Abstract

Both Taiwan and South Korea have a shared colonial past under Imperial Japan and formed post-war authoritarian regimes that eventually democratized in the latter half of the 1980s. Yet, these two countries have extremely divergent perspectives on Japan post-democratization. This begs the question: what factors explain differentiated colonial memories and interpretations of those memories between two former colonies of the same regime? Through a most-similar cross-case study analysis, I argue that cultural and educational colonial institutions were the root of modern-day sentiments toward Japan, as colonial institutions intended to “Japanize” the colonized population in Taiwan were far more successful in eliciting acceptance of colonial rule than in Korea. This meant that post-war authoritarian actors in Taiwan and Korea were constrained in their ability to advance narratives that challenged Japanese cultural hegemony, in the case of Taiwan, or affirmed closer relations with Japan, in the case of Korea.

Introduction

Both Taiwan and South Korea have a shared colonial past under Imperial Japan and formed post-war authoritarian regimes that eventually democratized in the latter half of the 1980s. Yet, these two countries have extremely divergent perspectives on Japan post-democratization. According to a Gallup Korea poll conducted in 1992, when asked whether they thought Japanese people felt remorseful for atrocities committed during World War II, 80.1%, a large majority of those surveyed, answered “not at all” or “not so much.” In stark contrast, in a poll conducted in 2009 in Taiwan about Japan, 52% of participants responded that their favorite country other than Taiwan was Japan. This begs the question: what factors explain differentiated colonial memories and interpretations of those memories between two former colonies of the same regime? In answering this question, I do not attempt to give an exhaustive reading of Taiwanese, South Korean, or Japanese history, but instead focus on the long-term effects of colonial institutions and their effects on post-war state actors. Through a most-similar cross-case study analysis, I argue that cultural and educational colonial institutions were the root of modern-day sentiments toward Japan, as colonial institutions intended to “Japanize” the colonized population in Taiwan were far more successful in eliciting acceptance of colonial rule than in Korea. This meant that post-war authoritarian actors in Taiwan and Korea were constrained in their ability to advance narratives that challenged Japanese cultural hegemony, in the case of Taiwan, or affirmed closer relations with Japan, in the case of Korea. Resistance that formed in response to these authoritarian narratives on Japan reinforced these differentiated views on Japan and allowed pro-democracy opposition movements in both countries to associate themselves with prevailing societal views of Japan.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Previous literature on the impact of colonial experiences in shaping modern-day attitudes toward Japan in its former colonies is still developing. Some scholars, especially those conducting comparative analysis of Japan’s former colonies, pay closer attention to pre-war factors. For instance, Lai (2024) compares Taiwanese and Japanese colonial experiences to explain their responses to island disputes with Japan in the 21st century. However, a newer strand of literature in this domain more rigorously analyzes the role of South Korean domestic politics and nationalism as a catalyst for negative attitudes toward Japan. For instance, Jo (2022) argues that contemporary anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea is rooted within “how South Korean struggles for democracy became bound up in understandings of Japan.” Similarly, Deacon (2024) asserts that the “history war” between South Korea and Japan continues to persist because “each side’s…representations of the other…constitute an important element of their national identities.” This is similar to the approach taken by Taiwanese-Japanese relations scholars, who have similar conclusions on the role of post-war domestic politics in shaping how collective memory is apprehended. For instance, Suzuki (2011) suggests that the brutality of the Kuomintang (KMT) regime in Taiwan, in combination with contestations over Taiwanese national identity during democratization, led to the silencing of narratives of gendered violence under Japanese imperialism.

METHODOLOGY

To bridge together scholarship on exclusively the colonial period itself and scholarship that covers solely post-colonial regimes, I place analytic weight on both the impact of the colonial period itself and the post-war authoritarian regimes that succeeded it. To accomplish this, I employ a most similar cross-case analysis of South Korea and Taiwan, as these cases are similar in “background conditions,” such as the time range in which they were acquired, the length of the colonial period, and types of post-war regimes, but differ significantly in terms of the independent variable of interest, colonial memory. In acknowledging these similarities, I do not claim that South Korea and Taiwan’s shift from authoritarianism into democracy are identical to one another nor that Japanese domination impacted these two former colonies in equivalent fashions. Rather, I argue that the broad swath of institutional changes in South Korea and Taiwan, from Japanese colonization to democratization, are analogous to one another and fruitful for comparison. In analyzing my case studies, I apply Jo (2022)’s concept of collective memory as “intersubjective understandings of the past,” as well as Bernhard and Kubik (2014)’s concept of mnemonic actors as actors, particularly state actors, that frame the past in terms that “will generate the most effective legitimation for their efforts to gain or hold power.” These mnemonic actors are constrained by “a historically formed repertoire of cultural (mnemonic) forms and themes” that are generated through both state-led institutions that espouse certain narratives about the past and unofficial narratives that are “generated and reproduced within personal networks.”

CASE STUDY 1: TAIWAN

Following the Qing Dynasty’s loss to Japan in the Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan was formally integrated into the Japanese Empire. After Japan’s defeat at the end of World War II in 1945, Taiwan fell under the control of the Kuomintang (KMT) and became the KMT’s site of retreat after its loss in the Chinese Civil War. For the next four decades, the KMT imposed martial law and curtailed forms of political opposition until democratization in Taiwan occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I argue that throughout this historical trajectory, Japanese influence became deeply entrenched in Taiwanese society during the colonial era, meaning the KMT faced a high gradient in erasing the effects of Japanese imperialism on collective memory. Because of this, resentment from the Taiwanese public built up as the KMT attempted to sinicize Taiwan, which was mobilized against the KMT through opposition and pro-democracy movements near the end of Taiwan’s authoritarian period.

A. Colonial Subjugation (1895 – 1945)

The imposition of an education system that privileged Japanese customs, language, and knowledge early on in Japanese colonization of Taiwan, alongside a lack of resistance to Japanese domination due to the dependence of Taiwanese elites on Japanese imperial governance, facilitated the success of kōminka policies in Taiwan. An exodus of former Taiwanese elites to mainland China created a new elite class that was “dependent on — and loyal to — the alien regime” due to the opportunities granted to them. The response of Taiwan’s elite class after Japan had acquired Taiwan can be analyzed through the lens of Lake’s (2007) conceptualization of political authority, where a dominant state “provides the order demanded by subordinates” in exchange for acceptance of its authority. Under this framework, Taiwanese elites post-annexation had become reliant on Japanese imperialism to create order and maintain their local authority. Therefore, Taiwanese elites were incentivized to maintain Japanese colonial rule, which constrained the conditions under which elite-led resistance against the Japanese imperial government could occur.

This aversion of Taiwanese elites to resistance against Japanese colonization was exacerbated by education policies that mandated conformity to colonial rule. The imperial education system imposed by Imperial Japan onto Taiwan was primarily concerned with teaching the Japanese language and preparing students for public service or business occupations,, magnifying Japanese cultural hegemony in Taiwan and the prestige of conforming to Japanese customs. Although the Japanese education system also inadvertently fueled Taiwanese anti-colonial movements, Tsurumi (1977) argues that the “assimilation message of Japanese education” was mostly accepted and that anti-colonial movements remained “entirely within Japanese legal and constitutional frameworks while fighting for reform.” Thus, the dependence of Taiwanese elites and assimilationist education policy weakened resistance to Japanese imperial policies in two ways: the former created incentives for Taiwanese elites to conform to colonial rule, while the latter developed broad acceptance of colonial rule amongst the Taiwanese population.

Because previous cultural policies had reduced resistance to Japanese rule, the implementation and success of kōminka (“Japanization”) policies were possible. These policies were far more restrictive and further entrenched Japanese influence on Taiwanese collective memory. Near the end of Japanese rule over Taiwan, Japan imposed harsh cultural policies that “enforced the adoption of Japanese customs, religion, language, and even names” in 1936. During kōminka, the Japanese imperial government formed specialized language schools that mandated the use of Japanese and large youth clubs to cultivate “civic virtues and public spirit.” As the Japanese war effort during World War II moved southward into Southeast Asia, the imperial government mandated the conscription of Taiwanese men, and created a “girls agriculture volunteer corps” for industrial labor. Although there existed resentment toward colonial rule during this period, Japanization policies were accepted by younger members of the Taiwanese elite and Taiwanese indigenous groups, even those who had previously participated in anti-Japanese violent resistance movements. Thus, kōminka-era policies strengthened the general acceptance of colonial rule built by previous colonial policies, and therefore, entrenched Japanese influence on Taiwanese society.

B. Post-War Collective Memory (Post-1945)

As a result of the success of Japanization, the KMT experienced immense difficulty in supplanting the legacies of Japanese rule. He (2014) argues that because of restrictions on Mandarin and Taiwanese dialects of Chinese during kōminka, the Japanese language and education had integral parts of the Taiwanese elite identity. Thus, applying Bernhard and Kubik's (2014) theory of memory politics, Japanese imperial cultural policy had expanded “the available set of narratives about the past that constitutes a ‘nation’s heritage.’” Mnemonic actors that wish to propagate narratives post hoc must conform to this “repertoire of ‘traditional forms’” to be “politically effective”. Therefore, because Japanese cultural hegemony during the imperial period had expanded this repertoire, the post-war KMT regime was faced with a high degree of entrenched Japanese influence in Taiwanese society and collective memory. In other words, espousing narratives that challenged the legacies of Japanese colonialism would be more difficult for the KMT. This relationship between Japanese colonial rule and the constraints that it produced for the KMT’s ability to shape collective memory is depicted in Figure 1 below.

[Insert Figure 1 Here]

Because the KMT faced such a high gradient in challenging Japanese influence, the KMT’s attempt to “sinicize” Taiwanese society in building its legitimacy was met with fierce opposition. Immediately after the end of Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan in 1945, the incoming KMT regime restricted the use of Japanese and mandated the use of Mandarin in its place, eliciting strong resentment from the Taiwanese public through “large demonstrations and riots” in 1947. Outright displays of frustration from the Taiwanese public would decrease following the KMT’s loss in the Chinese Civil War and the beginning of PRC-initiated purges in mainland China, which energized anti-PRC sentiment in Taiwan. However, distrust continued; for instance, in 1951, “politically articulate native Formosans and mainlanders” urged U.S embassy officials to carefully review aid sent to the KMT, claiming the “Nationalists had ‘sighted the gravy train.’” It could be argued that the KMT’s ban on Japanese was similar to the kōminka-era bans on the use of Mandarin and Taiwanese dialects. Thus, under this logic, KMT cultural policies should have been met with similar levels of resistance. However, analogously to the Taiwanese education system’s gradual implementation, which limited backlash against the Japanese imperial government, kōminka policies followed decades of more moderate Japanese cultural policy. Therefore, in comparison to the KMT’s attempts at Sinicization, kōminka did not constitute as heavy a shift from the status quo, explaining why the KMT’s cultural policy was met with more resistance.

This resentment, created by Sinicization, fueled opposition movements to KMT rule, causing a propagation of positive sentiment toward Japan during Taiwan’s democratization. During the KMT regime’s gradual liberalization and the beginning of supplementary elections in the 1970s, the dangwai opposition movement appealed strongly to the offspring of Taiwanese elites that had benefited from Japanese rule, as well as members of the working class. As a result, the dangwai movement was able to foster an association between opposition to the KMT regime and fondness toward Japanese colonial rule within Taiwanese collective memory. This affinity with Japan came to a head as the process of democratization occurred in Taiwan during the early 1990s, becoming both a “weapon to address historical grievances under the KMT’s authoritarian rule” and a “celebration of Taiwan’s democratic achievement.” This association between the Taiwanese pro-democracy movement and colonial Japan facilitated the forgetting of Japanese atrocities during the colonial era, further bolstering positive attitudes toward Japan. For example, Suzuki (2011) argues that narratives surrounding the sexual abuse of comfort women in Taiwan during World War II have been supplanted by “memories of KMT wrongdoing” due to the association between anti-Japanese narratives and the KMT regime’s brand of Chinese nationalism.

In summary, the effects of both colonial cultural policy and the dependency of Taiwanese elites on colonial institutions caused the KMT to face difficulties in supplanting deeply entrenched Japanese influence. Opposition movements to the KMT utilized the resulting resentment to appeal to the Taiwanese public, creating an association between Japanese colonialism and opposition to the KMT. This relationship between Japanese influence as developed during colonialism and positive attitudes toward Japan in the authoritarian period is shown in Figure 2.

[Insert Figure 2 Here]

CASE STUDY 2: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOUTH KOREA

Similarly to Taiwan, Korea was acquired as a protectorate during the turn of the 19th into the 20th century through the 1905 Eulsa Treaty, and then fully annexed into the Japanese Empire five years later. After Imperial Japan’s defeat in World War II, Korea was hastily partitioned along the 38th parallel, and war erupted between the newly formed Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that led to the lasting division of the Korean peninsula. Starting with the Syngman Rhee government, South Korea experienced multiple authoritarian regimes for the next four decades, until democratization started at the end of the 1980s.. I argue that, unlike in Taiwan, Korean colonial institutions failed to engender a sense of acceptance amongst the Korean population, resulting in the entrenchment of resentment ininto Korean collective memory. Although the authoritarian Park regime attempted to subvert this perception of Japan, it instead fueled mass demonstrations and the formation of a pro-democracy movement that capitalized on negative perceptions of Japan, resulting in the strengthening of negative colonial memories of Japan during democratization.

A. Colonial Subjugation (1905 - 1945):

Similarly to the Taiwanese colonial education system, Japanese colonial officials intended Korea’s system to facilitate the assimilation of the Korean population. However, unlike in Taiwan, where education bolstered acceptance of colonial rule with the exception of smaller anti-colonial movements, the Korean education system exacerbated resistance to Japanese rule amongst the middle and upper strata of Korean society. Because of annexation, Korean students whothat had studied in educational institutions in Japan came to understand Japanese rule as a threat, but Japanese education as a necessity in advancing nationalist goals; Wells (1989) argues that Japanthe Japan had become “a haven to Korean nationalists” in the first decade of Japan’s rule over Korea. The Japanese-imposed education system in Korea had thus become a driver of resistance to colonial rule.

It could be argued that because education also fueled smaller pro-reform movements in Taiwan, the imposition of a Japanese education system alone cannot fully explain why Taiwanese and Korean responses to colonial rule diverged. While this is true, educational institutions in Korea itself were more developed before its annexation than in Taiwan, and thus, Japanese imperial officials in the first few decades of colonization could not completely impose their educational system upon Korea. As a result, the Japanese education system had to compete with already existing educational institutions, mitigating the legitimacy of these Japanese educational institutions and hamstringing the ability of this system to encourage assimilation in comparison to Taiwan. Thus, Japanese colonial officials in Korea were constrained in their ability to utilize education to their advantage, compared to their counterparts in Taiwan. Because of this, education in Korea had the opposite effect that it had in Taiwan, despite being framed to achieve similar goals.

As a result of this failure of the Korean education system to promote assimilation to the same extent that its counterpart did in Taiwan, mass resistance movements mobilized against Japanese rule. Following the release of a Korean declaration of independence, a wave of initially peaceful protests for Korean independence spread throughout Korea in March 1919, which was violently curtailed by April. In response to the March 1st movement, the Japanese government shifted away from explicitly calling for assimilation. It instead began to espouse an ideology of unity between Japanese and Korean peoples and utilized promises of increased opportunities in “education, enterprise, politics, and other realms of public life” to strengthen the legitimacy of its colonial rule. However, because the March 1st movement had made the issue of Korean nationalism salient, even amongst Koreans who were politically disengaged, this response from Japan would fail to root out resentment against colonial rule. A 1930 report written by a British embassy located in Tokyo notes that though these policies reduced outright dissent to colonial rule, discontent toward “Japanese domination and…dependence [of Koreans on Japan]” remained. As a result, unlike in Taiwan, Japanization of Korean society during kōminka would not be as effective due to this entrenched resentment.

While kōminka policies in Taiwan were able to appeal to a base of Taiwanese youth despite the violence associated with them, kōminka policies enforced in Korea furthered the resentment already felt by Koreans as a result of the suppression of independence movements. Kōminka-era policies implemented in Korea involved similar restrictions in comparison to those implemented in Taiwan; similarly to Taiwanese cultural policies, kōminka in Korea led to bans on public displays of Korean cultural practices starting in 1937. Furthermore, as the Japanese war effort progressed into Southeast Asia at the same time as kōminka-era policies were implemented, Koreans were coerced into forced labor to address labor shortages, and Korean women were forced into sexual slavery as comfort women. Although Taiwanese people were subjected to forced labor, and Taiwanese women to sexual slavery, the number of forced laborers and comfort women from Korea was far greater than that from Taiwan. The gravity and commonality of this violence committed by Imperial Japan in Korea during World War II, in combination with the already contentious reputation of Japan within Korea pre-WWI, deepened negative perceptions of Japan within Korea. Therefore, unlike in Taiwan, an acceptance of Japanese colonial rule did not entrench itself into the “repertoire of traditional forms,”, unlike in the Taiwanese case. Rather, an overt association between Japanese colonialism and violence did. This process is shown in Figure 3.

[Insert Figure 3 Here]

B. Post-War Collective Memory (Post-1945)

Because of the resentment toward Japan produced by cultural colonial institutions, the shift from the Rhee government’s tough stance on Japan to the Park regime’s more amicable approach led to even greater entrenchment of negative views of Japan within Korean collective memory. Similar to the KMT’s attempts at Sinicization, the Syngman Rhee regime reversed the impacts of Japanization policies that had been enforced during Japanese rule. However, these cultural policies were implemented at a slower rate and to a lesser extent due to geopolitical and economic crises caused by the Korean War. Despite this more lax approach to de-Japanization in comparison to Taiwan, the Rhee regime nevertheless took a hard line on relations with Japan. For example, in 1955, Rhee floated the idea of severing all diplomatic ties with Japan, claiming that Japan had been emboldened by U.S. financial backing. Similarly, in 1956, the South Korean government “persistently refused to go along” with Japan’s claim over Takeshima (Dokdo) island. This contrasted heavily with the succeeding Park Chung-hee regime’s approach to South Korea-Japan relations, provoking open displays of resentment from the South Korean public, especially students, and furthering the resentment that had developed in collective memories of Japan during colonization.

Eschewing the Rhee regime’s tougher stance on Japan, the Park regime advanced a form of what Kim (2017) terms “statist, authoritarian…developmental nationalism” that emphasized affinity with Japan and energized discontent from the Korean public. This South Korean developmental nationalism was driven by the creation of a distorted economic system during colonization, which fueled the creation of a small echelon of capitalist elites post-colonization that formed a “mutual dependence” with the Park regime. Therefore, in espousing a “pragmatist” rhetoric on its relations with Japan, the Park regime had failed to create an opposing narrative that could challenge entrenched anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea, like the KMT’s inability to supplant the influence of Japanese customs on Taiwanese collective memory and society. Furthermore, the Park regime’s stance toward Japan did not follow a precedent of previous amicable foreign relations between Japan and the ROK, constraining the extent to which the Park regime could shift public opinion.

Because of this, the Park regime’s choice to normalize relations with Japan energized student movements and opposition parties that disapproved of closer South Korea-Japan relations, exacerbating resentment toward Japan. In response to negotiations over a proposed treaty between the ROK and Japan that would normalize relations, over 200,000 middle school, high school, and university students participated in rallies during March of 1964. By September of 1965, more than 3 million people had joined these protests. The sheer number of protestors demonstrates the extent to which the negative sentiment of Japan had entrenched itself into Korean collective memory during the authoritarian period and points to the difficulty caused by this entrenched sentiment in the Park regime’s attempts to change public opinion. Furthermore, the response to the Park regime’s moves toward normalization with Japan demonstrates the creation of an association between opposition to the Park regime and a negative stance toward Japan in public discourse.

As a result, opposition parties aligned themselves with pro-democracy activists, which was crucial in reinforcing negative sentiment toward Japan within Korean collective memory. During the late 1970s, due to hikes in the Park regime’s authoritarianism, the minjung populist ideology, which framed South Korea as a state opposed to colonial forces such as Japan and the U.S, became increasingly popular. By 1979, the movement had “become the focal point” of opposition to the Park regime, resulting in the New Democratic Party (NDP) winning a majority of seats in the South Korean National Assembly. Thus, opposition parties such as the NDP played key roles during the South Korean protest movements in 1964-1965 and the democratization movement in the following decade.

This allowed progressive politicians who had been involved in anti-authoritarian movements to, as Jo (2022) argues, interweave together “grievances against Japan and grievances against the state” during democratization from 1988 onwards. As a result, formerly opposition politicians reinforced the association between opposition to authoritarianism and a negative stance toward Japan, meaning that the negative collective memory of Japan that had persisted throughout colonization and the authoritarian period continued into the 21st century. The effects of authoritarian-era policies and the ensuing backlash on colonial memory are shown in Figure 4. This association between anti-authoritarian movements and relations with Japan is remarkably similar to the Taiwanese case, despite differences in the outcome on collective memory. In Taiwan, pro-democracy actors utilized an affinity toward Japan to mobilize resistance against an authoritarian regime, while in South Korea, pro-democracy actors utilized resentment toward Japan to accomplish the same goal. Thus, in both cases, democratization reinforced anti-authoritarian resentment and facilitated either an affinity with or resentment toward Japan.

[Insert Figure 4 Here]

FINDINGS OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Appraising the historical trajectories of South Korea and Taiwan at large, what is immediately apparent is that Japanese colonial institutions differed significantly between the two; in South Korea, cultural and educational institutions were not as effective in “Japanizing” the colonized as deeply as their counterparts in Taiwan. As a result, the bounds of Korea and Taiwan’s “repertoire of traditional forms”, or the intersubjectively accepted historical narratives belonging to these nations’ history, differed significantly between the two. Because of this, the legacies of these institutions constrained the succeeding post-war authoritarian regimes. Applying Bernhard and Kubik's (2014) theory of memory regimes, the Park regime and KMT, respectively, attempted to act outside the bounds of their nations’ repertoire of traditional forms through advancing pro-Japan or anti-Japan policies. This resulted in political failure and the creation of pro-democracy movements that eschewed relations with Japan, in South Korea’s case, or embraced them, in Taiwan’s case. These pro-democracy movements, although oriented in different ways in terms of their stances on Japan, were similarly successful insofar as they reinforced colonial memories of Japan.

This focus on colonial institutions provides more explanatory power to existing explanations of the collective opinions of Japan within South Korea and Taiwan. For instance, although some scholars have argued that the threat posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to Taiwan facilitates positive attitudes toward allies like Japan, these explanations fail to fully explain why the South Korean public, who face a similar adversary in the form of the DPRK, does not gravitate toward so easily toward Japan, even when accounting for Taiwan’s unrecognized status. Thus, this comparative analysis contributes to a fuller account of South Korea-Japan and Taiwan-Japan relations in the contemporary context.

CONCLUSION

The most important factor that differentiated Taiwanese colonial memory from its South Korean counterpart was the effects that colonial institutions had on the acceptance of Japanese rule during colonization. This is because Taiwanese institutions deeply entrenched a positive association with Japan, while Korean institutions entrenched resentment of colonial rule into collective memory. As a result, the post-war KMT regime’s attempts to “sinicize” the Taiwanese population resulted in the formation of an opposition movement that capitalized on the positive collective memory of Japan, while the Park regime’s attempt at fostering closer relations with Japan resulted in the mobilization of an anti-authoritarian opposition movement that aligned itself with an ideology opposed to Japan. During democratization, these opposition-led sentiments prevailed, resulting in differentiated collective sentiments toward Japan across the two countries. Because stances toward Japan became associated with democratization, South Korea’s negative sentiment toward Japan and Taiwan’s generally positive outlook on Japan will persist in the long run. Democratization was a watershed moment for both South Korean and Taiwanese national identity, and therefore, narratives of Japanese colonialism affirmed by pro-democracy movements in both countries are likely to have a lasting impact. However, the fact that democratization had a silencing effect on narratives about Japanese atrocities in Taiwan suggests that sufficient upheaval in domestic politics could result in changes to colonial memory. This is especially important because the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to contest “the U.S.-led hegemonic order in East Asia.” In combination with the U.S. Trump administration’s willingness to risk its economic partnerships through a catch-all trade policy, this could create a crisis within South Korea and Taiwan stark enough to facilitate that process. Ultimately, this paper demonstrates the importance of colonial institutions in shaping colonial memory decades down the line and the role of post-colonial regimes in strengthening previously held notions of colonial rule. Thus, future scholarship should seek to more rigorously examine cases where authoritarian regimes had the effect of weakening or subverting colonial memory.

REFERENCES

American Commission For the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments In War Areas. Taiwan (Formosa) [Civil Affairs Handbook - Taiwan (Formosa) - Taiwan Province], 1943-1945. Records of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, 1943. https://catalog.archives.gov/id/66897665?objectPage=28#object-thumb--28.

“Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen (Korea): (1910-1911).” Government-General of Chosen, 1938. https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/006782655.

Baldwin, Frank. “Participatory Anti-Imperialism: The 1919 Independence Movement.” The Journal of Korean Studies 1 (1979): 123–62.

Barry, Mark P. “The U.S. and the 1945 Division of Korea: Mismanaging the ‘Big Decisions.’” International Journal on World Peace 29, no. 4 (2012): 37–59.

Bernhard, Michael, and Jan Kubik. “A Theory of the Politics of Memory.” In Twenty Years After Communism, 0. Oxford University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199375134.003.0002.

British Consulate at Tamsui. “Formosa: Educational Methods,” 1932. The National Archives. https://www.foreignofficefilesjapan.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Detail/formosa-educational-methods/4439810?item=4439837.

British Embassy in Tokyo. “Korea, Annual Report by HM Consul General.” Tokyo: British Embassy in Tokyo, 1930. The National Archives. https://www.empire.amdigital.co.uk/documents/detail/4018015?item=4018146.

Bukh, Alexander. “Korean National Identity, Civic Activism and the Dokdo/Takeshima Territorial Dispute.” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3, no. 2 (2016): 183–99.

Charney, Jonathan I., and J. R. V. Prescott. “Resolving Cross-Strait Relations between China and Taiwan.” The American Journal of International Law 94, no. 3 (2000): 453–77. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555319.

Chu, Yun-han, and Jih-wen Lin. “Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity.” The China Quarterly, no. 165 (2001): 102–29.

Deacon, Chris. “Mnemonic Encounters: The Construction and Persistence of International ‘History Wars’ and the Case of Japan–South Korea Relations.” International Studies Quarterly 68, no. 3 (June 24, 2024): sqae114. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae114.

“FORMOSA CONSCRIPTION TO BE ENFORCED.” Tokyo, DOMEI FBIS-FRB-44-291 (December 4, 1944): NE1.

Fulda, Andreas Martin. “Reevaluating the Taiwanese Democracy Movement: A Comparative Analysis of Opposition Organizations under Japanese and KMT Rule.” Critical Asian Studies 34, no. 3 (September 1, 2002): 357–94. https://doi.org/10.1080/1467271022000008938.

Goh, Evelyn. “Contesting Hegemonic Order: China in East Asia.” Security Studies 28, no. 3 (May 27, 2019): 614–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2019.1604989.

He, Yinan. “Identity Politics and Foreign Policy: Taiwan’s Relations with China and Japan, 1895-2012.” Political Science Quarterly 129, no. 3 (2014): 469–500.

———. “Identity Politics and Foreign Policy: Taiwan’s Relations with China and Japan, 1895-2012.” Political Science Quarterly 129, no. 3 (2014): 469–500.

Hechter, Michael, Ioana Emy Matesan, and Chris Hale. “Resistance to Alien Rule in Taiwan and Korea.” Nations and Nationalism 15, no. 1 (2009): 36–59. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2009.00378.x.

Hein, Patrick. “The Ambiguities of Amending Historical Injustices and Espousing a Shared Collective Memory: The WWII Forced Labour Narratives in Germany and Japan.” State Crime Journal 9, no. 1 (2020): 47–70. https://doi.org/10.13169/statecrime.9.1.0047.

Jo, Eun A. “Memory, Institutions, and the Domestic Politics of South Korean–Japanese Relations.” International Organization 76, no. 4 (2022): 767–98. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818322000194.

Kim, Sang-Hyun. “Science, Technology, and the Imaginaries of Development in South Korea.” Development and Society 46, no. 2 (2017): 341–71.

King, Ross. “ERASURE AND REINVENTION: Korea to 1945.” In Seoul: Memory, Reinvention, and the Korean Wave, 23–73. University of Hawai’i Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvvn773.5.

Kuznetsov, Vasily, and Kim Byeong-jik. “Record of Conversation between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov and North Korean Ambassador to the Soviet Union Kim Byeong-Jik.” AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 21, papka 105, delo 2, listy 17-20. Wilson Center Digital Archive. Accessed May 17, 2025. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/record-conversation-between-soviet-deputy-foreign-minister-vasily-kuznetsov-and-north.

Lai, Christina. “South Korea’s and Taiwan’s Territorial Disputes with Japan, 1990s to 2018.” Asian Survey 60, no. 3 (2020): 583–606.

Lake, David A. “Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics.” International Security 32, no. 1 (July 2007): 47–79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.32.1.47.

Lee, Hye-Kyung. Cultural Policy in South Korea: Making a New Patron State. Media, Culture and Social Change in Asia 58. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019.

Lee, Yoonkyung. “Diverging Patterns of Democratic Representation in Korea and Taiwan: Political Parties and Social Movements.” Asian Survey 54, no. 3 (2014): 419–44. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2014.54.3.419.

Liff, Adam P. “Japan, Taiwan and the ‘One China’ Framework after 50 Years.” The China Quarterly 252 (December 2022): 1066–93. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741022001357.

Lim, Timothy C. “The Origins of Societal Power in South Korea: Understanding the Physical and Human Legacies of Japanese Colonialism.” Modern Asian Studies 33, no. 3 (1999): 603–33.

“March 1, 1919 High No. 5288 Discovery of Independence Declaration.” Information Ministry of the Japanese Army, 1919. Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR). https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/result?DB_ID=G0000101EXTERNAL&DEF_XSL=default&ON_LYD=&IS_INTERNAL=false&IS_STYLE=eng&IS_KIND=detail&IS_START=1&IS_NUMBER=1&IS_TAG_S18=eadid&IS_KEY_S18=M2007050114245172110.

Minns, John. “The Labour Movement in South Korea.” Labour History, no. 81 (2001): 175–95. https://doi.org/10.2307/27516810.

Park, Mi. “South Korea: Passion, Patriotism, and Student Radicalism.” In Student Activism in Asia, edited by Meredith L. Weiss and Edward Aspinall, 125–52. Between Protest and Powerlessness. University of Minnesota Press, 2012. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttv18p.10.

Park, Sang Mi. “The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present.” The Journal of Korean Studies 15, no. 1 (2010): 67–93.

Ping-Hui, Liao. “Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895–1945: History, Culture, Memory.” In Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945, edited by Liao Ping-Hui and David Der-Wei Wang, 1–16. History, Culture, Memory. Columbia University Press, 2006. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/liao13798.6.

Reuters. “Trump’s Chaotic Tariff War, and How It Has Evolved.” May 13, 2025, sec. Autos & Transportation. https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/how-trumps-chaotic-trade-war-has-evolved-2025-05-12/.

Rhee, Syngman. “Letter, Minister Yong Shik Kim [Kim Yong-Shik] to the President.” Wilson Center Digital Archive. Accessed May 17, 2025. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/letter-minister-yong-shik-kim-kim-yong-shik-president-1.

Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring. “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options.” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (June 2008): 294–308. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077.

SHIMANOUCHI, TOSHIRO. “Letters to The Times: Japanese-Korean Relations Efforts by Japan to Settle Issues Peacefully Cited Disbarment of Lawyers Approval of Recommendations of Bar Committee Noted Record-Breaking Year Predicted For Use of Night Stick.” New York Times  (1923-), January 28, 1956. 113551774. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times with Index.

Sun, Jing. “Japan-Taiwan Relations: Unofficial in Name Only.” Asian Survey 47, no. 5 (2007): 790–810. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2007.47.5.790.

Suzuki, Shogo. “The Competition to Attain Justice for Past Wrongs: The ‘Comfort Women’ Issue in Taiwan.” Pacific Affairs 84, no. 2 (2011): 223–44.

“Telegram No. 209 from Taipei to the Department of State, ‘Political Report on Nationalist China - March 1951,’” April 17, 1951. Wilson Center Digital Archive. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/telegram-no-209-taipei-department-state-political-report-nationalist-china-march-1951.

The Times. “General Sketch of Formosa.” July 19, 1910. The Times Digital Archive.

Toby, Ronald. “Education in Korea under the Japanese: Attitudes and Manifestations.” Occasional Papers on Korea, no. 1 (1974): 55–64.

Tsurumi, E. Patricia. “CHAPTER 7. Colonial Education in Korea and Taiwan.” In The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, edited by Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, 275–311. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. https://doi.org/doi:10.1515/9780691213873-011.

———. “Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945.” In Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945. Harvard University Press, 1977. https://www-degruyterbrill-com.proxy.swarthmore.edu/document/doi/10.4159/harvard.9780674434080/html.

Uchida, Jun. Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945. Harvard East Asian Monographs 337. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center distributed by Harvard University Press, 2011.

U.S. Department of State. “Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy).” U.S. Government Publishing Office (GPO), Foreign relations of the United States: diplomatic papers, no. yr.1964-68 v.29 (June 3, 1964): 25.

Ward, Thomas J. “The Comfort Women Controversy - Lessons from Taiwan.” Asia-Pacific Journal 16, no. 14 (April 2018): e4. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1557466018014274.

Wells, Kenneth M. “Background to the March First Movement: Koreans in Japan, 1905-1919.” Korean Studies 13, no. 1 (1989): 5–21. https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.1989.0007.

Wong, Timothy Ka-ying. “From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: The Formation and Changing Nature of Taiwanese Identity.” Asian Perspective 25, no. 3 (2001): 175–206.

“갤럽리포트 1992년 9·10월(통권 제3호),” Gallup Reports. Seoul: Gallup Korea, 1992. https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=3.

DAILY REPORT. FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS FBIS-FRB-44-246 (October 12, 1944): NF2.

FIGURES

Figure 1. Effects of Colonial Institutions on Taiwanese Post-War Regimes

Figure 2. Effects of Taiwanese Authoritarian Responses to Colonial Legacies

Figure 3. Effects of Colonial Institutions on South Korean Post-War Regimes

Figure 4. Effects of Korean Authoritarian Responses to Colonial Legacies