Introduction

While social media was initially touted as a force for good, such as its use during the Arab Spring’s pro-democracy protests in 2011, recently, major platforms have faced criticism for failing to sufficiently combat political disinformation and election interference. After all, one of the major controversies during the 2016 American presidential elections was the revelation of Russian meddling attempts on social media.

Therefore, this paper will investigate the dynamics between social media strategies and political success, while also examining its larger effects on public discourse, voters, and political communication. It seeks to understand how leaders employ the digital sphere to gain and remain in power, with a focus specifically on populist leaders in semi-democratic states, namely Narendra Modi in India and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. The relative similarity of the regimes in which Modi and Bolsonaro rose to power enables a more precise  isolation of the factors that have contributed to their distinct political outcomes. This comparative analysis aims to offer insight into the evolution of social media's impact on politics, and its implications for the resilience of populist leaders in semi-democratic regimes.

Analyzing Politicians’ Relationship with Mass Media in Semi-Democratic and Democratic Countries

While social media platforms were originally touted as a potential force for positive political change, such as during the Arab Spring, when they  were used to coordinate and mobilize citizens to protest against authoritarian regimes,his quickly shifted when

non-democratic actors realized they could also utilize social media just as effectively as

pro-democracy activists to sow discord. In the case of the Arab spring, governments tracked protestors online, including those overseas, and attempted to silence them through relational repression, or threatening to hurt their relatives at home.

Governments also pass legislation under the pretense of making the internet “safer,” yet in reality, such measures are often utilized to silence dissent. For example, in 2020, Turkey passed a law that allegedly aimed to curb “immoral” content.this legislation, however, also granted the Turkish government the right to remove content from platforms, and allowed for the storage of Turkish users’ data within the country.  In 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan went even further, passing disinformation legislation that punished those who spread news that was inaccurate with up to five years in prison. Right before the 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections, Erdoğan then forced X (formerly Twitter) to ban access to several local opposition public figures’ accounts.

Even before the popularization of social media, politicians placed significant emphasis on cultivating their public image to maximize electability, and have had to adapt as new mediums that have arisen. Politicians who quickly adapt to new forms of media have always gained an advantage. One of the most famous examples of this is the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon presidential debate, which was the first televised debate between American presidential candidates. Reportedly, viewers of the debate believed Kennedy won, while radio listeners tended to believe that Nixon performed better – a phenomenon that scholars have since replicated in experiments. Thus, it is possible that Kennedy’s adeptness in harnessing this newfangled technology just as it became commonly used among the general electorate contributed to his electoral victory.

Politicians in today’s current political climate have similarly adapted to new mediums – notably social media – to gain electoral advantages. During the 2016 presidential elections, Donald Trump’s campaign  benefited significantly from utilizing the expertise and staff of technology firms. S This advantage stemmed from the active involvement of social media companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google which initially courted political campaigns by providing advice on leveraging their platforms for digital advertising. This assistance enabled Trump’s campaign to target key demographic groups, swing voters, and supporters online, likely mitigating the Trump campaign’s  relative staffing disadvantage.. In contrast, Clinton’s more well-funded and staffed campaign meant that it crafted most of its ads in-house, and treated the technology companies more like vendors instead of consultants.

Even without the help of tech companies, politicians are recognizing the importance of utilizing data to effectively target key voters on platforms. For example, in the UK, Vote Leave, which campaigned for the UK to leave the EU ahead of the 2016 Brexit referendum, utilized personal data to target specific demographics and test which narratives voters were the most responsive to. The utilization of citizens’ data to more accurately target them with political messaging has, however, attracted controversy. This public controversy that such microtargeting attracts is exemplified by the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018, which revealed that the company collected the information of over 50 million Facebook users without their consent through a Facebook app that misleadingly told users that their information would be used for academic purposes. That data was ultimately used by the Trump campaign to precisely target voters, although whether this method was truly effective at swaying voters is uncertain.,,

Interestingly, Trump had significantly more engagement with his social media content, following the old adage of “all press is good press,” which allowed him to overcome his disadvantage in traditional campaigning techniques. In particular, his provocative tweets received significant organic coverage from mainstream media, which allowed him to spend less on traditional media advertising. Additionally, Trump’s combative approach to tweeting proved effective, as an analysis of tweets before the 2016 election found that tweets about Clinton tended to be unfavorable.furthermore, her most popular tweets primarily focused on criticizing Trump rather than promoting her own candidacy. This is potentially reflective of a larger bias among social media algorithms, which have found that negative content is more likely to go viral. Therefore, it is unsurprising that in the 2016 election, negative content gained the most traction, reflecting the importance of social media in allowing politicians to personalize their appeals to voters.

In recent decades, politicians have increasingly personalized their media strategies, conducting campaigns that encompass both their political agenda and personal brand. Media coverage not only focuses on the politician's policies and leadership capabilities, but also on their private life. While this behind-the-scenes content is, in general, generally just as polished and curated as performances on the campaign trail, by claiming to give voters a peek into their private life and personality, this content seeks to make the candidate more relatable and endearing to voters. Consequently, Trump’s openness about his extreme views and his use of colloquial language added an air of authenticity to his social media content that enhanced his populist claim of being of the masses. Trump’s social media presence, in particular, thus underscores how the advent of social media has opened up new avenues and methods through which politicians cultivate authenticity in pursuit of electoral success. By removing barriers between politicians and voters, social media allows politicians to communicate more directly with the electorate in an intimate and personal manner. This communication  feels even more intimate now that social media has become synonymous with authenticity.

Moreover, social media platforms provide politicians with the opportunity to strategically showcase their personality. Trump, in choosing to disregard basic grammatical and spelling rules and post rambling tweets, employed indexical signs, or signals alluding to his persona, to cultivate an appearance of authenticity. These distinctive features of his social media content seem to  indicate that his tweets are a truer reflection of his personality relative to other politicians (such as Hilary Clinton) who sign off their tweets with their initials.

Trump’s success also highlights how populist leaders are particularly

well-positioned to benefit from the digitalization of the public sphere and the growing forms of direct communication between politicians and voters. The establishment of closer bonds between politicians and their support base make it easier for anti-establishment populists’ to fuel  distrust in mainstream media and present alternative versions of facts. Consequently, populist and authoritarian leaders  utilize social media to directly appeal to the public, bypassing critical voices like investigative journalists, thereby facilitating the spread of misleading or false information, as demonstrated by Donald Trump.

Background on Modi and Bolsonaro

Modi has been India’s Prime Minister since 2014, when his party, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won a landslide majority in India’s parliament. He is currently serving his second term as prime minister, following the BJP’s success in the 2019 elections. As a boy, Modi joined the Hindu nationalist paramilitary organization ‘Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’ (“National Volunteer Association,” or RSS), which heavily shaped his life and worldview. The RSS is a far-right Hindu nationalist group advocating for the establishment of a purely Hindu nation. Their vision leaves no room for India’s Muslim minority, leading to frequent accusations  of inciting  hatred towards Muslims. Modi dedicated almost 3 decades  to organizing on behalf of the RSS, which is closely associated with the BJP. This ultimately played a significant role in propelling Modi to the forefront of the  BJP’s electoral campaigns. He eventually became a BJP party spokesperson, establishing his public presence.  He was subsequently appointed as the chief minister of Gujarat in 2001, during which time  the state’s economy grew rapidly.

India’s media landscape is fairly varied, as popular sources of news include everything from legacy publications such as The Times of India, to broadcasters such as NDTV, and BBC News, which tend to be relatively unbiased. Over 70 percent of Indian consumers get their news from their phones, and YouTube is a particular popular platform for accessing news. Notably, Indians are particularly interested in hyperlocal news, which they obtain through small, local publications and WhatsApp groups. That being said, India is one of the most dangerous places to be a journalist, and, in recent years, press freedom has declined as Modi and the BJP have increasingly attacked the freedoms of speech, judiciary, religion, and protest. Because of this, journalists often shy away from criticizing the government or reporting critically on the government out of fear of retribution.,,

Jair Bolsonaro was the president of Brazil from 2019-2023, who after leaving the military, was elected to Rio de Janeiro’s city council, and then later represented the city in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies. He gained notoriety for his extremely conservative social views, and numerous sexist, homophobic, and racist comments. He also exhibited nostalgia for the previous dictatorship, a sentiment that persisted throughout his campaign and presidency. In 2018, amid widespread discontent following simultaneous economic, political, and social crises due to major corruption scandals, Bolsonaro won the presidency. However, his presidency was plagued by numerous controversies, including his deforestation of the Amazon and most notably, his poor handling of the COVID-19 crisis. During the pandemic, he seemingly expressed indifference to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Brazilians due to his lax COVID-19 policies, mocked those with severe cases of COVID-19, touted unproven drugs, and refused to wear a mask or get the vaccine. Furthermore, after losing his bid for reelection in the fall of 2022 and sowing distrust in the electoral system in the months leading up to the election, on January 8, 2023, Bolsonaro’s supporters attacked numerous Brazilian government buildings in protest of the results, an event that parallels the events in The United States on January 6, 2021.

Brazil’s media landscape is dominated by several large private media conglomerates, including Globo, Record, SBT, Bandeirantes, and Folha, which are owned by politically connected individuals who distort coverage favorably. Similar to India, Brazilians also increasingly access news through their smartphones, and especially through YouTube, WhatsApp, and Facebook. Disinformation, especially in political discourse and online, continues to be a problem, although it was especially severe under President Bolsonaro, who frequently attacked the press. Folha, one of the major media conglomerates, even pulled its content from Facebook from 2018-2021 over fake news concerns., Moreover, Brazil is also one of the most dangerous places to be a journalist, as journalists have been killed by criminal groups, especially when reporting on Amazon-related environmental issues.

Analysis

Both Modi and Bolsonaro have taken fairly personalized approaches to social media.

However, while Bolsonaro adopted this approach largely out of necessity, Modi’s decision to do so was a calculated one, as part of his general personalization of Indian politics. Thus, while Modi’s success mirrors those of leaders such as Erdoğan, who actively distort social media, in favor of their own regimes, through laws and the parliament, Bolsonaro appears to more closely resemble less successful populists like Trump.

In Brazil, historically, airtime on radio and TV was one of the decisive factors in the election. This changed with Bolsonaro’s election, however, as he had less than 1 percent of all airtime. His ability to capture voters heavily active on social media and his ability to dominate conversations on those platforms helped him mitigate this disadvantage. Bolsonaro upended this traditional advantage through his personalized approach to social media, and especially his activity on the extremely popular WhatsApp. Similar to Trump, his lack of resources for a full-fledged marketing team turned out to be an advantage. Bolsonaro allegedly personally managed his WhatsApp account, and would heavily record his events, which his staff would then forward to supporters through his massive network of WhatsApp groups.

Similar to how Kennedy leveraged televised debates to garner voter support, Bolsonaro’s “guerrilla marketing” capitalized on social media, proving particularly  effective among its users. Consequently, it is unsurprising that Bolsonaro supporters had the highest rate of social media usage among supporters of all the major presidential candidates. However, it is possible that the personalized nature of Bolsanaro’s social media strategy  arose from insecurity and personal hypersensitivity to criticism than from deliberate strategy. At one point, Bolsonaro posted a whole video on social media just to deny reports that he went to the hospital because of illness, instead claiming that he was at the hospital for “personal reasons.” Furthermore, during his 2018 campaign, there were strong accusations and evidence that he had encouraged supporters to pay digital marketing firms to flood WhatsApp with thousands of attack ads, implying that his own campaign team did not have the funds to do so. Consequently, Bolsonaro also resembled Trump in how he overcame a traditional media disadvantage through utilizing free press from posting inflammatory statements on social media that led to free, organic coverage in the mainstream media. Similar to Trump, Bolsonaro’s tendency to make extremely “politically incorrect” and offensive statements was endearing to supporters, who viewed his bluntness as a signal of authenticity.

Modi was an early adopter of X, using it to interact with other politicians, convey his policy objectives, and notably, integrate social media into his campaign strategy well before  the 2014 elections. But unlike Bolsonaro, Modi’s decision to do so was not out of lack of access to other forms of political messaging. Rather, this was the product of an extensive in-house public relations team and public relations firms that decided to intentionally cultivate an image of Modi as accessible to the people. Therefore,Modi’s ability to cultivate a social media presence that exudes authenticity authentically , especially during the 2019 elections, underscores his success at positioning himself at the center of the  BJP’s political strategy.

Notably, in both India and Brazil, Bolsonaro and Modi took advantage of WhatsApp’s popularity to coordinate campaigns and spread misinformation through a network of group chats that were extremely difficult to shut down. Not only does WhatsApp’s decentralized nature allow new groups to pop up easily after groups are shut down, but the app’s end-to-end encryption also makes it hard to monitor and identify the spread of misinformation within these groups. In India, the ruling BJP party pioneered the use of social media ahead of the 2019 elections, the first national election where a substantial proportion of the population, around 45 percent, had smartphones, compared to around merely 15 percent in 2014.

The BJP effectively utilized group chats in WhatsApp, a platform which the vast majority of Indian smartphone users have downloaded, to target and spread regionally specific messaging, mirroring Trump campaign’s use of Facebook data to similarly micro-target key demographics. Specifically, in India, politicians relied on a network of hundreds of WhatsApp groups, each based in different regions, to coordinate and convey campaign messaging and logistics to supporters. Modi and his staff tailored tweets and messaging strategies, which were then shared with a network of hundreds of thousands of volunteers, who spread the messaging by the millions. In these group chats, the BJP also pushes rhetoric and disinformation that aimed to inflame religious tensions and stoke fear of the Muslim minority among India's majority Hindu population. Examples of disinformation included pornographic deepfakes of reporters critical of Modi’s role in anti-Muslim riots as governor of Gujarat, as well as less directly insidious falsehoods, such as inflated crowds sizes at his rallies.,

Similarly, in Brazil, where WhatsApp is one of the primary sources of information for its 120 million local users, Bolsonaro supporters paid digital advertising firms to run attack ads in various WhatsApp groups. Here, Bolsonaro’s supporters exploited the intimacy of these groups, similar to Modi and the BJP, enabling them to hyper-specifically target various groups, often with disinformation that spread rapidly and extensively. However, in Brazil, Bolsonaro’s digital content mostly preyed on the fears of those with socially conservative views and dissatisfaction with the establishment. Therefore, prime examples of popular misinformation on WhatsApp include a deep-faked image of former president Dilma Roussef next to Fidel Castro, and a picture allegedly depicting two male employees from Globo, one of the major media companies in Brazil, kissing, which was actually taken at a pride march in New York. Bolsonaro’s network of WhatsApp groups also shared the social media of those critical of Bolsonaro and coordinated mass campaigns attacking critics.

More broadly, while both Modi and Bolsonaro rely on WhatsApp as the primary platform for disseminating election-related disinformation, they have  extended their operations to other platforms as well. Bolsonaro exploited the popularity of online, partisan sites and social media as sources of news to spread information. A study of the Brazilian 2022 elections found that those who joined political groups on messaging apps such as WhatsApp and used partisan, online sites and social media as their sources of news were more likely to believe in election related-misinformation. Furthermore, every week Bolsonaro live streamed on YouTube, aiming to directly deliver disinformation to his supporters. In these streams, he primarily attempted to discredit the mainstream media, claiming to speak the authentic truth, despite primarily propagating borderline propaganda. Yet notably, unlike Modi, most of his attempts to reduce the independence of the press and institutions was primarily through rhetoric rather than direct suppression and censorship.

Modi’s efforts to exploit social media to silence dissent were more extensive and refined, and contributed to his ability to concentrate power in a way Bolsonaro was unable to. Furthermore, he continues to actively suppresses critical content, recently banning access to a BBC documentary investigating his role in a deadly 2002 riot while he was Governor of Gujarat. Modi also weaponizes the regulation of platforms to coerce them into complying with content takedown requests. In 2021, Modi implemented new IT rules under the pretense of combating misinformation. However, these rules, which forced social media companies to hand over user data, take down any content the government deems “restricted,” and hire a local Chief Compliance Officer, seemed to be designed to facilitate the government’s ability to coerce platforms to remove unfavorable content. Under these new rules, the government threatened to sue X and even raided its Indian offices after it labeled BJP politicians’ tweets as manipulated media. Furthermore, Modi has been unafraid to go after major tech companies, and has exploited their fears of being cut off from  the massive Indian market. Modi has also pressured X to block access in India to the accounts of Sikh activists and those who are critical of Modi. Modi has not hesitated to punish platforms who resist his demands, and has threatened to jail employees of companies such as Facebook for noncompliance with censorship requests. Furthermore, platforms have also found themselves caught up in the backlash after geopolitical spats. In the wake of deadly clashes at the India-China border in 2020, Modi banned TikTok.

Notably, both Modi and Bolsonaro have employed social media platforms to spread false information that contributes to and exacerbates platform violence outside of elections. However, Modi is much more effective at intimidating potential dissenters and translating his network of supporters into tangible organized acts of violence. Modi’s ability to incite violence and his exploitation of and leaning into Hindu nationalism through the spreading of fake news about Muslims or lower castes has inflamed tensions and motivated real-life mob violence and hate crimes. Modi, however, has consistently refused to acknowledge acts of Hindu nationalist mob violence.,

Bolsonaro intentionally spread false rumors about voter fraud and irregularities in Brazil’s digitalized voting system. These actions resulted in him him having to participate in a runoff in 2018 and ultimately to his electoral loss in 2022. He spread these lies through interviews with traditional media and through directly appealing to users with disinformation on online platforms, for example, through his weekly YouTube live streams. These disinformation campaigns culminated in the January 8th riots in 2023.

Unlike Modi, who was running for re-election, Bolsonaro’s social media strategy mirrored Trump’s in that his spreading of misinformation likely came from a place of weakness. Leading up to the presidential election in both instances, Bolsonaro and Trump both had seemingly long odds.  Additionally, both of their  social media strategies were influenced by their campaign’s limited resources. Therefore, it is likely that Bolsonaro’s dissemination of disinformation regarding electoral fraud in anticipation of the 2018 election stemmed from a sense of insecurity. After all, if Bolsonaro were genuinely confident he was going to win the election, he would not have prepared an explanation for a potential loss before the election even happened.

Bolsonaro’s encouragement of violence following the 2022 elections also likely came from feelings of vulnerability and anger at the perceived humiliation of not winning the election. Contrary to Modi, however, outside of social media platforms, Bolsonaro’s network of supporters are less organized, and therefore, have engaged in less acts of violence and physical intimidation. Even the largest violent outbreak under Bolsonaro, the January 8th protests, were nowhere near as deadly or violent as Modi’s army was, as it was more of a last-ditch attempt at holding onto power rather than an intentional, organized, than a demonstration of strength., Similar to Trump, the January 8th riots in Brazil can be interpreted as a product of Bolsonaro lashing out due to a feeling of powerlessness and refusal to accept what he perceived as the embarrassment of not winning the election.

Yet, despite the importance and widespread use of social media in the Bolsonaro’s campaigns, Bolsonaro was ultimately unable to retain power due to the differences in political structure between India and Brazil. Brazil has a federal presidential republic, meaning that similar to the US, power is split among the different executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and thus the president inherently has much less authority than the prime minister in India. Because of this, the other branches of government were able to check Bolsonaro’s authoritarian impulses. Specifically, the Brazilian Supreme Court, with its criminal jurisdiction over all public officials, including the president, as well as the Congress’ refusal to endorse Bolsonaro’s assault on judicial institutions, played significant roles in restraining him. Therefore, the judicial branch, in particular, was able to nullify Bolsonaro’s worst attempts at censorship or influencing social media to portray him more favorably. For example, in 2021, when Bolsonaro attempted to ban social media platforms from taking down certain types of misinformation, including misinformation about COVID-19, the Supreme Court and Brazilian Senate nullified the legislation. When Bolsonaro supporters refused to accept his defeat, one of Brazil’s Supreme Court justices ordered the accounts of some of the loudest protesters suspended. As a result of the January 8, 2023 riots, during which Bolsonaro supporters stormed government buildings in protest of the election results, the Superior Electoral Court banned Bolsonaro from running for election again until 2030. Therefore, Bolsonaro's political downfall demonstrates the limitations of social media propaganda when faced with strong institutional checks and balances.

In contrast, India is a federal parliamentary republic, which generally leads to much more powerful heads of government, since the prime minister is determined by the majority coalition in the legislative branch. Thus, unlike in Brazil, in this political system, the executive branch inherently has influence over the legislative branch, which enabled Modi to shape government opinion much more rapidly. Therefore, while the combination of the independent judiciary and congress restrained Bolsonaro, Modi has been able to successfully erode the independence of government institutions, including the judiciary, which he has weaponized against opposition politicians through promoting friendly judges and punishing defiant ones. Thus, Modi bears similarity to Viktor Orban in Hungary, who was able to quickly weaken independent institutions due to his unified parliamentary supermajority. Furthermore, he also bears resemblance to Erdoğan, who held a 2017 referendum that amended Turkey’s constitution from a parliamentary to a presidential system. Erdoğan’s presidentialization of a parliamentary system allowed him to consolidate the powers of the leaders in a presidential and parliamentary system into one role while reducing the checks on these powers. Essentially, Erdoğan had centered his party's campaign for seats around his personal appeal, instead of the party's Similarly, Modi’s rise to power in 2014 diverged from historical norms in that, unusually for a parliamentary system, the BJP’s campaign centered around Modi’s appeal as prime minister. This presidentialization of parliamentary elections foreshadowed his ensuing consolidation of power.

It is also important to consider how each leader fits into the broader historical context of their respective countries. Most importantly, Modi's social media disinformation campaigns are able to exploit tensions between different ethnic groups that have been present since India gained independence from the British. While Modi has increasingly centralized power under his leadership, his actions must be interpreted and understood in the context of his longstanding commitment to  creating a Hindu nation, which has motivated him since he first joined the RSS as a youth. Modi’s actions and ideas align with a larger movement that has been in the works for far longer than he has been in power. Therefore, to understand Modi’s underlying motives, it is important to keep in mind historical events such as the bloody partition of the Indian subcontinent and the history of discrimination against Muslims in India. Since the chaotic 1947 partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan, which was done largely along religious lines and led to the death of approximately a million people, Muslims in India have continued to face discrimination. Modi has regularly deployed internet blackouts to silence dissent in the Muslim-majority federally administered Jammu and Kashmir states, which, in 2022, had the most internet shutdowns globally. Under Modi, anti-Muslim lynchings and hate crimes have risen rapidly, and Modi and the BJP have encouraged the spread of Islamaphobic conspiracy theories, such as the COVID-19 pandemic being a “Muslim plot.” Therefore, Modi’s ability to capitalize on the significant issue of religious divisions and focus his social media disinformation efforts around this specific issue, in a manner Bolsonaro could not, have contributed to his enduring resilience.

In contrast, Bolsonaro relied on a broader variety of societal tensions,and it is probable that his inability to channel his efforts around a single issue contributed to his ultimate downfall. Bolsonaro positioned himself more generally as a populist outsider who was a break from the establishment. He fed on Brazilians general sense of discontent stemming from general political and economic turmoil to rise to power. However, once he was in office, despite attempting to frame himself as “anti establishment” and railing against “mainstream media,” he could no longer be considered as an outsider.

Moreover, unlike Modi, who had substantial governing experience and political organizing experience from his time as governor of Gujarat and his work volunteering for the RSS, Bolsonaro’s status as a relative novice, which was especially evident during his poor management of crises like the pandemic. Before becoming president, Bolsonaro had only served as a legislator, and had limited connections within government, having spent most of his previous political career at the fringes of governmental circles.

Furthermore, Modi’s close ties and history with the BJP and RSS naturally provided  him with a significantly stronger and more entrenched base of support, forged over decades of advancement through the party ranks. In contrast, Bolsonaro’s frequent switches between political parties, both over the course of his career and even during his presidency, left him isolated and unable to secure substantial support in Congress. Therefore, Bolsonaro’s loss suggests that while social media may have propelled his unlikely presidency, it was not sufficient to maintain his grip on power, particularly coupled with his relative political inexperience.

Furthermore, the resilience and independence of civil society and press in Brazil compared to India also helped curb Bolsonaro’s attempts to consolidate his power. For example, as soon as Bolsonaro was elected, protests broke out in several cities. Despite his initial threats to jail left-wing protesters, these threats proved empty as mass protests continued to occur during his presidency., Furthermore, interestingly, Bolsonaro’s attacks on journalists, instead of having a demoralizing effect, actually invigorated journalists, strengthening their resolve and resilience.  In contrast, under Modi, the independence of the Indian press has been substantially eroded. The collective efforts of Modi’s online army of trolls, which issues death and rape threats, along with the BJP’s direct intimidation of critical journalists, and the pressuring of media companies to fire or punish disobedient reporters, have effectively coereced many journalists into self-censorship due fear of retribution. For example, in 2018, the gang-rape and murder of an eight-year-old Muslim girl who was kidnapped and tortured for days by a group of Hindu men only gained national coverage after foreign publications picked the story up. Even so, coverage was limited, especially since the BJP organized a rally in support of the accused rapists.

Conclusion

While both Modi and Bolsonaro disseminate fake news on social media to circumvent traditional media barriers and communicate directly with the electorate, their attempts to control the narrative stem from different motivations. Modi operates from a position of strength,silencing dissenting opinions and consolidating power across the state, whereas Bolsonaro operates from a position of weakness, striving to preserve his tenuous grip on power. Additionally, it appears that while social media strategy played a substantial role in both Bolsonaro and Modi’s rise, it was ultimately external factors specific to their broader context, namely the strength of political institutions and social cleavages that facilitated one’s success over the other. Therefore, while social media plays an important role in these leader’s roads to power, it cannot overcome certain existing factors.

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