By Dmitrii Lebedev

The veto has historically served as a crucial mechanism for enforcing checks and balances within governance structures, preventing the consolidation of power and ensuring deliberative decision-making. This paper traces the evolution of veto powers from their origins in the Roman Republic through medieval and early modern constitutional frameworks to their codification in the U.S. Constitution. Through a historical-institutionalist and comparative approach, this study examines how veto mechanisms have functioned as tools for institutional control, shaping the balance of power across different political systems. Special attention is given to the role of the veto in the American constitutional order, including its use in executive-legislative relations, congressional oversight, and judicial review. The paper also explores attempts to expand or limit veto powers, such as the legislative veto, impoundment, and the line-item veto, analyzing key Supreme Court rulings that have shaped their application. While often criticized for contributing to legislative gridlock, veto powers remain a vital safeguard against majoritarian excesses and unilateral governance. This study contributes to the broader understanding of the veto as a structural check on power, highlighting its continued relevance in contemporary political decision-making.

Word count: 8,700

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Introduction

The legal mechanism of the veto has historically served as a crucial instrument for enforcing checks and balances within governance structures. By allowing one branch of government to reject or delay the decisions of another, the veto prevents the concentration of excessive power and ensures a more deliberative approach to lawmaking. Rooted in the Latin term veto, meaning “I forbid,” this mechanism has evolved across different constitutional frameworks, shaping the balance of power in diverse political systems. While typically associated with executive authority, veto powers have also been exercised by legislative and judicial bodies, reinforcing institutional control.

This paper examines the evolution of veto powers, tracing their development from the Roman Republic to their role in medieval and early modern constitutional frameworks, culminating in their codification within the U.S. Constitution. Through comparative analysis, it explores how veto mechanisms have been institutionalized across governance structures, from monarchical assent in medieval England to the presidential veto in the United States.

The central thesis of this paper is that the veto, while often seen as an obstacle to governance, has been essential for preserving institutional integrity by preventing majoritarian excesses and ensuring interbranch accountability. However, its effectiveness depends on its design, political context, and broader institutional constraints. By analyzing historical precedents and contemporary applications, this study provides insight into how veto powers function as a structural check on governance and continue to evolve in response to shifting political dynamics.

The Roman Republic

The concept of the veto has ancient roots, tracing back to the Roman Republic. The Roman Republic was an oligarchy, and the slogan of the republic often used on banners, coins and monuments was “SPQR”, an acronym for Senatus Populus Que Romanus (The Senate and the Roman people). The phrase clearly demonstrates the elitist nature of the government structure, where the populus and the ruling class were strictly divided. Initially, the Republican Constitution concentrated the political power in the hands of the political establishment, the patricians, leaving the plebs, the common people, with little power[1].

The two main political bodies–comita centuriata (century assembly) and the Roman Senate–largely represented the interests of the elites[2]. Although the comita centuriata was a legislative assembly where all citizens could participate, it was divided into centuries, class groups based on property. Each century had only one vote, no matter the number of citizens in it, which gave disproportionate influence to the economic elite. The Senate, on the other hand, consisted of magistrates and ex-magistrates, representing the interests of the political elite. The comita centuriata, dominated by the patriciate, was responsible for appointment of executive magistrates: consuls (temporary war leaders and chief executives), praetors (civil administrators and law enforcers) and censors (census, public documentation and taxation officials). The Roman Senate, consisting of current and former magistrates, issued instructions and de facto laws of the republic that the executive officials needed to obey. The comita tributa, a more egalitarian but less influential assembly, dominated by plebeians, formed based on geographic districts, could only elect quaestors (custodians or auditors) and curule aediles (economic and trade regulators). Thus, the initial constitutional structure of Rome fostered self-reproduction of the elites, when the economic, political and military establishment had almost monopolistic control over appointment of executive magistrates and the Senate, a permanent legislative body. The plebs could only exercise oversight functions with little influence on decision making. This legal disparity would lead to growing tensions between the ruling class and the plebs.

Indeed, such deep social inequality resulted in the first secessio plebis in 494 BC, when plebeians, thinking themselves to be oppressed by debt and arbitrary treatment by the patriciate, seceded to the Sacred Mount, a hill northeast of Rome, in a mass exodus as a form of civil disobedience[3]. The fact that the city ceased to function properly, as working-class people left their jobs, and the concerns over a possibility of an attack by hostile neighbors forced the Senate to start negotiations with the representatives of the plebs. A compromise was reached, which included the creation of an office of a tribunus plebis, or people’s tribune, which functioned as a Roman version of an ombudsman and was tasked with defending the rights of plebs and preventing abuse of power by the patriciate. To be effective in this capacity the tribunes were given special rights. One of their key powers was the right to convene the Senate at any time (in latter stages of development of the republic this authority extended to provide them with legislative initiative, the ability to introduce legislation). Additionally, tribunes had the right to convene and preside over concilium plebis (Council of the Plebs, gathering of all plebs), which could pass plebiscita (in the early Republic laws concerning only the plebian class). Most importantly, tribunes held the ius intercessionis or the power to intercede on behalf of common citizens and veto any executive action (by the magistrates) or legislative and regulatory action (by the Senate). Disregarding the veto of a tribune was punishable by death, and tribunes could order such execution. Additionally, any plebeian was given a right to what we would now call habeas corpus, a right to petition the courts to release a person under unlawful arrest. In Roman law, the doctrine under which any citizen could “appeal” the decision of magistrates was called provocatio ad populum Evidently, the position of a tribune was a check on the patrician-dominated political bodies. The veto emerged as a mechanism to enforce checks and balances in the Roman constitutional system preventing the patriciate to overreach with their authorities and infringe on the interests of the plebeians. The system of government of the Roman Republic was arguably the first one that established a clear separation of powers between different branches of government. In the Athenian democracy, where the assembly of citizens, ecclesia, was the sole source of government—meaning that it had ultimate and unquestionable authority in all matters including legislating, judging and forming the executive branch[4]. In contrast, the Roman Republic sought to clearly separate branches of government both on the class basis (by creating different assemblies with differing functions and authorities) and on the institutional basis (by dividing the responsibilities between various executive officials). This division of powers would intentionally create power struggles among the branches of government, preventing each of the institutions from seizing full control. Unlike in the Athenian democracy, there wasn’t a single institution that could monopolize the control over the system. Veto powers were an essential element of this constitutional practice, as they were the key tool that the politically disadvantaged plebeians could use to prevent abuse of power by the patriciates. It’s important to note that this practice, although very important in the constitutional structure of Rome, did not concern a legislative process, as the Roman Senate over which the tribunes had jurisdiction wasn’t a legislative body, but rather an advisory board that issued interpretations of statutes and controlled the executive function beyond the scope of laws passed by the Assemblies.

Medieval Legislatures and the Royal Assent

The introduction of a veto as a formal element of the legislative process did not exist in the constitutional traditions of classical antiquity; it only began to emerge with the development of the first medieval legislatures. A key difference between the medieval legislatures and the legislatures of classical antiquity was its estate-representative nature. Unlike the former (Greek Council of Citizens, Roman Century Assembly, Tribal Assembly and Plebian Council), the English Parliament, or Estates-General, and the Imperial Diet in the Holy Roman Empire were estate representative legislatures. These bodies became representative for the first time: instead of forcing all citizens or nobility to be present, the medieval legislatures allowed for the selection of representatives from different estates or social classes to participate in the legislative process. This system of representation marked a significant shift from the direct democracy of classical antiquity to a more hierarchical but professional form of government that evolved into modern representative democracy.

Another crucial aspect of medieval legislatures was their territorial orientation. The assemblies of the Ancient Rome and Greece were based on class and citizenship respectively, while the feudal system of Medieval Europe required representation of all feudal subjects of the monarch from castles and baronies (nobility), abbeys and church lands (clergy) and free cities (commoners). At the time, these legislatures weren’t as powerful as modern legislatures. Monarchs still mostly ruled by decree and used their parliaments to rubber stamp the decisions that were already made. Still, due to a great degree of decentralization and feudal autonomy, the vassals were often much more influential than the monarchs, forcing them to retract their decrees and decisions. In such circumstances the “dormant” institution of representative legislatures turned into real political actors, not just a platform of opinion sharing and advising.

The veto powers of monarchs, known as royal assent, were unnecessary with parliamentary institutions that did not enjoy legislative initiative privileges, in other words, did not actively engage in lawmaking beyond approving legislation proposed by the crown. For instance, the French Estates General was considerably less powerful than the English Parliament, as no bill could originate from it[5]. The main function of Medieval Estates General was providing authorization for general taxation of feudal lands and cities. Thus, the king could summon the Estates General for the sole purpose of approving his levying of taxes and then dissolve it. However, the French Estates General was also a platform of opinion exchange between the monarch and his vassals, often resulting in compromise on the more controversial taxes. But the assembly did not possess a formal power to amend proposals of the crown[6]. In fact, a legislative function was unnecessary in the French format since France was a decentralized state (unlike England), which made it impossible for a king or the Estates General to establish laws for the entire country, since Medieval France lacked a centralized administrative and bureaucratic apparatus and judiciary that would be in charge of enforcing them. The King could exercise his legislative functions only in his domain, which mostly consisted of the Île-de-France region, while local barons and lords had almost complete autonomy and legal jurisdiction over their own realms, often issuing their own decrees that could contradict the “federal”, country-wide laws, but, unlike the crown, they did have means of enforcing them.

In contrast, the English parliament slowly gained legislative initiative. Unlike in France, where the monarchy was powerless and needy in comparison to its vassal subjects, the Norman invasion of England effectively upended the previous Anglo-Saxon feudal system when noble families of the previous regime who held allegiances to the House of Wessex were stripped from their lands and their realms were redistributed to the Norman nobility that fought along William the Conqueror[7]. Thus, when the English monarchs were rebuilding the feudal system from the outset, rather than as a consequence of centuries of a “Brownian motion” of hereditary succession and feudal wars, it made it possible to establish a clear hierarchy of titles and create an explicit structure of enforcement of the country-wide laws. Obviously, such a centralized political system was more advantageous for the monarch than to feudal lords and especially barons (the lowest ranking in this hierarchy), which inspired a number of rebellions against the English monarchs. This conflict was settled through the famous Magna Carta that embodied a compromise between the king and his vassals: the vassals did not succeed in reducing the powers of the king to the French level but were guaranteed protection against tyranny of a monarch and could influence decision making by withholding consent for certain forms of taxation.[8] In other words, the system became more balanced: the “federal” authority was still able to pass laws and enforce them while the local vassals (the nobility, clergy and commoners) got a right to influence and limit it.

Slowly, the function of authorization of taxation evolved to also include legislative business. The first such Act of Parliament is the so-called Statute of Merton that significantly amended the Common Law in areas of feudal jurisprudence, land ownership and law enforcement. The Act served as a precedent for future Parliaments to enact laws beyond just the rubber stamp of taxation.

The Hundred Years’ War between England and France, a very costly enterprise, gave the parliament more leverage to demand concessions in return for more taxes[9]. In this way, the Parliament acquired the right to approve all taxes (the Magna Carta allowed unauthorized customary taxation) and gained the exclusive power to initiate legislation establishing new taxes in the House of Commons, rather than by the king, which was called the power of origination. Additionally, a new rule was established that no bill could become law without the agreement of the House of Commons, nor could the King or the House of Lords change the wording of any bills submitted by the House of Commons without its approval.

By the beginning of King Henry VI’s rule, the parliament had almost fully monopolized legislative function, but it still couldn’t act independently from the King. To counteract the parliament’s authority, the monarchy introduced the practice of royal assent[10]. Royal assent is the formal approval by the monarch required for a bill to become law[11]. This practice ensured that the King maintained a final check on legislation passed by Parliament. Without royal assent, no bill could become law, effectively giving the monarch a veto power over parliamentary decisions[12]. Royal assent functions are very similar to that of a veto in the US context but have some very important distinctions.

Firstly, the royal assent isn’t fully a part of the legislative process, as the act of withdrawal of royal assent is a final blockade of the bill, preventing it from passage. It cannot be revised or overturned by the parliament, making the leverage of monarchy greater in negotiations with the legislative branch. This mechanism allows the monarch to become a leading obstructionist, who could sabotage the parliament in passage of the most uncontroversial bill to intimidate it to pass the bills they don’t support. This became a common practice under King Charles I, which soon led to the English Civil War between the royalists and the parliament, resulting in an overthrow of monarchy and execution of the king.

Secondly, the withholding of royal assent did not allow the parliament to amend or modify the parts of the bill that were the most controversial, forcing the legislators to start from scratch. Unlike in the modern American political system, the monarch can only approve or reject the entire bill without providing reasons or suggesting amendments.

Over the years, as the British monarchy took on an increasingly ceremonial role, the Kings withheld royal assent less frequently. The last time royal assent was refused was on March 11, 1708, when Queen Anne vetoed the Scottish Militia Bill. No royal veto has taken place since then, making this practice a mere formality in our Age.

The Veto Powers in American Colonies

Despite being almost fully abandoned domestically, the British homeland government used royal assent as a form of control of the self-government of their American colonies. By the time the colonies in America became a vital component of international trade and their population exceeded 200,000 people, the conflict between the parliament and the monarchy in England came to an end with a resounding victory of the parliament. The social and political equilibrium was set on parliamentary supremacy over the monarch. Recognizing this principle, American colonists tried to expand their rights to be properly represented and exercise the right to self-government. The political order of colonies, however, was sharply different from that of England of the time. In the beginning the British crown tolerated a much greater degree of control over local affairs by the colonists. A direct rule on the continent would hardly be possible due to issues of communication and coordination. In Hobbesian terms, the British ‘Leviathan’, the sovereign power, was weakened by the geographical remoteness of the American colonies, as it had to depend on the colonists themselves to enforce royal laws and defend the territory. Thus, to match the level of responsibilities of the colonists, they should have also received the necessary powers and autonomy to effectively fulfill these expectations.

The geographical distance across the Atlantic allowed the colonies to develop their own systems of local governance, often with a high degree of autonomy. While British politics were still dominated by aristocracy and gentry, the American colonies were far more egalitarian: the number of small landowners was much higher, the cost of land was significantly lower than in England, and, as all property holders could vote, the electoral system became more democratic[13]. The colonial assemblies played a crucial role in local governance. The lower houses of the legislature, dominated by the representatives of the people, held the purse strings, effectively forming the budget. These bodies had significant power over local affairs, including taxation and spending[14]. This practice of self-governance became deeply ingrained in colonial political culture, creating expectations of representation and consent of the governed that would later fuel revolutionary sentiments.

The Mainland British government soon understood that unchecked democratic decision making had unwelcome consequences, such as encroaching on the prerogatives reserved to the British Government itself, especially in the matters of appointment of local officials. Therefore, since the establishment of the colonies, British policy had consistently maintained that no colony could govern itself completely. Starting from the Restoration in 1660, colonial laws were typically subject to veto by a royal governor and then to review and potential disallowance by a committee of the King’s Privy Council, with few exceptions. These two veto powers are distinctly different from one another both procedurally and legally.

Colonial governors, appointed by the Crown, wielded considerable authority, including the power to veto legislation passed by colonial assemblies. This veto power was a critical tool for maintaining royal prerogative and ensuring that colonial laws aligned with imperial interests. Governors held the authority to block legislation before it became law, making the governor an actor in the legislative process. The nature of such a veto could be interpreted from different perspectives. On the one hand, the process was completely arbitrary, and a governor could use his veto powers to undermine the collective decision making of democratically elected representatives. On the other hand, this arbitrariness could also be beneficial to the colonists, as it would be easier to pressure one particular colonial official to achieve a desirable outcome.

Knowing this, the Crown established a permanent body in charge of reviewing legislation passed by the colonial legislatures. Since 1695, this committee of the Privy Council in charge of colonial oversight was the Board of Trade and Plantations. This body had much greater veto powers, as the royal disallowance that they imposed on colonial legislation can be equated to a repeal of the statutory provisions[15]. Unlike the governor’s veto, the royal disallowance could be invoked after the bill became law and started functioning. Thus, these powers could be better characterized as that of judicial review. The main purpose of the Board and its primary criterion in the analysis of colonial legislation was minimizing the inconsistency between the English laws and the colonial laws. In sum, the Board was responsible for maintaining the constitutional structure of the empire, preventing the legislatures of the colonies to erode the laws passed by the British parliament. Unlike the governors, the Board was far more objective in its acts and deliberations, as it sought to invite both parties to appear before the Board and argue their case. The Board created the offices of permanent agents of colonies in London, who were lawyers tasked with representing the colonial legislatures in various government organizations and lobbying the Board to leave the colonial laws unchanged. Thus, the functions of the Board were much more similar to that of the contemporary Supreme Court of the United States.

In the British common law, there is a principle of parliamentary supremacy, meaning that Courts cannot nullify or overturn the acts of parliament. So, after a colonial law was passed and signed by the governor, it had the same weight as an act of parliament, making courts unable to interfere even if the law contradicted the main principles of English Common Law jurisprudence and the Acts of the British Parliament. By creating the Board of Trade and Plantations, the Homeland Government and the parliament attempted to subordinate the colonial legislatures to the mainland, making their laws reversible and evading possible overreach of the colonists. It is noteworthy that this practice was not opposed by the colonists and was generally regarded as necessary and reasonable.

The tensions between the British Homeland Government and the colonial legislatures escalated following the Seven Years’ War. As one of the first major conflicts with a significant theater of operations in the New World, Britain had to devise a logistical strategy to sustain the war effort from afar. Prime Minister William Pitt the Elder’s plan relied on colonial troops while funding the war with British tax revenue. This approach proved effective during the war but led to postwar grievances, as both sides felt they had sacrificed disproportionately to achieve victory[16].

The British upper class, already burdened by high taxes, viewed the colonists as undeserving beneficiaries of British funds, contributing little to the imperial treasury. Meanwhile, the colonists argued that their lower taxation was justified by their lack of representation in Parliament, which left them unable to influence how tax revenues were spent. Many saw the war as a foreign conflict unrelated to their direct interests and felt that British contributions had not sufficiently compensated for colonial losses. Further resentment grew when the British crown issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763, prohibiting settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains. This measure, intended to prevent conflicts between settlers, French colonists, and Indigenous tribes, frustrated colonists who had hoped to expand into newly acquired territories.

To pay off post-war debts, the British government and Parliament, dominated by mainland nobles and gentry, decided to levy taxes on the colonies, arguing that they had not contributed their fair share. For the first time, Britain imposed taxes and regulations that not only increased financial burdens but also infringed on colonial autonomy. The Currency Act of 1764 forbade colonies from issuing their own money, a measure heavily supported by British merchants. Parliament then escalated its efforts by passing the Sugar Act of 1763 and the Stamp Act of 1765, which imposed direct taxes on the colonies and sparked widespread resistance.

This taxation was constitutionally dubious, as the Magna Carta had established that no taxation could occur without parliamentary consent. However, because the colonies lacked representation in Parliament, they had no means to object to these financial impositions. Many colonists saw this as a violation of their traditional rights as Englishmen. As George Mason expressed (Mason, 1970), “We claim nothing but the liberty and privileges of Englishmen to the same degree, as if we had continued among our brethren in Great Britain.”

As the tensions between colonies and the mainland government rose, the institutional structure of colonies underwent significant changes as well. Parliament established the Colonial Department among other parts of the Townshend Acts[17]. This institution was supposed to exist alongside the Board of Trade, but the latter very soon lost its powers, as it was officially subordinated to the aforementioned Department[18]. The Department was tasked with fair and impartial administration of laws and ensuring their uniformity throughout the lands of the crown but became a militant force for royal administration of the colonies and subjugation of seditious colonists. The Department very soon weaponized the Board to nullify, or prevent from taking effect before the review, any laws passed by colonial legislatures. The Crown started to use these powers far more arbitrarily, making itself the final actor in the legislative process. Even before the passage of the infamous Taxation Acts of the British parliament, the already existing checks on the colonial authorities by the British were accepted, as colonies were left to themselves, exercised their self-governance and the British parliament did not interfere with it. But from that moment on Britain not only started to block the colonial laws they considered dangerous but also started to legislate on their own, with no checks on such legislation from the colonies, this order amounted to a direct authoritarian rule with no rights to influence the decisions of the Parliament by electing their own representatives, and no opportunity to pass the laws of their own. These terms heavily violated the established social and political contract between the mainland and the colonies agreed to at the times they were established, which certainly unleashed a direct rebellion by the Americans.

The Veto powers in the American States and the Federal Constitution

The Revolution against British rule had a profound effect on the political and constitutional structure of each state. After many years of restriction on legislative self-governance by the Crown through royally appointed governors and the Board of Trade, many newly independent states in righteous indignation minimized the authority of executive officials generally and governors in particular.

This reaction against strong executive power was reflected in the state constitutions drafted in the immediate aftermath of independence. Most states deliberately created weak gubernatorial offices with limited powers and short terms, while granting extensive authority to their legislatures[19]. For example, in Pennsylvania’s radical constitution of 1776, the office of governor was entirely eliminated, replaced by an Executive Council. Other states, while retaining the position of governor, severely curtailed the office’s powers. In many cases, governors were elected by the legislature rather than directly by the people, further reducing their independence and authority. The Continental Congress, and later the Congress of the Confederation, stood as the sole national political entity during the formative years of the United States. There was no executive office that was nearly as powerful, and the Committees of the Continental Congress were often tasked with executive business.

However, the concept of an executive veto was not fully abandoned. The New York Constitution, for instance, established a Council of Revision, composed of the governor, the chancellor of the Court of Chancery, and the judges of the Supreme Court and possessed the power to “revise all bills about to be passed into law by the legislature” and to return them within 10 days to the house of origin for reconsideration. Due to the continuation of predominant use of the British Common Law system the concept of judicial review was not yet established, as it was only codified and institutionalized by Articles III and VI of the federal Constitution and Supreme Court decisions in the early republic. Before its ratification the parliamentary sovereignty was still the law of the land, and the Courts could not exercise their judicial review in the way they do today. To prevent passage of unconstitutional laws the Council of Revision would be able to review legislation before it takes effect. It is notable that in doing so it amalgamated the qualities of governor’s veto and the royal disallowance of the Board of Trade. The Council was a part of the legislative process, just like the royal governors were, but was also a collective body mainly tasked with upholding the constitutional structure of the state.

The Constitution of Massachusetts, known as Mr. Adams’s Constitution, was ratified 4 years after Declaration of Independence and, considering the demotivating experience of other states that rushed to weaken their executive, established one of the strongest executive branches of the early American period. The governor could veto the laws passed by the state legislature that could only be overruled by the two-thirds majority in each House of the legislature.

A key innovation of these two versions of the executive veto was its constraint. After many years of colonial rule when gubernatorial veto or disallowance by the Board of Trade were the final action that blocked any further consideration of the bill, often being used arbitrarily, the veto was now subjected to overrule by the legislative branch and became time limited, so that a governor or the Council of Revision couldn’t delay the passage of the bill, or ignore it to prevent being overturned by the legislature.

After a failure of the Confederation, the Delegates from each state gathered for a Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The concept of veto powers was heavily discussed and became part of many constitutional plans. The delegates, influenced by their experiences under British rule and the weaknesses of the Confederation, sought to create a government that balanced effective governance with the protection of individual liberties. The veto prerogative would become a central piece and instrument in structuring this new political and constitutional order.

Even though the majority of delegates agreed that a “vigorous and energetic executive”[20] would require some form of revision and veto over bills passed by Congress, the founding fathers differed in what kind of veto should be established.

As part of the Virginia Plan, James Madison proposed to create a national executive in the form of a committee selected by the legislature for one year, which somewhat resembled the Committee of the States that functioned while the Congress of Confederation was in recess[21]. The National Executive would not have veto powers on its own, instead the Council of Revision, composed of the executive and the “convenient number of federal judges, would be empowered with it. The Virginia Plan version of the veto powers was very similar to that of the New York Council of Revision. The proposal drew significant opposition: Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts argued that by participating in the legislative process, the judiciary became a political body, making appointments to Courts even more crucial, forcing political actors to fill the judicial positions with their loyalists[22]. In addition, he argued that judges should not participate in legislating as they would later interpret and apply this legislation, infringing on the separation of powers doctrine. As part of the same plan, Madison also proposed giving veto powers over state laws to Congress, imposing a check on the state governments’ irresponsibility, but this proposal was soon rejected due to the fear of much more powerful federal government and impracticality of Congressional review over all of the laws passed in 13 different states.

The Convention settled on a presidential veto that can be overridden by Congress with two-thirds majority of each House. The final version of the veto power, as outlined in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, grants the President the authority to return a bill to Congress with his objections if he does not approve it. This process is a “qualified negative,” as it allows the President to influence legislation without giving him absolute power to block it. The requirement for a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress to override a presidential veto ensures that there is substantial support for a bill before it can become law over the President’s objections. The final version of Section 7 also included a loophole that would allow a president in certain circumstances to conduct a final veto with no opportunity for Congress to overturn it, known as “pocket veto”[23]. A pocket veto is a legislative maneuver that allows the President to effectively veto a bill by taking no action on it when Congress is adjourned, thus preventing the bill from becoming law without the need for an explicit veto. Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution provides the President with ten days (excluding Sundays) to sign or veto a bill presented by Congress. If the President does not sign or veto the bill within this period, it automatically becomes law, provided Congress is in session. However, if Congress adjourns during this ten-day window, thereby preventing the return of the bill, the President can exercise a pocket veto by simply not signing the bill.

The use of the pocket veto has been a subject of legal and constitutional debate, particularly regarding what constitutes an “adjournment” that prevents the return of a bill. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in the Pocket Veto Case (1929)[24], ruling that if Congress adjourns in a way that prevents the President from physically returning the vetoed bill, a pocket veto is valid. The Court clarified that the key factor is whether Congress remains in session and able to formally receive the vetoed bill, deliberate on it, and potentially override the veto. If Congress is not in session and thus unable to take further action, the bill effectively dies without the possibility of reconsideration. Congress did not want this loophole to allow the President to effectively block any legislation passed by Congress without even a possibility of override. Because of the use of pocket veto and temporary appointments, Congress found a way to avert it, by introducing pro forma sessions every three days, so that Congress is technically always in session and the president may not exercise the pocket veto[25].

The use of the presidential veto in the early years of the United States was relatively rare and restrained compared to modern times[26]. George Washington, the first president, set an important precedent by using the veto power sparingly. He issued only two vetoes during his entire presidency, with the first occurring on April 5, 1792. This conservative approach to the veto power was largely followed by subsequent early presidents. The power to veto legislation passed by Congress was considered the last resort to prevent unconstitutional laws. For instance, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson did not issue any vetoes during their terms. James Madison used the veto power seven times, including the first use of a pocket veto in 1812. James Monroe vetoed only one bill during his eight years in office. The nature of early vetoes is also noteworthy. While some were indeed based on constitutional objections, others, like Washington’s veto of a military reduction bill, were grounded in policy disagreements. This suggests that even in the early years, the veto was not strictly limited to constitutional issues. Instead, it was a common assumption that presidents should not devalue the meaning of veto and use it only in extreme cases in constitutional matters and severe policy disagreements. It could be used as a political tool too.

A significant shift in the use of the veto power occurred during Andrew Jackson’s presidency (1829-1837). Jackson used the veto more frequently and expansively than his predecessors, most famously in his veto of the recharter of the Second Bank of the United States in 1832. This marked a certain turning point in the evolution of the veto power, setting the stage for its more frequent use as a tool of policy making, political bargaining and inter-branch negotiation in later presidencies.

Contemporary Use of Veto Powers

It is important to note that both political branches of government tried to exercise veto powers beyond the scope of constitutional authorities delegated to them. Since the 1930s, when the executive branch was delegated, much greater authority following the introduction of various federal programs and regulatory agencies, Congress has often been prudent in giving such broad powers to another branch without any checks. To prevent possible executive overreach, Congress passed legislation that included provisions that would allow Congress to unilaterally nullify specific executive actions without passing new legislation, known as legislative veto, thereby providing a check on the executive’s implementation of laws. For example, it was used in the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, a landmark legislation that allowed the executive branch to lend or lease war supplies to any nation deemed “vital to the defense of the United States” amidst World War II. The Act contained the following provision[27]:

“After June 30, 1943, or after the passage of a concurrent resolution by the two Houses before June 30, 1943, which declares that the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) are no longer necessary to promote the defense of the United States, neither the President nor the head of any department or agency shall exercise any of the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) except that until July 1, 1946, any of such powers may be exercised to the extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement with such a foreign government made before July 1, 1943, or before the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever is the earlier.”

Unlike a joint resolution that has to be signed by the president, concurrent resolutions only require approval of both Houses of Congress, drawing the president out of the legislative process. It gave the legislative branch significantly more leverage to pressure the executive branch and make sure that the laws are followed in accordance with legislators’ vision, as, unlike regular bills and joint resolutions, they could be passed by simple majorities in both Houses without the necessary presidential approval, de facto circumventing presidential veto powers given to him by the presentment clause. More broadly, in domestic policy, the legislative veto was employed to oversee administrative regulations. Congress could nullify specific regulations issued by executive agencies, ensuring that these regulations aligned with legislative priorities and did not overstep the authority granted by Congress.

The widespread use of the legislative veto raised significant constitutional questions, particularly regarding the separation of powers and the principles of bicameralism and presentment. The ability of Congress to unilaterally block the actions of the executive branch gave the legislature an authority much beyond the legislative functions. Congress could not only block the president from participating in the legislative process as prescribed by the Constitution, but also to interfere into core functions of the executive branch by nullifying their actions without the consent of the president. If allowed, such a legal mechanism would provide fruitful ground for ad hoc legislation or for constitutionally vague statutes. Knowing that Congress can unilaterally cancel the executive action if it doesn’t like the way the legislation is applied, legislators won’t focus as much on writing strict and stringent laws knowing that they could later control their implementation through the veto. This practice could lead to a decline in the quality and specificity of legislation and infringe on the authority of the executive branch for an obvious reason and the judicial branch, as it would be even harder for them to apply such broad and vague laws.

These issues came to a head in the landmark Supreme Court case INS v. Chadha (1983)[28]. The case involved a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that allowed either house of Congress to veto a decision by the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of an alien. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court declared the legislative veto unconstitutional. The Court held that the legislative veto violated the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment, as outlined in Article I, Section 7. The Court reasoned that any legislative action altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the legislative branch must be passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the President for approval or veto. The decision in Chadha effectively invalidated nearly 200 statutory provisions that included legislative veto mechanisms.

However, despite an unfavorable Supreme Court decision, Congress has sought alternative methods to maintain oversight and control over executive actions. One of the easiest and most broadly used tools is the “report and wait” provision, which requires executive agencies, or Courts to submit proposed regulations to Congress before they take effect, giving Congress the opportunity to pass new legislation to block or modify the regulations if necessary. In that time frame, before the rule took effect, Congress can draft a joint resolution, which if enacted by both Houses in the identical form and signed by the president, or in case of such veto being overridden blocks the implementation of the rule. An example of such provision is § 2074 of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act[29], which states:

“The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law”.

This legislative tool allows Congress to be able to control the actions of other branches of government without violating the constitutional separation of powers doctrine.

Another method used by Congress to control the regulations and actions of the executive branch is through the use of e so-called sunset provisions. Sunset provisions are clauses embedded in legislation that cause a law or agency to expire automatically on a specific date unless renewed by legislative action. Sunset provisions require Congress to periodically review and evaluate the effectiveness of laws and agencies, ensuring that outdated or ineffective policies do not continue indefinitely without withstanding the test of congressional scrutiny. It also allows Congress to refuse to reauthorize the provisions of the original bill that it found unnecessary or poorly executed. By setting expiration dates, Congress maintains leverage over executive agencies. The threat of non-renewal can motivate agencies to be more responsive to congressional oversight and concerns. Such regular review cycles equally allow Congress to revisit legislation passed before to adapt to changing circumstances without constant ad hoc resolutions. It’s also more practical from the political perspective as every bill that became law is a result of a political bargain that typically involves both parties and unilateral revision of or amendments to some of the provisions may uncover long healed political debates. The reauthorization process, on the other hand, is more flexible and allows legislators to renew the legislation by revisiting the piece of legislation as a whole. For example, the USA Patriot Act of 2001 contained the following sunset provision[30]:

“(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), this title and the amendments made by this title (other than sections 203(a), 203(c), 205, 208, 210, 211, 213, 216, 219, 221, and 222, and the amendments made by those sections) shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2005. (b) EXCEPTION.—With respect to any particular foreign intelligence investigation that began before the date on which the provisions referred to in subsection (a) cease to have effect, or with respect to any particular offense or potential offense that began or occurred before the date on which such provisions cease to have effect, such provisions shall continue in effect.”

From time to time the people found the legislatures to be unproductive or overly productive, passing legislation that either stalled necessary reforms or inundated the system with excessive regulations and spending measures. This is a natural consequence of the democratic system in which every Representative or Senator is interested in bringing funds to their state or district, creating jobs in the area they represent, and advancing the priorities of people in their respective constituencies, which often results in pork barrel spending – in other words, unnecessary funding which is passed for the purpose of pleasing constituents. This perception of inefficacy and fiscal irresponsibility has led to the rise of skepticism about congressional spending. Many critics of Congressional budget creation turned to the executive branch, and to the presidency in particular, to mitigate the Congressional overspending.

Initially, in the early years of the Republic, Congress allowed the executive branch to manage funds appropriated by Congress more freely. Due to inefficiency in technology and generality of appropriation bills, the Executive Branch was given wide discretion on how exactly to spend the money. The President held the power of Impoundment, which allowed the President to withhold or delay the expenditure of Congressionally approved funds[31]. At that time, impoundment was used sparingly and was generally accepted as part of the president’s discretion in managing the execution of laws and the federal budget. Presidents occasionally withheld funds to ensure efficient use of resources or to address changing priorities. The practice was not highly controversial and was seen as a practical tool for the executive branch to manage fiscal policy effectively. Impoundment gained more prominence during the mid-20th century as the federal government expanded and budgetary issues became more important. Presidents started to use impoundment more frequently to control spending and influence policy directions. In particular, President Richard Nixon frequently used it to block spending on programs he opposed, which obviously antagonized Congress that considered it an overreach of the presidential authority[32]. In response to this tension, Congress passed the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which significantly restricted the president’s ability to impound funds by requiring congressional approval for any rescissions (permanent cancellation of appropriated funds) and establishing a more structured budget process.

After the president was stripped of the power to withhold funds and prevent excessive spending, the line-item veto emerged as a proposed solution to address the concerns of Congressional fiscal irresponsibility. Many opponents of congressional overspending have advocated for it as a measure that can limit government spending and reduce what they considered fiscal waste. The line-item veto is a power that allows the president, or other executive authorities, to veto specific provisions or items within a bill, particularly budget appropriations, without vetoing the entire legislative package. Many presidents understandably supported this idea, as it would allow the president to play a much greater role in Congressional Appropriations and the legislative process as a whole. This proposal would make the president a party in the legislative process to the extent that he had never been before.

In 1996, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act[33], introduced by Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, which granted the President the authority to cancel specific spending items and targeted tax benefits within five days of signing a bill into law. The Act was designed to give the President the power to rescind specific items of discretionary budget authority and targeted tax benefits within appropriations bills, without vetoing the entire legislative package. Under the Act, the President could exercise the line-item veto by sending a special message to Congress within five days (excluding Sundays) of signing a bill into law. This message would specify the items being rescinded and the reasons for their rescission. Congress could then override the President's rescissions by passing a disapproval bill within 30 days. If Congress did not act, the rescissions would take effect. The legal mechanism used in the Line Item Veto Act to prevent a direct violation of the Presentment Clause of Article 1 was to give the president the power to cancel budget items that were parts of an already signed law. This piece of legislation was quite remarkable as a Republican-controlled Congress gave a Democratic President Bill Clinton more discretionary authority to participate in the legislative process and de facto unilaterally amend laws passed by the legislators.

The constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act was challenged almost immediately after its enactment. In the case Clinton v. City of New York (1998)[34], the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, ruled that the Line Item Veto Act was unconstitutional. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the Act violated the Presentment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Presentment Clause (Article I, Section 7) outlines the process by which a bill becomes law, requiring that any bill passed by both houses of Congress be presented to the President for approval or veto in its entirety. Any action by the President other than signing or vetoing the legislation as a whole would give the president an opportunity to amend the law and give effect to the provisions he approves of and make it much harder for Congress to pass the parts he may not like.

The Court found that the line-item veto allowed the President to unilaterally amend or repeal parts of duly enacted statutes, effectively giving the executive branch legislative powers that the Constitution did not grant. In addition, the Line Item Veto raised concerns on the so-called non-delegation doctrine, a principle of constitutional law which holds that Congress cannot delegate its legislative powers to other branches of government or entities without providing clear guidelines. The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 challenged this doctrine by granting the President the authority to cancel specific items in spending and tax bills amounting to passage of amendments, without vetoing the entire legislation. This power potentially violated the separation of powers principle and blurred the lines between legislative and executive functions. If settled into law, this precedent of line item veto usage could potentially allow Congress to delegate the amendatory powers further to heads of executive agencies or perhaps even other non-governmental actors.

While the Supreme Court held that the use of line-item veto violated the federal Constitution, the States were free to use that tool to reduce spending and over the years developed experience that allows us to assess the advantages and disadvantages of such a mechanism. A study published in Public Administration Review[35] found that the line-item veto is often used as an instrument for inter-branch partisan politics rather than purely for fiscal restraint. Another analysis in the Journal of Economic Perspectives[36] concluded that the line-item veto’s impact on limiting special-interest legislation and reducing overall spending has been less significant than proponents initially argued. Indeed, it is quite doubtful that a governor, who often needs the support of the same constituencies, would be a reliable ‘deficit hawk.’ The infrequent use of line-item veto challenges the assumption that the line-item veto is a consistently effective means of controlling expenditures. Furthermore, a study in the Journal of Political Economy[37] found that the presence of a line-item veto does not consistently lead to lower state government expenditures.

Conclusion

The evolution of veto powers as a mechanism for enforcing checks and balances reflects their enduring role in maintaining institutional stability across different political systems. From the Roman Republic to the modern U.S. Constitution, veto mechanisms have consistently functioned as a safeguard against the concentration of power, ensuring that governance remains a negotiated process rather than an unchecked exercise of authority. While often criticized for causing legislative delays or political gridlock, the veto was historically designed to prevent the dominance of any single governing body and to encourage deliberation, compromise, and accountability.

Despite concerns about inefficiency, the constraints imposed by veto powers are not flaws but intentional features of representative government. The American constitutional framework, in particular, embraces these constraints as a means of preventing majoritarian excesses and fostering institutional cooperation. While the necessity of broad consensus can slow decision-making, it ultimately strengthens the legitimacy and durability of laws by ensuring they reflect a balance of competing interests.

As modern governance continues to evolve, so too will the role of veto powers in shaping political decision-making. Whether in executive, legislative, or judicial contexts, their function as a structural check remains vital in protecting against overreach and maintaining the integrity of democratic institutions. In this light, the veto is not merely a tool of obstruction but a fundamental mechanism that upholds the principles of accountable and balanced governance.

Works Cited

1. Abney, Glen, and Thomas P. Lauth. “The Line-Item Veto in the States: An Instrument for Fiscal Restraint or an Instrument for Partisanship?” Public Administration Review 45, no. 3 (1985): 372–77. https://doi.org/10.2307/3109963.

2. Alm, James, and Marvin Evers. “The Item Veto and State Government Expenditures.” Public Choice 68, no. 1/3 (1991): 1–15. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30025364.

3. “ArtII.S3.3.7 Impounding Appropriated Funds.” Congress.gov. Accessed July 13, 2024. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artII-S3-3-7/ALDE_00013376/.

4. “A Founding Father in Dissent.” National Archives. February 2, 2023. https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2006/spring/gerry.html.

5. Carter, John R., and David Schap. “Line-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, no. 2 (1990): 103–18. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1942893.

6. Cary, M. “Athenian Democracy.” History 12, no. 47 (1927): 206–14. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24400152.

7. Clinton v. City of New York. Oyez. Accessed July 13, 2024. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-1374.

8. Dinkin, Robert J. Voting in Provincial America: A Study of Elections in the Thirteen Colonies, 1689-1776. United Kingdom: Bloomsbury Academic, 1977.

9. Foulds, Nancy. “Colonial Office.” In The Canadian Encyclopedia. 2015. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/colonial-office.

10. Genet, Jean-Philippe. “The Government of Later Medieval France and England: A Plea for Comparative History.” In Government and Political Life in England and France, c.1300–c.1500, edited by Christopher Fletcher, Jean-Philippe Genet, and John Watts, 1–23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

11. H.R. 4807. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act. 100th Cong., 2nd sess. November 19, 1988. https://www.congress.gov/bill/100th-congress/house-bill/4807.

12. “H.R. 3162 - Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001.” Congress.gov, Library of Congress. October 26, 2001. https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/3162.

13. Harriss, G. L. “War and the Emergence of the English Parliament, 1297–1360.” Journal of Medieval History 2, no. 1 (1976): 35–56. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4181(76)90012-9.

14. INS v. Chadha. Oyez. Accessed July 13, 2024. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1832.

15. Kennedy, Edward M. “Congress, the President, and the Pocket Veto.” Virginia Law Review 63, no. 3 (1977): 355–82. https://doi.org/10.2307/1072355.

16. Lend-Lease Act (1941). National Archives. June 28, 2022. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/lend-lease-act#:~:text=Passed%20on%20March%2011%2C%201941,defense%20of%20the%20United%20States.%22.

17. Livy. Books I and II. With an English Translation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919.

18. Mason, George. “Letter to the Committee of Merchants in London.” In The Papers of George Mason, Vol. 1, edited by Bernard Bailyn and John M. Smith, 65–72. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1970.

19. Millar, Fergus. “The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic, 200–151 B.C.” The Journal of Roman Studies 74 (1984): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.2307/299003.

20. Middlekauff, Wm. Bradford. “Twisting the President’s Arm: The Impoundment Control Act as a Tool for Enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure.” The Yale Law Journal 100, no. 1 (1990): 209–28. https://doi.org/10.2307/796769.

21. Moe, Ronald C. “The Founders and Their Experience with the Executive Veto.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 17, no. 2 (1987): 413–32. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40574460.

22. National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning. Oyez. Accessed July 13, 2024. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1281.

23. “Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).”

24. Puryear, Cynthia L. “The Effects of the Norman Conquest on Anglo-Saxon Aristocracy.” Honors Theses 711 (1976). https://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses/71.

25. “S.4 - Line Item Veto Act.” 104th Cong., 2nd sess. April 9, 1996. https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/senate-bill/4.

26. Sayles, G. O. The King’s Parliament of England. London: Edward Arnold, 1974. https://archive.org/details/kingsparliamento0000sayl/page/116.

27. Taylor, Alan. American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804. New York: W. W. Norton, 2016.

28. Torrance, David. “Royal Assent.” House of Commons Library, 2024. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9466/CBP-9466.pdf.

29. UK Parliament. Accessed July 9, 2024. https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/passage-bill/commons/coms-royal-assent/.

30. U.S. Senate. “The Virginia Plan.” August 15, 2022. https://www.senate.gov/civics/common/generic/Virginia_Plan_item.htm.

31. Watson, Richard A. “Origins and Early Development of the Veto Power.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 17, no. 2 (1987): 401–12. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40574459.

32. Yakobson, Alexander. “Traditional Political Culture and the People’s Role in the Roman Republic.” Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte 59, no. 3 (2010): 282–302. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25758311.

33. “1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/States-General.” Wikisource. Last modified April 28, 2019. Accessed July 8, 2024. https://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/States-General&oldid=9223354.

34. Hamilton, Alexander. Federalist No. 70. In The Federalist Papers, edited by Clinton Rossiter, 471–480. New York: Signet Classics, 2003.

________________

In-Text Citations

[1] Yakobson, Alexander. “Traditional Political Culture and the People’s Role in the Roman Republic.” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 59, no. 3 (2010): 282–302. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25758311.

[2] Millar, Fergus. “The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic, 200–151 B.C.” The Journal of Roman Studies 74 (1984): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.2307/299003.

[3] Livy. Books I and II with an English Translation. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919. (Chapters 32–33).

[4] Cary, M. “Athenian Democracy.” History 12, no. 47 (1927): 206–214. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24400152.

[5] Genet, Jean-Philippe. “The Government of Later Medieval France and England: A Plea for Comparative History.” In Government and Political Life in England and France, c.1300–c.1500, edited by Christopher Fletcher, Jean-Philippe Genet, and John Watts, 1–23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

[6] “1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/States-General.” Last modified April 28, 2019. Wikisource. Retrieved July 8, 2024. https://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/States-General&oldid=9223354.

[7] Puryear, Cynthia L. "The Effects of the Norman Conquest on Anglo-Saxon Aristocracy." Honors Thesis 711, University of Richmond, 1976. https://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses/71.

[8] Primarily because the English feudal system embraced the principle of “divide and conquer” creating a ton of smaller counties, while France had a small number of very powerful dukes.

[9] Harriss, G. L. “War and the Emergence of the English Parliament, 1297–1360.” Journal of Medieval History 2, no. 1 (1976): 35–56. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4181(76)90012-9.

[10] Sayles, G. O. The King's Parliament of England. London: Edward Arnold, 1974. (Pages 116–117). https://archive.org/details/kingsparliamento0000sayl/page/116.

[11] UK Parliament. "Passage of a Bill: Royal Assent." Accessed July 9, 2024. https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/passage-bill/commons/coms-royal-assent/.

[12] Torrance, David. Royal Assent. House of Commons Library, 2024. Accessed July 9, 2024. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9466/CBP-9466.pdf.

[13] Dinkin, Robert J. Voting in Provincial America: A Study of Elections in the Thirteen Colonies, 1689–1776. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1977.

[14] Moe, Ronald C. “The Founders and Their Experience with the Executive Veto.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 17, no. 2 (1987): 413–432. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40574460.

[15] Moe, Ronald C. "The Founders and Their Experience with the Executive Veto." Presidential Studies Quarterly 17, no. 2 (1987): 413–432. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40574460.

[16] Taylor, Alan. American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750–1804. New York: W. W. Norton, 2016.

[17] Foulds, Nancy. “Colonial Office.” The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2015. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/colonial-office.

[18]Moe, Ronald C. “The Founders and Their Experience with the Executive Veto.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 17, no. 2 (1987): 413–432. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40574460.,

[19]Moe, Ronald C. “The Founders and Their Experience with the Executive Veto.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 17, no. 2 (1987): 413–432. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40574460.

[20] Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 70, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), 471–480.

[21] U.S. Senate. “The Virginia Plan.” Last modified August 15, 2022. https://www.senate.gov/civics/common/generic/Virginia_Plan_item.htm.

[22] National Archives. “A Founding Father in Dissent.” Last modified February 2, 2023. https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2006/spring/gerry.html.

[23] Kennedy, Edward M. “Congress, the President, and the Pocket Veto.” Virginia Law Review 63, no. 3 (1977): 355–382. https://doi.org/10.2307/1072355.

[24] Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).

[25] National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014). Oyez. Accessed July 13, 2024. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1281.

[26] Watson, Richard A. “Origins and Early Development of the Veto Power.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 17, no. 2 (1987): 401–412. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40574459.

[27] “National Archives. "Lend-Lease Act (1941).” Last modified June 28, 2022. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/lend-lease-act#:~:text=Passed%20on%20March%2011%2C%201941,defense%20of%20the%20United%20States.%22.

[28] INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Oyez. Accessed July 13, 2024. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1832.

[29] H.R.4807, 100th Cong. (1987–1988). Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act. Enacted November 19, 1988. https://www.congress.gov/bill/100th-congress/house-bill/4807.

[30] H.R.3162, 107th Cong. (2001–2002). Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001. Enacted October 26, 2001. https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/3162.

[31] Middlekauff, Wm. Bradford. “Twisting the President’s Arm: The Impoundment Control Act as a Tool for Enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure.” The Yale Law Journal 100, no. 1 (1990): 209–228. https://doi.org/10.2307/796769.

[32] Congress.gov. "ArtII.S3.3.7 Impounding Appropriated Funds." Accessed July 13, 2024. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artII-S3-3-7/ALDE_00013376/.

[33] S.4, 104th Cong. (1995–1996). Line Item Veto Act. Enacted April 9, 1996. https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/senate-bill/4.

[34] Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). Oyez. Accessed July 13, 2024. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-1374.

[35] Abney, Glenn, and Thomas P. Lauth. “The Line-Item Veto in the States: An Instrument for Fiscal Restraint or an Instrument for Partisanship?” Public Administration Review 45, no. 3 (1985): 372–377. https://doi.org/10.2307/3109963.

[36] Carter, John R., and David Schap. “Line-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, no. 2 (1990): 103–118. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1942893.

[37] Alm, James, and Marco Evers. “The Item Veto and State Government Expenditures.” Public Choice 68, no. 1/3 (1991): 1–15. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30025364.