Abstract

To stay below 2.0 °C of anthropogenic warming, the globe must push for the rapid development of clean energy technologies. To mobilize this development, a significant emphasis is being placed on critical mineral extraction for green energy and national security purposes. However, this extraction has been shown to have significant detrimental human rights effects. This paper analyzes the role critical minerals have in clean energy, and the role China plays as the dominant producer/processor of critical minerals. Theoretically, this paper posits 4 categories of human rights violations: (1) Environmental Issues, (2) IPLC Rights, (3) Labor Issues, and (4) Violence. By drawing on Kara’s (2023) fieldwork in Katanga, as well as various NGO (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch) reports, Government Reports, and UN documentation, this paper uses the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a case study to examine human rights abuses in the cobalt mining supply chain through storytelling. This paper suggests that the energy transition must be coupled with policy tools to address human rights abuses, ensuring the globe commits to not just a clean transition, but a just transition. The paper suggests three focus areas to help couple the clean energy transition with a just transition: Shared Governance and Legalized ASM, Shared Prosperity and Economic Benefits, and Effective Due Diligence.

Introduction:

Critical minerals have increasingly been the focus of domestic and international policy within the United States. Since taking office in 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump has directed significant focus on the acquisition of critical minerals and the national security imperatives of critical mineral access. In February, controversy surrounded a proposed U.S. bilateral agreement with Ukraine, wherein Ukraine would pay back U.S. aid and military assistance by signing over rights to their critical mineral deposits; which, according to the most recent estimates, total $126 trillion worth. Following, on March 20th, the President signed an executive order increasing domestic production of minerals under the guise of national security.,Additionally, on April 24th, the White House signed an executive order directing the Department of Commerce to “pursue the exploration and exploitation of deep-sea resources both within the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and areas beyond national jurisdiction.”

Critical minerals have become part of a broader policy goal of the Trump Administration to “Unleash American Energy,” and to localize critical mineral mining and processing within the United States. But the fascination with critical minerals is increasing around the globe, with many countries seeking to increase access to these vital resources. The control of critical minerals has become a national security priority for many countries in the “West.” Their use in technology, specifically weapons and security tech, as well as infrastructure and manufacturing, has made securing access to mining rights, processing strength, and stockpiles a critical defense strategy against unanticipated demand spikes or supply chain disruptions.

Currently, China has global control over critical mineral mining and processing, which has left countries such as the U.S. and the EU wary of supply chain risks and security. As a result, many countries have sought to expand their control over these sources. And, the increasingly rapid cycle of commodity use in the 21st century has led to a clear spatial expansion of extractivism across the globe. This expansion of the critical mineral extraction and processing industry is increasingly dangerous for local actors. Human rights abuses, sexual violence, child labor, and environmental destruction are rampant throughout extractivist industries; especially those that are linked to critical minerals. Despite this, critical minerals are also positioned as vital for a clean energy transition and a post-carbon world. This paper seeks to explore the connection between critical minerals, the global supply chain, and human rights abuses. First, this paper traces the need for critical minerals in the clean energy transition and the role of China’s control over resources. Following, this paper goes in depth into the political ecologies of the extractive industry and the violence inherent in critical mineral extraction. By focusing on the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a case study, this paper details how histories of colonialism and resource extraction have been exacerbated by the clean energy transition, and how on-the-ground local ethnographic knowledge can provide critical information on the violence of extraction. Finally, this paper concludes with policy recommendations for the industrial and political world of the U.S., while acknowledging the multifaceted and opaque nature of extractivist violence. This paper hopes to contribute to the ongoing literature surrounding a just clean energy transition.

What Are Critical Minerals?

Critical minerals (also called ‘critical materials’ and ‘green metals’) are elements necessary for advanced technologies central to our contemporary lives. They are vital for the twin–green and digital–transitions, as new technologies utilise far higher amounts of minerals than more traditional technologies. For example, critical minerals have become necessary for the production of everyday technologies, such as iPhones, device batteries, computer chips, as well as green technologies: solar panels, wind turbines, and battery storage.

While often referred to as “critical minerals,” the concept is slightly in flux when it comes to these materials. Elements such as these are predominantly metals, but can be non-metal elements and minerals, as is the case with arsenic (a metalloid). The criticality, in this instance, refers specifically to their vitality for various energy and technological uses, and their risk in the global supply chain. Minerals that have become necessary for our smartphones and batteries, for instance, are considered critical due to their importance in the U.S economy, but also because of the heightened chance of supply chain disruption. Supply chain disruption refers to a vast array of issues, but the most prominent is a small concentration of minerals and global monopolies. For example, ruthenium, rhodium, and palladium are all present in very minimal concentrations as by-products of platinum processing; they can, then, experience disruption of the supply chain due to how limited production capabilities are. Additionally, some minerals are market concentrated at the processing stage, such as copper, cobalt, and lithium as China holds over 40% of the global smelting and refining capacity. Critical minerals can also be viewed in contrast with “traditional minerals,” which often have well established extraction and refining processes and supply chains; gold, nickel, and coal all fit within the more traditional mineral model, but notably have very little place in a green energy transition.

Our use of critical minerals is expected to increase drastically as a result of the clean energy transition. To put emissions on track with the Paris Agreement would require a significant scaling up of clean energy deployment across the globe. Annual installation of solar photovoltaic cells, wind turbines, and electricity networks must expand by about 3x their current levels by 2040. In the same period, electric car sales must expand 25x over. As a result, our reliance on critical minerals will increase. A typical electric car requires 6x the mineral inputs as a traditional car, and an offshore wind plant requires almost 9x the mineral resources as a gas plant of the same capacity. Additionally, the construction of wind farms and electric cars uses seven different types of minerals, while a natural gas power plant and a conventional car use only two.

While demand forecasts do fluctuate over time, the best estimates show that, to reach net

Zero demand is expected to triple for copper and cobalt, more than triple for zinc, and grow more than fivefold for lithium and manganese. Since 2010, our mineral demand per new unit of power generation capacity has increased by 50%. Suffice to say: the clean energy transition means a shift to a material-intensive system from a fuel-intensive system.

China’s control over critical minerals

China is the dominant player in global mineral processing. It holds a majority of rare earth elements, and dominates the midstream (processing and refining) and downstream (manufacturing) stages of critical minerals supply chains. Apart from processing the minerals mined within, China is also the destination for the processing of minerals mined in other countries. Additionally, China is the primary producer of a majority of technologies that come from critical minerals, such as solar PV cells. This vast control over the production and export of critical minerals has shaken other countries. There is concern that the high level of dependence on China for these minerals will create energy security risks. The U.S. and the EU have both grown increasingly wary of this issue and have moved to build out their own critical mineral supply chains and production facilities. Despite this, currently, China still holds a strong grasp on the critical mineral industry.

Globally, China refines 68% of nickel, 40% of copper, 59% of lithium, and 73% of cobalt and is by far the world’s leading producer (60% of the global production share, but down from 95% in 2010) and processor of rare earth elements (REEs), such as neodymium, which are used in motor technologies for EVs and wind power technologies. The U.S. The Department of Energy projects that “demand for rare earth elements for wind power alone could exceed the supply for  all uses by 1.6 to 3.5 times over. China has also become the globe’s most strategic player in the production of battery cells. They produce 70% of cathodes, which are the most important component and can account for half the cost of a manufactured cell, 85% of anodes, 66% of separators, and 62% of electrolytes. For electric vehicles, China holds 78% of the world's cell manufacturing capacity for batteries and hosts three-fourths of the world's lithium-ion battery megafactories. This makes China the largest consumer of the minerals it refines.

Despite the lack of direct domination in mining for critical minerals, China (and Chinese companies) has made several moves to secure raw mineral inputs globally through investments and deals. Chinese firms have moved to make direct investments into international mining projects and companies, and have acquired part-equity stakes in major operations in emerging economies. For example, in 2018, China's Tianqi Lithium purchased a 24% stake in SQM, a major lithium producer in Chile. Ganfeng Lithium has acquired stakes in mining projects in Argentina, Ireland, Chile, and Australia. CATL, a major EV battery manufacturer, has acquired Canada-based Millennial Lithium and stakes in Australian lithium mining companies, as well as copper-cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Finally, Suzhou CATH Energy Technologies is investing in a lithium and tin project in the DRC through a joint venture, earning a 24% equity interest. These deals have also been beneficial for cornering partnerships with electric vehicle manufacturers and the industry that requires these minerals. Some foreign automakers seeking to secure supplies have collaborated with Chinese companies, such as Volkswagen, forming joint ventures with Huayou Cobalt and Tsingshan Holding Group to secure nickel and cobalt. In this regard, a company may feel forced to make a deal in partnership with a Chinese firm to secure access to vital minerals.

China’s control over critical minerals has also developed a distinct spatial factor. As part of its Belt and Road Initiative, China has taken a distinct interest in African nations for resource extraction. No other country serves as such a dramatic example as that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Chinese-backed companies own or have a financial stake in 15 of the 19 cobalt-producing mines in the DRC. In the cobalt supply chain, Chinese control over mining and intermediate production comes almost entirely from outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in cobalt-producing facilities in the DRC. After purchasing the majority shares of Tenke Fungurume in 2016 and 2017, Chinese-controlled production was over half of the DRC's chemical refinery production.

China has shown little desire to show proper due diligence in its critical mineral supply chain. Despite having two legal frameworks to ensure responsible sourcing and compliance with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards, regulation is lacking. The China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC)’s Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investment and the CCCMC’s Due Diligence Guidance, both call for a commitment to human rights in mining efforts, and to identify, address, prevent, and mitigate risks associated with their activities or sourcing decisions. In actuality, however, these regulations have not been deemed enforceable. And, as this paper will explore later, the global critical mineral supply chain is so opaque that many efforts to ensure proper due diligence fall flat.

Human Rights and the Critical Mineral Trade

The mining sector has a long history of improper treatment of human rights. From histories of colonialism, blood diamonds, land grabbing that displaces indigenous groups, food contamination that affects nearby communities, and fatal force against workers protesting for livable wages, mining has often failed to be grounded in the principles laid out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UDHR is the bedrock for standards and principles that govern the mining sector, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, and the International Council of Minerals and Metals Mining Principles. And, while many global mining companies have committed themselves to respecting human rights laid out in the UDHR, more work is still needed to ensure a human rights-based approach in mining. For example, despite article five of the UDHR, which states that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,” Mining companies continue to fail to address long-term environmental and health impacts of their commercial activities.

Public information surrounding the human rights impacts of critical mineral mining has often been sparse, and used to justify further reliance on fossil fuels. Despite this, focus on the human rights aspect of the clean energy transition is vital for ensuring a just transition for all. A significant portion of critical mineral hot spots are located in countries that are at risk for human rights violations. And, according to a report by the IEA in 2023, over 40% of cobalt, lithium, and copper come from mines with verified human rights abuses. That number, however, is expected to be greater, as human rights abuses are often poorly reported and tallied due to fear of further assaults. Across a majority of mines, there remains a risk for gender based violence (GBV), violence against Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs), environmental degradation, extrajudicial killings, child labor, and a number of other issues. Since the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises were released, more human rights complaints have been filed against companies in the mining and manufacturing sectors than in any other sector.

Due to the spatial realities of mining, human rights abuses become more realized. A majority of mining operations take place in remote areas, with local communities that have poor access to basic standards of living, exacerbating issues. Concerns surrounding human rights violations can most easily be broken into 4 categories: (1) Environmental Issues, (2) IPLC Rights, (3) Labor Issues, and (4) Violence.

Environmental Issues: There is primarily concern surrounding the environmental devastation that occurs as a result of critical mineral mining. Most methods used to mine critical minerals today require significant amounts of water for separating minerals, cooling machinery, and controlling dust. Additionally, water contamination from chemicals and mineral tailings is commonplace. Take, for example, lithium extraction. In large areas of Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia – often referred to as the lithium triangle –  lithium is acquired through evaporation brine pools in the region's salt flats. This evaporation method uses up to half a million gallons of brine water to extract just one ton of lithium carbonate. And, while the brine water is unfit for other uses, reports have shown that this form of extraction has led to contamination of local freshwater sources and vast depletion of groundwater. In addition to water contamination, ecosystem devastation is commonplace in mining. Just one example is copper, where vast open-air pits carve holes into the crust of the earth, and pollute the air with dust and mine tailings. In a report done by the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, the leading tracker of mining human rights abuses, environmental devastation makes up almost 29.5% of all tracked violations – the second largest category in their 2024 report.

IPLC Rights: The largest category for the report? Infringements on Local Communities. Over 50% of the current critical mineral supply falls in indigenous lands, with 29% of these projects on or near lands over which Indigenous peoples are recognized as managing or exercising some form of control or influence over land for the purposes of conservation. IPLCs are disproportionately at risk for displacement and forced relocation thanks to critical mineral mining. In Indonesia, for example, the PT Vale Indonesia (PTVI) nickel mine has consistently been under scrutiny for its impacts on IPLCs in Sorowako. For more than 50 years, indigenous peoples, local farmers, and fisherfolk have been displaced from their land due to the development of this mine, and reports of harassment by local law enforcement have raised concerns of grave human rights violations. These broader inequities and attacks against IPLC communities are commonplace across mining operations, and thanks to rising demand, more mining is forecasted to take place on IPLC land over the next 50 years.

Forced Labor: Forced labor in supply chains is a pervasive issue for the critical minerals sector, and makes up a large amount of human rights violations across the globe. Many miners are paid measly sums – upwards of $1 USD a day for mining – with many being trafficked to their current operation. At nickel processing plants in Indonesia, many workers have been deceptively recruited in China, and once they arrive, they receive a lower wage than promised and work longer hours. Workers regularly experience having their passports confiscated by overseers, having their wages deducted for no obvious reasons, and being subjected to restriction of movement, forced isolation, and constant surveillance. Child labor has also become commonplace across the critical mineral sector. Children as young as six have been made to haul heavy ore, work in narrow and dangerous mines, and come in close proximity to explosives, toxins, and dust; often without proper personal protective equipment. Child miners often work in informal artisanal and small-scale mines, which usually fly under government radars, and leave workers vulnerable to exploitation and dangers. While obviously child labor is abhorrent, the choice is often the lesser of two evils. The choice isn't simply sending a kid to work in the mines or sending a kid to work at school. It's often between putting a kid to work or starving.

Violence: Violence is perhaps too broad a category to lump together. It can better be split into its own three distinct categories: Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV); torture, cruel and inhumane treatment; and attacks against activists.

Women make up upwards of 15% of the global mining workforce, and gender -based inequalities remain pervasive. There continues to be a longstanding masculine dominance in the structures, systems, and policies that make up critical mineral operations. From ‘everyday sexism’ to sexual harassment, assault, and rape, women are subject to gender based violence on an everyday basis. According to the International Institute for Environment and Development, one study that surveyed 12 African countries found that women and girls are exposed to “rape, sexual harassment, sexual exploitation, physical violence, spousal abandonment at the end of their assignment, [and] unwanted pregnancies and abortions” during their time mining. Additionally, economic violence, including failure to promote women and inequitable sharing of resources and income, is pervasive, and harmful gender stereotypes “combine to limit women’s access to resources, capital, education, higher-paying roles, equality in professional and domestic roles, and fair remuneration.” Due to their precarious position, many women often feel forced or coerced to provide sexual favors in exchange for access to work, protection, or payment. Many feel they have no alternative.

State forces and paramilitary contractors have repeatedly engaged in cruel and inhuman punishment for dissidents and protestors fighting against mining operations. Workers who protest conditions in the mines are often subject to government repression, arrest, or even slaughter by government forces. In 2016, the Venezuelan government authorized expansion into the Arco Minero del Orinoco, which authorized mining for critical minerals in previously protected lands. Since the authorization, the area has become heavily militarized, and armed groups and criminal syndicates have come to control mining operations and populations. These groups, while the state has turned a blind eye, have consistently been found to be complicit in or committing large-scale human rights violations and crimes against the local populations, including: unlawful deprivation of life, disappearances, extortion, corporal punishment, and sexual and gender-based violence. Additionally, in 2012, during a protest against mining conditions in the Republic of Guinea, state officers fired on protestors, killing 6, and resulting in the unlawful arrest, injury, or torture of 15 others according to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court.

Human rights defenders, environmental defenders, and activists specifically bear the brunt of these attacks. While widespread extrajudicial violence against protestors and angry miners is commonplace, activists and defenders experience specific targeted attacks against them and their family members by the state. According to a report by Global Witness, the mining sector has been the main driver of killings against land and environmental defenders. Attacks can include killings, physical violence, harassment, and even SLAPP suits, all of which prove detrimental to the livelihoods and civic rights of activists. Unfortunately, most of these attacks are done by or for the state and go unpunished, fostering a culture of fear for activists.

While these human rights abuses are pervasive across the critical mineral industry, no country bears more responsibility than China. Of the mines tracked in the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre report, Chinese-owned mines were responsible for almost a third of violations reported, and almost 80% of direct reports of violence. Additionally, a majority of other mines in the report have some direct ties to Chinese-owned operations or investments. However, due to the opaque nature of the critical mineral supply chain, it is distinctly difficult to track violations back to direct parent companies, and as a result, many more attacks may have had direct ties to Chinese operations.

Cobalt: The Blood of the Congo

One of the broader challenges in extractivist literature is tracing the connection between the global supply chain and local actors in the commodity chain. The supply chain of critical minerals is often viewed as disconnected and static. As a result, there is a discursive understanding of the actors and interconnections in the critical mineral supply chain. Consistent with Calvão et. al.’s (2023) methodology, the following section of this paper works to place relational and material understanding of natural resource extraction that directly examines the human and social experience through a case study of cobalt extraction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By incorporating local, ethnographic knowledge, research, and stories, this section aims to demystify human rights abuses that take place in mining operations. This section draws on Kara’s (2023) fieldwork in Katanga, as well as various NGO (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch) reports, Government Reports, and UN documentation to illuminate the grave abuses taking place in the DRC.

One cannot truly understand the history of Cobalt mining in the DRC without first understanding the nation's history. From 1855 to 1960, King Leopold II embarked on a brutal conquest of the region, laying the groundwork for over a century of genocide, violence, and apartheid. He unleashed one of the more brutal colonial regimes, designed specifically to extract maximum wealth from the Congo and maximum labor from the Congolese people. He turned the territory into a machine. Forced labor, amputations, and genocide under Leopold laid the groundwork for violent extractive industries to run rampant through the Congo. Under the command of Leopold, the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) was founded, and became responsible for copper mining within the country, compelling the Congolese to almost triple their production of copper.

Following World War II, the African nations became engulfed in anti-colonial protests. The Belgian Congo’s quest for independence of the late 1950s was led by four charismatic figures: Patrice Lumumba (the nationalist leader) and his three right hands – Joseph Mobutu, Joseph Kasa-Vubu, and Moise Tshombe. Lumumba was elected prime minister in 1958, but the Belgians embarked on a desperate last-minute plan to save the minerals of the Katanga province, and the resulting combat, infighting, and CIA-sponsored coups led to Mobutu seizing control of the country. By 1965, Mobutu had control of the country, renamed it Zaire, and had become a despot in his own right. He nationalized the UMHK under the banner of Gecamines and took direct ownership of the mines. Under his control, the Katanga region became the premier exporter of Cobalt, and the Katanga province became one that many countries sought to seize control of. Following Mobutu’s fall, the Rwandan Genocide, and the two Congo Wars, cobalt had become deeply ingrained in the DRC’s economy. Gecamines experienced a drastic institutional collapse and could no longer pay wages, leading many miners to turn towards artisanal mining. When new leadership under Joseph Kabila took power in 2001, instead of revitalizing Gecamines, the mining code was updated to attract foreign investment, and specifically emphasized Chinese investment with the SICOMINES deal in 2009. Throughout Kabila’s presidency, he continued to engage in wide-scale corruption and kickbacks through Chinese banks, putting his own profit above his people’s.

Due to the collapse of Gecamines, artisanal mining surged,  and state dysfunction left people with no other livelihoods. The cobalt supply chain has become increasingly informal and dominated by artisanal mining. Creuseurs (diggers) mine by hand in dangerous tunnels or sort tailings from industrial mines. They are searching for heterogenite, a composite of cobalt, copper, nickel, and sometimes uranium. They mine with whatever tools are available, and rarely any PPE.  Miners fill large sacks with the ore, which are then tied to ropes and pulled by hand out of  the mine shafts, which can be tens of metres deep, or carried up the walls of a large open pit, where miners often fall, breaking their legs or arms.

One such case is the story of Tshite and Lubo. Tshite, Lubo’s father, worked every day in a mine at Tilwezembe, making just enough money a day to send his son to school. When Tshite was exiting a mineshaft, it collapsed, shattering his arm. Lubo, despite his father's pleas, was forced to mine to support his family. Lubo began mining under the control of the trafficker Arran, who had upwards of 200 boys locked in contracts and extortive violence at Tilwezembe. When one day Lubo did not return from the mine, Tshite went looking for him. When he arrived, he had guns pointed at him by armed soldiers, and they beat and kicked him while he pleaded, “Where is my son. Show me my son.” After a while, the soldiers took pity on him, revealing that a mine had collapsed, killing 7 of the 40 children in it (almost all of whom had been trafficked by Arran), Lubo included. SAEMAPE, the mine, provided the coffin, but that was all. “I miss Lubo so much. He was my best friend,” Tshite recalls. Similar stories are commonplace in Haut-Katanga. Children are forced to mine in horrific conditions, and many are killed, maimed, or seriously injured in the process. Many of these incidents go unreported as miners may not want to come into contact with the authorities because they are working without licenses in unauthorized mining areas. It is commonplace for miners to die in collapses and to remain there: “They die and are forgotten.”

After the heteroginite has been mined, it must be washed. Women and children stand in knee-deep water, contaminated with lead, uranium, and toxic chemicals, washing the dust tailings off the ore. Nothing lives in these ponds. Many miners complain of constant respiratory issues from breathing in the dust, and those washing ore complain of sores and burns from where they must stand in the water. 63% of all workers suffer injury or illness; at artisanal sites, the injury rate reaches 72%.

Following the washing of ore, it is delivered to the Negociant, who pays the miner for their product. These negociants then deliver cobalt to depots, which are often upwards of 10 miles away from artisanal mining operations. The introduction of a third-party seller poses risks for distinct inequalities in the mining sector. Negociants offer a fixed price that artisanal miners must accept: usually about $1-$2USD per day's load. However, women are offered lower prices for the same amount of ore – usually only $.80 for a day's work. Women endure significant hardship in the artisanal mining sector. Sexual assault by males in the pit is commonplace. Artisanal miners often drink to distract from the pain and hardship of mining, and drunken rages and assaults have become the norm. Additionally, soldiers and paramilitary forces have been known to assault women, extorting them with the power they wield. Almost every woman in the sector knows someone who has been raped or has been raped herself. But, many have no other alternative.

Child labor is pervasive throughout the artisanal mining sector in the DRC. Children make up around 40% of the artisanal mining workforce. Many have been forced to drop out of school to take over mining, as school fees have become too expensive (almost $5-8 a month), or their families are not making enough to support themselves. Children as young as 9 work up to 12 hours a day in the mines, carrying heavy loads, earning very little. Even those who attend school work in the mines during the weekends, on holidays, and in between school hours. On top of the arduous working conditions, children are distinctly at risk of trafficking, sexual assault, and physical assault. To reach the mines, many children must enter mining concessions that security guards patrol – some independent and some employed by the state – who often catch children and physically abuse them. One child, Mathy, described to Amnesty International her experience with the Gecamines’ security guards:

“They asked for money, but we didn’t have any…They grabbed my friend and pushed her into a tank containing diesel oil. I was able to run away and hide, but I saw what happened. I cried. I was scared, I ran away and hid, so I saw what happened.”

Children also routinely are extorted by negotiants, guards, and other miners, and forced to pay others to free themselves of harassment, or assault.

Child trafficking is also prolific in the mining industry. Due to the increased paramilitary presence of the Mai Mai militias, M23 insurgents, and other members of the 120 active armed groups in the country, paramilitary violence is commonplace. In Le Triangle de la Mort, Mai Mai militai men have reportedly trafficked many children into the artisanal mining sector, forcibly removing them from their parents, or extorting family members with violence. Peter, a young boy from Manono, recounts how Mai Mai militia men “took us from our home… and sold us to a Lebanese man named Ahmed. He made us dig, and he took all of the money.”  Peter escaped from the triangle, but many children do not. The town itself has received its macabre name thanks to the tactics the Mai Mai militia men have used to extort locals to mine. Reports describe torture, murder, and the chopping off of hands and feet – a tactic that is directly descended from Leopold's brutal torture regime.

Following the negociant’s purchase of ore, they sell it to Depots, who collect cobalt from artisanal mining and sell it to processors. Almost all depots in the DRC are owned and operated by Chinese nationals. Artisanal cobalt and industrial cobalt are not separated in the Depots, and as a result, there is no way to verify if your cobalt has been tainted by child labor. Eventually, it is bought primarily by CDM, a Chinese-owned smelter and subsidiary of Huayou Cobalt. After smelting, cobalt is shipped to China for further processing and assembly. Of the 70% of the global cobalt supply that comes from the DRC, and although estimates are tricky, it's possible that upwards of 78% of production comes from forced labor. Of that 78%, 92% is sold to foreign-owned entities, with 52% going specifically to Chinese buyers.

Policy Recommendations

The world is careening towards the mobilization and upscaling of critical mineral production and processing. Bipartisan support backs increasing access to critical minerals for national security and industry uses. Throughout this, though, there remains a persistent cry from human rights activists and protestors urging corporations to do more to prevent gross human rights violations during the scramble for critical minerals. Corporations have committed to several due diligence policies and internal oversight mechanisms to ensure they follow current human rights standards. Despite this, most humanitarian groups claim that due diligence policies are ineffective and humanitarian-washing. International businesses have a responsibility to ensure their practices are upholding international human rights standards. Based on the foundations set out in the UN ‘Respect, Protect and Remedy’ Framework study, these rights include the right to rest, the right to reasonable standards of living, access to education, the right to express oneself, and the right to be involved in decisions affecting one's life., Protection against infringement of these rights comes from two places: the state and the corporation. The state has a duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties through governance mechanisms such as policies and adjudication. In essence, the state must act to create a legal framework that protects the human rights of its citizens. Businesses have the responsibility to respect the rights of their workers, which essentially means acting with due diligence to ensure rights aren't being violated and provide recompense for victims of rights violations. Despite these responsibilities, it is clear that human rights are continuing to be systematically violated in pursuit of the clean energy transition. The following section details the current international due diligence standards and provides three focus areas to help couple the clean energy transition with a just transition: Shared Governance and Legalized ASM, Shared Prosperity and Economic Benefits, and Effective Due Diligence.

Shared Governance and Legalized ASM: One of the primary avenues suggested for advancing the human rights of mineworkers is the legalization of artisanal-scale mining (ASM). Through the legalization of ASM, policymakers hope to ensure that abuses from traders, public officials, or armed groups become less common, and when it does happen, there are legal options for miners. This goal, however, remains misguided. Simply put, the legalization of ASM fails to accomplish its goals: artisanal miners often place more weight on customary law and follow historical social rules regarding mining; artisanal miners are still often not given proper sites to mine on, meaning they must remain tied to corrupt mining companies or bosses; and lastly, it fails to provide artisanal miners with other forms of safer production. More work must be done to formalize practices in dialogue with various stakeholders, miners, and governments to incentivize actors to prioritize human rights. Additionally, larger economic policies must be designed to lift artisanal miners out of poverty and open up other economic avenues to miners. Significant research has shown that the inclusion of affected stakeholders in negotiations around the economic, social, and environmental conditions of mineral exploitation has positive effects on balancing both economic and decision-making resources among stakeholders. For example, Local Benefit-Sharing Trust Funds can be a way to combine democratic decision making, through the use of vertical accountability mechanisms (elections or consultation), and economic benefits for AS miners. One prime example of community-based decision-making aiding in the legalization of ASM is through the Côte d’Ivoire government/village co-management approach for diamonds. Communities take 12% of sales for local development at the expense of allowing the nationalized mining companies to define boundaries for ASM. These agreements “resulted in the formalization of most mine sites and the majority of diamonds registered at the mine level as part of the chain of custody.”

Shared Prosperity and Economic Benefits: Critical mineral demand will continue to grow. This growing demand presents an ideal development opportunity for emerging resource-rich economies, if they’re able to utilize proceeds to diversify their economies. However, this opportunity has yet to manifest itself. African countries only possess 1% of the global installed photovoltaic capacity and are estimated to generate only about 40% of the revenue they could potentially collect from critical minerals. Ensuring that prosperity is shared equitably across the commodity chain is vital for ensuring a just clean energy transition. On a more local level, as well, economic and development benefits must be shared. Mining provides a number of value streams into a country: job creation, commodity chain development, and increasing reliance on domestic goods and services, which offers the chance to boost local economies. Additionally, infrastructure developments such as power, water, transportation, education, and healthcare can bring long-term benefits to communities. Through the legalization of shared use of mining infrastructure, extractive industry investments in infrastructure can help close the infrastructure development gap. That being said, extractive industries should continue to operate within sustainable development guidelines and human rights guidelines. This includes, first and foremost, proper wages, decent jobs, and the right to collective bargaining. Co-ownership may be the solution for shared prosperity between miners and the extractive industry.

Corporate Due Diligence: Corporate due diligence is challenging in the context of the human rights violations of extractive industries. Due to the complex and extended nature of critical mineral supply chains, even the most proactive companies struggle to determine the origin of their products. Additionally, once a company has become aware of a violation, the solution isn't always to immediately cease business with the responsible party. Stopping trade often brings other forms of harm to the same communities. There are a number of tools available to companies to prevent harm to communities. For example, companies might pay higher prices to those that require miners to wear personal protective equipment.

First and foremost, corporations must engage in stakeholder/rightsholder engagement across the commodity chain. Corporations should also engage in capacity building for local communities and workers. This can take the form of vocational training, increasing education access, and upgrading facilities and infrastructure. Additionally, companies must work to address the current transparency issues within the critical mineral supply chain. Companies must ensure human rights tracking across the full supply chain; a task easier said than done. One solid step companies can take to begin this work is rejecting the use of certificates of origin as sole proof of origin for critical minerals. The cobalt supply chain is muddy, and oftentimes, ASM cobalt is mixed with company-mined cobalt. This means cobalt origin data is often unreliable for determining how free from rights violations it is. Rejecting the use of certificates of origin requires companies to spend more time ensuring minerals are free from human rights violations. Additionally, activists, citizen groups, and governments should push for legal requirements of transparency from corporations. Corporations should make data on their supply chain, efforts to reduce human rights violations, and engage in capacity building, and blind spots, publicly available. This accomplishes two goals: first, it requires companies to identify potential blind spots; additionally, it allows consumers to choose between corporations engaging in effective due diligence versus ineffective due diligence; essentially, it provides a financial incentive for proper due diligence.

These recommendations are far from exhaustive and are limited in their assessment of effectiveness. However, they offer a strong jumping-off point for future research into remedying human rights violations within the critical mineral trade.  More work is necessary to ensure remedies take into account local humanitarian and political contexts and don't cause more harm than good.

Conclusion

There is a term used by critical scholars in the environmental field: climate colonialism. Our ways of addressing climate change are directly entangled with historical and present-day practices of colonial extraction, ecological degradation, and uneven and unfair international arrangements, which disproportionately negatively affect the global south compared to the global north. This paper has illuminated the ways in which the current extraction industry of critical minerals is directly tied to modern-day colonialism: the global north is tearing up economically developing countries for resources, often breaking bodies in the process, but this time, we’re solving a crisis, so it’s allowed. This paper is not attempting to argue for a deprioritization of critical mineral access; these minerals are necessary for the clean energy transition and are essential for ensuring global warming stays below the 2.0 °C mark. However, the rush for critical minerals must be a just transition, centering the voices of those it most impacts. This transition must be taken with a climate justice and decolonial approach. Proper payment and human rights-centered policies have the opportunity to lift countries out of poverty and directly work to decouple carbon from development. The environmental movement must work to ensure a just transition; without it, we’re just destroying the people who will be the most affected by climate change. Extraction of critical minerals has drastic consequences on the environment and on the people who mine them. We must not destroy the planet in the process of saving it.

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