to technological competition with China is beginning to emerge in popular discussion (15). At a baseline level, research detailing government technology strategy during the Cold War provides a rough idea of the lessons leaders analogizing the present may draw. The Cold War national security apparatus routinely dictated innovation strategy and goals across sectors in a departure from market-driven innovation, instead being motivated by a greater focus on pre-eminence in key areas such as radar, jet propulsion, and telecommunications. In particular, the government drove innovation primarily via federal projects (rather than the creation of state- owned enterprises) organized in the constellation of a few critical government lab- oratories, a slightly larger group of independent labs and sources of expertise, and a large array of businesses fulfilling contracts. The sheer scope and size of government funding for these projects was exorbitant and focused on specific technological achievements rather than foundational research (16). The most powerful techno- logical Cold War analogy is the Space Race. This episode condenses the notions of technological competition between great powers and is still reflected today by Americans’ general fascination with space and support for “space leadership” (17). Securitization Another way the US security relationship with China may influence support for 5G technology development is the securitization of various facets of the relation- ship as a result of a rising perception of great power competition. Securitization theory refers to a politicization process in which leaders of states assert policy areas as issues of national security, redefining the way actors treat the issue (18). An array of scholars argue the aforementioned “new Cold War” framing creates depictions of China as a threat that leads to the securitization of the US-China relationship (19). Importantly, securitization is a phenomenon that describes how countries, leaders, media, and other political actors understand things as threats. The securitization of something—such as aspects of the US-China relationship—does not imply that said object does not genuinely constitute a security threat. Rather, the theory is useful for understanding discursive constructions of threats, but the determination of whether that construction is justified is a separate question. Recently, scholars of securitization theory have applied it to the realms of technology and cybersecurity. Hansen and Nissenbaum propose a three-pronged framework for the securitization of cyberspace useful for evaluating possible security constructions of 5G. First, securitization in cyberspace includes depictions of entire infrastructures at risk of devastating, irreversible attack. Second, emphasis on everyday security practice in cyberspace creates powerful links between people’s everyday experience with their personal electronic devices and the threat of devastating attack. Third, emphasis on the technical complexity of the security threats (“technification”) powerfully motivates the securitization of a cyber issue and lends credibility to those securitizing it (20). Given how recently the Huawei issue has risen to public prominence, only a small body of literature specifically argues US discourse securitizes Huawei (and ZTE, another key Chinese telecommunications company) (21). Of course, a wider body of scholarship investigates the ways cybersecurity and critical infrastructure are constructed or securitized, implying the potential securitization of specific Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE (22). The securitization of technology has unique implications, such as substantial restrictions to trade (e.g. export controls, tariffs, localization requirements, restrictions on foreign direct investment). This immediate effect in turn leads to greater securitization of technology (creating a feedback loop), as well as tensions between nation-states (23). Industrial Policy Industrial policy connotes a specific economic intervention by the government. The economic strategy requires government intervention into the economy to tar- get the allocation of capital, alter production models, and provide protection for sectors deemed key drivers of economic growth and job production (that, absent said intervention, would perform significantly less well) (24). Japan’s rapid economic development in the mid- to late 20th century best exemplifies this strategy of a developmental state: a system closely coordinating government and business by limiting the entry of competitors, creating recessionary cartels, coordinating technology uptake and knowledge sharing in key industries, forcing and guiding mergers and industry exits, and providing subsidies through regulating pricing, government purchasing schemes, tax breaks, the use of tariffs, and low-interest rate loans (25). The process results in the “picking of winners and losers” where- by the government plays a key role in determining which companies become the conglomerate drivers of certain industries or sectors. While consensus generally assumed this process was almost entirely bureaucracy-driven (26), recent scholarship has suggested that elected leaders still played a key role in shaping Japanese industrial policy (27). China’s strategic plan, “Made in China 2025,” also reflects the core tenets of industrial policy. The strategy articulates China’s current industrial policy, serving as a ten-year guide to pivot the economy away from low-quality, labor-intensive goods to high-quality, technology-intensive goods and services. The plan provides the framework by which the Chinese government will coordinate massive subsidies, preferential market access, and technology uptake from other nations in or- der to promote specific companies in key industries as national champions (28). “Made in China 2025” identifies key industries including information technology, and Huawei is one of China’s most successful national champions. The multinational technology company Huawei provides a useful case study in Chinese industrial policy: the company benefits from large state subsidies, lucrative contracts with the military, and favorable tax breaks. As a result of its ability to consistently undercut all competitors on pricing, it has experienced massive global market growth (29). Much like how some American thinkers and leaders called for industrial policy in reaction to Japan’s industrial policy successes in the 1980s, today some call for the strategy in reaction to China’s policy (30). This sentiment may be grounded in states modeling their policy behavior off of the actions of one another, particularly in defense policy (31). Donald Trump, and key advisors in his administration such as Peter Navarro, have strong records of supporting industrial policy and have made attempts at enacting such an economic strategy both broadly and in relation to China over the previous three years (32). However, while the administration may have attempted to use strategies like a trade war as a protectionist reaction to China’s industrial policy, China’s recent behavior and industrial planning have continued to emphasize the industrial policy mentality of “Made in China 2025,” suggesting the influence of the administration’s policies on China’s behavior has been limited thus far (33). Nevertheless, this track record demonstrates that in the US, support for industrial policy empirically derives from interactivity with other nations’ economies and that it is reasonable to suggest that the orthodoxy of industrial policy may motivate the Trump administration’s economic strategies. Indeed, research is beginning to investigate how industrial policy motivated by economic competition with China specifically influences technology innovation strategies (34). Methodology Operationalization of the Dependent Variable Understanding the evolution of government policy toward greater intervention and control in technological innovation presents distinct challenges. Because this dependent variable is a recent trend that is continuing to develop, factors that indicate it are subtle. As a result, a composite of indicators best illustrates this change within the past few years. In particular, this shift has three components: protection of domestic technology firms from perceived risks, investment in technological innovation, and intervention specifically designed to support US-based semiconductor manufacturer Qualcomm as it competes with Huawei. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) provides evidence of the protection of domestic technology firms from perceived risk. CFI- US is an interagency governmental body that was created in the 1970s to evaluate potential national security implications of various forms of foreign direct investment. Its powers have generally expanded over time, now focussing on the broader implications of specific investments and on the implications of aggregate investments from certain countries and investors in specific industries. Given this role, its record of enforcement illustrates the protection of domestic firms from foreign—and in particular, Chinese—firms. CFIUS’s scope has expanded significantly over the past 15 years as it increasingly scrutinized Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 2007, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act officially codified CFIUS (which had previously enjoyed the mandate of only an executive order) in a clear push by Congress to give it more sway in screening FDI. In 2015, Ralls Corporation v. CFIUS expanded the presidential powers to use the committee to prevent FDI on claims of national security. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 further expanded CFIUS’s purview, instruct- ing it to both consider the risks of cumulative investments in particular sectors and the broader economic implications of any single investment in national security terms. It also instructs the committee to take into account the country from which FDI originates, signaling its increasing focus on China. In the same year, CFI- US intervened in the hostile takeover of Qualcomm by then Singaporean-based Broadcom, marking the first instance of the committee intervening before a deal was finalized. The cumulative effect has turned CFIUS into a gatekeeper to the US economy, enjoying broad, unappealable power to dictate FDI (35). The data demonstrate this expansion of CFIUS intervention over the previous decade. Crucially, the threat of a CFIUS investigation is the most important way CFIUS influences businesses due to the high costs these entities must shoulder under an investigation (36). Over roughly the past decade, CFIUS has dramatically increased the number of notices it has received as its scope has broadened and has correspondingly pursued a greater number of investigations over time (see “Increasing CFIUS Enforcement and Deterrence, 2009–2017,” above) (37). Correspondingly, this increase in investigations has deterred companies from following through on their transactions, as the number that have withdrawn their notices during investigation or review has increased, as demonstrated by the same chart. This expansion of notices has specifically focused on China. Between 2005–2015, CFIUS dramatically increased the number of transactions originating from China that it covered, and Chinese transactions became a larger part of its port- folio (see “Chinese transactions covered by CFIUS,” next page) (38). In addition, be- tween 2016–17, China far outpaced any other country for the number of CFIUS cases explicitly concerned with acquisitions of critical US technology, totaling over 1/5th of all such cases (a total of 38 cases) (39). Two cases under the Trump administration demonstrate how the 5G/semiconductor fight has particularly shaped this growth in CFIUS’s power. In 2017, President Trump directly blocked the takeover of Lattice Semiconductor by a Chinese-backed investor on the basis of national security (40). In 2018, CFIUS intervened to prevent the hostile takeover of Qualcomm on the national security grounds that the deal could potentially undermine America’s ability to compete with Huawei (41). The application of the national security framework, citing the threat from China, for a case concerning a takeover by a non-Chinese firm underscores how seriously the government has taken 5G. Tracking government investment in 5G is more difficult—for as many times as the White House has had Infrastructure Week, the government still has not put substantial funding toward 5G. Nevertheless, the government has made a number of steps that collectively signal an increasing level of involvement in the 5G space. The FCC’s controversial approval of the T-Mobile and Sprint merger (given the substantial concerns regarding oligopoly among cellular network providers) was explicitly founded upon the reasoning that it would promote “United States leadership in 5G” and conditioned the deal on the company’s provision of 5G to 90% of rural Americans (42). Moreover, the FCC recently announced a $9 billion fund for 5G in rural areas (43). The Department of Labor additionally created and put $6 million toward a public-private partnership to support education and training for jobs considered key to accelerating 5G deployment (44). Most relevant, however, is the Networking and Information Technology Re- search and Development Program (NITRD). NITRD unites various federal agencies, serving as the primary source of direct government research and development for advanced technologies relating to information technology. The “NITRD Bud- get Data, FY2011–2020” graph below captures how the government has ramped up its investment in this area over the past decade (45). This graph demonstrates three important trends. First, from 2011 to 2018, NITRD’s budget increased by 43%, from $3.7 to $5.3 billion, illustrating the substantial shift in the importance the government has placed on its research. While the total amount of funding may seem small by the standards of the government budget, the strong growth rate illustrates the shift to place greater emphasis on the government’s role in technology innovation. Second, the executive branch has begun substantially increasing its requested budget amount every year since 2016, suggesting a concurrent increase in government investment in IT. Third, the actual budget has outpaced the re- quested budget for each year recorded since 2015, suggesting Congress has also played a key role in driving this shift toward more government investment. Finally, the government’s involvement with Qualcomm and Huawei illustrates how it is willing to take low-frequency, high-visibility actions to protect 5G technology innovation. The Trump administration’s 2018 intervention to prevent the Broadcom takeover of Qualcomm signaled the degree to which it will intervene to protect this 5G chip-making company it sees as crucial to national competitiveness. This year, the administration has doubled down on this emphasis on Qualcomm, using the Department of Justice (DOJ) to back Qualcomm in an anti- trust lawsuit. Interestingly, this lawsuit was first brought against Qualcomm by the Federal Trade Commission under the Obama administration, with a district court ruling in favor of the FTC (46). Now, the DOJ (with support from the Departments of Defense and Energy) has supported Qualcomm’s appeal, explicitly making the argument that the courts should allow the company to maintain its business model on grounds that the company itself is integral to the security of the nation (47,48). Similarly, the Trump administration has taken aim at Huawei. In 2019, President Trump issued Executive Order 13873, which dramatically expanded government protections for telecommunications on the basis that such networks faced serious threat from foreign companies and governments and that such threats constituted a national security risk. Though not mentioning Huawei by name, the move was universally regarded as a reaction to the company’s perceived threat in the 5G space. Indeed, at the same time, the Department of Commerce added Huawei to the Entity List, effectively banning Huawei from doing business in the US. The coordination of these actions demonstrates the US government’s specific targeting of Huawei as the face of the Chinese technological competition with the US (49). While other Trump administration officials have spoken on this subject as well, these statements will not be as useful for signaling the existence of a shift in government policy toward more intervention in 5G innovation (50). First, this administration’s statements have conflicted in this area. In 2019, administration officials openly disagreed on the right level of intervention in 5G policy, with Trump finally deciding to oppose a direct federal acquisition of Nokia or Ericsson. However, a year later Attorney General Barr’s aforementioned speech revisited the issue and suggested that acquisition remained on the table (51). Clearly, the statements by the Trump administration send too many conflicting signals to reliably capture the trend of increasing government intervention. Additionally, intervention in the tech space matters for its actual effects on innovation processes, so tracking actions is better than tracking words. However, the concrete actions by CFIUS and the DOJ regarding Qualcomm unequivocally show how the government is increasingly fa- voring an interventionist approach specific to 5G. Taken together, the data from CFIUS, NITRD, and the government’s specific focus on Qualcomm illustrate a growing tendency in the federal government to intervene in technology areas such as 5G in order to promote innovation. Hypotheses The emphasis on great power competition has emerged in the government at the same time this shift in innovation policy strategy has occurred. Especially under the Trump administration, key government documents reflect this shift, arguing that China and Russia present the greatest threats to the United States. These documents forward a collection of related ideas: that great power competition will define the coming decades, that China is a revisionist power, that this competition is not simply a military one but an ideological one, etc. (52). Interestingly, while most of these documents, including the most authoritative such as the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), have emerged during the years of the Trump presidency, the 2016 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority embraced the notion of great power competition between the US and China, showing how this trend is not necessarily exclusive to the Trump administration (53). Clearly, an emerging trend is the perception of great power competition between the US and China, which seems at first glance to motivate or be invoked in the interventions the government is making into the 5G and technology innovation space. As detailed in the literature review, this trend can motivate political behavior, including through the influence of historical analogy and securitization. Given this trend and the literature on technology as a realm of great power competition, an overarching hypothesis for this shift in government innovation policy follows: The perception in the US of great power competition with China has led it to embrace greater intervention in technology innovation. This hypothesis has two implications alluded to by the literature review. First, this perception of great power competition may lead to Cold War analogizing that in turn motivates the shift in government innovation policy. The body of literature on historical memory as a heuristic for policymakers suggests the Cold War analogizing of the US-China relationship may have distinct political effects. Such effects and the general discourse around a “new Cold War” imply that perceptions of great power competition could motivate changes to technological innovation policy. Second, the perception of great power competition may motivate the securitization of the 5G space. Literature on securitization suggests that the US may construct technological innovation as a front in a great power competition, there- by necessitating intervention on national security grounds. Both of these scenarios are particular manifestations of the great power competition hypothesis. Testing each of these possibilities, then, illustrates the ways in which the hypothesis may be true. The results of those tests will specifically highlight the mechanisms by which great power competition leads to the shift in technology policy, and will more broadly illuminate the dimensions of this new era of perceived great power competition. Note that these manifestations are neither mutually exclusive nor dependent. To test the potential for Cold War analogizing, I will track analogizing of 5G to the Space Race with the USSR. This test will examine rhetoric framing 5G as a “race,” including a specific focus on analogies to US and Soviet achievements in the 1960s, over time. Given the rich literature on historical analogies’ influence on political behavior, a trend of such comparisons increasing over time will demonstrate how the administration is framing technology innovation with great power competition. NASA and the race to the moon represent perhaps the most critical Cold War episode concerning technology innovation in competition with another great power. As such, these comparisons are the most likely to take place, given the importance of simplistic analogies in particular, and are thus most illustrative of the use of analogizing in viewing 5G. Because the space race represented a pivot toward greater government intervention in technology innovation, its analogy serves as a likely motivator for a similar shift today. Of course, the government’s intervention in support of 5G is nowhere close to the scale of involvement it took in the space race, but the analogy-driven change in policy matters more than the parity in magnitude between government involvement in innovation in the 1960s and 2010s. This data is admittedly correlational, though the body of literature on the use of historical memory suggests that the perpetuation of specific analogies influences decision making. This suggestion means the greater the use of the analogy, the more likely it is influencing the shift in innovation strategy. To test for securitization, I will examine critical documents to understand if a securitizing discourse is being deployed. Securitization is a discursive process, meaning this review of such wording is the most direct way to detect whether or not the government is constructing technology innovation as a realm of security risk. One key implication of securitization is that the national security apparatus absorbs securitized issues, so to test this hypothesis, I will look at key national security documents such as the NSS, National Military Strategy, and Nuclear Posture Review in order to see if national security discourses are intentionally incorporating questions of technological innovation, especially with explicit reference to or focus on 5G. The literature on the Trump administration’s affinity for industrial policy suggests a different explanation for this shift in innovation strategy. Rather than a reaction to China based on notions of great power security competition, this shift may derive from a reaction based on notions of economic vulnerability to China. In other words, this industrial policy in the 5G area stems from an economic em- brace of industrial policy more broadly, rather than from the security concerns borne out of great power competition. This literature thus suggests the following hypothesis: The Trump Administration’s belief in industrial policy has led it to embrace greater intervention in technology innovation. The strongest evidence that supports the industrial policy hypothesis is the DOJ’s intervention specifically protecting Qualcomm. By advocating for the preservation of an anticompetitive business model, the government is effectively signaling a policy of “picking winners and losers” that characterizes industrial policy. However, to understand if this strategy is industrial policy rather than security strategy, there must be a trend of similar uses of this courts-based strategy that seems to be “picking winners” in sectors beyond 5G. To test this hypothesis, I will track the appellate briefs filed by the DOJ’s Antitrust Division to determine if it is advocating for anticompetitive equilibria that pick winners and losers in other industries as well. The implication of the hypothesis is that the administration is actively embracing the economic orthodoxy of industrial policy, meaning its interventions extend beyond 5G. Observing such a trend would thus imply the economic motivation for the 5G intervention, rather than the security motivation. Of course, this tracking method is imprecise—the individual facts and nuances of each case likely shape the content of the DOJ’s appellate briefs. However, survey- ing all briefs over the previous four years will demonstrate broader trends in the frequency with which the DOJ supports anticompetitive behavior. Results Cold War Analogizing The data on the use of the phrase “race to 5G” demonstrate a dramatic in- crease in the use of the analogy beginning in 2018. Using an analysis of documents employing the phrase between 2014–2019 (accessed through Factiva), the graph at right demonstrates the dramatic adoption of this term as mentions of 5G in- creased from 97 in 2017 to 715 in 2018, a 637% increase. Additionally, when only including documents that specifically make mention of the United States Federal Government or Federal Communications Commission, the data still demonstrate a similar jump from 17 in 2017 to 271 in 2018, a 1,494% increase. This increase serves as a rough indicator of the prevalence of technology race analogizing. Factiva aggregates publications using specific keywords, meaning this data reflect the prevalence of this analogy in the media. However, given the influence of analogies on decision-makers’ thinking, a greater prevalence implies a greater likelihood of such an analogy shaping public policy. Additionally, isolating the publications that specify the FCC or USFG demonstrates the connection between government action and this perceived technology race. A random sampling of these publications also suggests the vast majority employed the analogy, rather than argued against using it. Admittedly, establishing causality between government action and prevalence of the analogy is difficult—the media could be ascribing the analogy to the actions of the government without policymakers ever having employed the analogy. Fortunately, the record demonstrates that policy- makers have adopted this analogy in recent years. Key figures in the government, including President Trump, FCC Chairman Ajit Pai, Chief Technology Officer of the United States Michael Kratsios, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Com- merce, Science, and Transportation Roger Wicker, House Energy and Commerce Ranking Member Greg Walden, and Communications and Technology Subcommittee Ranking Member Bob Latta, have all employed the analogy (54). Moreover, Attorney General Barr has explicitly argued the US has not yet had its “Sputnik moment” in this race, further underscoring the connection to the space race (55). Taken together, the aggregate data from Factiva and the specific examples from key elected officials provide compelling evidence for “Race to 5G” analogizing. Securitization The set of documents articulating national security priorities and assessments provides the best source to scour for the securitization of 5G technology. Because these documents articulate matters pertaining to the security of the United States, their inclusion of 5G specifically and the domestic technology innovation base more broadly indicates the securitization of these spaces. The most recent Worldwide Threat Assessment from the Director of National Intelligence directly addresses 5G, arguing that the creation and adoption of 5G networks by other countries directly implicates data security within the United States due to the interconnectedness of communications and information technology infrastructure. Additionally, the Assessment connects this data infrastructure to threats posed by decryption capabilities growth, underscoring the technical threats to sensitive data in particular (56). Similarly, the 2016 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority specifically connects great power competition with China and Russia to threats to US information technology systems and argues crucial outputs enabled by 5G such as better AI will dramatically influence the balance of power.57 These depictions conform to Hansen and Nissenbaum’s framework by emphasizing a threat to the broad data infrastructure in the US posed by foreign development of 5G technologies and engaging in technification by emphasizing aspects like decryption capabilities growth and complex 5G outputs. The 2017 NSS is particularly important given its reframing of technology issues in a national security framework. The document identifies the need for the nation to excel in technology and innovation domestically to ensure the security of the nation, which in and of itself may not represent a dramatic shift from previous security orthodoxies that emphasized US domestic innovation as a component of national power. However, the NSS also asserts a new idea of a National Security In- novation Base (NSIB), formalizing the notion that technological innovation across the economy (not simply for defense purposes) is crucial to the balance of power the US must maintain to survive inter-state strategic competition. The document directly confronts China for intellectual property theft that it argues undermines the NSIB, discursively creating the notion of a Chinese threat to the securitized domestic innovation base (58). The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) builds on this idea of the NSIB, arguing that non-defense related innovation directly implicates the command of the commons: “The fact that many technological developments will come from the commercial sector means that state competitors and non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that risks eroding the conventional overmatch to which our Nation has grown accustomed” (59). Crucially, what follows from this assessment that commercial innovation is a security issue is the absorption of non-defense technology development into the military’s purview: “A long-term strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national power—diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military. More than any other nation, America can expand the competitive space” (60). This absorption classically models the discursive securitization of a policy area and the following policy change as the national security apparatus begins to dictate policy in said area. The DOD has specifically applied this notion of commercial innovation as central to the command of the commons. A spokesperson for the DOD framed 5G as a question of ability to function on the battlefield, claiming: “That’s where we are with 5G...we are going to run our entire warfighting ecosystem though communications.” She directly connected this vulnerability to grand ideas of the balance of power, arguing: “If we don’t embrace it and apply it towards our goals, we could be overcome quickly with technical overmatch” (61). Clearly, by connecting 5G in- novation to the nation’s warfighting ability and conventional military superiority, and by directly echoing the phrase “technical overmatch” used in the 2018 NDS when it discusses the national security importance of the NSIB, the spokesperson frames technology innovation as a question of debilitating collapse of the nation’s military, securitizing the issue. This analysis of key national defense documents and statements by members of the national security state provides compelling evidence for the securitization of 5G. Industrial Policy A review of the roughly 80 appellate briefs filed by the DOJ’s Antitrust Divi- sion reveals a dramatically limited scope of interventions supporting specific companies’ anticompetitive practices analogous to the DOJ’s intervention to protect Qualcomm in 2019 (62). During this period, only seven briefs opposed antitrust enforcement. Of these, two related to Qualcomm (briefs for Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm, Incorporated and Karen Stromberg, et al. v. Qualcomm Incorporated ), excluding them from consideration as they pertain specifically to 5G. A third, for State of New York and Other Plaintiff States v. Deutsche Telekom AG, et al. , supported the merger of T-Mobile and Sprint conditioned on the company’s rollout of 5G infrastructure across America, excluding it from consideration as well. Among the four remaining briefs, Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., et al. only weakly supports the notion that the government is supporting anticompetitive behavior in order to promote specific companies. In this case, the DOJ states that it takes no position on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, only stating that proof of reduced competition in a market is necessary in addition to proof of the existence of agreements considered anticompetitive (arguing that behavior must be effectually anticompetitive to be subject to antitrust laws, not simply anticompetitive based on a company’s decisions on paper). Two briefs better demonstrate opposition to antitrust enforcement—those for Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, et al. and Apple Inc. v. Robert Pepper, et al. The final brief, for Intel Corporation and Apple Inc. v. Fortress Investment Group LLC, et al. , also pushes back against the application of antitrust laws, though in favor of Fortress Investment Group; this behavior is puzzling for the “winners and losers” hypothesis because Apple and Intel would likely be considered American national champions of sorts, implying the government would intervene in their favor were it truly interested in promoting their market dominance. Put simply, too few briefs oppose antitrust enforcement to indicate a trend sup- porting the industrial policy hypothesis. Due to their limited number, it is not possible to discern a broader trend from the briefs that do oppose antitrust enforcement. The DOJ may take the position it does in these cases simply based on its reading of the law and understanding of the facts in each individual case. Because there is not a sufficiently discernible trend, it is not possible to confirm the hypothesis that the government is engaging in the picking of winners and losers. This finding complements previous findings that the effects of CFIUS investigations are non-discriminatory, implying their use is based on actual national security (their stated purpose), not protectionism of special interests (63). These findings thus imply the industrial policy hypothesis is less accurate than the great power competition one. However, watchdogs and journalists have noted that under the Trump Administration, the DOJ’s antitrust division has significantly reduced the application of cartel and merger enforcement (64), and the number of personnel working on antitrust cases has similarly declined (65). This trend may indicate an embrace of a permutation of industrial policy, whereby the Trump administration may not be “picking winners and losers” but, rather, allowing rapid consolidation such that the market picks national champions. This evidence thus lends some credence to the industrial policy hypothesis. However, given the observed behavior of the dependent variable includes active intervention to support Qualcomm, this de- cline in enforcement alone does not provide as good of an explanation for the motivation of the Trump administration’s 5G strategy as does the great power competition hypothesis. Conclusion The assessments from the previous section demonstrate stronger evidence for the great power competition hypothesis than for the industrial policy hypothesis. The assessment of aggregate data on publications by Factiva as well as statements by key administration officials demonstrates the substantial growth of rhetoric analogizing 5G to the Cold War space race. This trend demonstrates how US policymakers are employing historical thinking as they understand the US-China security relationship more broadly as well as competition in the 5G space specifically. The assessment of key national security documents and statements illustrates the securitization of 5G, also providing support for the great power competition hypothesis. In contrast, the assessment of the appellate briefs filed by the DOJ’s Antitrust Division reveals the government’s interventions in support of anticompetitive behavior are almost exclusively limited to the 5G space thus far, meaning evidence for the industrial policy hypothesis does not presently exist. The available evidence thus suggests the security relationship, manifested both in historical analogy and in securitization, more powerfully motivates the government’s shift toward greater intervention in 5G technology innovation than the economic relationship and derived inclinations toward industrial policy. As technological innovation appears to be growing into a key facet of the US-China relationship, the change in government policy represents a manifestation of how the Sino-American relationship is evolving. This change in the technology innovation space is particularly important for understanding the broader US-China relationship. Because technological developments like 5G and AI, which have emerged from interconnected economies and had impacts beyond borders, are being framed as areas of competition, the ways the US and China interact in this sphere will have implications for their broader relationship. Beyond speaking to the motivations behind the administration’s 5G strategy, the findings in this paper shed light on how the US more broadly perceives China’s economic and technological behaviors in a national security mindset. Finally, because this trend is relatively nascent, this paper is only a first step to- ward understanding changing government policy in technology spaces. Assessing motivations is difficult, and more research into the topic—particularly involving interviews with actual policymakers—will help better define this trend as it evolves over the coming years. More research is needed to understand the influence and limits of the emerging industrial policy mindset. In particular, the possibility dis- cussed in the previous section that the Trump administration may be “letting the market pick the winners and losers” in a permutation of traditional industrial policy merits attention. Additionally, given the implication that securitization of domestic technology innovation has led to a shift toward more government intervention in the 5G space, future research may seek to understand other manifestations of this securitization. Finally, scholars should explore the motivations behind securitization. While legitimate security threats may exist, proponents of industrial policy may see securitization as an effective means to achieve their ends; similarly, leaders of US technology companies may see securitization as a useful strategy to secure favorable government policies. These possibilities suggest a need for future research into the motivations for different actors deploying securitizing discourse of 5G. Endnotes 1 Bruce Mehlman, “Why the 5G Race Matters,” TheHill, December 10, 2018, https://thehill.com/blogs/ congress-blog/technology/420509-why-the-5g-race-matters; “How 5G Can Transform Healthcare,” Verizon, October 22, 2018, https://www.verizon.com/about/our-company/5g/how-5g-can-transform-healthcare; Jason Curtis, “5G Wireless Networks Leading Fourth Industrial Revolution,” TechRadar, April 26, 2020, https://www. techradar.com/news/5g-wireless-networks-leading-fourth-industrial-revolution. 2 Tom Wheeler, “5G in Five (Not so) Easy Pieces,” Brookings (blog), July 9, 2019, https://www.brookings. edu/research/5g-in-five-not-so-easy-pieces/; Chris Donkin, “Verizon VP Warns on 5G Overhype and Under- Delivery,” Mobile World Live (blog), April 26, 2019, https://www.mobileworldlive.com/featured-content/top-three/verizon-vp-warns-on-5g-overhype-and-under-delivery/. 3 William Barr, “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers the Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference,” https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr- delivers-keynote-address-department-justices-china. 4 Michael Pompeo, Silicon Valley and National Security (San Francisco, 2020), https://www.state.gov/silicon- valley-and-national-security/. 5 “The Qualcommunist Manifesto: American State Capitalism Will Not Beat China at 5G,” The Economist, February 15, 2020. 6 Robert B. Reich, “Why the U.S. Needs an Industrial Policy,” Harvard Business Review, January 1, 1982, https://hbr.org/1982/01/why-the-us-needs-an-industrial-policy. 7 For example, see Robert D. Kaplan, “A New Cold War Has Begun,” Foreign Policy, January 7, 2019, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/a-new-cold-war-has-begun/; Niall Ferguson, “The New Cold War? It’s With China, and It Has Already Begun,” The New York Times, December 2, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/02/ opinion/china-cold-war.html; Odd Arne Westad, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Are Washington and Beijing Fighting a New Cold War?,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 5 (2019): 86–95; 8 Matthew Kroenig, “Why the U.S. Will Outcompete China,” The Atlantic, April 3, 2020, https://www. theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/why-china-ill-equipped-great-power-rivalry/609364/. 9 Melvyn P. Leffler, “China Isn’t the Soviet Union. Confusing the Two Is Dangerous.,” The Atlantic, December 2, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/12/cold-war-china-purely-optional/601969/; Ben Westcott, “There’s Talk of a New Cold War. But China Is Not the Soviet Union,” CNN, January 3, 2020, https:// www.cnn.com/2020/01/02/asia/us-china-cold-war-intl-hnk/index.html. 10 Donald Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2017” (The White House, December 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf. 11 Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, “Foreign Policy Decisionmakers As Practical-Intuitive Historians: Applied History and Its Shortcomings,” International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 2 (1986): 223–47, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600677; David Patrick Houghton, “The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situations,” British Journal of Political Science 26, no. 4 (1996): 523–52; Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at Ear: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); David Bruce MacDonald, Thinking History, Fighting Evil: Neoconservatives and the Perils of Analogy in American Politics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015078809848; Jeffrey Record, Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015054296721. 12 Andrew J. Taylor and John T. Rourke, “Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process,” The Journal of Politics 57, no. 2 (1995): 460–68, https://doi.org/10.2307/2960316. 13 Alastair Iain Johnston, “China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing’s International Relations,” International Security 44, no. 2 (November 11, 2019): 9–60. 14 Stephen Benedict Dyson and Thomas Preston, “Individual Characteristics of Political Leaders and the Use of Analogy in Foreign Policy Decision Making,” Political Psychology 27, no. 2 (2006): 265–88. Federal 5G Innovation Policy 175 15 Brad Glosserman, “Innovation: The Front Line of the New Great Power Competition,” The Japan Times, March 4, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/03/04/commentary/world-commentary/innovation- front-line-new-great-power-competition/. 16 Philip Scranton, “Technology, Science and American Innovation,” Business History 48, no. 3 (August 20, 2006): 311–31, https://doi-org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/10.1080/00076790600791763. 17 Cary Funk and Mark Strauss, “Majority of Americans Believe Space Exploration Remains Essential” (Pew Research Center, June 6, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2018/06/06/majority-of-americans-believe-it-is-essential-that-the-u-s-remain-a-global-leader-in-space/. 18 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2003): 511–31; Paul Roe, “Is Securitization a ‘Negative’ Concept? Revisiting the Normative Debate over Normal versus Extraordinary Politics,” Security Dialogue 43, no. 3 (June 1, 2012): 249–66, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010612443723. 19 Weiqing Song, “Securitization of the ‘China Threat’ Discourse: A Poststructuralist Account,” China Review 15, no. 1 (May 8, 2015): 145–69; Emma V. Broomfield, “Perceptions of Danger: The China Threat Theory,” Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 35 (May 1, 2003): 265–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/1067056022000054605. 20 Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School,” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2009): 1155–75. 21 Andrew Stephen Campion, “From CNOOC to Huawei: Securitization, the China Threat, and Critical Infrastructure,” Asian Journal of Political Science 28, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 47–66, https://doi.org/10.1080 /02185377.2020.1741416; Noah T. Archibald, “Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure: An Analysis of Securitization Theory,” Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Policy and Society 3, no. 1 (2020): 39–54. Note this work is an undergraduate paper, implying its lack of peer-review. The need to cite an undergraduate paper underscores the lack of scholarly literature in this domain. 22 Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “From Cyber-Bombs to Political Fallout: Threat Representations with an Impact in the Cyber-Security Discourse,” International Studies Review 15, no. 1 (2013): 105–22; Agnes Kasper, “The Fragmented Securitization of Cyber Threats,” in Regulating ETechnologies in the European Union, ed. Tanel Kerikmäe (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014), 157–87, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08117- 5_9; Mark Lacy and Daniel Prince, “Securitization and the Global Politics of Cybersecurity,” Global Discourse 8, no. 1 (February 15, 2018): 100–115, https://doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2017.1415082. 23 Karl Grindal, “Trade Regimes as a Tool for Cyber Policy,” Digital Policy, Regulation and Governance 21, no. 1 (2019): 19–31, https://doi.org/10.1108/DPRG-08-2018-0042. Federal 5G Innovation Policy 177 24 Howard Pack and Kamal Saggi, “Is There a Case for Industrial Policy? A Critical Survey,” The World Bank Research Observer 21, no. 2 (2006): 267–97, especially 267-268. 25 Chalmers Johnson, “Japan: Who Governs? An Essay on Official Bureaucracy,” in Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 115–40; Leonard Schoppa, “Productive and Protective Elements of Convoy Capitalism,” in Race for the Exits: The Unraveling of Japan’ s System of Social Protection (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 36–66. 26 T. J. Pempel, “The Bureaucratization of Policymaking in Postwar Japan,” American Journal of Political Science 18, no. 4 (1974): 647–64, https://doi.org/10.2307/2110551. 27 John Creighton Campbell and Ethan Scheiner, “Fragmentation and Power: Reconceptualizing Policy Making under Japan’s 1955 System,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 9, no. 1 (April 2008): 89–113, https://doi. org/10.1017/S1468109907002836. 28 Wayne M Morrison, “The Made in China 2025 Initiative: Economic Implications for the United States,” Congressional Research Service, April 12, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10964.pdf; James McBride and Andrew Chatzky, “Is ‘Made in China 2025’ a Threat to Global Trade?,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 13, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade; “Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions Built on Local Protections” (US Chamber of Commerce, 2017), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/ default/files/final_made_in_china_2025_report_full.pdf; “Made in China 2025 Backgrounder” (Institute for Security and Development Policy, June 2018), https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2018/06/Made-in-China- Backgrounder.pdf; Scott Kennedy, “Made in China 2025,” Critical Questions (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, June 1, 2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025. 29 Lindsay Maizland and Andrew Chatzky, “Huawei: China’s Controversial Tech Giant” (The Council on Foreign Relations, February 12, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/huawei-chinas-controversial-tech- giant; Chuin-Wei Yap, “State Support Helped Fuel Huawei’s Global Rise,” Wall Street Journal, December 25, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-huaweis-global-rise-11577280736. 30 Robert D. Atkinson, “The Case for a National Industrial Strategy to Counter China’s Technological Rise” (Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, April 13, 2020), https://itif.org/publications/2020/04/13/case-national-industrial-strategy-counter-chinas-technological-rise; Gabriel Wildau, “China’s Industrial Policies Work. So Copy Them,” The Japan Times, November 19, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/19/ commentary/world-commentary/chinas-industrial-policies-work-copy/. 31 Patrick Major and Rana Mitter, “East Is East and West Is West? Towards a Comparative Socio-Cultural History of the Cold War,” Cold War History 4, no. 1 (October 1, 2003): 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740 312331391714; Joâo Resende‐Santos, “Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870–1930,” Security Studies 5, no. 3 (March 1996): 193–260, https:// doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429280; Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage,” International Security 43, no. 3 (2018): 141–89. 32 Peter Navarro, Death By China: How America Lost Its Manufacturing Base (Official Version), 2016, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=mMlmjXtnIXI; “Strategy for American Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing” (National Science & Technology Council, October 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2018/10/Advanced-Manufacturing-Strategic-Plan-2018.pdf; Justin Wolfers, “Why Most Economists Are So Worried About Trump,” The New York Times, January 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/upshot/why-most-economists-are-so-worried-about-trump.html; Rana Foroohar, “Trump Aims for an Industrial Policy That Works for America,” Financial Times, May 7, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/9b6ed79a-318c-11e7-9555- 23ef563ecf9a; Ted Gayer, “Should Government Directly Support Certain Industries?,” Brookings (blog), March 4, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/should-government-directly-support-certain-industries/. 33 Orange Wang and Adam Behsudi, “Beijing’s New Industrial Policy Plan Doesn’t Address Trump Complaints,” South China Morning Post, November 20, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/ article/3038590/chinas-new-industrial-policy-dismissed-made-china-2025-rehash. 34 Kevin Honglin Zhang, “Industrial Policy and Technology Innovation under the US Trade War against China,” The Chinese Economy, February 27, 2020, 1–11, https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2020.1730553. 35 James K. Jackson, “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)” (Congressional Research Service, February 14, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf; Grindal, “Trade Regimes as a Tool for Cyber Policy;” Hunter Deeley, “The Expanding Reach of the Executive in Foreign Direct Investment: How Ralls v. CFIUS Will Alter the FDI Landscape in the United States,” American University Business Law Review 4, no. 1 (2015): 125–52; Kevin Granville, “Cfius, Powerful and Unseen, Is a Gatekeeper on Major Deals,” New York Times, March 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/what-is-cfius.html. 36 Paul Connell and Tian Huang, “An Empirical Analysis of CFIUS: Examining Foreign Investment Regulation in the United States,” Yale Journal of International Law 39, no. 1 (2014): 131–64. 37 Data sourced from Jackson, “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).” 38 Note – chart taken from Grindal, “Trade Regimes as a Tool for Cyber Policy.” 39 Jackson, “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).” 40 Ana Swanson, “Trump Blocks China-Backed Bid to Buy U.S. Chip Maker,” The New York Times, September 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/trump-lattice-semiconductor-china.html. 41 Aimen N. Mir, “Letter From Treasury Department to Broadcom and Qualcomm Regarding CFIUS,” March 5, 2018, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4407490-Letter-From-Treasury-Department-to- Broadcom-and.html; Chris Sanders, “U.S. Sees National Security Risk from Broadcom’s Qualcomm Deal,” Reuters, March 7, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-broadcom-idUSKCN1GI1S8. 42 “FCC Approves Merger of T-Mobile and Sprint” (Federal Communications Commission, November 5, 2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-360637A1.pdf. 43 “FCC Proposes the 5G Fund for Rural America” (Federal Communications Commission, April 23, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-363946A1.pdf. 44 “WIA Awarded $6 Million DOL Grant to Train 5G Workforce” (Wireless Infrastructure Association, February 19, 2020), https://wia.org/wia-awarded-6-million-dol-grant-to-train-5g-workforce/. 45 Data sourced from the NITRD’s Supplement to the President’s Budgets for Fiscal Years 2012-2020. 46 “United States District Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Public Redacted Version), Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated” (UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION, May 21, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ documents/cases/qualcomm_findings_of_fact_and_conclusions_of_law.pdf. 47 “BRIEF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT AND VACATUR” (US Department of Justice, August 30, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case- document/file/1199191/download; Kadhim Shubber, “US Regulators Face off in Court Tussle over Qualcomm,” Financial Times, February 9, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/adbca366-49d3-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441. 48 Note – the government’s support for the T-Mobile-Sprint merger, which (as mentioned earlier) is explicitly premised on 5G rollout to be enabled by consolidated market power, is another example of government intervention supporting anticompetitive behavior in the 5G space. For more, see Thomas M Johnson et al., “Statement of Interest of the United States of America” (United States Department of Justice, December 20, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1230491/download. 49 Donald Trump, “Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, Executive Order 13873” (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/ executive-order-securing-information-communications-technology-services-supply-chain/; “Department of Commerce Announces the Addition of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. to the Entity List” (US Department of Commerce, Office of Public Affairs, May 15, 2019), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/05/department-commerce-announces-addition-huawei-technologies-co-ltd; Tamer Soliman et al., “US Commerce Department Proposes Sweeping New Rules for National Security Review of US Information and Communications Technology or Services Transactions,” Mayer Brown, December 2, 2019, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/ perspectives-events/publications/2019/12/us-department-of-commerce-proposes-rule-for-securing-the-nations- information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain; Damian Paletta, Ellen Nakashima, and David Lynch, “Trump Administration Cracks Down on Giant Chinese Tech Firm, Escalating Clash with Beijing,” Washington Post, May 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump- signs-order-to-protect-us-networks-from-foreign-espionage-a-move-that-appears-to-target-china/2019/05/15/d982ec50-7727-11e9-bd25-c989555e7766_story.html; Annie Fixler and Mathew Ha, “Washington’s Huawei Ban Combats Chinese Espionage Threat,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, May 16, 2019, https://www.fdd. org/analysis/2019/05/16/washingtons-huawei-ban-combats-chinese-espionage-threat/. 50 For example, see Barr, “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers the Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference;” Michael Pompeo, U.S. States and the China Competition: Secretary Pompeo’s Remarks to the NGA, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1BbswU3i10; and Pompeo, Silicon Valley and National Security. 51 Margaret Harding Mcgill, “Trump Rejects Government Intervention in 5G Wireless Networks,” POLITICO, April 12, 2019, https://politi.co/2P4erlI; Barr, “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers the Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference;” Peter Newman, “How the US Buying Ericsson or Nokia Would Impact Networking,” Business Insider, February 10, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-could-buy-ericsson-nokia-to-compete-against-huawei-report-2020-2. 52 Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2017;” Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America” (United States Department of Defense, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf; Jim Mattis, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018), https://media. defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT. PDF; Daniel R. Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2019), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR--- SSCI.pdf; “Description of the National Military Strategy 2018” (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), https://www.jcs. mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf; John Richardson, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority: Version 2.0” (United States Navy, December 2018), https://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Richardson/Resource/Design_2.0.pdf. 53 John Richardson, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority: Version 1.0” (United States Navy, January 2016), https://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/cno_stg.pdf. 54 Todd Haselton, “President Trump Announces New 5G Initiatives: It’s a Race ‘America Must Win,’” CNBC, April 12, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/12/trump-on-5g-initiatives-a-race-america-must-win.html; Ajit Pai, “Remarks of FCC Chairman Ajit Pai at the White House” (Washington, D.C., April 12, 2019), https://docs. fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-356994A1.pdf; Michael Kratsios, “America Will Win the Global Race to 5G,” The White House, October 25, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/america-will-win-global-race-5g/; Roger Wicker, “Wicker Convenes Hearing on the Race to 5G” (Washington, D.C.: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, February 6, 2019), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2019/2/wicker-convenes- hearing-on-the-race-to-5g; Greg Walden and Bob Latta, “Walden and Latta Statement on Bipartisan Bills to Boost 5G” (Washington, D.C., January 8, 2020), https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/news/press- release/walden-and-latta-statement-on-bipartisan-bills-to-boost-5g/. To the extent that business leaders’ rhetoric on this issue matters as well, see Katie Lobosco, “AT&T Chief: China Isn’t Beating the United States on 5G — Yet,” CNN, March 20, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/20/business/att-randall-stephenson-5g/index.html. 55 Barr, “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers the Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference.” 56 Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.” 57 Richardson, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority: Version 1.0.” 58 Trump, Donald. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2017,” 20-22. 59 Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.” 60 Ibid. 61 C. Todd Lopez, “Pentagon Official: U.S., Partners Must Lead in 5G Technology Development,” US Department of Defense, March 26, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1796437/pentagon- official-us-partners-must-lead-in-5g-technology-development/. 62 To see these briefs, see “Appellate Briefs,” US Department of Justice, n.d., https://www.justice.gov/atr/ appellate-briefs. 63 Connell and Huang, “An Empirical Analysis of CFIUS: Examining Foreign Investment Regulation in the United States.” 64 “The State of Antitrust Enforcement and Competition Policy in the U.S.” (American Antitrust Institute, April 14, 2020), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/work-product/antitrust-enforcement-report/; “FCC Proposes the 5G Fund for Rural America;” Kadhim Shubber, “US Antitrust Enforcement Falls to Slowest Rate since 1970s,” Financial Times, November 28, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/27a0a34e-f2a0-11e8-9623-d7f9881e729f. 65 Kadhim Shubber, “Staffing at Antitrust Regulator Declines under Donald Trump,” Financial Times, February 7, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/cf1ed2a6-2619-11e9-b329-c7e6ceb5ffdf. 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Author Name < Back From Sex to Science: The Challenges and Complexity of Consent Matthew Grady I. Abstract Since the beginning of biomedical research on human subjects, the notion of consent has been widely debated and highly contentious. With philosophers and bioethicists focusing on the issue of what constitutes truly informed consent and the proper ethical guidelines for retrieving it, the existing notion of consent in biomedical research fails to fully consider the potentially coercive forces on participants. Consent has also been an issue of import amongst philosophers of sex and feminist scholars. Rallying behind the contemporary idea of a robust version of consent—one that fully encompasses the ways in which agents may be coerced into consenting to a sexual act—these philosophers have argued that societal norms, external pressures, and the nature of consent itself often render consent insufficient to guarantee the moral permissibility of sex. I will argue that these two seemingly distinct concepts of consent in sexual and biomedical spheres face many of the same ethical issues. Borrowing from recent discussions around coercive factors influencing consent in sexual interactions and my own experiences in biomedical research settings, I will draw parallels between these two notions of consent in order to illuminate a more accurate and robust philosophical framework for setting ethical guidelines around obtaining consent in biomedical research settings. II. Introduction As biomedical research has increased exponentially with regard to both enhanced funding for the practice of human-subject experimentation and new research methodologies for promising medical interventions, there is an urgent need for robust ethical guidelines around utilizing human subjects in biomedical research contexts. This paper will focus on the use of human subjects in average biomedical research experiments, which typically recruit and pay individuals to undergo a certain medical procedure, take a specific drug, etc. before approval of the medical intervention for the general population. Across all of the varying perspectives regarding how to best recruit, treat, and compensate human subjects, consent has remained an absolute standard and necessity for conducting ethical biomedical research. While philosophers and bioethicists have contentiously debated over the necessary conditions for obtaining consent, most have widely (if not completely) neglected factors that may wrongfully induce human subjects to consent to biomedical research. Consent has also been a central topic of importance within the philosophy of sex and feminist p hilosophy, yet its development has remained quite distinct from the understanding of consent in the field of biomedical research and subject recruitment. Philosopher and bioethicist Alan Wertheimer has made a connection between the notion of consent in sexual interactions and biomedical research, but my parallels and conclusions will clearly be distinct from his and will primarily focus on developing thoughts inspired by the initial connection made by Quill Kukla in “A Nonideal Theory of Sexual Consent.” In sexual interactions, most philosophers agree that consent is a necessary, but insufficient, element for ensuring the permissibility of sex between p artners. Consent is something to be given freely, and many forces may serve to coerce or influence an individual into granting their consent, thus potentially curtailing the normative goal of “ideal” consent. Traditional discussions of consent are structured around fulfilling the normative goal of obtaining consent that is free from undue influence on one’s agency, autonomy, ability to make rational decisions, etc. Consent, under this view, is either valid or not—anything constraining an agent’s ability to consent automatically invalidates its moral force. Quill Kukla has introduced a “nonideal theory of sexual consent,” which classifies consent as degreed and emphasizes that genuine consent can still be achieved in the presence of potentially coercive factors. Under this conception, agency and autonomy are present in lesser and greater degrees within different sexual interactions, and agents are continually pressured by coercive forces. Thus, consent is not valid or invalid; instead, genuine consent (or robust consent as I will often refer to it) is built when coercive factors are controlled to such a degree that all sexual partners possess sufficient agency to make a fully rational decision to consent. This does not deny our ability to determine whether a sexual act is morally permissible and establish a standard for morally permissible ways to obtain consent. Rather, it allows us to adopt a nuanced view of consent as a nonideal concept, wherein agents can consent under our oft-constrained and coerced statuses. Philosophical inquiries into coercive factors impacting one’s ability to obtain genuine, robust consent in sexual interactions have focused on external pressures, societal norms, and the implications of consent as the dominant framework itself. Yet, bioethicists have neglected this crucial area in their understanding of consent. Much can be gained for our existing notion of consent in biomedical research settings by embracing the approach taken by philosophers of sex. Consent operates in many different facets of life—agreeing to consent forms, consenting to a sexual interaction, consenting to someone entering your home, and many other forms of implicit and explicit acts of consent . However, the nature of consent within sexual interactions and biomedical research settings is distinct from other forms, making them especially morally-laden. Given violations of these kinds of consent are particularly harmful to one’s bodily autonomy, sexual interactions and biomedical research settings are especially deserving of rigid consent guidelines. The genuine robustness of these two forms of consent is also dependent upon the satisfaction of external conditions not always under the control of the agent granting consent (ex. a non-coercive partner in sexual interactions or a biomedical institutional review board that grants approval for a biomedical experiment), opening up the potential for coercive factors to render a certain act morally impermissible. T hese two distinct forms of consent face many of the same ethical issues and should be engaged in a conversation with one another—a conversation that has been neglected thus far. I hope to build a more accurate, encompassing framework in the biomedical sphere by which we can set ethical guidelines for engaging human research subjects in a truly consensual manner based on the progress made by philosophers of sex, like Kukla and others. To conduct this comparative analysis, I will begin by discussing the existing notion of consent within the biomedical research field and detailing the major issues of importance currently debated. I will then proceed to review the ways in which many philosophers of sex have taken a broader approach to defining consent—one that takes into account the coercive factors that may inhibit an agent’s ability to grant consent with full autonomy and agency. I will then draw comparisons b etween these two distinct notions of consent to reveal several coercive factors in biomedical research settings that may render “informed” consent coerced. Finally, I will suggest how we may build a broader philosophical framework to scaffold the agency of human subjects when consenting to potentially dangerous biomedical research experiments. III. The Existing Notion of Consent in Biomedical Research After many instances of harmful treatments being given to vulnerable, often marginalized populations, such as the Tuskegee Syphilis study, bioethicists began to question what truly constitutes informed consent in biomedical research settings. This question has included exploration into both the b est ways to obtain consent, as well as the proper way to interpret the term, “informed.” The p redominant conclusion on how to best define informed consent has overwhelmingly neglected consideration of coercive factors that impact the ability for human subjects to rationally consent to biomedical trials. As will become clear, there are an abundance of underexplored factors that may constrain one’s ability to rationally consent to participate in a biomedical research trial. This paper aims to fill this lacuna in the current understanding of biomedical research consent. There are many interesting debates around the understanding of biomedical consent that will become relevant to my argument later, the first being the therapeutic misconception. This phenomenon occurs quite often in biomedical research settings, where human subjects possess the incorrect belief that they are receiving life-changing or potentially beneficial treatments, despite being told about the potential of receiving a placebo treatment, or the chance that the experimental drug may be ineffective. The implications of the therapeutic misconception for ensuring the genuine nature of a human subject’s consent are vast. Consent hinges upon an agent’s uncoerced ability to make an informed decision, and philosophers of biology have rightfully debated what constitutes truly meeting the informed standard of consent. Can one really be said to have full decision-making agency and possess the needed information to genuinely consent if they wrongly believe, as subjects with the therapeutic misconception do, that they are guaranteed life-saving treatment? This is not to say that consent is in some way unobtainable in biomedical research settings; however, we ought to properly understand the implications of the therapeutic misconception on a subject’s ability to grant their consent in a knowing, informed fashion. In addition to the therapeutic misconception, there is another important debate around whether informed consent requires comprehension in any way. Some argue that full comprehension of what the study entails is the only way to ensure the participant is aware of all of the risks and does not possess the therapeutic misconception. Participants have also been shown to severely misunderstand the actual p rocedures, treatments, etc. they are consenting to, whether that be due to not reading the consent form or not fully understanding the researcher’s explanation of what will occur during the study . By not comprehending both the purpose of the study and the exact particulars involved in it, research subjects may fail to meet the “informed” requirement of informed consent. Regardless of the exact answers to these concerns, it is clear that the current discourse surrounding biomedical consent has yet to satisfactorily explore the intricacies of the coercive factors impacting consent in medical experiments. Participants may be hindered in their ability to grant genuine, uncoerced consent when, as research shows is often the case, they do not understand the purpose or specifics of the research study to which they are consenting. In a way, participants in many biomedical studies consent to a version of the study that does not carry the significant risks of harm they take on when consenting—is this morally permissible? How can we ensure coercive factors, like the therapeutic misconception, do not wrongly influence a human subject to consent to a potentially dangerous experiment? These ethical issues debated within the philosophy of biology can be b etter answered with a revised, robust version of consent—one which thoroughly examines and addresses the coercive factors that unduly encourage someone to grant consent without b eing truly informed and open to participating. IV. Moving Beyond Mere Consent: Philosophy of Sex While consent works to p reserve the agency of a sexual partner, the vast majority of philosophers agree that consent is necessary for sex to be morally permissible, not sufficient. When consenting to a sexual act, a person is utilizing their agency and autonomy—their capacity to make free and independent decisions to meet their own ends—to make a rational choice, so consent both contributes to and draws from one’s agency. We now recognize the ability of rational agents to utilize their agency to consent to sexual acts that may still be morally problematic, whether that consists of morally dubious sexual actions or acts obtained with a coerced notion of consent. Given the importance of sexual consent, we need an understanding of it that can account for any and all factors that may coerce a sexual partner into granting consent when they otherwise would not have. Philosophers have addressed the issue of consensual sex that may be coerced in a variety of fashions. Some feminist scholars, like Catharine MacKinnon, have taken a radical approach, claiming that no consent is truly valid under heteronormative structures. Their understandings of consent highlight the ways in which external societal conditions may render consent insufficient if they constrain one’s options to the point where consent becomes obligatory, rather than freely given. Nicola Gavey provides a compelling account of how heteronormative , oppressive structures may render one’s consent involuntary or obligatory in sexual situations because of societal conditions pressuring women. Women sometimes feel obligated to consent to unwanted sexual advances because of the heteronormative forces that pressure them to enter a subservient, diminutive role within sexual interactions. Other philosophers take a different approach to consent by illuminating varying ways in which traditional consent is not sufficient to guarantee a good moral standard for sex. Power dynamics, a misunderstanding of what will actually take place during sex, the offer of money, socialized b ehaviors, and societal pressures are all examples of coercive factors that may encourage one to say yes, even when one did not originally intend to. A person may not be able to fully, rationally consent to a sexual act if pressured by these sorts of coercive factors. Philosophers operating with this lens focus less on making a valid versus invalid distinction of consent and instead emphasize the way consent can be constrained or limited by oppressive structures and other coercive forces. The moral permissibility of a sexual act depends on the agency and autonomy possessed by all of the sexual partners consenting, which may be constrained by coercive factors. By emphasizing the coercive factors outside of direct threats from a partner that may constrain one’s genuine consent, feminist philosophers have been able to build a more robust understanding of consent—one that accounts for the coercive factors that may wrongfully influence one to consent to a sexual act. To summarize all of this into a more digestible framework, I find Quill Kukla’s non-ideal theory of consent to be particularly illuminating. Essentially, under Kukla’s perspective, consent is a “nonideal concept,” where virtually no sex will turn out to be consensual if consent requires the full autonomy of its participants. Their framework allows for the permissibility of sex and obtaining consent even when coercive forces are present; all agents are constrained in different ways, by different power relations, as a result of different identities, and that does not fully invalidate our ability to consent. Instead, to ensure one’s consent is genuine in the presence of common coercive factors, Kukla argues we must “scaffold” consent by “[being] sensitive to the limits of and possibilities for agency and consent in a given context and [adjusting] accordingly,” to ensure a partner possesses agency and autonomy. Scaffolding can be accomplished socially or interpersonally, where practices, environments, and relationships can help to enable a sexual partner’s agency. Kukla uses the example of a retirement facility embracing guidelines, policies, and management that allow its patients to have sex in such a way that does not threaten their ability to participate safely or diminish their own agency in pursuing sexual relationships. On the interpersonal level, agents can also aid in scaffolding their sexual partner’s (or partners’) agency and autonomy by ensuring their partner feels the, “ability to exit a situation, trust, [and] safety,” among other crucial practices that build and protect one’s ability to genuinely consent. Policies here scaffold consent by examining potential coercive factors and building social practices which are inclusive and protective of sexual agency. Again, philosophers of sex, like Kukla, have explicated external factors, such as power dynamics, money, the traditional, overriding depiction of a woman “giving” consent to a man’s request, and heteronormative structures, that may coerce someone to consent to a sexual act. In identifying these, philosophers can strategically recommend scaffolding structures to ensure the moral permissibility of sexual interactions and to enhance the agency and autonomy of sexual partners. I argue that the bioethicist ought to take on a similar project of identifying coercive factors and scaffolding their designs to preserve agency, autonomy, and genuine consent in biomedical research experiments. This challenge has been neglected thus far, and the current understanding of informed consent fails to fully account for coercive factors; thus, the biomedical research community is in need of a scaffolding strategy to preserve genuine, robust consent. The following section attempts to embrace the approach taken by Kukla and others in developing a more robust theory of consent within biomedical research settings. V. Can Biomedical Research Achieve Genuine, Robust Consent? To curb coercive factors from playing a role in one’s decision to have sex, Kukla proposes a more robust, nonideal theory of consent, which works to scaffold protections for an individual’s autonomy in the process of granting consent. Kukla’s framework understands that agents are constantly influenced by external, coercive factors. I argue that we should embrace this approach in the b iomedical research field, which requires a thorough understanding of the implicit and explicit factors that encourage participants to grant consent to medical experiments and treatments. I will now begin to detail four p rimary coercive factors that have been underexplored by philosophers of biology, highlighting the direct parallels that can be found with the coercive factors that impact sexual consent. In drawing these parallels and embracing a more robust understanding of consent, this paper will aim to demonstrate the need for greater encompassing ethical guidelines around biomedical research experiments. A. Compensation: Fair or Coercive? The standard practice for most biomedical research trials is to compensate their human subjects for their participation and time spent completing the study (and any additional costs incurred, medical expenses, inter alia). To recruit enough human subjects for a statistically valid biomedical study, researchers must offer compensation as an inducement to p articipate. Many ethical questions have been explored by philosophers and bioethicists, including how much to pay human subjects, whether payment for certain kinds of research is morally acceptable, and if payment can truly compensate for the serious risks involved in participating in experimental research. However, most have neglected to explore the role money plays as a coercive factor to participate in potentially dangerous research and its impact from a scaffolding perspective. Participating in biomedical research can be a valuable way to earn both active and p assive income, yet money is known to influence the rational decision-making of moral agents. Might someone “consent” to engaging in a biomedical research study that crosses their ethical and/or physical level of comfort in desperation for money? Philosophers of sex have rightly acknowledged that money can serve as an influential and potentially coercive force for consenting to certain actions because an agent may, in an attempt to earn crucial income for themselves, consent to sex in which they would not normally be comfortable engaging. A very similar ethical dilemma arises in the case of biomedical research. Consider this fictional example: an extremely poor woman who struggles to pay for her basic necessities agrees to take a highly experimental drug that could have damaging, long-term side effects. She would not normally endanger her own health in this way, but she is so desperate for passive income that this compensation is too important to pass up. Under the existing notion of informed consent in b iomedical research, this kind of participation would still be considered fully consensual when, clearly, money played a coercive role in her decision. This is not to say that all sexual interactions and all biomedical research settings involving the exchange of cash are coercive (e.g. sex work depends on the presence of money, but is not necessarily coerced), but we ought to pay crucial attention to these areas because of the morally problematic force money can have on obtaining consent. Money has the potential of encouraging and even forcing one into doing things they would not normally be comfortable with, so compensation is especially deserving of ethical guidelines. See Largent, et. al. for a further discussion of the concerns here. Imagine a case where someone decides to consent to a risky biomedical research trial with full comprehension of the risks and particulars involved with the medical study. They choose to accept all of the accompanying risks with participation because the potential compensation is worth their involvement according to a rational assessment by the agent in question. I concede here that this person may not be making a coerced decision to consent—this person, depending on the background circumstances and personal costs, may be choosing to utilize their agency to make a rational decision to pursue compensation. But, it is equally important for research designers to ask, ‘If this subject were in a greater position of agency and authority, would they still be comfortable with making the same decision?’ This question concerning the potential for coercive influence is neglected and unaddressed in the vast majority of biomedical research settings. Not all cases will reveal coercive factors influencing a subject’s decision, but bioethicists have neglected to fully accept the incredibly powerful and sometimes coercive influence compensation can have on a person’s ability to rationally consent. Furthermore, many research studies design their compensation schedule in a way to coerce participants into completing the entirety of a biomedical experiment by offering a significant “bonus” at the end of the study. Given that consent hinges on the ability for an agent to say “no” at any time to any part of an experiment, compensation can wrongfully be utilized as a tool of coercion, in that a research subject may feel unduly compelled to complete a study in hopes of receiving the bulk of their compensation at the end of the research. Compensation, in this role, can coerce consent and thus render the consent given as less robust, less agential, and likely to be less morally permissible than a more scaffolded version of biomedical consent. B. Underexplored Power Dynamics Furthermore, there exist underexplored power dynamics that may induce individuals to consent to biomedical research that they might not otherwise. It is not uncommon for physicians to offer (or even suggest) participating in an experimental research trial to their ailing patients. The physician here possesses a status of authority and level of power that may wrongfully induce their patient to agree to participate, despite the overwhelming risks, in benefits to their own research or that of their colleagues. This is not to say that all actions by a doctor wrongfully operate on a power dynamic, but recommending someone to consent to a trial with clear and substantial potential for harm rightfully deserves a more critical lens for moral judgments. Another example worth noting is when professors recruit their students to participate in their own b iomedical research. Might a student consent to participate merely because their p rofessor, who is in a position of power, asked them to do so? I argue that both of these cases illuminate a power dynamic that may render the given consent here as below the standard for moral permissibility and fully robust consent. Just as a boss requesting to have sex with their employee possesses an imbalanced power dynamic, so do certain recommendations of research studies by people of authority. By understanding the coercive influence of underexplored power dynamics in biomedical research recruitment, we can begin to build a more robust theory of consent that accounts for this coercive factor. C. The Misunderstanding of Particulars By Research Participants As previously discussed, it has been well documented that human subjects often misunderstand the particular actions and risks involved with their participation in biomedical research trials. While comprehension is difficult to fully impart on human subjects, might some of these knowledge gaps wrongfully encourage one to consent to a research study? As mentioned earlier, if one is under the guise of the therapeutic misconception, they may be more willing to consent to potentially dangerous research in the hope of receiving free treatment; however, there is no guarantee they will receive any sort of efficacious medical intervention. Research participants are also often unaware of the particular procedures, treatments, etc. they will have to undergo, meaning they cannot grant fully informed consent to them. A similar ethical dilemma arises in the case of sexual consent: one may consent to a sexual interaction without knowing the full breadth of what will occur. Biomedical researchers ought to work (or alternatively, “scaffold”) toward ensuring their research participants have full knowledge and comprehension of any factor of the research that might change their decision to consent. Only a more robust consent framework within biomedical research settings can properly protect the autonomy of human subjects to provide truly informed consent. D. Lack of Knowledge Regarding Research Intentions The final factor that I argue merits greater consideration in our ethical guidelines around b iomedical consent concerns the ability of the patient to understand the intentions of the research. Due to the nature of biomedical research, human subjects are often not informed of every detail of the study in order to maintain scientific objectivity and integrity. So, a human subject may be told what the study consists of, while not fully understanding the intentions of the research. What if a human subject consents to participating in a Phase I biomedical trial without knowing that the intention of the research is to produce a drug that only the extremely wealthy will be able to afford (an unfortunately common occurrence in the US)? Or, what if the aim of the research is to reach a conclusion that goes against one’s own morals, like that racial differences are essential rather than constructed? Just as one possesses a right to know the intentions behind their partner asking for consent to have sex, human subjects have a right here as well because the information presented may actively encourage one to not offer consent in the first place. Our existing definition of consent for human subjects in biomedical research experiments does not properly account for preserving, or scaffolding, the full rational decision-making of human subjects. While understanding the need for a certain level of confidentiality, the intentions behind the research itself may serve as a deterrent for someone to grant consent. So, in order to have genuine, robust consent, we must be able to set ethical guidelines that actively inform the participant of any detail that may render their consent below the bar for moral permissibility if unknown. VI. An Argument for a More Robust Consent in Biomedical Experiments I present these four coercive factors not in an attempt to develop a fully-fledged account of proper consent in biomedical research, but rather to demonstrate that our existing notion does not go far enough to protect the autonomy of human subjects. All four of these concerns do not apply equally in every context, but they do merit a greater, more nuanced understanding of consent and how to ethically scaffold against coercive factors. Philosophers of sex, like Kukla, have begun to p opularize the idea of a robust, nonideal theory of consent as a way to scaffold ethical precautions to engaging in sexual acts with a partner. The field of biomedical research ought to embrace a similar strategy and approach, and these four factors can begin to identify the key elements influencing the autonomy and agency of sexual partners. To scaffold a human subject’s ability to grant their uncoerced consent, we need to maximize their knowledge of anything essential to their rational decision-making. This would involve instituting clear and expansive policies to combat the therapeutic misconception and ensure participants understand the potential harms they may undergo. Researchers should also develop pay schedules and formats that work to ensure that the benefit incurred from compensation does not wrongly coerce one into participating or lacking the ability to revoke their participation at any time. Crucially, though, we ought to concurrently reform the issues of capitalism and systemic wealth inequality that force many people in the US to sell their own bodies for lifesaving income. Finally, we should adopt stricter guidelines for participating in biomedical research experiments to both restrict coercive power dynamics and pursue further scaffolding of subjects’ agency and autonomy. It is important to note, though, that this paper is primarily concerned with the philosophical issues that might constrain one’s genuine consent, and I invite bioethicists to create a more concrete and thorough list of ethical guidelines to scaffold agency in experiments. By conducting a rigorous philosophical analysis of coercive factors that influence human subjects, philosophers of biology will be better equipped to develop their own version of robust consent that can account for coercive factors. This new, reinspired lens from a philosopher of sex into scaffolding consent should help to control the damaging effects of coercive factors and grant the human subject greater autonomy in making rational decisions regarding whether and when to participate in biomedical research. Research study designers can utilize the recognition of these coercive forces, scaffold ethical practices to combat their influence on diminishing an agent’s authority and embrace a more robust understanding of consent in biomedical research experiments. VII. Conclusion My aim in this paper has been to draw parallels between the currently distinct notions of consent within sexual interactions and biomedical research to illuminate the similar ethical issues facing both. Many feminist scholars and philosophers of sex have taken an approach of examining the societal conditions, other external pressures, and nature of consent itself to illuminate the ways consent may be unduly coerced in rational agents. In doing so, they have been able to develop a more robust framework around a nonideal theory of consent that socially and interpersonally scaffolds (but not completely) a person’s agency in order to minimize coercive factors in one’s decision to consent to sex. By detailing parallel coercive factors present in the biomedical research field, I hope further philosophical inquiries will be able to develop a similar robust consent framework for biomedical research involving human subjects. On a more practically conclusive note, biomedical research experiments are luring; research designers purposefully advertise their studies to sound like easy, safe ways to make money, despite their risks. As shown by decades of research studies with devastating effects on communities of color, biomedical research experiments target specific populations…populations that are often BIPOC, low-income, young, and most vulnerable to being coerced into consenting in a biomedical research setting (see NIH for more on the crucially important element of structural medical racism). I’ve seen firsthand the consequences of a biomedical research industry that has consistently used advertising to tempt many young people, like myself, to participate in potentially harmful studies—experiments where we may not be in a fully agential capacity due to coercive factors. Money, power relations, a lack of understanding regarding the experiment, and other coercive factors constantly influence the ability for people, especially those of marginalized or fiscally disadvantaged backgrounds, to make a fully rational choice in consenting to biomedical research. 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Author Name < Back Editorial Board Foreword Tianyu Zhou & Juno Tantipipatpong “And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of soul is justice and its defect injustice?" In this issue, we welcomed articles that centered around the theme of “political theory as a vehicle of social change.” We’ll first introduce the thematic logic and then proceed with a brief summary of articles. Can PPE theories serve as a vehicle for social change? Since the Axial Age (8th - 3rd century BCE), Vergeistigung , or spiritu- alization of the human mind, was complete among major world civilizations. Based on “rationality and rationally-clarified expe- riences,” humans began to question the current state of affairs, and political theories thus became a preoccupation for the pro- lific minds, not only as a description of how societies and polities are , but as a prescription of what they should become. The Socra- tic inquiries and Plato’s Republic were remarkable in defining, for the first time in the Western tradition, the role of a philosopher in society and polity–that is, to seek justice. Economics as a sci- entific matter emerged as a normative subject on how society may improve by scientific means. Important studies of how PPE theories may serve as a ve- hicle of social change first emerged in the 1920s. In his book, Crystallizing Public Opinion , Edward Bernays proposed a theory that took the “public opinion” of political economic matters as the problematik . The study demonstrated the effect of news and factual information on society are a function of the channels through which they were transmitted. As Bernays himself put, “[the] public relations counsel must lift startling facts from his whole subject and present them as news. He must isolate ideas and develop them into events so that they can be more readily understood and so that they may claim attention as news.” The tension caused by the question of how the logical and evidential basis of ideas may best correspond to their effects on society has haunted intellectuals ever since. The human rights theorists, Marxists, a number of political economists and the New Leftist intellectuals, and many scholars who began such inquiries in the aftermath of the Vietnam War have proposed various theories. In our current issue, authors have discussed topics of vital import in a wide range of fields, from the study of the ethics of ignorance to gender and sexual consent, from political ideology and public discourse to the politics of secularization and religi- osity, and from economic disruption to the meaning of work. We believe these issues are best examined through the lenses of philosophy, politics, and economics jointly. Through our pieces, we wish to illuminate both the diversity of thoughts and advise reflection on how readers might use this knowledge to improve the social conditions. References [1] Plat. Rep. 1.353e, “ἡ μἡν ἡρα δικαία ψυχἡ καἡ ἡ δίκαιος ἡνἡρ εἡ βιώσεται, κακἡς δἡ ἡ ἡδικος”. [2] Jaspers, K. (2017). Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte (K. Salamun, Ed.). Schwabe Verlag. https://doi. org/10.24894/978-3-7965-4059-2.Recommended translation is Jaspers, K. (2021). The Origin and Goal of History (C. Thornhill, Ed.; 1st ed.). Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/The-Origin-and-Goal-of-History/Jaspers/p/book/9780367679859 [3] “[die] Rationalität und [die] rational [geklärte] Erfahrung (der Logos gegen den Mythos)”. [4] Brown, E. (2017). Plato’s Ethics and Politics in The Republic. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-ethics-politics/#Rel. [5] Samuels, W. J., Biddle, Jeff., & Davis, J. Bryan. (Eds.). (2003). A Companion to the History of Economic Thought (1st ed.). Blackwell. https://www.wiley.com/en-us/A+Companion+to+the+History+of+Eco- nomic+Thought-p-9780631225737. [6] Bernays, E. L. (1923). Crystallizing Public Opinion . Liveright Publishing. [7] I.e., Vilfredo Pareto and Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere. Serious scholars of Marxian thought and its history are referred to Kołakowski, Leszek. (1981). Main Currents of Marxism: The Founders, The Golden Age, The Breakdown (P. S. Falla, Ed.; Revised). W.W. Norton & Co. https:// wwnorton.com/books/Main-Currents-of-Marxism/.On human rights, see Jean Quataert, & Lora Wildenthal (Eds.). (2021). Routledge History of Human Rights (1st ed.). Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-History-of-Human-Rights/Quataert-Wildenthal/p/ book/9781032089669.8 [8] On politics, see T. Ball & R. Bellamy (Eds.), The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521563543 On economic thought, see The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015. (2019). In K. Becker & I. D. Thomson (Eds.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy , 1945-2015 (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. https:// doi.org/10.1017/9781316779651.