I. Abstract

This paper discusses a 2025 Supreme Court case that raised the question of whether elementary public school instruction on LGBTQ+ topics infringes upon the rights of parents who object to their children learning such content. The case Mahmoud v. Taylor serves as a development of religious free exercise and anti-discrimination precedent, extending parental rights established in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972). However, the case also introduced broader complexities regarding exposure to controversial ideas to elementary school students. In recent cases, the Supreme Court has increasingly ruled in favor of free exercise claimants, so it is no surprise that they ruled in favor of the Petitioners in Mahmoud. Academics and advocates have debated the classroom and judicial implications of granting parents broader discretion to remove their children from curricular instruction. This decision may disrupt the delicate balance between parental free exercise rights and classroom teachings on morals and inclusivity. This essay will begin by introducing the case Mahmoud v. Taylor in detail. It will outline the religious rights guaranteed under the First Amendment and the relevant case law that frames the context of Mahmoud. Then, it will present the arguments of both the Petitioners and Respondents, analyzing how each side seeks to build upon existing precedent. Finally, the paper will assess how the Supreme Court structured its ruling and explore the broader social implications that may follow from their decision.

II. Introduction

Since 2000, the Supreme Court has generally ruled in favor of religious free exercise arguments against gender identity anti-discrimination. The case Mahmoud v. Taylor presented the question of whether it is a burden upon parents’ religious free exercise rights to compel their elementary-aged school children to participate in classroom instruction relating to gender and sexuality. In 2022, the Montgomery County Public Schools (MCPS) district in Maryland incorporated the use of storybooks relating to sexual and gender orientation into the elementary K-5 curriculum. The school board had initially permitted an opt-out policy in which parents could remove their children from lessons using the books. However, the board removed this policy in March 2023, eliminating the opt-out for parents. A religiously diverse group of parents, including Ukrainian Orthodox, Muslim, Catholic Christian, and Judaic backgrounds, sued the school district on the grounds of religious burden claims. Both the district court and Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the school district, however, the Supreme Court overturned their decisions. The question then presented to the Supreme Court was whether public schools pose a burden to parents’ free exercise rights when schools compel elementary students to participate in lessons on gender and sexuality. Even more so, the court needed to determine whether exposure to storybooks that contain LGBTQ+ identifying characters constituted such compulsion. In light of their consistent rulings, which have backed religious liberty claims under Chief Justice Roberts and the current conservative majority, the Supreme Court, in June 2025, ruled in favor of the Petitioners’ claims. While the court only issued a temporary order requiring the school district to provide opt-outs, the ruling nonetheless limited the power of school districts to mandate a diverse array of perspectives in the classroom, giving parents a stronger basis to excuse their children from certain classroom instruction under religious reasons.

III. Overview of First Amendment Precedent

A. Free Exercise and Establishment

The First Amendment of the Constitution reads that “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” Under this clause, individual citizens enjoy the right to practice their religion without interference from the government. Furthermore, the government may not sponsor or “establish” any religion, or favor one over another. To understand how the First Amendment is applied in the context of a school environment, it is important to understand how the interpretation and application of case law has evolved free exercise and establishment rights.

Tinker v. Des Moines (1969) established that students do not “...shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker set the precedent that, even considering the special characteristics of the school environment, students still maintain their First Amendment rights on schoolhouse grounds. However, these rights are not unlimited. School officials may restrain constitutional rights on school grounds if “...the students' activities would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”

Parental rights regarding children’s upbringing and education also hold a share of case law. Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) decided that through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, parents may not be forced by states to send their children to public school, nor force their children to accept instruction exclusively from public school teachers. This case recognized parental rights as a broader liberty protected by the Constitution. Then, in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), the Supreme Court incorporated the First Amendment to apply to the states, ruling that Amish parents may remove their children from school entirely through religious exemption. The Burger Court wrote that a “State’s interest in universal education, … is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests.” While the Wisconsin mandate for child participation in education was compelling, it ignored the Amish community’s right to educate and raise their children according to their belief system. This case saw that the free exercise rights of individuals outweigh a state’s interest in having students attend school beyond eighth grade. Thus, parents maintained the right to remove their children from school beyond eighth grade if school attendance conflicted with the tenets of their religion.

In Sherbert v. Verner (1963), the court ruled that a law is rendered unconstitutional if its purpose or effect impedes the observance of one or all religions. This established a new constitutional test which extended strict scrutiny to the Free Exercise Clause: burdens on religious observances must possess a compelling government interest through the least restrictive means. However, in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), Justice Scalia wrote in the majority opinion that individual free exercise rights do not excuse individuals from complying with an otherwise valid law, thus narrowing the scope of Sherbert and weakening free exercise protections overall. This established the Smith test, stating that laws incidentally inhibiting religious practice must be (1) a neutral law that does not target religion and (2) generally applicable to everyone. If both criteria are established, the government does not need to provide a compelling interest under strict scrutiny to justify a law, and a law would be constitutionally permitted even if it burdens religion. However, Smith did not define what it meant for a law to “target religion” in itself. Furthermore, the new Smith test redefined and narrowed Yoder by distinguishing it as a hybrid rights case that involves both free exercise and parental rights. The court’s ruling offered little guidance on how broadly a law would need to “target religion” and to what extent. Lower courts have thus struggled to determine how the Smith test should be applied, and the degree of scrutiny which should be used on free exercise claims.

Later cases such as Lukumi have highlighted the confusion of its interpretation. In the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993), Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority that the City of Hialeah’s “... ordinances' texts and operation demonstrate that they are not neutral, but have as their object the suppression of Santeria's central element, animal sacrifice.” The court ruled that Hialeah passed ordinances which were non-neutral against Santeria's religious observances and were underinclusive to the Santeria Church in the context of this case. By striking down the ordinances under strict scrutiny, the court signaled a willingness to bypass Smith when government action targets a particular faith. In this way, Lukumi Babalu Aye partially revisited the doctrinal pathway that Smith seemed to restrict. Justice Kennedy noted that a law will lack “...facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernible from the language or context.” Here, the court ruled that the aim of a law is also dependent on its context, expanding the Smith test’s definitions of what neutrality and general applicability meant. In the case of Lukumi, the court extended Smith by noting that the city of Hialeah’s ordinances were in response to the church’s religious actions, thus targeting their religion even if religion was not explicit in the law itself. This shed light on the difficulties of applying Smith’s broad language to specific cases, and would foreshadow later cases where the court would again take a more proactive stance towards free exercise claims, circumventing Smith.

A number of cases have also shaped the ways that schools can establish religious practices. In West Virginia v. Barnette (1943), the Stone Court ruled that public schools may not compel students to salute or pledge allegiance to the American flag, nor can schools force individuals to speak a message contrary to their ideological, religious, or political beliefs. Mandating students in schools to salute or recite the pledge of allegiance constituted compelled communicative action that directly conflicted with student and parent free exercise rights. So the court ruled that the school district’s actions unconstitutionally coerced students to speak the government’s message, violating the First Amendment. Engel v. Vitale, (1962) and Abington v. Schempp (1963) further built upon this by ruling that school-sponsored prayers or bible readings, even if voluntary or non-denominational, are unconstitutional. These acts inhibit students’ liberty from religious compulsion. However, in Zorach v. Clauson (1952), the court upheld schools’ abilities to establish hours in which students may leave campus to engage in religious activity. In Clauson, off-campus activity does not constitute an Establishment Clause violation as it does not necessarily coerce students to engage in religious activity.

To test for Establishment Clause violations, the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) introduced the Lemon test, where a law must have: (1) a secular legislative purpose, (2) a primary effect that neither advances nor prohibits religion, and (3) an avoidance of excessive government entanglement with religion. This framework was used in Establishment Clause cases until 2022.

The Lemon test was abandoned in Kennedy v. Bremerton (2022), where the Roberts Court distinguished that permitting private prayer in a public setting, such as a school’s football field after a game, is not school coercion of students. Rather, it is a free exercise right that school staff and students maintain. Through this case, the court shifted religious doctrine and replaced the Lemon test with the history and traditions test. In other words, the court established the framework of evaluating whether the government is coercive in a way that resembles historical establishments of religion, and the extent to which religious expression aligns with the American free exercise tradition.

Notable cases have also established boundaries or expansion of rights regarding religious liberty and public funding. Blaine Amendments are provisions in many state constitutions that prohibit the use of public funds to support nonsecular institutions. However, in Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2017), the Roberts Court ruled that government funding and services cannot be denied based on an institution’s religious status. Doing so interferes with members’ free exercise rights, as it denies access to public goods and penalizes members for religious affiliation. Then, in Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue (2020), the court ruled that the State of Montana may not deny generally available public funds to a parent who wishes to send their children to a religious private school. The court further reaffirmed these concepts in Carson v. Makin (2022), when the State of Maine denied funds to be used to send schoolchildren to religious institutions. The court held that excluding publicly available programs from individuals based on the use of funds for religious purposes violates both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.

While the previous cases discuss the Supreme Court’s evolving Free Exercise and Establishment Clause doctrines, Mahmoud v. Taylor also holds implications regarding LGBTQ+ discrimination colliding with religious precedent. Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) first considered the recognition of gay marriage protections under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Justice Kennedy wrote that the Due Process Clause “promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.” Here, the court had recognized gay marriage as a liberty. However, the court did not recognize the right to marriage as a constitutionally enumerated freedom established by due process. In other words, Obergefell recognized same sex marriage as a constitutional liberty, but it did not resolve how this right interacts with competing religious claims.

Before Obergefell, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000), an adult member of the Boy Scouts organization had his membership revoked after the organization discovered he was homosexual and a gay rights activist. The suspended member sued under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), and the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that Dale’s membership must be reinstated. After the case was appealed and argued to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Rehnquist Court recognized that “...States have a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination…” on the basis of gender and sexuality. However, the ruling also stated that “...public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization's expression does not justify the State's effort to compel the organization to accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization's expressive message.” This case directly addressed the question of anti-discrimination against gay individuals and the right to expressive association. The court maintained that the Boy Scouts, being an expressive organization, could not be compelled to include the member if doing so would contradict their organization’s expressed values. This case, while it did not explicitly balance religion against anti-discrimination, demonstrated how the court may value other First Amendment rights over anti-discrimination.

Similarly, in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado (2018), a bakery owner refused to make a wedding cake for a gay couple, citing his religious opposition to gay marriage. The couple took their complaint to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which charged the cake shop with discrimination under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA). The Supreme Court had to reconcile the religious rights of the owner and the compelling interest that the state had in protecting gay marriage. Like in Lukimi, Justice Kennedy stated that “...the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s consideration of this case was inconsistent with the State’s obligation of religious neutrality.” The court ruled that the owner’s religious rights were violated because of targeted conduct by the state. The Commissioner of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had made remarks about religion which the court found “as inappropriate and dismissive comments showing lack of due consideration…” for the bakery’s claims. The court noted that the State of Colorado had demonstrated religious hostility towards the baker through its comments, which ultimately led to the court ruling in the baker’s favor. Yet, the court did not rule on whether the baker had the right to refuse service based on religious claims. The case left the question of this conflict with the Free Exercise Clause open, as it did not outweigh free exercise and anti-discrimination against one another.

Similarly, in Fulton v. Philadelphia (2021), the City of Philadelphia banned Catholic Social Services from placing children into foster homes. Catholic Social Services had refused to place children into homes with same-sex couples, thus leading the city to terminate the service’s contract. Here, the court applied the Smith test to determine whether Philadelphia’s actions were neutral and generally applicable. The Roberts Court applied strict scrutiny and found that the “...provision is not generally applicable as required by Smith” as the City Commissioner had discretion to pick and choose exemptions as to who can receive foster home status. Thus, the court ruled that the city had no compelling interest in denying Catholic Social Services status. The court held that the city had violated the free exercise rights of Catholic Social Services by excluding it from the foster care system for its religious beliefs. While Smith initially confined the scope of religious exemptions, Fulton and Lukumi demonstrated the court’s inconsistent application of Smith’s precedent. Yet, the court still had not addressed the conflict of how anti-discrimination laws weigh against free exercise rights.

Finally, in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (2023), a website designer refused to create marital websites for gay couples, citing it was against her religious beliefs. In this case, Justice Gorsuch wrote that the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act was unconstitutional, as it compelled “...an individual to create speech she does not believe.” While Masterpiece avoided a broad ruling on free exercise against anti-discrimination claims, Fulton and 303 Creative indicated the court’s willingness to constrict Smith and strike down generally applicable laws when they conflict with religion. Furthermore, Masterpiece, Fulton, and 303 Creative all demonstrate that the court leans towards religious free exercise over anti-discrimination laws.

These cases gave insight for the direction the court would eventually rule. They demonstrated that the court’s jurisprudence had to balance the collision between adherence to anti-discrimination laws and religious beliefs, often leaning towards the latter. These precedents provided a foundation for the Petitioners’ arguments. As they based their claims within the court’s recent religion-privileging rulings, the Petitioners sought to extend parental and free exercise doctrinal trends.

IV. Arguments for Petitioner

A. Free Exercise Burden

First, the parents established the court’s precedent in recognizing parental rights over their children’s upbringings. They laid out the court’s history in allowing parents to have a say in selecting their child’s education through Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue and Meyer v. Nebraska. They then cited Pierce, noting the court held that “...a law mandating public education violated ‘the right of parents to choose’ for their children an ‘appropriate mental and religious training’ in a private religious school.” The Petitioners continued by citing the Barnette case, “...emphasizing that ‘compelling little children to participate in a ceremony which ends in nothing for them but a fear of spiritual condemnation’ ‘fails to accord full scope to the freedom of religion…’” Here, the parents asserted a broader conception of coercion that treats exposure of children to the LGBTQ+ books as religiously objectionable. By making children sit in on lessons that present LGBTQ+ identities, the Petitioners argued that schools compel an impressionable endorsement of such ideas, even without explicit verbal affirmation. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that by claiming ideas of gender and sexuality as a fact of life, it coerces elementary students to believe ideas contrary to the religious beliefs of their parents’ upbringings.

Most notably, the parents drew a parallel between the facts in their case and the Yoder case. The parents asserted that “...subjecting their children to instruction contrary to their religious beliefs could ‘endanger their own’ standing before God ‘and that of their children.’” As it was ruled, the Amish faced a burden on their free exercise rights over their children’s religious upbringing by having to send them to school after the 8th grade. Similarly, the Petitioners here claimed that “...in response to the Petitioners’ requests to opt their children out for religious reasons, the Board ultimately prohibited that religious exercise.” The Petitioners treated Yoder as affirming religious parental opt-out claims as a broad constitutional right. As a result, the Petitioners claimed they can no longer “...direct their children away from religiously objectionable instruction on gender and sexuality.” Furthermore, the Petitioners argued for an expansion of the rights set by Yoder. As Yoder only applied to religious objections beyond the 8th grade level, Mahmoud v. Taylor sought to broaden parental opt-out rights beginning with K-5 elementary schools.

The Petitioners also noted that their claim was supported by the history and traditions test outlined in the Kennedy case. The parents contended that children lack the maturity to comprehend gender and sexuality, and that they are the most prone to making ill-considered decisions as a result. They added on by claiming that Yoder outlined its ruling “...based on the student’s age”and “the realities of adolescent development…” The Petitioners used this to illustrate that Yoder had recognized the need to protect children from exposure to topics appearing controversial to parents. Additionally, they argue that “...further ‘exposing… children to worldly influences’ would substantially interfere with the religious development of children.” The Petitioners fitted this into a Kennedy-Yoder framework by demonstrating that jurisprudence has maintained a history of granting parents the right to protect their children from topics that conflict with their religion, as it would impair the religious development of a child.

B. Non-Neutrality and General Applicability

Next, the parents claimed that MCPS’s actions regarding the removal of the opt-out policy are targeted at religion and thus fail the generally applicability requirement under the Smith test. The parents claimed that under Fulton, “The existence of a ‘formal mechanism for granting exceptions…’” is a discretionary policy which was used in this case to burden the parental religious upbringing of their children. Furthermore, they claimed under Kennedy, government policies that “...include categorical exceptions that treat religious requests for accommodation differently than ‘comparable’ secular requests” also fail the general applicability prong. In the case of MCPS, the parents claimed that the removal of the opt-out policy is based on an arbitrary system of discretionary classification, similar to the system contested in Fulton, to incorporate discussion of sexuality into the K-5 curriculum.

The parents also used the Lukumi framework to claim the removal of the opt-out policy as biased. They claimed that “Masked discrimination can be shown through ‘the effect,’ ‘design,’ and ‘net result’ of a government policy.” The Petitioners argued that the Board’s abrupt notice to withdraw the opt-out option solely for the LGBTQ+ storybooks—an area with an abundance of religious controversy—burdens predominantly religious families. Additionally, the Petitioners argued that under Masterpiece Cakeshop, “‘Official expressions of hostility to religion,’ especially when ‘not disavowed’ by the decisionmaker ‘ at any point…’ are also inconsistent with what the Free Exercise Clause requires.” Here, the parents asserted that Board members made open comments expressing such hostility to the parents, and at no point were they ever disavowed. Pulling from Lukumi and Cakeshop, the Petitioners argued that repealing the opt-out system was a form of religious discrimination and hostile targeting of opposing views.

C. Interpretation of Strict Scrutiny

Finally, the parents claimed that the removal of the opt-out policy does not satisfy strict scrutiny. They argued that MCPS’s interests in a desire to promote inclusive civic values should not succeed when placed against the history and traditions framework. Parents have historically maintained a strong presence in guiding their children’s moral and civic upbringing. Even if the school district held a compelling interest in wanting to ensure a safe learning environment, the Petitioners claimed that “an interest unjustified by history or tradition is presumptively not compelling” as the Board has not demonstrated classroom disruption as a result of the religious opt-outs. Thus, the Board has an obligation to continue its opt-out policy.

V. Arguments for Respondent

A. No Established Cognizable Coercion

In response, the Respondents alleged that the Petitioners’ misinterpreted the standards of coercion. The Respondents asserted that there is no cognizable burden on religion that constitutes true coercion. They argued that the Petitioners omit from their analysis that coercion is “...government action that ‘deters or discourages’ religious beliefs or practice…” Under this construction of coercion, the Respondents moved to demonstrate that “...public-school students and their parents are not cognizably coerced by students’ exposure in the classroom to religiously objectionable ideas.” In other words, the Respondents argued that cognizable coercion must involve the discouragement of religious beliefs and that mere exposure does not constitute such. They reject the claim that MCPS overlooked parents’ sincere beliefs about which the storybooks violated their religious rights. Rather, they asserted the evidence that parents are “...not cognizably burdened by virtue of their belief… that their children’s exposure to ideas in public schools conflicts with their obligation to raise their children in accordance with their faith.” Citing Barnette, MCPS focused on how the court clarified that “...parents and their children would not have been cognizably ‘coerced’ if the students were ‘merely made acquainted with the flag salute…” Here, the Respondents distinguished this case from Barnette in which flag saluting was merely an exposure to an idea when it was performed in schools. Flag saluting only became coercion once students were required to communicate acceptance of the ideas. Where Barnette involved coercion by compelling students to engage in communicative action, the Respondents in Mahmoud contend that students were merely required to engage in passive listening. The Respondents used this framework to distinguish that they were not undermining the religious beliefs of the parents by merely exposing students to the storybook characters.

The Respondents then moved to counter the Petitioners’ interpretation of compulsion. Whereas the Petitioners argued that the storybooks compel their children to learn about gender and sexuality at the elementary level, the Respondents claimed that the storybooks “...merely introduce students to characters who are LGBTQ or have LGBTQ family members and those characters’ experiences and points of view.” In other words, MCPS’s policy contemplated only exposure to certain identities rather than explicit instruction or coercion resembling Barnette that would force children to change their beliefs about gender and sexuality. By contrast to the Petitioners, the Respondents claimed that coercion only arises when students are forced to adopt or affirm ideas. They distinguish that the Petitioners misinterpreted Barnette, and that Barnette instead would have “...approved of instruction through which elementary-school students are ‘merely made acquainted with’ material to which their parents object.”  The Respondents drew a different interpretation of the Barnette framework, asserting that exposure to controversial ideas such as the ones posed by the storybooks are constitutionally permissible. The school district maintained that the storybooks served a broader purpose for lessons on mutual respect, consistent with the school’s “obligation to promote civic virtues…” established in Ambach v. Norwick.

The school district also affirmed the Sixth Circuit ruling in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education that held the court has “...never taken the ‘significant step’ of ‘imposing on school boards the delicate task of satisfying the ‘compelling interest’ test to justify each instance of not dealing with students’ individual, religiously compelled, objections.’” The Respondents argued that if Hawkins County were overturned,  that “public schools simply cannot accommodate opt-outs and create alternative lesson plans any time these or countless other religiously objectionable concepts arise…”

B. Opt-Out Precedent

MCPS claimed that Yoder is distinguishable from what the parents assert as the extent of parental rights to control the upbringing of their children. The district claimed that the parents in Yoder made a convincing claim of coercion, whereas the parents in the case at hand have not. They claimed that the Petitioners “seek to pick and choose among curricular elements at public schools in which they have chosen to enroll their children.” Meanwhile in Yoder, it was “...compulsory ‘high school attendance with teachers who are not of the Amish faith… [that would] expose the plaintiffs’ children to ‘worldly’ influence in conflict with their beliefs.” The Respondents thus distinguished the difference of removing a child from schooling holistically, rather than from individual classroom instruction. They argued that the Petitioners “...ignore this fundamental aspect of Yoder, [which] ‘strongly showed’ that the challenged law prohibited the plaintiffs from imparting their religion to their children at ‘home…’” In contrast to Yoder, the district showed that the Petitioners do not refute the claim that the exposure to classroom materials interferes with their ability to freely impart their religion on their children at home. Therefore, the Respondents did not see Yoder as a comparable precedent to evaluate the Petitioners’ claims. Instead, the school district confines Yoder to specifically pertain to withdrawal from school entirely as opposed to individual classroom lessons.

C. History and Tradition

The Respondents claimed that the Petitioners’ analysis of the history and traditions test is incorrect. They claimed that the Petitioners relied on “...the historical treatment of ‘instruction on gender and sexuality…’ [which] is beside the point because the storybooks are not used for such instruction.” The Respondents continued by asserting the correct application of the history and traditions test “...is that of courts approving public schools’ denial of parental opt-out requests.” The Respondents listed various state-level cases rejecting parental requests to excuse children from individual lessons. They note that courts have recognized the impracticality of allowing parents to pick and choose the curriculum of their children, and that it “would be a power of disorganizing the school… rendering it substantially useless.”

D. Policies Are Both Neutral and Generally Applicable

The Respondents asserted that the no-opt-out policy “...treats religious and secular conduct the same.” The school district contested that “...the conduct MCPS forbids (opt-outs from the storybooks) is not religious, nor is the conduct MCPS permits (opt-outs from the health-education curriculum) secular” as opposed to the opposite claims made by the Petitioners. Additionally, MCPS granted all requests for opt-outs from sex education but none for English Language Arts (ELA) curriculum including the challenged storybooks. Furthermore, MCPS also contends that the no-opt-out policy is not discretionary, unlike in Fulton. Given this, the school district maintains that the Petitioners are not being singled out for any harsh treatment, nor does the Board of Education’s history “...compromise[s] the general applicability of its no-opt-out policy….” Unlike the Petitioners’ arguments based on Lukumi and Cakeshop, the Respondents rely on the Smith framework and emphasize that their policies apply equally to all ELA content regardless of viewpoint. Therefore, the school district asserts that neutral and general applicability is satisfied under Smith.

VI. Direction of the Court

On June 27th, 2025, the Roberts Court ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The court granted a preliminary injunction for Montgomery County Public Schools to continue the opt-out policy. In other words, the court mandated that the status quo—the opt out policy— continue while the case moved back to the lower courts. Given the Roberts Court’s previous ruling in 303 Creative, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Fulton, this was expected as the court has consistently placed parental religious exercise as a higher priority than many other rights.

The ruling substantially expanded parental free exercise rights within the Yoder framework. During the oral arguments, several justices posed questions about what it meant for children to be exposed to controversial material, such as the storybooks, as opposed to what it means for their beliefs to be actively coerced. Justice Barrett, who joined the majority in favor of the petitioners, raised the point during the oral arguments that “Presentation of an idea as fact, such as telling students that ‘this is the right view of the world,’ … is different from exposure—such as telling students that ‘some people think’ a particular thing.” Justice Gorsuch built upon this by claiming that a teacher telling children a normative stance on a subject goes beyond mere exposure. In the context of the storybooks, Justice Gorsuch implied that teaching children that views are hurtful or non-inclusive meets the definition of coercion against the Petitioners’ religions. Justice Alito also sided with the parents, noting that “...under the county’s current policy a school can teach children moral principles that are ‘highly objectionable to parents and they can’t opt out.’” These questions alluded to Justice Alito’s majority opinion, ruling that the storybooks presented to elementary students in MCPS “...are clearly designed to present certain values and beliefs as things to be celebrated and certain contrary values and beliefs as things to be rejected” which Yoder found unacceptable. The majority rejected the Respondent’s interpretation of Yoder, which they saw unnecessarily “confined Yoder to its facts.” Ultimately, the storybooks’ biased presentation of ideas and values led the majority to understand their compulsory exposure to students as a threat to parental religious upbringing.

Mahmoud v. Taylor had the potential to directly address the conflict between school discretion to expose children to certain perspectives and free exercise rights. The court instead focused narrowly on the context of the case. Alito stated that the court could not accept “...the Board’s characterization of the ‘LGBTQ+-inclusive’ instruction as mere ‘exposure to objectionable ideas’ or as lessons in ‘mutual respect.’” This poses the question of what schools should consider as mere exposure against religious infringement going forward. However, no precedent or doctrine was established to determine how to evaluate these types of cases.

The court had rejected the Respondents’ interpretation of Barnette that coercion only occurs when students are forced to accept ideas that are contrary to their religious beliefs. While Barnette dealt with the type of coercion that required students to make affirmations against their religious beliefs, Justice Alito asserted that Free Exercise Clause protections do not exclusively apply to this specific context. The court has “held that the Free Exercise Clause protects against policies that impose more subtle forms of interference with the religious upbringing of children.” Here, the majority expanded the definition of coercion in the classroom. Coercion may extend beyond mere affirmation of ideas. The exposure of LGBTQ+ identifying characters to students is a subtle form of coercion which directly conflicts with parental religious childrearing. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor argued that the court “has made clear that mere exposure to objectionable ideas does not give rise to a free exercise claim.” She argues that simple exposure to ideas contrary to one’s beliefs does not directly nor indirectly compel an individual “to give up or violate their religious beliefs.”However, Justice Alito disagreed with this interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, and saw it as too narrow. “The dissent sees the Free Exercise Clause’s guarantee as nothing more than protection against compulsion or coercion to renounce or abandon one’s religion.” Rather, the majority saw that the First Amendment’s protections extend to less obvious forms of coercion. The issue raised by the storybooks in Mahmoud is what Alito and the majority view as subtle coercion.

During his questioning in the oral arguments, Justice Kavanaugh seemed unconvinced by the Respondent’s argument that opt-outs are administratively infeasible. He brought up the point that eliminating opt-outs seem inconsistent “...when ‘every other school board has opt-outs for all sorts of things.’” This concern was affirmed in the court’s ruling, claiming “the Board cannot escape its obligations under the Free Exercise Clause by crafting a curriculum that is so burdensome that a substantial number of parents elect to opt out.”

VII. Social Implications

A. LGBTQ+ Books in Schools

The implications of the court siding with the Petitioners may raise questions about how much control parents can maintain over their children’s exposure to LGBTQ+ topics in the classroom. Since 2021, “‘Parental rights’ bills, [have sought] to increase parents’ ability to control their children’s access to information about race and racism, comprehensive sexuality education, and discussions of sexual orientation and gender identity.” Specifically, “...school boards and parent groups have increased their efforts to ban books from school and public libraries, with a special focus on books that discuss LGBTQIA+ identity.” The question of the LGBTQ+ identity in conflict with parental beliefs and religious rights persists, especially after the court’s ruling in June. The court’s ruling may preserve parental childrearing control by giving them more say in their children’s curriculum. However, the court’s ruling also creates challenges on how schools will approach lessons on inclusivity to young students. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor stresses the civic importance of teaching children how to live in a multicultural society in harmony with ideologies such as those presented in the storybooks. “Yet it will become a mere memory if children must be insulated from exposure to ideas and concepts that may conflict with their parents’ religious beliefs.” On the other hand, many parental rights advocates would claim that state police powers are “...limited to what is ‘plainly essential to good citizenship,’ such as literacy, numeracy, and civic knowledge. Controversial sexual ideologies don't meet this bar.” There still remains a lingering debate between parents' rights and LGBTQ+ advocates as to whether learning about the LGBTQ+ identity furthers or hinders civic virtues, and the extent to which it should be included in classroom material. It seems that with the ruling, at least at the elementary level, lessons exposing students to LGBTQ+ identity do not imperatively further civic knowledge in the classroom. This ruling still leaves questions as to how inclusivity is defined in teaching students civic morals, and how LGBTQ+ identity plays a role.

Critics of the majority opinion would argue that exposure to LGBTQ+ identity should play a larger role in children’s education. They “...contend that [measures reducing exposure to LGBTQ+ identity] infringe on children’s right to education and undermine the state’s responsibility to provide comprehensive and inclusive education.” In Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis signed the “Don’t Say Gay” law, which Pro-LGBTQ+ supporters claim is aimed to “...chill the discussion of LGBTQ issues in public schools.” Pro-LGBTQ+ activists and student plaintiffs may claim “...(1) First Amendment claims for violations of a student’s right to receive information and (2) Fourteenth Amendment claims for Equal Protection violations.” The ruling in Mahmoud v. Taylor could have potentially served as a “...binding precedent that guides lower courts in assessing a right to receive information claim.” However, given the narrow scope of the majority opinion, the case does not provide a clear guiding precedent that can be applied in other cases.

B. Exigency of the Classroom

Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson raised concerns over what parental dictation could mean for public educational curricula. Justice Sotomayor, in her dissent, noted that “The crucial word in the constitutional text is ‘prohibit,’ for it makes clear ‘the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.’” The dissenting justices’ attempted to bring the expansion of the Free Exercise Clause into question by asserting that the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause should solely be to protect individuals from religious coercion rather than accommodate the individual for their practices. Essentially, they see the majority’s expansive interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause as an overreach of what constitutes religious rights. However, the majority refuted this by alleging that under the dissent’s interpretation, “...even instruction that denigrates or ridicules students’ religious beliefs would apparently be allowed.” Notably, “the parents’ proposed rule would have a wide sweep, giving them broad discretion to opt out.” Justice Kagan also expressed concern that such a ruling would permit parents to “...decide that it is unfair for their children to have to leave the classroom to avoid the materials to which they object, leading to a challenge to the materials themselves.” For instance, after the State of Florida banned Advanced Placement Psychology in high schools, the American Psychological Association claimed that “understanding human sexuality is fundamental to psychology, and an Advanced Placement course that excludes the decades of science studying sexual orientation and gender identity would deprive students of knowledge they will need to succeed in their studies…” Giving parents broader leeway to parse out subjects from their children’s curriculum based on their objections could undermine the integrity of certain curricula. The court’s ruling is presumably narrow enough to encompass only elementary lessons on LGBTQ+, gender, and sexuality-related topics. However, it still leaves questions as to how much latitude schools have to teach lessons on civic knowledge or inclusivity at the elementary level.

Furthermore, many critics have expressed concern over the ruling’s impact in establishing safe learning environments and teaching students to treat one another with respect. Some scholars suggest the inclusion of picture books or story books with LGBTQ+ characters could “...help children develop tolerance for different lifestyles…” Thus, critics were wary of the precedent that the outcome could set for viewpoint discrimination against topics on gender, sexuality, and exposure to LGBTQ+ perspectives. Previously, Justice Brennan noted in Keyishian v. Board of Regents that “The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’" However, other scholars assert that even the most knowledgeable teachers can have difficulty guiding elementary-level conversation and curiosity surrounding perceptions of sexual identity and gender.

C. Equal Protection

LGBTQ+ activists argue that the “Don’t Say Gay” laws, “violate the Constitution’s equal protection guarantees, regard­less of what level of scrutiny applies to them.” They recognize the  potential for viewpoint discrimination that would target the LGBTQ+ experience. The Mahmoud case does not directly address such a question of equal protection nor does it determine if laws against LGBTQ+ viewpoints count as viewpoint targeting. However, the majority’s ruling for parents’ rights could still hold future implications for viewpoints of the LGBTQ+ community to be taught in schools. While schools still maintain the power to teach civic lessons on inclusivity— including on gender and sexuality in a literary context—parents may now remove their children from these lessons. This raises the question of the extent to which  parents may remove their children from various lessons that interfere with their religious upbringing.

VIII. Conclusion

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Petitioners in Mahmoud v. Taylor setting the precedent that parents maintain the right to opt their children out of classroom instruction pertaining to LGBTQ+ characters in storybooks. The Roberts Court expanded upon Yoder, thereby giving parents broader discretion over the information to which their children can be exposed. While this ruling did not serve as a revolutionary doctrinal shift to free exercise and parental rights jurisprudence, it continued the court’s trend of giving greater weight to free exercise rights in school environments. It reaffirmed that schools must accommodate when elementary lessons interfere with parental religious exercise rights. Questions regarding how hybrid rights, general applicability and non-neutrality are to be defined under the Smith test remain unanswered by this decision. Furthermore, the ruling presents unanswered questions as to how education on civic values can occur within schools when parents are granted more power over their children’s exposure to potentially religiously disagreeable viewpoints. Finally, the decision furthers a trend among First Amendment cases in which free exercise rights are favored over LGBTQ+ perspectives and viewpoints.

IV. Bibliography 

Primary Sources

U.S. Const amend. I.

U.S. Const amend. XIV.

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).

Carson v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767 (2022).

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464 (2020).

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021).

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022).

Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U. S. ____ (2025)

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. 617 (2018).

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449 (2017).

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570 (2023).

Brief for Petitioner, Mahmoud v. Taylor, No. 24-297 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2025).

Brief for Petitioner, Mahmoud v. Taylor, No. 24-297 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2025).

Secondary Sources

American Psychological Association. “Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Are Not Being Discussed in Many Florida High Schools, Survey Finds.” Press release, June 6, 2023. https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2023/06/sexual-orientation-gender-identity-florida-high-school.

Cassaro, Thomas M. “LGBTQ Parent Concerns and Parent–Child Communication About the Parental Rights in Education Bill (‘Don’t Say Gay’) in Florida.” Family Relations 73 (2024).

Howe, Amy. “Supreme Court Likely to Rule for Parental Opt-Out on LGBTQ Books in Schools.” SCOTUSblog. April 12, 2025. https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/04/supreme-court-likely-to-rule-for-parental-opt-out-on-lgbtq-books-in-schools/.

Mahmoud v. Taylor, Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/2024/24-297.

Moschella, Melissa. “Nonreligious Parents Have Rights Too; In Mahmoud v. Taylor, the Supreme Court Should Hold That No Declaration of Faith Is Required to Opt Children Out of Sexual Indoctrination Lessons.” Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2025. ProQuest.

Petterson, Hadyn. “Blaine Amendments: An Overview for Religious Educators.” Napa Legal Institute, October 6, 2025. https://www.napalegalinstitute.org/post/blaine-amendments-an-overview-for-religious-educators.

Pohlman, Zachary. “Oral Argument: Mahmoud v. Taylor – Petitioners.” The Federalist Society. April 5, 2025. https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/oral-argument-mahmoud-v-taylor-petitioners-supreme-court.

Pori, Bella Mancini, and Edward Stein. “Multi-Generation Queer Families: Foregrounding the LGBTQIA+ Children of LGBTQIA+ People.” Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 26 (2024). www.law.georgetown.edu/gender-journal/in-print/volume-xxvi-issue-1-fall-2024/multi-generation-queer-families-foregrounding-the-lgbtqia-children-of-lgbtqia-people/.

Reingold, Rebecca, et al. “SCOTUS Takes Up Inclusive Education: Mahmoud v. Taylor in a Global Context.” April 16, 2025. https://oneill.law.georgetown.edu/scotus-takes-up-inclusive-education-mahmoud-v-taylor-in-a-global-context/.

Rosky, Clifford. “Anti-Gay Curriculum Laws.” Columbia Law Review 117 (2017). https://columbialawreview.org/content/anti-gay-curriculum-laws/.

Smolkin, Laura B., and Craig A. Young. “Research Directions: Missing Mirrors, Missing Windows: Children’s Literature Textbooks and LGBT Topics.” Language Arts 88, no. 3 (2011). https://www.jstor.org/stable/41804253