BY Lucrezia Asdente

The relationship between female education, female labor force participation (FLFP), and fertility rates has always been highly debated among scholars. Nowadays, as Europe faces the challenges posed by an aging population and decreasing fertility rates, it is critical to examine what could counter the bleak implications of such trends. This article aims to contribute a possible solution to change current European population prospects. The analysis of the relationship between female education and FLFP demonstrates how they are positively correlated with fertility intentions in developed countries and, in certain institutional contexts, with actual fertility outcomes (Impicciatore & Tomatis, 2020). Therefore, it is suggested that the implementation of policies fostering gender equity both inside and outside the household would enable women to invest both in their human capital and in family life (Jaumotte, 2004). The essay starts with a brief introduction of Europe and its current demographic framework. The subsequent segments investigate the association between female education and fertility, FLFP and fertility, and, lastly, the relationship between the three of them. Finally, the role of family policies is discussed, and it is followed by the closing section on the findings and limitations of this study. It is concluded that, in developed countries with equitable socioeconomic contexts, higher female education and labor force participation could be a valuable means to counter the implications of current European demographic trends.

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The global population experienced unprecedented economic and social development in the twentieth century, yet it also witnessed significant declines in fertility and population growth rates (Bryant, 2007). Until the 1980s, only the most developed countries had low fertility rates. Lately, however, it has become a global problem. An increasing number of Asian, Latin American, and Caribbean nations report sub-replacement fertility rates, meaning they are under the threshold that ensures that a population perfectly replaces itself from generation to generation (Sobotka et al., 2019). Nevertheless, decreasing fertility is far from a homogeneously diffused phenomenon.

Indeed, nowadays, half of the world’s population lives in countries where the period Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is below the replacement level threshold of around 2.1 births per woman. This distribution results from the negative relationship between fertility and economic and social progress, which has become one of the most well-established empirical regularities in the social sciences (Lee, 2003). As Lee explains, most economic models of fertility indicate that parents have a desired number of surviving children (2003). As economic and social advancement improves child survival rates, the number of desired offspring decreases (see Nerlove, 1974). This negative relation has been regarded as individuals’ rational reaction to improvements in medical technology, wealth, nutrition, contraceptive technology, and evolving societal norms and values. These factors have de facto resulted in lower desired fertility rates, smaller family sizes, and an overall trend toward an aging population. In several highly developed countries which have reached “very low” (with a TFR below 1.5), “lowest-low,” or “ultra-low” (with a TFR below 1.3) fertility, the trend of decreased fertility is even assumed to be irreversible, especially as it is associated with rapid population aging (Basten et al., 2014).

Europe, the region examined in this analysis, is one of the most affected areas with a TFR of 1.53 live births per woman in 2021 and “very low” to “ultra-low” fertility rates of 1.2 to 1.5 children per woman being recorded across the continent, particularly in Southern and Eastern European countries (Eurostat, 2023a). The shrinking working-age population strains labor markets and welfare states and leads to major socioeconomic concerns and policy challenges. The reduction in the working-age population leads to labor shortages, a decrease in overall economic output, reduced productivity and innovation, and increased pressure on social welfare systems. This hampers a country’s ability to sustain economic growth (Mason et al., 2022). As Mason and his colleagues explain, this leads to a higher old-age dependency ratio—meaning there is more consumption in excess of aggregate labor income for the population aged 65 and older—which places a burden on social welfare systems including healthcare and pensions (2022). This strain on public resources may result in difficulty funding these systems and increased per-capita burden of public debt (Mason et al., 2022).

In this regard, many factors have been investigated in an attempt to find the reasons behind falling TFR and counter its bleak implications. Among them, female education and female labor force participation (FLFP) have been traditionally considered negatively correlated with women’s childbearing. However, the EU is also striving to achieve greater gender equality, with policies granting women the same employment and educational opportunities as their male counterparts implemented alongside other policies fostering TFR growth (European Commission, 2020). Therefore, were the negative relationship between female education and FLFP to hold, the European Union, while attempting to attain the best of both worlds—higher TFR and higher rates of educated and working women—would risk ending up empty-handed.

In light of the challenges that Europe is presently facing, this article presents a counterargument to historical views by reexamining the relation between female education, FLFP, and fertility (both intended and actual). The analysis demonstrates that female education is positively correlated with fertility intentions. The relationship between female education, FLFP, and fertility outcomes, however, is more complex as there is evidence, polarized across EU member states, supporting both their positive and negative associations.

Therefore, this paper argues that when policies enable women to achieve both childbearing and other possible life paths, education, FLFP, and reproductive behaviors can be positively correlated. Implementing family leave policies, promoting gender equity inside and outside the household, investing in female education, enacting family-supporting tax schemes, and fostering a supportive work environment can enable women to balance their careers and motherhood. Enforcing such policies and harnessing the potential positive association between education, FLFP, and reproductive behaviors across all European countries would be highly beneficial to the EU, which could advance both fertility rates and women’s education and employability.

I. Female education, fertility intentions, and actual fertility

Because a woman’s education attainment level is regarded as one of the major predictors of family behavior, it is important to investigate the relationship between higher education among women and fertility in Europe (Bongaarts, 1978). Historically, the relationship between female education and fertility has been thought to be negative. Indeed, the postponement of motherhood, which clashes with social stigma around childbearing at mature ages, and low total fertility rates have been consistently considered the result of women’s increased access to education (Sobotka, 2004).

Some of the most relevant arguments supporting this assumption are the low fertility rates registered in women’s educational years, due to:

(1) the difficulties of balancing family life and academic achievements, which is reinforced by

(a) the lack of economic means to raise children and

(b) societal conventions deterring women from having children before completing their education (Bhrolcháin & Beaujouan, 2012); and

(2) the reduced likelihood of eventual motherhood due to the prospective reproductive window being narrowed by the long period of schooling (Lappegård & Rønsen, 2005).

Ultimately, these considerations relate the general deferral of motherhood as a result of higher education with a greater likelihood of remaining childless (Impicciatore & Tomatis, 2020).

Nevertheless, despite the lengthy history of research into the association between education and reproductive outcomes, little is known about how educational disparities impact fertility intentions (Berrington & Pattaro, 2014). Investigating this is extremely relevant as, according to the Theory of Planned Behavior, intentions are the most immediate determinant of the resulting outcomes (Ajzen, 1991). Research suggests that graduate women are equally likely to desire a large family as their less educated counterparts (Berrington & Pattaro, 2014). There is even a positive relationship between women’s education and lifetime fertility intentions at the individual level and throughout the EU (Testa, 2014). However, when analyzing educational disparities in the realization of fertility intentions, an overall tendency to under-reach reproductive goals is observed: highly educated women have a tendency of failing to fulfill their fertility intentions (Berrington & Pattaro, 2014). These findings indicate that, were the institutional framework to allow highly educated women to have large families, women of fertile ages would invest in both their human capital and family size (Testa, 2014).

The rationale proposed by the developments in gender theories supports this assumption. According to this view, higher fertility rates are positively correlated with macro- and micro-level gender equality (McDonald, 2000 and Goldscheider et al., 2015). The macro-level deals with overall equality between men and women in broader social, political, and economic structures and institutions. On the other hand, micro-level gender equality focuses on the distribution of rights, responsibilities, and resources between men and women within specific social institutions and relationships (Goldscheider et al., 2015). Despite many European countries achieving almost equal levels of education and employment among men and women (macro-level), the gender equity or Gender Revolution approach claims that, within the household, women still encounter a deeply unequal division of chores with their partners (micro-level). Indeed, Figure 1 shows how disproportional the division of Unpaid Care and Domestic Work (UCDW) between men and women is in the EU, with women’s share being almost double that of their male counterparts, on average. This disequilibrium is rooted in a patriarchal model which imposes a choice between work and family life on potential mothers. Hence, women’s decision to minimize the number of children is due to a trade-off between childbearing and being able to fulfill their academic and career objectives (Goldscheider et al., 2015). In this regard, education has a twofold positive effect on fertility rates as people with higher education have higher lifetime fertility intentions and are more likely to display equity within their relationships (Duvander et al., 2010). Indeed, Duvander and colleagues’ research reveals that higher educational attainment for both parents is connected with an increased probability of having a second or third child in both Norway and Sweden (2010). This shows that highly educated women are better at balancing work and family life since their partners are more likely to take an active role in childcare. Overall, the findings appear to suggest that higher levels of academic achievement might favorably contribute to greater gender equity within the relationship, allowing women to pursue both motherhood and their career aspirations.

Figure 1. Hours spent on Unpaid Care and Domestic Work (UCDW) by men and women in the EU[1], 2023. Chart, bar chart

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Source: Personal elaboration from the data from OECD. (2023). Gender, Institutions and Development (Edition 2023) [Dataset]. In OECD International Development Statistics. https://doi.org/10.1787/7b0af638-en

Despite the historical perception of a negative relationship between education and fertility, there are still cases of favorable relationships between women’s education and reproduction rates. For instance, in Norway and Sweden, women with higher education have more children, on average (Duvander et al., 2010). In this case, long-established family policies in both Norway and Sweden contribute to more egalitarian relationships outside and within the household. This includes policies such as parental leave for approximately twelve months after childbirth with reserved periods for the father, as well as social conventions, and attitudes toward equality among genders, (Duvander et al., 2010). Thus, highly educated women’s desire to build large families is facilitated by the balanced division of family duties characteristic of highly educated partners. This supports the idea that women’s higher education, by fostering gender equality, positively impacts women’s opportunities to balance work and family life, and thus gives them more leeway in childbearing decisions. Therefore, gender equity, in this instance, serves as a mediator driving the positive relationship between female education and reproduction rates. Consequently, gender equity plays a key role in FLFP as well due to the positive impact that it has on women’s capacity to balance their family lives and other life goals.

II. Female labor force participation and fertility

As in the case of female education, the correlation between female labor force participation rates (FLFPR) and reproductive behavior has commonly been regarded as negative. The theory of the “value of children” is one of the most accredited arguments supporting this relationship. This theory claims that the motivation for motherhood may be greater among women who consider their alternative paths to self-realization, like career development, less appealing (Friedman et al., 1994). In this context, it is assumed that larger families play a more significant role in the lives of less educated women. This is because poorly educated women experience greater difficulties in the labor market (Impicciatore & Tomatis, 2020) as education is positively associated with earnings (Amidei et al., 2023) and, thus, with FLFP.

The negative relationship between FLFPR and fertility is also an economically solid assumption since rising female workforce participation is predicted to increase the opportunity cost of childbirth (Becker, 1992). Although it might seem logical that having a higher income would entail a smaller relative expense of a child, the “income effect” could be offset by two main factors: (1) since motherhood is time-demanding, the opportunity cost of childbearing may increase with career status and its subsequent earnings (Impicciatore & Tomatis, 2020); (2) wealthier couples might not necessarily have more children but rather higher quality offspring, as research has shown that the trade-off between quality and quantity of children is critical (Becker & Lewis, 1973). “Higher quality” offspring refers to children who display attributes that society values. Intelligence, health, academic achievement, talent, and conduct are examples of such criteria. According to Becker and Lewis (1973), the cost of raising children of higher quality is greater, resulting in a negative association between the quantity and quality of children per household. Therefore, higher FLFPR tend to be associated with lower fertility due to the quantity-quality tradeoff of children.

However, current cross-sectional studies and time-series evidence for several countries undermine such reservations, pointing to the effectiveness of work-family reconciliation policies in enabling women to avoid choosing between pursuing either motherhood or their careers (Jaumotte, 2004). For example, despite having high FLFPR, Sweden also has a high number of childbirths relative to the OECD average (Jaumotte, 2004). In particular, Sweden’s comprehensive public policies during the late 1980s and early 1990s successfully increased both FLFPR and fertility. Sundström & Stafford argue that Sweden’s high rates of taxation, separate taxing for spouses, subsidized daycare, flexible working hours, and financial support for couples with children enhanced women’s labor-force participation (1992). In addition, its expanded parental leave program decreased the opportunity cost of having children (Sundström & Stafford, 1992). These schemes incentivized fertility and paid labor for women by lowering the expense of having children while requiring parents to be employed to access full benefits (Sundström & Stafford, 1992).

Still, European institutional frameworks often do not feature such policies meant to narrow gender disparities in the labor force. Figure 2 shows that the proportion of women aged 20 to 64 outside the labor force accounts for 1.5% of the total population in the EU, more than three times the share of men, which is less than 0.5%. Moreover, it can be observed that the countries displaying the greatest difference between women’s and men’s inactive population share—namely Italy, Greece, and Spain, respectively with 2.6, 1.7, and 1.5 percentage point differences between the female and the male population—are also among the ones with the highest imbalance in UCDW in Figure 1.

Figure 2. European inactive population due to caring responsibilities, by sex, by country, 2022.[2]

Source: Personal elaboration from the data from Eurostat. (2023b). Inactive population due to caring responsibilities, by sex, by country, 2022 [Dataset]. In Eurostat.

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sdg_05_40/default/table?lang=en

As mentioned before, starting from the mid-1980s, the cross-sectional relationship between female employment and fertility within advanced countries like Sweden shifted from negative to positive due to the introduction of new family policies (Oshio, 2019). This included policies aimed at expanding public expenditure on families through benefits such as early childhood education and home support (Oshio, 2019). These measures were put in place to improve the socio-institutional context for parenthood, reduce the incompatibility of mother and worker roles, and raise working women’s earnings (Oshio, 2019). This newly found positive association was also attributed to a shift in a third component, namely social norms and values. Motherhood and women’s careers were no longer regarded as mutually exclusive, thus driving female employment and fertility in the same direction (Engelhardt et al., 2004). This framework is consistent with the findings of the gender theories previously discussed, claiming that fertility increases in countries whose policy schemes promote gender equity (McDonald, 2000).

III. The interrelation between female education, FLFP, and fertility

In light of the above considerations, it is clear that the interconnection between female education, FLFP, and fertility rates is just as crucial as it is complex. If educational achievement is evaluated as a proxy for socioeconomic standing and income, its positive relationship with reproductive behavior—also referred to as the “income effect” previously discussed—can be explained from an evolutionary standpoint. Wealthier social strata couples display higher fertility rates because they have a greater means to raise children (Impicciatore & Tomatis, 2020). Nevertheless, throughout this essay, it has been observed that both education and women’s employment lead to ambivalent, and sometimes even polarized, fertility results.

The findings of the study by Impicciatore and Tomatis on the correlation of these variables across six European countries highlight an East-West divide. In Eastern European countries, fertility rates are higher among less educated women. In contrast, in the West, more educated women show the highest fertility rates (2020). This cross-country variation is consistent with the literature stating that fertility intentions and actual fertility are not conditional upon just individuals’ preferences, but also on country-specific institutional frameworks (Neyer, 2006). Indeed, it has been observed that fertile-aged women living in a country where employment and family life are not perceived as incompatible are more likely to invest in both education and family size (Testa & Stephany, 2017).

The analysis of the relationship of these factors in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries also supports this theory: despite strong FLFP, Nordic countries’ fertility rates are higher than the OECD average; Southern European nations, on the other hand, have both low female involvement rates and low fertility rates (Jaumotte, 2004).

Chart, line chart

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Figure 3. Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15–64), Sweden and Italy, 1990–2019.

Source: International labor Organization (ILOSTAT). (2021, June). Female labor force participation rate—Sweden, Italy. World Bank Open Data. Retrieved April 30, 2023, from

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.ACTI.FE.ZS?end=2019&locations=SE-IT&start=1990&view=chart

Chart, line chart

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Figure 4. Total Fertility Rate (births per woman), Sweden and Italy, 1990-2019.

Source: United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects. (2022a). Total fertility rate—Sweden, Italy. World Bank Open Data. Retrieved April 30, 2023, from

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?end=2019&locations=SE-IT&start=1990

As seen in the comparison of Figures 3 and 4, Sweden and Italy are quintessential examples of this differentiation. The two figures outline that the correlation between TFR and FLFPR can be positive in developed countries. In the case of Italy, both variables are very low, reaching an “ultra-low” TFR of 1.3 births per woman in 2019 and only a 57% FLFPR that same year. The opposite goes for Sweden which, with a 1.7 TFR and an 81% FLFPR, is remarkably above the 2019 EU average of 1.53 births per woman (INED, 2021) and 46.1% FLFPR (World Bank, 2022b).

This contrast has been attributed to the diverging institutional contexts of the two countries. In the Italian case, the welfare state and societal norms obstruct the compatibility of female employment and family life (Impicciatore & Tomatis, 2020). In Italy, inadequate childcare facilities, rigid labor markets, and conventional gender norms constitute severe challenges for women (Impicciatore & Tomatis, 2020). The absence of affordable and accessible daycare services severely hinders women’s ability to work while raising their children. Additionally, the inflexible labor market raises the opportunity cost of having children, complicating the balance even further (Impicciatore & Tomatis, 2020). In Sweden, on the other hand, the implementation of policies allowing women to balance work and motherhood, especially through family leave policies and a family-supportive tax scheme, have increased both labor force participation and fertility (Sundström & Stafford, 1992).

These findings demonstrate the importance of policies that target more-educated working women when it comes to raising TFR. The relevant literature presented in this essay shows that both the rise and fall in fertility rates in developed countries are driven by people of the same socioeconomic class, namely higher-educated couples, who register greater heterogeneity in fertility outcomes than their less educated counterparts (Berrington & Pattaro, 2014).

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IV. The role of family policies in Europe

The pivotal role of family policies is highlighted in the previously mentioned examples, such as the reversal of the negative relationship between FLFP and fertility in developed countries during the mid-1980s (Impicciatore & Tomatis, 2020). Having established this, it is noteworthy to examine how family policies could be utilized to counter the concerns stemming from the current demographic challenges Europe faces.

If European measures fostering gender equality worked in the same direction as those aimed at increasing TFR, they could provide a valuable new means to reduce the burden of a declining and aging population on the shrinking working age population. These regulations would allow women who previously stayed at home to care for their children to combine family life with labor force participation. In addition, women who had decided to decrease their family size in order to pursue their careers could then invest in their family life as well (Jaumotte, 2004).

Countries, such as Sweden, which were more successful in reaching the convergence of these objectives show that the implementation of general welfare family policies per se is not effective. Rather, benefits should be related to employment and earnings history: fruitful policies are the ones reducing the opportunity cost of parenthood while requiring the parents to have a job in order to access such state subsidies (Sundström & Stafford, 1992). Moreover, as discussed, women in more egalitarian relationships are more prone to capitalize both on their human capital and family size (Impicciatore & Tomatis, 2020). This trend underlines the importance of the involvement of women’s partners in family care. In this regard, the implementation of family leave policies for both parents is crucial. These measures must also be matched by a cultural shift away from the traditional share of housework and childcare across genders, which is still extremely unbalanced to the disadvantage of women (Figures 1 and 2). If their partner’s contribution in these fields is significant, the family size may grow (Nitsche et al., 2018). The positive relationship between women’s education and the chances of ending up in a relationship with a more equal division of UCDW (Impicciatore & Tomatis, 2020) also emphasizes the relevance of school reforms promoting and investing in female education.

Lastly, the benefits stemming from these policies would not only be limited to the increase of TFR in the immediate future. Research shows that the fertility rates of highly educated women may have a spillover effect on the intended fertility of younger highly educated women (Testa, 2013). This feedback spillover pushes younger women to plan for larger families (Testa, 2013). This suggests that as the proportion of highly educated women with children expands, future generations are likely to end up having more children. This is because they have seen previous generations successfully combine work with family life and are thus more inclined to believe in their ability to achieve the same.

In addition, being highly educated and living in a country with a high proportion of college-educated women are factors positively correlated with women’s childbearing intentions (Testa & Stephany, 2017). The positive impact of working women having children does not stop at fertility intentions. Social contact has been proven to affect actual fertility behavior among women working in the same business—the transition rates to first pregnancy double within twelve months after a co-worker has given birth (Pink et al., 2014). According to further analysis, such impact of co-workers’ fertility is mediated by social learning (Pink et al., 2014). This phenomenon might explain the positive social contagion that affects couples surrounded by young children—the chances of a couple transitioning into parenthood increase proportionally to the number of young children present in their social network (Lois & Becker, 2014).

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V. Discussion and conclusion

This essay examined the manifold relationships between female education, FLFP, and fertility rates, while being aware of the density and complexity of the literature on these elements. Although the research on these subjects is extensive, they usually investigate the correlation among only two of the three variables that have been hereby analyzed. This consideration is brought forth in the attempt to highlight a fruitful prompt for future research. A shortcoming which should be acknowledged is that women’s relationship statuses were not accounted for in their reproductive decisions. Indeed, partnership transitions are a crucial proximal driver of fertility, and women who never marry are considerably less likely to fulfill their fertility intentions (Berrington & Pattaro, 2014). Therefore, the marriage market plays a key role in fertility behaviors: as more educated women are more likely to marry, have a lower likelihood of divorcing, and are more likely to have a spouse who is more educated, their fertility rates are likely higher (Testa, 2013). Controlling for this component when dealing with the interrelation of female education, FLFP, and fertility rates is another premise for future research in this field.

In conclusion, this study has demonstrated that the relationship between female education, FLFP, and fertility rates in Europe is polarized between Western and Eastern countries and Northern and Southern European member states. The findings additionally highlight that, in developed countries, highly educated working women in fertile ages are equally as likely to desire large-size families as their less educated counterparts. However, they tend to underachieve their intended fertility if the policies and institutional frameworks under which they live pressure them to choose between motherhood and alternative life paths. On the other hand, these highly educated women are also the drivers of TFR increases in countries fostering gender equity both within and outside the household. Therefore, supporting female education and FLFP and implementing family policies such as family leave benefits for both parents are in the best interest of European governments. Doing so can not only build a more equitable society but also counter the demographic challenges posed by declining fertility rates and an aging population.

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[1] The European countries considered are the member states of the European Union because of data availability. Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia do not appear in Figure 1 as no data was collected in those countries. Figure 1 also presents the aggregates of the European continent, the European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the world to show how European countries compare with them. Although EU countries still display a disproportionate division of UCDW between men and women, on average, their distributions are more equal than the world’s; that holds even when considering them individually, except in the cases of Italy and Ireland.

[2] The countries represented are the European countries for which the data was collected on both female and male 2022 inactive populations. It is possible to check them looking at the linked dataset.